EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Monday, September 18, 1995

.1611

[English]

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Good afternoon. My name is Don Oliver, and I am one of the joint chairs.

Pursuant to the order of reference adopted by the Senate on Wednesday, June 28, 1995, and by the House of Commons on Monday, June 19, 1995, we are here to consider the code of conduct for senators and members of the House of Commons.

It is very fitting today that our first witness is Howard Wilson, the ethics counsellor.

Mr. Howard Wilson was born in Edmonton, Alberta, and graduated from the University of Edmonton with a BA (Honours) in economics. In 1964 he joined the public service, holding positions with the Department of Trade and Commerce, External Affairs, and International Trade. From 1991 to 1993 he was the executive director of competitiveness of the Prosperity Secretariat at Industry, Science and Technology Canada and in June 1993 he was appointed assistant deputy registrar general of Canada, part of Industry Canada, in which position he was responsible for administering the conflict of interest and post-employment code for public office holders.

It is fitting that today, as we begin our voyage into the area of conflict of interest and code of conduct, we have as our very first witness Mr. Howard Wilson.

We invite you, sir, to make an opening statement, and it is our wish that you would then respond to questions that will be put by members from both sides. The floor is yours.

Mr. Howard Wilson (Ethics Counsellor): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few comments to make.

There has been much debate over the past several years on what might be an appropriate code of conduct for MPs and senators. From my perspective, the best way to engage your debate is to clearly distinguish between the rules that are appropriate for legislators, whether in the House of Commons or the Senate, and those additional rules that are required of members of the executive branch - that is, the government - and in particular, ministers.

An important principle, in many ways an overarching principle, is that MPs and senators should not be prevented from having outside interests and being active participants in the community. Many argue that this is essential for the health of our parliamentary democracy.

[Translation]

In Ontario, the Members' Integrity Act, 1994 was passed by the Ontario Legislative Assembly last year unanimously. It received royal assent in September, but has yet to be proclaimed.

In its preamble, the first paragraph states:

The Assembly as a whole can represent the people of Ontario most effectively if its members have experienced and knowledge in relation to many aspects of life in Ontario and if they can continue to be active in their own communities, whether in business, or in the practice of a profession or otherwise.

.1615

[English]

In the United Kingdom, the Nolan committee was set up by the government last year to examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all holders of public office. In its first report in May of this year, in discussing outside employment for MPs, the committee made the following comments:

19. We believe that those Members who wish to be full-time MPs should be free to do so, and that no pressure should be put on them to acquire outside interests. But we also consider it desirable for the House of Commons to contain Members with a wide variety of continuing outside interests. If that were not so, Parliament would be less well-informed and effective than it is now and might well be more dependent on lobbyists. A Parliament composed entirely of full-time professional politicians would not serve the best interests of democracy. The House needs, if possible, to continue with a wide range of current experience which can contribute to its expertise.

20. As well as having Members with continuing outside interests, it is important that the House of Commons should continue to contain Members from a wide variety of backgrounds. We should be worried about the possibility of a narrowing in the range of able men and women who would be attracted to stand for Parliament if Members were barred from having any outside paid interests. We believe that many able people would not wish to enter Parliament if they not only had to take a substantial drop in income to do so but also ran the risk of seeing their source of livelihood disappear altogether if they were to lose their seats.

This led the committee to conclude with the following recommendation:

We recommend that Members of Parliament should remain free to have paid employment unrelated to their role as MPs.

That is a British point of view on this issue.

Now, contrast that with the situation applying to ministers and other members of the government. Here for some years it has been considered essential that there be in place quite specific rules and obligations for these public office holders concerning conflict of interest. At the federal level these rules, beyond disclosure of assets and liabilities and outside activities, specify that ministers and other public office holders in the executive branch cannot engage in a profession, actively manage or operate a business or commercial activity, hold directorships or offices in a financial or commercial corporation, hold office in a union or professional association, or serve as a paid consultant. Furthermore, they are not permitted to trade in publicly traded securities, that is, shares on a stock exchange.

Why is this? It is because, I believe, of the generally recognized fact that ministers and other members of the government have considerable powers and access to information that could lead to a conflict of interest situation unless certain steps are taken to prevent or void these types of situations. This is what the conflict of interest code for public office holders attempts to do.

All provinces and territories except Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Manitoba make this type of important distinction in the obligations appropriate to members of their respective assemblies and those that apply to ministers.

How have other jurisdictions dealt with the question of conflict for legislators? Unlike the case with the executive where an attempt is made to avoid a perception of conflict in advance, the operating assumption has been to accept that situations of possible conflict are inherent for any individual who has a range of assets and outside interests.

In other jurisdictions - and these include most of the provinces and territories, the British House of Commons and the U.S. Congress - accent has been put on disclosure. This requires normally an individual legislator to disclose his or her assets, liabilities and outside interests. In most provinces this is done confidentially, with an extract made available in a public registry, generally through the clerk of the assembly. These disclosures in Canada include information on the spouse and any dependent children.

.1620

Disclosure is thus at the heart of the system. Accompanying it has usually been a general obligation to avoid conflict by not participating in any discussion or debate that might have an effect on that individual's private interests. The essence of the obligation and responsibility is that no prohibitions are placed on members of the assembly practising a profession, operating a business, or investing in publicly traded securities.

The other issue a number of other jurisdictions have considered important is establishing guidance on what gifts and other forms of hospitality are appropriate. In Canada, at the federal level, there is generally no concern about gifts to members of the government up to $200 in value. This is paralleled in the provinces, with a range varying from ``modest value'' in Quebec to over $1,000 from one source in two years in Prince Edward Island.

[Translation]

Some other issues that the committee might want to pursue in its deliberations would include, in my mind, the question of travel as well as the rules specified in the Parliament of Canada Act regarding contracts. The rules in this statute as they apply to Members of Parliament and Senators, perhaps need updating. They permit certain kinds of contracts but for example, forbid anything relating to the construction of a public work. Ontario recently dealt with this question generally prohibiting a member from being party to a contract or having an interest in a private company that had a contract with the Government of Ontario; however, the company would be permitted to contract with the Government if the member's interest was placed in an approved management trust.

In summation, I have put stress on your committee reinforcing the principle that it is highly desirable that Members of parliament and Senators have outside interests. I regularly speak to the provincial commissioners and they tell me that public confidence in members of their assemblies has increased since there has been a specific requirement for public disclosure.

[English]

If the committee were to come to the conclusion that this was a suitable outcome, then you would have to determine to whom this disclosure should be made. This could be the respective clerks of either chamber or a specially selected individual. There are examples of both approaches in the provinces.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson, for a most interesting presentation. You've certainly challenged us with some of the comments you've made, because they are different from a lot of the written materials we've been reading in the past. It takes a fresh approach to a very difficult problem.

One of the other things unique about the hearings we're engaging upon today is that rather than just looking at so-called conflict of interest, we are also asked to look at a new code of conduct. There is a dividing line between the two. Before we turn to general questions, I was wondering if you could give us some of your advice about the types of things that should be in a code of conduct per se. I know you referred to the question of gifts in your comment, but what other advice would you give by way of code of conduct? Where should the lines be drawn? What things should be included and what should be excluded, in your opinion?

Mr. Wilson: Thank you, Senator. One of the important aspects, I think, of the conflict of interest code that ministers are obliged to respect is that it does have some specific rules. It has rules, as I have outlined, about practising a profession. It has rules on what kind of assets can be held. It has rules on gifts.

What is important, I think, in coming to grips with the kind of range of problems that a minister or any public office holder has to deal with - and this would include senators and MPs - is the fact that the code has a set of principles. These principles are what we then take and apply certain rules to.

.1625

These principles include a basic requirement that public office holders act with honesty and uphold the highest ethical standards, that the performance of their official duties be such as to bear the closest public scrutiny, that in decision-making they take decisions in the public interest and with regard to the merits of each case, and that they arrange their private interests in such a way that when there is a conflict between their public responsibilities and their private interests, this is always resolved in terms of the public interest.

These, Senator, are some of the broader principles that you might want to consider including in a code.

Lord Nolan, by chance, has made that recommendation. He was asked by the British Prime Minister to look at the problems of MPs, to look at the questions of the executive branch and of their equivalent of crown corporations. He will be looking at the House of Lords, and he set out a series of broader principles that are similar. They deal with integrity, objectivity, openness, transparency. This would then usually allow a member, when confronted with a question that may be troubling him or her, to be able to relate back to this.

But there are a number of examples. I wouldn't want to design for you what would be best for MPs and senators.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): But they should start by having a look at some principles that might apply?

Mr. Wilson: Yes.

[Translation]

Senator Gauthier (Ontario): Mr. Wilson, you are proposing something different from what was proposed by the last committee on Bill C-116. I'm sure you remember its work. You have stated that there should be a system or rules to control ministers and other public office holders in government. Other legislators, be they MPs or senators would be excluded.

I think that at the present time in the provinces, all the conflicts of interest rules apply to all parliamentarians. Am I mistaken? In your presentation, you gave some examples that seem to indicate that there is a distinction to be made between ministers or those close to government and other parliamentarians. Do you agree that these provincial acts apply to all the members of the legislature rather than to only some members, those of the Cabinet?

Mr. Wilson: It is not quite right that in the provinces, MPs and members of cabinets have exactly the same obligations.

In Ontario for example, and Ontario is a good example, there are rules of disclosure that affect all MPs, including members of Cabinet. However, ministers have additional obligations.

Senator Gauthier: That's right.

Mr. Wilson: In Quebec, the rules of the National Assembly affect all MPs, but some guidelines put out by the Prime Minister affect only members of Cabinet.

[English]

Senator Gauthier: Did I hear you correctly when you said there should be two sets? I heard two sets from the comments you made today, but the previous committee said that there should be one set of rules for all members of Parliament, be they ministers or others, and possibly other rules or regulations for those who are in trust of a ministry or parliamentary secretaries, or others of that nature.

Am I misunderstanding you here?

Mr. Wilson: No. I'm trying to make a distinction, in my mind at least, between what is appropriate for the legislature and what is appropriate for the executive branch of government.

Senator Gauthier: So for you there are two rules?

Mr. Wilson: Yes. To the extent, though, that an individual is both a member of the legislature and a member of the executive branch, there may be two sets of obligations applying to that individual.

The point I wanted to make clear was that on a debate where one starts to argue whether or not it is right to have outside interests, I think that is fundamental for legislators.

To the extent that somebody has become a minister or a parliamentary secretary, then additional rules will kick in and may make it impossible for that person to do that. That is the rule in Canada. It is the rule in the provinces and in a number of other places.

.1630

[Translation]

Senator Gauthier: The Committee was charged with coming up with a code of ethics. The main elements of the code include, first of all, anything having to do with conflict of interest. Then you have all the personal advantages, the gifts that you mentioned in your comments, the special advantages granted by a third party or trips, the usual lobbying besides the rules concerning the relations between an ex-partliamentarian, once his turn is up, with the government. Then there is the question of whether an ex-parliamentarian is allowed to deal with government for purchases or service contracts.

As for the responsibility and integrity of the individual, do you see areas where there should be restrictions other than those I have just mentioned?

Mr. Wilson: The responsibilities of MPs and senators are quite clear. The MPs represent the voters and the senators, the provinces.

One often wonders if the decisions made by MPs are of the order of a public or private responsibility. The responsibility of a minister, for example, is very important. The minister has information and power, but the MPs are responsible for representing their voters within the Legislative Assembly. I find these people are often in conflict.

It's clear that all members of a legislative assembly are faced with conflicts, but is that a problem? I don't think so, because their responsibilities are quite different from a minister's.

Here's a specific example. Say a company asks a member to travel to Europe to represent its interests. In my opinion, there is a possible conflict of interests there. But if the goal of the trip is for the member to go to an international meeting through inter-parliamentary associations, there is no conflict.

In the absence of any rules on what should be done in a conflict of interest case, occasionally the member or senator has to wonder what to do in such a case. He has to wonder whether what's being done is quite compatible with his responsibility as a member or senator. The absence of such rules creates a problem.

Provincially, there are rules concerning gifts given to members; there are rules for delegations. Some situations where the financial interests of a member are involved mean the latter should not take part in or withdraw from the discussion.

.1635

For a minister, it's different because he cannot always be excused. A government could not work if Cabinet members were to decline to accept responsibility 40 or 50% of the time. Minister have to act to avoid conflicts of interest.

Senator Gauthier: Thank you.

[English]

Mr. McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra): Mr. Chairman, I have the same difficulty that I think you saw in the presentation. It seems to me the argumentation doesn't really lead to the conclusions the witness has been making.

The mandate here is to examine a code of conduct, which is ultimately directed towards public perception of members. We've already seen some public discussion on whether members are too highly pensioned, too highly paid, travel too much, and the like.

Conflict of interest is a rather separate issue. It is implicitly bound up in the law-making process. I would question the relevance, for example, of American precedence, unless one examines the law in action of the United States Congress, as distinct from what Ehrlich called the ``law in books'': the abstract rules. American legislators actively participate in law-making, in drafting of legislation, from the beginning. They are also not subject to the strict party rules that apply under the English-derived common law systems. In other words, they exercise a very considerable discretion in voting.

So I can see the reason for the Draconian rules on conflict of interest in the United States; not always followed, by the way, by American senators and congressmen. I can see the reason for those rules, but I would question their transference automatically to Canada, where the function of MPs is totally different. They're not actively engaged in drafting of laws from the beginning, law-making in the full sense, and of course - and we've seen the party discipline applied in all parties in the House - they don't actively participate in taking an individual position different from the party line.

So I'd ask you if you really consider, then, insofar as the mandate of this code of conduct is concerned, whether there is relevance in the conflict of interest rules extrapolated from the United States and other systems where the law in action of the parliamentary process is different.

Mr. Wilson: First of all, I agree with you. If I have given an impression that I am advocating U.S. rules.... I am not. What I was attempting to do was to say that I think as you engage this subject you first of all must have clearly in mind the distinction that must be made between the responsibilities, in this Parliament, of a legislator and the responsibilities of those who hold ministerial responsibilities.

The second thing I did say was that in other, similar situations - that is, in other provinces and in the British House of Commons - it has been found necessary and in fact desirable that there be some rules on disclosure. I am not necessarily advocating that at all. I'm saying I would find it wrong if you were to go beyond that point.

What is done in other provinces and in the British House of Commons is a certain amount of public disclosure, in which members indicate what their interests are. Then some version of that is made available to the public. It would say what companies the person may be a director of. It may indicate what land they hold beyond their home. It may indicate what companies they have shares in. There are various approaches to this.

.1640

My argument is that how far you decide to go is clearly your choice, but to go beyond that would be a mistake, because it would then call into question the ability of an MP or of a senator to be a full participant in their community.

Mr. McWhinney: That issue of disclosure of interest, for example, is relevant to the law-making process, and in the case of a cabinet minister, if ignored, would render the cabinet minister liable, and rightly so, to disciplinary action within the House. This has been historically true. It is parliamentary misconduct in that sense, but I would suggest that it is not strictly relevant to the examination of a code of conduct for members.

What is the relevance of disclosure for members? Their background is known when they are elected and their association known. What is the relevance if they are not in fact exercising a law-drafting function? In other words, the conflict may be there for a minister and it is subject to Parliament's own very considerable indemnities if it's defined, but what's the relevance for members?

Then, getting back to the larger issue, aren't we really concerned with the public perception of members' conduct and shouldn't that be the main thrust of our examination?

Mr. Wilson: I think at the end of the day that in fact will be the issue before you. You collectively are certainly better placed than I am to be able to make a determination as to the degree to which there is public confidence in the basic integrity of members of Parliament.

What has happened in other jurisdictions - and I'm merely giving examples - is a concern that that existed. It led in 1974 to the British putting a number of rules in place. Most of the provinces have followed suit. Why? Because they felt it might be desirable to have a basic amount of disclosure both with respect to the individual and with respect to that person's spouse.

That happens to be the practice across the country. Whether or not it's necessary at the federal level is a point your committee is best placed to decide.

Ms Catterall (Ottawa West): I want to clarify one of the points you made in responding to Senator Gauthier. You were talking about travel, and that is an area at which we perhaps should be looking, maybe in the context of gifts.

For instance, you seem to say it might be a conflict for someone to go on a trip in some kind of an international forum on behalf of a company. Is that what I heard you say?

Mr. Wilson: I said that could create a problem.

Ms Catterall: But it wouldn't be a problem if somebody was an employee, a director, or a senior manager of that company?

Mr. Wilson: No.

Ms Catterall: What's the difference?

Mr. Wilson: The point I really want to make on travel or on gifts is that in the absence of something that is clearly understood in the public mind, the inevitable reaction of both the press and the public will be that something is wrong.

Certainly, in terms of the code that I administer for ministers, because we have certain rules on certain of these matters, that generally puts ``paid'' to any sort of assertion that would subsequently be made that the person has done something improper.

Again, it is invariably found in provinces that some kind of rule on benefits is desirable.

If you're travelling for your company, then it seems to me that's something quite different from your accepting a trip that someone else is paying for.

The point is not that this hypothetical example is right or wrong. My view is that you're just going to have a continuing discussion in the press that something was wrong.

.1645

Now, when you have an interparliamentary association, that's very, very clear and nobody is going to raise their head about that. But they pay attention to trips to certain parts. We have seen this. Most of us will have in mind at least a recent example. I am saying it might be very helpful in dealing with that kind of public perception, which does no good for the image of the House, to have some idea what sort of rules might be appropriate. I don't know what those are, and I would not presume to -

Ms Catterall: Let me strain your application of the principle that it's healthy for Parliament for members to remain involved in a variety of aspects of the community. What's the difference between someone remaining involved in, say, a certain sector of the economy through employment, cost-sharing, management, or directorship of the company and a member of Parliament remaining involved in the community by attending a conference that will inform them better about that industry?

Mr. Wilson: There may not be any difference at all.

Ms Catterall: Okay. Then may I go to the issue of disclosure. It seems to me there's a standard principle in municipal conflict of interest legislation, where it exists, as in Ontario, for instance, that says you disclose and abstain from discussion on an issue in which you have an interest. I notice you referred to that principle, I think on page 3 or 4 of your document, without suggesting a solution to it.

Isn't it possible that in fact this is a type of disclosure the committee should consider, where when a piece of legislation is before the House, or a matter is before a committee of which you're a member, or there is a matter on which you, because of collegiality, might be better able to influence a member than someone who is not a member of the House of Commons, the member should be required to disclose on a specific issue before the House or a committee that they do in fact have an interest in that matter and abstain from any discussions, influence, or participation in decision-making?

Mr. Wilson: That is in fact, I think, more or less the approach that is used in Quebec.

The question of withdrawal from a discussion has to be treated very cautiously. You could have an example where a member is a farmer. Does that mean that individual is to withdraw from any discussion on an agricultural issue because however the debate goes forward he or she may be a beneficiary?

When an individual is part of a very wide community, then the question of withdrawal or refusal should not be on the table. Otherwise what will happen, inevitably, is that the debates in the House, in committee, will be deprived of the very important experience that individual can bring to bear.

For example, at the federal level it's been very common, of course, that we have had Ministers of Agriculture who have been farmers, and measures can be taken in order for those individuals to participate fully in cabinet discussions and in other matters. They have to stay away from the day-to-day management of their farms.

It may be carrying an idea that would be important just too far. It seems to me if you are going to look at the question of withdrawal from a discussion, you would want to have the personal interest very directly involved - something in which you are not part of a broader class of people who just happen to have experience or interest in a particular part of the economy.

Ms Catterall: I'd like to flag that as something I think we should explore further.

Finally, the issue of whose interest is the member's interest is one that isn't really discussed in your paper, beyond sons and daughters and spouses. Again, other codes of conduct, conflict of interest codes, tend to be broader than that. I'm not sure there's a great deal of difference between a spouse with whom you're living and a dependent parent with whom you share a home, for instance. Do you have any thoughts to give us on how broadly the interest of another is also your own interest?

.1650

Mr. Wilson: It could be a never-ending exercise in trying to determine just where these sorts of family connections end.

The approach we have used federally with ministers and what the provinces seem to do is to try to concentrate on the spouse and on the dependent children. Then, certainly with ministers, when you have a discussion, you ask if there is a relative who in fact has close dealings with the Government of Canada. Then it may well be necessary for the minister to take some precautionary steps with respect to that relative's activities with the Government of Canada. But to try to draw a general rule is quite difficult.

With respect to spouses and dependent children, the line is more direct. The committee looking at Bill C-43 came to that conclusion. It exists in the provinces. It exists at the federal level with respect to ministers and parliamentary secretaries. The question is why?

For ministers, the interests of the spouse in particular are quite relevant. The responsibility for taking action does not lie with the spouse; it lies with the public office holder. But it may well be that the spouse of that individual has interests that might be affected by decisions that he or she can take as a minister. Therefore, to the degree that exists, our advice to ministers is that they should not get themselves involved in that; they should avoid that kind of discussion because their spouse has an interest that may be furthered by the decision they're about to take.

The rationale in the provinces has been somewhat the same. The logic used in the joint committee report on Bill C-43 said that increasingly under Canadian law the assets of a married couple are viewed as being joint, and that made a very useful distinction between that and what may occur with brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, and so on.

There is a way of dealing with that. If you look to the principles that you may be talking about, then there is some basis upon which an individual can then come and address a very particular situation they may have - generally a unique one - but then they can apply those principles and decide how best to resolve the problem.

Mr. Epp (Elk Island): Thank you, Mr. Wilson, for coming to visit us.

I have followed your relatively short - at this stage - career as ethics counsellor with some interest. I want to talk a little bit about the enforcement end of it, because that's really where you're at. You are in a position to advise on what kind of legislation we should have, to whom it should apply, what the restrictions should be, etc.

Because of your experience in actually enforcing - if that's the word - or administering codes that already exist around here, I would like to ask you how you think that should work when we're dealing with a code that applies to all members of Parliament, to cabinet ministers, to senators, and so on. What kind of mechanism should there be?

Mr. Wilson: That is going to depend largely on what you conclude the obligations should be. If you devise a code that has a set of principles and a few specific rules....

Just for the moment, as a point of discussion, let us say you have decided there should be some level of public disclosure. If that is the extent - and my argument is that you should not contemplate ever going beyond that - then the question first would be to whom you make that disclosure. It could be made to the Clerk of the House or the Clerk of the Senate. Then the only issue before you is what happens when a member decides not to make a disclosure.

.1655

It seems to me in that instance you're not really talking about investigations as such; you're really talking about the prerogative of the House to enforce its own rules. So presumably there already exists in both chambers the ability to deal with that kind of question.

I would not start from the point of investigations. The first thing is, what is the proper scope of the code you're looking at and what will be the obligations flowing from that? If they're fairly straightforward, then an investigation might hardly be the expected occurrence.

Mr. Epp: In other words, you're saying the legislation very much has to be defined before we talk about enforcement and administration.

Mr. Wilson: Yes, that's....

Mr. Epp: Are we chasing a phantom here? How many investigations have you conducted in your role...?

Mr. Wilson: The question you're posing is, is this committee chasing a phantom in trying to construct a code of conduct?

Mr. Epp: The public is calling for it. There are some members of Parliament who raise these questions from time to time, my party members among them, because there is this perception, correctly or incorrectly, that there is wrongdoing.

You're in a position where you are asked to administer the present codes. There's the Prime Minister's code of conduct and there's the code for public office holders, and I guess there is even an unwritten code, as an advisory to the Prime Minister, sort of a generally accepted code on what's considered decent behaviour.

Do you sit around your office all day and twiddle your thumbs or are you busy? That's my question.

Mr. Wilson: I think I put in an honest day.

Let me say that what you are dealing with is very much a political question. It was not that many years ago when it would have been considered an affront to question the basic integrity of a cabinet minister. In this country, as in a number of other countries, it was expected that these individuals were honest, could be counted on, and the public was prepared to accept that.

I make this point because I don't believe administrations are any less honest today than they ever were, but the public is not prepared, at least insofar as members of governments are concerned, to give people the benefit of the doubt. You may well find that regrettable, but it has been a feature of public sentiment in this country. It certainly is the case in the United States and in Europe. Governments have responded.

For a number of years we have had a quite specific code of conduct that sets out some basic rules for ministers. I think ministers have found this to be terribly helpful. Why? Because it gets them out of an impossible situation, which happens when somebody comes along, no doubt well meaning, and says, Minister, I think you're in a conflict; I think the decisions you have taken on this matter, because of your private interests, have less to do with the public responsibilities you hold and more to do with your private interests. The minister will then respond and say, no, I'm sorry, but I do not believe I am in conflict. The individual may well come back - and there have been cases - and say, with all due respect, Minister, I still think you're in a conflict. It creates a massive problem for people who have come into public life to pursue legitimate public goals.

One of the things the code has done is it has been able to take a whole series of areas off the table so that an individual with private interests, through disposal in some instances, through resignation of some positions in others, by putting affairs into a blind trust, has been able to demonstrate conclusively that they can do the task for which they were elected and appointed.

I made the distinction at the beginning that for ordinary members of Parliament it's quite a different matter, but still there are these allegations made. You're a better judge than I of whether they have to be responded to, but to the extent that you do believe there is that kind of public perception, then one way of dealing with it, which I'm told members of assemblies in the provinces have found helpful, is some kind of basic disclosure. It has been intrusive but not exceptionally intrusive. They didn't establish the value of your assets; they did say what interests you may have.

.1700

People have found that valuable. I can only repeat what I've been told by some of the ethics commissioners in the provinces, who have said it has made it possible for members who have been subject to allegations by members of the press or by other parties...they have found it useful to say there is a declaration that says they either have that interest or they don't have that interest. It's been viewed basically as quite minimal.

But Mr. McWhinney raises an important point. You have to decide just how far you want to go. My concern was that I thought some of the debate earlier, over the 1980s and 1990s, was confusing. What it did was imply that everybody in the House of Commons and everybody in the Senate had to go and take the same measures as were necessary for a minister. My argument is that it is absolutely not right. I agree with Mr. McWhinney on that point.

Mr. Epp: It seems to me the same principle applies here as we would apply to our justice system. We need to have a mechanism that clearly and unequivocally exonerates the innocent, besides decisively finding guilty the person who is actually guilty. I agree with you, from my observations as a new parliamentarian here, that one-tenth of 1% give the others a bad name. I think that's true.

Now, I'm going to ask you a question. I don't know whether you can answer it or whether you want to answer it. Maybe you just want to whisper it to me so the others won't hear it and it won't be on the public record.

In your position right now.... You've said this is a political question and you do answer to the Prime Minister. If there were a question of ethics, of collusion or some other thing that comes to you - maybe it's something as simple as fund-raising during the campaign; all of a sudden one of the people who made a big contribution to the campaign of a person who subsequently became a minister now gets a contract.... There's a perception that something untoward is going on; it's a thank-you for your help before; you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. Would you like to tell this committee that the administration and the enforcement of any rules we do come up with would be better served by a person who would be politically independent?

That's a loaded question. I give you the choice of saying you don't want to answer it. I know what I think.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Wilson dealt with that in his remarks already, when he said this could be the respective perquisite of either chamber or of a specifically selected individual, which could mean an arm's length individual. But I leave it to Mr. Wilson to speak for himself.

Mr. Wilson: Mr. Epp brings up a point that was taken up at some length during Commons consideration of Bill C-43 - another Bill C-43, not on lobbyists. It was whether or not the position of ethics counsellor should be a parliamentary position or whether, as is currently the case, it should be a question of appointment by the Prime Minister.

The point I made - and it comes back, I think, to the comments I made earlier about the distinction between the legislative branch and the executive branch - is that the differences are very real. They are constitutional. I don't know that it does any good in fact to mix the two.

There are good examples of the course that has been chosen in Canada at the federal level. That is that at the end of the day the conduct of the government is the responsibility of the Prime Minister. That distinction exists in Quebec, where some general rules are expressed in the law for the Assemblé Nationale. Then there have been, for a number of years now, very distinct additional rules that have been issued under the authority of the premier ministre du Québec, first by Mr. Bourassa, then by Mr. Johnson, and now by Mr. Parizeau, to establish the responsibilities of ministers and who is accountable.

The distinction exists as well in the United Kingdom, where the Nolan committee was quite clear on what should apply to members of the House and what should apply to the executive.

.1705

The question is yes, certain provinces have mixed the two. I have no difficulty with it. That was their choice. Here there has been a very conscious choice not to mix the two, and therefore my responsibility is to the Prime Minister.

There are good precedents elsewhere - very solid ones, I think - in terms of our parliamentary practices, but there are admittedly others where a different course has been chosen.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Wilson, both Mr. McWhinney and Mr. Epp have raised the question of public confidence and public perception, and you have said that the media drive some of this as well and ask questions about the integrity of members of Parliament. Today, if you look around the table, everyone here is a member of Parliament. Should we as a committee not be looking outside of this group to get more input from those who seem to feel that the public interest and public perception and public confidence are being eroded? Should we not be getting some input from them as to what should be in this code and in these principles?

Mr. Wilson: Yes, you might find that to be quite helpful. There are a number of people who think on these.

I often think that some members of the press might make valuable witnesses. There is the experience of some of the provincial commissioners. A number of people have thought and written about these matters in the academic world. A reasonable cross-section of people who are concerned with these matters might make it an interesting discussion for you, or possibly not.

I would start, however, from the aspect that all members of this committee are remarkably well plugged into public opinion and at the end of the day should be the best judges of what is appropriate. I think that's what we're talking about here, because at the end of the day what you are trying to do is to reinforce public confidence in the integrity of this institution.

Twenty years ago we would have had a quite different discussion. Maybe 20 years ago you would not have felt the need for this discussion. The fact that you're having it now is important in its own way.

Senator Stollery (Bloor and Yonge): Mr. Chairman, like some others around here, I was here 20 years ago, or more than that. I have to say that in my 23 or 24 years in Parliament, as both an elected member and an appointed member, and having known hundreds of MPs, I have to think very hard to come up with 10%. I would have to say that it is minuscule. If I really thought it through, then I'd have to say that maybe one or two individuals I've met in my many years here might have been a little bit dubious, and the two I'm thinking of of course were defeated, which I thought is what happens to members of Parliament when they do things they're not supposed to do.

At this point it's very important that we have a system in Canada whereby members of Parliament approve or disapprove legislation, but it's not written by them, as it is in the United States in the congressional system.

In the summer we had a visiting delegation of Australian...I guess they were MLAs. They were from New South Wales. They had tied themselves up in knots that I wouldn't wish on anyone. They had got to the point where they didn't consider themselves to be citizens. They were citizens who got elected to their legislature, but once this happened they were no longer citizens, and they'd appointed a board of other citizens to sit in the most convoluted recipe for a lot of difficulty.

My point is that as I read the material, I listened to those Australian MLAs, who, as I say, now actually were not even calling themselves citizens. Presumably a legislature is citizens being elected to Parliament; but not in New South Wales.

.1710

So I don't understand. We have the Parliament of Canada Act. We have the Financial Administration Act. It seems to me they've been pretty successful. Is there a problem? If you are a corrupt member, aren't you going to run into the Parliament of Canada Act or the Financial Administration Act? Where does this not happen?

Mr. Wilson: Senator, I'm not here advancing any particular brief.

Senator Stollery: No, I understand. But you're an expert. I'd like to know where this has gone wrong.

Mr. Wilson: I hope I'm agreeing with you that to go as far as some others...and I think I did meet some of these people from New South Wales. I too was quite astonished at what they thought was necessary to avoid conflict. My fundamental point is that members of the legislature have to be engaged in the community and be full participants in the community if they are going to do their job properly in both houses.

Is there a problem with the Parliament of Canada Act? I cited one problem, and that is that when you start dealing with contracts, you're starting to use language that probably dates from the last century.

Senator Stollery: Because I guess there were public works...and the railway committee, which, as you know, Sir George-Étienne Cartier chaired, was the most spending committee of Parliament. I guess they singled it out because that's where contracts were -

Mr. Wilson: And it's not been changed in many years.

Just on that point, if I could.... The committee on Bill C-43, looking at that, said clearly the business of government is much more complex now than it was then, when public works were the essential -

Senator Stollery: Right.

Mr. Wilson: Therefore, what we should now have is some scheme whereby senators and members of the House of Commons cannot participate in any kind of contractual activities with the government. The point I was -

Senator Stollery: But you cannot, can you? A member of Parliament can't be involved in a contract with -

Mr. Wilson: You can have an interest in a company, and I think that's right. As the government becomes much more complex, as the government is the largest purchaser, it can well be that some very legitimate business concerns in which a member of the House has some interests might inadvertently be prevented from doing business. I am saying there are solutions to that kind of situation.

But is the Parliament of Canada Act absolutely perfect in this area? No, there are some problems. They were recognized in part by the committee on Bill C-43. Their solution was a little drastic. But it's an interesting question.

Do you have to go beyond? That is your point. Perhaps not. That will be your judgment on the climate. You are sitting at a time when there was a unanimous conclusion of the Bill C-43 committee in the last Parliament that there should, for members and senators, be a minimum amount of disclosure. You are dealing in a situation where the bulk of provinces in this country have decided for some years that a basic level of disclosure is necessary. That is a reality. You can draw whatever conclusions.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Do you agree with that reality?

Mr. Wilson: I have seen that some value has been derived from that at the provincial level.

Senator Stollery: Mr. Chairman, I go back to the fact that in all my years...excluding the cabinet, of course, which is dealing at an entirely different level and is preparing legislation for the House of Commons and Senate...it escapes me, really - and I know the parliamentary system in this country reasonably well - just how an individual member of Parliament is going to be able, without running into the Financial Administration Act - because it would have to be.... Never mind that. They're going to be running into the vast bureaucracy, the system Canada is operated by.

.1715

A member of Parliament doesn't sit in the cabinet, doesn't participate in cabinet debate. I'm trying to think of a way in which an independent member of Parliament is going to have much luck being corrupt in Canada. Maybe I'm wrong.

Over the years, I certainly never came across it, that I can think of.

The person's a member of Parliament. He or she goes to the caucus, makes known their point of view, which is taken into consideration by the caucus, the system, and all that. They can't lobby a minister any more than Joe Smith or Marilyn Smith can.

It's hard for me to see where we're not going to run the risk of tying ourselves into knots over a problem that doesn't exist.

Mr. Wilson: I don't know that I'm really disagreeing with the senator at all. There are some rules already, ones that are found in the Parliament of Canada Act and some of the by-laws of the House of Commons, the Financial Administration Act.

Senator Stollery: The Criminal Code.

Mr. Wilson: The Criminal Code, exactly.

Whether or not anything additional is necessary is really a judgment for you to make. My argument was, don't go so far as to try to put into place all the sorts of things that we find necessary for members of the cabinet.

Mrs. Parrish (Mississauga West): You're going to have to bear with me, because I ask fairly simple questions.

I noticed that when you were answering Mr. Epp's question you said, ``I think I put in an honest day''. I want to know - and please forgive me for being a bit facetious - if you obeyed all the laws of the country on your way to work today. No traffic infringements? No breaking of any traffic rules?

It's not a trick question.

Mr. Wilson: Quite possibly I overstayed in a parking spot without paying the -

Mrs. Parrish: I don't want any confessions. Did you pretty well follow the Highway Traffic Act on your way from home to here?

Mr. Wilson: I think so.

Mrs. Parrish: You didn't murder anyone?

Mr. Wilson: No.

Mrs. Parrish: You didn't steal anything?

You know that when you get to work - and you say that you put in an honest day - you have so many hours of work you have to do a week, and you can come in a bit late one day and go home a bit early the next day. But, generally speaking, your coffee breaks, your washroom breaks, all these daily things, are not regulated too closely?

Mr. Wilson: That's right.

Mrs. Parrish: And you're confident in yourself that you put in an honest day's work.

I feel the same way, and what concerns me is that if we begin to pander to the mistrust, the perception out there that politicians are crooks, and we put too many rules in place - we tell you when you can go to the washroom and exactly at what time you have to get to work and the only time of the day at which you can hold a meeting - then we'll be reinforcing the public's perception.

I'm very concerned, because as a politician my life is an open book. I gained a few pounds over the summer, and it's in the Mississauga news that I'm looking healthy. My whole life is an open book.

So we are under the laws of the country. We're under the microscope of public observation. I don't think that, as good as we are, we can bring in any rules that will ensure good judgment or integrity. I think the electorate has to do that.

I was more making a comment. I think you're confident that you're doing a good job. I'm confident that I'm doing a good job and that I'm honest.

I believe in disclosure. I believe that in all aspects there should be a good public disclosure. But I really believe that if we overregulate ourselves and bring in too many rules, then we are agreeing with the public that we need regulation.

Frankly, the one or two crooks to whom the senator has been exposed over his many years up here probably would know how to get around those rules.

Senator Stollery: Out of maybe 2,000 MPs.

.1720

Mrs. Parrish: Right, and those two would probably have the expertise to get around any rule you could set up.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Wilson, did you want to add to her comment?

Mr. Wilson: I just happen to agree very much on the danger of having too many rules.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): But your word wasn't so much ``rules'' as ``principles''.

Mr. Wilson: That's right. But these are important. They then can provide guidance in certain situations. There may be a necessity for some kind of guidance in areas such as gifts, travel. Those are the only ones I highlighted. Offhand, I can't think of anything other than that.

The point I would make is that I have seen elsewhere that in an attempt to restore public confidence in the integrity of legislators - and I'm thinking of south of the border - the rules have become so precise that they have given the distinct impression to many that the individuals occupying those offices don't have the intelligence, the common sense, the judgment, to be able to fulfil them properly without being told precisely what they have to do. You defeat the purpose you set out to achieve.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask the witness a question about lobbying, which we haven't dealt with here today.

It's well known that members of Parliament - I am including senators, of course, in that term - make representations on behalf of constituents or others to ministers or to various boards or agencies of the Government of Canada. Do you think rules are required to regulate lobbying by parliamentarians - and I refer, of course, to other than ministers and parliamentary secretaries - and if so, have you any suggestions you could make to the committee?

Mr. Wilson: Thank you, sir. I had looked at your terms of reference and was trying to think of how this kind of question could be answered.

MPs and senators will receive representations from lobbyists. The Government of Canada has put in place legislation that requires those lobbyists to disclose their purposes in a public registry. It includes lobbying of MPs and senators.

I'm not sure I would think anything special is necessary. You're going to hear arguments that may be rather important in coming to a decision on your own about whether or not the case being made is worth while. It's also very difficult, to my mind, to make a distinction between your receiving representations from your constituents and somebody who may be hired by someone who is also a constituent - a firm, for example, wanting to make a point to you - coming to see you and asking for your judgment on how best to advance a view. It's probably a two-way discussion.

I'm not sure how you would want to handle this. As I say, there is an obligation on the part of the lobbyist at least to put on the table what it is they are trying to do.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): So what's your answer?

Mr. Wilson: I don't know that I have an answer on that.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): You're not recommending a course of action in this regard.

Mr. Wilson: No. I think it's very hard, quite frankly, to make a distinction on who it is you are receiving these representations from. Clearly you have a very real responsibility to your constituents. They come to you, they express concerns, and you take them up with ministers, you take them up with officials, you try to advance their cause. From time to time lobbyists will be coming in to see you perhaps because some of these things overlap, or simply because they have an interest in trying to get some support. It's part of the parliamentary process, it seems to me.

There's nothing wrong with lobbying. It lies at the essence of the democratic process. Not every Canadian has the ability to continue to represent their interests individually to their MP, or to others.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Senator Prud'homme.

[Translation]

Senator Prud'homme (La Salle): I sat very diligently in other committees. We agonized over these questions for years but I always come back to the same conclusion, you cannot legislate honesty.

And when you start legislating honesty, there is no end to the regulations that can be devised.

.1725

The Honourable Senator Stollery raised this point which we raised ourselves. I'm wondering how many people in Canada have read what already exists: the Criminal Code.

[English]

If anybody reads the Criminal Code pertaining to public office holders, it's enough to scare people out of running, because it's so dangerous. You cannot talk. During the campaign you cannot even hint to someone that in return for helping you to get elected you might consider having them in your office. That is illegal. You cannot do it.

[Translation]

You cannot do it. If you take it at face value...

[English]

The Parliament of Canada Act - I sat on that committee too. I don't want to be naughty or personal, but it's now public. One member tried to use it to get away with having done things that he should not have done. He used the Parliament of Canada Act, but it has never been written to help members to be crooks - in the administration of their budget, for instance. For other reasons, he's now in court, after many years. He tried to hide behind the Parliament of Canada Act, but the judges, their honours, decided that no, a crook is a crook is a crook, or crookery is crookery.

I will not take long today, because I wish to give advice to the committee if there is any time. I was advised that, after having sat in Parliament for 35 years and having sat on these committees, I may even ask permission to appear as a witness. I was told, ``Sure. Why not?'' I'd like to exchange views with colleagues for a longer time on how you come to be more honest.

One of the dangers, of course, is what I call the titillation of the people. ``My member is worth that much and this member is worth this much...''. I did not go that way.

I discovered this in Australia, on a trip made at my own expense. While I was there I went to visit what they were doing, because at the same time I was sitting here on the conflict of interest law and parliamentary associations. I'll come back to this at the end, because that's titillating people a lot.

When I was in the House of Commons I was not afraid to defend members' travelling, and I'm not going to be afraid in the Senate either, if you explain clearly to the press what you're up to and what you're doing.

So there might be an open door there, as all the hon. members from the Senate and the House who sat on Bill C-43 said. There might be a difference between quantification and qualification. Maybe at the end of the day we will discuss with you if we're to be more pure than purity - if that is even possible. Then we might go along the line of quantification versus qualification. Maybe we will ask every member to qualify their participation in public affairs - are they the owner of something - without saying at the end of the day, to titillate people, ``I am worth that much''.

I'm ready. I hope you understand the difference here, because we agonized with these words, ``quantification'' versus ``qualification'', to qualify what a member is worth and then it's up to public opinion to follow their people and it's up to the press to follow if there is a conflict of interest.

Going backwards to the question of gifts to members, yes, there may be something that could be done. I don't understand a member travelling around the world and then accepting gifts. I mean a gift not from having travelled but a gift for having been somewhere.

As for parliamentary associations, I wrote a full report on that and I will stand publicly on it again, three or four years later. The conclusion of that report was not my own total personal opinion; it was a collectivity of opinions that I put together.

I would be very careful, sir, to the committee, to my colleagues, to say no more trips, except those of parliamentary associations.

I shall illustrate that today by just one example, and then I shall conclude for the day.

.1730

Many years ago a man - and I will name him - Mr. Bob Coates, who eventually became Minister of National Defence...and you have the triviality, according to the Europeans, who couldn't believe he had to resign for having gone to a bar. But that's another matter. Many years ago, when he was not a member of cabinet, he created the Canada-South Korea parliamentary friendship group. It was at a time when there was no relationship whatsoever with South Korea.

It was not well perceived by the government of the day. It was not well perceived by External Affairs, because they don't like members to know as much as they. I may say it openly. People could challenge them, get up in debate.

But people asked, have you been to South Korea? Yes. Who paid? The Government of South Korea. Thank you. Now you know I was there. So now follow me in what I'm doing publicly.

To me this is public disclosure. But to say no, it should be reserved only for Foreign Affairs people, or no, it should be reserved only for official parliamentary associations, I think is a mistake. It is not serving Canada's interest.

I will pursue the Canada-Korea example. Mr. Coates went on and opened up South Korea to his caucus. The same could apply to Taiwan. I disagree with Taiwan's parliamentary association, because I'm pro-one China, but I agree with their right to have an association.

It's because of Mr. Bob Coates' early open eye on possibilities for Canada in South Korea that things started to pick up, with a lot of interest. It was well known. Then the Prime Minister of Canada went to South Korea. The rest of the story has been a good story economically for Canada.

The same for Taiwan. I don't agree, but it is not because I don't agree that it should not be done.

So I would hope, sir, you would come back here. Second, someone should have a longer discussion about especially these parliamentary associations, because it is so badly put to the Canadian people in the press. Everybody is stuck on the issue and they're afraid. But for some members it might be the only way to know what's going on in a country.

We believe in freedom of association in this country. If members want to associate with each other....

I helped create Canada-Cuba. I helped create the Canada-Latin America association. Mr. Stollery is the eternal chairman. I am the founder. Canada agrees....

I wanted federal members to have, and to understand they have, an international preoccupation. I wanted them to open their eyes to the world. We aren't provincial members of the House. We are federal members and we should have international preoccupations. Unfortunately, one of the only ways was through parliamentary associations, recognized and not recognized.

Eventually they do become recognized. Canada-Japan was not recognized. Eventually it became recognized. Now it is one of the official ones.

Most of these parliamentary associations, as you know, have opened up the eyes of the members. Those who go to Washington under the Parliamentary Centre, with Peter Dobell.... That would be known by some as a conflict of interest. It's an educational process. Those who go once in a while to the United Nations under the sponsorship of churches and so on...as long as it is declared, I don't see why it should be forbidden.

So I would certainly come back on these issues. I do respect very much the views of the Reform. I have had a long discussion with some of them and I respect their views. I'm respectful of members' opinions. That doesn't mean you have to agree all the time. But when you put your case better, it's our job then to be very clear with the press and take the flak.

I've said - and Mr. Oliver knows; I did it in the Senate - and those who were in the House know, I'm ready to take on anybody in a debate on this issue on television, because at the end of the day it's for the benefit of Canadians to have better informed members. But Canada cannot afford to send members on expeditions to see, for instance, if CIDA is doing a good job while you're visiting a country as a guest of the country.

.1735

As an aside you could go on your own and visit all the projects of CIDA where millions and billions of dollars are spent. The government is not going to send you there. The churches might. External Affairs is not going to send you there unless they are sponsored by the minister.

I know that it seems as if I'm emptying thirty years of frustration at not being understood or not doing a better job of explaining to the Canadian people. I'm for openness, and at the end of the day I would let Canadians decide if you're a good person or not. But to arrive with that kick....

They've tried to do that in the United States, and I went to study it. Every year their book of conflicts of interest is becoming bigger. On this, you're a much better expert than I am.

The difference is that we're not American, we're Canadian. We have much less say in certain decisions.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Senator Prud'homme, you've raised a number of questions. I'm wondering if I can get our witness, Mr. Wilson, to respond to them.

Mr. Wilson: That illustrates the complexity of trying to deal with the trip issue. I think it's important. I suspect that when you get into the essence of it, you will find out that most of these trips are well justified and can be easily justified to whomever is asking.

There might be certain circumstances in which some trips raise more serious questions, depending on who's sponsoring them, but that's an issue upon which I don't have enough experience. It's an area you might want to look at, but I certainly agree with the point that now there are a number of associations that are prospective. They are not official. It's quite clear that their purpose is to develop better understandings with some important potential partners.

Senator Gauthier: On the trips issue, the House of Commons has a register, as you know. The Senate doesn't have one. I guess we would look at that positively.

The register has some problems. I can agree with you that it indicates where the member travelled but not how much was spent to get him or her to that place, wherever he or she was going.

Since 1994, spouses and dependants of cabinet ministers and other public office holders have been officially under the code, and you have been responsible for administering that code. Have you had any problems with the spouses or the dependants?

Mr. Wilson: No, in fact I have not.

Some very legitimate concerns were expressed to me by individuals wanting to know exactly what was in mind here. My explanation was that it was not a question of the spouse having to take any particular steps; it was a question to be able properly to advise his or her spouse, who was a minister, on what precautionary steps the minister might have to take. In other words, if any action had to be taken, then it was the minister who was going to have to avoid doing something.

With that type of explanation, there were no difficulties whatsoever.

Senator Gauthier: Do you have any advice for the committee about extending that to all members on disclosure?

Mr. Wilson: Quite frankly, the kinds of responsibilities that members of the House and the Senate have might not make that particularly relevant in terms of having to take certain precautionary steps. On the other hand, a disclosure might serve some importance.

Senator Prud'homme makes an important point about titillation. Most of the provinces and the U.K. have certainly tried to keep away from quantifying these matters.

Senator Gauthier: On the question of disclosure, you seem to prefer that it be in-house. In other words, the clerk of either the House or the Senate would be the person to whom the member would declare. Did I hear you correctly on that, Mr. Wilson?

Mr. Wilson: That's one choice. The other choice is to have somebody special for that purpose.

.1740

Senator Gauthier: Somebody from outside Parliament. You don't see that. The jurisconsult suggested in the last bill: is that something you would favour?

Mr. Wilson: The jurisconsult, as I understood it, was going to be not similar to the Quebec one. The title would be the same. But the jurisconsult is not an officer of the Assembly, I don't think. The proposition in Bill C-43 was that that person could be.

That is one solution. I'm quite agnostic on the point.

Senator Gauthier: You're agnostic.

Mr. Wilson: Yes. I don't have a view on it.

You could do this to the clerk. You could do it to somebody called the jurisconsult who would have that special responsibility.

Senator Gauthier: You also talked about the Parliament of Canada Act, and you said there were certain other contracts, apart from those that are directly related to public works, for example, that should be looked at. I wonder if you would be good enough to give us a list of the other types of conflict a person may have to put up with post-term, for example; after he or she has left Parliament.

Mr. Wilson: Yes, you had made that comment earlier, and I should have commented on it - the après mandat.

I don't think any special rules are necessary after a senator or a member of the House of Commons has left office. That comes back again to the special powers a senator or a member has. If that individual turns out to be a minister, then yes, there are rules that are necessary. But I know of no case where special post-employment rules have in fact been required of legislators. I would have strong reservations about its need.

Senator Gauthier: Thank you.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Epp, before I call on you, there's one member who has not had an opportunity to put a question today, Michel, and with your leave I'd like to let him put his question now.

Michel.

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur (Berthier - Montcalm): Mr. Wilson, we met on several occasions when we were studying Bill C-43. I haven't asked you any questions because I know fairly well what you think about such matters as transparency.

Let me tell you what strikes me today, Mr. Wilson. Trips and gifts have been mentioned and eloquent words have been spoken about virtue. It is all nice and well, but the experience you have acquired these last years in the course of your duties as well as the comments you might have received from taxpayers and from people who have telephoned you or who have come to testify concerning Bill C-43, and these people did not restrict themselves to the question of lobbyists, brings you to believe deep down inside that the federal Parliament needs the type of code of ethics which is presently discussed?

In the end, that's the question. If you believe it is not the case, the matter will be quickly settled. I see that hearings are planned until October 31st. If we hear all the witnesses which are scheduled, we'll still be here at Christmas. It doesn't bother me, but I remember that during the study of Bill C-43, we worked almost day and night to almost no avail.

Mr. Wilson, great counsellor of the prime minister in matters of ethics in this Parliament, tell us if we need a code of ethics.

Mr. Wilson: I believe, Mr. Bellehumeur, that Parliament, members and senators need a modest code of ethics that would include certain disclosure requirements, but no more. It might be good to have more specific rules concerning gifts and trips but no more. It might also be useful to set some principles as those found in the current codes concerning integrity and ways to balance private interests and public responsibilities. We need a modest code.

.1745

Mr. Bellehumeur: Should Parliament legislate the code? Should I get back once again to my pet subject, Bill C-43, with the code of ethics for lobbyists, which really just pays lip service to the matter rather than restrict lobbyist activities. If it is reasonable, is it just to clear everyone's conscience?

Mr. Wilson: I am no expert on the Parliament of Canada Act. As for Bill C-43, the committee moved an amendement to the Parliament of Canada Act, if I'm not mistaken. I suppose there are other options, such as a resolution from both Houses. I am not an expert, but I do think the Committee can decide whether the matter requires an amendment to the Parliament of Canada Act or a resolution that would bind members of Parliament and senators.

Mr. Bellehumeur: My last question, Mr. Wilson should perhaps be asked of Mr. Prud'homme, given his long tirade. I can ask him later.

Let me quote you a very minor case. Someone has already asked you the procedure at the municipal level. Quebec has a Cities and Towns Act, a Criminal Code and even specific legislation on that.

In light of what I have heard so far, I expect you will answer that a reasonable code is perhaps required. The provisions of the Cities and Towns Act, the Municipal Code or the specific legislation are not reasonable.

Elected officials have to do certain things: they must withdraw and make public disclosures; every year they must submit reports to the Department of Municipal Affairs. Why should a small town with a budget of, say, $600,000 or $700,000 - since there are 1441 municipalities in Quebec, some do not manage very much - be burdened with denunciation procedures whereas we, members of Parliament and senators, would have a small reasonable code dealing with trips and hockey tickets we may have been given to see the Canadiens? Why should there be such a marked difference?

Mr. Wilson: Municipalities deal mainly with property or licensing matters. For instance, here in Ottawa, they decide what kind of activities can be carried on in the market. The decisions made by municipal councillors are very closely tied to individual interests. That is the idea.

In provincial and federal assemblies, decisions are not made on propertay matters. For example, in the Quebec Act respecting the National Assembly, it says:

62. A Member having a direct personal financial interest distinct from that of the other Members or the general public in a matter before the Assembly or a committee or subcommittee must publicly declare the interest before speaking or voting on the question.

However, he is not bound to make the declaration if he abstains from speaking and voting on the question.

The situation in Ontario is more or less the same. Municipal councillors must abide by very specific, stringent rules, but there are more general rules on disclosure, nothing more, for the members of the Ontario legislature.

.1750

It is the same thing at the federal level. Interests in real estate in terms of expropriation decisions, as well as decisions to allow involvement in a firm, all this is not addressed at the federal level.

As far as legislation concerning Canadian corporations, we have rules for lobbyists; we have budgets. The decisions are of a more general nature, the necessary rules have to be consistent with the pertinent decision-making level.

That's why I have talked about a modest code.

[English]

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Epp, you have the final questions.

Mr. Epp: Thank you. Mine are quite short. I have a couple of ``for instances,'' because I detect that the direction of the committee is softening very quickly on the need for a code of ethics and enforcement mechanism.

Mr. Wilson, I'd like you to answer the two for instances I thought of. Let's say, for example, a member of Parliament in seeking election runs up quite a debt in his election expenses. Subsequent to his election he becomes a cabinet minister. A person organizes a fund-raising event for him, raises a lot of money, and after that receives a contract from the department of which this person is a minister. Is that an example of something that should be investigated? Is it unethical?

Mr. Wilson: Mr. Epp, I think you've put a hypothetical question forward.

Mr. Epp: Well, is it illegal? Who would bring the charges? Would you? Would I, as a member of Parliament?

Senator Prud'homme: You would have to use the Criminal Code and go directly and make a complaint to the RCMP. It's much tougher than any code of ethics.

Mr. Epp: I take it you won't answer. I'll give you another one. Let's say, for example, a parliamentarian is paid some $60,000 a year. To a millionaire that's petty cash. To most Canadians, the ones I represent, it is a lot of money.

Let's say that parliamentarian, whether he's an MP, a cabinet minister, a senator, or whatever, at the same time gets working as a consultant for some firm, and let's say he makes essentially the same amount of money again, travelling around the world as a consultant, gathering data, making reports, etc., for this client of his. Is that unethical? Should there be an investigation? Should there be rules against that?

Mr. Wilson: What I have said in my opening remarks is I think it's well founded as a principle that MPs should be permitted to have outside interests. Some will choose not to. Others will choose that in fact they should be members of their community in a very active sense. So they may become directors. They may run their own company. They may do a variety of things.

If allegations are going to be made that what they're doing is improper, then one of the ways of dealing with that - and it has been done at the provincial level - is disclosure. Then there can be a discussion of whether or not some of their activities are seen as acting in their private interest, not their public responsibilities.

I would find it very hard a priori to say somebody who is in fact engaged in an outside activity is doing wrong. Quite the contrary, I would argue that should be one of their rights.

Mr. Epp: Okay. Then my concluding comment to other members of the committee is that this blows my mind. As a member of Parliament, I find this is more than a full-time job. I had to give up my other career to become an MP. I'm spending about eighteen hours a day on this job. I don't have time to work for anybody else. So I'm away from my job as a mathematics and computer instructor.

I think a person who is living as a full-time employee of the people of Canada in this place should not be making other money. I'm sorry, but that's my view on it. If he or she is, there needs to be total and full disclosure of the activities of that individual in all regards.

Otherwise, we might as well shut this committee down. I will go and look at other things that I have to deal with.

.1755

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Wilson, do you care to comment?

Mr. Wilson: No.

Senator Prud'homme: Just a short question. Let's say my father was in politics - and I think he did a good job; he was a doctor. Would you say that if a doctor runs for Parliament he should completely cut off his medical practice?

Mr. Epp: That's a tough question. Of course, as you know -

Senator Prud'homme: And we can go down the line. A farmer has a nice big farm in Saskatchewan.... I can give you many examples that I know of, especially in Saskatchewan and Alberta. He has a good farm -

Mr. Epp: I can answer your question. It's very simple.

Senator Prud'homme: That's the meaning of this committee.

Mr. Epp: My job is possible only if I am there physically. A medical doctor or many of the other professions can practise only if they are there physically. On the other hand, a farmer can say, ``Neighbours, I'll rent you my lands''. He can say, ``Son,'' - or son-in-law or whatever - ``you farm this in addition to your land. Carry on.'' He can physically put his work toward representing his constituents, the people who elected him, and therein lies the difference.

I know businessmen who have a business that in no way interferes with their jobs as parliamentarians. However, then we need to be careful that decisions they make as parliamentarians don't affect the well-being of their businesses. There's that aspect to it, and of course I think that has already been dealt with. They need to abstain from voting on issues where there is a direct monetary advantage to them.

I've answered the question.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Wilson, you can tell by the variety of questions that have been put to you that you have been a major catalyst. You have stimulated everyone's thinking today, which is excellent.

As I said at the beginning, you are our first witness in our inquiry. The thing that is most interesting to me is that you said that it is highly desirable that members of Parliament and senators have outside interests. That was one of your major points and is one we shall consider as these deliberations go on.

Thank you very much for coming. Other questions were prepared for us by the researchers, and we might want to send those to you and have responses that we can table for the rest of the committee.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Wilson: Thank you.

Mr. Epp: Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of motions, if I may move them.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Certainly.

Mr. Epp: I'll read both of them, because I have only one copy of them, and then I'll give them to the clerk, and if they need to be dealt with separately, then perhaps you can read them again.

The first motion is one that will help us as a committee to do a good job. We need as much information and data as possible, and my motion is that this special code of conduct committee have made available to it the PMO code of conduct guidelines for ministers. That's not available to us presently, and I think it would help us.

The second motion I have is again one on data gathering: that our researchers prepare a table or list of all the recommendations by previous committees or commissions on the topic of ethics and a code of conduct, identifying the sources of each recommendation, organized by subject. That probably could be done in four or five pages.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): We don't have a quorum of eleven now, so I'll take your two motions as notice and we'll deal with them when we next have a quorum.

Mr. Epp: We don't have eleven?

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): We don't have eleven now.

Mr. Epp: I'd like to point out that all Reform members of this committee are present.

Senator Gauthier: You're the only one.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): No, there are three Reform members on this committee.

Mr. Epp: Who are the other two, Mr. Chairman?

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): All the members of the procedure and house affairs committee are members. You're a substitute, are you not?

Mr. Epp: No, I'm the regular member.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): That can't be, because the membership of the procedure and house affairs committee was changed today and they are the members of this committee. They are Mr. Frazer, Mr. Ringma, and Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Epp: In that case I point out that one-third of our members are here.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): So none of you is here.

Mr. Epp: I want the other members to take notice that they had better have more than three here, because the next time we will outnumber them.

Senator Prud'homme: Did you realize that they are not even here?

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): There is going to be a meeting of the steering committee of the special joint committee at 6 p.m. today, and at that time we will be talking about witnesses and discussing other matters so we can report back to the full committee at the next meeting.

.1800

On that basis, would someone be interested in moving that we adjourn to the call of the chair?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): The meeting is adjourned.