EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 23, 1995

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[English]

The Chairman: Order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the study of the report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves will commence.

Today again it is my pleasure to introduce a group of people to us: retired Colonel A. Craig Cameron from the Gang of Two plus Five, about which he will tell us in a minute; Mr. Rossetto, representing the Edmonton United Services Institute; and Mr. Robert Gibson of the Alberta Militia Society.

All of the representative organizations presented briefs to the special commission, and I'm certain that we'll be interested in hearing what they have to say to us today. I therefore invite each of the panellists to make a short presentation, after which the members will put questions to them.

Mr. Cameron, I believe you are going to start.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Craig Cameron (Ret.), (Member, Gang of Two plus Five): Mr. Chairman, lady and gentlemen, good afternoon.

I'm here today representing a Vancouver group known as the Gang of Two plus Five. I hasten to explain that we have no connection whatsoever with the supposed B.C. cabinet gang of seven, which it is rumoured precipitated the departure from government of our premier.

Our gang was first formed in 1979, to appear before the Fyffe commission on unification.

Although membership has changed over the years, the military service of our present members includes World War Two, Korea, regular force and the reserves. Civilian experience ranges from a judge of the B.C. court to business management.

Although small in number, we continually attempt to update our knowledge by exchanging views with other organizations and individuals interested in defence-related subjects.

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We greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to give our views on the recommendations and report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves. Overall, we are heartened by what the commission has recommended and consider many of the proposals long overdue. There are a few points, however, that we believe require further emphasis or that were not covered completely in the report. I will deal with these first.

We are in total agreement with the commission's recommendation that a national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch. However, we consider it imperative that the government plan deal with all aspects of the country's mobilization. These would include resources, industry, and manpower, besides detailing the involvement and responsibility of every government department. Unless this is undertaken, the commission and this committee's examination into the restructuring of the reserves to comply with mobilization in isolation from all other factors becomes meaningless.

The commission's recommended brigade and division organizations for the militia are ideal. Having regular force and militia brigades serving under the same divisional headquarters, with integrated staff, will assist in countering the ``we''-and-``they'' attitude. We fully support the commission's recommended criteria for determining the viability of existing militia units, but also agree with the opinions of the junior non-commissioned members and officers, who wish to serve in full-strength militia units.

In order to maintain operational efficiency, gain maximum training benefits, and give experience to and develop leadership qualities in the officers and non-commissioned officers, unit authorized manning levels should ideally not be lower than 80% of operational establishment. However, with the paid ceiling for the reserves mandated by the 1994 white paper, which reduces the militia to 14,500, the commission's recommended establishment of seven brigades can be manned only at approximately 33% of operational establishment. This works out to be an allowed strength of about 240 per major unit.

We recommend that the paid ceiling be increased to allow for more effective militia units. We also recommend that the militia brigades be increased to eight, so as to look after more participation in the west.

To maintain group solidarity within units, it is considered essential that all reserve and regular force personnel posted to a reserve unit be badged and uniformed as per that unit. In addition, all subunits, regardless of geographic location, must by name and identification belong to the same unit. This one unit should then be tied closely to the population of the city or area in which it is located, taking part, whenever possible and wherever meaningful, in civic functions, so they become well known as the city or area primary reserve unit.

As the commission suggests, some primary reserve units could be transferred to the supplementary order of battle. They also make the excellent recommendation that all personnel leaving the regular force or primary reserve be required by contract to transfer to the supplementary reserve. At present the supplementary reserve is mainly a list of former officers and other ranks by classification or trade.

Canadian service personnel, be they navy, army, air force, regular or reservist, are very unit family oriented. These unit ties are paramount in their service and usually remain with them for life. Therefore it would be more meaningful to the individual if he belonged to a unit on the supplementary list instead of just being a number on a computer list. We are therefore recommending that the supplementary list be maintained as actual units, specialist elements, and formations. It would also be more efficient at any one time, if required under mobilization, and providing equipment is available, if unit formations could be moved in an orderly and progressive sequence from supplementary reserve to primary reserve to active force status.

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As with primary reserve units, supplementary reserve units should be closely associated to a city or area of the country. It is appreciated that the supplementary reserve must be maintained at no cost. However, such units could be encouraged to form unit associations and, if possible, even sponsor cadet corps and unit bands. These in turn would help them in maintaining a presence in their city or area. To assist them to maintain an association, each supplementary reserve unit could be given an office in a DND or other federal government building for their association office.

The commission's report mentions, under the air reserve deployment, the justification for a reserve helicopter squadron in British Columbia, as a portion of the province is located on geological fault lines. The report then says the commission is hesitant to recommend it on grounds of cost. There appears to have been a misunderstanding by the commission, or in the way it is stated in the report. The submission was not for an additional helicopter squadron but for the relocation to British Columbia of 6 to 8 of the 24 Griffon helicopters presently earmarked for 408 squadron in Edmonton. They would be for a reserve flight to be located in the Abbotsford-Chilliwack vicinity, out of the fault-line area.

There are an abundant number of civilian pilots and maintenance personnel in the region, along with firms that could carry out additional maintenance under contract. This helicopter flight would then be in a position to support federal and provincial authorities in emergency situations; provide support for B.C. militia unit training; provide support to 3PPCLI if, as has been recommended, it is retained in Chilliwack as a light infantry battalion; and provide an air force presence in the region.

The report states that the commission found virtually no interest among senior officers in restarting various university officer training programs. However, it was the opinion of the commissioners that in the interest of the Canadian forces, the military presence on campus be increased and more visible.

In this regard, we did submit to the commission a proposal for augmentee reservists, destined to fill out regular force units in operational establishments to be recruited from community colleges.

Our proposal was that in exchange for receiving full-time military training during the four-month summer break, they would sign a contract to serve for two years as augmentee reservists. This would not be officer training, but selected individuals could be earmarked for such training in subsequent years. I'll leave any interest in this proposal for the discussion period.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the one ingredient we consider has been lacking in most of this country's previous defence policies is the political will over time to see the defence policy through. If you can correct this, you will have accomplished far more than any previous parliamentary defence committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Cameron. We'll hear the next three people and then go to questions and answers.

Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Robert Gibson (Member, Alberta Militia Society): Mr. Chairman, hon. members, I represent the Alberta Militia Society, whose members include regular and retired militia and regular force members, as well as members of the community. We are primarily interested in maintaining the association of the militia with the communities.

Thank you for the opportunity of appearing here today. We have submitted a written brief for your consideration, so I will simply summarize the key points.

Our presentation is primarily focused on the army militia. The Alberta Militia Society would like to compliment the members of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves for their thoughtful and thorough analysis and their concise recommendations. We support the majority of their recommendations.

We do recommend that the Government of Canada allow decisions on the implementation of the restructuring of the militia to be carried out on the basis of cost targets, rather than the limit of 14,500 soldiers.

We would suggest the basic question being considered should be, what is the most cost-efficient method of restructuring the reserves while retaining the maximum capacity of the reserves to fulfil their mandate? The Government of Canada must revisit both the costs and the cost-control structures not only of the reserves but of the total military.

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The current system of accounting and budgeting for annual costs of reserves is both misleading and incorrect. Prior to the completion of the commission's report, the chief of review services encouraged a $153 million reduction in the allotment to the reserve budget, partially, I gather, because of discussions over allocations. To put this adjustment into perspective, that equates to the annual pay of about 38,250 reservists. The inability to estimate more precisely certainly eliminates the paid ceiling as a legitimate approach to defining the new structure.

The army must develop the costing of the militia from the bottom up, from unit to brigade group, from brigade group to area command. Under the proposed structure the area command is the highest level at which there should be any differentiation between the militia and the regular forces. The allocation of militia budgets above that level should be unnecessary. If the actual objective is a 25% reduction in costs, commence the analysis by determining that value in dollars rather than in personnel numbers.

I've taken an analysis of the seven brigade groups and run an analysis of ten full brigade groups, assuming that central Canada and eastern Canada would want an extra one if western Canada had an extra one. That increases the paid ceiling at the unit level, including the brigade headquarters and area command, by about $24 million a year. That's about 9% of what's budgeted for the reserve salaries in the 1994-95 revised budget. Compare this with the 30% of the current pay budgets - at least - that are allocated above the area headquarters level.

The commission found that obviously too much money is carved out of the reserve pay budget before it reaches the armoury floor. The methods of analysing the relative efficiency of the reserve should be on an incremental cost basis. What is the cost of meeting the mandate of the regular forces, ensuring that they are properly equipped and trained to effectively handle their taskings?

Once this has been determined and a conclusion is reached that there is a unique but complementary role for the reserves, we must determine how much funding is required to ensure how that mandate can best be met. By using this approach, decisions that are largely cost-limited will be based on a far more valid assumptions than the current approach allows.

In reviewing the cost of the militia, we must start with the front end, the soldiers at the unit level. It's obvious that the ideal conclusion would include the widest possible representation of the reserves across Canada. The real benefits can best be achieved at the armoury level. It is here that the source of soldiers for augmentation exists. It is here that the relationships between the military and the community are at their strongest. It is here where assistance to civil authority can occur in the event of natural disaster. It's here that the best benefit is gained for dollars invested.

The second major cost item of the militia and the army is equipment. The cost of large-ticket items isn't going to change substantially. The majority of this equipment is acquired for serving in taskings and serving the basic training of the regular force and the militia. Such items as armoured personnel carriers, tanks and helicopters are necessary to carry out the tasks of the army, whether it's militia or regular.

The third point is facilities. Armouries are those facilities primarily used by the militia. The major training centres like Wainwright, Alberta, for example, will likely exist in approximately the same scale even if there were no militia at all.

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The last item to be looked at is overhead. The commission noted that only thirty days of each hundred days of pay reaches the armoury floor. This is neither practical nor a representative allocation of costs. The pyramid is inverted.

I'd like to comment on a few of the recommendations of the special commission.

On recommendation 6, we recommend that the number of brigade groups not be determined until a thorough review of the costing can be carried out. Our initial impression would be that at least three brigade groups are needed in western Canada because of the practicalities of geography. They may find there should be eight, nine or ten brigade groups. They may be smaller than they should be, but they'll achieve the footprint in the community.

Recommendations 8 and 10 I've covered in my comments.

On recommendations 34 and 35, whereas we believe the reservists on full-time duty should receive equivalent pay and benefits to the regular force personnel, we do not believe the costs of applying this equality are necessary or cost-effective for normal training duty. Solving issues relating to proper access to training and certainty of summer training exercises is much more critical.

On recommendation 41, there's much variation of opinion on the issue of legislation. The debate doesn't centre on whether reservists should have their rights defined but on whether or not they can be achieved voluntarily. There is some concern that a legislated position may have a negative impact in the short term.

Even though we support the majority of the recommendations of the commission, certain of them deserve special attention.

On recommendation 10(5), if the militia were accountable for the maintenance and efficiency of armouries, we believe the total funds required to administer these facilities would be substantially reduced.

On recommendation 26, the harmonization of civilian and military qualifications will allow for more of the training budgets to be spent on more productive efforts. The ability of the militia to recruit and provide specialists should be enhanced.

The report concluded with a comment that, although not stated as a recommendation, certainly warrants support:

In the context of Total Force, it seems to us somewhat incongruous to study one component of the Canadian Forces and to recommend fundamental changes to its structure, as if they would have no impact on the Regular Force, or as if changes now under way in the Regular Force might not affect the reserves. Accordingly, we urge the Minister of National Defence to consider the creation of a special commission with the widest possible mandate to examine the administration and structure of the Canadian Forces and the civilian component of the Department of National Defence.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Rossetto.

Major Luigi Rossetto (Ret.), (Edmonton United Services Institute): Thank you kindly.

It is the nature of an inquiry of course to focus on that which can be improved. Subsequently, some reports, including ours, which has been distributed to you, appear to paint a relatively bleak picture, perhaps somewhat wanting in breadth.

However, we cannot escape the fact that Canada spends in the order of $750 million to $1 billion for a reserve system that was designed to meet the Fenians. Some people would leave it untouched forever, and its advocates are apt to use their influence for personal and local benefit rather than for the welfare of a system that is supposed to serve all Canadians.

Considering the vast sum spent on this and the fact that fifty years have passed since the Second World War, and considering that an entire series of commissions, analyses and reports have already spoken on the subject, it should be shocking that the SCRR could still describe the reserve, particularly the army reserve, as, in their own words, first of all, not actually having a plan for mobilization; having far more officers and senior NCOs than are warranted by the numbers of serving people under command, in fact too often parading more chiefs than Indians; having a number of units well below their allowed ceiling and not able to field a company or even a platoon; producing forces with a very questionable and inadequate level of collective training; having a command cadre that is inexperienced in commanding sizeable forces and and that would probably prove wanting in a national emergency; having an administration that is cumbersome, inefficient, and costly, with overstaffing at every level; having an organizational structure that has been repeatedly cited for giving a poor bang for the investment buck, a view supported by the auditor general.

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All these are not my words, ladies and gentlemen. They are from the commission.

The picture is not entirely bleak, for in general the reserves have earned an A plus plus in providing individual augmentation to the regular force, particularly for UN duties. The same cannot be said, however, for the reserves' ability to raise, train, and field trained subunits. Here, even the most charitable would probably assign a D.

These two separate aspects of reserve service are not necessarily compatible, and it is easy to fall into the trap that caught the SCRR recommending individual augmentation for phases one and two of its mobilization plan, followed by unit size mobilization as required for phases three and four. Unobserved is the fact that this basic dichotomy remains unresolved, for you might ask yourselves, if Canada implements the first two phases of this mobilization for any emergency with individual call-outs - and one assumes these will be the better trained and readily available people - who is going to be left to fill the ranks of the units that will be required for phases two and three?

Could Canada rely on a system such as has been described above to produce fighting formations without a lengthy period of additional training, considering also that in the main the rank and file is made up of high school and post-secondary youths? Would these people be available, given that even now Parliament has not seen fit to establish a legal framework for a reserve call-out short of a declaration of war?

In reality, would not an entirely new levy be required, with a complete set of new leaders and soldiery?

In our presentation we challenge the view - and this was accepted by the SCRR - that the standing reserve as such played a major role in mobilization for the Second World War, for example. Today, as in World War II, the bulk of service men and women would not be reservists but people who would have to be raised off the street and who would have to be trained and formed into new organizations. Although indeed these may end up as units bearing the names of current reserves or regular regiments, this is relatively incidental and after the fact.

As mentioned, the SCRR has already admitted that the perception that it was the standing reserves that went to the colours at the outbreak of the Second World War is essentially incorrect. It would, then, seem imprudent to rely upon a system that is based on such a false premise.

A second view that we challenge regarding the reserves is that reservists are less expensive than regulars. True, individual pay and benefits for the reservists are in fact lower, but the true cost must measure the number of people who are made available against the cost of maintaining the entire system. As has been stated already, Canada spends in the order of $750 million to $1 billion - and some people aren't even sure of that. It is admitted that by far the greater part of this money goes to an infrastructure and to a system that is top-heavy, inefficient, and of questionable reliability, and to maintain a whole group of people, generally of the higher ranks, who are not and cannot be actually available for service.

The bottom line is that for all the money spent on reserves, in the order of 10% of the defence budget, Canada gets actually to deploy, at the very best, an extra battalion of people. This is judging by the number of reservists who go on UN operations. It seems to be an exorbitant price for the returns.

There are several ways in which to effect savings. One, that chosen by the SCRR and its predecessors, is to cut spending by simply cutting the size of an organization. Apparently, prior attempts along similar lines have not succeeded in improving the system or making it more efficient. The SCRR's own report is evidence of that.

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Of course, another way to effect savings is to change the system itself and make it more efficient. It is to achieve that end that our proposal in Edmonton suggested a revamping of reserve units to reflect the size and the rank structure they actually carry.

I might ask those of you who care to follow it to just inquire about the number of reservists who actually showed up for summer training this summer. It would not be out of turn for me to point out that one district produced exactly two infantiers, and that one area produced just over 500 people.

We also suggested a system of reserve service that would include complete basis training and a set period of service with the regular force. We recommended a year followed by recurring periods of training and service, two to three weeks over four to five years. Contractual obligations and incentives in the form of cash bonuses or educational credits would ensure participation.

At the same time, the size of the reserve available for mobilization will become controllable by the simple expedient of increasing or decreasing the number of people going through this system. Not incidentally, this contractual aspect will meet the single most glaring weakness in the reserves, which you as members of Parliament have unfortunately failed to address, and that's to provide the legal framework for their work. This again goes back over a period of 50 years.

The proposal we presented was criticized for dooming the current reserve system. This is not necessarily the case. In fact, we look at it as perhaps saving it from itself.

Australia is keeping both types of systems going at the same time. A vast reorganization would have to be undertaken by the reserves to secure the savings for this new scheme, which in contrast to having $500 million go to the militia would cost less than $30 million. That's based on 800 persons at a generous average salary of $30,000, and that's for a full year's worth of service on a full-time basis. Even doubling the figure for incremental cost and follow-on service demonstrates that the potential savings would more than pay for themselves in a few years and perhaps look after some of the equipment problem that both the regulars and the reserves are facing.

Regrettably, this will not please any people who are wed to an outdated system, one that is not responsive to Canada's defence requirements and one that, in the words of some advocates, would rather see a battalion's worth of officers and NCOs for regiments that can then boast of a platoon's worth of soldiers. I'm afraid that such advocates cannot be answered.

However, it should be pointed out that the strength of the reserve has been repeatedly cut. Reserve units have been continually reduced and their presence in the smaller communities throughout Canada has been eradicated without any obvious improvement in the overall system. If reserve units are required for mobilization, one might ask what to say to those many small cities and towns you represent that have lost or are likely to lose their units. In contrast, we offer a system whereby reserve service is available to all Canadians, irrespective of their location.

We continue to believe that what we propose by paying only for troops that will actually be available is a system that better fits Canada's defence requirements and a modern mobile society. It is also a system that promises to change the focus of the reserves from meeting that of Fenians.

Thank you kindly.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Richardson): Mr. Hart, would you like to start the questioning?

Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your presentation today.

What we're working on here is trying to determine which recommendations in the commission we are going to bring forward to the House of Commons. I'd like to talk a little bit about the mandate or the guidance document that the commissioners actually received. Did you find that to be restrictive in any manner? I'd like you all to answer, if you could.

Mr. Rossetto: Yes. It's included in our documentation. When you look at the original scope, in fact it never asked them to examine the reserve as such from a basic starting point. They just accepted to examine the reserves, in large measure as they are standing. I believe it was their second and third piece they were asked to look at that in fact accepted the current system.

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Mr. Gibson: The area of difficulty I found was primarily the limitation of identifying personnel numbers, as opposed to focusing on means of reducing the overall cost while improving the efficiency.

Mr. Cameron: You stated that they should look at the reserves in relation to the four stages of mobilization, but these four stages, from what I can see, were never really brought out before and there seems to be no tie-back of the mobilization to any stated government plan.

Mr. Hart: What do you suggest this committee do? We have a few more days to take these recommendations into consideration. What is your recommendation to this committee? Do we throw the whole report out? Or do we suggest to the House of Commons and to the minister that the minister come back with a wider scope for a new commission to look at and develop more of a mandate to look at the entire Canadian Armed Forces structure? What's your recommendation?

Mr. Cameron: I think, as it's been stated, there is an impact of the recommendations on the regular force and of things that are happening with the regular force on the militia, and there should be some tie-in of these. I'm not sure if a full-scale committee has to look at this.

Mr. Gibson: I don't think a new commission needs to be established to rework what's been done on the reserves. I think a number of the points can be implemented. I think the limit on bodies should be changed to a limit on dollars. I think there should be very clear direction to the implementers, a large part of which will be through the regular forces, that the top-end costs be cut very substantially and that perhaps the mandate may include sufficient funds to allow up to 20,000 reservists. I don't know if that's a correct number, but I don't think that should be the limiting factor.

I think that can be done as part of the implementation process flowing from the findings of the commission, with the guidance of and very specific direction from Parliament.

Mr. Hart: It's my understanding that the commission has recommended a paid ceiling - not necessarily the exact number - that should be reflected in the rank structure in the reserves.

Mr. Gibson: My understanding - and maybe I'm wrong - is that they perceived it as being a limitation of the original mandate because it was a number derived from the defence review in 1994.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Richardson): The number flows directly from the budget.

Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): Don't blame us for those numbers.

Mr. Gibson: No. I'm saying they were created and they were carried on. I don't think they sat down and analysed. In fact, I think they said specifically that with the information available they couldn't sit down and analyse those costs thoroughly enough. The cost structure, the cost allocation, the accounting process and the budgeting process - they didn't use the word, but I'll use it - were screwed up enough so that you can't derive meaningful conclusions.

Mr. Hart: Do you have anything to add to that?

Mr. Rossetto: From my presentation you'll see that I have a slightly different view. This was supposedly a second kick at the cat. I think, if it's not a completely separate commission, that there are certainly things that are worthwhile studying further, things that need not restart the entire process. Perhaps some direction could be given that if some of these ideas we offered are worthwhile, they may be worthwhile pursuing.

Mr. Hart: We've heard from other witnesses that as far as this whole idea of putting two or three units together and making one unit, the numbers don't necessarily work out. If you combine two units of 100 people each, at the end of the day you may still end up with one unit of 100 people rather than 200 people. What is your feeling on that?

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Mr. Cameron: I'm not quite sure why you'd end up with only 100, unless you're taking a unit in one location, adding one from another location and saying this location will close down. But if you're combining two units in relatively the same area, there might be a period to begin with when the numbers will drop, but they should come up.

Mr. Hart: Other witnesses have suggested because of the attachment to the community and the regimental tradition that's held in that unit, it doesn't necessarily mean you can combine the two and end up with the same size of unit. The numbers will actually filter down over time. In other words, one regiment will win out over the other one, and the other one will just feel like it has lost its....

Mr. Cameron: I agree. I think there would be a drop to begin with, but over time it would climb back up.

We should look at England's experience in this, where it has combined units quite successfully a number of times. It has gone through this same process, to my knowledge, at least two times in the last thirty-odd years.

Mr. Hart: Are there any other comments on that?

I also wanted to ask you about base closures. There have been a few base closures. In Alberta - and you can comment on British Columbia, if you wish, as well, with the closures in Chilliwack and Calgary - how are those closures going to affect the reserve systems in those areas?

Mr. Cameron: The closure of CFB Chilliwack, of course, has had quite an impact on those in the militia throughout British Columbia. It not only supported them in training but was a location where they could train. So there have been many recommendations from various groups to retain, if not all of Chilliwack, at least a portion of it, especially the training areas and some areas that could be used by the militia to go there and train.

From my understanding, there is a strong recommendation, not only from people within the community but also from the military at a certain command level, to retain the 3PPCLI battalion if it becomes a light infantry battalion in Chilliwack.

Mr. Gibson: In Calgary, the closure of Calgary was of great concern. I think it heightened the concern over the potential loss of significant segments of the militia.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Richardson): Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. O'Reilly (Victoria - Haliburton): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing and giving us some very interesting thoughts. I know I'll certainly be reading them all to see how they can be applied to this report. As you know, we've been given this special commission to study and make recommendations on what changes should be made.

First, I take exception to page 33 of the report with the word ``footprint''. To me a footprint is something you leave. I will be presenting a motion to remove that word from the report and replace it with something like ``presence in the community''. I'd like that recorded. I'm getting quite upset with this footprint thing because, as I said, it's something you see when something is gone. If I donate nothing else to this committee it will be to remove that word.

You talked about the legal framework not being in place. I'll ask three questions and then you can all deal with them. It was my understanding that the legal framework is in place, but it has to be requested by the province and not necessarily the military. Unless it's a national disaster and so declared, the only way that legal framework can be put in place is at the request of the province. So I would ask for your comments on that.

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The equipment problem you mentioned has been mentioned in the report and referred to in the white paper, where equipment is bought and tagged for the reserves but the reserves don't see it. Having been a reservist, I understand that problem. I think it took three trucks to drag a Howitzer from Lindsay to Peterborough, a distance of 23 miles, and change it. So I understand that problem.

Then, of course, no one has asked what the Gang of Two plus Five means.

So I could start with those questions, which you may answer in any order.

Mr. Cameron: Very quickly, the Gang of Two plus Five merely means that there are seven members of the gang. The two are the remaining originals. One is Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Merritt, a Victoria Cross winner; the other is Group Captain Alfred Watts, who was an air force group captain during the war and later on became a judge of the B.C. court. The five are all of us new people who have only been with them for four or five years. We're still just in apprenticeship.

Mr. O'Reilly: ``Gang'' not meaning that you hold up banks or anything like that?

Mr. Cameron: Well, not yet.

Mr. O'Reilly: My other questions, I believe, are on the legal framework. Mr. Rossetto.

Mr. Rossetto: You were implying, in a sense, calling out the reserve. What I was implying is ensuring that the reservist himself or herself would actually show up. There's actually no obligation right now on the reservist, at whatever level of training, to show up for either training or actual operations.

Mr. O'Reilly: So you see a contractual arrangement being made when someone signs up?

Mr. Rossetto: Indeed. Most of the frustration that I've heard from any number of reserves and reserve units is that whenever they go out for training, it's never the same two people.

One of the problems is that they have a low level of strength in the first instance. Secondly, when these people don't show up, or when there is a change in the organization, how can you possibly progress from a certain level of training as a group to the next level? Patently, it's impossible.

Mr. O'Reilly: And the equipment problem?

Mr. Rossetto: I really don't....

Mr. Gibson: The equipment problem is the access to the equipment for training and the ability to keep the equipment running. I put a bit about that in the written presentation, the ability to get a piece of equipment fixed when you're moving a group for a weekend exercise and one piece breaks down and you have to sit in place and wait for a tow truck to come up from base Calgary. When they finally contact the people, your weekend exercise is gone for the whole group - that's a bit of an exaggeration - instead of being able to allow the fellow who's part of the group who's a mechanic in Calgary to fix it or take it to the nearest shop and get the belt put back on, things like that.

Mr. O'Reilly: On the structural problems with limiting the budget strictly to dollars and not having an overall number at the end, you talk about setting a budget and not a ceiling on the number of people who could be in, or a lower end. Would you not foresee that, in that type of a scenario, in the present structure you would end up with a number of highly paid officers but no foot soldiers?

Mr. Gibson: I don't think so. As I read it, the area commander would be the primary in command. He is responsible for delivering the quality of the product to his superiors. He's not going to allow an exorbitant number of officers to sit at the unit levels and so on. If there are limits and the objective is to get training done and put manpower on the ground, then I believe they can do it.

At present the area commander is probably responsible for around 15% of the prorated share of the militia budget. Everything above that is totally out of his control. If a larger portion of that budget was to be brought down into that component, then it would be managed substantially more effectively and with substantially less overhead.

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Mr. O'Reilly: Do you see a problem with the closing of armouries - and from what I can see, most of them would be in rural areas - and them being moved into the cities? Do you see a difference in trying to recruit entirely from the cities? Will there be the problem that has existed in the past, where the rural members are basically cut out of the reserves because of the distance they have to travel? Regular members of the force who retire because of distance are cut out of the reserves. Do you see that as a problem that is also going to come out of the recommendations of this report?

Mr. Cameron: I'm not entirely sure of the number of units you describe in small towns. Certainly in western Canada most of the units are in the major centres, with a few having subunits in other areas. But if the recommendation the commission has put down to look at the units is followed, then that will determine whether some of these units or subunits in smaller areas would be retained.

Mr. O'Reilly: The exercise in the past, after the two downsizings, after the Korean War and I believe in the late 1970s, saw most of the small armouries close in rural Canada and the larger city ones remain open.

As a result, the people in small rural areas have to travel great distances. If they hold down regular jobs, shift work or call-back type of work, where they're not allowed to be fifty or a hundred miles away for training two or three times a month, they drift out of the reserve units.

I see that problem happening again with the recommendations in this report. I wondered if, in reading this report or in submitting to it, you recognize that as a problem.

Mr. Cameron: It could be a problem.

In a couple of instances the air force has worked very well with local communities in the Maritimes, I'm led to understand, where the communities are providing them with facilities and what not because they're putting the reserve unit in there. Therefore they're giving part-time employment to certain people, I gather, with their airfield engineer squadron and their airfield security squadron.

Mr. Gibson: I'm not sure how much is left to be done in cutting out the rural armouries in Alberta. I think the next swatch of armouries is going to be in some of the remaining cities.

Mr. Rossetto: I don't think there are very many we would describe as rural armouries. I don't think there are any left. But what you're saying is absolutely right.

The other side of the coin is, why do you need armouries in the first instance? What's so special about a building? The presence of the units is more important than the site where they might meet. Surely there are other buildings and places for military units, particularly when you're talking of the size we are. We're not talking of regiments here. One armoury in Regina, I think, has seven units or whatever, and I think in Moose Jaw or someplace they only have one unit where fifty people meet. Surely they could meet somewhere else.

Mr. O'Reilly: Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): I'd like to thank the witnesses for attending and making their presentations.

Mr. Rossetto, you're a member of the USI and you seem to have some background in the forces. Were you in the air force, the army or the navy?

Mr. Rossetto: I was in the army, basically regular force for most of my career and the last few years as a reservist, but really working for the regular force.

Mr. Richardson: In Patricia's?

Mr. Rossetto: The RCR, a good regiment.

Mr. Richardson: That is a good regiment.

Mr. Rossetto: Thank you.

Mr. Richardson: In some of the proposals you make, you talk about Australia and their positioning. I know a fair bit about it, but you've taken a spin on it that I haven't seen before. They are founded on regimental systems. It's almost like our former air auxiliary, in which they do have some augmentees out of their COTCs. Universities have regiments there.

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Mr. Rossetto: We received the report of their latest reorganization of reserves. They have in fact a two-tier system, sir. It's very similar to ours. But then they have one that they've implemented in the last few years that is along the lines of what we're recommending. It's not all that different. In fact, in the paper I suggested that the less we adopt the new system and the more we keep to the old one, the less we will save and the less effective our reserve will actually be.

But they have two different tracks right now, and there doesn't seem to be any direct tie. That's the only thing that perhaps may be noted as a weakness.

Mr. Richardson: Many standards for both of them are the same.

Mr. Rossetto: I mean the service. These are the people who go out and serve their year with the regular force, then go into the reserve status. I have not seen any document that discusses the parallel.

But the document we received was right from the high commissioner here in Ottawa. That should be available to you.

Mr. Richardson: We have that.

Here's the other thing. Has USI ever been addressed by the area commander?

Mr. Rossetto: Yes, we have.

Mr. Richardson: Did he give you a briefing?

Mr. Rossetto: Yes. You mean in regard to the reorganization of the reserves?

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Mr. Rossetto: This was a self-actioned paper that we presented from work within the USI.

Mr. Richardson: You're the only one that did mention the cost of $1 billion to $800 million. Where did you get that figure?

Mr. Rossetto: Fiscal year estimates for 1994-95 were $1.03 billion for the reserves overall and about $0.5 billion for the militia.

In fact, that's one issue that has really not been addressed directly. In the major aspect, most people do not realize the amount of money.... There has been discussion about what money goes where. I've heard the argument in both directions that money earmarked for the reserve really ends up in the pockets of the regulars, and regulars spend money for the reserves, so they therefore spend some of their allotment.

I really can't address that particular side of the issue. I'm just saying that of what is allocated and being spent, we are talking about a tenth of the defence budget.

Mr. Richardson: Your suggestion is on record now, and we have it both in writing and orally. You suggest that it will be more cost-effective. In what manner? Where do you see the cost-effective items? You gave us an oral description, but I didn't get some kind of strategy for cost-cutting there.

Mr. Rossetto: Look at the organization of reserve units overall. It has been admitted and reported any number of times that there is a heavy concentration of certain ranks and certain levels of experience that are really not deployable and not really field-ready, as compared with actual troops on the ground.

Say you have units that maintain a full complement of senior officers and yet have fifty parading soldiers, for example. What if we reduce those units to the size they actually have so that you don't have this overhead of a senior level?

I understand it's both at the officer.... It's understandable, to a large measure, because in any organization that meets over a number of years, it is bound to happen that those who continue to participate will gravitate toward the top end. But on the other hand, the reorganization of most militia units in fact does not reflect anything near the command element requirements of the size of force they carry. As long as you're willing to accept that overhead, you're going to have these outrageous costs going to something that is not necessarily militarily effective.

Mr. Richardson: What kind of training do their officers get in the militia?

Mr. Rossetto: Some - the very best - go into summer training, which is the same as the regular force, for two or three years. But then, when they go to the units.... When you have a unit that can only field a platoon, what is the major commanding?

Mr. Richardson: But there are such units in western Canada.

Mr. Rossetto: There are some units like that right across this country, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Well -

Mr. Rossetto: There are many.

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Mr. Richardson: I think some of the ones we have from the committee here are pretty strong. Some are pressing 400. Some of them marched into summer camp with 275. We haven't heard about this one that came with 2; it's quite possible it did.

What standard are they training to now?

Mr. Rossetto: That's exactly the point. In fact, look at numbers. I would suggest that when you look at numbers, you might inquire as to the difference between paper strength and actual parade numbers. Look at those people who are actually on the armoury floor, if you will, and available on a week-to-week basis, as opposed to those who flow through the reserves or just don't show up. There is a vast difference between the two.

As far as parades go, that may be fine, in large measure. It is not unusual in reserve service - I'm not an expert on this, mind you - to have more officers and senior NCOs on parade than actual troops.

What we're seeing, at least as far as UN employment, is that the soldiery is really required for phases one and two.

Mr. Richardson: One last question. How long does it take a regular-force person to work up before they are deployed? How much time are they given?

Mr. Rossetto: For UN operations, they get three months.

Mr. Richardson: That's right.

Mr. Rossetto: Those reserves that show up go out for three months.

Mr. Richardson: At their competency level, what's the difference when they come back?

Mr. Rossetto: I would assume they are the same, because otherwise they wouldn't be employed.

What we're seeing here is a difference about training individuals as opposed to training units.

Mr. Richardson: What is a unit but a compilation of individuals?

Mr. Rossetto: No, sir. When you are talking about deploying a seaman, as opposed to training a ship that can work as a ship, there's a vast difference, at least in my opinion.

Say you're talking about people who may even be in the infantry - take the example of what I am - who may be very good at their individual task. What happens when they are formed as a platoon, company, or battalion when those in command of and directing that battalion have never in fact done that?

Mr. Richardson: I'll take a pass on that.

Mr. Rossetto: That's fine.

Mr. Richardson: I'll take a pass, but I don't think you have it all straight yet.

Mr. Rossetto: Well, nobody has in this world.

The Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Bertrand (Pontiac - Gatineau - Labelle): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I read some of the report. Do you think that in the event of a natural disaster the local authorities have enough access to the reserves? If not, what can we do to change that?

Mr. Cameron: A province has access to the reserves through the attorney general, who requests that service. Do you mean below that?

Mr. Bertrand: Below that.

Mr. Cameron: You mean at the municipal level. I don't believe there is any legal way that a city can request the services of the armed forces, whether it's regular or reserve, except through the attorney general.

Mr. Bertrand: Do you think that's all right? For instance, say a natural disaster happens in Edmonton. The City of Edmonton feels they need the reserves, yet the attorney general of the province says no, because it would cost too much. We're basically talking about the cost involved. Do you think the city, under special circumstances, could itself ask for the reserves?

Mr. Cameron: If the federal government was willing to take up the cost. Somebody is going to have to pay. Say the municipality says they'll pay. Then, obviously, if they told that to the attorney general of the province, he would probably agree. It boils down to who is going to pay.

Mr. Rossetto: In Edmonton, to cite an example from the tornado, it was quite the opposite. In fact, there was one reserve unit in which the CO, on his own initiative, deployed his troop. He was brought up short for exactly that question.

First of all, there was no authority for it. Second, as for the liabilities involved in deploying soldiers under those circumstance, again, it's a legal problem. It's mostly the cost, one assumes.

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Mr. Hart: May I do a quick follow-up on that?

Last summer there was a fire very close to Penticton, and the attorney general called for military personnel. Instead of going an hour down the road, 60 kilometres or so, to ask for the Dragoons, I think they ended up coming from Winnipeg, regular forces.

So for me the big question is, when that move is made, why don't we use our reservists? To me that says there's something wrong with the structure and the mandate the reserve has right now.

Mr. Cameron: If you used the reserves in a situation such as that, then you would have to call them out, unless they volunteered to go.

I cite an occasion of the Winnipeg floods back in....

Mr. Richardson: In 1955.

Mr. Cameron: No, later than that. It was in the 1970s. We got volunteers from the militia, from Winnipeg and other places, to augment the regular-force units. But they had to be volunteers. There was no legislation in effect to call out the reserves.

Mr. Hart: Looking at restructuring the reserves, shouldn't they have a role to play in this emergency preparedness scenario within the province, where, instead of bringing in people from the regular force in Winnipeg, you would use people right in the local area at a reserve unit?

Mr. Cameron: Certainly. But again you would have to call them out from their civilian employment, or whatever, in order to do that.

Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): May I clarify this for my colleague's benefit, just as a matter of fact?

The attorney general doesn't go to the minister; he goes to the chief of the defence staff, and it's up to the chief of the defence staff to call out. If he thinks the reserves are best and they can afford to be paid, then he can call them out.

I don't remember a recent example where this has been done, for the reasons that I thinkMr. Rossetto gave - pay, liability, and sometimes, quite frankly, whether or not you would get the reserves if you called them out.

Mr. Richardson: They did that at Oka, by the way.

Mr. O'Reilly: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bertrand has the floor. He has been interrupted three times. Does he have the floor, or are we...?

The Chairman: Mr. O'Reilly, usually in situations like this, if there's a question out on the floor and somebody has something to tag onto it, bootlegging it in, if you want to call it that, we allow that to happen. We have done so in this committee. If we would like to have it changed, then we can make a motion and see -

Mr. O'Reilly: I've never sat on a committee in which everybody talks on everybody else's time, that's all. I'm quite happy to cut in at any time, then.

The Chairman: If it relates to the question at hand and if I allow it.

Mr. O'Reilly: Don't make the rules tough now.

Mr. Bertrand: It's still my turn.

I doubt if you can answer me, but this is a question on the National Guard in the United States. I know that when there is a disaster down there, they don't call the army or the reserves; they call out the National Guard.

In the event of a disaster, do you think that maybe we could give a role to the reservists something like that of the National Guard, or would it always boil down to the question of costs?

Mr. Gibson: We had a recent situation in Medicine Hat, with the floods there. The British forces were out immediately when the problem was identified. It took more than two days of negotiations before the local commander could get his volunteer troops out in uniform. They thought this was a great opportunity to show their presence in the community. Finally, the area commander allowed it on his own recognizance for a couple of days.

My understanding is that one of the basic reticences of the province calling out is that they get billed back in the same ratio as the costs are here. If it's $10 for a man's pay, then the bill comes in at $100 for a man's pay by the time all of the miscellaneous charges are lumped on. It takes it from being a practical cost to a....

Mr. Bertrand: An astronomical cost.

Mr. Gibson: Well, at least that's how it was described to me. I haven't been involved in the accounting of one of those.

The Chairman: The other thing we understand is that they don't pay it back, either. Most provinces never pay it.

Mr. Gibson: That figures.

Mr. Cameron: That's only P.E.I.

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The Chairman: No, British Columbia....

Mr. Bertrand: The provinces don't pay?

The Chairman: They don't pay it back. They're billed for it, but they never pay.

Mr. Bertrand: Why would they hesitate in calling them out then?

The Chairman: It's a game of why don't you ask questions every day in Question Period? Those are the rules. That's the way the process operates.

Mr. Cameron: As far as a national guard, of course there are the state national guards, which I believe, under legislation, the state governors can call out. When they are called out the individual must turn out by law. So it's slightly different from the situation here.

Mr. Rossetto: That also indicates their jobs are guaranteed. In some cases perhaps they will make up the difference between what they get paid when called out and whatever their regular employment is. It appears to be very easy.

If legislation were passed, first of all, to force the reservists to go out and cover the difference, then you might have a working situation.

The Chairman: Mr. Frazer.

Mr. Frazer: Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, you mentioned in your briefing - and I think Colonel Gibson mentioned it as well - that the number of brigades recommended by the commission should be increased from seven to at least eight to recognize the size of the west. Is that the reason?

Mr. Cameron: Yes. Because of the size of the west, the number should be increased to cover all that area and all the militia units within it. As was also brought out, if we increase them we will probably have to increase in the other areas to compensate. But again, it's a matter of financing.

Mr. Frazer: Yes, I understand that. I'm concerned because at a quick glance the number of brigades were mostly based on population in the four regions that have been addressed here, including the Atlantic region, the Quebec region, the Ontario region and the west. Therefore, rather than adding another brigade, couldn't those brigades just be wider spread? They would still belong to the brigade, but would respond to the relative parity and population that would be in the area.

Mr. Cameron: Do you mean increase in strength or...?

Mr. Frazer: No. I'm asking whether you need a third brigade in the west. Could you do it with two and just spread them a little more thinly? The population basically reflects a need for that.

Mr. Cameron: Yes, I realize the recommendation was based on population, but it didn't look at the geography of the west.

Mr. Frazer: But there's no reason why you couldn't have part of a brigade in Winnipeg and another part in Regina, for instance. They could belong to the same brigade. Granted, there is a distance problem there, but with transportation today, the commanders could quite easily get back and forth to establish standards.

Mr. Cameron: Yes.

Mr. Frazer: The reason I'm asking is because I think the seven brigades were probably based on cutting down the overhead, the infrastructure that runs the costs way up. It also struck me that if the districts were reduced from 14 to 7 it would save an awful lot of money that could then go to the armoury floor, which you mentioned a number of times.

Mr. Gibson: You'll have a brigade in British Columbia with the Rockie Mountains as a physical divide. From there you would go right to the Lakehead. Right?

Mr. Frazer: Yes.

Mr. Gibson: That's a tremendous distance for purportedly part-time soldiers to effectively travel. We have enough problems getting people from Calgary to Wainwright for other than summer exercises. It's a 5.5 hour trip each way if everything works out right. To get any cohesive training at that distance is impossible.

The overhead costs aren't so much from the area command down; it's the minimum of an additional 30% miscellaneous overhead that's not visible. People know it exists. It shows up in all the numbers, but nobody can point a finger to it.

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Area commanders and even some former commanders of the army said the percentage of the total budget that was allocated and that they could identify was very small.

Mr. Cameron: If you had just two brigades, moving people for collective training great distances would certainly be more expensive than if you had three brigades moving a short distance for collective training.

Mr. Frazer: But this was my question: where would the collective training be done in the west other than at Wainwright?

Mr. Cameron: At Dundurn.

Mr. Frazer: Now we're not that far apart here.

Mr. Cameron: There are Dundurn, Suffield, the Chilcotins and Chilliwack, if it still remains.

Mr. Frazer: Oh, absolutely, but now I think we're talking another brigade. You mentioned a possible brigade in B.C. that would use the Chilcotins, Chilliwack and so on, but the prairie brigade, the other brigade, would probably use Wainwright. Suffield is another one. I won't dwell on that, but I wonder whether we do in fact need that third brigade.

Incidentally, gentlemen, I'm sure you've recognized that you aren't here accidentally. We wanted a divergence of views and I think we certainly got it with the three of you sitting here. That is part of the reason you're here.

Colonel Cameron, when you said supplementary reserves should ideally be formed into units and into specialist elements and formations, did you by any chance determine what that would cost in extra funding?

Mr. Cameron: I don't think it would cost very much. If you've got the computer program set up and a person transfers to the supplementary reserve from the regular force or the primary reserve, it's a matter of posting him to a unit nearest to where he's going on the supplementary list vis-à-vis posting him on the computer to a number position.

Mr. Frazer: But does he ever report? Does he have any affiliation with that unit or is he just merely assigned to them, and if so what does it accomplish?

Mr. Cameron: He's affiliated with the unit, and, as I mentioned, it would be ideal to encourage associations to be formed by those units. There would be no cost in associations, as there is now in getting together.

Mr. Frazer: But I'm wondering how you establish that association without that individual actually hitching up with the unit that he or she is assigned to and establishing something -

Mr. Cameron: You would have to encourage people within that unit to form associations. That's quite true.

Mr. Frazer: I think there might be a cost entailed there.

Major Rossetto, with regard to your proposal, I think you said a year of regular force training followed by two to three weeks annually in the following five years, to presumably upgrade the training or keep the skills up. Is that what you mean?

Mr. Rossetto: Yes. The actual details of the training can best be left to those who are more highly qualified in it. But perhaps basic training with the regular force or with a unit -

Mr. Frazer: Yes.

Mr. Rossetto: - that does it full-time is suggested.

I think some of the people got hung up about taking training out of the hands of the reserves and putting it into the hands of regulars. I think that escapes the main thrust, which is to have all reservists trained to a certain standard after a certain period of training and working with the regular force to establish that level of knowledge.

Then the follow-on can actually be in any number of fashions. We suggest that it be as flexible as possible to enable people to choose another straight period of work related to the regulars or to let those who want to break it up. It can be pre-programmed into a person's individual plan for schooling or employment so that it isn't haphazard. Once you come to that agreement, if you agreed that next year you are going to go out for four weeks or six weeks, you're going to be there and that's the main thrust of the point. Then after a certain period of commitment you would be absolved.

Mr. Frazer: Once these people have done their year of regular training or have been brought up to the skill level required, would they be assigned to units or would they just disappear and come back every few months for additional training?

Mr. Rossetto: Again, it has been suggested that both aspects could be followed. Those who live close to reserve units could join them and could work with them other than when they have to go off and do their service. Or in fact they could disappear until their next period comes up.

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The difficulty with many reservists and their service is that many live far away from reserve units, and therefore there's no opportunity at all for them to participate in any reserve type training or service. This is one way of overcoming that difficulty.

Mr. Frazer: In your submission you also mentioned changing the system to reflect the rank, the numbers, and the structures. Let's suppose we're talking about a unit where there is only a platoon available, with 30 or 35 people. Under your submission, that unit would be commanded by a captain?

Mr. Rossetto: Or a lieutenant.

Mr. Frazer: Where would that individual's supervision come from?

Mr. Rossetto: If that unit, in the way we have discussed it, is a platoon size, it is part of a larger entity that supposedly builds up to this brigade. Therefore, he or she answers to that superior officer.

Mr. Frazer: So they would form part of a battalion.

Mr. Rossetto: They would have to. You wouldn't have a platoon sitting by itself, lost. It would have to be part of a larger organization, but at least it would be a real organization with real people.

Mr. Frazer: One of the recommendations the commission made, as you will see, is that they thought that more important even than pay was the realistic training; that is, a real sergeant commanding a real section and a lieutenant or a captain commanding a real platoon.

Did you by any chance notice recommendation 33? You were talking about reservists not being available. In the report the commission talked about obligation to serve.

The Commission recommends that, on being recruited, a reservist be made to sign a clearly worded contract, setting out his or her training and other obligations and the effect on pay if these obligations are not fulfilled, and providing a commitment on behalf of the Canadian Forces to guarantee a stated minimum number of training days.

Did you read that and did you agree with it?

Mr. Rossetto: I saw that and I took it as a compliment that perhaps we had contributed something to that report.

Mr. Frazer: I see. So you're relatively happy with that.

Mr. Rossetto: Yes, as long as it's actually a working contract.

Mr. Frazer: As long as it's enforced, you mean?

Mr. Rossetto: That's right.

In fact, some years ago when I was working in Edmonton at LFWA headquarters, I was shocked when a reservist was actually charged for being AWOL, or AWAL, as some people might know it. This was the first time it had happened in years. So it's not just the regulation but the imposition of those regulations.

Mr. Frazer: Colonel Gibson, how do you feel about that one? Do you support that requirement?

Mr. Gibson: If it's clear and consistent, I don't see a problem with it.

Mr. Frazer: Is it workable? Would people join the reserves and submit to that discipline?

Mr. Gibson: Yes, if the quid pro quo is that they're getting what they're joining for, which is a certain amount and type of training.

Mr. Cameron: Yes, I agree with that.

Mr. Rossetto: May I ask why you would want anyone else? Why would you want someone who is not necessarily going to be there?

Mr. Frazer: No, I agree.

Colonel Gibson, in our discussion with the commissioners when we were briefed on it, you mentioned a couple of times that you thought that rather than dealing with numbers, the commission should deal with costs. It was my understanding from the commissioners that this was in fact what they were doing.

They proposed deleting some of the hierarchy in the rank structures, decreasing the district headquarters, and cutting down the number of senior officers. What they quoted was that for every lieutenant colonel's pay you can put four privates on the floor. So they thought the $14,500 that is currently established for the militia could in fact be extended quite substantially beyond that, not to the $20,000 you were talking about but to $16,000 or $16,500.

Mr. Gibson: I certainly didn't get that impression from the report. If that's what their thoughts were, we certainly would agree with that.

Mr. Frazer: That's what they gave us as their rationale.

Is that not correct, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Frazer: I'm also interested because yesterday we had some young officers here giving a proposal, and what they said was similar to what you said. They felt the cost of the reserves should be based on their role and their needs or requirements for the regulars. They also suggested that there should be a study done to see how the whole issue fits together.

I guess I'm a little hurt by that because I thought we spent the better part of a year on the special joint commission trying to establish just what the Canadian defence force was supposed to do. Although we weren't able to go into detail on the reserves, we thought we had established that the reserves were there to assist the regular force wherever possible. You don't support that, I guess?

Mr. Gibson: First, I think the mandate in the white paper for the regular force and the majority of the mandate for reserves was well defined. I don't have a problem with that. Where I have the difficulty is, in making that mandate the priority, how do you service it from the front working up? Such a tremendous burden of the costs falls between the areas of major capital appropriations and payroll, and those aren't being focused on. That's my problem.

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Mr. Frazer: Again, the commissioners in their briefing - I was trying to find it in the report and I can't, but I think it was Charlie Belzile's quote - used the term of ``stove-piping'' money to the armoury floor to be sure that amount of money went down there. I think it was incorporated in their pitch that there should be four days of training per month for every month between September and May, guaranteed to the people.

Mr. Gibson: And they've identified that. All I'm saying is even ten brigades, which is 20,600 people approximately, still only use up, using the maximum amount - ten days of courses, fourteen days of summer training, forty days of regular training and six full-time positions for every unit, even if there were sixty people - just over $80,000 a year in payroll, and that's an insignificant portion of the budget. If you take the amount that's shown, I'm sure triple that is shown as payroll.

I'm saying cut the other two-thirds out as a matter of course. Start at the unit level. Let the area commander say this is what they need, and then say nobody else needs any unless they can convince me they need it. I think you'd get rid of tremendous....

I'm not saying it's being misspent, but it's certainly being improperly explained.

Mr. Frazer: Yes. These young officers have done basically what you're saying. They started from the armoury floor and worked up. They came with what they figured was a more representative cost for the militia, and it was $500 million as opposed to the $750 million to $1.03 billion that's proposed here.

Mr. Rossetto: The militia itself is slated at $0.5 billion. The $1.03 billion is for the reserves, both navy and army, and for communications as well. So those figures aren't that different.

Mr. Gibson: We went through the exercise with a number of different people, some in the militia, some ex-militia, to come up with the structure of these hypothetical ten brigade groups and also for the seven. The pay cost is $58 million for seven and $82 million for ten. What I'm saying is the $82 million is just over half of the rounding off that occurred during the commission's study.

Mr. Frazer: They gave us a ballpark figure of $0.75 billion, and they couldn't substantiate how they came to that figure, but it's substantially less than the $1.03 billion you quoted.

Mr. Rossetto: That's just the estimate for this year, which is not necessarily.... They were citing actually spent money, I believe, was it not?

Mr. Frazer: Yes, and this was not militia. This was the whole reserve program, so it was interesting.

That's about all I have for now.

Mr. Mifflin: I want to again, like my colleagues, welcome the gentlemen who are here before us and commend them on their interest and the detailed papers they've prepared. I've had a chance to scan through them, though I haven't read them in detail. I thank you very much for your input.

Your job of course is to have a look at the report and tell us what you don't like about it and what you do like about it. Our job, as I'm sure you know, is to table the report in Parliament with our recommendations, and it's not going to be a simple task.

I have to tell you where we're coming from, just to bring you up to speed. Most of the members here were members of the special joint committee, and we were imbued with the importance of the reserves. We found we were getting so interested in it that it was beginning to overwhelm our report, so we had to put a stop to it and say really we need to have a special look at this.

So we are, like you in a sense, the victims of the setting, and whether we fight the setting or not is something we have to decide in camera.

At least in my perimeter of thinking, we have to assess whether the committee responded to their terms of reference as given, from the first instance as the committee, and we perhaps don't need much help with that.

.1655

I was intrigued with some of your comments and, Mr. Chairman, if I could, my first round will be just points of clarification.

First, Major Rossetto, you mentioned - I don't have a thin skin and I don't think any members of this committee do. You blamed politicians for not coming forward with legislation. In fact, we became quite brave during the special joint committee. We were almost prepared to make that recommendation, even without the study, and I think there was consensus in the committee.

It was the reservists who said, no, no, please don't do that because the reservists won't be hired and militia people won't be hired; it's a real problem. And we're still getting that. There are some pretty important reservists and honorary colonels who say they're not so sure about this recommendation. We've had that since we started the committee, so please don't blame us. We're prepared to go the route on this one, but there are some reservations in your ranks about this final recommendation, which I think is one of the most important recommendations of the study.

Mr. Rossetto: Agreed.

There are two parts of the legislation question that have been left hanging, at least in my view. One is the part that obliges reservists to actually serve and the other one is the part you're alluding to in regard to guaranteeing their employment.

Mr. Mifflin: Yes.

Mr. Rossetto: The statement I made before was an example. That's how the Americans find it easier in calling out their troops -

Mr. Mifflin: Indeed.

Mr. Rossetto: - one of the ways - and I'm not sure whether you can address it or not. That's why, if it's not addressed legislatively, at least the structure and administrative structure could be set up so that reservists are obliged to serve. I think I see where you're heading, in that they would feel it would have a negative input in their employment.

Mr. Mifflin: After all, as much as a reservist is part of the total force concept, his major bread and butter comes from his civilian job, and if we proceed without that cognizance then we may be doing the reservists and militiamen a disservice. I'm very concerned about how we go forward, and how we go forward will be largely determined by the kinds of witnesses and what their reactions are.

How do you three feel about the legislation? You haven't actually addressed it as a recommendation. Do you fully support recommendation number 41 in the report?

Mr. Rossetto: I suggest that perhaps rather than legislation, an administrative system could be set up that would force the reservists to show up under certain instances. I recognize that every Tuesday or Wednesday night they can't guarantee their employer they won't be there, but they can guarantee that under certain instances they would be available. In fact, they can build up in their own personal.... Without that, what reserves do you really have?

Mr. Mifflin: But we have the Canadian forces liaison council that has now embarked on what I think - and I've had some personal experience acting on behalf of the minister on several occasions in their meetings, the most recent one being in New Brunswick about a month or so ago when Frank McKenna proclaimed a reserve weekend and made what I think are tremendous strides. In my opinion, they are proceeding in a nicely aggressive way. Do you believe their work would balance any reservations one has with recommendation number 41?

Mr. Rossetto: Yes.

Mr. Mifflin: I couch my language. I'm not going to ask you what you think of the Canadian forces liaison council. I don't think that's a fair question. But I am asking you if this is the kind of administrative procedure you have in mind.

Mr. Rossetto: The SCRR itself was unsatisfied with the production of that particular system.

Mr. Mifflin: Very clearly. They gave statistics and they didn't mince words at all in the report.

Mr. Rossetto: They said only 175 -

Mr. Mifflin: Absolutely.

Mr. Rossetto: To that end, more that can be done in that action also should be encouraged, but I suggest that if that's the type of reaction and effect we've had over the years with that particular process, one can question what actually.... First of all, from what I understand, the federal government is the worst offender.

Mr. Mifflin: Absolutely.

Mr. Rossetto: Well, how can you possibly expect the employer to do anything else?

Mr. Mifflin: We may be able to assist in that regard. We'll have to talk to our friendly chairman to see if we can make recommendations that are outside the purview of the report, but I won't bore the committee with that right now.

What about the other two gentlemen? Do you all have the same opinion about the legislation?

Mr. Cameron: I gather there is concern in some quarters about the legislation. Employers in small businesses might be reluctant to hire reservists because they might be called out and the businesses would not be able to operate unless given a substantial amount as compensation.

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So there is, I think, this concern amongst many.

Mr. Mifflin: God forbid, but if you were a politician, which way would you proceed?

Mr. Cameron: Well, if there were a lot of reservists working for the government, I'd proceed right away.

Mr. Mifflin: Colonel Cameron, you're conspicuous by your silence on this.

Mr. Gibson: The majority of the people I've spoken to who are employers - and this is primarily in southern Alberta - already provide voluntarily what's being talked about. They seem to be the ones who have the greatest resistance to the legislation, because they assume some others won't appreciate it.

From my own point of view, I would sooner see it legislated so there's a GST kind of equality to it all. It may not be liked and it may have some problems, but it will certainly work through the system. It's not a lot different from giving women time off to have babies. There was a lot of resistance to that.

Mr. Mifflin: So we may be breaking new ground?

Mr. Rossetto: The Australians do compensate the employer for absence of the reservist, so obviously it can be overcome.

Mr. Mifflin: I can assure you we have the courage to go ahead with this, but we must have some support from the witnesses.

Mr. Gibson, maybe I misunderstood you, but you left the impression that you couldn't relate the employment of the reserves to a master plan and mobilization. I realize we don't really have a mobilization plan, and that's probably what you meant, but certainly in the white paper the definitions of mobilization phases one through four are spelled out very clearly. So I'm comfortable with that. I just wondered if there was something I wasn't understanding.

Mr. Gibson: That was Colonel Cameron.

Mr. Mifflin: I'm sorry; yes.

Mr. Cameron: What I was getting at was that over and above that, from a complete federal government plan, there's -

Mr. Mifflin: No general mobilization plan.

Mr. Cameron: No.

Mr. Mifflin: No, that's right. And you'll recall, Colonel, that one of the suggestions made in this report is that there be one. I don't think anybody disagrees with that.

Mr. Cameron: Yes, but all we're doing is reinforcing that and saying it must take in every aspect.

Mr. Mifflin: Okay.

I'd like to ask you some specific questions now, and then I have one final one.

I realize I'm running out of time here, Mr. Chairman.

Do you support the main organizational recommendation, and that's recommendation 6, that essentially you go from the area system to the brigade system?

Mr. Cameron: Yes.

Mr. Mifflin: That's good.

Do you support recommendation 8, which in fact gives the criteria for the priority of deciding how you make that move?

Mr. Cameron: The criteria that are laid down?

Mr. Mifflin: Yes.

Mr. Cameron: Yes, very much so.

Mr. Mifflin: Good.

For my final question, then, I think I'm going to have to go back to Major Rossetto.

What do you have against cadets?

Mr. Rossetto: Nothing. I wasn't asked.

Oh, in the report?

Mr. Mifflin: Yes, in your report. That's the first time I've seen somebody make that kind of recommendation. You've made it basically because, as you say in your report, you feel we're taking money away from what I presume you mean would otherwise go to the reserves.

Mr. Rossetto: Oh, in that sense, yes. It wasn't the cadets themselves.

Mr. Mifflin: No, no.

Mr. Rossetto: In fact it's peculiar to me. A movement that has been established and recommended for youth and citizenship is being funded strictly from defence dollars. If that's a worthwhile item, then I would suggest the money for that should be found somewhere else, unless it is in someone's book that it is allocated as extra money. That's the only....

Mr. Mifflin: I don't have the figures with me, and I'm a bit embarrassed I don't, as the parliamentary secretary, but I can assure you it's precious little money. It's not very much money at all.

We in our special joint committee made the recommendation that we believe there should be a little bit more put in it. We were all surprised that the white paper said they were going to do that. They haven't done it yet, but this report also says the biggest bang for your buck is the cadet organization and you should follow what it says here.

We have three reports saying we have to do more for cadets, and I think you would support that too.

Mr. Rossetto: I wasn't implying that money shouldn't go to cadets. What I would suggest is allocate the proper amounts from the proper sources.

Mr. Mifflin: Are there any other comments you want to make on the areas I've looked at?

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Mr. Gibson: I'd like to make one supporting comment on cadets. I think it's fundamental to the whole structure of cadets, the militia, and the regulars that we bear in mind that the opportunity of Canadian citizens to participate one way or another in the forces, even if they don't become an active soldier in Bosnia, is helpful throughout their life and across the board.

Mr. Mifflin: That's great. Thank you.

Colonel, have you anything more to add?

Mr. Cameron: I'm very much in agreement.

Mr. Mifflin: Good. That's nice to hear. It's a good note on which to end the testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: If there are no further questioners, I will thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here today. It's certainly been a worthwhile exercise. As you can see, we have many questions; we have many solutions to come to before we table this report in the House, whatever day that will be. Of course, as Mr. Mifflin suggested, we have to sit together in some in camera sessions and thrash some of these things out.

I thank you for your input; it was very much appreciated. We will probably be calling on you in the future. Thank you.