EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, December 7, 1995

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[English]

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I'll call the meeting to order, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), a study of the report of the special commission on the restructuring of the reserves.

Today, as we come close to the end of our formal hearings, it's my pleasure to introduce our representatives from the Atlantic area. We have with us Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment Advisory Council, and Colonel Fearon Currie, commander of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island District.

Gentlemen, I will ask you to make your presentations and then we'll go around the table for questions and comments. You may proceed.

Colonel P. Fearon Currie (Commander, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island District): Mr. Chairman and members, good afternoon. My name is Colonel Fearon Currie, and I'm the commander of NBPEI District with headquarters in Moncton, New Brunswick. I live in Saint John and I'm employed there as a manager at the New Brunswick Community College located in Saint John.

I'm pleased to be here today addressing you on this very important and far-reaching report. My aim today is to present orally, within my allocated time, the NBPEI District perspective on the key recommendations that affect our district. I have also prepared notes on most of the recommendations and I believe you have copies of those before you.

In putting together this presentation I have received input from my eight commanding officers, and therefore all my material is generally from a district perspective, with some implications for the whole of Land Force Atlantic Area.

Generally we find the report to be a fair and honest representation of the army reserves as they exist today. We realize that changes are required and essential if we are to ensure the maximum efficiency with the resources allocated to the reserves. The report is well written, well researched and representative of all stakeholders in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Having said that, there are a number of recommendations that are cause for some concern to us, especially in Atlantic Canada. If we lived in a Utopian society, all 41 of those recommendations could be approved and the reserves would soldier on. This, I believe, is not the case. The most difficult work is yet to come, and that is implementation of all or some of the recommendations. A rhetorical question may be what the end state will look like.

I would like now to key in on some of the recommendations my district feels should be looked at.

On recommendation 6 on page 31, we have no real issue with the elimination of districts and those districts being replaced by a brigade group. However, my district and LFAA are in a unique situation relative to the other three LFAs. We in Atlantic Canada do not have a regular-force brigade to assist us in our training and support. CTC, the combat training centre in Gagetown, cannot fulfil this role. Therefore we ask the committee to look at options to meet our unique environment.

There are some points we wish to make, and these are points we arrived at collectively in our district. We should have a start point of a minimum of 10% regular-force cadre in each unit. This is critical if we stand up a brigade group and don't make allowances for the day-to-day administrative and training support required for the units to train.

Another point to bring out is that Operation Enhancement has decided that all credits are to go to the three regular-force brigades and none to LFAA. The army should revisit this issue and allow some of those credits to enhance LFAA with the regular-force cadre I just spoke about. There must be some flexibility shown so that LFAA benefits, because many of those credits will come directly from units in our area.

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Thirdly, if the committee were to study figure 1 on page 27, we in LFAA can make the following point relative to average strength to units: LFAA has 173, LFQA 183, LFCA 128, and LFWA 101 - and this is taken from the report. The point we make is a consideration for maintaining a geographic footprint in Atlantic Canada. Perhaps two brigade groups would better serve what the report states relative to maintaining that footprint. Again, we refer to recommendation 8(g), which emphasizes the footprint.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I want to interrupt for a minute. One of the Ontario Liberal members in our committee gets very upset with the word ``footprint''. He believes the definition of ``footprint'' is ``something that was left''. I just apprise you of that as you continue in your deliberations.

Mr. O'Reilly (Victoria - Haliburton): Mr. Chairman, I appreciate being recognized for one thing on this committee.

I'm sorry to interject, but to me a footprint is something someone leaves when they're gone. I prefer the word ``presence''. I'm going to change it on this report, if I can. I have a footprint of the military in my riding - there's no military there. But there also is no presence.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: You may continue, Colonel Currie. He's made his mark on the committee, but he hasn't left a footprint.

Mr. O'Reilly: No footprints.

Col Currie: We feel recommendation 8 on page 33 is the key recommendation of the report, fully supporting the concepts outlined in that recommendation. A critical aspect of this recommendation is that the area commander be given the responsibility and authority to design his brigade group and division headquarters within the guidelines that are imposed by the commander of LFC.

Recommendation 9, on page 35, covers TAE, or total army establishments. It is one of the most controversial recommendations in the report. In principle, we agree with TAE because we understand the fiscal reality of present-day funding. The commander of LFAA again must be given guidelines that allow him to reach the proposed end state and still remain faithful to the preamble of the recommendation.

Any reduction in personnel due to implementing TAE should be managed with a minimum of disruption to the unit and its soldiers. A severance package must seriously be considered, not only for TAE reductions but to the reservists across the board. As well, redundancy must be built into TAE for the obvious reasons that citizen-soldiers have other full-time jobs that take them away from reserve training and there must be someone to back-fill for them.

TAE is definitely the minimum the reserves should be reduced. Any more and there may not be anything or anyone left. TAE must be implemented quickly and be well planned.

Recommendation 10, part 1, page 36, has generated a tremendous amount of discussion, from the radical to the more thoughtful. The 25% cut across the country is a typical Canadian compromise: if one suffers, we all suffer. That is sometimes acceptable, but in this case strong arguments can be presented from the report itself to warrant a less-than-25% cut to my district and to the Atlantic provinces. To state but a few, LFAA has 86% of the strength of another LFA with two brigades plus a regular force brigade. The average number of soldiers per unit in LFAA is the second highest of the four LFAs. With 21 units, a 25% hit in LFAA has a larger impact on a geographical presence in the four Atlantic provinces than the other LFAs.

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For example, the distance by road from Campbellton, New Brunswick, to Stephenville, Newfoundland, is the same as the distance from Kamloops to Winnipeg, and with the four provinces two of them are islands. So the span of control in this case not only refers to people, but to time and space.

We therefore suggest that a national 25% reduction to the reserves be tasked to the commander of LFC, who can then negotiate with the four LFA commanders. We believe a 25% reduction would be devastating to the army reserves in the Atlantic provinces, while attempting to honour a geographical presence as stated in the report.

In conclusion, this basically forms part one of my observations on the report. I have further remarks on most of the recommendations. I think you have them in your hand now and I hope you consider the comments appropriate to your deliberations.

One other point I want to make concerns the two cultures as stated in the report. When I read the report the first time - and I've read it many times - it was the first time in 21 years that I'd heard the term ``two cultures'', so I'm not really up on the two-culture aspect.

We must remember that a reservist training for 36 to 40 days per year can only become proficient at so much. Therefore the onus is on the regulars to ensure that training is conducive to the reservists. The key is training. I must say that the so-called two cultures are really not very evident in my district or in LFAA.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Colonel Currie.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Mackay (Chairman, Royal Newfoundland Regiment Advisory Council): Mr. Chairman and members, my name is Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Mackay and I'm chairman of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment Advisory Council and Deputy Commander of Newfoundland District.

I'm proud to be called a reservist and have been one since 1959. In my real life, I'm a manager of information technology with the executive council of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. I'm also very proud to be associated with one of the few regiments in Canada that can celebrate its 200th birthday this year.

I would like to make a few oral remarks and present you with printed copies of a three-page submission to be left with you. I've discussed our presentation with the commander of Newfoundland District, with the CO of the First Battalion Royal Newfoundland Regiment, and with the executive of our advisory council.

We wish to commend the commissioners for having carried out their task within a very limited time in an energetic and thorough manner. Though the hearings did not attract as much public attention at the community level as we would have liked, reservists were very much aware of the importance of the commission.

I think it is fair to say that reservists feel their case was sympathetically heard by commissioners who were equipped with appropriate credentials and attitudes and that the commissioners challenged reservists to carefully analyse, weigh, and consider the nature of and issues affecting the current state of the militia.

I've heard more than one witness appearing before the commission say that the questions they were asked by the commissioners were not at all what they expected and that they were put to the test to answer the questions in a careful way, so that's good.

We applaud many of the commission's recommendations. Of particular merit are the suggestions about better integrating the reserve and regular forces and the guidelines for determining reserve unit efficiency, the reserve budget and reserve pay and benefits. Many of these points are logical and consistent with total force policy, and to many reservists appear to have been unduly delayed far too long.

The essence of our submission can be summarized as follows: don't throw out the baby with the bath water.

We support the recommendations of the commission regarding restructuring and the redistribution of district headquarters. The need for both is obvious to most reservists who seriously and carefully consider the role of the reserves and the need to enhance its effectiveness in today's fiscal climate.

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However, when the army responded to the commission's recommendations, we believe the commission did not give sufficient weight to some important regional variations. While the commission did urge that areas be given discretion - for example, deciding how many units should be included in the training brigades or offering only guidelines for deciding which units are effective - the commission could have similarly decided to recommend that reductions in strength be determined by areas, perhaps on the basis of attendance and other similar measures of effectiveness.

Similarly, the point could be made that just as not all areas are the same across the country, not all districts are the same. In other words, there is little latitude in the commission's recommendations for applying solutions that are tailored to special circumstances.

What constitutes special circumstances? There are the obvious factors of geography that Colonel Currie just alluded to, leading to time and distance considerations. There is also the factor of starting from different baselines in different areas. For example, in Atlantic area, special efforts have already been made to redistribute headquarters and to reduce the high ratio of staff officer positions to the number of bayonets.

In our written submission we present some facts and figures on this issue, which leads one to examine our plea that one size does not fit all. This does not mean that some areas should receive special exemptions in implementing force reductions. What it does mean, or is intended to mean, is that perhaps guidelines for areas should be developed by the army based on strength of headquarters to troops to be used in determining the extent of reductions from that area. In other words, don't penalize an area that has already done its homework and has thinned out its headquarters staff to become more efficient.

Similarly, we ask that care and thought be exercised before deciding how training brigade headquarters are going to maintain training effectiveness over barriers like water and long distances. Imposing a structure like a brigade headquarters because it is militarily sound and dissolving all vestiges of district headquarters may be tempting, but there are risks. We ask that these risks be thoroughly assessed before final decisions - hence the reference to the baby and the bath water.

Our written submission says nothing on two other topics about which I personally feel strongly. Regular force and reserve relationships have always, in my experience, been touchy and sensitive. I applaud the recommendations of the commission to try to narrow the gap between these two worlds, each with its own set of expectations and attitudes.

The recommendation regarding reserves being required to provide sections and platoons for regular force duty particularly intrigued me. I have seen a company of Atlantic reservists work with 2RCR in Cyprus, and I have listened to reports about 2PPCLI's experience in Bosnia. There is one difficulty with the commission's recommendation. If a militia unit can gather up all the leadership necessary for a sub-unit, it will probably leave its rear party back in garrison in a state where effective training could be impaired. I've seen it happen.

I suggest the solution that 2RCR tried in Cyprus. If a reserve platoon is sent, either the platoon lieutenant or the platoon second-in-command must be reserve, though not necessarily from the same regiment. However, this experiment was never repeated - although in my opinion it was quite successful - so I don't know if it was considered a failure or if the opportunity never recurred.

Finally, in terms of service and pay, to me it seems simple. A reservist serves either on a part-time basis or the reservist serves full time. If the reservist serves full time, he's entitled to full-time pay because it is full-time service.

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The classes A, B, BA, and C have always left me confused and frustrated. The reason for my confusion should be obvious: there are so many classes. The reason for my frustration is that it is discriminatory for a reservist on BA to perform equitable work on a full-time basis and not be paid at the same rate as a regular force colleague. These pay classes should be simplified and made more equitable. At headquarters they still favour BA service because they can obtain cheaper labour.

I'll conclude by saying that if regular force members were being paid with the IRPP system, which has been on trial in Atlantic Canada for three years, the system would have been thrown out or redesigned long ago. I would not blame taxpayers for demanding the head of the project manager. The number of ministerials generated by the IRPP system should attest to that. Please support the commission in advocating immediate and effective correction. Let's not continue penalizing our soldiers.

Thank you for your time.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay. Before I go to questions I want to tell the other members of the committee who arrived a little late that after the formal hearings we want to sit together for a few minutes and decide where we're going from today.

We'll start off with Monsieur Leroux.

[Translation]

Mr. Leroux (Shefford): It's a pleasure for me to welcome you here today. Yesterday, three reserve battalion commanding officers came to meet with us to tell us that it would be important for the reserve's budgets to be managed by the staff of the district concerned. That meant that all the budgets would be managed locally.

I would like to have your opinion on that. Would you be satisfied if we recommended that budgets be decentralized so that you could manage them locally.

[English]

Col Currie: We're talking about budgets and I believe you're asking if we agree that the district should have the budget and should distribute the budget. That's what we're doing now. I have a budget for my eight units and we distribute the budget accordingly.

Will that take place in the future? I can't answer that question and I don't think my opinion on it matters to this report.

[Translation]

Mr. Leroux: You say you're managing the budgets locally. Do you issue the cheques in your area? Yesterday, the people told us that cheque issuing was not decentralized and that it would be a good idea for it to be decentralized. You're telling me the contrary.

[English]

LCol Mackay: Historically units used to pay their soldiers directly. Back in my early years there was a pay about three times a year and the soldiers were paid cash at the pay period. The units at that time didn't manage their own budget though. So things have changed in the sense that we now have a situation where units - at least in our area of the world - have been given amounts of money to manage but the payment process has been removed from their control. So things have gone almost 180 degrees around.

Because of the problems we've encountered in the IRPP system some units are paying in cash now until the problems can be rectified. At the unit level, some unit commanders and most units in the Atlantic areas, as far I know, have been delegated budgets right down from the area headquarters through the district. The district commander is the one who makes the decision as to how the district budget is split up and handled by each of the units. The decisions are based on things like effective strength, training requirements, and the role they're required to play.

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[Translation]

Mr. Leroux: You know that the Government of Canada and Canada as a whole are currently under a great deal of pressure to cut their spending. Obviously everyone must pay his share and everyone agrees on that.

Some witnesses said they were concerned about the disappearance of militia units in rural areas. In your area, if units are disappearing... We do know that the reserve plays an important role among the public and perhaps more so in English Canada. The tradition in this area may be more deeply rooted in English Canada.

If any militia units are disappearing, what, in your view, will be the impact on the populations of the Maritime provinces?

[English]

Col Currie: First of all, in reference to losing units, I think what we have to do is wait until the final report comes out. I don't want to pre-empt what my area commander might decide to do with the units that remain. They may all remain. Some may go. We don't know yet. So once this report goes through all the gyrations it has to, then we'll see what falls out of it.

We are very cognizant in Atlantic Canada of the rural and urban saw-off, if you wish. Saint John, Moncton, Halifax, Sydney, Charlottetown, and St. John's, Newfoundland, are the urban centres. I feel - and this is a personal opinion - that we cannot concentrate all our reservists in those areas. So I am sure the area commander will leave a rural representation of the reservists in Atlantic Canada.

It's a little more difficult because of the fact that we do have two islands - although one is becoming tied into the rest of us in a couple of years. But there will be something there.

[Translation]

Mr. Leroux: The Special Commission says that reservists want a job protection statute. But some witnesses, including reservists, say we don't need one. What do the people of your region think, particularly employers? Is this idea well received? Are there any problems and, if there are, could you outline them to us immediately?

[English]

LCol Mackay: Mr. Chairman, I personally have favoured this legislation for some time. I have at the same time over the years talked to members of the CFLC, the liaison council, who are particularly concerned about the impact this legislation might have. They feel, as you probably know, that this legislation would have the effect of deterring employers from hiring reservists.

An employer might feel that if he had two candidates available for a job and one of them could leave at any time, or if he were forced to give up one of these employees to allow him to go off on duty somewhere, he would probably take the other candidate. So there would be some discrimination against the reservists when it came to hiring time.

I personally think the CFLC may be overstating the case for two reasons. One is that I think the commission themselves maintain that there aren't that many reservists in the workforce anyway, the impact of this is not going to be very heavy on employers, and it probably would not have as much impact on employers who have a large workforce. But here's where we start talking about regional factors again. As far as I can see, we don't have many employers in Atlantic Canada who have large workforces. A large part of our business force is composed of small businesses, so the impact of reservists going off may be greater in certain areas than it is in other areas. Legislation might have a different impact on some areas from what it might have on others.

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In summary, I would like to see the legislation go ahead, provided that it's not punitive, that it does offer attractions to the employer for employing reservists. So far, the CFLC has worked on the assumption that if the employers knew what the quality of the employees of the reservists is, they would be more willing to hire reservists. But I think there need to be other attractions as well, other kinds of incentives. If those incentives were there, then I think the process and the legislation would not meet the kind of resistance the CFLC anticipates. I think it's important that employers feel it is a good thing to hire reservists, but not that they are doing it because they have to. That's an important distinction.

Col Currie: Mr. Chairman, may I add something? When New Brunswick had a reserve day in October, the province of New Brunswick was the first province to recognize civil servants, in that it passed legislation permitting civil servants to take time off from work to attend reserve training as long as it was beneficial to both parties. So there's official legislation in place in New Brunswick, and I would hope that kind of situation would spread across the country. For the reasons Barry Mackay was talking about, I would prefer to see that sort of cooperative effort through the CFLC rather than having legislation in place. I mentioned that in my presentation to you, and I think we have to be very careful there.

Mr. Leroux: Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): I would like to welcome the members from the Atlantic area.

I appreciated your presentation. I'd like to go back to what we know is as close to what we have as right, and that's the naval reserve. They have the people and the recruitment program in place. Like others, they seem to have some difficulties, but they have a task, they have the equipment, and they have the training. The only variable they may have is at the bottom end. It's always whether or not the sausage machine has enough meat to go through it. Quite frankly, I don't like to use that term, but it's often used in service. Anyway, the morale seems high. I don't think I've met a naval reservist who wasn't happy serving there. I hear very few complaints about it.

Why can't the other two environments develop a plan that has personnel - that's recruitment - training to meet the task, and the equipment upon which to train? It seems so simple on the surface, but it seems so difficult for the land forces and the air reserves to get that quite together. Do you have any opinions on that?

Col Currie: Perhaps, gentlemen, I'll make comments. I can't answer the question specifically because I am not that knowledgeable about the naval reserves. Although I served six years in sea cadets, it does not make me an expert.

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If you look at the navy today, they have new frigates. The first coastal defence vessel is off the blocks. There are small - and when I say ``small'', it's small in numbers...the number of people in the naval reserve. They have new armouries. In Saint John is an $18 million armoury. So they certainly have a lot going for them on the surface, and probably under the surface as well.

The Chairman: We hope.

Col Currie: The army reserve, on the other hand, is a lot larger, more complex in the sense of command and control. They have two headquarters, MARLANT and MARPAC, whereas we would have four land force areas. And we don't have any clearly defined roles, tasks, or mission. When I ask, the answer is always ``augment the regular force''. That's all I can say.

Mr. Richardson: Just to follow up on that, for years the concept of the four phases of reinforcement has been kicked around as part of the army doctrine, but certainly it was never codified as it has been in the past two years. The augmentation has always been one of the things they have talked about. Some of that augmentation did not mean going directly to war, because they would pull trained technicians off from base, because that's what they're going to be short of, and bring them into the operational force, and the reservists would go back into the bases and backfill with the skills they bring from Civvy Street.

The doctrine doesn't seem to flow as smoothly as the naval doctrine. I don't know how that can be corrected. It's not a simple thing to develop a good doctrine. At the same time, it has to be understood at the very lowest levels what the navy is all about, what the army is all about. I would hope this could be straightened out. It would help clarify the air for the reserves.

All that being said, I would like to hear from you on a couple of short, sharp points. What is right about the reserves now? What is right? Do you think the commission has identified the right things? If not, what did they miss?

LCol Mackay: What's right about the militia today? The primary thing I am most happy about is the attitude of the soldiers who join the militia. They're just as committed and enthusiastic - even more than they were when I first started out. The interest, the commitment, the motivation are all there. But I don't think we're doing a very good job of capitalizing on it, to put it bluntly.

The commission hit it right on the head. We need better organization, we need better budgeting procedures, we need better command and control, and we need better definition of missions and better working conditions or terms of service. The commission has done a great job. I'm happy with all the recommendations they've made on these things. I can only see improvement ahead of us. I don't think the commission made one recommendation I disagree with.

But an awful lot is already going well for the militia. I don't think it's in trouble. The condition of the militia is not nearly as weak or as deficient as perhaps has been painted in some areas or in some quarters. I feel strongly about that.

Col Currie: I would echo what Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay has stated. I agree in principle with all 41 recommendations. They did an excellent job.

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In talking with a lot of people at my rank level and below, which I did before coming here, I don't think they believe all this will come to pass, to put it bluntly. All the benefits for the reservists as stated in here would be a tremendous boost to the morale of the reservists. Assign them missions, roles, tasks, and it would increase the level of attendance, decrease the level of attrition in the reserves. It would go a long way to taking this two-culture aspect away from the reservists.

Increase the training given to the reserves, so if we have a corporal in the reserves he has the same training as a corporal in the regular army. Right now my district did a staff check, and a reservist gets about - generally speaking, but don't stick me with this - two-thirds the training of a regular. The standards are the same, the performance objectives are the same, but they don't get the same amount of time; they don't cover the same amount of performance objectives.

If we were to look at that aspect, we would get away from this ``I'm a professional soldier and you're a weekend warrior''. We have to do away with that.

Mr. Richardson: That's a good point. Part of personnel is leader training at the NCO level and leader training at the officer level. If they're not seen to be equal, they're seen to be a deficiency; in other words, you can be looked down upon.

The Chairman: Mr. Hart.

Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): Welcome, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay and Colonel Currie. Nice to have you here today. There's a lot of pressure on you - I want you to know that - because this is the very last day we will be hearing witnesses. So it's all up to you. This is your chance to make a big impression on this committee.

I do have a few questions, first of all about recruiting at the unit level. Do you feel the recruiting system currently is conducive to maintaining the corps, or are you having difficulty with recruiting?

Col Currie: We always look at each other to see who's going to answer. I'll give it a shot.

I have a meeting this Sunday with the head recruiter for NBPEI. We're going to go over a few things.

Generally, since total force recruiting came into effect we have seen an increase in the quality of the soldier we get in at the unit level. Some areas of recruiting could be improved upon.

Mr. Hart: Such as...?

Col Currie: A reliability check, for example. Again, I use the term ``double-edged sword''. We have to make sure the person we're recruiting is in fact eligible to become a member of the Canadian Armed Forces. That's the purpose of the reliability check. However, as stated in the report - and I agree with it 100% - we can enrol them conditionally while we're doing a reliability check, and then if something happens that precludes them from becoming a member, they have signed a piece of paper that is a legally binding document.

Mr. Hart: You want to get them on the armoury floor as quickly as possible.

Col Currie: That is correct. There were so many stories in the past of soldiers who have applied to become a member of a unit and it has taken anywhere up to maybe four months. They become disenchanted. They find work, or part-time work, or whatever they're looking for, elsewhere, and we lose them.

The average now in my district, I would say, is from four to six weeks. That's not bad, compared with what it used to be. It took me eight months to become a member.

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Mr. Hart: Do you have anything to add?

LCol Mackay: Yes, I can add a little bit to that. I believe the present recruiting system is doing a good job of matching up quality of reservists with regular force. The standards are equitable. They are identical.

This means it will have good repercussions for the reservist, because when the day comes that he may want to go to Bosnia or to go on duty with the regular force there won't be the usual delays encountered as there have been in the past with the regular force saying that these reservists were recruited to lower standards than those of the regular force and that they're doubtful about the reservists' qualifications. They may do checks on the qualifications of reservists and find that maybe they didn't meet the same standard and they might disqualify some people from overseas service.

They've addressed the problem of standards by now bringing reservists in through the same recruiting centre as the regular force. The only problem is they aren't recruiting regular forces any more so they don't have anything else to do anyway.

Mr. Hart: The other problem we've heard is that the local units could put more people on the armoury floor, but there have been limitations placed on the different areas so they can't get their units up to the numbers required. Do you have that problem in your area?

Col Currie: That is a function of budgets. That's really all I can say, Mr. Hart.

Mr. Hart: Do you have that problem?

Col Currie: Not in my district.

LCol Mackay: We have more recruits than we can handle.

Mr. Hart: As far as pay, there seem to be an awful lot of problems with the pay situation for reservists. I believe the previous Conservative government had a look at this and spent about $4 million studying the problem. There was an implementation program and they spent some more money and we still don't have the pay system for reservists up to standard yet. What is the problem?

LCol Mackay: I'm a professional in information technology, so I have a personal interest in this.

Col Currie: Go ahead.

LCol Mackay: But I have to remember that I also have a uniform on. However, we decided earlier we were going to say pretty much what we thought.

Mr. Hart: I hope you do.

LCol Mackay: Here goes. I don't think the system was designed properly at the outset. As an IT system it has certain basic flaws in the technology that was used, in communications, and in the way that it was designed vis-à-vis the pay centres, the drill-hall floor and the central system up in Ottawa. There's an awful lot of communication going on between all these different subsystems and too many errors are being made in the transmission process.

That said, there were also some problems at the outset with the system operators. They lacked training. We had to put on a special push to make sure that all the operators received better training but I might point out that even now when soldiers go off to do their clerk-admin training, they're still not being trained in the IRPP system. They're still being trained in the old RDS system.

Mr. Cannis (Scarborough Centre): Is IRPP the software you use?

LCol Mackay: IRPP is an interim pay system that is on trial in Atlantic area. Eventually it will be used to pay all reservists, or so we're told.

Mr. Hart: Why can't they simply use the same pay system that the regular force uses?

Col Currie: We asked you that question.

Mr. Hart: Well, I don't know. It seems simple. There's a regular force pay system -

Col Currie: Yes. I'm sorry.

Mr. Hart: - that has an automatic payment plan for service personnel with the banks and they have a system in place. People in the regular force get paid and yet our reservists wait months and weeks. It's always behind and it's never correct.

Col Currie: It's worse than that. Atlantic Canada, LFAA, was the pilot area to do IRPPS. It has become greatly demoralizing for our soldiers. The cases of people being mispaid or not paid would fill two or three boxes.

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I agree with you that if the Government of Canada can pay its regular force soldiers it certainly has the means to pay its part-time soldiers. I work at a community college. We have part-time employees and full-time employees, and they all get paid on the same day.

LCol Mackay: Part of the problem, Mr. Hart, is that IRPPS is more than just a pay system. It's a human resources management system, and there's a lot of data in the system that relates to qualifications, training and other personnel matters. They're not direct pay matters. So in a sense the system is top heavy.

The other part of the problem is that in the regular force it's simpler to pay a soldier who's on salary than it is to pay one who is coming in on this weekend or that Thursday night or at infrequent periods for different amounts of time. So it's a little more complex.

Mr. Hart: Regarding the cost efficiency of the reserve, no one really knows how effective or efficient it is, but we have heard testimony that 5% of the budget that goes towards pay provided about 20% of the personnel from the reserve that went to the former Yugoslavia and served in UNPROFOR. It seems to me that's pretty cost-effective.

I look at the recommendation that suggests we should be cutting by 25%. How do you feel about that?

Col Currie: I really don't have any data to back that up or to be able to make any comment that you may find useful. I'm sorry, but I just can't answer that question.

LCol Mackay: I don't feel good about it. I've watched the militia dwindle over the years. When I first entered the militia, a lot of the members in the reserve force were Second World War veterans, and there were a lot of them. It was a unique organization. It still is, but it has changed completely. It's a different world, and we have to make things work better with less. We all recognize that, but it still hurts to see the reductions there. It's something we just have to live with.

Mr. Hart: It would seem to me, though, that we should probably try to find efficiencies in other areas. The commission suggests this as well on pages 72 and 73, where they say that their mandate was very narrow. They also suggest that looking at the reserves was just a small piece of a much larger, costlier apple and that maybe we should be looking at a broader review of the entire system, including the regular force.

LCol Mackay: I would agree with that recommendation. There certainly is more at stake here than just the reserves. A lot of what goes on in the reserves is determined by policies affecting the regular force, such as training standards and the tasks the regular force is given.

I don't agree with the idea that we should separate the reserve world from the regular force world. Some of the committee members have mentioned that this has been expressed by others. I don't subscribe to that theory at all.

Mr. Hart: To make this work, the part-time soldier and the full-time soldier really have to be considered as a partnership, don't they? In other words, it's not a junior part of it. It's part of the national defence policy of this country and it has to fit in as a partner. To me, it would seem that way.

.1625

One thing I do know about the military, and particularly the militia, is that the people aren't really in it for the money. So we can talk about the pay and we have to get that fixed, but they're really in it to serve the country. They're a different type of people: they're patriotic; they want to wear the uniform. They want to be part of the fabric of the country. They're very proud about that.

Do you have any concern about things like service medals, for instance? You're not eligible to wear the Canadian Forces decoration until you have twelve years of service, yet we have reservists in the militia who have put in an awful lot of volunteer time but never receive pay at all for the volunteer time they put in. Would you support the concept of having some kind of volunteer service medal for the militia? It's not one of the recommendations.

LCol Mackay: I'm not aware of volunteer time as such that reservists put in. In fact it's not permitted. It wasn't up until recently, at least. Commanding officers also typically put in a lot of time that doesn't appear on the pay sheets, but that's all part of the job.

I agree with you completely that there's more to being a reservist than just drawing the pay. They're not in it for the pay, but if they aren't being paid properly it is a tremendous dissatisfier. It's not an attraction by itself, but it can hurt if it's not done properly. There is the heritage, the tradition, the feeling of being part of something that Canada is respected for worldwide. We do a good job of it. I think a lot of young people, for a time, want to be part of that.

Just looking at your question from a different angle, maybe it would be worth while looking at a service medal with conditions different from the CD. Maybe a reservist would be eligible under different conditions from those of the regular force.

Mr. Hart: It could use length of time, for instance.

LCol Mackay: It may be something like that. I hadn't really thought about this, but it's something worth looking into.

Mr. Hart: The last question I have is -

The Chairman: Be very brief here.

Mr. Hart: Okay, but it's my most important question.

Yesterday we were told we would be committing troops to Bosnia. From the figures I gave you, I'm wondering if 20% of the personnel on UNPROFOR were militia people. Also, how does this announcement affect your region, your units and your people? Do you suspect you will be sending some personnel to Bosnia?

Col Currie: Perhaps I'll start out by answering that.

I heard it last night on the news, probably like a lot of other Canadians. My understanding is that it's not going to affect my district tremendously. And my wife is very happy that it doesn't affect my son, who is in Petawawa. From what I heard on the news, I personally don't think too many troops will come out of my district.

LCol Mackay: Given the numbers that are involved, there is probably sufficient capability in the regular forces to cope with this. It is only for a one-year stint, whereas before we were dealing with six-month rotations for an indefinite period of time. But that remains to be seen, of course.

Mr. Hart: That does remain to be seen. That's right.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The Chairman: Mr. Mifflin.

Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our two witnesses here today and thank them very much for their presentation. It's always gratifying when the last few witnesses provide you with more information. It makes it more exciting and challenging for us.

I was particularly struck by your admonition or advice - whatever you want to call it - to not just take an overlay and throw it on the four militia areas because it may not take into account some of the house cleaning you've already taken up. I understand, for example, there are more actual fighting soldiers, combat soldiers, in the Atlantic area than there are in the western area, by about a hundred.

.1630

LCol Mackay: It's always difficult to make a comparison between areas.

Mr. Mifflin: Well, I'm making the comparison, so you don't have to worry.

I did ask that question about a week ago. Basically what I was trying to do was to see how many headquarters soldiers there were. I was expecting the Atlantic area to come out with a negative balance, because of the island problem we have with two of the provinces and the fact that in Atlantic Canada we're dispersed all over the place. In fact the prairies, I understand, or the western area, are worse off than Atlantic Canada, because of the vastness of the prairies.

Perhaps it's an unfair question. But I understand there's at least an equal number of combat soldiers, although the western area is considerably larger, by about a thousand people, isn't it?

Col Currie: Not really, Admiral. LFAA is about 86% of the strength of LFWA. But our average per unit is higher.

Mr. Mifflin: Average per unit is higher.

Col Currie: Yes, sir. We're geographically about the same size as far as getting around goes.

Mr. Mifflin: Let me sail into clearer waters. I didn't hear you complain about the size and the strength and the recommendation for a paid ceiling of 14,500, and I'm not going to give you the opportunity to. Since you didn't, I presume you like the numbers. Given those numbers, do you think the Atlantic area is being treated equitably and fairly with one brigade and two, two, and two?

Col Currie: No, I don't, Admiral.

Mr. Mifflin: Could you elaborate on that, please? I'm giving you guys a chance here. Come on, let's go for it. Help me out here.

Col Currie: I don't believe, first of all, it's officer-like to boost our area at the expense of other areas.

Mr. Mifflin: Forget about the other areas. Everybody else is doing it, so I don't see why you should be any different.

Mr. Richardson: I want to tell you Fred boosted it.

Col Currie: The point is I must be very careful -

Mr. Leroux: He wants to join the army.

Mr. Mifflin: He's already in the army.

Mr. Leroux: You have to be kidding.

Mr. Mifflin: I'm a politician.

Col Currie: I think if the members were to read the figures and do a little calculation - I have to be careful here - they'll see that LFAA really.... I shouldn't say ``again''. We are, with one reserve brigade.... To some of the people, some of the soldiers, some of the officers, it looks as if we're being hit.

I have here a number of submissions that were presented to me, very good options. Some of them are very pointed, and I certainly wouldn't bring them to this forum. But they make very good sense.

Mr. Mifflin: But where would you have your brigade headquarters?

Col Currie: I can't answer that, Admiral. That's up to the commander of LFAA.

Mr. Mifflin: Could you have one brigade headquarters? I suppose Ontario has the same problem, in a sense, and the west has.... Maybe I'm getting into it too deeply.

Col Currie: Yes.

Mr. Mifflin: I'm sorry. If you want to finish that thought, I've other areas I want to explore.

Col Currie: The point to remember, and I hope this committee remembers it, is that the combat training centre - it's laid out in the diagram - and one militia or army reserve brigade...and then in the other areas they have a regular force brigade and then two militia brigades. Remember what I said in the beginning, that the combat training centre cannot put a brigade - they can't put a battle group - in the field, because they're a training centre. They're the centre of excellence for artillery, infantry, and so on. The Canadian Forces school of military engineering is coming to Gagetown. They're not tasked to perform what One, Two and Five Brigade are tasked to perform.

.1635

In that sense, after all I've said in response to your observation, I agree with you.

Mr. Mifflin: Let's leave the legislation recommendation number 41 aside and let's take all the other recommendations. This is almost a desperate question because you are the last witnesses and I want to get it straight in my mind. If we were to say to you now that we're going to recommend to Parliament that we're comfortable with going ahead with all these recommendations, would you lose any sleep over this?

Col Currie: Probably.

Mr. Mifflin: What aspect would trouble you?

Col Currie: Recommendation 41.

Mr. Mifflin: I said with the exception of 41.

Col Currie: Oh, I'm sorry. With the exception of 41, I wouldn't lose any sleep.

Mr. Mifflin: How about you, Barry?

LCol Mackay: Excepting the legislation, would I lose any sleep?

Mr. Mifflin: Yes.

LCol Mackay: I'm uncomfortable with the point I made in my original submission earlier today.

Mr. Mifflin: About treating all places the same?

LCol Mackay: I think the Atlantic area has done an excellent job of anticipating what the pressures on the military were going to be in the near year or two, devising a plan, and getting ready for the problems that lie ahead. Having done some of these things, we're now faced with being hit with the same percentages as every other area that hasn't done that kind of planning and that preparation. That does concern me.

In the Atlantic area I think the attendance of its soldiers as a percentage of its total strength makes it unique. In August at the annual concentration, there were some 1600 soldiers at Gagetown this year. That's down a bit from last year, but compared to the other areas in Canada that was remarkable. In Ontario they only had some 1600 or 1700 soldiers out of the total potential strength they had all together. I don't know what the reason is, but I'm just making the observation. With LFAA, I believe the annual concentration numbers were under 2,000.

Mr. O'Reilly: We have IRPPS to contend with as well.

LCol Mackay: There's something unusual between the different areas. I haven't been able to figure it out because I don't know the other areas well enough, but I do know we have something going for us in the Atlantic area and it's a good thing.

Col Currie: Admiral, I'd like to sort of renege on my first answer because in red here, recommendation 10(1) is one that I have addressed previously and one that I think we should take another look at.

Mr. Mifflin: Are you concerned about the two aspects? Are you concerned about the across-the-board aspect or the total numbers aspect or both?

Col Currie: I'm concerned about both, whether it's a 25% reduction in people or a 25% reduction in dollars. Secondly, does it have to be a 25% hit in each area?

Mr. Mifflin: Yes. I think you made that point very gracefully.

Col Currie: I wanted to emphasize that.

Mr. Mifflin: I want to deal with the legislation now. This is a judgmental thing. You did introduce some new factors and I think the point was made that really, after all, you are dealing with 23,000 people in a workforce of 13.5 million. That's not really a big sausage.

The argument has been made that generally speaking, people who volunteer to go into the Canadian forces, either as reservists or as regular force, are just a little cut higher than others in education and wherewithal and ambition and personal qualities. I don't know whether that's a specious argument or not. I'd rather that it were not, but I'm not sure it would stand the real true test. I've heard this argument and I think it would have trouble washing.

.1640

I have to tell you I have always believed central to the total force concept was some form of legislation. In fact, six or seven years ago most reservists I spoke to, and with, were very much in favour. But now that there has been a parliamentary committee for the last eighteen months, starting really with the special joint committee, where we were almost prepared to put it in our recommendation, until we saw there was a reluctant objection.... Then when we saw it in the commission's report we said this has been talked through, and clearly it's been sorted out.

We find it's no better now. In fact I personally find there's probably more resistance to it now than there was when we were doing the special joint committee.

I'm not going to sort it out here with any witnesses, because -

The Chairman: Hang on there, Mr. Mifflin. One of the things that did come out today, though, again, with the honorary colonels, was if there were an incentive for the employer, there might be some grounds to look at.

Mr. Mifflin: That's a good point, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I think the point they made just before they put their hands up to say they would agree was that it was on the understanding that not only would you go for legislation but you would make it worth while for the employer. I think that would change the situation.

But I'd have to tell you I think both the Reform Party and Paul Martin would have difficulties - seriously - politically in doing anything that would give tax breaks to people. The climate is not ripe now for any committee to make that recommendation. That's not to say we're not going to make it, but it's something we're going to have to be very cautious about.

But what would you think of...? You've either alluded to this or come out and said that we can set an example in the Canadian government by starting to say all employees, all civil servants, etc., and invoke the legislation for them, very much as New Brunswick has done. Maybe that's the way to go.

What would you think of some form of legislation, whether it's the civil service or whatever the case may be? Maybe we start and see how it works, but don't dissolve the Canadian Forces Liaison Council, because I personally believe - maybe because I've been closer to it in my capacity as acting minister from time to time - that the work they're doing is fantastic. Even if they don't recruit another reserve, the fact that they are getting out there and they are getting the John Murphys of the world - Elsie Wayne's former brother in arms in St. John's, who is just a totally magnetic force but has had no involvement in the military.... Now he's so excited about it he's on the phone. I think that's an excellent aspect.

So even if we were to recommend some form of legislation, what would you think of saying ``but still retain the Canadian Forces Liaison Council''? Or are you as enthusiastic about this as I am? I don't know. I want to feel you out on this.

Col Currie: As for legislation, I won't comment on that, because that's certainly beyond my mandate. But as for as the Canadian Forces Liaison Council, I feel it should carry on. I would like to see it more involved directly down to the unit level. For example, Admiral, you could come and visit the CO of Third Field Regiment in Saint John, and he could take you and himself and a couple of others to visit some of the larger companies in the city and meet the right people, the decision-makers in that company. I'm not talking about a coffee-and-doughnuts type of meeting. I'm talking about hard facts.

I would like to see that happen, as opposed to legislation that tells a company they must let Joe Bloggins go for three weeks of training. It just doesn't seem it will fly. When you talk to soldiers 18, 19, 20 years old, they might all agree, yes, they'd like to have legislation, but I don't think they have realized the impact of what they're agreeing to; whereas the older people, like myself, may see some negative sides to it. That's why I said we have to be very careful. But I like the Canadian Forces Liaison Council, basically because I'm from New Brunswick and I saw what they did. I'm a civil servant and that's why I was able to come up here today.

.1645

Mr. Mifflin: That's a good point.

Before I leave, Mr. Chairman, I want to reassure the two witnesses that certainly from where I sit, I will apply an overlay on these recommendations with two litmus tests. First, is it part of the total force concept? Second, will it enhance the reserves and the militia? Those will be the litmus tests. There may be others. Those will be the two main ones.

I think it's safe to say that you have an understanding and sympathetic audience in this committee. I think you can be assured that our aim is not just to get rid of this report and pass it on like a hot potato. It's to put the report in a perspective that puts a political overtone on it for the minister. We have all parties participating in this and I think it's important to let you know that this is the way I believe we're heading in this committee.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. O'Reilly: Thank you, gentlemen, for a very thorough and thought-producing report to this committee once again. As we go through the report and look at the 41 recommendations, we're still drawn back to those 41 recommendations and what changes we can make to them to either improve them or throw them out.

We've had people here who have suggested that we put the whole thing through the shredder, and we've had other people who say that there are certain areas that with some change will make it an acceptable report.

I want to correct a couple of things. Mr. Hart indicated that the pay wasn't a big thing and everyone agreed. I can tell you as a former cadet and a former reservist who was a teenager at the time, pay was a big thing. To hear that people are still not getting paid now.... Back in those days I thought it was just dumbness. Now I guess it's just straight stupidity. They don't pay people. I take exception to that. I think I quit the reserves because we didn't get paid and although you went through the various functions as a teenager and all the gun crews and so forth, you liked getting paid because it kind of decided whether you went out on Saturday night or not. So I take exception to that.

Also, you've noticed that I take exception to everyone who comes in here and talks about a footprint. I know it's a military term and I know the meaning of it, but as I said, to me a footprint in the sand means somebody's gone, so I am going to try to change that word to ``presence'' and to make sure that the presence we now have in the communities stays.

So I have probably four specific areas. One that comes to the front every time in my mind is the DND costs at national headquarters and how you start to trim those costs and bring them into line with the rest of the unit. When you have a parade and there are more people on the reviewing stand than there are parading, I know there's a problem. That's not hard to figure out.

Also, in this report there is a lack of a medical component in the costs and in the models that were used and I'm concerned - although they are mentioned in there - that there is no mention taking them into account in any of the recommendations.

I also take great exception to the fact that this is another kick at rural Canada because it seems that the rural presence in the military will soon be non-existent if we keep going into the cities and large towns. I also think that when deciding dollars versus bodies, industry usually defines the job, then they obtain the bodies and then they set a budget to meet the need, and if there's no money, they redefine the role. I find that this kind of goes a little backwards in that. I guess it's kind of like a wheel and at the end of the wheel we're back reinventing it again.

Those are my four specific areas, besides the presence and the footprint. The pay system does bother me. As I said, I think it has to be addressed.

.1650

The nine versus seven brigade groups I see as the elimination of rural Canada involvement and also the elimination of a number of cadet corps.

So I have some definite problems with the specifics in the report. If you would care to address those, you can talk about it between yourselves, and either one can start.

Col Currie: What is the specific question, Mr. O'Reilly?

Mr. O'Reilly: There are four, actually. You've addressed the rural loss, I realize that.

The lack of the medical component in the report, is that of concern to anyone except me? There's no equation for it in there, and I just wonder how you could have a report where a large segment has been left out. Yet it is a large segment of costs, and it is an area I thought should have been dealt with.

Col Currie: It's one of the 11 combat functions. LFAA does have a medical component. We have a medical company and a dental company. I can't speak for the commission. I don't know why it wasn't in there. I can't answer that.

Barry, maybe you can elaborate on that aspect of it.

LCol Mackay: I understood that it was largely an error of omission rather than intention. I am putting words in other people's mouths now, but I understood there was an intention to put the medical into the report, and it was overlooked.

But there are definitely medical and dental components on the ground now, and we don't foresee any reduction there, particularly if there is a brigade structure in place. That's obviously one of the supporting services that would be integral in a brigade structure. All officers have been trained in what the components of a brigade are, and that's one of the organic structures. I don't think there'll be any long-term effect by the omission in the report.

Col Currie: I think General MacDonald, when he was here, answered that question.

Mr. O'Reilly: No, he took the fifth amendment.

Col Currie: We don't have that in Canada.

Mr. O'Reilly: I know, but it's the equivalent of it.

The Chairman: Just to follow up on that, Mr. O'Reilly, this morning at the meeting with the honorary colonels a couple of people brought that up. The man from Edmonton, Colonel Munn, who was in the medical operation, was concerned about the lack of facilities. He feels that would be the case if mobilization and other things were required. So it is something that is there. As you say, you have it, but to them it is not as prominent as they'd like to see it.

Mr. O'Reilly: I think you've covered the loss of the rural presence.

I think most of my questions have been answered by previous questioners. I know Mrs. Wayne is ready to jump in and give us an east coast view, so I'll end there.

Mrs. Wayne (Saint John): Some day, Colonel Currie and Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay, I hope the two of you will come back when you don't have your uniforms on, and you have freedom of speech. Then we're really going to hear what you think about this report, because I can see how hesitant you are when you go to answer.

We were informed by the honorary colonels that there is a problem because of the paper work that has to be done and that by the time our administrative people in the reserve get through with the reporting they have to do - they say there's about 48 reports, sometimes 50 - there's not as much time for training as there was before. Are you finding this to be a problem?

LCol Mackay: Definitely. I was a commanding officer for seven years, not all at one time, and I used to complain bitterly about the fact that I could not get out into the field with my soldiers nearly often enough because I had to stay back at the desk and do a lot of paperwork. There is a huge amount of paperwork required. There doesn't seem to be any improvement in sight. I'm trying to be very candid here and not hesitant at all.

.1655

Mrs. Wayne: No.

LCol Mackay: The one area here of assistance could be that if the paperwork doesn't diminish, we'll need more help to do it. That help will have to come from our full-time friends, because the part-timers don't have time to do it. They should be out training with their troops, not doing paperwork. That's for the clerks and the full-time guys who are there from Monday to Friday.

Mrs. Wayne: That's one of the concerns they had this morning, and with further cutbacks I'm not sure what's going to happen in the future. Certainly you can't afford to give any more time to paperwork; it's a situation that was expressed today to us.

Also I have to say, Colonel Currie, that when having lunch with the Atlantic group - the honorary colonels - they were expressing the need for two brigades in their region. They were emphatic about that. Maybe lieutenant-colonel Mackay feels there is need for more than that, but at least there is a need for two, not just one.

I'd like to have your comments on that. I believe you addressed it, perhaps, when Rear Admiral Mifflin asked.

Col Currie: I don't want to sit here and say that I know the answer to that question by telling you that I feel we should have two or twenty brigades in Atlantic Canada. I guess what I'm saying is we should all look at Atlantic Canada in a slightly different light, due to certain factors that I outlined in my paper to you. That is, no regular force brigade, and CTC cannot do the job of a brigade, so we're left with a reserve brigade in the militia or the army reserve.

Whether I feel that's adequate or not, I really can't comment, Mrs. Wayne. When I take the uniform off and see you in Saint John, I'll tell you.

Mrs. Wayne: Okay.

LCol Mackay: Could I make a comment on that as well?

The report seems to be focused mainly on the requirements for phases one and two of the mobilization plan. I think the projected needs of the army, as seen by the commission, were based primarily on phases one and two.

Mrs. Wayne: That's right.

LCol Mackay: What the honorary colonels you spoke to are probably looking at is what happens in phases three and four. We don't have any back-up units that can pick up that extra manpower requirement and run with it. The structure just isn't there. Maybe I'm again putting words in others' mouths.

Mrs. Wayne: No, they shared that. They did.

LCol Mackay: That's what I'm seeing in what they're saying. The answer may be we don't yet have a very clear projection as to what's going to happen in phase three or phase four. A mobilization plan is badly needed. I think Colonel Currie made that point in his written report, and I agree completely.

Maybe this is where we get back to reconciling the need for more rural units with the report of the commission. If there was a structure out there that we could use in the rural areas or elsewhere that would allow us to mobilize for phase three and four needs - in other words, keep unit identities or unit structures there without necessarily having to fill them up all the way with large amounts of manpower - then we might have an answer. But there's a lot of to and fro here, because we have only a limited number of dollars. We can only see our way clear to what's going to happen in phases one and two.

I don't know if I'm being very clear on this.

Mrs. Wayne: I understand what you're saying.

.1700

I will say to my colleague Mr. O'Reilly that I'm worried about the militia becoming non-existent, not just in the rural areas but in the urban areas as well, particularly in our region, with cutbacks. I said it this morning and I'll say it again: they play a major role in society. They teach young people respect and responsibility and so on. I'm sure this is where you learnt it as well.

I'll find out yet -

An hon. member: [Inaudible - Editor].

Mrs. Wayne: He quit. He had it, but he lost it.

I've seen it; it's there, and you are needed. I'm hoping that some day we'll see that we need more of you, not fewer of you.

I will say to Colonel Currie that the New Brunswick policy that was brought in does not apply at the local level, just at the provincial level and if we have any federal employees.

I have some concerns - I've shared them before - with regard to that section and demanding that employers will give x number of weeks or days off. A lot of employers up to now have done that when they looked at the type of person they were getting when someone was involved with the reserves. When it becomes legislation and two qualified people are coming in, we'll have to look out: they're probably going to take the other one for that reason. That's not fair, so we have to more or less take a look at what's happening.

I had a man in my office recently. He has been waiting for his cheque for eight months. He said ``My landlord is after me. I'm married. I have no money and I don't know what to do.'' So the problem still is there. That's a major problem. If they're going to be there and they're promised a pay cheque, then they should get the pay cheque.

Mr. Bertrand (Pontiac - Gatineau - Labelle): One of my questions has been answered.

Colonel Currie, you mentioned in your brief that every time you asked your superiors what the task of the militia was, you were told that the job of the reservist is to augment the regular force. Is that what you were told?

Col Currie: I responded orally to that; it's not in this.

I said that, over the years as a reservist, when I asked, when I was a young lieutenant - I never was a young lieutenant, but when I was younger - they would say that our role is to augment the regular force. I don't necessarily mean that in this context.

Mr. Bertrand: Supposing that for a brief moment you were the CDS and you had to sit down one morning and to define very specific tasks for the militia, what would those tasks be? I'm sure that you must have ideas on it.

Col Currie: I do have ideas, but I cannot, in all sincerity, presuppose that I can answer for my area commander or the commander of LFC or the chain of command.

Mr. Bertrand: I'm not asking for those people; I'm asking just in your case. What would you see the militia doing in your case?

Col Currie: They must be given a role; they must be given a specific mission, a task - roles, mission, and task - from the commander. That must come down the chain of command. It's not built from the bottom up. Depending on the operational level.... There are seven factors in this report that determine roles and missions.

From the top down, a unit that is a good unit, that parades well and goes to the field and does its collective battle task standards to the same degree or to an acceptable degree, can be given a role and a task. But that has to come from higher up.

.1705

I don't think I've answered your question, but I've skipped around it.

Mr. Bertrand: What about in cases of natural disasters? Could you see a role for the militia in that?

Col Currie: Let me say one thing first, before we get sidetracked here. I don't know if you recall the middle and late 1960s.

Mr. Bertrand: I was a young fellow, but I remember it.

Col Currie: I was a gunner, and they took all the guns away from the reservists and gave us ladders and ropes for civil defence. We used to call it snakes and ladders. I don't want to go back to that.

I think there is a viable role for the reserves and if national disasters becomes one of the roles, but not a specific role, I can accept that. But I would not want to say that in the N.B.-P.E.I. district you have x number of units and one of them is tasked to provide flood control in the Saint John River Valley or something like that. I don't agree with that. I think it should be all-encompassing so that if there is a natural disaster or something, the reserves be treated the same as the regulars and whoever is available at the time will do it.

Mr. Bertrand: Thank you very much. C'est tout.

The Chairman: Mr. Cannis.

Mr. Cannis: Let me apologize for being late, gentlemen, but I listened with great interest, being a new member on this committee, and it's a totally new field for me, as well.

As much as this review sometimes seems to be a matter of only reducing dollars and cents, there's a human aspect that I know some of my colleagues have alluded to, the community aspect and the support aspect, in many areas. So I don't think it's strictly dollars and cents, but sometimes we have to get to the structure aspect you referred to and fine-tune the system.

I'd like to go back to the ERPs system because previous witnesses came before us and one gentleman, whose name I can't remember, indicated that there's a stack of computers sitting there and not being utilized. Is this system run through an out-source service? Has it been contracted out? Is somebody developing this payroll system?

Sometimes, instead of slashing bodies, you can look at other areas and say there we go, this is working fine. As my colleague across the way indicated, why do we have these people for eight months? This isn't something new, I presume. From what I've heard from other witnesses, this has been going on for quite an extended period of time.

Colonel Mackay, over this period of time, who controls the payroll activity? Does it come from a central service bureau here in Ottawa? I don't know.

LCol Mackay: The IRPP system is in transition right now; it's being corrected. It's hard to say exactly where it is right now because it has been revised compared to what it was even a month ago.

Let me begin by just saying that the system was designed by non-DND. It was out-sourced. As far as I am aware, DND did contract with a private consultant to develop, produce, install, and manage the system.

Mr. Cannis: Was there not internal expertise within DND to develop a payroll system or buy a payroll product off the shelf and customize it to the DND needs and requirements?

LCol Mackay: Oh, I'm sure there is expertise there.

Mr. Cannis: I understand you come from the information systems area. We both can agree that out-sourcing or contracting can get very costly.

LCol Mackay: I suspect that the contract wasn't managed or wasn't written very well. I understand that at one time the contractor threatened to sue the crown and there was a bad situation there.

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Mr. Cannis: Can the crown not go back and say we agreed, we contracted with you, but we haven't had a system delivered to us that works?

LCol Mackay: There was a dispute about the contract. That's all I can say. I wasn't involved in any way. But I know at several times in the last year various commanders, including the area commander, have said if the system isn't adequate or doesn't reach our criteria by such-and-such a time, it's gone.

Mr. Cannis: We're back to square one, then. Meanwhile, these people still find it difficult, or are sitting at home, waiting for the cheque to pay the rent and put the food on the table.

Col Currie: First of all, let me say I'm not familiar with the consultants, but I believe they have been changed since the original.... A new consulting firm has taken over from the original consulting firm.

IRPPS was meant originally as a pay system. Add-ons were placed on the consulting firm. They started to do personnel: can it do this, can it do that. It simply built itself into a monster.

Each commanding officer in my district - I'm speaking for my district - can access pay for a solider within one day if IRPPS burps. This happened on the fifteenth of this month.

Mr. Cannis: Club soda disease?

Col Currie: One of my eight units did not get paid on the fifteenth. It was a drive to CTC Gagetown. People there are very cooperative now that they know the problems with IRPPS. They sit down and write out 150 cheques, come back that night and the soldiers are paid.

Mr. Cannis: I know in other presentations we have heard how if there were a dedicated budget.... We obviously can't put a finger on how much, because there's never been an actual evaluation done that this is the budget we'll set aside for the reserve. But if there were such a budget, could you see...?

Mr. Mackay, you mentioned earlier the paperwork; you don't have the time to get out there and participate. Today we're talking about the paperless office. If there are systems there and we are trying not just to teach our people respect, discipline, and training, but maybe if we could teach them some of these skill sets that they could also use to take out to the future workforce, would you not see it as an advantage?

If we remember the previous conflicts, there are people who do get out into the field, and there are support staff who have to sit back. They used to do those manual typewriters. There's a function for everybody. Maybe it's not as flamboyant as being out with the arms and what have you, but.... Could you not see yourself utilizing some of these computers that supposedly are sitting there - if they are, Mr. Chairman, I don't know - and training your people to help you with this paperwork and creating this paperless office, which is going to make it much more efficient and effective for you to get out there and be with your troops, providing that leadership, as opposed to having these computers sitting in storage? And if that budget were there, hypothetically speaking, could you see setting up a separate independent payroll system, a dedicated payroll system, that would address the concerns we've been hearing consistently from the various witnesses who have appeared?

LCol Mackay: The problem with the paperwork is not so much the lack of technology. Technology is only a tool, after all. The problem in my view is the business practices the paperwork is supposed to be leading to or handling. In other words, there are requirements in the system to do this, this, and this, and the paperwork follows from that.

So we're really talking about revisiting some of the business practices of the military and how things are done, why they're done, rationalizing a lot of the reasons for doing the paperwork. Probably forty or fifty different categories of paperwork are required even in a reserve unit. That needs to be streamlined. You need system consultants, or even military consultants, to come in and revise that.

Frankly, we never had the time. We've been too busy worrying about whether we're getting enough recruits in, whether they are getting the weapons and the vehicles they need, the uniforms they need. There have been too many other pressing problems. I know it sounds like we aren't concerned with these issues, but they have traditionally been low on the list of priorities. Maybe we need to revisit that.

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Mr. Cannis: I think maybe we could take a step back to fine-tune it. I'm not saying it isn't efficient, don't get me wrong, but I believe you would be able to put in that time you so much long for to spend out there training your troops. I think the systems are there today, the automation is there. I think we would add an additional skill to the reservist, who could take it out in his private life and make another contribution to the community.

I think there can be found restructuring or cuts from a dollars-and-cents point of view. Coming from a systems area or information technology area, you know how we can save the money and how we can best utilize the information and systems that are available to us today. From the presentations we've heard from various people, I think there's a lot of - I speak personally now - tradition, a lot of history. If we just take the knife and start going right across to satisfy some people, I think that's the worst way to approach it.

The Chairman: Mr. Speller, you have time for a short question.

Mr. Speller (Haldimand - Norfolk): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you want to get on with other things, and I want to thank the colonel and lieutenant-colonel for coming.

Unlike Mr. O'Reilly, I still have militia in my area, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, and I want to keep it there. I'm wondering how you see this breaking down in the rural areas and Atlantic Canada. Mr. O'Reilly said you already answered this, but I'm sorry, I didn't hear your answer. How can you see this breaking down across the country? Do you see these reserve units ending up in the cities?

I've read the report. I've read the categories on how they will make their decisions as to what will stay and what will go. From reading that, it would seem to me that we'll end up with all kinds of reserves in the city in the end, but not in the rural areas. How do you see it breaking down in the Maritimes?

Col Currie: I can tell you it will be work from the bottom up. Our area commander of LFAA has begun the process. During the week of November 24 we met in Halifax and started working on this. I don't believe the commander of LFC - this is a personal opinion - will dictate to the area commanders which units go where and which units are amalgamated - whatever the outcome of this report is.

I think some leeway - actually, I hope it's a lot of leeway - will be given to the area commander to put his brigade or brigades in place. Those factors will be taken into consideration, along with other factors particular to the western area, Ontario, Quebec, and down east, of course.

To answer your question, I can't get into specifics. It would be unfair of me to do so because I don't know the big picture.

LCol Mackay: I think it might be worth pointing out that I would like to urge that units be retained on the order of battle, if at all possible. What may change is the number of headquarters and administrative organizations that supervise or control these units. There may be amalgamations, and there may be individuals wearing different hat badges in a composite battalion, for example. That would answer a lot of problems about the heritage and traditions in terms of keeping regimental identifications up there in the community so that the community linkage is still maintained.

The effectiveness may come in, however, through reducing the top of the structure rather than the bottom. I think that's what Colonel Currie meant when he said we are attacking this from the bottom up. If anything, we're going to try to preserve units and unit identifications, but we may collapse some of the hierarchy these units fall into. Especially if we have this TAE thing, the total army establishment, it's going to be difficult to maintain units within that kind of structure with the current commanding officers, DCOs, adjutants and all of the other battalion headquarters administration we have now.

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The Chairman: Thank you, Colonel Currie and Lieutenant Colonel Mackay. It's certainly been an enlightening afternoon for us here. As we mentioned, you people are the last official witnesses to appear before the committee on this specific topic, and now we have to make some decisions within the next while as to what our report is going to recommend. Thank you very much. Season's greetings.

Members, if we could just stay for a few minutes after these gentlemen leave to talk about future business, I will adjourn the meeting.