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CHAPTER 10 - TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION REGIME FOR CIRCUMPOLAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In this brief, final chapter, the Committee returns to several related underlying themes raised in the first chapter and running through the report. The first is that of the increasing importance of international Arctic cooperation across a broad spectrum of issues, with implications at all levels from the local to the global, and requiring concerted joint actions from Arctic countries in particular. The second is the development of a variety of organizational entities and policy instruments in order to do justice to the complexity and diversity of this agenda, accompanied by the growing demands of Arctic peoples and other actors for inclusion in international policy processes that can bring concrete benefits to the region. Whether the locus of activity is the domestic formulation of a Canadian circumpolar foreign policy, the conduct of bilateral northern cooperation with specific Arctic states, Canadian involvement in specialized Arctic initiatives, or Canada's future role within the Arctic Council as the primary institution of circumpolar internationalism, there needs to be some coherent overall framework that can help to coordinate these multiple channels and provide appropriate direction. It is not enough, in short, to add activities; the issue is how to collaborate effectively in order to realize the common aims of environmentally sustainable human development to which repeated reference has been made in the meetings and documents cited to this point.

Broad political declarations among Arctic states, that of 19 September 1996 being the most recent and important, are, while necessary, only a prelude to the long-term work that still lies ahead on comprehensive multi-level strategies for the implementation of circumpolar cooperation objectives. The Committee indicated in Recommendation 10 in Chapter Three that we believe this must be one of the explicit functions of the Arctic Council itself. However, we are under no illusions that this will be an easy task. Our discussions, especially with Nordic-country partners, were also a reminder that Canada must proceed carefully at each stage to build like-minded alliances with other circumpolar countries. The opportunity to chair an Arctic Council affords another means for such creative diplomacy; it does not automatically create a solution. The circumpolar level of international relations cannot proceed separately or alone, but must be able to connect both upwards to wider transnational and global processes, and downwards to subsidiary regional, national and subnational processes.

It is useful to recall the qualifications expressed in a Norwegian commentary on the original (and more ambitious) Arctic Council Panel proposals: "even when a regional problem proves difficult to handle on a bilateral basis it will not necessarily become more manageable if submitted to a body of full circumpolar participation." The commentary added that cooperation at this level should not be promoted "in competition with, or to the displacement of," other already working arrangements. Moreover, some issues may not be good candidates for Council determination since they are "functionally linked to important non-arctic contexts."322 Canada would be well advised to take into account the sophisticated work that has been done in the intervening years by the Nordic countries in particular to identify and connect all of the different elements within an evolving Arctic cooperation regime. The Committee was reminded of that contribution in meetings at the Nordic Council of Ministers secretariat in Copenhagen. A major report to the Council on Arctic cooperation, which was prepared following the first (1993) conference of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, had observed that from a Nordic perspective:

The current political and administrative structure in the Arctic region means that it will be complicated and time-consuming to include all of the countries and regions of the Arctic regions in any comprehensive cooperation structure. There is much to suggest that any such cooperation process must initially be based on cooperation structures which have already been established in the Nordic parts of the region and in the Barents region, and developed in the concrete policy areas which are already included in the extensive network of agreements concluded for the Arctic region.323
At the same time, this Nordic report was very favourable to the longer term linkage of Euro-Arctic initiatives to a broader circumpolar "solution in line with the existing Canadian proposal for an international "Arctic Council,'' which can serve as a supplement to the existing sectoral, bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements which are currently being implemented in the region."324 The "Programme on Cooperation" subsequently adopted by Nordic Council ministers in early 1996 strongly endorsed the final push towards successful establishment of the Arctic Council as a means to that end.325

The role of supporting rather than replacing functional cooperation and advocacy mechanisms, by enabling more political collaboration on concerns shared across the entire Arctic region, goes in fact to the very heart of the Council's raison d'être. As Ambassador Simon has rightly reflected on these explicitly international relations dimensions:

The Arctic Council will for the first time bring senior ministers of all eight Arctic countries and Indigenous Peoples' representatives together on a regular basis to discuss specifically Arctic issues. The importance of this should not be underestimated. By means of this function, the Council will act as a means of getting the Arctic governments to focus on their own priorities for the region, and to discuss those with one another, with a view to identifying common objectives and drafting joint plans. This political role for the Council has the potential to help Arctic states arrive at longer-range planning for regional cooperation, a critical requirement for dealing with such threats as the long-range transport of contaminants, or sensitive proposals such as opening up the Northeast Passage to maritime shipping.
At another level still, the Council could, in time, have a role in conveying Arctic regional concerns to global bodies such as the United Nations, where it is felt that the regional interests are being infringed by activities elsewhere. It could bring its collective weight to bear in countering the anti-fur lobby in Europe. Or, the Council could have a part to play in initiatives to devise global standards, such as through agreements as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 or the Convention on Biological Diversity.326
In terms of issues such as the sustainable utilization of Arctic natural resources and the effects of long-range pollutants on health, indigenous peoples' organizations in the Council can be expected to be in the forefront, also working within broader alliances such as the Ottawa-based World Council on Indigenous Peoples, to convey Arctic concerns to a world public. Also at the level of global policy influence, Oran Young has argued that international environmental NGOs with growing Arctic interests, several of which appeared before the Committee, "may also be harnessed under some circumstances to raise the consciousness of southerners regarding the destructive consequences of their actions on Arctic systems." While that wider realm of interaction should not be allowed to detract from the immediate imperative of making the Arctic Council operational, creating any new organization "that diverts attention from these global connections is likely to be understood within a short time as little more than a Pyrrhic victory."327 In short, it is essential to prevent the Arctic from becoming a policy "ghetto" that engages the attention of only a small constituency and a few specialists on the region. A crucial role for a circumpolar political organization will be to raise consciousness and pursue issues within the United Nations and other major international forums, including the "G7/P8" summit process (notably, for example, around Arctic nuclear safety concerns).

Combined with indigenous rights, environmental protection and human security goals, there are also very important questions of economic cooperation and development linking the global and regional levels. For example, as Oran Young points out: "the fact that Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are dependent on outside sources of investment capital, including the World Bank, provides an opportunity to work toward a greater concern for environmental and socio-economic impacts in the Arctic as part of the process of reaching decisions about loans and other forms of financial support."328 More generally, Finland's statement at the inauguration of the Arctic Council affirmed that: "Cooperation with International Financing Institutions, such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Nordic Investment Bank, is important for the implementation of environmental, industrial and transportation projects in the region."329 In the previous chapter, we specifically addressed the role of the EBRD in supporting small business and sustainable community-level development within Russia. Clearly, it is that country that has the most to gain from a coordination of technical cooperation efforts. Commenting on the problem of limited financial resources for achieving multilateral purposes, Russia's foreign minister drew a further pertinent lesson in his statement to the Barents Council meeting330 that took place while the Committee was in Russia:

We are aware that in addition to our council other organizations have also taken an active stand in the North Arctic Region, among them the CBSS [Council of Baltic Sea States], the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Arctic Council, etc. With a view to avoiding possible duplication and scattering of funds we should take stock of the ongoing projects in the region to find out where they overlap and where they complement each other.331
In welcoming the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Joint Statement of the Barents conference also specifically recommended "cooperation and coordination of work in relevant areas, especially in the field of the environment, as identified by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)."332

With regard to linking the circumpolar and Euro-Arctic levels of multilateral cooperation, the Finnish statement at the signing of the Arctic Council Declaration again usefully pointed in the direction of a functional and flexible complementarity:

The two cooperation arrangements, the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, could be regarded as partly overlapping. However, the roles of the two bodies can be coordinated: global arctic problems can only be addressed and solved by the Arctic community as a whole, whereas issues of regional significance in northern Europe can be tackled by the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. The linkage between these bodies will guarantee that we will draw on the experience gained by all.
The Arctic Council will be a new forum for regional cooperation in the space of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Regionalism plays an increasingly critical role in the management of change and in creating security in the broad sense. It is noticeable that the regional cooperation in the North has already brought about a great deal of knowledge and experience.
The Council of these eight governments will constitute yet another channel for political management and practical coordination in the dynamic scene for transnational and subregional initiatives and institutions existing in the Arctic region. By creating a common institution, we shall strengthen our common identity as countries and societies sharing the same attribute of being northerners.333
Obviously, the European members of the Arctic Council will take the lead in developing the Euro-Arctic contribution to this encompassing circumpolar multilateralism. With three of the five Nordic countries (Denmark/Greenland, Sweden, Finland) being members of the European Union as of January 1995, the scope and progress of European integration is also an increasingly important factor to be considered in assessing the future of institutional mechanisms for Arctic-region political cooperation. Not only do EU regional and foreign policies now include an Arctic component,334 but the Nordic states are in some sense becoming a crossroads for that pan-Arctic cooperation. As a recent research study puts it: "Within the broader framework of European integration the Nordic countries are in a position where they may have the chance to assume the role of bridge-builder `across the borders of the EC, to eastern and western neighbours in the Arctic region'. . . . In this way the Nordic countries could contribute to the development of small communities and nations in the Arctic region. . . Of all the various challenges, the one presented by Russia is perhaps the most important."335 The Nordic Council report cited earlier is still more explicit in arguing the salience of these linkage and policy implications for strengthening the North American as well as Russian dimensions of circumpolar cooperation.

The [Nordic] governments should consider the opportunities arising from the fact that three Nordic countries are now members of the EU. Inevitably, the EU will exert an influence, e.g. on environmental policy, regional policy, transport policy and certain areas of policy on resources. Further, all of the Nordic countries should give serious consideration to the development of the Arctic links with Russia, the northern part of the USA and Canada. It will be especially important to establish links to the North American Arctic interests.
With regard to this issue, it is important to bear in mind that the Nordic Greenland forms - in geographical terms - part of the American continent and has to address a number of problems more closely related to the problems faced by Canada and Alaska than, for example, the Barents region. Greenland and Denmark assume a major role as the bridge linking the Euro-Asian areas and the Greenlandic/North American areas.336
While the Nordic countries appear to be doing their homework, if several of our witnesses are correct, Canadian policy on Arctic geopolitics and economics has some catching up to do. Inuit business representatives who appeared before us were keenly looking to explore opportunities internationally, yet felt they were still doing so in the absence of any coherent Canadian strategy for circumpolar trade or sustainable economic development. The role of organizations representing Arctic peoples, especially the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (see note 336) has been exemplary in putting a wide range of such issues on the international Arctic agenda. But it is national governments that must formulate public policy responses in the light of the emerging globalization and regional integration, and under the sometimes complicating conditions of binding regimes such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Community single market. In assessing future directions for the Arctic Council, Robert Huebert suggests that Canada has some hard thinking to do, including about how to work out a multilateral approach that draws in our closest American circumpolar neighbour.

In the debates regarding the Arctic Council, no consideration has been given to important developments in the international economic system. Seven out of eight state members of the Council are members of NAFTA or the EU. Will this affect large scale economic activity in the North? If so how? Will these agreements limit the Arctic Council's ability to promote northern development in a sustainable manner?
These are all important issues and the ability of the Arctic Council to respond to each will determine its ultimate success or failure. If it is unable to keep American support and/or if it is unable to transform its focus from environmental to economic - then the Council will have little long-term significance. On the other hand, if it is successful in creating a regime that keeps the Americans interested; if it is able to act as a coordinating body to encourage sustainable development - then it could be a tremendous success.337
We would hope that to help keep up the political pressure, the Government would support increased interparliamentary contacts as well as contacts between indigenous peoples. In addition to the stronger Canadian contribution to the ongoing work of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, which we recommended in Chapter Seven and which has depended on Nordic Council backing, we would encourage circumpolar cooperation issues to be raised regularly within both the Canada-U.S. and Canada-Europe Parliamentary Associations.

Finally, below the national level, there is great scope, as we have already seen, for governmental and nongovernmental initiatives on a circumpolar basis; this could involve regions, provinces and territories (e.g. through the Northern Forum - refer to Box 3), municipalities (e.g. through the Winter Cities Committee), joint ventures and private-sector enterprises, universities and other knowledge-based institutions. As was argued in Chapter Three invoking the "European" principle of subsidiarity, it would be completely counterproductive for some larger organization to move in as if it could "take over" any of these activities. At the same time, especially in regard to the potential transboundary effects from the growing number of Arctic resource management issues (for example, oil prospects versus caribou habitat in the Beaufort sea region), and the variety of institutional arrangements being developed to accommodate diverse stakeholder interests in many parts of the circumpolar North, Oran Young points to "the need to avoid a situation in which subregional and regionwide initiatives evolve along unrelated but potentially conflicting tracks." He believes that an appropriately constructive role for the Arctic Council would be to "lend support to those subregional initiatives by facilitating communication among those working on such arrangements in different parts of the region, enhancing the legitimacy of specific arrangements as elements in a broader system of Arctic governance, and providing financial support in cases where the availability of material resources is a limiting factor."338

In determining the roles of the distinctive organizational actors within an effective multilateral system for circumpolar cooperation, the Committee received some excellent advice from one of its last witnesses, former Alaskan Governor and current Northern Forum executive director Stephen Cowper. He related an experience following an address he gave in March 1996 at the Nunavut Trade Show; a number of participants asked whether the Northern Forum and the then still to be established Arctic Council would not duplicate functions. "The idea seemed to be that once the `big boys' from the national governments took over, the Northern Forum would vanish from the scene." Cowper's detailed response is instructive and completely apt:

I told the people of Iqaluit that I thought the Arctic Council and the Northern Forum served very different, but potentially complementary, purposes. While the Arctic Council's agenda is not yet clear, it does not seem likely that it will ever be involved in (for instance) introducing roadbed technology developed in Yukon to Yamalo-Nemets in the Russian North. Nor does it seem plausible for the Northern Forum to discuss, say, global Arctic environmental policy. The Governors who serve on our Board of Directors have neither the time nor the resources to pursue such visionary agendas. They are looking for more mundane things: solving persistent social problems like alcoholism, importing waste water treatment technology appropriate for small communities, finding reliable small generator sets, getting good training for commuter airline pilots, learning better reindeer management, and comparing inspection regimes designed to avoid oil spills.
The members of the Northern Forum believe the Arctic Council is vitally necessary. There is a need for a permanent organization through which Arctic nations can discuss the larger issues of the day, including how to control pollution which seeps across national boundaries, how to protect wildlife migrating from one nation to another, and how to resolve the various sovereignty claims of the indigenous groups throughout the Arctic. These important discussions can lead to a consensus from which binding treaties or other agreements may be negotiated by the participating nations.339
In sum, there is a place for both larger and smaller actors in the ongoing development and implementation of circumpolar cooperation policies. Achievement of success does not presuppose uniformity or even convergence, but it can only be helped by the pursuit of greater multilateral harmony, now that this has finally become possible as Cold War legacies are left behind. Among the watchwords should be: coordination, consensus-building, complementarity, and subsidiarity. The need for an Arctic Council has already been affirmed. What have yet to be determined are the next steps; however, we believe that the foregoing provides sufficient clues at least to begin the process of effecting multilateral collaboration on a circumpolar basis. Canada, perhaps more than any other country, has much at stake. It is time, therefore, for the Canadian interest in this work in progress to declare itself through the full engagement of a circumpolar foreign policy that is designed to meet not only the complex realities of the present but also the challenges of a fast approaching new century.

In light of the above considerations:

322
John Skogan, "International Arctic Cooperation: Scope and Limitations," Northern Perspectives, Summer 1991, p. 19.

323
Cooperation in the Arctic Region, Report Submitted to the Nordic Council of Ministers, Stockholm, 1995, p. 73. See also Appendix II which explains the acronyms to an "alphabet soup" of over 90 organizational and program entities referred to in the report, and Appendix III, "Matrix Survey of Institutions and Cooperation Bodies."

324
Ibid., p. 11.

325
Programme on Cooperation in the Arctic Region Adopted by the Nordic Council of Ministers (Cooperation Ministers), Copenhagen, February 1996.

326
Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships'' (1996), p. 6-7.

327
Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 34.

328
Ibid.

329
"Statement by Mr. Pekka Haavisto, Minister of the Environment of Finland, at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Arctic Council in Ottawa on 19 September 1996, p. 3. Similar points on the salience of transnational institutions to regional development and environmental security were also stressed by the delegation accompanying the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament in an unrecorded briefing session with the Committee just prior to its travel to northern Europe (No. 48, 29 October 1996), and during the Committee's meetings in Helsinki.

330
For a description of the Council refer back to Box 3 in Chapter Three. In addition to the Nordic and Russian state members, the representative of the European Commission, and Barents regional council, Nordic Council of Ministers and regional indigenous peoples representatives, this ministerial conference of 5-6 November 1996 was attended by observers from Canada, the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Poland.

331
Minister of Foreign Affairs Primakov, "Statement by the Chairman of the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region at the Fourth Session," 6 November, 1996, Petrozavodsk, Russia, p. 4-5.

332
Joint Statement of the Fourth Session of the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, 5-6 November 1996 (Petrozavodsk)," p. 2. Committee members were briefed on the results of the meeting on 7 November in St. Petersburg by Canada's Consul General Ann Collins, who also referred to efforts within the region to create a Northwest Parliamentary Association.

333
Statement of Minister of the Environment Pekka Haavisto, Ottawa, 19 September 1996, p. 3-4.

334
For example, under "Objective Six" of the regional policy directed by the Brussels Commission of the European Communities which applies to remote regions in Sweden and Finland. In terms of EU foreign policy, there are several programs under which northern regions of Russia can benefit, notably that of Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS).

335
Lassi Heininen, Olli-Pekka Jalonen, and Jyrki Kakonen, Expanding the Northern Dimension, University of Tampere, Tampere Peace Research Institute Research Report No. 61, Tampere, Finland, 1995, p. 75.

336
Cooperation in the Arctic Region, 1995, p. 72. We would also note, in terms of indigenous peoples' participation in fostering circumpolar internationalism, the major bridging role of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and the close links which Canadian Inuit have developed with Inuit in Greenland, Alaska and northeastern Russia.

337
Robert Huebert, "The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance" (1996), p. 21.

338
Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 31.

339
Written statement of testimony from Anchorage, Alaska, 3 December 1996, p. 3-4.

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