EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 26, 1996

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[English]

The Chairman: I'd like to call this meeting to order.

We have with us this afternoon the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Minister, welcome again before the committee.

Accompanying the minister are Rear Admiral King, who's been here before to talk of Haiti with us; Colonel Maisonneuve; Ambassador Bell; and Mr. Charles Court, who's the policy analyst for NATO.

Minister, we understand you'd like to make an opening statement on our position with respect to the IFOR mission in Bosnia, or the former Yugoslavia, and NATO enlargement.

I'd just remind the members of the committee that we discussed Haiti this morning. We had therefore, as a matter of procedure, decided we would hear the minister on IFOR and NATO enlargement. So this afternoon, if time permits, we'll see if we can complete our discussion on Haiti and the participation in the Haiti force, and then we'll move to IFOR and then deal with NATO enlargement.

Perhaps I could ask if the media would be good enough to withdraw. Thank you very much.

Minister.

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Hon. Lloyd Axworthy (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First let me express my appreciation to the committee for indulging me a second week in a row by allowing me to come before you to make a presentation and gain your views.

Today I want to talk about a number of important decisions with respect to our position in and relations with Europe. Particularly, I'll be dealing with, as you mentioned, the future of the IFOR operation in Bosnia and the discussions pending on the question of the enlargement of NATO itself. First let me deal with the issue in Bosnia.

Thanks to the work of the NATO implementation force, Bosnia is beginning to stabilize. The fighting has stopped, which is a matter of enormous joy for many people. Federal elections have been held and the process of rebuilding the economic and social structure is under way.

But it is obvious that Bosnia faces a new and more challenging peace-building phase of consolidating stability through the new political institutions, holding municipal elections, supporting the return of refugees to their homes, freeing the land from land mines, and pursuing real social and economic reconstruction that gives people a stake in peace through the acquisition of jobs and a sense of hope. We also have to do a lot more on the issue of war criminals, to heal the psychological wounds from the war and to assure people that the new Bosnia will be based on fairness and the rule of law.

[Translation]

The NATO Ministers of Defense met unofficially in September. They concluded that despite the success of IFOR, a military presence would still be required in Bosnia to ensure stability and security during the next stage of the peace process. The ministers asked the military authorities to identify various options regarding the possible mandate of such a force.

[English]

As a result of this direction from the defence ministers last September, on November 18, NATO military planners proposed a follow-up force of about 35,000 personnel, about two-thirds the current size of the IFOR mandate. The final decision to send in a follow-on force will be taken at the NATO council meeting on December 10, when I and the other NATO foreign ministers will meet.

The follow-on force as described by the planners needs to be of sufficient size to support the upcoming OSCE municipal elections planned for June. Its presence must also be sufficient to act as a confidence-building measure while the formerly warring sides reduce stocks of armaments foreseen under the arms control agreements.

As members know, we've been involved in the effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia right from the very beginning, and we believe we should see this commitment through to a successful conclusion. A continuing contribution to the military side complements and helps secure the contribution we make to the civilian reconstruction.

Minister Young and I have worked to prepare options for a Canadian military contribution that meets the new needs of Bosnia. Both he and I support a Canadian contribution that would demonstrate Canada's continuing commitment to ensure the building of a lasting peace in Bosnia and our continuing interest, as a member of the NATO alliance, in contributing to the resolution of security problems in Europe.

The Canadian contingent will be assembled in a way that ensures its own security. It will therefore likely include infantry companies, reconnaissance groups and other support units, and in addition, medical personnel, military engineers and technical forces who can continue to provide support to civilian reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. This sort of activity has shown the real benefits of peace to the people in the area in terms of the kind of presence and contribution Canada can make.

The military aspects of Dayton have largely been realized, but in the coming months some very important problems still have to be dealt with, including, as I said, the regional arms control measures, supporting the elections, providing a secure environment for the refugees and support for their efforts to arrest war criminals. These all require work by experienced, capable troops, and Canada's troops are among the best in doing this.

[Translation]

The Canadian forces would be there with our NATO allies. For example, President Clinton recently announced the decision to keep up to 8500 American troops in Bosnia for a period of up to 18 months. Our forces and those of most of our allies will not remain without such a commitment on the part of the American. The contribution of the United Kingdom, France and Germany will also be significant. For example, for the first time Germany will send combat troops to peacekeeping missions. For its part, Italy will increase its contribution.

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[English]

One outstanding issue that needs to be resolved is that of war criminals and how best to apprehend them. This question, along with others, will be on the agenda for a meeting next week in London of the Peace Implementation Council for the former Yugoslavia. At the steering board conference held two weeks ago in Paris, I stressed that I want to see the international community become much more active in the pursuit of war criminals, and in London we intend to urge specific measures for doing so.

We can put pressure on the parties to the conflict and on the governments of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to turn over to the tribunal people who've been indicted and who live in those countries. These are the authorities that have the main responsibility for war criminals. We also must consider measures such as offering rewards for information leading to the detention of wanted persons.

I will talk at the London meeting about conditionality. We must consider reducing or cutting assistance to localities where war criminals live undisturbed and where the local authorities are not cooperative. I've also been urging allies to have their military play a more active part. By more patrolling, by training our forces in methods to detain war criminals and by public information campaigns to identify those sought, we might increase their isolation, reduce their influence and eventually make their capture more likely.

In Paris last week I also spoke of the need to consolidate the peace-building process now under way in Bosnia. That must include much more effort at de-mining, without which the land cannot be transformed to a prosperous, productive one in which Bosnians feel they have a personal stake in the peace.

We must focus more efforts on building the economy and jobs in areas of particular importance for the Bosnian people, such as the agricultural processing sector, and most especially for young people, so they can become their society's builders and not another generation of soldiers. Canada can make a substantial contribution to both these efforts.

Minister Young has made it very clear that the Canadian forces have the resources to participate in the follow-on force in Bosnia while at the same time carrying out missions in Zaire and Haiti.

On the political side, IFOR has brought Russia and 32 other NATO and non-NATO countries together. IFOR has been an unparalleled way for NATO to demonstrate its defensive nature to countries formerly members of the Warsaw Pact and to showcase the benefits of the Partnership for Peace program. For Canada, this has meant we have had Czech forces serving very successfully under the Canadian brigade headquarters in Bihac.

This good working relationship was clear to me when I visited Bosnia this past spring. I came away from that visit with an enormous impression of the professionalism that our troops in Bosnia have applied, not only in the strict military sense, but in working with the local communities and building up a sense of confidence and trust. I wish all Canadians could see the effective work that our brigade in Bihac, in the northwest corner of Bosnia, has carried out over the past year or so. They are well placed to maintain that very strong Canadian presence.

Our Canadian contribution to Bosnia is clearly a key part in the larger context of Canada-Europe political and security relations and must be seen in that context. Therefore at this point I would like to speak to you and obtain your views on another policy decision the Atlantic alliance faces in the next several weeks, and that is the question of NATO enlargement.

At the NATO summit in January 1994, the alliance declared itself willing to accept new members from among the states of central and eastern Europe. When I attended the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin this past June, foreign ministers from countries of the old Warsaw Pact sat around the table with NATO ministers for the very first time. It was a truly historic encounter. We pledged that regardless of the extent of enlargement, the stability of Europe and the ties established by the Partnership for Peace must be the priority of all our efforts.

[Translation]

In September, the United States proposed, and most of the allies accepted unofficially, that a summit be held around the middle of 1997 for the purpose of inviting new members to join the Alliance. President Clinton suggested that the accession of these new members to the Alliance should come into affect in 1999 in order to mark the 50th anniversary of the Alliance.

[English]

In three weeks I will be attending the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, which will launch the process leading to the 1997 summit. The detailed work on modalities will be done through the NATO delegations in Brussels during the period leading up to next June. After the summit, formal negotiations with prospective candidates will begin.

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I want to outline to you today a Canadian approach to the NATO enlargement that I would like to take to the NATO ministerial sessions in December.

I want to have this committee consider a Canadian position that would (1) support a wide enlargement, with a view to developing a broad transatlantic community; (2) encourage the alliance to reach decisions on enlargement on the basis of a transparent and objective process reflecting the extent to which candidate states meet considerations of democracy, good governance, civilian control of the military, sound economic reform, good relations with neighbours and the ability to contribute to alliance objectives; (3) ensure that the enlargement costs will be kept to a minimum; (4) seek the broadest and most effective partnership arrangements with countries that remain outside the alliance following this enlargement exercise; and (5) encourage a thorough reform of NATO command structures with a view to ensuring greater flexibility, generating savings and providing reassurance to Russia.

I also want Canada to be a strong voice on behalf of the Ukraine and the Baltics, and for how their concerns and interests can be taken into account through the enlargement process.

We must develop a special relationship with the Ukraine. As the NATO country currently responsible for coordinating NATO's outreach program with Ukraine, Canada is actively supporting the alliance in setting up an information office in Kiev. As NATO enlarges, we should upgrade this office into a diplomatic mission with political and military representatives to demonstrate our commitment to Ukrainian security. We must supplement this with enhanced Ukrainian representation at NATO. This is the sort of support the Ukraine's leaders told me they needed when I met with them during last October's visit.

For the Baltics the alliance has a special responsibility. If the three Baltic states do not join the alliance in the first wave, NATO should pursue a policy of active bridge-building. We can help by encouraging the creation of new relationships between the Baltic states and Russia. We must encourage them to address the sensitive issues that still create tension between them, including boundary issues, citizenship and language rights. We will be pursuing the same line of approach at the OSCE meetings that start in Lisbon on Sunday.

Canada can also encourage increasing Partnership for Peace activities with the Baltics, perhaps with a more specific regional focus, a proposal put forward by the Nordic countries. We could enhance interoperability with NATO and we could involve Baltic units in NATO's combined joint task forces.

Finally, I would like to talk for a minute about the relationship with Russia. Clearly the greatest challenge to NATO in terms of non-member states is its relationship with Russia.

Canada will call for NATO to do three things in this respect: firstly, examine all proposals for adaptation of its military structures and decide whether they are appropriate in terms of NATO-Russia relationships; secondly, develop its political relationship with Russia; and thirdly, expand military cooperation with Russia so it is engaged as much as possible in the day-to-day activities of the alliance. We must ensure that the alliance no longer looks at Russia as a string of commands lined up from the Arctic to the Mediterranean against it.

At the political level there's much we can also do. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe could be updated. At NATO headquarters, we must open our doors to Russia, with the ultimate aim of involving it in a range of alliance decision-making. And we should invite Russia to negotiate mutual access to military and political discussions.

[Translation]

We must be satisfied that we have done everything reasonable to address the concerns of Russia. If Russia agrees, the proposals I have just presented could form the basis of a special relationship between NATO and Russia.

[English]

It's important that Canada play and be seen to play an active and constructive role in all aspects of the enlargement process. This is a means of ensuring that the concerns of interested Canadian groups are addressed, of demonstrating continuing commitment to the alliance, and of ensuring, to the extent possible, that the objectives and costs of enlargement are kept in line with Canadian aims and resources.

History will judge us not so much by how we fought the Cold War as by how we built a new order in its aftermath. Canada is committed to playing its part in Bosnia, and in NATO more generally, not least because our interests are at stake. We are working with other countries towards a renewed transatlantic partnership, an enlarged and reformed NATO, and transparent, close-knit relationships between NATO and non-member states. The effort will be great, but the rewards can be even greater.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Minister.

Are there any questions?

[Translation]

Mr. Paré.

Mr. Paré (Louis-Hébert): Good afternoon, Mr. Minister. You addressed the question of war criminals and said that the issue would be on the agenda of a meeting which will take place shortly in London. I would like you to give us some idea of the opinion of other countries on this important issue.

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Is there really a will to bring an end to impunity and take the necessary steps to ensure that war criminals and people who have committed crimes against humanity are brought to trial, although from the information I have received, the tribunals in question are only temporary? What means would we and the international community need in order to really fulfil this responsibility?

Mr. Axworthy: Generally, I think that there is a will to bring such war criminals to trial, but at the same time certain countries have reservations concerning the involvement of the forces in this process. There is a concern about direct involvement by troops from the peacekeeping forces.

As I said in my presentation, we are proposing a number of initiatives, for example a clear principle on the responsibilities of those war criminals who remain in new governments in Bosnia and other countries such as Croatia, etc.

Second, I think that an international system would serve as a safeguard and be helpful in such trials.

Another point to be considered might be the development of a process through which we would reduce the territories concerned, so as to limit the movements of war criminals against NATO troops. I am not sure whether it would be possible to obtain an agreement on such measures, but I think that it is in the interest of Canada and other countries to find the most effective ways possible of achieving this goal, which is a very, very important one.

Mr. Paré: When you talk about conditionality, am I to understand that the reconstruction of countries or republics affected by the war might be conditional on the governments concerned helping to hand over criminals? Am I to understand that?

Mr. Axworthy: Yes. Those are the recommendations of Carl Bildt, who was the coordinator of the reconstruction process. He asked, during meetings in Paris, for the power to recommend to the countries concerned the imposition of restrictions on direct assistance going to regional districts which are ready to cooperate with the tribunals on the question of war criminals.

The Chairman: Mrs. Debien, you have a few minutes.

Mrs. Debien (Laval East): Good afternoon, Mr. Minister. You pointed out earlier that President Clinton intended to reduce the U.S. contribution to IFOR to 8500 troops. At the present time, as we know, the force comprises about 14,000 troops. Therefore, we are talking about reducing them by almost half. As we also know, at the present time the Canadian contribution is about 1000 troops.

Has Canada taken a decision regarding its contribution to IFOR? You told us that you were in favour of continuing the Canadian contribution. Therefore, have you made a decision in that regard? Could you please inform us of the content of any such decision?

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[English]

Mr. Axworthy: I'll let Rear Admiral King or Colonel Maisonneuve deal with specifics. But the point I wanted to make in my presentation is that Minister Young and his advisers think it's very important that Canadian participation have a degree of self-containment to it, that the Canadian forces there be able to have all those elements that allow them to maintain their own security and have a full complement of resources, so that they can undertake a variety of functions, and so that they have a degree of autonomy in their action, which is more at the brigade level.

From my own layperson's view, when I visited the troops in Bosnia and spoke to the military personnel there, I thought that made a lot of sense, as opposed to their being fragmented or parcelled off unit by unit, spread around different parts of Bosnia. To have a clear-cut, definable, Canadian area of responsibility with a presence there in a very comprehensive, cohesive way is by far the most appropriate and effective way.

Perhaps Admiral King and Colonel Maisonneuve can deal with what exactly that would require in terms of specific numbers.

[Translation]

Colonel J. Maisonneuve, (Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence): At the present time, we are considering about the same number or perhaps a little more. However, the unit will be structured completely differently.

At the present time, IFOR has been given what is essentially a brigade headquarters, allowing command and control of multinational units. For example, at present, we have a unit from the United Kingdom, one from the Czech Republic and Canadian troops under the brigade command.

The new contribution to what is now referred to SFOR, that is the ``stabilization force'', would be based on an infantry combat unit, with three infantry companies. The level would therefore drop from that of a brigade to a unit, but the figures would remain basically equivalent to what they are now.

Mrs. Debien: That is approximately 1000?

Col Maisonneuve: Just over 1000.

[English]

Mr. Axworthy: I have one other comment - and I think the colonel touched on this - that I think is very important. That's why I did the two presentations together.

One of the advantages that a comprehensive brigade offers is the opportunity to work with some of the new countries coming in. The Czechs are a good example. When I was in the Ukraine a month or so ago, they expressed an interest in working with our military to pick up techniques on how to deal with peacekeeping efforts.

There's an enormous opportunity for us to transfer skills, develop new relationships, build confidence with the new countries, the new democracies that are emerging. Having that presence of our force in Bosnia has a number of additional benefits associated with the larger issue of forging new connections and relationships.

The Chairman: Mr. Mills.

Mr. Mills (Red Deer): Thank you. I have several questions. I'll deal primarily with the IFOR mission -

Mr. Axworthy: I think it's called SFOR now, isn't it?

Mr. Mills: Well, the Americans are calling it IFOR 2, or the Germans at least.

Whatever we call it, the problem I have, first of all, comes down to the interviews that were done this time last year. At that time the then head of the Department of National Defence, Mr. Collenette, said that European troops would be able to take over this time next year. They may have had to be there a long time, but they would be in a position.

This morning we were asked to approve the Haiti mission. Again, we were told by you yourself that we would be there for six months, and that by December 1996 they should be up and running and able to take care of themselves.

Subsequent to that, during various military problems through the spring and summer, we then were told that in fact we would not be able to handle three missions, that two missions were about the maximum we could handle. Not to say anything negative about our troops and their capabilities - I don't think that's ever been a question - but we were told that we couldn't handle more. Now, of course, we can handle more. Our new defence minister says we can.

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So I have a real concern as to which of these facts are right and which are wrong. Can we really handle three missions? How long are these missions for?

My problem, as you and I have discussed regarding Haiti, is that we should have a long-term plan. Let's involve a lot of countries in this and really fix this thing, not just put a band-aid on a bleeding artery. So I'd like to know that sort of general thing.

There are a lot of other questions when you talk about expansion of NATO. This is a huge subject that has a whole bunch of areas. What will be the effect of Russia? Will these put an extra burden on our membership? When they add their forces to ours, are they comparable? There are so many questions I believe could be asked there.

I suppose the most current question that certainly my office has been getting all day today is from taxpayers. They want to know what these kinds of missions cost and what it means to extend - the real figures, the real dollar figures, not just for Haiti, but for this SFOR mission. Of course, Zaire...we don't know what that mission is yet.

I suppose the other question that people have been throwing in is how much the CANDU reactors are costing us as taxpayers. Now, that's really throwing a curve ball at you from the other field, but people are asking those questions and are expecting to have answers for them. Who better to answer them than the minister?

A voice: If they're putting a CANDU reactor in Bosnia, let us know, will you?

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Mills: I threw that in -

A voice: Call the IFOR.

Mr. Mills: - because I knew the minister would know the answer right off. Taxpayers want to know. I knew he'd know the answer to that.

Mr. Axworthy: Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to provide a full, encyclopedic response to the very interesting questions put by Mr. Mills.

Let me first, in a broad way, say that the investment Canada makes in these missions can't be, or shouldn't be, measured solely in what it costs. It's an important consideration, but -

Mr. Mills: I agree.

Mr. Axworthy: - the most important consideration is how it helps maintain our own security internationally. How does it help build relations with other countries, especially at a time when so many countries are now striving towards democracy and emerging on the world scene?

Just on a basic humanitarian basis, Canadians see themselves as world citizens in a real way, and want to respond to crises in which we think we can make a difference. I think that's one of the criteria: can we make a difference? In each of these cases I believe we can.

In the discussion we had last week on Haiti, I pointed out that the concern you raise about ensuring that there is a transformation and adjustment towards a more stable system in Haiti is well considered. That's one reason, as you know, that about three or four weeks ago we announced a strategy on peace-building. That will allow us to have a complementary policy to our peace-making, which is to help rebuild the institutions in these countries so they will be able to stabilize. They would have their own police forces, their own judicial systems and their own administrative systems so that our military doesn't have to stay there on a permanent basis.

It's one of the lessons we have learned. If you simply rely on the military presence, which is a crucial element in helping the conflict come to an end, but you don't invest much in rebuilding, then you have this perpetuity. That's why we - I and the Minister for International Cooperation - announced that we will begin to devote more resources and more attention to that complementary work of peace-building, which will help us.

Mr. Mills: Are other OAS members committing themselves?

Mr. Axworthy: Yes, they are. We've had discussions with them - for example, the discussions we had recently with the Chileans, who were here about how we can combine to do some common work in the OAS. We met with the central American presidents, foreign ministers, about two months ago on the very same topic.

We'll be meeting next week with the Guatemalan foreign minister, whose country has just signed peace accords - again with the help of the Canadian military, who have been there to help during that period of conflict - on how we can now help Guatemala start demilitarizing its rebel forces, its army, and work on the peace-building side. It's very important, and I think you're quite right: you have to have the two. They have to be complementary. Perhaps in the past other countries weren't as conscious of that requirement.

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Similarly in Bosnia itself, because we're talking about that, the international community has pledged a very substantial effort. Our own military is now engaged in part of the reconstruction effort. I think we've assigned about $300,000 this year to our own military units in the Bihac area to start working in the local communities, to rebuild the schools and some of the communication structures.

So there's a case where the very presence of our military, which is there to help stabilize and do its military function, also has some complementary task to work on with the NGOs, the local groups and the local people. I can tell you the benefits from that are multiple, because we're able to establish a real sense of stability at the same time that there's a kind of outgoing outreach for the rebuilding side.

In response to your question about how long we stay, it really depends upon the need. For us to pull out in a precipitous way might undo all the good work that's been done. President Clinton's announcement said that he thought 18 months would be the right time period. We have proposed more like 12 months, with the condition that there be a much more substantial involvement in the creation of a civilian police force with the ability to maintain order and stability. That would replace some of the activity our military forces now provide.

But we can't reach that until we deal with some of these tough issues like the continuation of major arms caches in the area and the de-mining that has to go on, because it's a country where mobility is severely limited. You can't get back on the agricultural fields because of the mines. You must also deal with the war criminals issue and start clearing up that justice system so that you can get some assurance that there is fairness in that area.

Those are the reasons I think you have to run on parallel tracks. You have to have a peace-making component, which is what we're asking the committee today to approve or support - the continuation of our efforts. But I can assure you that we're conscious of the points you've raised about having to do the peace-building at the same time, and investing in it.

Mr. Mills: You see, I agree with all of that, but we need to have all the facts on the table. I think we can agree with most of those points, the war criminals and that whole thing. We do, though, have to ask what it costs, what all the partners are contributing, whether it is fair, and how we are doing. We need some kind of a scale for how we're doing. We can't just keep coming back every December and saying that we need to renew it for another 12 months, without evaluating how we have done. It doesn't seem that we get that depth or that cost.

Mr. Axworthy: I will ask the rear admiral and the colonel to give you some specific costs.

On the question about whether we are capable of mounting the three missions, I think it has been quite clear - and Mr. Young has said so - that the capacity of our armed forces to meet the three missions is there now. But we would not be able to meet it, say, six months from now if we continued in Zaire in a major way.

The colonel can talk about the rotation questions that come into play, but at the present moment, within the timeframe we're working on, all three missions are capable of engagement. That may change in six months if we are still involved in Zaire in a major way. But as I said today, with the continued movement of refugees that may become less and less necessary. I can give you that assurance on behalf of Minister Young, and perhaps the admiral or colonel can give you a more specific cost estimate.

Rear Admiral J.A. King (Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Communications, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Chairman, to address the first issue with regard to how you know how well you're doing, when we went into IFOR we went in with a very robust force. It was a force that was deliberately intended to intimidate the warring factions, to make it clear to them that we would brook no interference with what was a UN operation. So we went in with very heavy forces, over 50,000 troops.

We also went in with a great deal of concern about the kind of effort we would have to put forth, the kind of threats we would face, the kind of risks we would undergo. In fact, almost a year later now, we have had a terrific success.

I think we can measure that. We've had success to the point where we've had an extremely low casualty rate, almost all of it as a result of other factors being involved in a mission like that - accidents and that sort of thing - but not as a result of war infractions.

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We have indeed stopped the fighting, as the minister pointed out. I think we're now in a position to withdraw a lot of the heavy equipment we had to put in that cost us money to put into the theatre, and to reduce the forces very significantly. As the minister pointed out, that is reducing, in the Americans' case, by a half.

So we believe that from a military point of view, in looking ahead at the other parts of the peace-building effort that are so important to go on in this place, to follow on, it is easy to measure the success. The success thus far is incontrovertible.

With regard to the cost, I think I dealt with the cost of Haiti the other day. The cost of the mission we contemplate is approximately $90 million over the 12 months for which we have considered signing up. That 12 months is notwithstanding the fact that the Americans are talking about 18 months. We are looking at 12 months on the basis of the cost, on the basis of the fact that this is a reasonable amount of time to see what sort of progress is likely to be made in the area. It also gives us an opportunity to reassess our situation with regard to maintaining the three missions, as the minister said.

We're not sure about Zaire. We clearly need to see what sort of progress we make in Haiti, although we are heartened by what we see. But again, we need to consider what's happening in Bosnia over time, how successful we are going to be with SFOR, and then we can make another decision about the extent to which we can support follow-on missions - in terms of not just the money, but also in terms of the numbers of people we have to devote to that sort of effort.

Mr. Axworthy: I should point out that this figure, Mr. President -

The Chairman: The $90 million refers exclusively to Bosnia, or to all three -

Mr. Axworthy: No, within Bosnia, but I was going to point out that this is within the estimates established by the Department of National Defence. It's not new money. Certain calculations were made in the government about what our peacekeeping requirements would be over the year. So that's all within the established A-base of the department.

Mr. Mills: How can you do that when it was thought we would be out of Bosnia, out of Haiti, by December 1996? How can that be in the budget from last year when last year it was said that we would be out of there?

Mr. Axworthy: The question is better put to the Minister of National Defence and his officials, but the reality is that we estimate x amount of dollars we're prepared to commit for peacekeeping, and we judge the missions accordingly within those parameters. If there's no more, we don't go.

The Chairman: It's not a specific mission.

Mr. Axworthy: No.

The Chairman: As I recall the estimates, it just refers to peacekeeping in general. So it's there as a reserve.

Mr. Axworthy: Yes.

The Chairman: Mr. Flis.

Mr. Flis (Parkdale - High Park): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to pursue further the NATO enlargement remarks of the minister.

First, I would like to compliment the minister for addressing the concerns of the three Baltic countries, of the Ukraine, and of not only those countries, but of Canadians of those backgrounds here in Canada. I fully support your game plan.

I would also like to congratulate the work of Mr. Bell, who has already been meeting with these Canadians who have that concern for these countries. Today we had a large delegation from Hungary, and it was helpful for Mr. Bell to sit down with them and share the direction in which we're going. So I would just applaud the direction; I think it is the right direction.

I have a number of questions. First, I think a lot of people are getting a little nervous about the behaviour of Belarus. There's a new fly in the ointment here, and I'm wondering what impact this will have on NATO enlargement, working with Russia. When Belarus allows Russian troops on the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine, you can see the concern of these countries and why they're pushing to join NATO earlier. That is one concern.

The other is that this committee broke up into two panels and visited the other circumpolar countries. In the panel I was on we had a report from the Bellona Foundation about the deactivation of the Russian nuclear subs. When you have 67 nuclear subs that have to be put out of commission and the country doesn't have the funds to do it, is this a role the present NATO or an enlarged NATO can look into?

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There are new kinds of insecurities out there that I think have to be addressed. I know time is short, so those are the two areas: Belarus and the Russian northern fleet, and the denuclearization of the Russian subs and its impact on our security.

Mr. Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to give Mr. Flis a full answer, but because the events in Belarus are so recent it's hard to know exactly what the outlines will be.

I certainly share his concern about the direction of the government and the referendum it just held. However, I think it points strongly to the presentations I made about the need to substantially reinforce not only the NATO enlargement itself but the Partnership for Peace, and make sure that in the Baltic, the Ukraine and others there are much stronger connections, links and strengthenings with NATO itself. I think the Partnership for Peace is one of the most interesting and potentially valuable new international institutions on the horizon for extending those confidence-building measures and providing those security guarantees. The difference, of course, is that the Partnership for Peace doesn't have article 5 in it, which is the crucial one. As you know, that issue is of great concern to Russia itself.

As for the second area that I think is appropriate, in our previous incarnations you and I had a lot of discussion about the utility of the OSCE as a way of providing stronger areas of security for Europe in which countries like Canada would participate.

I think the situation in Belarus just underlines and supports the reasons for the enlargement and for strengthening the Partnership for Peace process as dramatically as we can, to get down to business with the Russians and work out a special relationship with them.

The nuclear submarine issue was raised at the inaugural meeting of the Arctic Council, which we hosted in September. It might be very important to this committee to make that submission directly to Ambassador Simon and ask the Arctic Council, which does include the circumpolar countries, to put that on their agenda.

The Chairman: Mr. Minister, I don't know whether you want to get into this, but you didn't mention any specific candidates that Canada was pushing for NATO enlargement. Those of us who have visited other countries have had other countries...for example, Germany informed us that they specifically said Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Are you prepared at this time to give the committee a list of the countries this government will be raising at the Atlantic Council, or do you prefer to leave that as a matter for further clarification later on?

Mr. Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, I tried in my presentation to say that nobody should be automatically excluded. There is no Calvinistic predetermination at work here, but there are criteria and I listed what I thought the criteria should be. If a country has met those criteria, then it should be considered to be eligible. Some do and some don't. I did say there may be a special exemption for Baltic countries, particularly because of the sensitivity with Russia.

If we get to a point where we all pick our favourites... Clearly there are countries that automatically meet the criteria, and I think some of the countries you mentioned fit that, but there may be others. For example, we have had very strong representations by Slovenia and Romania saying that they meet these criteria, they meet these tests, so don't automatically say no as other countries are doing. I think the important thing is for Canada to say, here is that series of criteria, and if you meet those criteria, you should be given a chance to make your case.

The Chairman: Sorry to interrupt.

Mr. Assadourian, Mr. Morrison and then Mrs. Gaffney.

Mr. Assadourian (Don Valley North): Thank you, Mr. Minister. This is becoming a regular occurrence. You come here every week. Let's do it again next week.

Mr. Axworthy: I'm developing a real bonding here.

Mr. Assadourian: On the point made by my colleagues, Jesse and the chair, when we were in Germany the German government mentioned that it sees a relationship between EU and NATO enlargement. It didn't say ``enlargement'', but the ``opening'' of NATO. Could you comment on that point of view?

.1610

Second, last Wednesday I had a chance to meet the Russian Duma delegation here. I mentioned the points you raised in your speech on the east coast at the beginning of October - the four basic points for any nation to join NATO. When I mentioned the four points, he said you forgot the most important one, which is their security.

We didn't go further into this discussion, but they are concerned that either way their security is threatened: within NATO because they might feel they are bad boys from the Cold War, or outside NATO because they think they are the enemy if they're outside.

Could you comment on those two points, please?

Mr. Axworthy: They're both important points. I certainly hope that the discussion about NATO enlargement is accompanied by an equal discussion by the EU about its own extension. I think the ability of new democracies in central and eastern Europe to be incorporated as part of the European Union would be as much or even more of a bonding arrangement. Clearly they would then be given an enormous sense of economic security, and once that happens I think...

I go on the basis that at some point when you democratize, you also have to demonstrate to people that there is a reason for it, that you get some benefits from it. One of the best is to have a job and some security, and that's why the EU discussions are crucial. We support that totally, but we're not an EU member so there's not much we can do other than lend our cheerleading to it.

I think your questions about Russia are quite right, and that's why I addressed them in my remarks. There needs to be a special relationship with Russia and it has to deal with security matters. There are ways of doing architecture to help that develop. We've had several discussions with Foreign Minister Primakov about how that could happen.

Also crucial, as I said, is taking a serious look at the Treaty on Conventional Forces, which must be examined in the context of any enlargement. Second, we must look at the infrastructure of NATO itself, which was based upon Cold War planning with a string of bases and everything else.

Both for reasons of redefining the role of NATO and for reasons of costs and savings, we think that infrastructure must be reformed. I think it would also help alleviate the concerns of the Russians that somehow NATO is trying to encircle them or come up against the border. Those are the kinds of positions we'd like to take into the meetings that begin in early December.

The Chairman: Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Morrison (Swift Current - Maple Creek - Assiniboia): Mr. Minister, I'd like to make comments before I ask my questions. My comments deal with the NATO expansion situation.

When the committee travelled in Russia it quickly became apparent that not only is this a major international issue, but a major domestic issue in Russia. There are the seeds in there of something that could poison the west's relationship with Russia for a long time to come. It didn't matter what group we met with or what was on the agenda, we wouldn't be there 15 minutes before NATO expansion was raised. They're obsessed by it. Often they would ask when we were going to bring in unstable nations like Bulgaria, or militarily insignificant nations like the Baltic states, and they were very skeptical about our assurances that there was no intention of doing that. They are very worried.

The Finnish parliamentarians were very diplomatic when we met with them, but through their diplomacy made it very clear that they regard NATO expansion as a destabilizing thing, that we should not be putting the stick into the hornets' nest by doing this.

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That was merely a comment. I know we've discussed NATO again and again outside the committee.

I do have two specific questions about Bosnia. They're short ones.

If Bosnia fractures into two or three states along ethnic lines, what are the implications for IFOR - or SFOR, as I guess you call it now - and what in your opinion or the opinion of your department is the probability of that happening?

My second question, also with respect to Bosnia, is if there have been any serious discussions, negotiations or anything under way with respect to getting more European participation in Bosnia in order to get our contingent out and get more European participation in what is, after all, a European theatre.

Mr. Axworthy: I thank Mr. Morrison for both his comment and his questions. I think they're very much to the point.

We understand very much the level of sensitivity, and as you put it, the almost real obsession and preoccupation in Russia with the question of enlargement. It's understandable. For 40 years we were facing each other across a Cold War wall, and as a result a lot of conditioning took place. It's only been six or seven years. We're starting to work our way out of those conditionings to try to find new arrangements and a new architecture to resolve them.

One of the important areas is to ensure that the kind of parliamentary exchanges you've been engaged in help in that cross-fertilization of ideas and assurances that you said you've been giving. That's why I've been a very strong supporter, as I think the chairman and others know, of this committee's being able to travel and receive other delegations. It's very crucial that we be able to dialogue.

At the same time, I think Mr. Flis mentioned he was visiting today with a Hungarian delegation. I don't know if you had the same opportunity to meet with them, but I'm sure they would tell you it's very important to them to be involved and that it's part of their stability.

Mr. Morrison: But Russia is bigger.

Mr. Axworthy: Russia is bigger, but I think these are countries that have taken an enormous step forward in democratization. They all have. For us to say ``too bad'' would be really going back on commitments that we made.

I think it's very important, to use the metaphor of a family, that the closer we can work together in these areas through NATO and through Partnership for Peace, the more mutually reinforcing we can be to each other. But I don't in any way underestimate the really tough process that will take place with Russians to provide that sense of confidence and security.

I mentioned in my remarks that we'll be taking the same message that you reinforced to the various meetings in NATO to say there have to be agreements arrived at with the Russians on a special relationship that will provide them with a degree of confidence. So this is not aimed at them in the old Cold War context.

On your other questions about the break-up of Bosnia into ethnic lines, that's what happened. That's what the war was about and that's what took place through the ethnic cleansing process.

Mr. Morrison: But we have this theory now that it's one country.

Mr. Axworthy: There's an attempt under the Dayton Accord to provide the ways of building some bridges across those divides. It's not going to be easy. There are very strong views about that, but let's look on the plus side. The elections were held. We found out at the Paris meeting last week that the presidents now meet on a regular basis. They're clearly drawn out of their own constituencies. They are meeting. There's a real effort under way to get a council of ministers established that will bring all the parties together. There is a certain degree of cross-connections taking place at the local level.

I don't want anyone to understand that I'm being a Pollyanna about it, but there is some integration taking place, and we have to continue to reinforce that as much as possible. This is one of the reasons for extending this force. If we or the international communities were to walk out now, I think the power of that ethnic feeling would overwhelm it.

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There is a chance to help build the bridges. When I visited our troop establishments in Bihac and so on, I saw that they're helping. They're doing it. They're bringing people together in certain ways to help make it happen. We're the third party, if you like. We're there as the third-party mediator in some of these disputes simply by our presence and knowing that we don't have any obvious political stake on one side or the other. That's why it's important to keep the objectivity of the IFOR group.

I don't want to get into the probability of its happening. I think the major thing is to work as effectively as we can under this new extension, and as I said to your colleague Mr. Mills, to substantially reinforce the work that's going on in the human rights and the refugee areas to try to bring them together and give it the best shot possible.

Eventually they may find a new modus vivendi to work out under the Dayton Accord. I'm not saying that everything will be as was defined or drawn up at the Dayton meetings, but I think there's a framework there around which we can work and help support its happening.

As to more European participation, I think eventually that should take place. More importantly, as we go through the transition period, increasingly it's important to put on the ground more of a civilian police force back-up as opposed to a strict military one. Who does that and what would be the best source of that is another question. That's maybe where the OSCE and other groups can play more of a role.

We see this as a very important period of transition. As Admiral King said, we stopped a war; now we have to build a peace. That's what this next period is all about.

The Chairman: As the chair leaves, usually the vice-chair, Mr. Bergeron, would be here. But since he wants to participate in the questioning, I'm here and he's going to pose the next question.

[Translation]

Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Bergeron (Verchères): Good afternoon, Mr. Minister. I would like to come back to the question of war criminals. As you know, in this conflict as in many others around the world, what poisons relations between the various ethnic groups and is fundamental in preventing national reconciliation, is the question of impunity.

If there is no political will to arrest and try the people responsible for crimes, the problem continues together with the dissatisfaction and feeling of injustice on the part of the people affected, thus preventing national reconciliation.

This is very similar to the situation we have at the present time, and we will certainly have the opportunity to welcome you to the committee so as to consider in greater detail the question of the Great Lakes in Africa, and to examine the problems caused by the issue of impunity in that part of the world.

I would give as an example the tribunal examining war crimes and crimes against humanity. There are, of course, wrongs committed by both sides, but for obvious reasons the jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to complaints or accusations against Hutu exiles, since if there were accusations against Tutsi, the current government in Rwanda would prevent the tribunal from going into the territory in question in order to investigate.

We see the same problem at the present time. The territories currently under Serbian control are not really accessible to the international community, and consequently war criminals are still at liberty there.

Therefore, we have to look at the broader issue, and I would like to give you the opportunity to reiterate your opinion on the establishment of a permanent international tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

More specifically, Mr. Minister, is the international community, and particularly Canada, seriously considering undertaking an expedition to apprehend war criminals, or will they be left at liberty on the pretext that we are gradually tightening the vice around them by reducing their freedom of movement? At this rate, Mr. Minister, can we hope to apprehend such criminals one day?

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[English]

Mr. Axworthy: I share many of the sentiments that Mr. Bergeron has expressed. I think this question of the impunity problem is one with which the international community is just beginning to grapple. Through one of our agencies we recently supported a seminar on bringing people together to discuss what it means.

While I'm not here to be nostalgic, I should say that it reminds me that one of my graduate theses was on the Nuremberg trials and what they meant for the evolution of international law. I'm afraid that 30-odd years later it's now coming home to roost. There's a big gap between the Nuremberg trials and what's now happening in the two countries. I guess we lost a lot of time.

I met with Louise Arbour, the new prosecutor, who indicated that what she desperately needed in Rwanda were resources. She simply didn't have the investigators nor legal people to undertake the task. We've committed to supplying those for her.

In the former Yugoslavia the tribunal has pretty much full access. They can go where they want to go. It's the apprehension question because under the Dayton Accord, the primary responsibility for apprehension was to be undertaken by the local authorities. As you know, there have been certain indicted people brought forward by the Croatians, the Serbs and a few in Bosnia itself, but there's still a long list of those who haven't been brought forward. That's the key issue.

As I said in my remarks, we'd like to put a stronger level of conditionality on those local authorities. Those who don't cooperate in working with the tribunal in apprehension may have to consider what the nature of their reconstruction is, and therefore let them explain to their own population why housing is not as available because their local officials are not cooperating with the international police in performing these duties or with the War Crimes Tribunal.

The other possibility is a shrinking of the area in which war criminals are allowed to work. That really would be a decision worked out as part of the mandate through the peace-building conference in London next week. If we can tighten the area in which the war criminals have mobility or movement, it will make it more accessible for their apprehension.

We may want to offer a form of reward system for information so the people feel there is something. We do it here in our own criminal system; we offer information. It may work there.

I certainly agree that we have to find better techniques than we've had until now. If we don't solve that during this period of transition, as I said to Mr. Morrison, then the ability to make that adjustment and to move into a place where Bosnia has more autonomy will be very difficult. If you don't have any trust in the justice system, then you allow the criminals to rule the roost, and we can't allow that to happen.

The Chairman: Beryl Gaffney.

Mrs. Gaffney (Nepean): Mine is just a follow-up to what others have already said,Mr. Minister, with regard to Russia's nervousness on the expansion of NATO. We had very high-level meetings and as Mr. Morrison said, without exception, at every meeting they felt the security of the country would be threatened if the expansion went ahead.

I wish I had brought my notes, but the one thing that stuck in my mind was that they are worried to the extent that one group of people said if it goes ahead, they will expand their nuclear power in Russia. To me that was a very threatening statement to make and one that we should be very concerned about.

Is it inevitable that the expansion of NATO must take place? If it does, how can we soothe the feelings of Russia that their borders are not going to be threatened by unfriendly neighbours?

Mr. Axworthy: First, let me say to the acting chair that I would find it very valuable if members of this committee could take some time before Christmas to put together their experiences.

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Several of you have commented on what you've heard or the kinds of reflections you've made as part of your travels to Russia and Europe, as well as the delegations you've worked with. It would be very helpful for us as a government in these negotiations to have your assessment or your synthesis of what these views would be. It would be very important to bring these into the discussion and show what our own politicians are finding out. If you want to include recommendations, I'd certainly be willing to have you do that. But even just giving us an overview of the kinds of assessments you've been able to engage in would be very helpful.

I come back to the point you raise, which is the crucial issue in the enlargement. Commitments have been made, the process is under way, and there are a number of countries that feel very strongly about it. These are democratic countries that feel that if you are a democratic country, you have a right to join the organizations you want to join.

We also know there's a very important, crucial relationship with Russia. I would add that it's equally crucial that we ensure that the Ukraine, which at the present time doesn't want to join NATO, feels its security concerns are raised, as we do with the Baltics. We have to put those in place. It is a sine qua non in terms of the enlargement proceeding that we find a modus vivendi with the Russians. I think it's possible. I've had very good discussions with the foreign secretary, Primakov. I think there's room for that.

But it does go back to the points we raised. It means you have to change the infrastructure of NATO in part, you have to build some new connections or linkages or architecture with Russia and the other countries, and as we're doing in IFOR, we have to put a model in place that shows you can cooperate.

In a sense, the interesting thing about IFOR is that Russians have been working with NATO countries. Can you imagine that taking place eight or nine years ago, Russian forces with Canadians, Americans and others and now the Germans coming in? In a way IFOR may be a bit of a crucible for the future on how we can make these things work. That may be. Maybe the IFOR and now the SFOR could be the model we need to work on in saying to them that we can ensure security by working together on these kinds of projects.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. Flis): Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

Before the minister and the witnesses leave, I want to remind the committee members, forMr. Graham, that we did not agree on the final resolution on Haiti this morning. More work has been done, more research and more drafting, so we're going to take a 10- to 15-minute break.Mr. Graham will be back then, at which time we'll vote on the resolution. During the break the clerk is going to circulate the resolution and supporting material.

Also, from our Arctic trip with the two panels, the research staff is writing a report of our respective panels. We should have that to you in about a week and a half.

Thank you very much for coming, Mr. Minister, and all your support staff.

.1633

.1644

[Translation]

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Bergeron): Order please. I'm sorry to interrupt your discussions and conversations. In a few minutes, we will resume with Mr. Graham and discuss the documents presented to us. Ms Hilchie has distributed to each of you the documents in question namely the new resolution, a letter sent to Mr. Graham, and the relevant documents requested this morning by certain colleagues.

.1645

I would first ask Mr. LeBlanc to present the documents for us. That will give Mr. Graham time to rejoin us and then we will be able to begin our discussion.

Mr. LeBlanc.

Mr. Francis LeBlanc (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs): In view of our discussions this morning, I undertook to revisit the resolution and provide the committee with information in support of the wording of the resolution to renew the mandate in Haiti, which we will propose to the committee. I will explain the changes made to the resolution and speak briefly about the supporting documents.

[English]

The resolution before us was revised after our discussions this morning to take account of those discussions, and I've also provided additional documentation.

Let me begin with the resolution itself. Aside from making the dates relevant, on the resolution we have added a paragraph before ``It is resolved that...'' to take account of the concerns raised by the Reform Party and by some of our colleagues on the Liberal side this morning. That paragraph says:

Whereas the continued support of the Canadian people and Parliament depends upon a positive demonstration that progress is being made in Haiti in solving long-term structural problems, with the support of regional and multilateral institutions,

That's a way of speaking to the long-term developmental concerns that were raised this morning and reflecting the committee's concern that these be attended to.

In addition to that, in the main paragraph we have included the clause requested by Mr. Paré to the effect that it includes the construction of infrastructure that will be visible for the Haitian population. What we mean by that, and I think what Mr. Paré means by that, is that those people who are involved in the mission would be enabled to be involved in infrastructure construction projects in Haiti that would show the concrete improvements they can make while they're there. I don't think it's a totally new portion of the mandate, but it's part of the mandate of the force. Mr. Paré can correct me if I misinterpreted his remarks, but his language is in the resolution.

That's the resolution. We've added to it a letter that was sent to all of us by the minister this summer. It describes the purpose of the renewed mission that was agreed to in June and went until the end of November. It includes specifics regarding the financing of that multinational force.

In addition to that, you will notice there's a one-page summary of the costs and the number of personnel associated with the mission that ends on November 30. It gives you a sense of what financial implications it will have for Canada as well as the number of people, soldiers and policemen, that will be involved. This was a five-month mission, and the proposed mission we are referring to in our resolution is a little longer, between six and ten months. The exact number of months will be determined within that benchmark by discussions with the Security Council. So the costs might be somewhat higher for Canada, but they're entirely within the range described on that single page.

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I also attached to the resolution a copy of the Security Council report on the United Nations support mission in Haiti that was released on November 14. It describes in some detail the situation in Haiti at that time as well as the work of the mission and some of the costs involved.

Hopefully that will provide additional information for the members who raised those concerns this morning. I would be prepared to try to obtain additional information as it is requested by the members of the committee. I'll leave it at that.

The Chairman: Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Assadourian: What's the difference between paragraph 1 under ``It is resolved'' and paragraph 3? We're talking about multinational, and in paragraph 3 we're again talking about multinational participation. Isn't there repetition there? Do we have to have paragraph 3?

Mr. LeBlanc: My understanding is that this part of the resolution is essentially the same as the one we approved this summer. The mission is essentially a UN-mandated and UN-funded one, but additional support is provided by other countries outside that mandate. This part of the resolution says that one of the conditions under which we, the committee, support this extension is that other countries share in the responsibility by providing personnel and financial support. So it's not just Canada adding additional money.

Mr. Assadourian: Paragraph 1 says the same thing, that the UN-funded multinational force -

Mr. LeBlanc: My point is that it's not only UN-funded.

Mr. Assadourian: Is there a country in the world that is not a member of the UN?

Mr. LeBlanc: Some of the costs are directly paid for out of the contributions made to the UN, and then there are costs borne directly by countries over and above those costs. So it's a UN-funded, UN-sponsored mission. Canada, for example, is assuming the cost of a certain portion of the soldiers it is contributing to the mission, over and above those who are directly funded through the UN. At the same time, the United States is also providing funding for the mission over and above what is covered by the UN.

Mr. Assadourian: I think it's repetitious anyway.

Mr. LeBlanc: Maybe it's repetitious, but it doesn't...

The Chairman: My understanding, Mr. LeBlanc, is that while in 1 we do talk of multinational and 3 is speaking is of multinational as well, paragraph 3 would envisage a different type of support than that contained necessarily in the force itself. For instance, there might be financial contributions to it that would not necessarily be the multinational force, such as suggested in the minister's letter back to us -

Mr. LeBlanc: That's correct.

The Chairman: - when he suggested the United States was going to be making side contributions. So this is a kind of double whammy. I think in that sense it's helpful, Mr. Assadourian, if I may suggest that.

Mr. Assadourian: If it's clear for the committee members, it's fine with me.

The Chairman: That's my understanding of the thrust of it.

Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Morrison: I'm trying to figure out the numbers on page 2 of the covering letter here, although of course this deals with the last one. It says that the U.S. is going to put up $15 million and Canada is going to put up $2 million. That leaves a net reduction from previous costs of $13 million. Take that away from $24 million and it's $11 million, but it says here that Canada's costs are going to be only $7 million. What happened to the other $4 million?

Mr. Mills: I was once on a board of directors that had financial statements like this, and the reason the whole board got changed was that they were bordering on bankruptcy. As soon as they got their budget statements in line, we managed to salvage the company, but if this is accounting, no wonder we have a $600 billion debt.

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Last year it was $35 million, but by the time you added the CIDA projects it was going to be$80 million for Haiti. Now it's costing $7.2 million; we've pulled that figure from someplace.

I don't understand how these missions can vary so much in the cost. Do you include some things sometimes and not other times? Because we're there - is that why it's so much cheaper? I can't figure this out. Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't know what it cost. It costs this number of dollars for troops, this number of dollars for equipment, this number of dollars for rented helicopters, and this number of dollars for food. What is the cost?

Mr. LeBlanc: It is very clear on the single page what it costs.

What we are talking about in that letter is the incremental contributions to Canada, over and above whatever we would have to spend for the forces that we contribute to this mission, if we did not participate. Those incremental costs are in the order of $7.2 million.

Mr. Mills: And the police force is totally paid for by the UN, right? There's no cost to us?

Mr. LeBlanc: I'm just informed that there are some incremental costs on the police force that are paid for by CIDA, in the order of about $1 million a month.

Mr. Mills: So the police force of 300 costs more than the armed force of 750...incremental costs.

A voice: The $7.2 million would be over five months.

Mr. Mills: Yes, and at $1 million a month for the police through CIDA for six months, it's$6 million, or if it's five months it's $5 million or whatever.

We went on patrol with them, Francis, and I can't see why a police officer would be more expensive than a military one. They weren't wearing as much equipment.

The Chairman: Are there any more questions?

Mr. LeBlanc: Those are the answers I have to the questions you provided.

Mr. Mills: I know. It's not you who created these numbers. Whoever is giving them to you is the person I find incompetent.

Mr. LeBlanc: Let's just go through the numbers. Have you gone through that one page?

[Translation]

Mrs. Debien: Mr. Leblanc, I don't know if I've understood correctly. When you say that the contribution is $7.2 million, if you add three police contingents paid by CIDA at a cost of $1 million a month, this comes exactly to the $12.7 million to which Mr. Collenette referred on page 2 of his letter. Is there no connection here? That's all right, but it is the $12.7 million referred to on page 2 of Mr. Collenette's letter which causes a problem. As Mr. Mills said, that doesn't add up.

.1700

[English]

The Chairman: Members, I wonder if we could agree on this. There seemed to be a consensus developing that we have a motion approving being involved in this mission provided that we clearly indicate the reserves we expressed this morning. The present motion deals with those reserves. At least in my way, it seems to indicate that they have been satisfactorily dealt with.

It then becomes a question of whether some members of the committee want to agree with staying, based on the satisfactory numbers being provided to them, or whether we would go ahead and adopt this resolution and deal with the mathematics questions afterwards.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Do you disagree with the resolution?

Mr. Paré: Not at all, not at all. Personally, Mr. Chairman, I think we should continue.

The Chairman: That is exactly the suggestion I made: that we continue and postpone examination of the accounts.

Mr. Paré: Exactly.

[English]

The Chairman: It seemed to me that at 5 p.m. we're going to have a vote.

An hon. member: Let's vote on the resolution.

The Chairman: I'm prepared to put the vote, but I want to get the consensus of the meeting, to see if I am correct in sensing it.

I think it's fair to say that the resolution addressed the problems Mrs. Gaffney raised this morning and some of the concerns of Mr. Mills. Now it's just a question of the accounting procedures that we're worried about.

[Translation]

Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Bergeron: To the satisfaction of our friends of the Reform Party, the Parliamentary Secretary has amended the resolution so as to take into account their concerns. I think that the Parliamentary Secretary has also included in the resolution the comments of my colleague, Philippe Paré, and those of our Liberal colleagues.

We could spend a lot of time quibbling about the figures, but we will have the opportunity to discuss them in greater detail subsequently. From Mr. Mills' statement, I understood that he would perhaps have preferred a more detailed breakdown of the expenditures undertaken by Canada. That is certainly something which the department could provide him with subsequently, but I do not think that should prevent us or our Reform colleagues from voting in favour of the resolution before us, because we have the overall figures in front of us.

We already have the main items of information we need to decide. If our colleagues from the Reform Party, quite legitimately, wants details, I am sure that my colleague, the Parliamentary Secretary, will be pleased to provide them with the figures they might need to satisfy their conscience.

[English]

Mr. Assadourian: I have a solution here for this problem. Doesn't $12.7 million U.S. come to $17.8 million Canadian? It says that if you add $2.5 million Canadian to $15.3 million Canadian-U.S. contribution, you come to $17.8 million. What's left is $4.3 million. That would be a $1 million expense to the police, if I'm not mistaken. Is that right?

Mr. LeBlanc: I don't know.

Mr. Chairman, if there's a real need on the part of the committee to have a full explanation of these numbers, I have with me Mr. Cousineau from the department, who is in a position to explain these numbers. If you would like to hear from him, he could sit at the witness table and explain it for all the members.

The Chairman: It would make much more sense to us. Let's cut out the middleman, as we say.

Mr. LeBlanc: I'm the middleman. I'll extricate myself.

The Chairman: Mr. Cousineau, thank you very much. Perhaps could you take us through the numbers in a way whereby we could understand the total costs of this operation?

Mr. Philippe Cousineau (Desk Officer, Haiti and Dominican Republic, Caribbean and Central America Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): One of the basic complications in this operation is that it's funded from two sources: the regular peacekeeping fund, as most UN peacekeeping missions are funded, and voluntary contributions.

As indicated in this one-page sheet we're going through, the total force size is 1,300, which includes troops funded from both sources. So 600 are financed by the UN, of which 550 are Canadians and 50 are Pakistani, and 700 are funded through voluntary contributions.

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There are two sources of voluntary contributions: Canada and the United States. Canada's contributions amount to $7.2 million. As Mr. LeBlanc explained, this is the incremental cost, the cost of having these troops in Haiti and not in Canada. The United States' contribution is $15.3 million Canadian. We've also heard the figure $11 million U.S., and it's the same figure. This is paid into a UN trust fund and it serves to reimburse the cost that Pakistan incurs for sending 500 soldiers as a voluntary contribution.

In the letter, the figure of $17.8 Canadian is the value of the UN trust fund. The U.S. contribution into the trust fund is $15.3 million, and the Canadian contribution is $2.5 million. The $2.5 million is part of our $7.2 million voluntary contribution. These are costs that are incurred by the UN but that are directly related to the 200 Canadian troops provided as a voluntary contribution. Therefore, the UN pays this cost and it reimburses itself out of the trust fund.

As for the police, the entire contingent is under UN financing. However, we have found that it is a lot more expensive to keep police officers abroad than military personnel. The reason is that average salaries for police officers are much higher. As the member for the Bloc said, the pension benefits and others are much higher and we have to subsidize this. This is what CIDA pays, between $10 million and $12 million a year, to keep our 100 police officers in Haiti.

I'd be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. Morrison: Is it reasonable, in your opinion, to assign zero cost to the 500 troops we will have there who are being paid by the UN, when we know bloody well that we're not going to get the money? This doesn't make sense.

Mr. Cousineau: My understanding is that it's money that's receivable and we expect to be paid at some point in the future.

Mr. Morrison: Good luck.

Mr. Flis: Mr. Chair, I think with that information, we should go ahead with the resolution.

Mr. Mills: Is it fair to extrapolate, then, that if 200 cost $7.2 million, 550 would be whatever that works out to, $14 or $15 million or something?

Mr. Cousineau: Not necessarily, because there are one-time costs for getting the people to Haiti and back and so on. If you double the size it doesn't necessarily double the cost.

The Chairman: I don't think that's quite the question, because the size is doubled already and then your question -

Mr. Cousineau: There is the basic infrastructure for the whole mission. If you add more you need not necessarily increase the infrastructure -

Mr. Mills: But following Mr. Morrison's thinking that these are receivables and good luck, it's reasonable to say that this mission is costing us, for the five months this budget is for, somewhere in the range of $20 million to $25 million, assuming we can't collect it from the UN?

Mr. Cousineau: You're assuming you can't collect it.

Mr. Flis: I don't think that's a good question.

Mr. Assadourian: Assuming you didn't get paid, can you pay your bills? Let's face it.

Mr. Mills: I'm just trying to be realistic. It's getting closer to $35 million.

The Chairman: The members will have to decide, each one, whether they want to make that assumption or not.

[Translation]

Mr. Bergeron: Unless the United Nations declared bankruptcy tomorrow morning and the organization is closed down, I do not think that we can take it for granted that we will not be reimbursed, just as you cannot simply presume that the United Nations will indefinitely fail to pay the money they owe to the United Nations.

We must consider that the United States will finally reimburse the United Nations, and as a result the United Nations will reimburse those countries which contributed to peacekeeping missions. Unless you take a doomsday view of things and believe that the United Nations are going to close down tomorrow morning, I think that we can consider that we will eventually be reimbursed.

.1710

[English]

The Chairman: I would suggest, members, that we've discussed this very thoroughly now. I propose putting it to a vote.

Thank you very much, Mr. LeBlanc, for coming back with a revised resolution.

Those in favour of the resolution?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

[Translation]

Mr. Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, please allow me to express my surprise. I sincerely believed that the resolution before us met the expectations of our Reform colleagues, since amendments, corrections and additions were made in the light of their recommendations and suggestions. Does this mean that, even after requesting that we amend the resolution, they had decided beforehand to vote against, which they did in fact do in the end?

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much. The resolution was adopted.

That is all until 9 a.m. Thursday, when we will move on to the Order in Council appointment.

[Translation]

Mr. Juneau will appear at 9:00 a.m. on Thursday for one hour, won't he?

[English]

We've set aside two hours for Mr. Juneau. I'd be very surprised if it lasted that long.

[Translation]

Mr. Bergeron: Before you lift your gavel, I would simply like to point out that my colleague from Laval East has indicated a few incongruities in the French version of the text. Would you be so kind as to take note of her comments, which are simply...

Mrs. Debien: Grammatical.

The Chairman: The French text can be rectified later with your colleagues. That is surprising; it's the first time that this has happened in this committee.

Mr. Bergeron: That's where the shoe pinches, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Leblanc.

Mr. Leblanc: I would like to draw your attention to the invitation extended by the National Press Club. There will be a breakfast address on Thursday morning by the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning our missions in Haiti, with IFOR, etc. If you are interested, please feel welcomed.

[English]

The Chairman: You're welcome to go at a cost of -

[Translation]

Mr. Paré: Will there be interpretation provided at the event?

Mr. Bergeron: That is a good question. Do you have a good answer?

Mr. Leblanc: I don't know. Unfortunately, I don't have the answer.

The Chairman: Is there simultaneous interpretation at the National Press Club? I've never seen that.

Mr. Bergeron: We may presume that Mr. Axworthy will make at least half of his speech in French.

[English]

The Chairman: We are adjourned until 9 a.m. Thursday.

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