[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, June 20, 1995
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[English]
The Chairman: I call this meeting to order. For the first hour and fifteen minutes this morning we have Mr. Christopher Westdal, Ambassador for Disarmament. He is accompanied byMr. Casterton and Mr. Jurschewsky from the department.
I understand, Mr. Westdal, that you'll start with about a fifteen- or twenty-minute introduction and then the members will be able to ask questions. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Christopher Westdal (Ambassador for Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Yes indeed, thank you very much.
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First let me say that appearing before this committee is an honour for me and for my colleagues, Sven Jurschewsky, senior adviser on nuclear affairs with the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament division of Foreign Affairs; and Jim Casterton, an adviser on nuclear non-proliferation with the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada. Both these colleagues have worked for many years on this subject and were members of the Canadian delegation both to the preparatory committee meetings and to the conference itself.
Last week we circulated to the clerk of the committee several documents that were intended to provide you with a sense of the dynamics of the conference, the themes and issues it dealt with, and Canada's role in the achievement by the conference of the government's declared first-priority global security goal, which was the indefinite, unconditional, extension of the NPT, that is, permanence with accountability.
Today we've circulated the three actual decisions of the conference that make up the extension package. I'll draw your attention to them. These are official documents of the conference. As yet they're only available in English. They will soon be available in the six official languages of the United Nations.
The first one has ``L.6'' marked in the upper corner. This is the Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Draft decision proposed by the President. That is the legal decision, the heart of the matter. In this document the conference decides that the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely. That's a legal document.
The other two documents are political decisions. The one that has ``L.5'' up in the corner, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, includes a program of action toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It is a political document.
The third, also a political decision, is more of an institutional and procedural document. It has the number ``L-4'' up in the corner and it is about strengthening the review process. The review is built into the treaty, and by tradition reviews have been held every five years.
I will talk about these documents and other things in my remarks, which are focused first on the significance of these decisions; second, on Canada's role in these proceedings; and finally, on some lessons that I think can be drawn from the experience. I will also, of course, be prepared to answer any of your questions and respond to your comments.
These three decisions were the essential outcome of what has turned out to be the one and only NPT extension conference, but it should be noted that the conference in New York was also the fifth review in the 25-year life of the treaty.
Although these two components are obviously related - they proceeded simultaneously, they covered much of the same ground, and they involved the same players - they were nonetheless distinct elements. It was a conference to review the implementation of the treaty, particularly over the last five years, and it was a conference to make an extension decision.
In fact, before I turn to the main event, the one-time-only extension, I would like to say a quick word about the outcome of the review.
It was productive in several respects, particularly with respect to nuclear safeguards. It endorsed the efforts of the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, to strengthen and streamline safeguards in light of the evidence from Iraq and North Korea that there was some cheating going on.
It endorsed the program they have labelled 93 plus 2 to strengthen those safeguards.
It fulfilled a long-standing Canadian objective in calling for full-scope safeguards, meaning safeguards that cover the full fuel cycle as a condition of supply.
It maintained the integrity and called for greater transparency and export controls such as those coordinated by the nuclear suppliers group and by the Zangger committee, which is part of the IAEA and is created or really reflects the NPT itself.
This review emphasized environmental concerns and nuclear safety, including waste disposal.
The review also generated a great deal of useful language for the principles and objectives document that was part of the extension decision.
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But, as twice before, in 1980 and 1990, the review was unable to agree on a final text, principally because of contention and disagreement and the somewhat quixotic search for consensus on every word on difficult political issues in the first main committee, the political committee of the conference.
If anything, the review proved the validity of the decision to strengthen the review process and particularly to re-examine the tradition of consensus, which, as you will know, gives each and every party - and there are now 178 parties - veto power over final text on quite difficult and complex issues. That then is a quick word on the review.
Let me turn to the extension decision. The essential decision made - and it was done without a vote - by the 175 states parties that were present was that the treaty would continue in force indefinitely.
There were 3 choices built into the treaty 25 years ago when it came into force. They were that the treaty would continue in force indefinitely, or that it would be extended for a fixed period, or that it would be extended for fixed periods.
The decision was that it would be extended indefinitely, that is, that it would become permanent. This legal decision, which is in document L.6, to which I drew your attention, was part of and could not have been achieved votelessly without an otherwise political package that reinforces the treaty by strengthening reviews in L.6 and proclaiming nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament principles and objectives in L.5.
The key thing is that permanence enshrines the treaty's values. We, that is, the global community, are now unequivocally committed to nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and safeguarded peaceful use. These are not principles we are going to reconsider every once in a while; they are now among the permanent proclaimed values of the world community.
Permanent values, not temporary, irremediably uncertain provisions, now join the forces of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. That's the extension decision.
The principles and objectives are like a template; they are a political commitment to a program of action - that phrase has been resisted for a long time, and it's unprecedented - toward ultimately complete nuclear disarmament. We are to pursue that program determinedly and progressively.
That program includes a comprehensive test ban by the end of next year. It includes hard work on a convention to cut off the production of fissile material for weapons. It includes commitment to work for universal accession to the treaty. There are now only 11 countries in the world that don't belong to the treaty, most notably, Israel, India, and Pakistan.
Finally, that program of action includes consideration of stronger, perhaps binding, security assurances, both negative and positive. Negative security assurances are promises from weapons states that they will not use those weapons on you, and positive security assurances are the stuff of alliances, like NATO: if someone else threatens to use them on you, one will come to your defence. There is a promise to consider stronger, perhaps legally binding, security assurances.
The strengthened reviews are procedural improvements to enhance treaty implementation. Substantive reviews - you can regard them as visits to the dentist - will henceforth occur in four out of every five years, and once every five years there will be root-canal work.
The reviews will look forward as well as back and, through working groups, they will focus on specific substantive issues. This is a significant evolution of the review process. In the treaty itself there is nothing more than simply ``the review'', ``there will be reviews held''. There is now an evolved and elaborated procedure of review.
In sum, these decisions represent the achievement beyond our expectations of Canada's first-priority global security goal, the unconditional, indefinite extension of the NPT, which we had hoped would be supported by at least an ample, preponderant, incontestably sufficient majority.
Well, it was supported without a vote. Some quibbled with the use of the word ``consensus''. There is debate about what precisely that means in a UN and multilateral context, but it was clearly supported by more than an ample, preponderant majority; no one objected.
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It was not altogether surprising that the treaty was extended indefinitely. Permanence made compelling good sense, and the most powerful countries on earth emphatically thought so.
What was unexpected though was the high quality of the decision. That was the moving and fundamentally significant achievement of the conference. In part, it was because the very few potential spoilers, i.e., those who would have denied consensus, were so isolated by the end that they really only had North Korea's option of absenting themselves, which none but North Korea took.
But in larger, more heartening part, it was because the general opinion of the 175 states parties gathered is that nuclear weapons are exceedingly dangerous abominations that must not proliferate and that ought not exist.
It must, nonetheless, be recalled that before the last week of the conference few were paying more than lip service to the notion that permanence might be achieved without division, as one, without a vote.
Instead very sophisticated public and private analyses were focusing on the spectre of secret balloting and the difficult choice that would probably have to be made between a bare, quite divisive majority for indefinite extension and perhaps many more votes for something less than permanence.
It did not turn out that way. Instead it turned out to be a meeting of minds, an exposure of deepening common conviction, to which states bent their will, in what we had labelled and helped orchestrate over many months through painstaking pursuit of a systematic strategy, what we labelled a ``consensus by momentum''.
There are only two kinds of consensus in a multilateral setting. One is by compromise, and we did not want to compromise on the essence of the extension of the decision itself. The other we labelled a consensus by momentum.
I think that for the achievement of that consensus Canada, from Prime Minister Chrétien and Minister Ouellet on through the Department of Foreign Affairs, DND and the Atomic Energy Control Board, right to our missions in the field, can take some of the credit - but only our fair share.
Indeed, before discussing Canada's role, I want to pay brief tribute to several key contributions in a list that does not purport to be comprehensive.
First of all, I think you will have noticed that South Africa changed the course of the conference at the start when Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo announced support for indefinite extension, putting paid to the fear of NAM coalescence around an alternative, and investing South Africa's great credibility in the cause of NPT permanence.
The South African delegation thereafter made that permanence possible by leading the drive for review reform and principles, i.e., accountability, i.e., trust your mother but cut the cards. In all, it was a stellar return for South Africa to the multilateral stage.
I would pay tribute as well, to Conference President Dhanapala, the Sri Lankan ambassador to Washington, who performed masterfully. I think particularly noteworthy was his decision and his foresight in the first week to establish a hand-chosen committee, which included Canada and 18 other countries.
That was distinct from the general committee, which is a formal part of the conference. He had that president's committee focus on review reform and principles and objectives, which were the essential political accompaniment to the legal extension.
As well, Chairman Dhanapala insisted that the decision for indefinite extension had to be embodied in text that did not condition the extension of the treaty, text of his own devising after deliberate, wide consultation so as to ensure a sense of common property. In his phrase, there was no victory but a common victory.
I would pay tribute as well to Egypt, which had the most legitimate reservations and made the largest leap of faith in allowing the decision to pass without a vote and, I should note, in accepting a considerably weakened resolution by the conference on the Middle East.
It is true that the Egyptians were subjected to pressure, but it is also true that they found the extension decision politically difficult, they held some considerable sway over the Arab bloc, none of whose 22 members agreed to co-sponsor our draft decision, and that in the end the Egyptians could have denied consensus. They gained much credit and new understanding for their predicament by not doing so.
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Australia made key contributions in keeping the weapon states honest, in leading the negotiation of security assurances text, and in assisting the president directly in his formal and informal consultations. We also found that the Australians and the New Zealanders added useful restraint and credibility to the drive that we led for co-sponsors of a draft decision for indefinite extension.
Finally, I pay tribute to several smaller members of the non-aligned movement, who deserve credit for supporting indefinite extension before the NAM meeting in Bandung in the middle of the conference freed their hands.
Noteworthy again in a list that does not pretend to be comprehensive were Honduras in Central America; in Asia, Singapore and Cambodia; and in the Caribbean countries, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, which joined our ranks of supporters of indefinite extension quite early in the process.
Turning to Canada's role, I think it's fair to say that our role was quite prominent and central. Minister Ouellet defined the goal in his opening address and this became a kind of headline: permanence with accountability.
He also established at a working luncheon on the second day of the conference a unique low-profile 16-member group, which we called the cosmopolitan core group. It met five or six times during the conference. It was called cosmopolitan simply because uniquely it included representatives from all groupings and all regions, including some who did not support indefinite extension, and certainly some who had not agreed to co-sponsor our draft decision for permanence. It included, critically, South Africa and it gave us a reliable sounding-board to canvass opinion, particularly about review reform and the principles and objectives.
Over many months, in Ottawa, New York, Geneva, Vienna, and in capitals where we have missions and those to which we're accredited duly, we had laid the groundwork for a consensus by momentum. At the conference itself, Canada convened the co-sponsors of indefinite extension and presented the draft decision on their behalf, and in doing so offered timely tangible proof. On May 5, five days before the extension decision had to be taken, we offered proof that the treaty would be made permanent and that the issue had therefore become the quality and depth of the extension decision.
Our strategy had been patiently and systematically to undermine and isolate prominent NAM critics before, in the final stage of the strategy, reaching out to them. This was not done through pressure, but through respectful dialogue and through a review with the undecided of our non-weapon state case for permanence.
Let me emphasize that the non-weapon state case for permanence, which is summarized in the aide-mémoire that we circulated last week, is in my view different and more compelling than the weapon state case for indefinite extension.
Our ultimate list of 111 co-sponsors, which is 21 more than was required legally by the treaty - i.e. it required a legal majority, which was 90 - began with 16 states parties, which were convened at the end of the fourth meeting of the preparatory committee in January. It became, under our chairmanship, first of all the 19-member group, which we called WEOG-plus. Forgive the jargon, but WEOG is the western European and other group; the plus was Russia.
We moved our focus to that group, and that group met three times in Geneva under our chairmanship and once in New York. Then we moved the focus to the 39-member Mason group, which is the post Cold War group of the east, west, and also South Korea and Argentina, which was convened by my predecessor, Peggy Mason, and was named in her honour. The first committee, the disarmament committee of the general assembly, shifted the focus to that 39-member group. It met for the first time in Geneva and then it met three times in New York, until in the last few days we were chairing full co-sponsors' meetings of something over 100 states.
We grew that list through repeated démarche in capitals through our posts, through systematic outreach dinners and luncheons in Geneva and New York, in which Ambassador Fowler at the United Nations played a key role, through one-on-one calls on uncommitted permanent representatives, in New York, and through intensive lobbying and sustained communications throughout the conference itself.
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At the conference we were credible and active across the range of issues involved in both the review and the extension. We were not obsessed, nor seen to be, with simply the length of our list of co-sponsors.
On our side, we had the benefit of our general credibility on arms control and disarmament. We had the credibility of being a non-nuclear weapon state by choice. That credibility was highlighted most recently by Ambassador Shannon's leadership in Geneva on the cut-off mandate, that is, the mandate to negotiate the cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.
As well, we had firm ministerial guidance and policy, and we had the resources and the flexibility to pursue it. Months ago, we had shared analyses of the reform of the review process and a reaffirmation of principles with the G-7/8, and notably as well with Mexico and South Africa. We had identified South Africa very early as a key player and partner.
At the conference, in the president's committee and in the core group that I referred to, our delegation, including particularly Sven Jurschewsky, who was the author of those early papers on the reform of the review process and on principles, contributed prominently to their substantive negotiation. He also synchronized the pace of the three-legged race we ran through the piece with South Africa.
Meanwhile, in the second main committee, which is concerned with safeguards, Philip McKinnon, who was the deputy director of the delegation with our mission to the IAEA in Vienna, chaired the key drafting group. Through great effort he achieved consensus on the final text on the last day, reviving hope, ultimately in vain, for agreement on final review text.
On both safeguards and peaceful uses, the subjects of main committees II and III, and an important part of the review, our delegations representatives from the AECB, including particularly Jim Casterton, lent the delegation substantive depth and credibility.
In all, it was a team effort in which we were able to bring to bear both our credibility in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses, and our multilateral reputation and capabilities.
Finally, trying to derive some lessons from the experience, it is still early for profound analysis. Only time will tell, but I think some lessons seem clear.
First, traditional multilateral security groupings, the Cold War's familiar east-west and the NAM, are in evident disarray. It is not yet at all clear how they will be replaced. It is as well not yet at all clear how old thinking will be replaced. There was depressingly much Cold War analysis and rhetoric.
The conference did perhaps, though, point the way to non-proliferation arms control and disarmament debate and negotiation, more closely based on national interests and group alignments that reflect real families of those interests. It also illustrated the scope for issue-specific groupings.
Second, Canada is unusually well placed to reach out to non-traditional partners. The links we have spent years building - whether in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN regional forum, the Middle East peace process, or in the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, you name it - equipped us handsomely to orchestrate a consensus by momentum, using existing groups and creating new, fleeting, efficient gatherings as required. We will want to maintain these new relationships and build on them in keeping the promises we've made.
Third, consistent constructive engagement pays off. Sweet reason alone could not have won the day. Some parties paid more heed to power and pressure. It is simplistic, unduly cynical, and simply wrong to regard the outcome as the result of a massive weapon state power play. The vast majority of states simply wanted to be engaged with respect, to have their opinions heard, their concerns addressed, and to play their part honourably in an historic decision.
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Fourth, straight talk to friends helps. We used our current G-7/8 chairmanship, our western group and Mason group contacts repeatedly to express our view that arrogance, rigidity, and number-crunching could yield only the pyrrhic victory of a grudging contestable majority for indefinite extension.
Our successors will have to speak straight too. Having played a central role in persuading states parties that permanence would deepen accountability, Canada will bear a particular responsibility in work to ensure that the treaty's promises are indeed kept.
Fifth, we should think globally but act regionally. Global values are vital, but this conference, which enshrined some, also highlighted the fact that the most pressing threats, whether they be Middle Eastern, south Asian, or northeast Asian, must be addressed regionally.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the sixth lesson is one I expect the committee will appreciate. Our expectation was realized that permanence would be achieved once the issues were addressed, not by diplomats and lawyers and arms control experts who have been at it for years, but rather by politicians and government leaders. Trust the people and their accountable representatives. Together they did the right thing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am, of course, prepared to respond to your comments and will try to answer your questions.
The Chairman: Thank you very much Mr. Westdal.
I'll try not to find distressing that reference to lawyers at the end.
Mr. Leblanc.
[Translation]
Mr. Leblanc (Longueuil): Welcome, Mr. Ambassador.
You're talking about nuclear arms control. What is the link between countries which sell, for instance, uranium and nuclear energy in countries which tend to build nuclear arms? How are you going to control all this?
You need uranium to make nuclear arms, I suppose. How are those countries which sell uranium going to control this? Canada sells a lot of uranium. How is Canada going to control the sale of uranium to countries which wish to have CANDUS and other devices for the production of nuclear energy? I don't know if there is link between the two. I don't know how you think all this can be controlled, but it seems to me that it would be difficult.
[English]
Mr. Westdal: It's difficult to do so but the verification of the NPT lies in the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards. Canada, for one, as the largest supplier of uranium, insists first of all on NPT membership and then nuclear cooperation agreements with customers, not only for uranium, but also with customers for elements of nuclear technology. That's why the safeguards are so important. Without them, we would not have confidence that there could be no diversion of nuclear materials or technology from peaceful uses to explosive or weapons purposes.
The conference in New York and as well the ongoing meetings of the board of the IAEA are trying to strengthen those safeguards further, are trying to enhance the access of the IAEA both to information and to sites. This is in response to the evidence in Iraq and North Korea, but particularly in the case of Iraq, that even though Iraq was a member in good standing and inspections were being carried out, there was a clandestine nuclear program being developed.
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I might ask Jim Casterton of the AECB, who specializes in safeguards and particularly their administration in Canada, and our relations with the IAEA, to comment further.
But you're right in putting your finger on the question of verification. It has been a subject of very lively concern. It was a subject of direct discussion and action at the conference.
Jim, do you want to add to that?
Mr. James A. Casterton (Senior Advisor, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Section, Non-Proliferation, Safeguards and Security Division, Atomic Energy Control Board): Thank you, Ambassador.
Just a couple of points. We refer commonly to what is typically called the ``nuclear non-proliferation regime'', the cornerstone of which is the NPT. But pursuant to the regime and other vital elements of the regime, as Ambassador Westdal has pointed out, are the International Atomic Energy Agency and its system of safeguards, which in relation to the NPT are there to ensure that states are living up to the commitments they enter into under the NPT.
Then, of course, there's another vital aspect of the regime, the multilateral commitments on export controls, to which Canada is a party, specifically the Zangger committee and the nuclear suppliers group.
These export control mechanisms remain in force and in fact are being strengthened in many ways to ensure that nuclear commerce, including things such as the supply of uranium or reactors, are used for peaceful, non-explosive use.
Finally, as Ambassador Westdal has alluded, there's the matter of national policy. Canada has been in the forefront in terms of national policy, ensuring that its exports, principally uranium but also the CANDU reactors, are used for peaceful, non-explosive purposes.
So all of these things are part of the whole. The most dynamic at the moment, I would imagine, is the International Atomic Energy Agency, where consideration is being given to strengthening agency safeguards in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness.
Thank you.
[Translation]
Mr. Leblanc: Based on your experience up until now, has this regime been sucessful? It seems that some countries such as China have been difficult to control, and there are others. You also talked about Irak. I'm asking the question again because it seems to me that right now, this does not appear to be under control. There are still things which slip away.
[English]
Mr. Westdal: I think one would have to say that the experience has been successful in the sense that when this treaty was negotiated in the 1960s there was real fear, and I think quite realistic expectation, that by this time there might be twenty or thirty nuclear weapon states.
There are not. There are five declared nuclear weapon states that have a recognized status within the treaty. Three threshold states who are not members - India, Israel and Pakistan - are suspected of having nuclear capability. There has been some evidence of cheating, North Korean and Iraqi, but those are only 2 states among 178.
Action is being taken to try to strengthen the safeguards and the procedures and the access IAEA inspectors have, to try to make sure that doesn't happen again. But all in all, I think the record is quite encouraging.
It has been possible to share nuclear technology while ensuring that neither material nor technology was diverted to weapons purposes. The record is not perfect, but it's encouraging, and steps are being taken to try to further strengthen the safeguard regime.
Mr. Martin (Esquimalt - Juan de Fuca): First let me congratulate you, Ambassador, and your colleagues for the hard work, the good work, you've done on something that I imagine can't be more important for international security.
I have less of a concern that in the future we will see a MIRVed ICBM go from one country into another area than I am that we will see a small nuclear weapon going off in somebody's hands, being used for terrorist purposes or otherwise, or to destabilize an area.
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I think Pandora's box is gradually being opened. There have been some disturbing reports of fissionable material being trafficked from areas in the former east bloc countries to areas in the Middle East. I suppose it follows along the lines of what Mr. Leblanc was speaking about.
Are we putting increased pressure on, say, the Baltic states, who have contemplated doing this, or trying to work with the Baltic states to try to put in some kind of control or cap? Because I think we ought to have - you'll agree - zero tolerance of cheating in this area.
As well, what are we going to do with Israel, Pakistan and India? The Middle East and the area between India and Pakistan are two big hot spots. The agreement of Israel in the NPT is I think a linchpin in the goodwill in the Middle East peace process.
I've had some disturbing reports that Iran has been trying to get their hands on some fissionable material for some time. Recently they have been getting the precursors to building a nuclear device.
Lastly, I've had some disturbing reports about red mercury. I don't know whether it's a myth or a reality. I don't know the answer. If you know, I'd like you to tell me, please. Is red mercury what it professes to be?
The Chairman: I hope you'll tell the rest of the committee what red mercury is.
Mr. Mills (Red Deer): It's a Hollywood movie.
Mr. Westdal: No, it's a new Ford product.
First of all, thank you for your kind words about the work of the delegation and my colleagues.
With respect to the first question, the risk of a clandestine bomb in terrorist or other hands, yes, that is a concern. There is no particular focus on the Baltic states in that matter, but of course there is concern about the safe custody of highly enriched uranium and plutonium coming out of dismantled weapons as part of the bilateral reductions. There is concern about nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union. The questions of control are obviously complex and dynamic, and have to be addressed with great care.
This subject is discussed in a G-7 and P-8 context. There it's discussed extensively, of course, in a bilateral context between Russia and the United States and as well between the former members of the Soviet Union and the United States. There is increased cooperation between police and customs agencies and cooperation through such institutions as Interpol.
At the Halifax summit, I think it was interesting to note that there will be a summit in Moscow next spring on the question of nuclear safety.
In all these settings and more there is an attempt to focus on the safe custody of weapons material and to try to ensure it does not find its way into the kinds of hands you were describing.
With respect to the non-signatories - Israel in the Middle East, India and Pakistan in south Asia - at the conference increased pressure was generated on those non-signatories in the sense that everything that happened at the conference, including the growth, to 178, in the ranks of the states parties to the treaty, will make those non-signatories increasingly lonely.
Our policy has long been to press for universalization of the treaty. We're on record in that respect, and have been for a long time. But we recognize that Israeli or Indian or Pakistani accession to the treaty is not likely to happen other than in the context of comprehensive regional peace arrangements. We're doing what we can to contribute to the achievement of those.
It first needs to be emphasized that it's not the fault of the treaty that those three don't belong to the treaty. Second, even for those non-signatories in both those regions, the treaty serves a useful purpose as a set of norms and values and as part of a beckoning solution.
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With respect to Iran, as well in the outcome of the Halifax summit, particularly in some of the comments by our Prime Minister, the chairman, there has been discussion. There is some difference of views within the P-8 on the intentions of the Iranians seeking the completion of their reactors. There is agreement that if evidence emerges that the Iranians are trying to develop a weapons capacity, all nuclear cooperation with Iran will cease.
With respect to Canadian nuclear relations with Iran, it's not really a live issue. We do not have nuclear relations with Iran, and right now there is none in prospect.
With respect to red mercury, I cannot tell you much. I will ask Sven Jurschewsky if he wants to complement what I've said and address that question.
Mr. Sven Harald Jurschewsky (Deputy Director and Senior Advisor, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Red mercury is one of those mythic substances. I'm one of those who doesn't believe there's such a thing. That does not obviate the fact that there is nuclear material being smuggled. So far we have been, to a degree, lucky. Very little fissile material suitable for explosive purposes has been intercepted - very little.
Not all nuclear material can be used to build a bomb. For example, strontium, which is very, very dangerous, cannot be used to construct a weapon. That has been one of the largest seizures. It is more of a public health hazard. This stuff is being carried on airplanes and on trains. The other passengers are put at risk. There's no doubt that this is a dangerous public health hazard.
But to date, no material to build a bomb, or sufficient quantities of that material, has been intercepted.
Mr. Martin: But the efforts are there.
Mr. Jurschewsky: Oh, yes, beyond question. This was something that was taken up by the G-7/8 in Halifax precisely because it is something to worry about. There's no doubt about that.
That said, we should not fool ourselves that building a bomb is hard. It isn't. We have to strengthen safeguards precisely along the lines Mr. Leblanc was suggesting, because it is easy to build a bomb. That is the lesson of South Africa, in point of fact. You don't need a test to build a weapon.
In terms of smuggled material, this is a domestic problem in the former Soviet Union. This has to do with breakdown of control structures, security structures, low salaries for people who work in laboratories - a range of issues we really can't address. But we can help governments of the former Soviet Union address them by provision, by assisting them on the security front.
In addition, there have been articles in the German press, particularly in the magazine Der Spiegel, suggesting that there were Germans operating in creating a market for this material. This is also something we have to be concerned about. There is an investigation going on in Germany to that effect, what role - because most of the interceptions were made in Germany - the German Bundesnachrichtendienst played in this.
There is no such thing as red mercury.
The Chairman: I guess we can take some comfort in that.
Ms Beaumier (Brampton): In the past, non-nuclear states have employed the threat of non-extension, or at least limited extension, as leverage to gain a disarmament commitment from the five nuclear states.
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What mechanisms do we have now for non-nuclear states to pressure the five to fulfil their obligations to dismantle their nuclear weapons? How can they be made accountable for their progress?
Mr. Westdal: First, the premise that in the past the threat of abandoning the treaty or limiting its extension or calling it into question at some regular period in the future was a form of effective leverage on the nuclear weapons states is, in my view and analysis, highly questionable. In fact, uncertainty about the future of the treaty undermined the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to consider further progress toward nuclear disarmament. It also undermined the basis for peaceful cooperation, and it also undermined the effectiveness of the treaty in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.
So we never found that the prospect of a less than permanent extension served the cause of either disarmament or non-proliferation or safeguarded peaceful use. That was an essential part of our argument for permanence.
There are mechanisms that now exist to try to insist that not only the nuclear weapons states but others keep the promises they made under the treaty include, first of all, permanence. That's fundamental and it will take some time to sink in. But the point is that these norms against nuclear weapons and against their proliferation are now values. They're permanent values. We aren't going to think about this every once in a while. These have entered the permanent declared values of the world community, and that will have long-term impact. The view of the world community has now been made firm and open that nuclear weapons must not proliferate and ought not to exist. That is now a value. That is a strong achievement.
Secondly, we have the reform of the review process, more regular reviews, more substantive reviews that look forward and back and that monitor a program of action. Third, we have the principles and objectives that contain a specific program of action.
All of those are a stronger means to try to ensure that the promises made in the treaty are kept. Those are all the substance of accountability - a much more effective substance than the threat of the demise or the weakening of the treaty at some regular future juncture.
Mr. Jurschewsky: Just to reinforce the point Ambassador Westdal has just made, one of the discussions as we approached it was what the minimum length of an extension would be, precisely to address the kind of question you've just posed - how to maintain pressure on the weapons states.
If you look at the nuclear planning horizon, in other words how long it takes to develop a given weapon against which one has to defend oneself by way of deterrence - that's the point of these things, after all - well, that's 25 years. That would be the minimum period for the treaty to make any sense from a security standpoint. Otherwise, nuclear planners in weapons states that are required to deter each other would not be in a position to countenance any nuclear disarmament whatsoever. In fact, if the extension had been less than 25 years, there would have been increased pressure to develop new weapons systems.
One has to look at the NPT not just as a political instrument; it is dealing with real security problems. Countries do threaten each other with nuclear weapons.
Ms Beaumier: The nuclear countries do as well. You say that threatening the treaty is -
Mr. Jurschewsky: They don't threaten the treaty; they threaten each other.
Ms Beaumier: Yes, but threatening the non-extension as a threat and destructive, that may very well be.... In a lot of cases when we're dealing with these treaties and with the mechanisms we have for enforcing them, we're taking out the aspect of human nature. It's not unlike...one of the five nuclear states that in response will say, we're not going to pull back because there's not proof that you've pulled back.... There's never going to be that absolute kind of proof. I'm just not sure how you can be assured of the accountability.
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Mr. Westdal: You can never be absolutely certain, I suppose, but we have together taken effective steps and have deepened the accountability of all parties in the ways I have described.
Again, it's back to the alternative of having had built into the life of the treaty some regular period during which we would stop and reflect and wonder if we wanted to continue in that direction. It makes no sense to lose the treaty now. We could not imagine any circumstances, short of catastrophe, under which it would ever make sense to lose the treaty. We heard no one coherently describe any circumstances under which it would ever make sense to lose the treaty. That was the essence of the argument for permanence.
The concerns you've voiced were also the basis of the package in the sense that permanence, which involved an element of trust, could only be achieved, and that trust would only be tendered, on grounds of credible accountability. It was addressed both politically, in terms of the principles and the objectives in the program of action, and it was addressed in terms of procedure and institutions, in terms of strengthening the review process.
Beyond that it was difficult to imagine how far one might go and in what direction. I agree with you that one can still not be absolutely certain, but we now have a deeper accountability to permanent values, not temporary provisions, than we had before the treaty was extended indefinitely.
Ms Beaumier: I guess I can always see a human rights aspect in a lot of this when I see that not all of the five recognized, and perhaps accepted, nuclear states have a great record on human rights and they don't respect their own. That was just a comment.
The Chairman: We had a case in the Supreme Court of Canada that tried to work this into a charter argument. It's complicated.
Mr. English.
Mr. English (Kitchener): I certainly accept your argument that the non-proliferation treaty has been successful. When one thinks of the predictions made in the 1960s by academics, President Kennedy and others, about 20 or 30 nuclear powers, I think he said, within 10 years, did not come into being. I think the treaty played a role.
Following up on Ms Beaumier's question, you talked about international values and permanent values. Ultimately, does not the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council - four of them western nations, and two of them quite small nations by international standards - possess nuclear weapons and the others don't...? In the 21st century the others that don't will be overwhelmingly the bulk of the population of the world. Take India as a special case. Isn't that likely to destabilize the treaty?
You talked about what is now an international value, but international values, as we've seen in the case of genocide and things like that, do change or are shattered by current events.
In the last few weeks we've had China testing. France announced that it was testing right before the Halifax summit, where it could have been challenged. Finally, this week I believe I heard that the United States was talking about resuming underground tests. I know moves are being made to lower the number of nuclear weapons, particularly between the United States and Russia, but aren't these kinds of incidents fundamentally destabilizing to the NPT regime over time?
Mr. Westdal: I'd hesitate to qualify them as fundamentally destabilizing. I think it's fair to say that at that conference in New York, we, the international community, were not able to solve all of our nuclear problems. We were faced with quite a specific decision. Under the terms of article 10(2), what is it going to be? Is it going to be permanence? Is it going to be a fixed period or are they going to be fixed periods? I think we made the right decision. That was the business of the conference.
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With respect to the special status of the declared nuclear weapon states - i.e., those that had set off a nuclear explosion before 1968 - I would prefer to emphasize the fact that the treaty does not give them the right to have nuclear weapons forever. In fact, it enshrines their obligation to get rid of those weapons, and that is an enshrinement we would not want to weaken or lose.
With respect to the testing, as you know, the government expressed quite firm regret both in the case of the Chinese test, which followed the NPT conference by only three days, and with the French announcement that there will be a test between September of this year and May of next. But in both cases we've taken note of the commitment of those governments to agree to a comprehensive test ban by the end of next year, which is part of the outcome of the conference.
I think those tests underline that this is a real live issue with which we have to contend. They also underline the expectation, which I think is real on the part of both those governments, that there is going to be a comprehensive test ban treaty. If they have any testing that they feel compelled to complete, despite the agreement made in New York that they would exercise utmost restraint, then they'd better get on with it because there is going to be a comprehensive test ban treaty negotiated by the end of next year.
With respect to the comments about possible American testing, I have simply seen that in describing all the options, from no test to the possibility of resumed underground tests, that were discussed and that are being discussed on an ongoing basis within the defence department, underground tests were included in the range of theoretical possibilities. But note that when the French announced their series of tests, President Clinton reiterated his commitment to the American moratorium on tests and his commitment as well, which he assumed others shared, to the completion of a CTBT.
I'll just add one thing. There was mention of human rights. A great Canadian, John Holmes, talked about the fact that the engine of human progress, particularly in terms of human rights, was the mobilization of shame. Shame arises from the exposure of difference between behaviour and declared values. Whether all of that is true - and I am inclined to think it is - we do now have in the form of these values, rather than their predecessors, temporary provisions, new potential shame to be mobilized. I do not underestimate the importance of the enshrinement of these values and the effect it will have on world public opinion and on public opinion within the weapon states.
Mr. English: In terms of these values, as you know, the World Court declared international nuclear weapons illegal. My colleague was mentioning that Australia and New Zealand might possibly...in that respect. The Canadian government has been criticized by some NGOs and other groups like churches for not taking a more active role in this World Court decision. I know the United States has doubts and the nuclear powers do. Why has the Canadian government been reluctant to state its position in this regard?
Mr. Westdal: In a nutshell, I think it's because the Canadian government regards these as security questions that should be dealt with by political institutions and governments, not legal questions that should be dealt with by the court.
Mr. English: Can it be seen as a question of values?
Mr. Westdal: Yes, I suppose it can be seen as a question of values, but those values find expression and will be respected or not respected in political settings by governments responsible for the security of their peoples, not by a World Court in The Hague.
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I'm comfortable with the references and only problematically equipped to deal with those references. One has come from the World Health Assembly and the other came from the first committee. I noted that the World Court, whether it was intentional or not, clearly had an eye on the calendar and did not wish to deal with these questions until the NPT conference was over.
Again, it's a matter of choosing institutions and settings in which these questions should be dealt with. The government's view has been that these are security issues to be dealt with by political institutions, not legal questions to be dealt with by still embryonic international court systems.
The Chairman: Do you want a quick follow-up, Mr. English?
Mr. English: We're still dealing with the five nuclear powers that have the weapons. A literature has appeared that argues that the long peace was the product of nuclear deterrence. Churchill was the first one who expressed it. John Geddes expressed it at the greatest length and most cogently in his book by that title.
I don't want to be too academic here, but there were academics a few years ago, including a Canadian academic, Professor Kapur, who argued that deterrence is important not simply between the two superpowers, as the situation then obtained, but specifically in the case of India and Pakistan. If India develops a bomb and Pakistan develops a bomb, that deterrence can apply regionally and more specifically.
As you mention, some of those arguments have not stood up all that well and yet we have examples of India, Israel and Pakistan, and earlier examples of Brazil and South Africa. We have Iraq and North Korea.
Doesn't the value of the treaty about which you spoke so eloquently relate in some way to a decision for Canada that it is important to express the moral value that nuclear weapons are profoundly wrong, in the same way we are talking about chemical weapons? I can't see the real difference between the stand we are taking on moral grounds and chemical weapons and how we are allowing nuclear weapons, which in some ways are pretty deadly things. In the case of nuclear weapons, it seems to me we could be criticized for having different kinds of standards.
Down the road, as North Korea develops a bomb, as Israel has a bomb and, heaven only knows, as Iran develops a bomb, other states will argue they have a need following deterrence to develop bombs. After all, one of the arguments is that during the period the United States had the bomb it uniquely had great diplomatic advantage...and that it was used. There are lots of arguments that this is the case.
In this situation, given that the international regime does not have this moral weight, don't we have a long-term fundamentally destabilizing process, to use the words I used before?
Mr. Westdal: There are several difficult issues here. First, with respect to a long peace and some of the various rationale for nuclear deterrence in several regions, in a nutshell one would simply say that a long peace could come to a very horrific end if weapons of mass destruction are the basis of its sustenance.
With respect to values, you are right to talk about the links between, say, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons, and also biological and toxic weapons. We are talking there about fundamental values of maturity and restraint. We're talking about one of the values that's in the UN charter, that we should defend our security with the least diversion of human and financial resources. I think in a way we can look at the work of disarmament ambassadors as trying to accelerate the process of maturity in that respect, that is, the maturity of foresight and the maturity of restraint.
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With respect to a fear or expectation that one day Iran or North Korea will develop the bomb, they signed and promised not to do so. Safeguards will be administered to try to make sure they and all other signatories keep the promises they made in the NPT. We can but hope that all of the states parties - the weapon states that have promised to pursue article VI and the non-weapon states that have promised not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons - will in fact keep their promises.
Mr. Jurschewsky: Countries disarm, not because of legal injunctions, but because of their security circumstances. That expresses a fundamental difference between the CWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the NPT. The Chemical Weapons Convention outlaws chemical weapons, period. The NPT does not, and that reflects a difference in the way those weapons are used and the character of those weapons. This has to be taken into account. That they are terrible abominations and should be gotten rid of is beyond question. The question is, how do you get from here to there?
With respect to the long peace, in point of fact that's a highly fallacious argument. It wasn't the long peace. More people have died in this century, particularly in the post-Second World War period, than ever before in history. There just happened to be a peace between the superpowers.
Mr. English: It's too argumentative. That's simply not true. The most deaths were between 1939 and 1945 and the other period was 1914 to 1918.
Mr. Jurschewsky: We had a large number of regional wars and that -
Mr. English: But the casualties are nothing like this.
Mr. Jurschewsky: Oh, yes; at the level of that.
Mr. English: No, they aren't.
Mr. Jurschewsky: But to think, sir, that those regional problems, if I understood you correctly, could be solved or that they were contained in some way by regional deterrence in the way thatMr. Kapur suggested...I've quarrelled with him and debated this bitterly with him. It increases the risk and danger of this war that would result by these countries having nuclear weapons.
Security circumstances are in fact worsened by the presence of nuclear weapons in those regions. That is why, in the principles and objectives, the first operative paragraphs deal precisely with the need to universalize the treaty, which implies addressing the regional circumstances of south Asia and the Middle East to get nuclear weapons out of those areas and to bring the non-proliferation regime to bear on those regions. This will be the first task of the preparatory process beginning in 1997 because of the risks posed by that.
Lastly, it's important to remember a little historical fact and why the NPT arose. The NPT arose because of the Cuban missile crisis. There's a direct link there. The nuclear weapons states were afraid of how close they had come to war.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Jurschewsky. Do I have the permission of the members to ask just a few questions, too. We will then have Mr. Leblanc, Mr. Martin and Mr. McWhinney.
I'd like to follow up by adding to Mr. Martin's congratulations to Mr. Westdal and the Canadian delegation. I know it's been a long work and that the Canadian delegation played a leading role in this very important enterprise. Please don't take what I say in the spirit of legal cynicism as being critical of your work. However, I wonder if I might posit a few thoughts for your consideration.
The first is about your notion that moral values enshrined in treaties act as deterrents. After the First World War there were many treaties that prohibited the establishment of chemical weapons and mustard gas and everything else. We saw instead a proliferation of horrible engines of death, which one thought, at the time of the League of Nations, totally prohibited and outside the bounds of any form of humanity.
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It seems to me the problem we face is that in a domestic society, when persons step outside of the legal rules, there are fair sanctions that will be applied to them and therefore people are restrained from behaving in certain ways. In the international community, though, clear, unambiguous terms that were interpreted by courts or tribunals having clear authority to do so and sanctions that will necessarily follow do not exist. As a result we are in this ground of moral suasion, which you referred to - the shame factor instead of the police factor, if I could put it that way.
Is the shame factor going to control this horrible thing when in fact it's the desire of states for power that will drive them? How much comfort can we take in this fact, given Mr. Martin's observation that it's no longer states we're dealing with, it's small groups? We know the technology is there for anybody to build a nuclear weapon. All you need to do is get your hands on the fissionable materials, and they're becoming much more available.
My first problem is the whole underpinning of your premise, given the new technological world in which we live. Perhaps in a cleaner, neater world of fifty years ago the premise might have been there, because one could have controlled the process. But now one no longer controls either the technology or the access to materials, which would be my first problem.
The second problem I have goes back to Madam Beaumier's question, which related to the credibility of the nuclear powers themselves in the process. My understanding is they now have such technology that they no longer need to test - that in fact they have the computers run it. The United States can say they forgo testing. I've been informed by American sources that in fact they have the computer capacity to say they know what a test would produce.
It's great for them to say they don't test. Meanwhile, all the other countries want to acquire the potential. My understanding is France has decided to do this series of tests precisely because it wants to, before the period ends, obtain enough information in its computers that it won't need to do any more tests; it can do computer runs instead to replace them.
Well, if that's the world we're living in, then we've created a world of permanent nuclear powers who will never need to do another test or face the shame because their computers will just be whirring away in the dark without anybody even knowing about it. So where is your shame sanction going to apply there?
Mr. Westdal: Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your kind words, but in both cases I would ask what the alternative is in the real world.
You're right; we don't yet have the police factor. We do not yet have an international community well enough organized on a sufficiently credible and effective political base to evolve judicial and police institutions.
We might perceive that the need for the human community to develop those institutions is urgent, and we might be working hard at it, but we aren't there yet. We all know about some of the frustrations of getting there in terms of trying to reform the United Nations, trying to create a rapid reaction capability and trying to create even the beginnings of some kind of international constabulary or police force that would have a legitimate political foundation. We ain't there yet.
But in the absence of such a police capacity, we're better off with values to which we've all committed ourselves. Cynics might vary about how deep and effective that commitment might be, but again, we're better off with it than we would be without it.
Similarly, with respect to testing, yes, you're right that some states now may feel confident that they don't need a test. They may think they can figure out, with a computer or in a laboratory, what would happen if they did have a test, and therefore they don't need a test. Others who've never had a test may one day be able to figure out what would happen if they were to put these things together and do this or that to them.
But again, we're better off with a comprehensive test ban than we would be without it.
So in both cases, again, I would go back to saying we could not, at this conference in New York, solve all of our international, political, long-term, evolutionary problems, nor could we solve all of our nuclear problems.
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We were faced with a very specific decision: what should we do with the future of this treaty and in what context might we make it permanent? We made a decision that I think, in both these respects and others, leaves us better off than we were. It does not leave us in a perfect world without serious political, philosophical and nuclear difficulties with which we'll have to continue contending.
[Translation]
Mr. Leblanc: I always come back to the main issue. You need uranium in order to build nuclear arms. Do we control efficiently the suppliers of uranium? We know that Canada sells a lot of uranium, but do we have a list of our customers? Do we know the customers of other uranium producers? I think this is very important. We know that uranium has become more profitable than gold. Many countries might be tempted to sell it to anybody. If we do not control the source of uranium, then...
I suppose that you have been dealing with that issue in the context of your treaty. If we could control the source of the problem which is the sale or uranium, we might at least reduce the consumption and better control consumers that have a tendency to use it for weapons rather than energy production.
[English]
Mr. Westdal: The answer to your question with respect to Canada is yes, we do know the uranium we market is not being diverted to weapons purposes.
You know we had an experience with India in the late 1960s or early 1970s that sharpened and deepened our concern about precisely the issues you're citing now, but since that time we have tightened our safeguard procedures. We in fact maintain higher standards than are actually technically required through our bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. With respect to Canada, we can be certain, owing to the insistence on full-scope safeguards, about the end use of our uranium.
I have no reason to question other sources of uranium and other levels of confidence that uranium sold is not being diverted, but again, let me ask Jim Casterton to comment on that issue.
Mr. Casterton: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I would just add a couple of things.
First of all, yes, in the specific case of Canada, we do control the export of our uranium. All exports of uranium require authorization by the government. Our agency in particular is responsible for ensuring those authorizations are consistent with our policy and our multilateral obligations.
We are also charged with ensuring that adequate and accurate records are kept with respect to not only the movement of the uranium itself but also the other fissionable material that is produced through the use of that uranium. As you can imagine, that can be quite an onerous deed as the uranium moves through the fuel cycle, from raw material into a fuel bundle, into a reactor and out.
We have very strenuous controls and we do expend a lot of time and energy in ensuring adequate records are kept for tracking our uranium.
We know other countries now take a similar approach. They require bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements in order to export their uranium and records are kept as to the use of that uranium.
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The NPT requires that both nuclear states and non-nuclear weapon states do not export source and special fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon states that would assist in their production and manufacture of a nuclear weapon. That's the undertaking in the treaty.
Complementary to that, what steps do you take to interpret and live up to that commitment? The major nuclear supplier countries, 32 countries in the world, have in place multilateral arrangements that require that certain assurances must be undertaken, certain conditions must be fulfilled when you export nuclear products. Nuclear products are basically in two categories: nuclear products that are direct-use nuclear products, such as uranium, direct use in nuclear reactors, and so on and so forth; and then since 1992 we even control the export of products that are called nuclear-related dual-use products, products that can be used in a nuclear or a non-nuclear application.
Over the last five years, I would say, there has been a great effort multilaterally among the nuclear suppliers to strengthen the conditions of supply for these items as well as to increase the number of items to which those conditions will apply. That is complemented also, as I mentioned prior to this, to the activities that are going on within the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are devoted to trying to make the safeguards they administer pursuant to the NPT more efficient and more effective.
One of the main ways of doing that is for the agency to acquire greater access to information about the movement of nuclear items, nuclear materials, exports and imports, productions, that sort of thing. Another way is for them to acquire greater access to information that will enable them to possibly detect undeclared activities in states parties.
Those are all part of a movement that's going on - it has been very active in the last five years - directed toward trying to address your kind of problem, how do you ensure that peaceful nuclear cooperation can take place without having an impact on nuclear proliferation?
The Chairman: Could you just answer yes or no to a question: does the experience out of the Chemical Weapons Convention of more close enforcement and inspection in member states help in this respect? Does this move the agenda along? Can this be translated over into the experience in the NPT?
Mr. Casterton: Yes.
The Chairman: Thank you. Sorry, Mr. Martin, I have both you and Mr. McWhinney. We're kind of running out of time.
Mr. Martin: Mr. McWhinney, you go ahead because I've had a chance and I will ask these gentlemen after.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Martin. It's very kind of you. Mr. McWhinney.
Mr. McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra): I just want to ask you, Ambassador.... Most international lawyers view legal cases as an auxiliary means of achieving political results. I was a little bit disturbed by your putting aside seeming allies in your work. The French, although they declined the jurisdiction of the World Court in 1973-74, did in fact accept the decision in 1974 and ceased all high-level atmospheric tests in the South Pacific. And President Mitterrand has said recently that the decision of the court was a factor in that. I'm wondering if this is a position of your own section, or is it advice you're getting from the legal division, the somewhat negative attitude toward litigation, including the possibility of further Australian litigation on these latest French nuclear tests? Is it an autonomous decision with your own expertise, or is it pressure from other departments? Or is that an indiscreet question?
The Chairman: Given Mr. McWhinney's occasional attendance before these tribunals, we will not concede that this question is some form of special pleading on his part -
Mr. McWhinney: No special pleading.
The Chairman: Strictly from an academic....
Mr. McWhinney: I'd love the ambassador's response, though, if he can discreetly give it.
Mr. Westdal: I don't regard it as an indiscreet question. I do regard it as a probing question and I know it comes from an international authority in this field, and I do not purport to be an international authority on the relation between the international legal evolution here and the evolution of political and security doctrine.
No, I was answering the more narrow question, why the government had chosen not to make a presentation at the court.
Mr. McWhinney: On the advisory opinion issues.
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Mr. Westdal: Yes, exactly. And the answer, that is the government's declared position and one I have taken to heart, is simply that certainly in the lead-up to the NPT these questions were thought to be more appropriately dealt with by government in a political setting than by the court. Again, my impression is - and here I would value your opinion highly - I'm not sure the court is well-equipped to deal with such a reference, and that the court will be well-served, and that the evolution of the court will be well-served should it make a finding that is for political reasons and security reasons essentially ignored. I'm not sure we've made progress in that respect, either in terms of the evolution of international judicial bodies or in respect of enhanced global security.
Mr. McWhinney: The 1974 decision is a masterpiece in the exercise of political self-restraint by a judicial tribunal. It goes as far as it needs and it gets the results. I trust my last question to you, professionally, would present no problem if you were asked, in your professional capacity, to help prepare briefs on either of these issues, the general reference on nuclear testing and any specific case involving the current French tests. These present no professional problems for you?
Mr. Westdal: No. I am a servant of the government that has taken that view, though, with respect to a possible reference to the ICJ.
Mr. McWhinney: We could change that position.
The Chairman: Ambassador Westdal and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming this morning. Your observation has been very helpful to us.
Following on our recent enactment of the Chemical Weapons Convention law, I think our understanding of this whole issue of the enforcement of these treaties - in domestic law particularly - is becoming much clearer and we're grateful to you for coming before us this morning.
We'll adjourn for two minutes and then we're going to hear from the Department of External Affairs and Department of Finance on anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the NAFTA.
This meeting is adjourned.