[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, October 3, 1995
.1529 
[English]
The Chairman: Welcome, gentlemen, to this technical briefing regarding the NORAD agreement, which we realize is going to be debated in the House. Prior to that, we're going to receive technical briefings.
With us today are people from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and from the Department of National Defence. I'll ask Ralph Lysyshyn, Director General of the International Security Bureau, to introduce the people and to start the briefing, after which we'll take questions from all sides.
I just want to forewarn everyone that at approximately five o'clock the bells will ring to tell us there will be a vote around 5:15 p.m.
With that, I go to Mr. Lysyshyn.
Mr. Ralph J. Lysyshyn (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.
First of all, let me begin by offering my congratulations to you, Mr. Proud, on your appointment. We are very pleased to have the opportunity to appear before SCONDVA to address the 1995 renewal of the NORAD agreement. You will find that paper copies of slides have been distributed. They may assist your following of the presentation.
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I would like to introduce my colleagues before proceeding. Together we will do the best we can to respond to all your questions.
Rear Admiral James King is Associate Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy and Communications. He is the DND lead for the NORAD renewal. Brigadier-General Terry Findley is Director General of Policy Operations at DND. General Findley has just come from Fighter Group Headquarters in North Bay, where he was the deputy commander. That means he also wore a NORAD hat and is therefore an expert on NORAD operations. And finally, Colonel Ron Guidinger is Director of Continental Policy and is responsible for the day-to-day operations and the policy aspects of Canada-U.S. defence relations.
The first portion of our presentation will highlight the importance of NORAD to Canada, provide a description of Canada's NORAD renewal objectives, and will give you a bit of an assessment of some of our success to date. This renewal is taking place in the context of the strong endorsements for NATO and NORAD that we received during the deliberations of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy and on the foreign policy review committee.
[Translation]
Although most Canadians take NORAD for granted, it is important to note the priceless advantages Canada gains from its NORAD participation.
First of all, NORAD is a central institution that ensures Canada's aerospace sovereignty. NORAD enables Canada to minimize its expenditures on operations aimed at maintaining its sovereignty. Without NORAD, Canada would have to spend substantial amounts on obtaining the command and control, satellite and aircraft resources that would be necessary to ensure the current level of protection.
As Rear-Admiral King will be going into greater detail about NORAD's purpose, I would just like to point out that Canada's contribution represents only about 10 per cent of the total cost of NORAD's operations. It is difficult to imagine better value-for-money. The United States makes most of the capital expenditures, especially on space-based systems.
However, NORAD's merit goes far beyond aerospace defence per se. NORAD has probably become the ultimate symbol of Canada-U.S. defence co-operation. The extraordinarily close bilateral co-operation that is the essence of NORAD's success clearly encourages an intensive dialogue on a whole range of military matters of concern to both countries. Thanks to this constructive dialogue in the context of its NORAD participation, Canada is often able to wield greater influence in security matters than it would otherwise be able.
In addition to this climate of goodwill created by NORAD, Canada obtains other extremely tangible and measurable advantages from this co-operation. Intelligence sharing is one of the most important of these practical advantages.
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Among all the Allied countries, Canada does in fact enjoy a privileged relationship with the United States. Intelligence sharing enables Canada to have access to invaluable strategic intelligence from space-based resources that we do not own and that we cannot afford to buy.
Second, access to leading-edge technology is another advantage that NORAD membership gives Canada. For example, we took part along with the United States in some research and development activities on space-based radar. In acknowledgement of the expertise Canada gained in this area, it was invited to become a full participant in a technological exchange program between the United Kingdom and the United States pertaining to space-based surveillance systems.
In general, our work with the United States in NORAD keeps us up to date on an extensive array of advances in aerospace technology.
As a diplomat who has spent a considerable portion of his career negotiating the various aspects of arms control, I can confirm the value of this knowledge. For instance, the information is of the utmost importance in disarmament treaty verification.
Another significant advantage is the operational value for the Canadian Forces. Through their years of planning and joint operations in NORAD, the Canadian Forces have developed the ability to work very closely with the American forces in complex military situations.
In terms of air operations, this ensures a level of interoperatibility that is crucial to the success or failure of military operations of all kinds. The professional training received by the crews, weapons technicians and controllers is invaluable if we compare it to the training the Canadian Forces could provide.
Since our financial climate will continue to be difficult for the foreseeable future, the operational value we derive from our participation in NORAD will be indispensable in maintaining the air defence capability of the Canadian Forces.
[English]
In early 1994, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Minister of National Defence directed officials to consult with the U.S. on the future of NORAD. These consultations took place between April 6 and October 18, 1994, under the auspices of a binational group of four officials representing the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence in Canada, and the State Department and the Department of Defense in the United States. These consultations produced a confidential report to ministers entitled Options for Canada-U.S. Cooperation in Aerospace Defence. These were binationally agreed to in October, and they outline the areas for consideration in the renewal process.
During President Clinton's visit here in February, 1995, both governments agreed to advance the renewal of NORAD to the fall of 1995. The current agreement doesn't expire until May 1996. The purpose of this is to build on the close review that was conducted by the joint committees on defence and the ensuing foreign policy statements and the December white paper on defence.
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Before we began our discussions, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade approved Canadian renewal objectives. We then discussed these informally with the United States. Following agreement between both countries on the basic objectives to be achieved during renewal, Canada submitted a draft exchange of notes to the United States to begin the negotiating process.
What I would like to do now is just talk a little bit about our objectives in this renewal. The Canadian objectives were developed taking into account the work that had been done by the NORAD renewal steering group, the work done in the special joint committee, and the direction provided in the white paper on defence. What I will do is outline the objectives and provide you with a bit of an assessment of the success of the discussions to date.
First, we wanted to update the language of the NORAD agreement to reflect current and projected geostrategic circumstances. The last NORAD agreement was written in 1981. As it is now written, it does not reflect current strategic and defence circumstances. The new draft agreement explicitly recognizes the changed security environment of the post-Cold War and how this affects North American aerospace defence.
The threat posed by manned bombers is considerably reduced. Nuclear arsenals could see profound reductions given some of the progress that has been made in the field of arms control. Nevertheless, sizeable inventories of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads can still reach North America. Given the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the continuing requirement to improve methods of missile event detection, assessment and warning, the role of space is becoming more and more important. Finally, we needed to note that the proliferation of cruise missile technology may eventually lead to a cruise missile threat to North America.
We have been successful in placing traditional threats in their proper Cold War context and have taken a prudent assessment of future challenges. From the point of view of that target, we believe we have been fully successful.
The second goal was to specify NORAD's missions to be aerospace warning and aerospace control in response to current and projected geostrategic circumstances. An example of aerospace control is the use of ground-based radars to detect, track, and identify unknown aircraft. These could be aircraft that have failed to file a flight plan or they could be aircraft with more clandestine intent such as drug smuggling and, of course, missions in times of war. Should that ever happen, aerospace becomes important in that context. An example of aerospace warning is the assessment of a missile launch, such as those that occurred during the Gulf War.
NORAD's objectives, as they are currently written in the current agreement, were established in 1975. Given the changes since 1975 and the potential challenges of the future, we believed the 1995 renewal should articulate NORAD missions to better define them in their current and future roles. We think the current language, which carries very specific definitions of aerospace control and aerospace warning, successfully redefines NORAD's mission.
Our third goal was to ensure that the NORAD agreement facilitates the examination of new or enhanced mission areas and does not close off any options that may be of interest to Canada and the United States in the future. Canada is interested in ensuring that NORAD allows for binational examination of potential areas of mutual interest. One example of this could be shared missile warning beyond North America to our allies and like-minded nations.
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Nothing in the new agreement, as we are working on it, would in any way commit Canada or the United States to any specific program in this regard, but it does establish the flexibility to explore areas of mutual interest. It is important to recognize that no changes to NORAD can take place without the agreement of both governments, and we believe we have been successful in keeping doors open.
The fourth goal we had was to include in NORAD a consultative mechanism obliging either party to respond to a request for consultations on any aspect of aerospace defence of North America. This objective is vitally important to ensure that Canada is able to exert some influence on developments in aerospace defence that have implications for Canadian security interests. We appear to have been fully successful in getting wording in the new agreement that will provide for this consultation.
The fifth issue we have addressed in the context of this renewal process is that of environmental protection. NORAD operations pose a very limited risk to the environment. However, it has now been agreed in principle that environmental protection will be addressed in the revised agreement. Canada has put forward proposals and the U.S. has agreed in principle to the inclusion of a clause in the NORAD agreement that commits both countries to develop binational approaches to addressing environmental issues within the context of this agreement. This work will be developed through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
I think that basically outlines the goals we have set and our success so far in achieving them. There is some small wordsmithing to be done, but in general we have been very pleased with the way the negotiation has gone.
I would now like to give the floor to Rear Admiral King, who will complete our presentation.
Rear-Admiral J. A. King (Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications), Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Proud, perhaps I can add my congratulations to Ralph's on your becoming the chairman of this committee.
I really want to address two things. One is to add to Mr. Lysyshyn's remarks by giving you a bit of a synopsis on NORAD's history, development and structure, and some idea of its current operations. Secondly, I'll close the presentation we're giving to you this afternoon by summarizing what I believe we will achieve in this renewal this year, and by taking a brief look ahead to the future.
So first I'll give you a little synopsis. The NORAD agreement was first signed, as you know, in 1958 to provide for the common air defence of North America. NORAD was originally structured to counter a Soviet bomber threat, but it evolved over the years in response to strategic circumstances. By the early 1960s, NORAD had to develop warning capabilities against intercontinental ballistic missiles in addition to the long-range aviation capabilities that were already in place. While this remained the principal threat of the 1960s and 1970s, the introduction of sophisticated cruise missiles into the Soviet inventory required further adjustments to the NORAD posture in the 1980s.
As NORAD evolved to take account of changes in the nature of the threat, facilities and infrastructure were also adjusted. Older radar facilities, such as the Distant Early Warning, Mid-Canada and Pinetree lines, were closed, to be replaced by the North Warning System. These adjustments have ensured that NORAD remained effective and efficient in both an operational and a financial sense.
For NORAD, flexibility and change is an established trait now and is in no way a small part of the reason for the success that we've enjoyed in these recent renewal negotiations.
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[Translation]
The current primary objectives for NORAD are the following: to protect the airspace of both countries; to prevent attacks against North America by maintaining capability in aerospace surveillance, warning, characterization of air attacks and defence against air attack; and, in the event that deterrence fails, to respond appropriately to an attack through the effective deployment of air defence forces from both countries.
[English]
The command and control structure of NORAD is integrated with binational representation throughout. The commander-in-chief position is filled by a United States four-star general. The deputy commander is a Canadian Forces lieutenant or three-star general.
NORAD headquarters is located in Colorado Springs, and there are three regional headquarters: Alaska NORAD Region at Elmendorf Air Force Base; Canadian NORAD Region at CFB North Bay; and Continental United States NORAD Region at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. The regional headquarters in the United States are commanded by U.S. majors-general, with Canadian brigadiers-general as deputies, while the Canadian region is commanded by a Canadian major general with a United States deputy.
[Translation]
Each year, the Canadian contribution to NORAD comes to about $320 million, and this includes a number of elements: headquarters facilities and command and control structure: $31.6 million; aerospace surveillance, that is, anti-missile alerts and air surveillance: $1.6 million; ground-based aerospace surveillance system: $77.6 million; airspace control, that is, aircraft operation and training: $163.5 million; and capital projects related to NORAD activities: $41.8 million.
Canada's contribution to NORAD represents only about 10 per cent of its total operating budget. It should also be noted that the structure of NORAD headquarters accounts for about 12 per cent of the total operating budget, which shows that NORAD uses its resources effectively.
The Canadian contribution takes the form of personnel and fighter aircraft, CF-18s, maintaining warning capability in sovereignty operations requiring a response time of one hour in most cases. On occasion, the response time is cut down to five minutes. 720 members of the Canadian Forces are participating on a full or part-time basis in NORAD missions, principally in the NORAD facilities in Canada.
In Canada, apart from the NORAD Canadian Region headquarters in North Bay, NORAD's air defence facilities include the North Warning System and the fighter squadrons based in Cold Lake and Bagotville.
The North Warning System extends from the north slope of Alaska across Canada's north to the Labrador coast and keeps surveillance over the northern air approaches to the North American continent.
The Canadian portion of the North Warning System consists of 11 long-range radars and 36 short-range automatic radars. The data gathered by the North Warning System is sent automatically by satellite to the appropriate regional operations control centre, that is, Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska or to North Bay, so that pursuit, identification and interception activities can be carried out.
[English]
Air sovereignty and air defence operations have been enduring missions for NORAD since its genesis. Last year, NORAD monitored over 400,000 flights entering North America. Over 400 of these flights could not be correlated with known flight plans and required further investigation, including, in some instances, the launch of fighter interceptors. Approximately 200 fighter launches take place each year and about one-third result in an intercept. The other two-thirds are generally identified by other means prior to intercept.
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Next, I'll turn to missile warning operations.
[Translation]
The threat of manned bombers has lessened considerably. Nuclear arsenals could be significantly reduced with the arms control measures taken. Nuclear weapons that could reach North America are still in position.
[English]
The Chairman: I'm going to have to interrupt you for a moment. The people in the interpretation booth have asked if we could give them a minute to see if they can repair a problem they're having. If we can just hang on for a second, I'll ask if you can excuse me for that, sir.
I will adjourn the meeting for several minutes until they repair this problem.
.1556
PAUSE
.1559
The Chairman: I apologize for this and ask the Admiral to continue.
[Translation]
Rear-Admiral King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Because of the expansion in missile technology and the need to improve anti-missile warning systems, greater emphasis will be place on the role of space.
Developments in advanced cruise-missile technology may eventually be a threat to North America.
[English]
As I mentioned a moment ago, in addition to air sovereignty concerns, NORAD has been concerned with missile warning for North America. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of missile attack in North America, the continued existence of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles necessitates the maintenance of a warning capability. There are still some 20,000 nuclear weapons in the world.
.1600
As the defence white paper noted, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the technology for delivering them over long ranges is an issue of growing concern. Accordingly, the missile-warning capability of NORAD remains an important part of North American defence.
While there are a number of NORAD missions I could discuss, I would like to focus briefly on how the NORAD missile warning mission is undertaken. Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, CINCNORAD, has specific responsibilities to provide warning of an intercontinental ballistic missile, submarine-launched ballistic missile, bomber or cruise missile attack on North America. Global missile events, which include all ballistic missile tests, live firings, and space launches, are detected by the United States SpaceCom DSP or Defence Support Program satellites.
Apparently, there are some 170 to 200 missile events annually, of which about half are space launches. This frequency is significantly less than the rates that characterized the late 1980s, when annual launches peaked at approximately 1,400 in 1989. That's when we saw a number of surface-to-air missile firings and the testing of ballistic missiles in the former Soviet Union.
Launch data is transmitted to the missile warning centre in Cheyenne Mountain. The information is assessed. Then it is correlated with information provided by ground-based ballistic missile early warning radar and relayed to the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, who determines if the launch threatens North America. All of this happens in a few short minutes from the launch detection.
This assessment is simultaneously communicated to the national command authorities through their respective national military structures. In Canada, this takes place through the National Defence operations centre in National Defence Headquarters here in Ottawa. NORAD continuously monitors the globe for significant missile events, 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.
Perhaps I can just give you now a summary of our renewal efforts. First, we're on track for a highly successful renewal of NORAD this fall, as Mr. Lysyshyn pointed. As a result of extensive binational consultations, we have moved beyond any Cold War orientation for NORAD to one that looks forward to new challenges.
This forward-looking orientation is an important objective for both Canada and the United States. For Canada, it is also important to ensure that changes in the conduct of North American aerospace defence be the subject of binational consultation. This consultation will serve to underline the centrality of NORAD as the mechanism for North American aerospace defence. Our negotiating objectives have been successfully achieved, without exception.
As such, this renewal of NORAD will represent the most significant rethinking of NORAD since the agreement was last rewritten in 1981. Over the next five years, Canada must continue to assess its post-Cold-War defence requirements and ensure that we retain the ability to participate in and exert influence on the conduct of North American defence.
Looking forward to the 2001 renewal, space will assume an increasing importance in aerospace defence. We have learned through this renewal process that in the future it will be increasingly important for Canada to participate in space activities to an even greater extent as part of its continental defence responsibilities.
We are actively assessing Canadian interests, capabilities and requirements in the area of space. Our consideration of potential space activities will remain focused on our current areas of expertise in surveillance and communications. It is here that we may make the most meaningful contribution to joint aerospace defence.
[Translation]
Ladies and gentlemen, NORAD has contributed to the security of North America over the past 37 years. The renewal will make it possible to maximize NORAD's achieved value as a central element in Canada's defence posture.
[English]
Thank you for your attention. On behalf of my colleague, Mr. Lysyshyn, we invite your questions or comments.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Admiral and Mr. Lysyshyn, for your presentation. I am sure there are many questions waiting to be asked.
We'll give you 10 minutes in the opening round, which is the same as the others.
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[Translation]
Mr. Jacob (Charlesbourg): Mr. Lysyshyn, Admiral, General, Colonel, welcome to you all. I have two short questions that you can be sure have nothing to do with the referendum.
My questions are about missile defence. For the past few years, aerospace surveillance has been conducted primarily by satellite. Until now, Canada has participated by providing radar bases in various areas in the north. As you know, some of these bases have been closed and others are scheduled to be shut down. In addition, Canada's participation represents about 10 per cent of NORAD's budget.
Consequently, once even more emphasis has been placed on satellite detection and the Americans have invested huge sums of money in it, they will not have much need for Canadian territory. Have you considered what contribution Canada will then be making to NORAD? If the Americans continue their discussions about broadening aerospace surveillance with other NATO countries and even with the Russians, there is a danger that the Treaty could be undermined. What sense do you have of this sort of dispute?
[English]
Mr. Lysyshyn: The question you've asked reflects what has been a long-term trend in NORAD. At the beginning, Canadian territory had very different meaning for NORAD, especially when all detection was radar-based, from that it had once we moved into space and as space-based systems got better. The dependence on Canadian territory was reduced, but is not yet diminished. It is interesting to note that while the space-based radars play an essential part in warning of missiles, the radars based on the ground are necessary to complement them and to provide the assurances with regard to aircraft, and that remains for the present case.
What will happen in the future is hard to tell. It might indeed come to the point where all radar can be space-based.
Admiral King in his presentation emphasized that Canadian military bring to the NORAD process expertise in communications and in surveillance. We have Canadian companies that have helped us in that area, and we continue to examine ways in which we can work with the United States in further developing Canadian expertise so that we shall bring a valuable contribution to NORAD.
You raised the possibility that the United States might want to do this kind of warning not just with Canada but with NATO. This is something we have thought about as well, and it is one of the reasons we gave as an example of the kind of activity we would like to discuss with the United States in the future. It is the issue of using NORAD as a means of providing missile warning to some of our allies. We have not got very far on that, but we have ensured that this agreement has kept the door open.
So, yes, there is an evolution into space, but I think we are trying to keep pace and provide our contribution to it.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I think it was the Admiral who mentioned that earlier. He said that Canada should be playing an ever-greater role in air defence.
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In light of the cuts in the defence budget outlined from now until 1997 and perhaps even after that, how do you plan to increase Canada's participation in air defence?
[English]
RAdm King: I think, Mr. Jacob, this is one of the key issues for us, not so much in this round of negotiations with the Americans, but certainly in planning for the future.
I think we're well situated. As you know, we have done away with the three lines I mentioned before, the DEW, Mid-Canada and Pinetree lines. We have installed our own North Warning System, which is much more cost-effective than what we had in the past.
We have also changed the pace of our fighter operations and all of the activities that surround fighter activity in the country. So we have made the whole process more cost-effective and something we believe we can afford in the future.
We are looking to contribute in meaningful ways based on the specific technology we think we can bring to this system, as we have both said, in the area of communications, in the area of surveillance, and in one specific area, and that is the surveillance of space itself.
Our unique geography, in addition to the technology we bring, may place us in a position to be able to make a fairly unique contribution to do surveillance of objects that are going into space. We believe this is an area where we can make a meaningful contribution. It's an area we have contributed to in the past, and we think the future may hold some potential in this area.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: During the negotiations on the signing of the renewed agreement, have the Americans asked for a certain minimum level of participation from us? Is there a starting point, or is this a negotiable item?
[English]
RAdm King: I don't think we have ever been in the situation, in NORAD as a whole, where we specified limits for participation. We have certainly looked at specific programs within that context. We have agreed to do a general participation, somewhere around the 10% rate. But in NORAD as a whole, I think it has been based, as Mr. Lysyshyn said, on a very flexible arrangement that has been based on geography and what each country can bring to making an integrated system work.
With our U.S. colleagues, we have been very careful to make sure that both sides are making a maximum contribution in the areas where they can bring the best technology, expertise and resources to bear. The Americans have been very understanding in this regard, and we believe we have reached a level of agreement that has sustained us in the past and will pose no problem in the future.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Thank you.
[English]
Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): I would like to thank the gentlemen who are bringing this explanation of the update of NORAD to us.
There is one thing you didn't mention. Is NORAD a stand-alone command now or does it answer to Continental Command?
RAdm King: No, it's still a stand-alone command. The commander of NORAD shares United States command responsibilities.
Mr. Richardson: That's right. Is it commanded from Norfolk?
RAdm King: No, it's commanded from Colorado Springs in Colorado.
Mr. Richardson: I see. What command is in Norfolk?
RAdm King: Norfolk is the command of the United States Atlantic Command, which is a U.S. command under General Sheehan. He is also the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, a NATO commander. The two are totally separate.
Mr. Richardson: We had a briefing from Admiral Johnston when he was here. I thought this was going to be a sort of mega command for the American forces out of Norfolk, but I guess not.
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RAdm King: There is talk in that regard, but not with regard to the command of NORAD.
Mr. Richardson: All right, then. I'll get on to more specifics about NORAD.
First of all, I was pleased to see that we're on track and that the agreement between the two countries is going to be consummated as outlined in your presentation. I would like to ask a couple of specific questions though. They are kind of minutiae.
Are the Russians still testing missiles in space, and if so, what is the frequency of the testing?
RAdm King: A number of nations, not just the Russians -
Mr. Richardson: I realize that.
RAdm King: - are testing ballistic missiles, that is, what we call either intermediate or long-range missiles, long-range being essentially intercontinental.
Of course, they're testing them for different purposes. In some cases they're for actual armaments and in other cases they're simply space launches using booster rockets to put up everything from weather satellites to weather sounding rockets and those sorts of things. So there's a fair rate of activity as more nations get involved in the use of space in general.
NORAD has a way of differentiating between the different types. As I said, in 1989, when there was quite a spate of technology around some new missile types, we had a much greater number of actual launches; it was something like 1,400 at peak. That's gone down now to somewhere from 170 to 200 a year.
And a number of those, of course, are done by the Russians. As you probably read recently in the newspaper, they carried out a launch from the Arctic Ocean.
Mr. Richardson: We're always focused on the Russians. Are there any second- or third-place activity countries that you're aware of? If so, could you name them?
RAdm King: I would not say we are focused on the Russians. I would say we are always very aware of them because of their advanced technology, because they're a neighbour across the Arctic Ocean, and simply because of their previous status as a very dangerous superpower.
But we're focused on a number of nations that possess this type of missile technology. I would say the one we're probably focused most closely on right now in terms of a country that has a fairly advanced program of developmental testing is North Korea. That's for two reasons. One is, North Korea poses some real concerns in general in terms of what its intentions are. Also, the capability of their technology and their strategic location mean they can pose a serious threat, even with a relatively shorter-range ballistic missile, to a number of neighbours such as China and Japan.
I would say we're focused far more on that nation right now, in terms of the developments we're seeing them test, than on any other country in the world.
Mr. Richardson: You've mentioned China as well. Is China a more frequent user of space ballistic missile testing than North Korea?
RAdm King: I'll have to defer to General Findley for the specifics.
What one has to determine first and foremost is whether the frequency of testing is based on an active space program. For example, India has a very active space program. The Indians are very keen on increasing the commercial exploitation of space, the use of space for satellites and those sorts of things.
We have to distinguish between that and a country that is focused on what we believe, from our intelligence and from what we're observing through NORAD sensors, to be specifically related to intermediate- and intercontinental-range types of ballistic missiles - those that are used strictly or almost completely for offensive purposes.
Brigadier-General Terry Findley (Director General, Policy Operations, Department of National Defence): All I would add to what the Admiral said is China does launch ballistic missiles regularly and so does North Korea. Those are parts of the world that we want to stay focused on.
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Mr. Richardson: In your statement you mentioned that cruise missile technology may eventually prove to be more accurate and more feasible in the future. Is there some reason for this? Do you suspect maybe the Russians, the Chinese, are heavily involved in improving that technology?
RAdm King: The cruise missile problem is one of both capabilities and intentions. We have seen cruise missiles go through a fairly rapid technology leap, to the extent where one can see some of the capabilities the Americans are using, the Tomahawk-type missiles. The Russians certainly have comparable types of systems in their arsenals.
But the real concern, as I said, is when we get to intentions. Here you have a much easier type of technology. It's an air-breathing missile, so you don't have all the problems of solvent and liquid rocket fuel to contend with and vast arrangements for launching. You have something that is much smaller, technologically easier to handle in launching the thing.
Therefore, you have the problem of proliferation. You have the concern that as these things become more available on the market there will be more and more nations that will be able to deploy them, and again, because of their size, be able to deploy them from all sorts of vehicles; for example, relatively small aircraft and submarines.
Mr. Richardson: I'll finish with the last one. You brought up the Korean one. Obviously the Koreans did focus on that. They were a factor in selling missile technology. Is that activity going on, on the part of the North Koreans? Is it a means of obtaining hard currency, or was it just a fluke that they were selling it into the Iraqi area and Iran?
RAdm King: I would say right now the threat from North Korea is posed primarily by their strategic situation and what we see as their intentions and their testing program, not proliferation per se. I would say the primary concern about proliferation is really countries such as the former Soviet Union, China, which have very active programs, where the control over these programs is perhaps not as close, where there's a great demand for hard cash, and where the control over these programs, particularly in China, is not done from a central position.
Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): I'd like to welcome you all. It's good to see you again.
Mr. Lysyshyn, you mentioned in your discourse environmental concerns and protection. I am not quite certain what specifically you were talking about there. Could you give us some idea of what you meant by ``environmental damage'' and what precautions we would take to overcome that?
Mr. Lysyshyn: What we have found is that Canada and the United States do not have fully in place a mechanism for dealing with environmental problems that may arise from our defence cooperation. In the past we have dealt with this on an ad hoc basis. In the process of negotiating this agreement, when we have come to talk about the environment, we have agreed that it would be useful to put into place a mechanism that would address environmental issues in the whole range of our future defence cooperation. We have agreement in principle that we will do this. We are saying in the agreement that any environmental problems that might arise from the implementation of this agreement would be dealt with in the framework of the mechanism that we will be developing in the separate channel through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
We assume that kind of statement will go into all future arrangements in the area of defence cooperation. It is to develop a mechanism so we don't have to ad-hoc it each time there's a problem in the future.
Mr. Frazer: Do I understand from your answer, then, that you haven't identified any specific environmental problem we might be addressing in this?
Mr. Lysyshyn: We have not.
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Mr. Frazer: So it's just a precautionary thing. It's words at the moment.
Mr. Lysyshyn: At this stage, yes, and it is a precautionary thing that we thought was prudent, given that this is something we always need to worry about.
Mr. Frazer: Admiral King, you mentioned a moment ago the launch in the Arctic of an SLBM. As I understand it, we were given advance notice that this was going to take place. Would you be at liberty to divulge to us how our detection system worked, the tracking? As I understand it, the missile was fired into a reception area in Russia. Could you give us some details on it?
RAdm King: We weren't advised beforehand, except that the Russians publicized the event in the open press beforehand. So we certainly had that notice. It was partially in preparation for some of the celebrations for an anniversary of their navy, and also the fact that part of this was the submarine transit close to the North Pole. So they were trying to get the maximum amount of publicity out of it.
The launch itself was detected by NORAD. Of course, in these cases, when the missile actually exits the water, the infrared, the DSP satellites, pick up -
Mr. Frazer: So it was a submersion launch?
RAdm King: I don't know. It was probably a launch from just on the surface. The point is that as the missile leaves the submarine, it ignites, and when it ignites that's initially picked up and then NORAD goes through the process by getting various hits to determine what exactly is the launch trajectory. In this case it was fairly rapidly ascertained that the trajectory would be toward the northern Russian peninsula rather than toward North America. This is something that NORAD figures out very quickly, well before it actually gets this on radar.
Mr. Frazer: Could you locate the launch in miles from Canadian territory?
RAdm King: I'd have to check that for you, but I believe it was in the order of 100 to 150 miles north of the northern part of Canada.
Mr. Frazer: So there was nothing even close to a violation of Canadian territory in this instance?
RAdm King: Not as far as we're aware, no.
Mr. Frazer: With regard to cruise missile sales, I understood that in the search for foreign exchange both Russia and China were in fact quite vigorous in pursuing the passing of cruise missile technology to other nations. Is that continuing, and if so, to what extent?
RAdm King: The proliferation we are seeing now is more in the area of shorter- and medium-range ballistic missiles of the type we saw, the Scuds being the classic example. The Chinese, as you may know, exported what we call the Silkworm missile, and a number of those figured in the Gulf War, as well.
To date we have not seen a large proliferation of cruise missile technology per se. I think this is primarily because they can have more of a tactical capability to them, depending on what the warhead is. Also, I think that other nations that are interested in that type of technology simply haven't got the money together. They're still working on less sophisticated delivery vehicles, for example.
Mr. Frazer: I got my information out of a magazine and it did relate to the Russian equivalent of the Tomahawk missile. I thought it was much more prevalent.
RAdm King: It has been exported, but I guess what I'm saying is that it hasn't been exported to as many nations as we expect we might see in the future.
Mr. Frazer: Is it possible for you to bring us up to speed on just how advanced space-based radar is? Is it in being? Is it in the late stages of development? If so, when do we expect to see it deployed and operating?
RAdm King: I'll turn that over to my staff. I'll simply say that we have looked extensively, over the last number of years.... The chief of research and development had a project to determine exactly how we would get into a space-based radar program. Notwithstanding the development in the technology, which is proceeding, the costs at this point are simply out of the question for our type of involvement.
Perhaps General Findley could say more.
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BGen Findley: It's the same for America. We're looking at tremendous costs and there's no way at this point that they can get directly involved. We're looking at something well into the next century.
Mr. Frazer: So it's an idea for the future.
BGen Findley: It's there, but it's going to cost a lot of money.
Mr. Frazer: So the northern warning system and the coastal radars will stay for some time to come.
BGen Findley: Absolutely, when you look at cost-effectiveness.
Mr. Frazer: It was mentioned that - and I presume it has to do with our geographic location and perhaps our geography - Canada might be able to offer something unique to the space surveillance program. Could you expand on that?
RAdm King: You will recall that in the late 1960s and early 1970s we had these Baker-Nunn cameras that we maintained up until fairly recently, which did quite an important service to NORAD. Since then, they have been declared obsolete.
This problem of surveillance of space, particularly our area, is one that's increasing all the time. It's also increasing for the Americans with both the near area and further out in space. It doesn't have to do only with so-called space junk. You might know that there are about 7,000 pieces,10 centimetres and over, flying around up there. It has to do with general surveillance of what is passing over.
For example, there's a terrific amount of satellite traffic. We believe through preliminary investigations that there may well be, because of our geography and previous technology, a niche where we could put in place a system - as I explained to Mr. Jacob - that is fairly cost-effective, which would make a real contribution to this agreement.
Mr. Frazer: Would we be looking at Cold Lake and St. Margaret's again as potential locations?
RAdm King: I have no idea, Mr. Frazer.
I think we're at the stage now where we are trying to determine where the technology that would allow us to make this sort of contribution is going. What sort of area could we provide reasonable surveillance for and ultimately what would be the cost? I think location and that sort of thing comes much later.
Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): I want to thank the witnesses for the excellent briefing. I apologize for having to absent myself for 25 minutes - I had other things to monitor - but I certainly got the context of your briefing.
My questions, Mr. Chairman, centre around the consultative mechanism and the command and control. Ralph, I noticed when you described the Canadian renewal objectives you talked about including a consultative mechanism. Did you really mean improving the consultative mechanism? It's my understanding that there was a form of consultation built into the existing system.
Mr. Lysyshyn: What we hope to write into the current agreement - and I think we have an agreement on it - is a very specific clause that says if one nation sees another nation heading in a particular direction in related areas and asks for a detailed consultation, it will take place.
When you're dealing with things like space, surveillance and warnings to other allies, this also takes it into the political-military area. It's not strictly military consultations. The language in this agreement gives us an in and provides us with this mechanism.
The relationship between Canada and the United States in the defence area has always been one in which consultation is frequent and extensive. There is no dearth of it. You can almost argue you don't need the mechanisms. But as we have entered into the more technological problem areas, we have found that the idea of having a written commitment for consultation helps. It speeds things up. That's what we've tried to do with it.
Mr. Mifflin: I understand that consultation did take place but not within the confines of the agreement as written.
Mr. Lysyshyn: That's right.
Mr. Mifflin: So now we're going to put it in to make sure it's cut and dried.
Mr. Lysyshyn: Yes.
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Mr. Mifflin: My second question really is one about command and control, and it stems from, if not my ignorance, my not being updated on where we are going with the American system. When we were in Norfolk last year we were briefed, I think without reservation, on the USACOM that is being operated under the auspices of SACLANT. I wasn't sure at the time where NORAD stood on that. I spoke to the SACLANT of the day. I'm not sure I either understood or appreciated his answer.
Is it possible we could just get some idea of how NORAD Space Command fits into the American system of command and control, specifically for SACLANT's responsibility, and indeed maybe the responsibility of the commander of the Third Fleet, or CINCPAC. It's not clear to me. Could that be handled?
RAdm King: Yes, I can certainly deal with that, sir.
I think the best way to look at it is first of all to recognize that NORAD does indeed stand alone, as do a number of these commands, notwithstanding double-hatting of positions and the rest of it. The commander of NORAD reports to the U.S. national command authority and to the Canadian command authority. It's a binational agreement, and command and control are clear and unequivocal.
That having been said, one has to recognize that in the U.S., with the changes that went on in the creation of USACOM, a major unified command, and significantly now commanded by a United States marine general, with the changes we saw in Strategic Air Command - we now have a strategic command, and there's still discussion about whether it should remain.... We have U.S. Space Command, which is the national command for space activity. All those commanders-in-chief are locked into an almost continual dialogue on how they should go about their business, who should take overall charge of, for example, doctrine and training. In this regard SACLANT, the commander of USACOM, has been particularly active in trying to take a stronger role in the extent to which he would control all the forces that would then go out to other commands: CENTCOM and other commands, which would include, for instance, fleet commanders at sea.
In the course of that struggle that is going on and no doubt will continue - it's an evolution - there have been proposals on a very informal basis by U.S. ACOM that perhaps the NORAD responsibility, and indeed perhaps part of Space Command, should come under USACOM, for example. General Sheehan has also proposed that perhaps there should be a stronger role for the Canada-U.S. regional planning group, the North American arm of NATO. He has a number of ideas about how to restructure these organizations.
I think that's about all it is. The command and control organization that's in place is in place. There's no attempt to change it in this renewal of the agreement, nor do we really see any change in the future. As long as the Americans maintain their organization, then indeed we will maintain ours.
Mr. Mifflin: My final question. Are there plans, or have there been innuendoes...? Was it General Horner who briefed us last summer?
The Chairman: He was here.
Mr. Mifflin: Anyway, we were briefed by the four-star in charge of NORAD. It was just something he said, or maybe it was an inflection in his voice. Are there any contemplations about extending Can-U.S. to Mexico, the Caribbean? Have there been any discussions along those lines?
Mr. Lysyshyn: There have been discussions in the NATO context of providing, in the theatre missile context, warning of missile launch to allies. They're very preliminary. During the Gulf War warning was provided when Scuds were launched.
Mr. Mifflin: In the Middle East.
Mr. Lysyshyn: That's right. But as far as I know, there is no discussion about taking the bilateral NORAD and making it trilateral or something else. Nobody has talked about extending that strategic warning for the North American continent.
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Mr. Mifflin: But there is the business of consultation with NATO.
Mr. Lysyshyn: That's right. It is on theatre missile warning.
Mr. Mifflin: The committee had a good look at this, as part of the joint committee, and I think our recommendations are very clear with respect to where we're going with this. I don't anticipate there will be a great desire on the part of members of the committee, certainly the members who were there before, with respect to the principle of NORAD.
Do you foresee any difficulties from the other side of the border with respect to the objectives we are anticipating to have written into the renewed contract?
Mr. Lysyshyn: I don't foresee any significant problems at all. We have agreement in principle everywhere and agreement on language in most places.
Mr. Mifflin: Thank you.
The Chairman: I want to thank you for coming here today to give us this tactical briefing. I think Mr. Mifflin wound it up by saying we've all been involved in this for some time and what we are saying about NORAD is that it's still the same.
So unless somebody has anything else, I thank you for being here and giving us this very valuable information.
The meeting is adjourned.