EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 29, 1995

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[Translation]

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Order, please. We now have a quorum. I'm happy to welcome Ms Susan Murray, President of SAMCI, S.A. Murray Consulting Inc.

[English]

We welcome you and thank you for taking the time to appear before the committee today,Ms Murray. We're sorry for the delay in getting going. I understand you have an opening statement, and then I expect you'll get a few questions. The floor is yours.

Ms Susan A. Murray (President, S.A. Murray Consulting Inc.): Thank you very much,Mr. Chairman. I've brought my associate, Kory MacDonald, who helped me with my presentation.

I appreciate the invitation to speak with you about a code of conduct for parliamentarians. I have met some of you before - although I don't think anyone I have met is here - when I made submissions on issues surrounding the Lobbyists Registration Act.

For more than 13 years, I and my associates have worked to make our clients' relations with government productive, efficient and effective. Much of what we do for our clients is to interpret and analyze what goes on in government so that they will be aware of opportunities and problems and respond to both immediately.

As a company, we are non-partisan. We have worked with Liberal, Conservative and NDP governments across Canada. A change in government means a different cast of characters and a different set of priorities, but much of what we do remains the same.

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I can't resist sharing this vignette with you. A wonderful letter to the The Globe and Mail, printed the day after a recent election, captured this perfectly. ``I see nothing has changed'', the grumpy correspondent wrote: ``The government is still in the hands of the government.'' As long as that's true, I and my associates, I believe, will have work to do.

In my presentation today, I want to concentrate on issues related to ethical principles, conflicts of interest, and my experience as a lobbyist who is governed by a written code of conduct. Although lobbyists do not hold public office, we all have worked in government. We are concerned with many of the same issues. We sometimes are portrayed in a similar negative fashion by cynical members of the public.

Let me start with this point. Politicians and lobbyists are sometimes regarding as self-seeking opportunists whose loyalty can be freely traded and whose morality looks no further than personal benefit.

I regret those perceptions, because in my experience, they are overwhelmingly not true. You, as politicians, and I, as a lobbyist, have been deeply disappointed on occasion by the behaviour of colleagues. There have been some bad apples in both barrels. However, I believe the vast majority of politicians and lobbyists are honest and do attempt to serve the public interest.

I also do not mean to sound self-serving. I am not a Pollyanna, nor am I new to these issues. SAMCI has had a written code of conduct, and I did append it for you. In fact, we just updated it.

Since 1983, before the issue became fashionable, before there was legislation affecting our industry, and before there was an industry association, our code of conduct and ethics has stood the test of time, and we are as committed to its principles and spirit now as we were when it was created.

I thought after I finish this I should give you a few real examples of how my colleagues and I make a code of conduct a living and real part of our day-to-day activities. I don't believe the most complex code is real if you don't use it in a difficult situation.

First, I am the classic entrepreneur. When I began my business in 1982, I spent three months with no clients, and therefore no income. I was on my own. My very first client asked me, within weeks of my being retained, to intervene with a provincial attorney general on a legal issue. I resigned the client immediately.

Second, we have always declined business offered on a contingency-fee basis, and we have advocated for many years that the government should ban contingency fees, particularly in the area of procurement.

Third, just two weeks ago, one of my consultants came to me to say he had just obtained information about a client from that client's lawyers that materially changed how we would have worked with the senior bureaucrats involved with this issue. It is part of our code of conduct that we do not knowingly mislead public officials. We wrote a letter of resignation to our client, and called the public officials to say we could no longer act for the company.

A code of conduct is just a piece of paper. It's how you live with it in a fluid way and as issues arise that make it real.

Certainly, we are in a period in which all public institutions are undergoing a process of renovation and reinvention. As parliamentarians, you face major challenges and have significant opportunities to be leaders in this process; however, I don't think we can reinvent our institutions without first admitting their imperfections and failings.

I also feel that we should acknowledge at the outset the limits of what we are attempting. Anyone searching for a perfect standard or set of rules will be disappointed. I was struck by a comment the Hon. Mitchell Sharp made to Mr. Zed's committee last year: ``You can't regulate honesty''. I think that's basic to your task here.

Whatever you decide to include in a code of conduct, if you create one, I think the results ultimately will depend on the determination of parliamentarians to act honourably and to fundamentally understand right from wrong.

Does that mean this is unimportant or just rhetoric? I don't believe so. The public has a fundamental right to feel that those it elects carry out their responsibilities honestly and impartially. A code of conduct, I believe, can assist both members of the public and parliamentarians to understand and deal with all the complexities of public life and significantly get on with the job. If I can use the word ``neutrally'' in this political setting, it helps strike a common-sense balance between the free flow of information and the public's right to accountability. That is positive, and that's an important accomplishment.

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Integrity and impartiality are the foundation of public sector ethics. People expect that the treatment they receive from public agencies will be without regard for any individual or personal characteristics and that they will be treated like everyone else. They also expect that those who hold public office, whether private members of Parliament, senators, public servants, or judges, will be honest at all times and not derive improper personal benefit from their position.

At the extreme, this is particularly straightforward. Bribery is a serious criminal offence. The code of conduct for parliamentarians will recognize these principles and attempt to guide behaviour both to avoid circumstances that may threaten one's integrity and to deal with harmless events and circumstances that might be interpreted as threats or violations to your integrity as MPs and senators.

I wanted to illustrate with a couple of examples. Say a newly elected MP has a pharmaceutical company head in her riding. She gets a luncheon invitation from the vice-president of corporate affairs who says she wants to introduce the company and offer any assistance the MP may need in dealing with related health care issues. They have a pleasant lunch, and they agree to split the bill.

A couple of months later, the vice-president offers the MP two tickets to a Stanley Cup play-off game, remarking that the company has a box at its arena and makes tickets available to MPs, as well as to customers and other guests. Is there a problem here?

Example two. A government industrial assistance program is up for renewal. The industry association hires a lobby firm and several industry representatives, and a senior government relations consultant arranges meetings with senior public servants and ministerial staff. They also meet with MPs whose ridings include the companies affected.

In each meeting, they present an analysis that shows government support levers so much additional private funding that the government gets back more in taxes than it pays out under the program, and they ask for favourable consideration when program renewal is considered. Is this activity proper?

In my view, both situations are proper if certain precautions are taken. I start from the position that it is part of an MP's job to represent all of his or her constituents and that getting to know them and their concerns is basic to doing the job. That doesn't mean there is never going to be an issue.

Lunch with a representative of a business or an interest group in any MP's riding is no problem, especially since the MP and the company official, in my example, split the bill.

Stanley Cup tickets could be seen as different. First of all, they're much more valuable - or they used to be. This has become a very dated example.

Secondly, they again perhaps used to be a much more restricted commodity, and the obvious question is, what's in it for the company handing them out? The easiest way, of course, to avoid a problem is to say no and suggest there must be many other people with whom the official would rather spend an evening. Another option would be to accept the tickets but only on the condition that the MP will pay for them.

You may also want to consider rules such as those that exist in Ontario, whereby a member of the legislative assembly can accept a gift or personal benefit ``as an incident of the protocol customs or social obligations that normally accompany the responsibilities of office'', but if the gift is worth more than $200 or if the total value of gifts from one source exceeds $200 in one year, the member must file a disclosure statement with the provincial integrity commissioner. The logic of the Ontario Members' Integrity Act is that disclosure of a benefit makes it difficult for there to be any untoward effect on legislators' behaviour.

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The second case is probably the most common. Here an organization meets with officials and parliamentarians to advocate for funding under an established program. Unlike the first example, a paid lobbyist is in the picture, but that person's role is to advise and facilitate. The discussion is conducted by the association representatives.

Aside from having paid assistants, this is a straightforward case of constituents communicating with their elected representatives. As long as all other groups have equal access to the representatives, the lobbyist should be no more than a convenience performing tasks the association could have done itself.

I hope these examples highlight several things about conflict of interest that you will want to reflect on.

First, many situations are less than textbook clear. Accepting a couple of hockey tickets may be fine, even if it results in envy from friends, relatives and colleagues, but what if you are offered a pair of play-off tickets to an out-of-town game, and that offer includes a weekend at a hotel, and airfare? That benefit is pretty hard to fit into the category of protocol, customs or social obligation.

Second, different situations suggest different responses. Sometimes the most sensible thing is avoidance - just say ``No thanks'' - while other circumstances may best be dealt with through disclosure.

There are circumstances where a parliamentarian's personal financial interests may be affected by a matter before them. In these cases, the MP or senator would be expected not to participate in the debate or the decision.

There will always be people who are suspicious or adept at finding fault. The test of a code of conduct is not whether its existence silences those who grumble about politicians. The fundamental issue at all times is the public's right to impartial treatment and personal integrity in its elected representatives.

Finally, regulating the conduct of parliamentarians will always be an ongoing process of attempting to balance the free flow of information with the integrity of elected representatives. No rule book can ever settle all the possible cases in advance.

I do think we are at a crossroads in Canada's public life, and I'm not referring to anything in the Constitution. Government and politics in our country no longer connect with many people's priorities or even expectations. Things are out of sync and people are increasingly disenchanted and alienated by the distance between what they want - or think they want - and what they think they're getting. This gap between government agendas and the expectations of citizens is not healthy, and results in wasteful and inefficient government.

In my view, Canadian citizens are years ahead of their politicians. They want less from government, but they still believe in government and that it can do good. They want services from government, but are prepared to accept far fewer than politicians believe. Their willingness to accept less is not because they think government-provided services are bad, that public servants are unproductive drones, or that poor and vulnerable people are undeserving. They are tired of paying for the notion of government as all-providing, as a one-stop shop for everything every Canadian needs in order to be protected, sheltered, educated, nurtured, guided, socialized, tutored and so on.

I believe they want government to be more responsive, and for customer service to be job one. I think they see government's role as creating the appropriate conditions for individuals, businesses and associations of all kinds to flourish and grow. To a much greater extent government would be a standard setter, context definer and an enabler, but less and less a direct provider.

It is time to pull government into the future. Government in Canada is reinventing itself; it has to. We have outgrown the organization, assumptions and business practices of our governments. The old paradigms are obsolete and we have to begin to reinvent them.

I think the opportunity facing you as parliamentarians parallels the situation I experienced when I began my business as a government relations consultant in the early 1980s. I started with the insight that the public and private sectors often existed as two solitudes in conflict because of mistrust and misinformation about each other. I saw that both could benefit from a service that attempted to bring those two solitudes together; in other words, a business whose business would be helping business and other organizations take a leadership role in creating solutions for their own issues with their government.

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At one time the practice of government relations was very different. It once was sufficient to rely on political contacts - on who you knew, not what you knew - and cronies to get results, and the business of lobbying government involved trading political favours for electoral fund-raising or other monetary benefits.

Those days are gone. There is no room within government decision-making today for responses and solutions that are not justifiable in terms of good public policy. Voters have clearly indicated that they will punish bad decisions.

Today, any lobbying firm that relied solely on political connections wouldn't last long. A few words in the ear of a friendly politician over a dinner or golf - I used to hear a lot about golf - simply won't solve the complex issues. Lobbyists need more than a fat rolodex and a silver tongue.

I hope...and I believe we continue to work at building SAMCI on a new paradigm that rejects cronyism, back-door influence and the exchange of political favours. I think a parallel opportunity to embrace a new paradigm exists for parliamentarians today.

More and more I believe partisanship matters less to Canadian citizens than integrity, good faith and the political will to do what's right, even if it is occasionally unpopular. I'm not saying that partisanship is a bad thing or that party discipline and party loyalty are obsolete, only that they can no longer provide the only baseline for the politics of the 1990s and the next millennium.

A fundamental aspect of the reinvention of government is the centrality of ethical principles. That is what drives the public's demand for ever greater accountability. It is not that most people think their representatives and officials are dishonest. Rather, they want to see an explicit commitment of public office-holders to standards of honesty, responsibility and integrity. I think this presents clear opportunity for parliamentary leadership.

We were the first government relations firm in Canada to adopt a written code of conduct. I believe we've established a standard for the practice of ethical government relations. I would be happy, during questions, to tell you that for many years it wasn't easy. There were years where we probably paid some prices, but ultimately it does make good sense.

It hasn't always been problem-free. My experience is that making ethical standards central to the conduct of one's business ultimately has enormous positive results.

First, it clarifies expectations on both sides of the relationship and eliminates a lot of possible misinterpretation and misunderstanding. Our clients know we are not peddling political or bureaucratic influence. They know before they ever engage us that we will not knowingly provide misleading or inaccurate information to officials, and that we will not play both sides of the street. Each client contract we sign states our commitment to not accept work that would involve direct conflicts of interests with existing client commitments.

Second, our commitment to transparent advocacy means our dealings with officials and politicians are fair, reasonable and open. This is something that has earned us respect from civil servants and MPs across Canada, and it has served us well professionally.

Third, it sensitizes us to issues that may arise where there are no established rules. For example, in the early 1990s I hired two senior consultants with connections to the NDP government in Ontario. One had been a political advisor and at the time was a civil servant, but her spouse continued to be a minister's chief of staff. The other was a senior advisor in the premier's office.

As you may know, there are no post-employment rules for the Ontario government's political staff. In each case we sought the advice of the then conflict of interest - now integrity - commissioner, and we agreed on a detailed set of constraints on the work these people would do at SAMCI. And that was in a context where former deputy ministers were going out and selling their services in the field they'd been in the day before.

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Again, there were no rules but we felt we should show some leadership. This did produce a win-win outcome for SAMCI and the government. It did underscore our commitment to ethical government relations, but it also permitted these individuals and those they dealt with subsequently in the Ontario government to do business without any apprehension, impropriety or conflict.

Finally, our code lets us focus on what we do best, to try to provide our clients with professional advice about their issues. Again, I think this is a particularly salient point for parliamentarians. The demands on government are so many and varied that anything that simplifies your job of representing the interests of Canadians while increasing public confidence in your commitment to the highest standards of integrity is worth embracing.

Across North America fiscal and other pressures have given rise to a host of efforts to reinvent government, to make it smarter and able to do more with less. I know you share those goals and you will see the work you're doing to develop a code of conduct for parliamentarians as very real and an important opportunity for our parliamentary democracy to embrace ethical principles in day-to-day operations.

By the way, I did want to offer any further assistance as you move forward. I'd be delighted to work with any members of the committee or the staff, and to answers questions.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Thank you very much for a very thorough presentation.

Mrs. Catterall is the first questioner, please.

Ms Catterall (Ottawa West): First, thank you very much for a very refreshing presentation and for putting the issue in a context that's practical.

After 20 years in public life the number of people I've met in public office who are not doing it for the highest purposes, almost to the point of self-sacrifice, are very few. I'm constantly amazed at the very high level of commitment to the public good - whether it's people I agree or disagree with on how that should be carried out. So personally, I have a hard time understanding the public concern.

I would like to go straight to page 11 because it goes to the heart of something I feel is extremely crucial. I want to know on what you're basing your interpretation of the public view of government these days, especially in terms of less from government, the alienation, the distance between what they want and what they're getting, the gap between government agendas and the expectations of citizens. I'm not sure I agree with you. That's why I'm asking you on what you based your opinions.

Ms Murray: It's partly with what we've seen in both federal and provincial elections, by and large, particularly over the last decade. Historically, we had a lot of stability in incumbency in Canada. But in the last decade, regardless of the party in power, both federally and provincially, Ontario comes to mind as being since 1985 a very cogent example.

We can look at the 1993 federal example where the public angst just swept governments out to the point in which we have two Tory members in Ottawa. We've had three changes of government in less than a decade in Ontario. That is absolutely new in terms of my interpretation and what we've seen. It was not based on partisanship. I don't believe, for example, the Tories won in Ontario based on partisanship. It's not the same party it was in 1985. It's a completely new group of people and there's no question they tapped into some of what I'm trying to illustrate in these points.

Partly because we work for so many different organizations and across so many sectors, we see it probably the way you do in some ways. We see increasing frustration with 19th century structures of government in a 21st century world, and that government isn't moving fast enough.

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Any large organization that wants to turn around or change takes a lot longer than a smaller organization. So I don't think these comparisons to the private sector are completely fair.

Governments have created part of this. Again, since 1984 federal governments have told Canadians that government had to change and that they can't expect as much. Now the public's bought it and has been waiting for it to happen. In fact, again, we've seen the current government in Ottawa make some real cuts. I think the public bought it and is now quite frankly driving this kind of agenda in every province.

Ms Catterall: In part you're making my point in asking the question. One of the points you make very strongly, and I couldn't agree on more, is the importance of fair and equal treatment for all citizens.

One of the things politicians have to resist is the perception that those they know personally or those who are like the people they know personally, whether it's people they've dealt with in business or people in their own economic class or in their own neighbourhood, represent the totality of their constituents and that diversity of people whom they have to treat and represent equally.

One of my colleagues said to me some time ago that the problem with most cabinet ministers - and that's not under this government, but maybe it applies under this government as well - is that they don't know any poor people. That's something we all have to resist, getting isolated from the totality of our constituency.

So I was asking what you're basing your opinion on. In part you're basing it on some observations about the transitory nature of governments in the last decade and to some extent your experience of your own clients. I don't know how broad your client base is.

Your third point was perhaps the most interesting, that governments had told people that government has to change. I'm not sure that brings me to the conclusion you come to, that people want government to change.

Ms Murray: People want government to get back to fundamentals. We had free-flowing dollars in Canada post-World War II until the recognition, let's say a decade ago, of the fiscal side. So government did get into more and more services quite freely and in many areas where they compete directly with the private sector, more than I would suggest a lot of other countries.

To your point about the disadvantaged and poor, I think the public is looking at getting governments back to core services, in health, education, environment, and asking what government should be in and where they do not need government. They're asking if there are other ways of delivery of service we now don't need.

When you see the speed of change and you look at CRTC, it is probably already obsolete, by and large, because the technology is moving way ahead of the possibility to even regulate it. You have a whole generation of these 20-something entrepreneurs out there doing their own thing in their garages. They can't relate to the regulator, which is again partly the speed of structural change outside of government.

We're still working in a 19th century government, how government buys services, how it delivers services, by and large. Therefore, we ask how we get back to caring for fundamentally what is in the public interest. That's really where I'm coming from.

Ms Catterall: I object to that from the ethical point of view.

I make another point. I've made the point that it's important for politicians to remember the diversity of the people they represent and to recognize that unlike the referendum mentality, it's not just a question of adding up the numbers. The decision 90% of the constituents in my riding may want me make may not affect them at all. It may affect the other 10% drastically. So it's not just a question of saying I'll vote with the majority or I'll promote policies of the majority.

The other thing I think is an ethical obligation is to help your constituents also understand the diversity of interests you represent. Everyone who telephones you to express a view wants you to represent your constituents. They think that means their point of view.

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Ms Murray: I think that's true. I'm always shocked.... We always ask everyone we meet, whether it's an NGO, a non-profit organization, an industry association or a company, if they know their MP, and about 85% of the time, they don't.

There is still a bit of shyness, quite frankly, when you get down to it, to even approaching your MP. We'll say to them, ``Your MP would be delighted to see your organization or learn more and will be an advocate for you.'' They say, ``Do you think so? Would they be interested?''

Considering, again, that we do have a lot of government, it is quite surprising to me. A lot of what we do is education. A huge amount of what we do is education. It is something that I find endlessly surprising. How many people in senior positions in major corporations have never been in the legislature and have very odd views of government and how decisions are made.

Part of it is, again, this whole education. I think you're right, it's a two-way street. I think it's MPs reaching out as well.

Ms Catterall: Thank you.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Senator Gauthier, please.

[Translation]

Senator Gauthier (Ontario): Welcome, Ms Murray.

[English]

I must join my colleague and friend Marlene Catterall in congratulating you on your presentation. I think it's a breath of fresh air - up to a point. To compare yourself with lobbyists and politicians, to put them in the same bag, as you did, is a breath of fresh air, because usually we're a separate breed.

I had a couple of questions. As a general rule, does your firm target members of Parliament?

Ms Murray: Target them?

Senator Gauthier: Yes, for lobbying purposes. Would you, for example, have a list of parliamentarians? I'm not talking about ministers. I'm talking about backbenchers or ordinary senators like me. Would you have a list of those that you would want to call once in awhile in the name of your clients?

Ms Murray: We recommend that every client we know and work with work with the MPs and MPPs in which they operate or do business, or if it's a non-profit group and it's a national group, the MPs in which they're organized.

Senator Gauthier: Yes, but I'm talking about you. I'm not talking about your clients, I'm talking about you as an individual, as a company. Based on the office the member occupies, if he's a backbencher, would you target or make an effort to meet these people, and if so, how often would you do that?

Ms Murray: You mean as an individual?

Senator Gauthier: As a company.

Ms Murray: Only with a client. We make phone calls to MPs on specific issues but we don't target them.

Senator Gauthier: Do you target other people, like parliamentary secretaries or ministers or ministers' staffs?

Ms Murray: On behalf of clients, but we would never attend a meeting with a minister's staff or a bureaucrat or an MP without the client with us. We're not here to represent ourselves.

Senator Gauthier: You're just an intervener here.

Ms Murray: Yes.

Senator Gauthier: You're just acting as a go-between, are you?

Ms Murray: Not just a go-between. What we find usually is that there is a perception that ministers solve all issues. It's a widespread perception -

Senator Gauthier: Not in political terms.

Ms Murray: - that if I just get to a cabinet minister, I will solve my issue. So we spend a lot of time generally with the organizations we act for. We will often say you don't need to work on this issue anywhere but in the bureaucracy if it's a regulatory matter. I would say we spend as much time talking to and working with, on the policy side, public servants as we do at the political level.

Senator Gauthier: Yes, that's what I was driving at. Because I don't take it that you find it very relevant to your work that backbenchers who have absolutely no direct influence on policy-making of the government.... They're there to support. They're there to debate. They're there to do the parliamentarians -

Ms Murray: They can be very strong advocates on individual issues.

Senator Gauthier: I know; I've been there for 23 years. I'm just telling you that they're not as important to you as the people in the minister's office who have the contacts with the public service, or, for example, the parliamentary secretary's office, who may have an assistant who may be attached to a particular department in which you're interested.

Ms Murray: You're trying to get me to say that an MP is less important than a public servant.

Senator Gauthier: We've been told that.

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Ms Murray: We do not rate them in terms of who's most important. Quite frankly, the MPs we can get engaged, who have the time to get engaged in issues.... For example, we have worked a lot on steel issues. We're fundamentally recommending that maybe the MPs with steel interests might want to get together and talk about it more often.

In fact, I think it's interesting; our form of government is in fact engaging in more public hearings with MPs. If anything, I see more parallels to the American situation of how an MP is using issues than I saw even five years ago.

So I would see the importance of an MP's involvement, on issues we're seeing, going up, both provincially and federally.

Senator Gauthier: When you hire people in your organization...you said in your statement something I found interesting. You said you hired two former NDPs, one was a ministerial assistant or staff person.

Ms Murray: Had been in with the bureaucratic -

Senator Gauthier: Yes. So they knew exactly how the system operated. You hired them because they knew how the system worked.

Ms Murray: Everyone in our firm has worked in government. There isn't anyone in our company who wasn't at either the political or bureaucratic level. Most of us, unfortunately, are also political scientists.

Senator Gauthier: But you also told us that you agreed with them that there would be some details, some constraints on their work.

Ms Murray: That's correct.

Senator Gauthier: What kind of constraints would you put on somebody who had just come out of government, for example?

Ms Murray: Any issues they'd worked on, on behalf of issues we were involved in, they could no longer work on for at least a year.

Senator Gauthier: You would set that up as the in-shop rule.

Ms Murray: Yes. We took those ideas. In fact, at the time, I spoke to the premier's principal secretary and said we would be part of this kind of a form to have Ontario put some post-employment guidelines, so it would be easier for us. They weren't interested. Their agenda was too busy. That's when we went to the integrity commissioner and set our own guidelines.

Senator Gauthier: Well, I think you did a good presentation. I'm happy with it.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Senator Bosa.

Senator Bosa (York - Caboto): I congratulate you on the presentation as well. You gave us an example where there might be a conflict of interest when a member is invited out for lunch and before leaving they decide to split the bill. Or you suggested that perhaps we should consider adopting the rule they have in the province of Ontario whereby members are permitted to receive a gift, but if it is in excess of $200, then the...I beg your pardon?

Ms Murray: It's $200 from one source in one year.

Senator Bosa: I see. What about political donations? You gave the example of the pharmaceutical company.

Ms Murray: Actually, that's a good question.

Senator Bosa: They become aware that MP X is having a fund-raising, and that company either makes a donation of $1,000 or buys a table. I know that becomes part of the disclosure -

Ms Murray: We get asked about this a lot by our clients. I think companies, particularly companies, struggle a lot with political donations. What should they do? Should they give? How much should they give? Again, you get into questions of.... It's a participatory democracy. We recommend political donations, but to all parties. Again, I think you can't have a democracy without having.... Right?

In fact, I'm not very happy with the number of national Canadian corporations that won't give at all to political parties. There are some we've worked on for years, saying if they want to participate in policy and they want to be at the table, they also have to participate in keeping the party system alive.

Look at the problems we've had with parties in debt, taking years to come out. I think that's very dangerous. Again, if people are going to be asking for leadership on their issues, I do think they should donate.

What we say is make it even-handed. Most companies don't even have the rules. We usually hand out the federal and provincial guidelines on giving to political parties, and we usually say, again, start at the local level.

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Senator Bosa: Let me ask another question. In your profession, you must have some promotion. If you're going to speak to an MP or a minister, you have to get to know that person.

Ms Murray: We do get to know them.

Senator Bosa: Yes, but do you invite members out for lunch?

Ms Murray: I'm personally very careful. I myself haven't been involved politically for about a decade. I have more friends - I don't know what this says about me or them - who are former politicians. Again, I think I have an obligation to be very careful. I will sit down on issues, including free-range issues like some of those we were talking about, and I will talk about where are we going, but it's generally on generic issues.

Senator Bosa: So you do invite members out.

Ms Murray: I'll invite members out if, for example, we're buying tickets to a dinner, because I find MPs, ministers and senators get asked to go to everything. So we will invite people, but again I think we have an obligation, and there's a line to how far we can go. We have to be scrupulous but we should also participate.

In terms of whether or not I say who I know, I don't. As a firm we tend to talk about the issue, the public policy interest. I get asked a lot about who I know, what ministers I know, what MPs I know. I generally ask about what bureaucrats the person asking knows. We say we can't possibly know everyone in government. We work with people from all political parties. We work in most of the provinces and federally, and yes, we know people, but it's irrelevant.

I have been asked repeatedly over the years to help someone meet Minister X. I'll tell them they have every right to pick up the phone, but that's not going to solve their issue unless they know what they're going to say. I ask what their case is, but I usually turn it back to them and tell them to go ahead, that they don't need me to call a minister, nor should they.

This goes to your point about equal access, because that's not the point.

Senator Bosa: I have one last question, Madam Chair.

Do you recommend that we have specific rules for the examples you've given, or do you think there should be broad, general principles?

Ms Murray: I attached ours, and they are under some broad headings. These things are fluid. It's amazing to me how many issues come up. For example, I deal with the issue of who I know, all the time. I would say MPs get the same thing. I hear all the time, well, I know the fund raiser for MP X; he will get me in to see his minister friend. So MPs have that same pressure to get to who they know.

Again, what are the guidelines here? I think they probably have to be broad, but enough so that they give people comfort. I have an expression: you do good business with good people. I hope over the years we will start to attract people who share this philosophy both to the firm and as people who want to work with us under this code. So I think you do therefore weed out the people who aren't going to be comfortable with those ground rules.

Senator Bosa: Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Since there are no further questions, I thank you very much, Ms Murray.

Senator Gauthier: May I ask one more question of Ms Murray?

Do you make a distinction between a senator and a member of Parliament?

Ms Murray: Yes. I've been using MP in my commentary -

Senator Gauthier: Would a code of conduct apply to both houses, in your opinion?

Ms Murray: I think there are some real issues for senators because they can, of course, work and take on other obligations - and so can MPs. Again, I think you're going to probably end up - and maybe you already have, although I've read some of the testimony and I haven't seen much in this area - where all the other obligations you have, particularly.... Most senators have other obligations. Many are still lawyers -

Senator Gauthier: I'm not one of those.

Senator Bosa: It may be 20%.

Ms Murray: I thought it was higher than 20%.

Senator Bosa: No, I meant 20% might have other activities.

Ms Murray: It's only that low?

Senator Gauthier: My other question to you was whether or not you think there is a difference. You said there is a difference.

Ms Murray: I think there are probably as many, if not more, obligations on senators who still have other professions and are still working in other areas.

Senator Gauthier: Okay. If that's correct, then, do you think we should have three codes of ethics - one for ministers, parliamentary secretaries and office holders, one for members of Parliament, and one for senators?

.1730

Ms Murray: I've done a lot of thinking about cabinet. In cabinet they're into very different things because they see information nobody else sees. They have access to information that isn't going to be released, sometimes for many years, sometimes not ever. I think there are some strong codes of conduct in place for cabinet.

By and large, I don't know why you couldn't have the same code for MPs and senators.

Senator Gauthier: Do you mean the same code as ministers?

Ms Murray: No. For ministers there are already a lot of guidelines.

Senator Gauthier: Okay. You think there should be another code for members of Parliament and senators.

Ms Murray: Yes. There should probably be one.

Senator Gauthier: One code.

Ms Murray: Yes.

Senator Gauthier: We could let the law, maybe the Parliament of Canada Act or some other law, look after the interests.

Ms Murray: Yes, though I think you end up with interpretations. I mentioned that we've had this since 1983. We're still changing it and updating it all the time. People read it and come to different conclusions. That's why I say it's not static.

Senator Gauthier: Do you support the notion that spouses of parliamentarians, for example, should be subject to the same rules?

Ms Murray: No.

Senator Gauthier: You don't go as far as many witnesses did who have told us that we should even go as far as children, whether they're dependent or not, and that they should all be subject to this disclosure thing. You don't agree with that.

Thank you very much.

Ms Murray: Thank you.

Senator Bosa: When you invite a member for lunch, do you insist even before that you split the bill with him or her?

Ms Murray: Yes.

Another example is that if I picked up the cost of lunch with you I'd say to you that next time I would expect you, Senator, to pick it up. And I do say that a lot, so that, again, people are comfortable with the invitation and don't think every time that -

Senator Bosa: Yes. Thank you.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Are there more questions?

Ms Murray, thank you very much for a very interesting presentation.

Our next witness is the Hon. Jean-Jacques Blais. There are copies of his presentation in both French and English. Would members please avail themselves of the copies or pass them around?

Senator Gauthier: That's what I call a very judicious decision.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Yes. I had a little advice.

[Translation]

Welcome, Mr. Blais.

[English]

I know most of the members here will be familiar with Mr. Blais. He is a distinguished former public servant.

[Translation]

Mr. Blais is now a member of the law firm of McTaggart, Blais, Martin & Stein, in Ottawa, and is involved in government relations work, among other activities.

[English]

Mr. Blais, would like to present your statement? I'm sure the members will have questions for you.

[Translation]

The Hon. Jean-Jacques Blais (individual presentation): Madam Chair, members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before this committee, in a place where I have had very pleasant times and faced very stimulating challenges. My presentation will take about 15 minutes.

[English]

As you've pointed out, I do come to you as a former member of the House between 1972 and 1984 and as a cabinet minister between 1976 and 1984, as well as a member of the Security Intelligence Review Committee between 1984 and 1991. I identify SIRC because in effect it's as close as you can come to a parliamentary committee. I would be pleased to discuss that comparison during your question period.

I also address you as one who's been a consultant in government relations, in other words, a lobbyist, both on a volunteer basis and a remunerated basis for the better part of the last decade. My comments will be brief and I welcome your questions in the hope that I can be of some assistance in your deliberations.

[Translation]

First of all, I would like to assure you that, in my view, the task you have undertaken is an essential one. As I was reading the magazine L'Actualité, I noticed that, according to a CROP survey, the satisfaction rating for politicians was about 4%. This is not very flattering, although, according to politicians, it doesn't come as a big surprise.

There is a crisis in government: the deficit, cuts in government programs which, in earlier days, were considered immutable, accusations of abuse of power, kickbacks, to cite but a few of our ills.

.1735

[English]

All of this encourages a persistent challenge to the credibility of our democratic institutions and those who have been entrusted with their administration. Politicians are being pilloried. While that isn't only because of the perceived degradation of ethical standards, that perception is out there and arguably has a causal connection to the unpopularity of politicians.

Since it is within Parliament's powers to address that perception, your activities are an essential part of the rehabilitation process. I hope the Canadian public is paying attention to your efforts. From the evidence to date before your committee, the suggestions should be very helpful in your reaching constructive recommendations. I have been very impressed with the range of experience at the provincial level.

Television and rapid changes in communications facilitate your work, but they do make the burden of accountability one that is ``on-line'', as it were. I was in the House, as was Senator Gauthier, when television was introduced. Senator Bosa was in the environs as well.

The communications revolution it typified has pursued its course, picking up speed as it goes. I was able to get access to your committee deliberations through the Internet. The information on government activities that you can get by plugging into your computer is marvellous. Indeed, more of that nature is to come. I'm told we'll soon be able to get copies of bills on the Internet, and in both languages.

A voice: You know how to manipulate the computer.

Mr. Blais: Of course. Once one leaves politics, one learns fast.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

[Translation]

Mr. Blais: I agree that, because of the lack of credibility of our public institutions, there is a need for a code of ethics that goes beyond the simple requirement for members of Parliament and senators to disclose their assets.

I believe that members of Parliament and senators are close enough to the decision-making process to be in a situation where they are in danger of breaching the trust of the public. Let me explain.

[English]

While the backbencher, including the senator, is not directly involved in the making of decisions, he or she is very much part of the process. His or her responsibility is not limited to showing up to vote, but through the party structure, caucus deliberations and studies and debates in the committees of the House and Senate, as well as in the legislative assemblies, he or she is, or ought to be, influencing the decision-making process and ensuring proper accountability by the governors.

I can't imagine how that could be possible without the member seeking to obtain the maximum amount of information, including information that could well be confidential and secret.

[Translation]

Even if it is true that others take decisions and are accountable for them, members of Parliament and senators can also contribute to the information decision-makers must have. If the system is to work, members of Parliament must do whatever is necessary to further their knowledge of issues.

So, it is not only advisable that members of Parliament or senators be available full time, it is a requirement. Even if the pay is not that attractive, it has been raised over the last 25 years to enable MPs to devote practically all their time to government.

[English]

I've heard those who maintain that MPs and senators should be part-timers, involved on the street, in the marketplace and at their jobs or professions to better reflect the Canadian reality in the debates in the House and Senate. Respectfully, I do not agree. First, given the many-faceted responsibilities of the MP or senator, there isn't time.

The danger of confusing priorities between private interests and public duty is great and could appear to the Canadian taxpayer to increase the opportunities for conflict of interest.

You may recall during the debate on members' pensions the argument that an MP, having devoted his full time to his duties as a legislator and ombudsman for a full six years, would be deemed to have abandoned at worst, or neglected at best, the means of earning his livelihood. He or she would therefore be in need of means of support for himself and his family when the democratic process decided that his or her time was up.

The MP or senator is meant by the system to be in a position to influence public policy, the legislative process and the making of decisions. He or she has daily access to the decision-makers, and when required, public servants from whom information, guidance and administrative insights might be obtained. While the parliamentary precinct is not hermetically sealed, it does offer a relatively intimate context within which information, attitudes, concerns, and arguments helpful in the taking of decisions can be exchanged and better understood between decision-makers, their supporters and even their antagonists.

.1740

It is therefore my view that MPs and senators should be subjected to a code of conduct that extends beyond simple disclosure. In considering the existing conflict of interest code as it affects ``public policy-holders'', the general principles of part one could well be applied to members of Parliament, excluding the post-employment restrictions and references to decision-making.

Part two, as it relates to controlled assets and their administration through blind trusts or management agreement, should also be excluded, as well as the more stringent requirements aimed at public office holders directly responsible for the taking of decisions.

[Translation]

I would be pleased to explore this issue further with you after my presentation, but I would also like to talk to you about the relations between MPs or senators and lobbyists.

First of all, I hope that, in the course of your duties, you consider that the role of lobbyists is an active, not a passive one. As I was saying, information is essential in the decision- making process in the House and in the Senate.

The accountability process is well served when information can bring out deficiencies in the government system or contribute to the debate of sensitive issues. I am sure that members of this committee could find many examples of this.

It seems to me essential, to ensure that our system works efficiently, that members of Parliament or senators be able to access all information they believe is relevant. It goes without saying that every single source of information which can be useful to the public administration process should be capitalized upon, whether it is within the public service or in the private sector.

For instance, take privatizations - which are becoming increasingly popular and whereby partnerships between the public and the private sectors are encouraged - the amount of relevant information available from individuals or organizations outside the government is enormous, and this is the type of information it is essential to have to take proper decisions. I believe that interested parliamentarians should make it their duty to identify such sources of information, as well as what it consists of, including any bias it might contain.

And this is but an example. There are many others. Clearly, private sector people who offer this kind of information have fish to fry. They have an interest, whether it is in the area of custom duties, procurement contracts or general policy provisions such as the Firearms Act.

Obviously, members of Parliament and senators should scrutinize this interest to determine its nature, using the public good as a benchmark.

[English]

As you are well aware, there are constantly private interests who follow the course of public policy with a view of ensuring their ox is not gored. They may represent the economic, social, and the provincial or foreign interests seeking to influence the course of Canadian public policy. They will retain the services of lobbyists who are knowledgeable of the workings of public administration at the official's level and/or the political level.

As public administration becomes more and more complex and sophisticated and as the competing interests looking to influence public policy proliferate, the number of these lobbyists increases and their methodologies improve. They advise their client to seek allies, preferably among the decision-makers themselves - the public servants, whose advice is sought by the decision-makers; and members of the House and the Senate.

The purpose of their advice is to advance the private interests of their clients. But the context within which they work is a decision-making process designed to further the public good. It is therefore essential that those approached at any level and in any function be anchored in their responsibility to advance the public good as decision-makers, as professional civil servants, as advising ministers, and as elected and appointed officials ensuring accountability of the governors to govern.

It would appear odd to me that the first two are subject to a code of conduct and the third is not. As I've stated, MPs and senators should be.

.1745

Might I also suggest that the adoption of a code of ethics that goes beyond the simple requirement to disclose assets and imposes an obligation to ``uphold the highest ethical standards'', including ensuring the public interest, would communicate a most positive message to the Canadian public.

As a lobbyist, I am most sensitive to the necessity of protecting public officeholders and their obligation to advance that public interest.

I have the privilege of drafting a code of conduct for the Government Relations Institute of Canada that will soon be adopted. I thought I might distribute it, but then on second thought, since it hadn't been approved by the GRIC, I thought I might just refer to it. Perhaps you might subsequently ask me if you want to have a copy.

In other words, those who exercise my profession come in contact with those who have the responsibility to advance the common good, as they seek to advantage their clients' private interests.

Because of the privileged position in which they find themselves, often having as much information on a dossier as those in the decision-making stream, their obligation is to ensure that they preserve the integrity of our democratic institutions and those who people them.

Lobbyists provide a needed service to public administration. They have information they will advance to help their client's case, but in so doing, they must also recognize that the debate between competing interests should have the public good as the primary criterion of analysis.

MPs and senators are in a good position to receive that information and use it in their analysis of government policy or proposed government legislative measures. They can serve to test the information, which may not be accurate, relevant or in the best interests of the Canadian taxpayer, or indeed of the Canadian citizen, but their action must, of necessity, be motivated by the public interest.

They must be purer than Caesar's wife in that respect, and they need to be seen to be so. The interplay between the parties needs to be seen as open, fair and devoid of any suspicion or appearance of impropriety. In my view, that dictates a code of conduct as well as disclosure of assets. And meaningful sanctions need to be applied for breach.

Evidently the definition of public good is a moving feast. What it may be at a given time is a matter of intense debate, and is the stuff that motivates this institution and its members. However, if there is a meeting of minds, it is on the question of transparence.

To come back to the public good, surely a lobbyist who is involved in doing analysis relating to public affairs ought to be very sensitive to the parameters of public good, and in fact should be held to comply with what I just identified.

If there is a meeting of minds, as I indicated, it is with reference to transparency. The people, the citizens of Canada, are the ultimate judge and jury. They are entitled to have their representatives openly debating, with as much knowledge and wisdom as can be marshalled, measures that are in their interest. Therefore they demand not only that the debates themselves be in full view, but that the private interests of those intimately involved also be subject to the same transparency.

MPs and senators need to feel comfortable in dealing with sources of information, relevant data and analyses on specific issues and dossiers. Their public needs to know that in their dealings with private interests who approach the public decision-making process, they have the public's best interest in mind.

A well-drafted code of ethics should provide for that transparency, while recognizing the special situation in which the MP or senator finds himself or herself, with the need to be as freewheeling and as independent as the system will allow, recognizing that he or she is not responsible for the decisions that are of the domain of Cabinet, but is able to contribute to the decision-making process and to demand accountability for those decisions in caucus or inside or outside the House and Senate.

[Translation]

Members of the committee, I am ready to answer your questions.

[English]

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Thank you very much, Mr. Blais.

Senator Gauthier, please.

[Translation]

Senator Gauthier: I want to thank Mr. Blais for a presentation I found interesting and balanced, albeit rather surprising at times. I am puzzled; it seems to me you throw all politicians in the same bag: members of Parliament, senators and ministers. Is this the case?

.1750

Mr. Blais: No. They fall in very distinct categories. I said that ministers, officials and parliamentary secretaries make up one category. Members of Parliament and senators belong to another.

Senator Gauthier: So, there would be two codes of ethics: one for the people...

Mr. Blais: The one which already exists and another for members of Parliament and senators.

Senator Gauthier: In your view, what provisions should there be in this code of ethics so that we may regain the confidence of the Canadian people?

Mr. Blais: Could I borrow a copy of the existing code of ethics, because I forgot mine?

First, there should be a statement of principle to establish very strict ethical standards all parliamentarians, whether they are ministers or backbenchers, would have to abide by. Then, as I mentioned in my presentation, I refer to paragraph 2, part I, of the code of conduct where it is noted that the purpose of the code is to increase the public's confidence in the integrity of office holders. Four elements, which I consider applicable to backbenchers as well as to ministers, are then identified.

In paragraph 3, there are references to ethical standards, transparency and decision-making. I would eliminate anything which has to do with decision-making and with private interest elements directly linked to decision-makers.

And I could go on and on. I am just saying that we should have very high ethical standards, but that we should also recognize that members are not accountable for decision-making and have to be free enough to properly carry out their duties. MPs should be free to nose around, if I may use such a popular expression, and to get the information they need to fulfil their responsibilities from all available sources, as well as from ministers, if they are able to make them talk, which can be done, if you give it a real try.

Senator Gauthier: In your presentation, you mentioned that we should, of course, have a code of ethics, but that it would not be enough. You are asking for disclosure. You feel that it is absolutely essential, but that we should go beyond that.

For instance, every time an MP meets a lobbyist and is invited to lunch, should he disclose that?

Mr. Blais: No, I don't agree with that. This is not what I have in mind. We should recognize that people have some common sense.

Senator Gauthier: But what exactly do you have in mind?

Mr. Blais: An MP should always remember that breach of confidence is a danger that is very real. This can happen when, thanks to his efforts, he manages to get some information the disclosure of which could run counter to the public good. He should, therefore avoid passing on such information. Also, there is a risk that, in his discussions with people from the private sector, he gives them information which they could use to their advantage and against the public interest. Even if, personally, he has nothing to gain by communicating such information, he should avoid to do so.

Bribes are, of course, dealt with in the Criminal Code. Personally, I think that this is the ultimate crime a public office holder can be guilty of. We cannot tolerate that someone, whoever it is, alters and falsifies the decision-making process within the government by getting some personal advantages out of it, in one way or the other, even if, at the end of the day, the decision is a good one.

.1755

Senator Gauthier: In your presentation, you made a rather clear statement regarding the time an MP or a senator should devote to his duties. Again, I understand that ministers and other officials have very different obligations and that their code of ethics forbids them to have other activities outside the House of Commons or the Senate. However, you seem to be in favour of MPs and senators limiting their professional activities to their duties as parliamentarians. Am I right?

Mr. Blais: This is the way I see things. I thought a lot about that. I indeed consider that, in a public administration as sophisticated as ours, the responsibility of an MP is to influence the decision-making process as well as any public issue. An MP has the obligation to ensure that decision-makers can be held accountable. To do this as thoroughly as possible, he has to have a very professional approach, and he should also be perceived as having no conflict of interest.

Senator Gauthier: Do you mean that if he has a farm, he should sell it because...

Mr. Blais: Oh, no, not at all. This is not what I mean. If a farmer has a farm or if a lawyer as a law firm, I do not see why he should sell it. I cannot imagine that a lawyer who is also a member of Parliament would go to the Justice Minister and tell him: "Listen, old boy, I have a few associates in my law firm. Could you send a few cases their way?"

Senator Gauthier: I completely agree with you. But, on page 12 of your brief, you say:

[English]

The interplay between the parties needs to be seen as being open, fair and devoid of any suspicion or appearance of impropriety. That, in my view dictates a code of conduct as well as disclosure of assets. And meaningful sanctions need to be applied for breach.

Give me an example of breach and how you would deal with it.

Mr. Blais: I could see quite readily a suspension from the House for a number of days, as a result of a relatively serious breach. I could see there being a provision for suspension for longer periods.

You know, the public mention in the House or a resolution condemning the conduct of a member is in itself highly effective punishment for the individual who needs to be re-elected. Of course, in the Senate, I'd have to think about it a bit more. Perhaps with your experience in both Houses, Senator Gauthier -

Senator Gauthier: This is my last question. I wanted to make sure I understood you clearly. Who would pass judgment on the member of Parliament, including members of the House and Senate?

Mr. Blais: The ethics commissioner should be responsible for -

Senator Gauthier: There should be one?

Mr. Blais: There is one.

Senator Gauthier: I know, but for members of Parliament?

Mr. Blais: Yes. I have no difficulty with this. There needs to be an ethics commissioner who is also available to members of the House, who advises these members of the House and permits the investigation of complaints.

Now, in terms of the investigations and recommendations, there is a House committee on privileges and elections dealing with related issues. This may be one way. I really haven't had a fundamental enough discussion on this issue to be able to be of any further assistance.

Senator Gauthier: You and I have been here for a long time. And you and I went through this committee process where House of Commons judges were passing judgment on another member of Parliament. I think you've sat on a couple of committees that did this.

Mr. Blais: I've sat as vice-chair of the committee.

Senator Gauthier: You found it rather difficult, didn't you?

Mr. Blais: Yes, very difficult. But I think there's an evolution. I was listening to what Susan Murray was saying. Ministers, in my view, are no longer able to have the knowledge required relating to their ministry. They need assistance in order to be able to penetrate this. This assistance is not from their officials. It's from members of the House who might assist the minister in seeking the accountability of officials in matters of administration as opposed to matters of policy.

.1800

I say this because I lived the experience of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, where on a part-time basis - but only with that one committee - five members with fourteen members of staff were able to do investigations relating to the security service.

We were able to - and I don't brag - sensibly and visibly change the operations and effectiveness of that organization as a result of that activity. In doing so, we were able to provide the Solicitor General on an ongoing basis with information that was useful to him in terms of how he discharged these ministerial responsibilities, even though he wasn't of my party during that period. And never once did we interfere with the policy-setting process.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Senator Bosa, I believe you're next.

Senator Bosa: It's nice to see you again. You look well.

Mr. Blais: And so do you.

Senator Bosa: Thank you.

I guess you've been on both sides of this issue and with your experience I'd really appreciate hearing your views on this. In your brief, you speak of disclosed assets. Are you saying that every member...?

First, let me preface my remarks by saying I agree with you that the backbencher has a great deal of influence on caucus or in the decision-making process, perhaps not on every subject, but on some subjects. I'm sure you recall Len Hopkins when Mr. Trudeau came back from a conference of -

Mr. Blais: NATO?

Senator Bosa: - the seven most-industrialized countries of the world; the ``Big Seven''.

You were in cabinet at the time. He came back and unilaterally announced that he was going to reduce the expenditures by $2.5 billion, and consequently they were chopping programs everywhere.

Len Hopkins made a very effective intervention in caucus. It's passé now; we're not giving away any secrets. He made a very eloquent intervention to save the forestry research bureau in his constituency. That was slated to go, and he saved it.

A backbencher, a mere backbencher, can say, ``When I pass in front of the press people, they never grab me, they never bother me; I could be a stranger.'' Some backbenchers may not feel important, but they are important. On certain issues they can make the difference.

Having said that, I would like to know if you you think these backbenchers should be subject to the same rules as a cabinet minister. You mention disclosed assets. You say their assets should be transparent and they should be publicly -

Mr. Blais: But in my view they wouldn't have to have separately controlled assets. All their assets would be disclosed, but they would be able to deal with their assets as they see fit.

Since they don't have inside information they could use in order to benefit themselves privately, in those circumstances there need not be a need to put them in a blind trust or a separate management agreement.

Since their assets are being revealed, however, if at one time there is a dramatic increase in assets as a result of the individual sitting on the natural resources committee, then the ethics commissioner should call in the individual and ask, ``What has happened here?''.

Senator Bosa: Even if he wins the 6/49 lottery?

Mr. Blais: If he won the lottery, that's another issue, but I'm sure he'd want to give 50% of that to the Canadian treasury, in any event.

Voices: Oh, oh.

Senator Bosa: Do you see any downside to that?

Ms Catterall: I'm sure he should be reported.

Senator Bosa: For instance, you have all the assets listed. Not all members of Parliament are destitute people; there are some people of means. Do you see any danger that perhaps someone might take advantage of -

.1805

Mr. Blais: But you don't have to publish that. You'd reveal that to the ethics commissioner.

Senator Bosa: Oh, I see.

Mr. Blais: Then there is disclosure. So it's outside of your control, and the ethics commissioner can deal with that as he sees fit. I'm sorry, I should have made that clear. I wasn't speaking of published.... I'm saying you reveal those aspects to someone who's able to do a verification of those assets from time to time to make sure you're a good boy.

Senator Bosa: So you would disclose all your assets?

Mr. Blais: I'm speaking to Peter.

Voices: Oh, oh.

Senator Bosa: Because of my youth, you call me so.

Voices: Oh, oh.

Senator Bosa: You disclose your assets to the ethics commissioner, and then he or she will decide whether to publish that, or whether to keep it -

Mr. Blais: No, there's no need. There's no need for him to decide to publish. The only time he would publish is if you get into trouble. In that situation he needs.... Or there's a recommendation by the committee in order to justify its activities...that the information be made available.

Senator Bosa: It's a very important distinction.

Mr. Blais: You made a comment initially about the importance of the MP and the senator. Senator, in retrospect, in terms of my thinking about my experience, the thing I think I regret the most is that I wasn't approached by people who had information, who wanted to see matters advanced before the House.

In order to be able to understand what they wanted, where they wanted to go, what they perceived to be the relationship between their position and the national interest, and so on....

In my view - and I advise clients in this way - they are missing out when they are not identifying MPs, speaking to MPs and keeping them well briefed on their business in order to be able to take advantage of their presence in the House of Commons.

I mean, lobbying really refers to the lobby behind the House, and there's nobody who has better access to that lobby than MPs and senators.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Senator Bosa, is that...?

Senator Bosa: I can stop there. We don't want to lose quorum, you know.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): No.

Madam Catterall, please.

I liked that.

Senator Bosa: You didn't say that. I didn't hear you say that.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Sorry?

Senator Bosa: When I mentioned quorum, I didn't hear anything you said.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): On quorum, I said nothing.

Mr. Blais: Madam Chairman, I didn't know you were offering scotch. I was just given water here.

Voices: Oh, oh.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): That's apple juice.

Mr. Blais: Thank you.

Ms Catterall: First, I want to thank you. I think you've given us a very perceptive insight here. There are some perceptions I haven't heard from other witnesses that I kind of like. I think they show a respect for and an understanding of the role of members of Parliament who are not cabinet ministers. Many of our witnesses have not appreciated that, and therefore have not perhaps gone as deeply as they might to the core of what a good code of conduct might be.

I also want to thank you for giving me a good description of the role of government relations officers. You really pinned it down. It's essentially trying to convince whoever's going to be making the decision of what your client wants to do or sell for the public good. That was a very neat way of putting it.

I also appreciated your point in disagreeing with the concept that members of Parliament or senators must be out there active in the business community. You may or may not have seen some of my comments, but my view is that members of Parliament have many ways of keeping in touch with their constituency. I'd rather they be keeping in touch with a wide range of interests than with a narrow range of interests represented by their own interests. I thought you made that point very well.

I think the other thing is the influence of members of Parliament. Members of Parliament themselves underrate this.

When it comes to disclosure, what do you define as ``assets''?

Mr. Blais: I don't think I'm speaking about the assets that are excluded, namely, the personal assets - car, automobile, cottage, etc. - but anything that is sensitive, in the sense that the public would see it as an asset that could be increased as a result of the proximity of the MP or senator to the public decision-making process.

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Senator Bosa: Nobody...[Inaudible - Editor]...the telephone.

Mr. Blais: Well, sure, you share the Bell telephone. The whole issue is between Stentor and the cable companies. Those are matters that are very much before the government, and I'm sure an MP who wanted to follow that very fundamentally could come to a number of people I know and get a lot of information relating to what is going on in that business.

Ms Catterall: You also mentioned the obligation of members of Parliament to seek out information. In my view, whether you call them lobbyists or government relations experts I've always welcomed those kinds of ``representational interest groups'', to use the terms of our friend John Bryden. I don't have the ability to know everything and I welcome people who can come concisely to the point and clarify the issues involved in certain things. Do you think a code of ethics should describe clearly the responsibility of members of Parliament to hear a range of representations?

Mr. Blais: I don't think it is desirable to codify specific elements of conduct, such as what type of situation do you accept; when do you go to lunch; when do you refuse to go to lunch; who pays for lunch; do you split the bill; and so on.

I heard Miss Murray tell you she doesn't deal with politicians. I deal with politicians because I like politicians. The fact is I have a great deal of respect for what they do and how they do it. Therefore, if I have a client who has an interest, I will raise that interest. I will try to identify where the general policy interests might be and strategize and advise my clients relating to how he or that company might deal with that public policy envelope to its advantage on a win-win basis.

In order to do that I need to know what the thinking is, and there is nothing improper in ascertaining what that might be. I do not ask people what they discussed in caucus today. However, if somebody wants to give me a general colouring of the caucus attitude on any given topic, I'll accept it.

The Acting Joint Chair (Senator Spivak): Ms Catterall, does that conclude your questions?

Ms Catterall: I guess I am trying to come to grips with it. I don't know whether it's part of our job here as a committee, but I think you make the point very well about why it's important to pay members of Parliament reasonably well. You put forward the most cogent argument I've ever heard for the pension plan that was in existence when I ran for Parliament, which has now been changed.

Would you have some concern if we went too far down that road of creating the financial situation where members of Parliament, in order to not deprive their families, almost have to have another occupation and another source of income?

Mr. Blais: I'd really be sorry to see that happen. That's something in the past. The legislation agenda is very heavy, and it's not going to get any less so. The necessity of MPs to give it their full time is, in my view, manifest.

If you look at the work I did and the work you're doing now, you're doing more work than I did, on average, in terms of MPs. I did considerably more than the fellow I succeeded, and so on and so forth. That's the reality, and I don't think the government, contrary to what the Tories believe, is going to go away. The Tories are gone, but the government stays.

Ms Catterall: I think we have a much stronger advocate these days than you dealt with for government going away.

Knowing the demands I face in terms of the time and how I use it, I frankly wouldn't want to be either the patient or the constituent of somebody who comes here for two to three days and then goes back and practices medicine in his or her riding. Both are badly served. But I'm not sure how we set the kinds of ethical standards that deal with that kind of clear negligence of duty, in my view.

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The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Is that the end of your questioning?

Ms Catterall: I'm finished.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Mr. Rideout.

Mr. Rideout (Moncton): I have a quick question, in four or five parts. You talked about the ethics commissioner. Do you any views on how that should be structured? How would that appointment take place? Who would the ethics commissioner report to? What types of things would be in that area?

Mr. Blais: In my view, the ethics commissioner should report to Parliament, since he's dealing with members of Parliament and he isn't dealing in a partisan way. You have to remove it from the partisan influence, which was prevalent when we were dealing with privileges. In order to be able to deal with the conduct of members of Parliament as members of Parliament, you have to remove it from the partisan atmosphere, which means you have to deal with a parliamentary officer.

The appointment might be done by the Board of Internal Economy or by whatever instrument Parliament wishes to invest itself with. It may be that Parliament would want the government to do it through Order in Council on recommendation of the leaders of the individual parties. There is a whole series of means of doing it and there are lots of precedents. You'll have no problems.

Senator Bosa: Rather than the government, should we have a blue-ribbon committee selecting the person? The commissioner would be in a conflict there because he's appointed and then has to pass judgment. He's appointed by the government or the leaders of the political parties, and then he's going to police them. Would it be better, for instance, if a committee of judges selected an individual?

Mr. Blais: No, I wouldn't want the judiciary to meddle in legislative affairs.

Senator Bosa: I'm not necessarily saying that.

Sorry for the intervention.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): I believe Mr. Rideout still has to complete his turn, and then I will go back to Senator Gauthier. We have just a few more minutes.

Mr. Rideout: I have one further question.

In the area of authority we would give him, would he report to Parliament once a year? Would he report whenever there's an incident? What powers would you give?

Mr. Blais: It seems to me the commissioner would have to report once a year, and that would be a statutory report. However, there would be a provision for special reports relating to special incidents. The question is whether or not a motion could be made by the House to have special investigations mounted at any given time. The issue is how you would bring that motion before the House. Would you want it of necessity to come via the government, or could private members' motions be acceptable? What number of supporters would you need on that motion before you could commence an investigation? I think all of those mechanics could be very readily found.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Senator Gauthier, did you have a further question?

Senator Gauthier: I have one question dealing with Mr. Rideout's point.

Ontario has what is called a Commissioner of Integrity or a Commissioner to Integrity, although I don't know what the exact term is in English - le commissaire de l'intégrité. I think that's a better term than ``ethics'' because ``ethics'' has a moral connotation that, as people have told this committee, is a bit difficult to grasp. Some people - for example, a Christian, a Jew or an Arab - may have different morals that apply to their church or to their religion. We have to stay away from that.

To follow up on Mr. Rideout's question on how you would go about naming him - that really deals with mechanics, and I think we can resolve that - having accepted the fact that we will need to have a either a commissioner of integrity or a commissioner charged with assuring the good conduct of members, what kind of disciplinary measures would you give this person in terms of his or her ability to do so? Apart from the public disclosure he or she could make, would he or she have powers to recommend some disciplinary actions to the Senate or to the House of Commons?

.1820

Mr. Blais: Yes.

First, I don't think there should be a legislated provision that would provide for some criminal prosecution. That is already in the act. I don't see that there's anything here that...and if there is somebody taking bribes, well, then, that prosecution can take place.

In terms of the code of conduct, it seems to me that the ethics commissioner is an officer of Parliament and has delegated power. I don't see how the delegatee of power can really impose sanctions on the delegator of the power or on the members.

Senator Gauthier: Agreed.

Mr. Blais: I think perhaps the Americans have a system we might want to look at.

Senator Gauthier: So he can't be judge, jury and executioner.

Having said that, you touched upon the point of legislation versus something else. I take it you're talking about a resolution.

Mr. Blais: Yes, or a code.

Senator Gauthier: Would you prefer a legislated code of conduct or a resolution to do the same thing in both Houses?

Mr. Blais: You could have one or the other. As I understand it, you could have either legislation or a code.

Senator Gauthier: Which one you would prefer?

Mr. Blais: I'd prefer to have some means of investigation and some effective means of applying sanctions so members know they have to comply by the code, that it's not just a wish, it's a verifiable obligation and if there is a breach, there are sanctions that are being applied.

Senator Gauthier: In terms of flexibility, don't you think a resolution would be more effective? It could be changed and modified at will.

Mr. Blais: But you want to avoid having too much flexibility so that the rule changes with the length of the emperor's foot, as it were. You want to avoid somebody saying, ``Well, you're on my side of the House and therefore I can be softer on you, and you're not on my side of the House and therefore I can be harder.''

I think the standards should be applicable to all members and there ought to be an ability to ascertain what the obligations are.

Senator Gauthier: If I hear you right, you'd go that second way. You wouldn't go with the resolution. You'd rather have the legislation.

Mr. Blais: If it's a resolution, it has to be in the Standing Orders or it has to be something that has permanence and is not able to be changed because somebody's in trouble.

Senator Gauthier: Okay.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): Thank you very much.

Mr. Blais, this was most interesting.

Mr. Blais: Thank you very much.

The Acting Joint Chairman (Senator Spivak): The meeting is now adjourned.