[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, December 5, 1995
[English]
The Chairman: Welcome, everybody. We'll continue pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), a study of the report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.
Today we have before us two sets of witnesses. First we'll hear from Mr. John Craig Eaton, chairman of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council. Along with being a member of numerous boards and councils, Mr. Eaton is also the honorary colonel of 400 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron, air reserve, based in Toronto. Mr. Eaton, of course, is no stranger to us. We're all well aware of the important work he has been doing on behalf of Canada's reserves over the years.
Also with Mr. Eaton is Mr. Léo Desmarteau, executive director of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council.
Gentlemen, you may proceed with your presentation, and we'll go around the table afterwards with questions and comments.
Mr. John C. Eaton (National Chairman, Canadian Forces Liaison Council): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I wish to thank you very much for the opportunity to address this committee on the important subject of job protection legislation.
Quite obviously, we are appearing before you as a consequence of the recommendation made by the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves for the adoption of job protection legislation. I would like to state the position of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council on the subject of support and protection of reservists by their employer, and focus on the issue of legislation.
I wish to make it very clear from the beginning that the council does not support legislation to protect the employment of reservists, except in war or during emergencies declared under the Emergencies Act. We certainly appreciate the needs of reservists and we are prepared to volunteer our help to obtain their support. We feel, however, that there is little to be gained and much to be lost with the use of legislation. The extremely positive response of business and industry to the appeal of the council leads us to believe that employers are prepared to support their employees, reservists, without being forced by legislation.
The council consists of 15 senior business executives who volunteer their services to reach Canadian business and industry executives to inform them of how they can benefit from having reservists as their employees. In return, we ask employers to provide those employees with the leave required to participate in military training and operations.
The council is in a growth period, as we are currently in the process of establishing provincial committees to expand the work of the council. By the summer of 1996, we should have close to100 volunteers involved in the work of the council across the country. The council is supported by a network of 14 liaison officers, who provide a vital link between the council and military organizations across the country. Support for the council is provided by a secretariat of 8 personnel at the Department of National Defence here in Ottawa.
The issues of employer support and job protection surface from time to time when the use of reserve force is discussed. Such was the case in the mid-1970s, and this led to the creation of the council's predecessor, the National Employer Support Committee. The matter was raised again in the mid-1980s, and this led to the revitalization of the employer support program and the creation of the CFLC, the Canadian Forces Liaison Council. It is worth noting that at the same time, the question of job protection legislation was thoroughly studied and the resulting report yielded the current Canadian policy on job protection legislation.
The council undertook to re-energize its approach in April 1993, which means that it is still in its development mode. Caution must be exercised in judging the support of employers exclusively by the results achieved in the first two years of the operation of the council.
In approaching employers, the council draws attention to the managerial skills, values, and trade skills acquired by reservists that are transferable to their civilian employment. In return, employers are asked to adopt a military leave policy that allows employees to get a leave of two weeks yearly to participate in an annual exercise, perhaps offers the difference between civilian and military pay to avoid loss of income, and perhaps provides additional time to attend courses and a leave without pay for up to twelve months to participate in operational missions.
In the past two and a half years the council has implemented six programs to reach employers and convey its message. Outreach allows the council to reach a large number of employers through mail-outs, presentations to groups, and articles in business publications. ExecuTrek brings employers to see reservists in training. Ombudsman helps to prevent conflicts and assist in their resolution. Awards ensures the recognition of supportive employers. Reservist Employment Assistance facilitates the hiring of reservists. Reserve Unit Support provides individual reservists and their units with the instruments to develop and maintain a good relationship with employers. This last program will be used to reach employers of reservists.
As we approach employers to ask their support, it is important to understand that leave requirements can take various forms, depending on the military operation. Of course there are wartime and peacetime emergencies, annual training exercises, courses, domestic operations and tasking, and operations abroad. For each of those, reservists will need to ask their employer for time off, which will vary in length from a few days to two weeks and up to one year. In some cases, such as the annual exercise, the reservists may ask for leave with pay or for the difference between the civilian and military pay to avoid loss of income.
The vast majority of reservists perceive legislation as the ultimate response to their need for support and protection, particularly since they know of the existence of legislation in the United States. When these reservists realize that job protection can result in discriminatory hiring practices or hindering of career progression, as was the case in the United States, opinions change.
Reservists who ask for legislation often do not realize that they would be required to give their employers advance notice of their leave requirements. In the current Canadian context this would be extremely difficult because the information is seldom available early enough to meet what would be established as a legal requirement of notice.
A large percentage of reservists are unaware of the work of the council and the results that have been achieved in employer support. The main vehicle used to inform reservists has only just been put in place, in the spring of 1995. Once reservists become aware of the positive response of employers to requests for their support, they usually prefer to employ a voluntary rather than a legislated approach.
The approach used by the council actually encourages employers to consider a partnership with the military. Within this perspective, employers develop a positive attitude toward military training that often leads to career enhancement for the reservists. As reservists are apprised of the potential of this relationship, they understand that legislation often destroys the possibility of the partnership.
The experience of other countries in dealing with job protection legislation can provide us with useful information. Although we have not had an opportunity to review the matter in detail, in 1994 the United States adopted new legislation on employment and re-employment that provides comprehensive coverage. One of the significant changes to the legislation is the introduction of clauses to deal with the discriminatory hiring practices that resulted from the previous legislation. In spite of the new legislation, CFLC's American counterpart must deal with 300 ombudsman cases monthly, some of which still include discrimination in hiring.
In the United Kingdom, provision for the safeguard of employment in the 1985 Reserve Forces Act, which applies when reservists are issued a call-out, is still in effect and will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future. The British policy on job protection legislation is similar to the current Canadian position. New measures are being considered to assist both the reservists and their employers to deal with increases in call-out.
With its 1973 Volunteers Employment Protection Act, New Zealand has found that legislation used to coerce employers is potentially counter-productive and that its value lies in providing moral leadership to employers and political support to the reservists.
In Canada there has been no legislation for other than the Second World War and the Korean War. We have had to depend on the voluntary support of employers for all reservist requirements. In the past two and a half years the council has been very active in establishing an employer support program. While we are still in the developmental mode, we are pleased to report that significant results have been achieved and that these results are sufficient to suggest that legislation is not necessary.
In its new form, the council has distributed information on the reserve force to more than 250,000 employers. During the past three years, more than 1,500 employers have visited reservists in training.
The CFLC currently lists 1,830 supportive employers who are prepared to consider sympathetically any request for leave from employees who are reservists. Indications of this support are given by employers through letters to the council, statements of support or military leave policies in the company.
A total of 238 employers are known to have a military leave policy, and 106 of those have filed a copy of their policy with the council. To these numbers should be added employers who have leave policies that can accommodate military leave without a specific reference. With a statement of support or a military leave policy, 775 employers have formally registered their support with the council.
In addition to the annual two weeks leave, 44% of these employers are prepared to top up the salary, 65% to grant twelve months of leave, and 84% to grant additional time for courses and to participate in operations.
The council is involved in a number of exciting projects that will yield valuable results. Measures have been taken, mostly through the Reserve Unit Support program, to focus our attention on employers of reservists. These employers will be reached by mail. They will be invited by their employees to attend an ExecuTrek and some of them will be given awards through our awards program.
The council was recently successful in obtaining a formal commitment to support the reserve from the province of New Brunswick. This support was formally declared publicly on a dedicated reserve day in October. I am pleased to announce that similar events will probably take place in Saskatchewan in April of 1996 and possibly in Ontario in the fall of 1996. We have yet, sir, to hear from Newfoundland.
These significant achievements with provincial governments, added to breakthroughs with municipal governments such as Riverview, St. John's and Ottawa, will undoubtedly help to prove that employers are prepared to support the reserve.
The council strongly believes that the current policy for the protection and support of reservists is adequate. Employment must be protected with legislation in cases of emergencies in wartime or in peacetime, and I believe that employers are prepared to accept legislation under those circumstances. The Department of National Defence should develop the draft legislation and have it ready for use as needed. I believe that a decision was recently made in DND to proceed with this project.
For all other instances where we are dealing with voluntary service by reservists, the support of employers should be voluntary. Should the government consider proceeding with legislation, it will be necessary to assess the financial implications of compensation for employers, the constitutional complications of dealing with labour practices, which are a matter of provincial jurisdiction, and the legal issues of exemptions and exceptions to the legislation.
I would be remiss if I did not address the situation in the federal government. The federal government currently has a military leave policy for its employees who are reservists. A number of difficulties have been encountered by federal civil servants, and it would indeed be highly desirable for the national government to show leadership in providing adequate support and protection.
Currently the provision of military leave is at the discretion of each department, as stipulated in the Treasury Board policy. This should be made mandatory. Leave for courses and special training is provided as leave without pay. Again, this should be corrected so the reservists will not be penalized for taking courses.
There is no provision in the policy for long-term leave to participate in military operations. While such leave was provided in relation to the Gulf War, there is no formal statement of the policy. There should be a clear statement of leave policy to avoid confusion.
Finally, a number of difficulties have arisen as a result of ignorance of the existence of the military leave policy by lower levels of management. It would serve the purpose to undertake a promotional campaign within the federal government to increase awareness of the military leave policy.
The council has discussed the question of legislation on several occasions over the past few years. In their deliberations, members of the council have seriously considered the request on the part of the reservists for job protection legislation and agree that it looks very appealing. But in considering all the evidence and implications, they have concluded that legislation would not necessarily provide all the protection required and that much of the support of business and industry could be lost as a result of the legislation.
The council has observed the work done in other countries and has found evidence supporting the use of a mostly voluntary approach to employer support. The results achieved by the council in a relatively short period of time argue most strongly in favour of the voluntary approach. The council believes that legislation is required only for wartime and peacetime emergencies. The council believes that the use of legislation for any other purpose would be to the detriment of reservists.
Mr. Chairman, this has been respectfully submitted.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Eaton. You certainly leave no doubt in our minds. Your stand has been the same throughout the times you've appeared before this committee when I've been on it, and I'm sure this is going to bring up many questions and comments.
Mr. Jacob, do you want to start?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob (Charlesbourg): Welcome, Mr. Eaton, and thank you for your presentation.
Throughout your presentation, it was clear that you had no intention of supporting a legislation that would require employers to give special treatment to members of the reserve. You support a more open approach.
My question deals with the participation of members of the reserve to some peace and other missions. We know that members of the reserve rarely account for more than 25, 27 or 30% of the strength of these missions. In your view, is that approach, which was set up as a kind of partnership and did not give positive results, too costly?
[English]
Mr. Eaton: Mr. Jacob, I maintain that throughout history in Canada, there has never been legislation to provide job protection for the militia in peacetime. We have always depended on volunteers and volunteerism, and business and industry have always been supportive of the volunteer program. If it were to be otherwise, I think we would lose a lot of the support of business and industry.
I hope that answers your question.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: If your theory is essentially based on voluntary service, both by the employer and the member of the reserve, I wonder how this situation could improve, given the fact that about 60% of jobs depend on small businesses which, in my view, do not necessarily have the same sense of volunteering or sharing as big corporations, the government or some municipalities. Do you know any other way to ensure the participation of small businesses that already are the largest important employer and that up to now have not had a very high level of participation?
[English]
Mr. Eaton: We do have support from big business, medium-sized business and small business. When we talk of small business, though, we have to make sure that the training period for the reservists is in a slack time for the smaller businessman. It is a concern we address from time to time, but we seem to have been able to maintain the support of the small business community. They, for whatever reason, are very opposed to legislation.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I understand that it is end is the Canadian mindset to resort to legislation. However, even though you are telling me that small businesses could favour this approach, such is not really the case.
You are saying that the training could be done during periods where the workload is lighter. If a member of the reserve agreed to go on a peace mission, would he get his job back upon his return? There is presently no incentive allowing that person to go on a mission. Past experience in the case of small businesses tends to prove that quite often, you cannot get your job back. Because of this, many reservists will refuse to take part in a mission. I cannot see how the present situation could go on.
Perhaps you could make some recommendations to us. Given the present situation, after having read the report and given that we want to enhance the role of reservists, increase their strength, make them more effective and more competitive and rationalize the costs, some things will have to be added.
You want to persuade us that your approach is the right one, but the facts are there. The use of reserve personnel could be enhanced by some incentive. I do not know of any that would do the trick, but I would like you to suggest one to us.
[English]
Mr. Eaton: I don't have the answer to that. You can bring up a particular instance you may know of, sir, where a small business has lost a very integral person to the armed forces, or on the other hand you may have an instance where in a small business the person who is a reservist has had to leave the armed forces to maintain his job. There has to be give and take.
We can't solve every individual problem, but the majority of problems, yes. You understand that on the one side it's the choice of the individual. If he wishes to do the peacekeeping, then he may have to leave his job. If on the other hand he wants to keep his job, he leaves the reserves, voluntarily again. You were talking about a tiny part. We can't say 100%.
Mr. Jacob: Thank you. I'll be back.
Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): I want to welcome Mr. Eaton and the colonel. Nice to see you again. Thank you for the presentation.
I was delighted to share that rather special weekend in New Brunswick with you, the colonels, some reservists and your executive. I thought it was an excellent weekend. I think it showed the strength of the organization you represent, and you know I'm a great supporter of it. So that will probably indicate where my questions are coming from.
I want to clarify this: I understand the Americans have essentially the kind of legislation that is being proposed by the commission, but the Brits, the New Zealanders and the Australians do not have it. Am I clear on that?
Mr. Eaton: That's correct.
Mr. Mifflin: In your dealings with other countries, have you found they are doing something along the lines of what we are doing to encourage reserves?
Mr. Eaton: We had a conference, Admiral, in June of this year dealing with employer support, to which 11 countries, a number of NATO partners, came. For the most part, those countries that had legislation wished they did not. Some countries had had legislation and had abandoned it. Those countries that didn't have legislation were more than happy to remain with the volunteer aspect. They feel it's a much better way of approaching the problem in the 1990s and into the 21st century.
Mr. Mifflin: There are a number of paradoxes and a number of contradictions. Let me just run through some of them for you.
I'm speaking now as a member of the special joint committee; there are five of us here at this table. When we started our special joint committee into national defence a year and a half ago, we were under the impression there would be very strong support for legislation. In fact, we found that from the senior reservists, the militia, and naval reserves, it was very difficult to find anybody who supported the legislation. But we felt that once the commission had gone to work and put their report together, there would be a change of heart.
We haven't found that yet. We are in fact finding what you are reporting to us: there is concern out there. We haven't heard it restricted to small business, but I think my colleagues will bear me out. We really have a lot of difficulty in this committee finding support from the witnesses we have seen for the legislation that has been proposed.
So my question to you is this: how much time did you spend with the commissioners? Why do you think it was difficult for you to convince them that your organization is working to achieve roughly the same goal that the legislation would achieve, with far less risk and downsizing? What do you think led them to the recommendations they made?
Mr. Eaton: The CFLC made one presentation to the commission. The commission sat in a number of cities across Canada. I've been told that at each commission hearing there was a reservist, usually a young person, who put forward the wish that reservists wanted job protection legislation. Having heard it at each presentation, wherever the commission sat, I believe they felt they were honour-bound to put something in their report suggesting that reservists, in large numbers, wanted legislation. We find very much the opposite when speaking to a large number of reservists.
Perhaps one of the most potent things is that if it's volunteer, everybody knows upfront if you have an employee with a responsibility to his or her unit in the reserves. On the other hand, if there is job protection or some legislation and you are talking about somebody being interviewed for a job, if that person has a requirement to the reserves but a second person comes in to ask for the job and has no such requirement, the second person will probably get it over the person who has responsibilities to the reserves, because it means time off. If that's the legislation, the person who doesn't have it will get the job.
This is the job discrimination, and gentlemen and ladies, I think it's very difficult to prove discrimination in an interview for a job. So if you have the job protection, in many instances you might hurt the opportunity of a reservist getting a job.
It's a fact of life that this kind of discrimination exists in the United States today, with all of the protection they can build into their legislation. As I mentioned, 300 cases a month having to do with discrimination in the job place are brought up to Léo's counterpart in the United States.
With that as a background, why would you want to bring that upon us when business and industry, and now governments, are becoming much more sympathetic to our needs with reservists in the military, regardless of where they are, the navy, the air force, or the army?
Mr. Mifflin: I think that's very good. Thank you, sir.
I suppose you could argue, if you extended this argument, that if you had the legislation, whether it worked or not, a certain amount of the face-to-face and eyeball-to-eyeball, the real people contact, that takes place between the Canadian Forces Liaison Council and its structures with the business communities in Canada would be lost. This personal aspect wouldn't be there. It's my belief that something would be lost.
Mr. Eaton: I believe that too. Of course, the Canadian Forces Liaison Council would support the law if it were there; it would be the law of the land. But we would feel that probably in the case of employees with business or industry or governments, it would be unpopular.
Mr. Mifflin: It would make your job more difficult.
Mr. Eaton: Very.
Mr. Mifflin: I have one final question, Mr. Chairman, then I'll go on to the other side.
The committee report says that you have 1,800 known supporters, but only 195 of these have filed for the military leave policies. They didn't indicate that this is a start or that this is not bad; they seemed to indicate that this is it for evermore. My impression is that you are continuing to innovate. Really you're saying that you have only got off the ground in some of the things you're trying. So my conclusion is that of the 195 of the 1,800, it doesn't mean the other 1,605 will not eventually come up with some leave policy.
Mr. Eaton: No. To that end, in the short time we've been doing this we feel we have just 10%, so we're looking at the tip of the iceberg. We hope in the next year or two to really get into the meat and get tremendous support.
The other aspect of it is that I spoke of the 100 volunteers. These are committees. In the past, the Canadian Forces Liaison Council only had provincial chairmen, and then they had provincial chairmen plus another volunteer and a liaison officer who's a reservist. Now we're looking at provincial committees that would probably have in the neighbourhood of five to twenty, all working at the same purpose - employer support.
Mr. Mifflin: Before I leave, Mr. Chairman, and in the presence of our colleague, I want to thank Mr. Eaton for his continuing work in this regard, and his colleagues, who are all leading businessmen across Canada who volunteer their own time for the good of the Canadian forces and the reserve. I'd like to thank you, sir, and all those associated with your committee. Keep up the good work.
Mr. Eaton: Thank you very much, sir.
The Chairman: Just before I go to you, Mr. Hart, I want to tag on to Mr. Mifflin's questions.
One of the other recommendations the commission made was that a contract should be drawn up with militia people as they become members of the reserves. Could this be done without the legislation for job protection? Would they be able to hold them to a contract?
Mr. Eaton: I'd want to study that with great care before I could really answer, Mr. Chairman. How binding is the contract? What is the part of the contract that's -
The Chairman: They couldn't really bind them to guarantee that they would have to go out on a mission if in fact they couldn't get the time off from the job.
Mr. Eaton: There's that to it, yes. We're finding other unique problems in this country. We have, for instance, the situation of people who have joined the militia as young officers or even as non-commissioned people, who have for one reason or another been asked by their company to transfer to another part of Canada. Regardless of where it is, their similar unit or militia is not in the place they're going to go. They have to put family before the militia. They have to step down, which is our loss, Canada's loss. It's a fact.
The Chairman: Mr. Hart.
Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): Mr. Chairman, the first comment I'd like to make is on the mixed testimony we've heard regarding whether legislation would be discriminatory or not. Now there are suggestions that it could be against the charter.
The House of Commons still has lawyers here, don't they? Could we enlist the services of a lawyer to get a legal opinion before we spend much more time spinning our wheels listening to the different -
A voice: We can get advice.
Mr. Mifflin: I feel fairly comfortable, seeing that the chairman was the Chief Justice of Canada.
Mr. Hart: We've heard conflicting testimony regarding this issue, though. If we can get a legal opinion from the House of Commons.... We do have lawyers, I believe. Why don't we use them?
Mr. Mifflin: [Inaudible - Editor] legislation is -
The Chairman: It's against the charter, is that what you're asking?
Mr. Hart: Yes.
Mr. Hart: Mr. Eaton, could you name a few of the businesses you consult with and that are involved in the liaison council?
Mr. Eaton: I'll throw my own company on the map, how's that. I don't know if I want to name names, as it were, but we have support from large companies, from medium-sized and from small. That's in manufacturing, retail, advertising....
Mr. Hart: There are many definitions of small business. How would you define small business in your -
Mr. Eaton: Anywhere from twenty to one or two.
Mr. Hart: For many of the small businesses, we're talking about family operations or operations that are very small, such as corner gas stations -
Mr. Eaton: When you get down to businesses that small, I don't think you have a difficulty. If the guy is going to go, he's going to go.
Mr. Hart: When you were doing your study and looking at this idea of legislation for job protection, did you consider other things besides job protection, for instance incentives for employers through the taxation system?
Mr. Eaton: Now you're getting out of the mandate of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council, which is to get time off for reservists from their jobs. That's all our mandate is. To comment further on that, I'm jumping into somebody else's turf and I don't think -
Mr. Hart: That wasn't looked at, then?
Mr. Eaton: Not by me or the CFLC.
Mr. Hart: So you looked at just the job legislation, job protection aspect?
Mr. Eaton: Yes.
Mr. Hart: In this committee and the special joint committee we've heard much to suggest that employers actually benefit from having a reservist on staff. For instance, they're getting a person who tends to have more dedication to their job and they seem to -
Mr. Eaton: Loyalty.
Mr. Hart: Loyalty and those types of things, so there is an actual benefit. Why would businesses discriminate, then, to have such a valuable asset as a reservist on their staff?
Mr. Eaton: Everything has been voluntary. I don't know about you, sir, being a legislator, but the more legislation that's introduced into the business community, the more they dislike you as legislators. I don't care if that's provincial, federal or municipal.
Mr. Hart: I couldn't agree with you more.
Mr. Eaton: That's the truth.
Mr. Hart: The question was asked today - the admiral might have asked it - of why reservists are suggesting we should have legislation such as this. The reservists probably feel as if they're the guys to blame for all the problems of the deficit and the debt in the world. With the reduction in the reserves and in the regular force, I would suggest they're feeling abandoned by their country. This type of legislation would protect them in a small way.
Mr. Eaton: It could be viewed that way, but I still maintain that it wouldn't help. It would still be viewed by business or industry as being another bit of legislation. There wouldn't be the volunteerism; there wouldn't be the support we're trying to drive at.
Mr. Hart: The point I'm trying to get at is that with the reductions in the reserves and in the regular force, in order to have that volunteerism there has to be a connection with the community. A lot of communities will lose their militia unit or reserve unit. As a matter of fact, some areas of this country now will have no military presence whatsoever.
Mr. Eaton: That's quite correct.
Mr. Hart: How are they going to volunteer for something they know nothing about? Ten years from now there will be people going through elementary school who will never have seen a Canadian Armed Forces uniform.
Mr. Eaton: That's right.
Mr. Hart: So would this legislation -
Mr. Eaton: I don't think legislation is going to make him see a uniform either, once he or she is in a community where there is no longer any military presence except for armistice day or Remembrance Day. When they see their grandfather go out with a chest full of medals and stand before the cenotaph, that will be their military experience. You're quite right. Perhaps from time to time they'll see on television an aerial display by the air force.
Mr. Hart: So your preference over legislation would be for the government to adopt the wisdom and foresight to make sure we maintain a military presence in every area of the country where it is possible.
Mr. Eaton: That's a tough one to answer. If you want an off-the-cuff response to that, I think the military has been the whipping-boy. I wish they'd find some other place to effect some savings, because I don't think we can go much smaller.
Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): I too welcome Mr. Eaton and the Canadian Forces Liaison Council.
I am amazed by the amount of work that has been done since the last time I saw you, when we were together. You've come to 1,830 businesses being involved. That's a significant step. I think in some ways that has allowed us to put large numbers of reservists into Bosnia. I don't think there's any doubt that it was a contributing factor, and it proves its worth in that type of exercise.
I think this committee will probably see more air reserves, although it's more unobtrusive. We were flying back home from Brussels one day on an Airbus, and those flying it - the whole crew - were reserve air force, from the pilot down to the stewardesses. So we see some significant growth here at all levels.
But more particularly, the navy has taken great advantage of this. I'm sure that kind of support across Canada allows the navy to keep four ships - two on each coast - going. I don't think a lot of Canadians understand that these ships are manned - I hope I'm not wrong, Fred - with around 90% reservists.
Mr. Mifflin: More than that.
Mr. Richardson: There's a significant thing that people aren't aware of, but slowly things are coming into acceptance.
We do need, though, to have on the ground the support for the budgets as well, which you mentioned earlier. My personal opinion is that we can't go any lower; we've hit rock bottom.
Concerning the reorganization of the reserves, I think this committee will have a reasonable amount of say that there will be some reserves from coast to coast and outside of the million-people centres.
I haven't really a question, because I know what you're doing. I just want to thank you.
Mr. Eaton: Well, thank you, General.
Just to respond to what you've said, we believe we've gone far enough.
One of our concerns also is the high turnover in the reserves. It hits the CFLC, and if that could be prevented in the units that will exist in the future.... I know it's all budget-driven, but if reservists have the proper tools so that they can do their jobs and learn their tasks, they'll be better reservists. They will probably want to remain in the reserves as opposed to being there for a year, a year and a half, two years, and then leaving because they're uninterested. But I'm getting out of my depth.
The Chairman: Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Reilly, did you have anything?
Mr. O'Reilly (Victoria - Haliburton): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for attending.
Once again, your report to this committee is a very fine and well-written one. It leaves us in the quandary of trying to deal with the commission's recommendation of job protection legislation and your recommendation against it.
I've been in the reserves and felt that discrimination. I can always remember working for a company that closed down the last week in July and the first week in August, and our training was the first three weeks in August. So I know what happens - you can have time off, but don't bring your stuff back when you come and apply for a new job. I've been through that and I know there is a problem with discrimination in there.
Would you then recommend that we revise this report to include the recommendation that if such legislation is drafted, it only be to cover wartime and peacetime emergencies?
Mr. Eaton: I believe that legislation is now being prepared by DND. It will come through in the fullness of time, I guess is the way to put it. But my recommendation would be not to legislate it, or the goodwill of the majority of businesses and industry in this country will be lost. We think that in the next couple of years, we will be able to come back to this committee and tell you we have the support and the goodwill of not only business and industry, but also of all the governments across this country.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Eaton and Mr. Desmarteau, for coming here today and making this presentation. We certainly appreciate it.
As Admiral Mifflin said, we also thank you, sir, for the time and effort you put into this council. We look forward to hearing from you in the future. We have to make a decision on our recommendations very shortly and your presentation will add to that. Thank you very much.
Mr. Eaton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen of the committee. Merry Christmas. Joyeux Noël, et bonne année.
I hope that went on the record.
The Chairman: Following this presentation, lady and gentlemen, we'll be hearing from Major-General Reg Lewis and Brigadier-General Don Pryer.
Members of the committee, I just want to remind you that Thursday we have an informal meeting with the Council of Honorary Colonels.
Major-General Reg Lewis is director of the Council of Honorary Colonels. He has served in both the British and the Canadian Armed Forces and was chief of the reserves from 1985 to 1987. He was also international president of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, NATO, from 1988 to 1990.
Mr. Pryer is co-chairman of Reserves 2000 and a former commander of the Queen's Own Rifles and of the Toronto Militia District.
Welcome, gentlemen. We'll have a presentation from you for approximately ten minutes, as we usually do. Then we'll go to questions around the table. The meeting is yours.
Major-General (Ret.) Reginald W. Lewis (Former Chief of Reserves): Thank you very much for inviting us here today. We appreciate this opportunity to air matters that give us a great deal of concern and interest.
Let me start with the SCRR report, a report that in my view served a very good purpose, commenting fairly on many problems of the reserves. Particularly pertinent were the contents of the report about the proposed corps model, mobilization, benefits, legislation, and the community link provided by the reserves with the community and the defence community. In the short time available to the SCRR they have carried out their mandate, in my opinion, in a laudable manner.
While I find the commission's remarks on the supplementary ready reserve and the supplementary holding reserve positive, I have to say I'm apprehensive that until the supplementary reserve has been developed into an effective reality - which has defeated us for quite a long time, despite some considerable effort - I hope it will not be used as a panacea for rationalizing a small primary and inadequate reserve force.
In that regard, it's no doubt been brought to your attention that Canada is somewhat of an anomaly in its major alliance, NATO, in the size of our reserve forces. Nearly all the countries of the NATO alliance have reserves that are larger than their regular forces, with the exception of France, where 46% of their armed forces are reserves; the U.S.A., where 48% of their forces are reserves; and ourselves, where just 26% of our forces are reserves.
It is particularly interesting to me that this percentage pretty well remains constant from now until the time the proposed changes and reductions of the regular force and reserve force take place, as proposed by the white paper. I would sincerely hope that this is not a somewhat superficial way - if indeed it was used - of arriving at an appropriate size of our reserve forces.
My remarks will particularly concern the militia, because that's where the bulk of my experience has been.
If you take figures such as those being put forward by land force command, looking to the militia providing about 7,200 troops, in taking a 3:1 ratio you're looking at an effective reserve in that bracket of about 21,000 to 22,000. That will move us a bit closer to what our major allies have as their reserve regular mix.
The speed at which the report was published precluded, in my view, a detailed financial analysis of the cost of the reserves, and also a detailed cost-benefit analysis. I think it must have been a very difficult problem for the commission to deal with a subject and be tasked to bring forward a report driven by those financial constraints, with time constraints and probably resources not being able to delve appropriately and deeply enough into the problem of cost. I think their apple analogy, in their afterword section, is apt.
Those several previous studies and reports on our armed forces, by inference, in my view, should be reviewed in concert with the findings of the commission's study. I think there should be some attempt to collate and bring forward some reconciliation to those several reports before any profound changes are made in our reserve forces.
Quite encouraging was the remark of the SCRR on the training burden imposed on our reserve forces, and more particularly the militia. I say that only in the sense that I know more about it. Their answer was to break training into no more than two two-week modules. That's not a bad idea, but it still doesn't concentrate on the main problem: the awesome load imposed on reservists insofar as training is concerned. All it means is that we need more two-week modules.
I'd like to take a little bit of your time. We have essentially two officer training programs in the militia. We have the MITCP program, which is the militia training program. This is essentially for people who aspire to be officers and are in the workforce, so their time is limited. To get from that officer-cadet entry to second lieutenant, besides their 30 to 35 LHQ training - that's local headquarters time training - through the year, they have to take three phases of ten days, full-time - six weeks essentially. That is quite difficult for somebody who is fully employed.
Then they move from second lieutenant to lieutenant, and the situation is exactly repeated insofar as time is concerned: 35 days roughly at local training, and then the three phases of ten full days each, two weeks each time.
Then we have a much more used program, RESO - Reserve Entry Scheme Officer - and this program brings them to a regular-force standard of officer training. In phase one of the training, they take two full weeks; in phase two of the training, they take thirteen weeks; and in phase three of the training, they take a further thirteen weeks, full-time. That is 28 weeks required, and then they become lieutenant.
On top of that, there is the LHQ training. I'll be very brief now. From lieutenant to captain, they have to take a staff course, which takes ten full days on top of all their local training and regimental duties. From captain to major, they have to pass an exam and study for that exam and take a further ten-day full-time course. From major to lieutenant-colonel they have to take a militia officer's staff course and a considerable program of tutorials, which take up ten full weekends above home study. By this time they are very involved with their units and they culminate that program with two full weeks in Kingston.
I emphasize that on top of this, they're doing a level of about 40 days a year in regimental duties. It's a very onerous task. I imagine it's almost as bad as being an MP.
Let me dwell on RESO. It's a very effective program that replaced the Canadian Officer Training Corps program, the COTC.
Before I became the chief of reserves, on giving up command of Central Militia Area, I was a special projects officer for the reserves at National Defence headquarters. The task I was given at that time was to carry out a study on the re-implementation of the COTC. The COTC had disappeared on the recommendation of the Suttie report in 1964. It objected to COTC because it felt that it should be based in the units, because too many people took the course in university and then failed to continue their service in either the regular or reserve force.
I've distributed a paper to you that's an extract from the submission I made to the SCRR. I commend it to your attention, if I may be so bold, because I dwell on why other countries pursue a COTC. You expose reservists and would-be regulars to a military atmosphere on campus and inculcate them in leadership training of the military and something of the military ethos. Our future leaders in the judiciary, government, politics, academe, industry and commerce pass through the university. We have no presence there now. These people in the past stood up in Canada and articulated the cause of defence. It is obvious that we're missing that constituency now.
We have perilous times in the military, both regular and reserve. There is, as the SCRR has said, a schism between the regular and reserve forces, and that's unfortunate. I think COTC has very much helped us prevent that schism, not only within the forces but among the civilian community, body politic and the armed forces.
Let me dwell on that study for a moment. I personally ran the study and contacted70 universities or university-like institutions throughout Canada. That included some that were obviously not appropriate, such as RMC, Royal Roads and some theological colleges.
When you got down to the hard numbers, you were looking at about 66 universities. Out of those 66, 37 did not reply. It was a detailed questionnaire. Of those that did reply, 13 were enthusiastic, 3 were against, 8 were clearly ambivalent and wouldn't mind it being there, 5 thought it was not appropriate for their university. Again, one was a theological college, the other one was OCA in Toronto. Of those that did reply, 13, or 54%, were enthusiastic about re-implementation of COTC; 3 were against, or 13%; and 8 were ambivalent, which was 33%.
We proposed to start a pilot program at King's College in Halifax and in the second year, if successful, at the University of Regina, Western, Memorial University and a university in the province of Quebec. What I found on the analysis was that the administrators of the university were quite in favour of re-implementation of COTC. The study body was quite in favour. The academics were against, with the exception of those who had been involved in COTC.
Now, I'm talking about an exercise that took place quite a few years ago. I think the atmosphere will be better at this time; we're further away from activities like the Vietnam War.
In completing my remarks, let me tell you where my thoughts and sympathies are. I believe we should have a two-tier reserve. Clearly our reserves have to be prepared for all four phases of mobilization, but to concentrate, as the white paper has it, on phases one and two is a mistake, and I'm delighted the SCRR acknowledged that mistake. In effect, that is not a reserve; it's an augmentation body for the regular force in its day-to-day known activities. A reserve is like a reserve of money. You put it there for something you're not sure will happen. Phase three is like the mobilization of units, as in Korea, and phase four is where you mobilize the country. That's the prime purpose of a reserve.
That's why I'm delighted the commission came forward with a corps model. I think they have too few brigades. I think there should be at least nine to address the demography of the country. I also feel that we must carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the reserves so that in the periphery, a budget can be developed for the reserves.
We should take a look at the armoury situation. There are many that may well be redundant, although I'm not sure. But we have to take a definitive look at the costs and convenience of those armouries, where they're located in terms of transportation and parking. I've been in those businesses. I've heard a lot of tommyrot spoken of in the accessibility of downtown armouries by public transportation...simply not true. Multi-purpose armouries should be taken into consideration so that other uses can be accommodated - the historical aspects of the armouries and alternative uses for them, joint ventures, and also the marketability of the armouries at this time. Some of them, if boarded up, would in fact cost more than running them.
I believe we have a serious problem, particularly with the reserves, and it reflects on the whole of the armed forces. I really do believe the reserves, being so integrated with the civilian community and the workaday world - as demonstrated by Mr. Eaton's being here - should go in almost a crown corporation direction.
I think we should have that two-tier reserve. The reason I say so is that we should concentrate on developing the junior ranks for the first two tiers, with the second two tiers particularly for the more senior ranks. It's absolute foolishness that it has been suggested that you can economize by cutting out a lieutenant-colonel and having four privates. The reality is on mobilization. You can instantly train privates - I've been a private myself and it didn't take long to make me one - but it takes you a long time to train the senior officers. As you can see by my paper, that will be our dilemma if we have a major catastrophe on our hands.
There should be a board of directors specifically for the militia, although I don't presume to comment for the other reserves. It should be made up of something like a chair or a CEO, probably the commander of land forces. I think there should be one or two representatives from business. Clearly we need somebody, probably a consultant with expertise, on personnel matters, human resources and also management on financial issues. I believe it's appropriate to have an academic, and it's appropriate to have somebody from the political dimension and the chief of reserves as resources. I reiterate that you must have a definitive budget. This board should be responsible for control of such a budget and the implementation of the changes government brings about. There is a need to depoliticize the process, and I would hope that would be the instrument of the depoliticization.
Thank you for indulging me for the length of time you have.
The Chairman: Thank you very much.
Do you want to add anything, Mr. Pryer?
Brigadier-General (Ret.) Don Pryer (Individual Presentation): Did you want me to carry on and hold questions to the end?
The Chairman: Yes, we could do that.
BGen Pryer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to appear before you today. My name is General Don Pryer. I am the honorary colonel of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and former commanding officer of that unit. As your chairman said, I am a former commander of Toronto Militia District and also a commander of what is now Land Force Central, but was Central Militia Area. I've also been a chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations and am a past president of the Canadian Infantry Association. In civilian life I am president and CEO of Armatek Controls Ltd.
From a personal standpoint, I have served over 37 years in the reserves. I support the Reserve 2000 paper, which you have received, but I appear here as an individual and as an honorary, concerned over an inference in the committee's report. That inference is that some honoraries or honorary colonels, in Ontario particularly, are being disloyal.
I view that statement with alarm, because I do not feel I am disloyal. I'm loyal to Canada, I'm loyal to my regiment, and I'm loyal to all those veterans who went before me. That was driven home to me in spades during the activities in Holland and France in the last two years, in D-plus-50 and in VE-plus-50. I hope the standing committee in its report did not confuse loyalty with blind obedience to the regular force.
My points today are very short. General Lewis and I met on the way up on the airplane and it so happened that I agree with many of his comments. So for your information I'll try to keep my comments short, because he's already stolen half the thunder. I agree with the comments he's made.
The key point I would like to dwell on is what has become known as the footprint in the community, the importance of the reserves in the community, or as I prefer to call it, a visible presence.
Mr. O'Reilly: If I may interject, we've had a great problem with this footprint thing. I keep telling the committee a footprint is something that's left after someone's gone, so thank you for changing that. Now I don't have to bring that recommendation up.
I'm sorry for interrupting.
BGen Pryer: To make a point on that, the defence minister in 1980, Gilles Lamontagne, was speaking with one of his PR folks who was trying to come up with a method of promoting the military to the Canadian public. His comment was, don't forget the reserves; all of their neighbours are civilians. I think it's a very important point that should not be overlooked.
I'll read for you, with your indulgence, one page from Reserves 2000 that condenses some of my thoughts:
- A military force detached from its community becomes little more than hired mercenaries.
By bringing community values to the Canadian forces, the Reserves help to enhance the
humanity in our military service. But it is by no means a one way street. The Reserves help to
remind our communities that we have responsibilities beyond parochial self-interest. The
Reserves provide a forum for the nurturing of citizenship. They teach our youth discipline and
co-operation and a concept of service to their country.
- In this sense, every day, day in, day out, our Reserves are involved in community service.
Beyond this, they are poised to play a much larger role in the community, should the need arise.
As alluded to earlier, the grass-roots distribution of Reserve units makes them the ideal choice
for localized emergencies and particularly assistance to civil authorities in natural disasters and
aid to the civil powers in major civil disobedience situations.
- The Reserves nurture the notion of volunteerism and community involvement. They have
the capacity to play a much larger role in community life and should be looked to for support
more frequently than is currently the case.
I will just read the first paragraph here:
- The year was 1933; the place, a sandy strip of wasteland on the southwestern shores of
Prince Edward County in the Province of Ontario. The Outlet, it was called, and here in the
sweltering days of July the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment was holding summer camp.
One hundred and thirteen private soldiers, NCOs and officers were there - they were the
Regiment. Two weeks earlier they had taken off their civilian clothes, put on motley remnants
of uniforms from the war of 1914 and, aboard a collection of hired trucks, they had gone off to
play at war.
- That, at least, was what the country of Canada at large thought at the time.
I commend the commission on its report. They did a lot of work. They brought many good features to the forefront. It opens the door to further discussions that could be held. There are a couple of areas, however, where I do not agree.
As I say, in fairness, the commission was faced with the problem of partial organizational analysis, or in their own words on pages 72 and 73, ``...at times we felt we were studying only one slice of a much larger and costlier apple.'' This was because the commission had accepted one of the terms of reference given to them. They were given an economic ceiling that equated to a total of 23,000 reservists, which further equated to 14,500 militia. I guess my question is, where did the minister get this figure and why was it cast in concrete? It tied the hands of the commission studying the role of the reserves.
Canada is one of the few countries whose regular force outnumbers its reserve force, as General Lewis said. The total pay budget, including contributions to pensions, etc., for the Canadian forces for fiscal year 1994-95 was approximately - and I had to put this down in numbers I could understand - $3,980.8 million, which I think equates to $3.9 billion. The total pay budget for the reserves was $222 million, which is 5.7% of the total. For that 5.7%, as the commission has pointed out, the reserve supplied over 20% of peacekeeping soldiers in the former Yugoslavia.
Gentlemen, I'll conclude my comments because I'm sure you have many questions for both General Lewis and me. I'll be happy to answer.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Pryer and General Lewis. Now I'll go to the questioners.
Mr. Hart, I'll start with you.
Mr. Hart: Welcome, General Pryer and General Lewis. It's nice to have you here with us today.
Just to follow up on your last point, General, do you believe this committee should recommend that a cost analysis of the reserve be done prior to suggesting that any of the recommendations go forward?
BGen Pryer: Yes, I think that would be in order. The Auditor General's report has a number of valid points raised in it. A thorough analysis would indicate that there are other ways to save roughly $100 million rather than taking it off the floor of the armouries. If we try to take it from the floor of the armouries, that's almost like running a business that's losing money and saying, bring in the person who buys the pencils - we have to stop this.
If the portion of the reserve budget that's going to pay and allowances is down at $222 million, yet the total reserve budget is $550 million, somewhere there's a savings that can be had without taking it away from the soldiers on the floor.
It's those young soldiers who are important to the community and the country. Each time you reduce their numbers, you are increasing their net cost. If you want to save money, double the strength of the reserves and you'll have the cost per soldier divided by two. The overhead stays the same.
Mr. Hart: General Lewis, would you like to comment on that as well?
MGen Lewis: Yes. I think it's absolutely essential that there be a financial analysis. Quite clearly, the figures that have been used in the past for the cost of the reserves have been extraordinarily inflated. In fact, there have been statements in the past by very senior officers that the cost of an individual reservist is higher than the regular.
I'm an accountant by background, and it's anathema to me to have speculative figures. There has to be a cost-benefit analysis. Now, it's very, very difficult. How do you apportion the overhead? But you should attempt it. You can always find some means, even if it isn't accurate, that is indicative of the true cost.
Mr. Hart: The other question I have, related to that, is whether you have any idea where the government or the Department of National Defence in particular could find some cost efficiencies besides the reserves.
MGen Lewis: General Pryer has mentioned the Auditor General's comments. I'm going from memory. I don't want to mislead you, so to a degree I disqualify myself. He focused on information systems and he came up with savings of an extraordinary amount, hundreds of millions of dollars. That should have sent warning bells off. I think we should go back to that report and use it as a departure point to see what economies can be effected.
Mr. Hart: With reference to our previous witness, Mr. Eaton, do you have any comments regarding job protection legislation?
BGen Pryer: I wasn't here for his complete report, but I did catch the tail-end of it. I agree. I think if we're going to have legislation, it had better be conscription, because if you have partial legislation to give the protection to individual soldiers, we will lose in the militia, not gain. You cannot have it for your key elements - that is, the police force, firemen, ambulance drivers. We just won't get it. They will have to leave the militia.
As a businessman, if I were looking at four candidates to hire, at the present time I would give preference to the militia soldier or the reserve soldier because I know he brings with him a sense of pride and an understanding of what discipline is all about. However, if there were legislation and I had to let this individual go for two weeks or whatever, I would have to look twice at it. I say that as a solid reservist. You cannot run a business if five or six of your staff all take off for summer camp at the same time.
Mr. Hart: How would you feel now, though, if a militia reservist were asking you as an employer to allow him to attend a peacekeeping mission for six months in Bosnia?
BGen Pryer: I would have to look at that as to what position the employer has. I have concerns over pregnancy leave when I train a secretary for five years and she stays away for nineteen weeks. I have to replace her. What I would do with a top executive who goes away for six months would be a concern.
Mr. Hart: General, do you have any comments on that?
MGen Lewis: Yes. I think there should be an attempt to have legislation. I think the reservist needs a demonstration of that type of commitment. I think the government should take a lead and make sure it makes adequate and appropriate leave available for reserve service. I think it would be anomalous if they were to bring about legislation and not practise what they're preaching, in effect.
I know it's a good-news, bad-news situation. There will be those who will argue that people will not be hired because of this legislation. However, we seem to be overcoming awesome obstacles in equity legislation, and I see this as somewhat the same ilk. I think it's an education program. I've run into a situation from time to time where reservists join U.S. firms and they're automatically allowed leave in Canada, but it's not forthcoming from our own firms.
I've heard this debate go on for four decades. We can't keep on putting it off, particularly when we are using the reserves in a totally different way now. They are almost part of the forces in being, and as such, to bring that about, you have to have the legislation. The mere indication of action being taken to seek legislation will, I think, be very beneficial for the reserves.
Mr. Hart: General Lewis, you would suggest that because of the downsizing of the reserves, this legislation is more imperative?
MGen Lewis: No, I don't link the two. I think we should have the legislation anyway. I would hope, from the debate that's going on and the statistics you have before you, that you might oppose the downsizing of the reserves and in fact have the sort of reserves that the tasking demands that we have.
Mr. Hart: What are the numbers you feel Canada should have for a reserve?
MGen Lewis: Let me speak more particularly for the land reserve. I think it would be between about 21,000 and 22,000. As I've mentioned already, you have to embark on programs like the COTC. We find in the COTC that not a great many go into the reserves - that's why it was done in before - but that was a foolhardy move. What we have done is captured people who have been military-trained, have...one would hope in the university, that mindset that they can keep that information. Even if they leave, they can go out to the civilian world and you can call them back.
Let me digress a little bit. When I was chief of reserves, I attended an exercise called Brave Defender in the United Kingdom. All the chiefs of reserves of NATO countries attended that exercise. I was the aberration in Canada alone, as a chief of reserves who in fact is a reservist. So you're in disguise, as it were, and you get the real goods. It was extraordinary seeing how well these troops that were called up could function on years-old skills, how they could regurgitate after a ten-day period.
Again, at that period I attended a mobilization exercise in Holland where the telegrams went out on the Friday - it was radio broadcast - and they reported on the Tuesday. I was there on the Tuesday with my colleagues. I saw the way they used simulators for training. But what was particularly interesting was that they kept...and their reservists mostly had done about a six-month or nine-month, depending on which branch they were in, full-time service. The retention of their skills, which they matched with the ``now'' test, with what they were at when they left, was just extraordinary.
If you get those keen minds and you train them, it is a bonus for us.
The Chairman: I just want to tell everybody that at 5:15 p.m. the bells will be ringing for a vote at 5:30 p.m.
Mr. Richardson, you might continue.
Mr. Richardson: I'd like to add my welcome to Major-General Lewis and Brigadier-General Pryer. I noticed you brought an old friend from Brockville with you today as well. It's nice to see you here.
I'll take a kick at one thing you threw out at us - what that 14,500 meant, or the total figure in the budget. That was a line serial in the budget, and it represented a dollar value at that point in time when the government was to bring down the defence budget. That was the part allotted by National Defence headquarters. So at that point in time, it was a budget figure representing what it would cost for that many people.
Now, if it can be reduced so that there are cost reductions in this reorganization, then when you take the dollar figure, there may be flexibility in seeing that number go up. I'm just speaking out loud here, but this is the way it has been explained to me.
So that will give you some idea why the number, the line serial in the overall reduction that everyone in the Canadian forces and at National Defence Headquarters took...and that was assigned to the militia.
I would like to follow up on one point you made, General Lewis. You mentioned the potential nine instead of seven brigades. What was your rationale behind that?
MGen Lewis: It's the demographics. If you take Western Area, they get the same as Ontario. There will be extreme difficulty making do with three brigades in Ontario, one regular and two reserve. Take southwestern Ontario, for example. That span of control and the sheer size of population, the number of reservists there, make it an inequitable distribution of the brigades for the population.
Furthermore, naturally the nine brigades fit very well with the corps model. I don't think all these brigades need to be essentially the same. In fact, they won't be. Some of them will be training brigades to varying degrees, but I think there is the case for the nine brigades.
Can I come back to your other remark about the 14,500?
Mr. Richardson: Yes.
MGen Lewis: I know you recall that we used to have a lot of volunteer duty at one time, which reservists are quite delighted to perform from time to time, and I think that's been left out of the equation. I think the reason it's been left out is the simple fact that the Conference of Defence Associations at one time sought to have volunteer duty - you will recall that situation - and we subsequently got it. Then some mom was a bit concerned about her son not being paid and wrote to her MP. You may recall that since about 1985-86 there had been no volunteer service.
I really do think there is a case for volunteer service as long as it is truly voluntary. You either do it or don't do it. There have to be innovative ways to reward people. I've long thought that you can reward people that way by bringing something like a volunteer service medal, where you get so many credits for a volunteer duty. You can work out various formulae. My own pet one brings you in at about ten years and you get post-nominals of VSM.
A lot of reservists, particularly at the senior NCO and officer level, will value that recognition of their service. There's no intrinsic value of the CD or the piece of ribbon, but it means much to you and to me. Those innovative ideas are not being searched out, in my view.
Mr. Richardson: Wasn't that the basis of the old ED, the old efficiency medal?
MGen Lewis: Yes, sure.
Mr. Richardson: Where would you put the other brigade? You mentioned Western Area; they had two. You mentioned nine, and that would bring it up to eight.
BGen Pryer: The other one is Ontario - three in Ontario, three in the west, two in Quebec, one in the Maritimes, and one in B.C. Sorry, B.C. is part of the west, so that would be the total of three.
A voice: Well, the west had two.
Mr. Richardson: B.C. is not going to like that regionalization. We seem to have to split the country on the mountain range. That makes little sense because.... Just to make an editorial comment, the two provinces that are growing, where people are immigrating, are the province of Ontario and the province of British Columbia. If there were potential to grow, I think British Columbia should have its own brigade. It would still report to the land forces' western headquarters. I don't know if these things can happen.
BGen Pryer: The geographics would indicate that B.C. would have a training brigade because that mountain range does present a problem.
MGen Lewis: I would like to respond to your question. With the brigade spread right now, of the seven there are two in the west, two in central, two in Quebec, and one in the Maritimes. I think the model for nine has to be one more for Quebec and one more for central. The numbers support that type of distribution.
Mr. Richardson: Are you sure, though? The west is the west. If you take the population, it's nearing or equal to that of Quebec. You're taking the demographics of the west, including Manitoba to British Columbia.
MGen Lewis: My answer will be tentative.
No, I'm being facetious.
Mr. Richardson: I'm serious about that. I know you're thinking political balance here. But the demographics.... I think Ontario is 37.5% of Canada.
MGen Lewis: Quite clearly the distribution cannot be rationalized on the basis of what would be an appropriate apportionment to Ontario.
Mr. Richardson: When you get 97 members of Parliament from Ontario in the same party, it's quite a good rationalization.
The Chairman: Three of them are here today.
BGen Pryer: We don't have that many brigades.
Mr. Richardson: I notice that I got the attention of my friend Fred Mifflin here.
You have arguments. That's the kind of argumentation that would take place. British Columbia is more than half the size of Quebec.
The Chairman: Mr. Mifflin.
Mr. Mifflin: I'll leave that, Mr. Chairman, and go on to other things.
I want to welcome General Lewis and General Pryer. It's nice to see you again, General, and your Brockville colleague with our colleague Jim Jordan. Welcome, Jim.
This legislation thing is going to be a real problem for us, because as legislators, that's the one we're going to be expected to come up with something reasonable on. I have to tell you the preponderance...at your level it's very risky. It's very risky.
You weren't here when I was talking with John Eaton, but almost two years ago we started off in the defence committee as a special joint committee, expecting that at the end of our report we would recommend legislation. It was only the intervention of members of the CDA, members of militia units, and the chief of reserves that dissuaded us. So we decided we'd better not get involved in this.
I personally was pleased to see it, because I've been a little like you on this one, General Lewis. Lo and behold, you're one of the few supporters. I think General Pryer is not that much in favour of it, so we have dissension just in two.
We're going to have to sort it out. We're not going to get agreement. It would be great to see this debate in the House of Commons, even if it weren't passed.
MGen Lewis: That's what I want.
Mr. Mifflin: I know where you're coming from.
Let me go on to something else. I was very attracted by your idea of a board of directors. In essence, that means a lot to me, and I think I know where you're coming from. It's like the naval board or the army board or something of that nature.
I was under the impression that the honorary colonels or the CDA - or maybe both - serve, in a non-institutionalized manner, as the de facto board of directors of the militia.
MGen Lewis: I'm a director. I represent Ontario. I'm the honorary colonel, so I think that gives me a certain qualification to be blunt. Yes, they do. The CDA specifically is tasked to advise the Canadian population on defence issues. That's their mandate. The honorary colonels are the collective godfathers or godmothers of their regiments.
My own experience - and I've chaired quite a few boards - is that a large board, like a large committee, is practically unworkable. The honorary colonels are excellent in dealing with their regimental issues. The issues that we're dealing with and that I touched on, albeit superficially - the development of the budget, the implementation of changes - would counteract what I see as a very dangerous situation beginning to emerge, and that is the schism with the regular force.
It's almost a catch-22 situation in that as you bring the reservists more and more up to the regular-force standard, particularly at the officer level, naturally it will satisfy the regular force in terms of technical skills. But the sheer demand on time means that they are not representative, by and large, of the prestigious jobs and the management jobs in the civilian world, which counteracts that admiration. The catch-22, as we go the other way around, is that these people are more worried about making money. They might be the president of this company, but they don't know anything at all about handling a battalion.
So there has to be a balance between those two. That's why I'm such a great enthusiast for getting the training early on and then having part of the reserve - and this comes back to the point - tasked to phases three and four, which do not need the same sort of funding as phases one and two.
Frankly, with that sort of brain and that sort of civilian training, you can get away with doing something like ten days a year. You have your phase four mobilization all wrapped up. I'm looking at a two-tier system, call it an all-singing, all-dancing. I don't see this emerging anywhere and it bothers me.
Mr. Mifflin: That's a good point and I thank you very much for it.
I have more questions, but in the interest of time I will defer to my colleagues.
The Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen. It's been a pleasure to have you here. Your presentations have been very thought-provoking, and I know that at the end of the day we'll have to take all these into consideration. I thank you for the work you've put into this and for being here with us today.
The meeting is adjourned.