Bodies engaged in international Arctic cooperation and established since 1989:1

Despite this headstart, negotiations among the eight countries' Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) were protracted. The major Arctic meetings held in Yellowknife and Inuvik in March 1996 helped to sustain the momentum. Sticking points remained, however, notably over the inclusion of environmental protection and sustainable development goals within the Council's mission, and over the criteria for broadening aboriginal representation beyond the original three permanent participant organizations. (This was the focus of a northern aboriginal consultation on the Arctic Council held in Ottawa in mid-April.) Following Ambassador Simon's appearance before the Committee on 30 April 1996, there were two further negotiating sessions of SAOs in Ottawa, in June and again on 5-6 August 1996, when the text of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council was finalized for ministerial approval. The Declaration was not made public until the signing ceremony and formal inauguration in Ottawa on 19 September 1996 (for the complete text, see Box 5), as announced by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy on 14 August 1996. However, a "backgrounder" released by the Government stated in summary that:

The Council, which will operate on the basis of consensus of its members, will meet at the ministerial level biannually. The Chair and the Secretariat of the Council will rotate concurrently every two years among the eight Arctic states, beginning with Canada in 1996. The main activities of the Council will focus on the existing programs established under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and a new sustainable development program dealing with economic, social and cultural issues.

Affirming our commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, including recognition of the special relationship and unique contributions to the Arctic of indigenous people and their communities;

Affirming our commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being;

Affirming concurrently our commitment to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural resources;

Recognizing the contributions of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to these commitments;

Recognizing the traditional knowledge of the indigenous people of the Arctic and their communities and taking note of its importance and that of Arctic science and research to the collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic;

Desiring further to provide a means for promoting cooperative activities to address Arctic issues requiring circumpolar cooperation, and to ensure full consultation with and the full involvement of indigenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of the Arctic in such activities;

Recognizing the valuable contribution and support of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Saami Council, and the Association of the Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation in the development of the Arctic Council;

Desiring to provide for regular intergovernmental consideration of and consultation on Arctic issues.

Hereby declare:

1. The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to:

(a) provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues,1 in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

(b) oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR).

(c) adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program.

(d) disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.

2. Members of the Arctic Council are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (the Arctic States).

(a) a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State; or

(b) more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state.

The category of Permanent Participation is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council.

3. Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to:
(a) non-Arctic states;

(b) intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, global and regional; and

(c) nongovernmental organizations

that the Council determines can contribute to its work.

4. The Council should normally meet on a biennial basis, with meetings of senior officials taking place more frequently, to provide for liaison and co-ordination. Each Arctic State should designate a focal point on matters related to the Arctic Council.

5. Responsibility for hosting meetings of the Arctic Council, including provision of secretariat support functions, should rotate sequentially among the Arctic States.

6. The Arctic Council, as its first order of business, should adopt rules of procedure for its meetings and those of its working groups.

7. Decisions of the Arctic Council are to be by consensus of the Members.

8. The Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat established under AEPS is to continue under the framework of the Arctic Council.

9. The Arctic Council should regularly review the priorities and financing of its programs and associated structures.

Therefore, we, the undersigned representatives of our respective Governments, recognizing the Arctic Council's political significance and intending to promote its results, have signed this Declaration.

Signed by the representatives of the Arctic States in Ottawa, this 19th day of September 1996.

The counter to these arguments is that the Council must be cost-efficient (for example by benefiting from existing services within federal departments DFAIT, DIAND, and Environment) and able to operate effectively as an international organization made up of nation-states (for example through access to other capitals). Local rivalries (Inuvik versus Iqaluit) also complicate the case for an Arctic location. Nor will northerners' sense of grievance and suspicion of southern power centres be overcome simply through the symbolism of the site of a small secretariat.59 Nonetheless, it will be particularly important for Canada, during the two years of its chairmanship of the Council, to affirm the role of Arctic Canadians in its work and establish meaningful communications between the Ottawa headquarters and our northern communities. The Aurora institute's director complained that northerners had had very little contact to date with the Circumpolar Ambassador. With the negotiations phase completed, Ambassador Simon, as the senior Canadian official responsible for coordination and liaison with the Council, will need to reach out to these communities as much as possible to make them feel included in the process.

The announcement that the Nunavut Secretariat office, which opened in Iqaluit on 30 November 1996, will house a "branch office" of the Arctic Council Secretariat is a positive step. We agree with Minister Axworthy's observation that: "Canada's work on the Council will benefit by its visibility in the Canadian Arctic."60 While the intent has been signalled, a concerted effort will be needed to accomplish it. It is important that residents in all parts of the Canadian Arctic begin to feel more "plugged in" to the Arctic Council process. Consultations should be pursued with northern governments and aboriginal organizations as to the most cost-effective way of achieving this, perhaps using other federal administrative offices in key territorial centres - e.g. Whitehorse for the Yukon, Inuvik and Yellowknife for the NWT, and Kuujjuaq for Nunavik (northern Quebec).

Canada must also beware of being prematurely satisfied with the mere fact of the Council's inauguration. Along with general support, international as well as domestic, for the idea of the Council, the Committee also heard some incisive criticisms. Oran Young noted that the 19 September Declaration "contains very few, if any, substantive commitments on the part of the signatories to take concrete action" [40:3]. He also expressed disappointment at what he saw as the quite narrow and conservative, top-down nature of the organization, compared to the functional flexibility of European regional bodies, for example. Dr. Young wondered whether there might be something to the scepticism with which foreign ministries viewed the Council as a way to recapture some of the action on Arctic issues which has been generated by the AEPS process. There is a real danger that the Council will be driven and dominated by calculations of interstate diplomacy rather than grounded in Arctic realities:

Although there is this provision for permanent participants, were I sitting in a small community in the Arctic and looking at this initiative, I'd be quite concerned, frankly, as to whether this initiative was going to be responsive or sensitive to the kinds of concerns uppermost in my mind. (. . .) A question in my mind is whether or not this Arctic Council process will be so dominated by foreign ministries with poor connections or relatively little experience in dealing with grassroots people that they will end up somewhat disenfranchised. [40:11, 17]

The extent of the challenge was indicated by the views of other international witnesses. Canada will have to manoeuvre very skillfully during the coming months when tackling a number of unsettled issues (for example, adding to the number of aboriginal permanent participants, observer roles, rules of procedure, integration of the AEPS within Council structures, and the nature of a sustainable development program). The United States may be a lukewarm joiner and lagging in its support for the AEPS, but clearly it can use its power to try to constrain and shape the agenda and process to its liking; Canada will have to work cooperatively to overcome this. Russian representatives will be looking for signs of material assistance to help them deal with their huge Arctic problems but funding commitments remain uncertain. Nordic country representatives have expressed concern that the Council should carefully carve out a useful niche that does not take anything away from their existing strong Arctic environmental initiatives. Norway in particular is sensitive as current chair of the AEPS process (due to be incorporated within that of the Council at the next ministerial meeting in June 1997 - see next section and Chapter Five).

During meetings held at the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University,David Scrivener of Keele University (and Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Northern Waters and Arctic Study Group) offered a penetrating and frank perspective on what the Council founders face in this critical post-establishment period. He argued that there are still many tensions left over from some very difficult final negotiations last year, and that "intensive care" is required to bring the hopes for the Council to fruition in the transitional phase that Arctic cooperation has now entered. It remains an open question whether the Arctic Council will be able to add significant value to the work of existing circumpolar bodies such as the AEPS. As yet it is an empty vessel with no agreed program or working groups. David Scrivener advised that Canada should reassure Norway and others that it sees the Council structures as building organically on the forms of international cooperation that are already working reasonably well, and will not seek to reinvent them. If not, in his arresting phrase, the Council risks not being a "one-stop shop," but a "one-more stop shop" with little impact.

In short, Canada's early leadership on Arctic Council consolidation faces at least a two-fold challenge. Domestically, it must stress that this is not just a matter for a few people operating through privileged foreign affairs channels, but is meant to engage public concerns, especially those of Canadians living in the Arctic. Multilaterally, it is equally important to emphasize that this is not just a Canadian-sponsored initiative, but one that is meant to enhance international partnerships in the circumpolar concerns shared by the peoples of all member countries.

In light of these challenges:

Recommendation 4

The Committee recommends that the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador consult with northern governments and aboriginal organizations on cost-effective means to link Arctic communities with Canada's activity at the level of the Arctic Council. In addition to and independantly from the office of the Secretariat serving Nunavut through Iqaluit, other permanent liaison offices could be established in the Yukon, NWT, and Nunavik in northern Quebec with continuing responsibility for channelling regular input from all of Canada's Arctic regions into the Ottawa-based structures. Consideration should also be given to having the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998 held in a Canadian Arctic community.

Recommendation 5

The Committee recommends that Canada, as chair of the Arctic Council Secretariat, collaborate closely with Council partners to ensure that Canadian ideas to consolidate the Council are tested multilaterally as well as domestically, and are therefore capable of attracting broad circumpolar support beyond the period of Canada's initial chairmanship.

Mandate

In addition, notwithstanding U.S. and Russian national-security sensitivities, David Cox noted the close links that may exist between the cumulative impact of many years of military activities in the Arctic and important transboundary environmental issues such as the containment and cleanup of radioactive or other forms of contamination [21:9]. Oran Young's paper on "Arctic governance" prepared for the Yellowknife parliamentarians' conference had argued against trying to introduce ambiguous concepts such as "environmental security" into the Council agenda at this time. However, appearing before the Committee, Dr. Young conceded that "expanding the definition of security through notions of environmental security is probably the way to overcome the resistance of the United States, for example, to allowing security issues to be discussed in the council" [40:17]. Indeed, that appeared to be confirmed days earlier by the oral statement of the U.S. representative, Timothy Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, at the Council inauguration ceremony in Ottawa.

Mr. Wirth's remarks also underlined the need to link the Council's activities with global issues affecting the environment and human well-being. Hence, "we need to ensure that [the] Arctic Council will be a mechanism open to other nations and organizations that have active programs in or knowledge and experience of the Arctic. We need to be able to draw upon all available technical and scientific resources if we are to be able to effectively respond to those issues requiring region-wide cooperation. This is especially true given our understanding of the relationship between the Arctic and our global environment. We all have a stake in what happens in the Arctic." Canada's Lloyd Axworthy agreed that:

increasingly, Arctic issues are becoming global issues. The policies and practices of non-Arctic as well as Arctic governments directly affect the lives of northerners. Some of the pollution in the Arctic originates in countries that are far distant from it. And development in the Arctic has brought new international attention to the region. The Council must therefore be prepared to involve non-Arctic states and nongovernmental organizations in its deliberations and in its work.

Oran Young was persuasive in making the case to the Committee that:

one of the most fundamental contributions the Arctic Council can make really falls under this generative heading: trying to raise consciousness, to develop a vocabulary, to articulate a vision, so the Arctic becomes a visible, well-defined, well-understood region in the world on a circumpolar basis and we have a sense of participating in a common enterprise, we know what it's about, we know the vocabulary, we understand how to deal with these issues and how to develop an agenda of more concrete Arctic questions. . . . I believe in the discourse of Arctic cooperation sustainable development is really the overarching question. . . . it's the basic program. . . . We should be developing a sustainable development architecture, or framework or structure, to which everything else could then be related or connected. [40:4-5]

. . . to bring political focus to addressing the urgent issues affecting the circumpolar North. These issues go well beyond those related to the protection of the environment and include the economic development of northern regions, the utilization of renewable and non-renewable resources, circumpolar trade, the improvement of transportation and communication systems, the health and welfare of northern residents, tourism development and cultural exchange. [15:2]

Of course, Canada's Department of the Environment, whose Minister has the leading Canadian role within the AEPS, is also crucially involved in the Council's mandate. Minister Marchi and Minister Irwin both made statements at the Council's inauguration and, together with Minister Axworthy, represented the Government of Canada's position. With respect to the continuation of the work of the AEPS and implementation of the commitments reached at its last ministerial meeting, hosted by Canada in March 1996, Ambassador Simon reassured the Committee that the Council "will incorporate it [the AEPS] as a cornerstone and reinforce its objectives" [15:3]. How this will be done, however, was unclear and our subsequent discussions with experts in England and the Scandinavian countries suggest that it remains so.

A particular challenge is the appropriate bridge between the primary environmental protection goals and other elements of a comprehensive sustainable development agenda. Although the AEPS had created a "Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization" (TFSDU) in 1993, the Council was envisaged as adding its own new Arctic Sustainable Development Initiative (ASDI). Robert Huebert observes that the September 1996 Declaration omits mention of the TFSDU in mandating the Council to "oversee and coordinate" AEPS activities, while calling for an apparently separate, unspecified "sustainable development program."63 It might be asked whether the AEPS processes ought not logically be brought within an encompassing sustainable development framework (as Oran Young suggests), since, in the words of Ambassador Simon:

Sustainable development is both a goal and integrating concept of the Arctic Council, to incorporate not only environmental protection but also the economic and social aspects of the Arctic agenda. (. . .) Sustainable development refers to planned development that is clearly within the carrying capacity of the Arctic and global ecosystems. Such development must contribute to a safe and healthy environment, as well as safeguard the cultures of indigenous people and respect their fundamental rights, values and priorities. [15:2-3]

There is considerable work to be done in interpreting the real nature and scope of "sustainable development" as a mandate for the Council. In Chapter Five, we will be elaborating on this central concept and its applications for the purposes of circumpolar cooperation. At this point, what needs to be acknowledged is that tensions which emerged in the course of the negotiations on establishment will have to be dealt with.

As recently acknowledged by Ambassador Simon:

While the ``Arctic 8'' have agreed to establish the Council, many differences remain over its priorities and the pace of its work. Some countries want to forge ahead on establishing tight standards for environmental protection. Others see sustainable economic development as the priority. Forging a consensus on cooperation that does not merely reflect the lowest common denominator, the slowest ship in the convoy, will pose an ongoing challenge.65

While arguments over institutional boundaries and mechanics, or over definitions of sustainable development, may quite legitimately preoccupy those involved in these international negotiations, there is a danger that this activity could become a substitute for action on the ground and that it might occupy officials while delaying getting down to business. Indeed, the visions of the Council's mandate that emerged from the Committee's travel in the Canadian Arctic had a markedly immediate and practical emphasis. There is, given the pressing needs and social problems of many northern residents, an understandable impatience with diplomatic initiatives unless they lead to direct, tangible benefits that will improve quality of life. Witnesses from aboriginal peoples' organizations, beginning with ICC President Rosemarie Kuptana, also stressed that the Council should give priority to issues affecting their rights and livelihoods. Indeed, in the international debate over environmentally sustainable development and resource utilization, indigenous groups have led the way in putting forward a substantive agenda for Arctic cooperation.66

Ambassador Simon, herself an Inuk, nonetheless acknowledged in an early Ottawa panel that Inuit had repeatedly questioned how an international organization could benefit them at the community level [15:19]. She suggested one area could be in promoting shared learning about social and environmental assessment processes for northern development (a point subsequently raised during meetings in Kuujjuaq, northern Quebec, and in regard to the diamond mining proposals in the western and central Arctic.) During the same panel, Jack Stagg, of DIAND, had advised that the real challenge would be to get the Council "doing concrete things that quickly benefit those small communities. This is not to be some larger kind of international foreign policy forum. Those of us who worked towards it have seen it more as a practical forum and a tool that will mean something to people in small communities in the various circumpolar regions" [15:18]. Franklyn Griffiths agreed that the Council would need to focus in order to show some results early on.

Oran Young, though advising that the Council should not attempt to start running existing programmatic activities like those of the AEPS working groups,67 told the Committee that it should help to initiate concrete projects in the sustainable development area: "We need to do tangible, focussed, identifiable, useful things so that the Arctic Council is not just some kind of talk shop, allowing for very broad, general kinds of discussions, but is actually seen to be doing useful things" [40:5]. Gary Pekeles, of McGill University's Baffin health project, nevertheless summed up northern "wait and see" scepticism by remarking that it would be important to "minimize [the Council's] uselessness" by curbing new bureaucratic/jurisdictional tendencies and instead stressing how it might support ongoing functional efforts to address Arctic problems.

In a later panel, an environment NGO witness suggested that the Council should concentrate only on areas where there is a strong international environmental consensus, leaving out controversial issues like the utilization of marine mammals (e.g. the harvesting of seals); however, this was definitely not the impression the Committee received during its Arctic trips. Aboriginal witnesses especially hoped the Council could be helpful in resolving matters such as the European Union's regulations on wild fur imports, and other measures with extraterritorial effects which they regard as threatening their communities' economic base, and impeding their progress towards self-determination. As Milton Freeman, of the Canadian Circumpolar Institute, argued: "The Arctic Council should include in its activities addressing legal questions in respect to U.S./EU trade-restrictive actions, and the human rights implications of EU and U.S. actions that adversely affect the rights of Arctic peoples to self-determination and security of livelihood" [Submission of3 June 1996, p. 7].

In short, the challenge of working out the Arctic Council's mandate reflects a complicated mixture of domestic and international considerations. It is essential that the conceptual framework be capable of accommodating the priority concerns of the entire circumpolar community, while reaching out to make global connections. We agree with Oran Young that Canada should lead here, and we think environmentally sustainable human development offers a sufficiently broad compass for orienting the Council's goals. At the same time, the Committee recognizes that these goals must be translated quickly into concrete activities with benefits visible to Canadians in the Arctic. The mandate, no matter how cleverly articulated, will not work if the Council comes to be seen as another externally based organization far removed from the human populations most directly affected by Arctic problems.

Accordingly:

Recommendation 6

The Committee recommends that Canada work closely with Arctic Council counterparts to ensure that the Council's formal mandate is carried out so as to integrate environmental protection with sustainable human development goals, without thereby jeopardizing existing AEPS activities. Canada should also interpret the mandate sufficiently broadly that any important issue affecting Arctic quality of life can be brought on to its agenda, even if this entails a lengthy process of consensus-building. In particular, matters affecting human security and prospects for peaceful cooperation within the circumpolar region should not be excluded from consideration over the longer term.

In addition:

Recommendation 7

The Committee recommends that, within Canada, the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador should lead in identifying concrete applications of the Arctic Council's sustainable development mandate, in order to advance Canadian Arctic interests. Furthermore, staff of this office and of the Arctic Council Secretariat should make it a priority to meet with residents of small northern communities to explore how the Council's mandate might be implemented most effectively to respond to their concerns.

Representative Structures and Process

That optimism should be tempered, however. First, having an aboriginal presence in this intergovernmental organization is more of an elaboration than a total innovation, since the ICC, Saami Council and AKMNSSDV, R.F. were already participating in the working bodies of the AEPS, which, although weakly institutionalized, managed to create an indigenous peoples' secretariat in 1993. Denmark has provided for this secretariat ever since, though it is currently headed by a Canadian, Chester Reimer, with whom the Committee met in Copenhagen and who expressed a more general concern about the level of Canadian support. As for the secretariat itself, the Arctic Council Declaration acknowledges its continuation; however future material support among Council members seems somewhat unclear. It is worth pointing out as well that formal aboriginal representation has been entrenched in the regional council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council linking the Nordic countries and Russia, one of the European bodies seen by Oran Young as having more creative flexibility in their operating structures. Dr. Young also observed that the chosen three founding aboriginal participants are themselves limited in their ability to speak for aboriginal interests: "They are high-level organizations that cover huge territories. They are manned, or staffed, by people who are often in the national capitals. It's very unclear to what extent these organizations are able successfully to reflect and represent the concerns of grassroots people" [40:18-19].

The Arctic Council's two-tier structure of member states and "permanent participants" (who are not "members" per se - see the text of the Declaration, Box 5) is in fact considerably weaker than the option preferred by the original Canadian Arctic Council Panel which was co-chaired by Franklyn Griffiths (see Box 4). That scenario envisaged putting representative delegations from the Arctic aboriginal peoples and the territorial governments on a more equal footing with those from the eight national governments.68 Oran Young argued the merits of still trying to move closer to this model. As it stands, the Arctic Council will be run by the member governments, which alone have voting powers.

Ambassador Simon acknowledged to the Committee that: "One weakness in the Arctic Council could be if we shut out the northern organizations too much, because governments ultimately have the right to hold their own meetings. So we will have to be careful in terms of when we have closed-door sessions without the northern peoples involved" [15:15]. The actual text of the September 1996 Declaration provides for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council" (see Box 5, Clause 2). In a recent address, although contending that the Council represents a "solid step" in the direction of a "true partnership" between states and indigenous peoples, she concedes that "the issue of indigneous participation was very contentious, and to be honest, the final outcome was not completely satisfactory to the indigenous representatives at the negotiations. While they had hoped to gain as close to equal status as possible to member countries, there was resistance from some governments. The final results were, of course, a compromise."69

Another key point delaying the Council's start up was the issue of broadening aboriginal representation beyond the original three recognized organizations. The U.S. in particular pushed the case of the Alaskan Athabascan and Aleut native communities,70 while in Canada, the ICC could not claim to speak for all northern native peoples. In mid-March 1996, the Dene Nation hosted a meeting which included representatives from Alaskan First Nations to discuss Arctic Council options. The Dene also prepared a summary report of the Northern Aboriginal Consultation on the Arctic Council held in Ottawa a month later, which stated: "The member countries have agreed in principle that equitable representation of indigenous peoples is necessary. The mechanism for admitting new permanent participants must now be developed." Ambassador Simon subsequently confirmed to the Committee that: "As other indigenous organizations in Alaska, the western Arctic and the Russian Federation that are not represented by the existing three permanent participants have also expressed a desire to be part of the council, provision will be made for additional permanent participant seats in the council to accommodate them" [15:2]. The Declaration opens the door to "other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples with majority indigenous constituency, representing: (a) a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state; or (b) more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state."

How this will work in practice remains to be seen. It is left to the Council to determine eligibility and accession (presumably by consensus), with the proviso that the number of such permanent participants should always be fewer than the number of state members. Committee members who travelled to the western and central Canadian Arctic were reminded by witnesses such as Chief Bill Erasmus of the Dene Nation of the complexities of aboriginal representation in that region. Professor Gurston Dacks of the University of Alberta stressed the importance of getting this issue right. Gary Bohnet of the Metis Nation argued strongly for an expanded number of Council seats, and also for diverse aboriginal participation in Canada's national delegation, with an advisory role for senior officials and the resources made available to facilitate such meetings. The Committee later heard a strong presentation in Ottawa from the Grand Council of Crees of northern Quebec advancing their case for Arctic Council recognition. Their Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Ted Moses, declared further that: ``The establishment of the Arctic Council provides Canada and the indigenous peoples with an opportunity to begin a new relationship'' [41:13]. However, the Quebec Crees would not appear to meet the criteria in the Declaration cited above.

The representation abroad of Canadian indigenous peoples could, moreover, be burdened by the legacy of unresolved "self-determination" claims.71 Indeed, it is probably no coincidence that the Arctic Council Declaration includes a caveat that: "The use of the term `peoples' in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law." Furthermore, it should not be assumed that aboriginal groups will necessarily share one view on key development issues. For example, with respect to the possible opening up parts of the U.S. Arctic wildlife refuge to hydrocarbon exploration, the Canadian Gwich'in are adamantly opposed to the idea, because of the threat they perceive to the Porcupine Caribou herd, while some Alaskan north slope native groups give it limited support.

Of course, there are also powerful interests at stake for non-aboriginal residents. For example, both Alaska and the Yukon have large non-native majorities, yet their governments will not have any formal standing within the Arctic Council. This may be where the Northern Forum could help to fill a gap. This association of subnational regional governments now has members from 10 countries, including 11 regions in Russia, though from Canada only the Yukon and the Province of Alberta are members. Indeed there may be greater interest from the Russian side than we sometimes detected in the Canadian North. The Forum, at its last assembly in Khanty-Mansiysk in Russia, passed a resolution requesting the Arctic Council to "consider the question of participation of the Northern Forum in further activity of the Arctic Council as a permanent observer. We believe that it is impossible to solve region-wide problems of the Arctic and the North without consolidation of joint efforts." When the Forum's Alaska Executive Director Stephen Cowper appeared before the Committee, he added:

We're finding now that there is an ongoing devolution of power in Government. . . Many of the decisions that were previously made at a federal level are being made, at least in part, by regional governments. That's a trend that probably is not going to stop. For that reason alone, we think it would be useful if the Arctic Council would allow the Northern Forum at least sufficient access to its proceedings to make our view known when it's necessary. [58:4]

This example is just one indication that achieving "northern representation" will not be easy. Oran Young's governance background paper for the March 1996 Arctic Parliamentarians' Conference in Yellowknife contended that to be successful, the Arctic Council

must find a way to combine the interests of disparate groups of stakeholders, including states or national governments with their concerns for developing the region's oil and gas reserves and preserving ecosystems of interest to tourists and scientists and local communities scattered throughout the Circumpolar North with their intense concerns for maintaining traditional cultural practices and subsistence lifestyles. . . Local residents show a marked tendency to view efforts to create multilateral regimes for the Arctic as irrelevant at best and as a source of serious threats to the viability of their way of life at worst.72

There needs to be a mechanism - I'm not suggesting a legal mechanism like seats at some table for these organizations - such as a consultative process through which the users, the stakeholders, the identifiable human communities and groups that have long-term interests and stakes feel they have ready access to channels through which their concerns can be transmitted in a way in which they have confidence and trust. Given the structure that has emerged in the [Arctic Council] declaration, I see this as a very major challenge. [40:19]

As noted in Chapter One, this parliamentary appeal exposed significant divergence, with ICC president Rosemarie Kuptana testifying in the same panel that, while a "close dialogue" with parliamentarians would be welcome, a formal status in the Council would not be appropriate: "I believe the interest of the general public can be met by the state representatives. There is also a category for observers, and perhaps this could be used by the standing committee if they wished to formally participate" [18:14]. Mr. Lincoln was unsatisfied with such a compromise, arguing that having a seat within the Council itself "would be a tremendous opportunity for the Arctic Council to get the support of parliamentarians from eight countries, who are . . . action-oriented, and who will be an independent voice in many ways. They'll be able to point out sometimes that the official policies may not really be what is best for the Arctic. At least it will add a little fire in what otherwise may be a very process-oriented council" [18:16]. Members from both committees spoke in favour of that approach, and the environment committee subsequently adopted a report in June 1996 which included recommendations to this effect.

The September 1996 Arctic Council Declaration allows simply for an observer status for interparliamentary organizations of a global or regional nature, although an accompanying "Joint Communiqué" by member countries does affirm that "Ministers welcomed the attendance of the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and looked forward to its future participation in the meetings of the Council." We believe that this limited opening needs to be widened and pursued further in the interest of the Council's own effective operation. As Oran Young pointedly advised the Committee:

. . .these initiatives or international agreements, which are signed by foreign ministers, or whoever signs them, are likely to remain paper operations or dead letters unless some real foundation of public or popular support is injected into them through the electoral process. . . . I also think the parliamentary channel is one that can be important in making sure that certain voices that are often not heard very clearly in the more administrative hierarchy are heard. [40:24]

An earlier note of caution was raised with the Committee, however, by Milton Freeman of Edmonton's Circumpolar Institute, who observed:

Arctic/northern people are a minority in each of the Arctic Council nations (except Iceland perhaps) and they are a very diverse citizenry even within a given jurisdiction. . . . Many well-funded special interest groups in such urban centres as, e.g. Stockholm, Toronto, Vancouver, or Helsinki, support agendas quite at odds with people in Cambridge Bay, Old Crow, Kuujjuaq or Iqaluit (and equivalent small communities in northern Norway, Greenland, Alaska, etc.) The problems that trappers and hunters in northern Canada and Greenland experience with the European Parliament or the International Whaling Commission (where urban interests predominate and parliamentary traditions prevail) should serve as a warning of what needs to be carefully thought through. [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 1]

Similarly, representatives of environmental NGOs who appeared before the Committee following its trips in northern Canada were very conscious of the need to bridge these barriers and past differences, referring to their efforts to work with aboriginal people. For Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund:

It is essential that all interested aboriginal groups be able to participate in the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Arctic Council.

With regard to observers, the declaration should establish criteria for observer status within the charter, and accreditation procedures should allow for the granting of permanent observer status to non-Arctic countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that provide meaningful and constructive contributions to the process. . . . all interests must be welcome in an open process. [27:9-10, 12]

Another issue of representation is that the Council must take full account of the interests of all of the member countries (including the United States), so that all will remain equally committed to the process. The opportunity for early Canadian leadership does not imply the imposition of a Canadian agenda. North American, European and Russian perspectives will have to be balanced, a view that was reinforced during our overseas meetings. In Oslo, Committee members were advised by Norway's senior Arctic advisor, Ambassador Jon Bech, to keep a realistic perspective on the Council, which should focus on common objectives where it can do something differently and better than other bodies; it should not become a supranational entity that takes over from national jurisdictions or can be led by any one country.

In an earlier Ottawa panel, Dr. Gerald Lock of Edmonton observed that the Euro-Nordic group of countries are a majority in the Arctic Council (five of the eight member governments) but together represent only about 25-30% of the Arctic area. As a result of his experience with the regional board of the International Arctic Science Committee, he suggested a tripartite structure in order to avoid any tendency to ``Eurocentrism'' and achieve balance: "For example, as we chair the Arctic Council, it might be prudent to appoint a vice-chair from Russia and a vice-chair from the Nordic countries and use that as an executive to ensure questions are dealt with in a fully circum-Arctic way before the agenda allows full discussions by the council" [20:4]. Borrowing from the inventive flexibility that Oran Young ascribed to European institutions, another suggestion would be to have a trio of countries involved in directing the Council's administration over time, similar to the ``troika'' structure of the European Union's rotating presidency. In other words, the immediate past and prospective chairing countries would share some of those responsibilities with the current chair.

In addition, the Council will need to establish practical working relationships with other multilateral arrangements that have Arctic-relevant mandates. According to Ambassador Simon, "The Arctic Council is designed to be an umbrella organization with a strong coordinating function." It is supposed not to duplicate but rather "reinforce those initiatives and organizations that are already working to address and resolve Arctic issues and focus attention on areas where more cooperative efforts are needed" [15:3]. In carrying out this task, Oran Young suggested applying the principle of "subsidiarity," which is well known in the European context: ``That is to say, decisions about Arctic issues should be made at the lowest level at which the competence to make these decisions exists" [40:5]. Such a principle would no doubt be welcome by many regional governments and aboriginal groups in the circumpolar north, especially so as to avoid intrusion into their efforts to work out co-management arrangements for the sustainable development and utilization of Arctic resources based on locally determined values and needs.74

More generally, Dr. Young cautioned:

The only way we will have any hope of success is if we can somehow find a way to integrate these various initiatives into a coherent whole, perhaps with the Arctic Council as a sort of overarching framework, as a body that gives coherence to or helps with the integration of all of these other initiatives. But if it tries to set itself up in competition with or as an alternative to these bodies in some new initiative, my sense is that it will go nowhere. [40:23]

In other words, the Arctic Council, no matter how nominally representative, must avoid being perceived as an uninvited superstructural body that spends scarce energies and resources inventing more processes yet ends up taking more decisions out of the hands of the Arctic people and those working with them on solving Arctic problems. Instead, the Council's aim as a circumpolar institution must be to try to create an environment that empowers and enables the peoples of the Arctic to realize their aspirations. It is fair to say that the Committee encountered some scepticism about this, which will be important for the Council to overcome in its initial phase. As well, as David Scrivener has observed, "for some, the Council's gestation itself raised the spectre of the proliferation of overlapping and competing institutions." It will be crucial therefore for the Council to prove early on the value that is added by its unique circumpolar structure and process. Certainly, as David Scrivener affirms, the purpose is a valid one: "The existence of an Arctic Council could generate more effective channels through which to nurture the ability of the Arctic states to coordinate and concert their policies on issues affecting the Arctic in international forums not confined to the region. . . . In these cost-conscious days governments are keen to maximize the impact and efficiency of the various cooperative processes in the Arctic."75

In sum, beyond adequate representation of a broad range of Arctic interests, the Council will have to strive to achieve a functional coherence in implementing its mandate. Otherwise, it risks alienating the very constituencies it is supposed to help, while adding yet another layer of complexity to the existing jigsaw of organizations and transboundary arrangements within the Arctic region.

Accordingly:

Recommendation 8

The Committee recommends that the Government work to achieve inclusion, at the earliest possible date, of additional representation for Canadian aboriginal peoples' organizations based in the North, and for all northern residents through their regional governments (including that of Nunavik in Quebec) within the Arctic Council's formal structures. Interested aboriginal organizations that do not meet the current criteria for becoming permanent participants should in any event be granted early observer status. At a minimum, these groups and the subnational Arctic-region governments should be assured of some representation, in an official advisory capacity, in the development of Canada's positions on all Arctic Council matters.

Furthermore:

Recommendation 9

The Committee recommends that the Northern Forum, and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, (which should include a representative from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade), be granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. As such, they should have the right to intervene in its deliberations on matters of special interest with the agreement of the Council's members and permanent participants. In addition, NGOs that have developed particular expertise in working on Arctic issues should be granted a consultative observer status with the Council.

Finally:

Recommendation 10

The Committee recommends that the Arctic Council beyond the first stageof incorporation of the AEPS be encouraged to develop an overall planfor coordinating circumpolar initiatives at the intergovernmental level and consolidating them where possible for consideration by the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998. Careful attention should also be given to establishing mutually supportive subsidiary linkages between the Council and other more specialized organizations working on transboundary Arctic issues.

Priority Objectives and Activities

In her testimony, Rosemarie Kuptana, President of the ICC, which will occupy one of the Council's permanent participant seats, indicated that its agenda would be to maintain support for AEPS programs (e.g. research on contaminants affecting Inuit health) while beginning new work to promote sustainable development that might affect the future economic base of Arctic communities.

ICC wishes to work on strategies for the revitalization of the Inuit sealing industry, its harvesting and marketing of marine mammal products in general. . . . The Arctic Council could also be an important forum for coordinating cultural exchanges and exchanging information and views on a wide range of social and economic issues. . . . [It] provides an opportunity for the circumpolar nations to establish a model of partnership and cooperation with indigenous peoples on the most vital northern policy issues." [18:27]

Other aboriginal spokespersons also emphasized issues affecting well-being and livelihood. For example, in Yellowknife, Gary Bohnet of the Metis Nation submitted that "the evolution of circumpolar relations and international cooperation requires that aboriginal trappers and commercial wildlife harvesters have free markets to support their traditional livelihoods and thereby maintain aboriginal cultural survival and obtain economic independence. The Arctic Council can promote the environmental importance of trapping as well as free international trade with other circumpolar countries." The Inuit of the eastern Arctic felt equally strongly about the importance of enhancing free movement of northern products and peoples. Kevin Knight of Unaaq International and Don Axford of the Canadian Inuit Business Development Council argued that current international trade agreements and regional blocs such as NAFTA and the European Union should be examined in this light [20:17-18]. Beyond that, Gerald Lock proposed that the Arctic Council "should explore an Arctic free trade agreement" [20:5]. David Malcolm of Inuvik's Aurora Research Institute advised that "Canada should use the Arctic Council opportunity to build circumpolar marketing networks, so that circumpolar northerners can easily trade with each other, without having to rely on southern products with inadequate specifications for northern conditions" [Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 4].

Northern research institutes saw the Arctic Council as needing to become directly engaged in efforts promising clear benefits to northern residents, such as resource management; sustainable economic development and trade; environmental science and anti-pollution measures; applied research and development; health and education cooperation; and improved communications and transport networks. In Calgary, the Arctic Institute of North America put forward as four initial priority objectives: "circumpolar promotion of the process of co-management by regional land claims co-management boards" (possibly an annual conference to discuss practical issues of administration and delivery); "circumpolar action on air and water borne contaminants" (including promotion of international pollution standards); "circumpolar development of sustainable tourism guidelines that focus on the preservation of the traditional land-based economy. . ."; and "constructive circumpolar opposition to the European fur ban" (including support for efforts "to find humane trapping methods and to train a new generation of trappers") [Submission of Michael Robinson, 31 May 1996].

In several Committee roundtables, northern studies experts from Laval University in Quebec City, McGill University and University of Montreal stressed the value of cooperative educational and scientific exchanges with those in other countries working on common Arctic problems. The Arctic Council could be of real service by supporting circumpolar progress in building up and disseminating relevant knowledge - not only technical but also more broadly social and cultural. In effect, how can the Council really assist those who are trying to build healthy, environmentally responsible and economically sustainable communities across the circumpolar region? Oran Young mentioned moving on items such as technical assistance, skills development, and resources for local investment, especially targeted to indigenous people, as well as giving consideration to more environmentally protected areas. He also advised that "we need to think carefully about fostering a dialogue between the world of research and the world of policy, the world of science and the world of practice. . . . [and] within the context of the Arctic Council, about how to make mutually beneficial links between the scientific or the reseach community, including those who are concerned with traditional ecological knowledge, and the world of policy" [40:5-6].

Given that the AEPS is to be brought within the Arctic Council's mandate, environmental issues will obviously have a high priority, both short and long term. But there are numerous questions to be worked out. How, for example, will the Council, established through a non-binding political declaration, be able to move from simply acknowledging the problems to taking joint remedial actions, as a number of those we met in Russia and the Nordic countries hope? Is it feasible that the Council might eventually oversee compliance with multilateral standards? Robert Huebert observed that to date "the two major focusses of the AEPS have been on the examination of existing international cooperative measures and how bad the problem is. The question now that will be facing the Arctic Council is what steps will be taken?" He suggested that global trends towards deregulation and privatization could make it more difficult to negotiate an effective international environmental regime for the Arctic [15:13].

However Stephen Cowper of the Northern Forum, argued that, from a practical business perspective, "It's important that there be a consistent set of environmental standards for development in the Arctic. It is not in anybody's interest to have a competitive resource development situation where the key variable . . . is that one of the countries doesn't have any environmental safeguards. . . . that is, I believe, one of the most important subjects to be tackled by the Arctic Council." He went on to highlight "the subject of the proper disposal of nuclear waste, much of which is in the Arctic region," as a priority activity for the Arctic Council [58:10].

Clearly, the creation of an environmentally sustainable basis for circumpolar economic development must be a Canadian priority. The Committee was therefore pleased by Minister Irwin's statement at the September 1996 inauguration that "as a first activity of the Council, Canada proposes an international conference on Arctic Sustainable Development be held in 1997 . . . [that] would bring together a wide range of Arctic stakeholders from Government, nongovernmental organizations, and, in particular, practitioners of business development." At the same time, as already discussed, the approach should at all times integrate environmental protection into the sustainable development program.

Ambassador Simon referred in her testimony to the AEPS-initiated "report card" on the state of the Arctic environment, due to be released in 1997, and indicated that follow-up action by the Council with respect to Arctic sustainable development "could be seen as a regional implementation of Agenda 21" (the UN program of action agreed to in 1992 at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, but which did not specifically target the Arctic) [15:32]. Milton Freeman, of Edmonton's Circumpolar Institute, cautioned, however, against expecting the Council to evolve into a powerful enforcer of multilateral environmental standards: "In the present era of downsizing Government, the Arctic Council will likely have to be quite minimalist as an organization . . . and to fully respect national traditions and differences. . ." [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 4]. He advised more modest steps such as replicating the successful model of the international polar bear treaty, or working through existing bodies like the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.

Witnesses representing environmental NGOs, on the other hand, wanted to see an Arctic Council backed up by the political resolve to address the Arctic environment in a comprehensive way. Kevin Jardine of Greenpeace outlined the many destructive effects of the release of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming (for example, forest fire and insect outbreaks, sea ice and shoreline erosion, and permafrost degradation). Louise Comeau of the Sierra Club urged fast action by the Council to have Arctic interests included in the global negotiations towards a framework convention on climate change: "If the Council waits until the Arctic monitoring and assessment program releases its state of the environment report in early 1997, it may be too late" [27:7]. Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund highlighted work on a circumpolar protected areas network; mechanisms for incorporating the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and utilization of ``quality of life'' rather than more conventional economic indicators of development; adequate environmental assessment procedures (notably for mining, oil and gas, and forestry projects); circumpolar guidelines for eco-tourism; strengthening of international environmental laws (e.g. the marine pollution convention, MARPOL, "taking into account the increasing shipping traffic in the Arctic,"76 and implementation of the Law of the Sea provisions) [27:9-11].

Clearly, there is no shortage of challenging items on the "menu." A 1995 Canadian Government position paper had foreseen the working groups of the Arctic Council tackling over the longer term, in addition to an expansive environmental protection agenda, a whole series of issues such as sustainable economic development, social and cultural development, emergency measures, and science and technology. Beyond continuing the current work of the AEPS, a long list of "substantive priorities for the Council's initial period" was also identified:

While all of the above can be seen as important to the Arctic quality of life, it is difficult to imagine a small organization dependent on goodwill and consensus simultaneously taking on so many of "priorities" at least without being very selective about where it would focus its energies. Even before an action agenda can be determined, the Arctic Council Ministers' "Joint Communiqué" of the September 1996 inauguration identified as the Council's "initial priority tasks" such basic matters as developing rules of procedure, terms of reference for its sustainable development program, and effective incorporation of the AEPS.

In short, the Arctic Council will probably have to trim advocates' ambitions in order to be effective in making a difference on at least a few issues. We believe that Canada should be proactive in working to establish early consensus on a short list of key objectives and activities. Canada has a window of opportunity as the founding chair to make good on Oran Young's challenging affirmation to the Committee that "beyond the signing of the Declaration, Canada is in a unique position to work out a really well-defined proposal about the roles the Council can and should play" [40:6].

Accordingly:

Recommendation 11

The Committee recommends that Canada use the two-year period of its initial chairmanship of the Arctic Council and hosting of its secretariat to build consensus on a manageable short-term work program, starting with the commitments already agreed to by the eight Arctic states in the Inuvik AEPS declaration of March 1996 (see Chapter Five). Following up the release of the AEPS state of the environment report in 1997, the Government should work closely within Canada with aboriginal peoples and other northern residents to establish the most urgent priorities for international environmental action (for example, the issue of contaminants affecting health). Canada should put forward concrete proposals in these areas to the Council's 1998 ministerial conference.

In addition:

Recommendation 12

The Committee recommends that the Government use the proposed conference on Arctic sustainable development to further the integration of environmental and economic development objectives within the Arctic Council's mandate. Canadian officials should also work closely with northern constituencies to identify priority activities related to sustainable community economic development, and especially to create opportunities for a growing aboriginal population, where international action is required (e.g. dealing with trade barriers, improving transnational communications and transport links). During the remaining period of Canada's chairmanship and beyond, Canadian energies should be focussed on encouraging the Arctic Council to deal with such issues, which are of greatest practical concern to our northern citizens.

Funding and Political Support

The 1995 internal Canadian Government working paper on setting up the Council appropriately devoted considerable attention to funding issues. It recommended that the Council give priority to programs that "have received an offer from a Member to accept lead responsibility and for which necessary financial support has been identified; and are feasible within the available resource base and time frame." The paper accepted that "basic funding" of the Council secretariat would be the responsibility of the host country, while proposing a mix of voluntary contributions and "burden-sharing" arrangements for other activities. There would be established a "common fund, based on an agreed cost-sharing formula, to support common program initiatives." As well, functional components, such as the work of the indigenous peoples' secretariat, would be among "the most obvious candidates for cost-sharing."79 However, other countries did not demonstrate much enthusiasm in that direction, with David Scrivener observing that: "The idea of common funding was dropped in the face of U.S. opposition which masked a widely shared reluctance to assume new financial commitments."80 Indeed, as Ambassador Simon bluntly acknowledged in recent remarks:

These days governments, including Canada's, are extremely reluctant to agree to setting up new bodies that will place demands on time and resources. . . The Council itself will not be endowed with more than a modest budget to operate a secretariat and other maintenance functions. It will be up to the member governments to commit to spending on agreed activities.81

As previously noted, some witnesses were concerned about the low level of resources being devoted to the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the functioning of the Arctic Council secretariat, given the size of their mandates and responsibilities. There was a feeling that their capacities should be strengthened, possibly through a consolidation of some existing Government spending on Arctic and circumpolar affairs. As well, aboriginal spokespersons sought assurance of adequate support for their full participation in Canadian foreign policy development and Arctic Council activities. None of this means that the advent of the Council should result in a circumpolar bureaucratic empire, only that it should be undertaken as a serious, if economical, operation.84

Organization and funding are linked to political support. That is another reason why the first two years under Canada's chairmanship are so critical. If the Council can show enough early promise of being able to do an effective job on a few issues of importance to Canadians, and northern Canadians especially, it will have a strong case for increased and sustained Canadian funding. Of course, Canada cannot be just a one-man band; there will have to be a work program that convinces other Council partners, and perhaps in particular the U.S. - with whom we have the closest relationship of any Arctic Council country - that it is worth supporting materially and not merely on paper.

The Council's inauguration, long sought by Canada, is an achievement in itself. But the first real test, under Canada's watch, will be whether the first substantive ministerial conference scheduled for 1998 can deliver on a clear action-oriented program that is backed by political resolve and solid funding from the Council's members.

Accordingly:

Recommendation 13

The Committee recommends that the Government review existing resources for federal circumpolar initiatives at the national, bilateral and multilateral levels in order to identify any that might more effectively be consolidated under the aegis of the Circumpolar Ambassador and through Canada's participation in the Arctic Council. Canada should also take the early lead in exploring long-term funding and administrative support for the Council's operations with other Arctic governments, as well as with aboriginal participants and observer organizations. Finally, the Arctic Council secretariat should identify potential program areas for circumpolar cooperation (for example, encouraging utilization of environmentally superior technologies, trade promotion, training and business development) where the financial participation by private-sector partners might be appropriate within the Council's overall sustainable human development mandate.

57
Cf. Ibid., p. 22ff for a useful synopsis of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

58
These are the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AKMNSSDV, R.F.). The three first gained participant standing within the AEPS, supported by an indigenous peoples' secretariat established in 1993.

59
Kenneth Coates has observed that "inter-town rivalries are legendary across the North," which also suffers from an ingrained "culture of opposition . . . [that] has distracted northern attention from the construction of internal and external networks of support. Instead of pulling together to capitalize on the availability of limited resources, northern regions tend to engage in internal contests and struggles that ultimately make it easier for southern authorities, be they corporate or governmental, to skirt northern expectations and to exploit divisions within the region" ("The Discovery of the North" (1994), p. 27, 42.)

60
"Nunavut Secretariat Office Opens in Iqaluit," Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development news release, Iqaluit, 30 November 1996, p. 2.

61
Cited in Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation (1996), p. 25.

62
Refer to Box 3; cf. also David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996).

63
Robert Huebert, ``The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance'' (1996), p. 8-9.

64
David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 24.

65
Mary Simon, ``Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 7.

66
Robert Huebert observes that: "while the ICC has limited resources, it, and not any of the Arctic governments, has been responsible for the introduction of the principles of sustainable development into a circumpolar context" (``The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance'' (1996), p. 17). See also Chapters Five through Seven.

67
See Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 59.

68
Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation (1996), p. 25.

69
Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 5.

70
David Scrivener points out that: "Although not organized transnationally, they exploit migratory species and live on both sides of the U.S. border with Canada and Russia, respectively." (Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 25)

71
For example, within the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. In addition to the testimony of the Crees, see that testimony of Rosemarie Kuptana [18:28-29]; also Russell Barsh, "The Aboriginal Issue in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1994," International Journal of Canadian Studies, Fall 1995, p. 107-33. On "self-determination" principles as applied to Arctic indigenous peoples, see the paper prepared for the Committee by Joelle Martin, "Internal Self-Determination at International Law: Case Examples," May 1996.

72
Oran Young, "Arctic Governance: Meeting Challenges of Cooperation in the High Latitudes" (1996), p. 7 and 15.

73
The issue of public participation and process was emphasized in the original vision developed by the Canadian Arctic Council Panel, which had called upon Ottawa "to include Canadians, above all Canada's aboriginal peoples, in the formation of its negotiation position on an Arctic Council . . . [the creation of which] must from the start be an exercise in public diplomacy if it is to be done right." (To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report, Ottawa (1991), p. 16.) It can be argued that this broader public dimension remains an unfulfilled promise of the Council initiative.

74
On this question see also Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996),p. 31, and Chapter Ten.

75
David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 28.

76
Related to that prospect, former Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker captain Patrick Toomey told the Committee: "The Arctic nations . . . must be prepared to supervise and assist such polar ocean navigation by the harmonization of standards with competency in ice navigation for the navigators and by the standardization of ice classification for ships . . . There must be a means of enforcement of these international rules" [20:2]. On the Council's potential role in the application of international conventions to Arctic marine transportation, see also Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 57.

77
"The Arctic Council: Objectives, Structure and Program Priorities," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, internal working document, Ottawa, May 1995, p. 15-16 and Annex C.

78
David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 17ff.

79
DFAIT and DIAND, "The Arctic Council" (1996), p. 12-15.

80
David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 24.

81
Mary Simon, ``Building Partnerships'' (1996), p. 2 and 7.

82
"Hands across the Ice," The Economist, 21 September 1996, p. 48.

83
Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 2. The Commission also seemed to have lost the support of the Dene Nation in the NWT. ("Dene Want Polar Panel Disbanded," Montreal Gazette, 19 September 1996.)

84
Oran Young argues that the Arctic Council should "not require a large or elaborate organizational apparatus of its own to administer its operations. Nonetheless, a modest permanent secretariat would serve the Council well. Experience in other areas has made it clear that small and efficient secretariats can play a variety of constructive roles in maintaining and enhancing international cooperation that go well beyond the technical tasks without overstepping the bounds of what is appropriate for administrative bodies," (The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 58-9).