[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Thursday, May 2, 1996
.1108 
[English]
The Chairman: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
On March 18, 1996, the House of Commons passed the following motion:
- That the matter of the communiqué of the Member for Charlesbourg released on October -
Mr. Boudria (Glengarry - Prescott - Russell): Mr. Chairman, is it appropriate that the cameras still be here while you proceed?
The Chairman: Okay.
- That the matter of the communiqué of the Member for Charlesbourg released on October 26,
1995 with reference to members of the Canadian Armed Forces be referred to the Standing
Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.
The issue before this committee is whether there has been a breach of the privileges of the House of Commons or whether a contempt of the House has occurred. In particular, the focus of our hearings is whether the actions of the member for Charlesbourg in sending out a communiqué on October 26 regarding the Canadian Armed Forces constitutes a contempt of the House or a breach of privilege.
.1110
Colleagues, as I did last week, I want to once again remind us of the guidelines that we as a committee have approved. The guidelines are that the committee is not a court of law and that therefore it is not an appropriate forum for determining the scope and the interpretation of the criminal law in Canada.
Matters that are directly related to the communiqué are within the purview of the committee. The committee must decide whether or not Mr. Jacob's actions violated the privileges of the House or were in contempt of the House and whether or not his actions were appropriate for a member of Parliament. The committee's duty is to establish the facts that surround this matter and to determine whether in its opinion there has been a breach of privilege or a contempt of the House.
Last week the committee heard from the member for Okanagan, Mr. Hart. Today we have before us the member for Charlesbourg, Mr. Jean-Marc Jacob. I would invite Mr. Jacob to make brief opening remarks if he wishes.
[Translation]
Mr. Jean-Marc Jacob (Member of Parliament for Charlesbourg): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no opening remarks to make. I would just like to say that I'm here to explain the content and the reasons behind the communiqué. I am doing so out of respect for the institutions of which I am still a member.
I would appreciate having a few minutes to make some closing remarks at the end of your questioning. I'm now prepared to answer any questions you may have.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Jacob. We'll begin as is our practice with the official opposition.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur (Berthier - Montcalm): I believe I'm the first questioner from the Official Opposition.
In reading your communiqué released on October 26, 1995, I noticed that you issued it as the Official Opposition critic on National Defence and as Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs. Do you still hold those positions?
Mr. Jacob: I am still the Official Opposition critic on national defence, but I'm no longer the Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Committee.
Mr. Bellehumeur: Why are you no longer Vice-Chairman?
Mr. Jacob: I can explain that somewhat for you. After all the publicity surrounding my communiqué, there was some political pressure being applied by the Reform Party and by the Liberal Party, and I therefore decided not to run for position of Vice-Chair so that another member from the Bloc could assume that position on this committee which, in my view, is very important.
Mr. Bellehumeur: That's fine. I will come back to the issue of a breach of your parliamentary privilege a little later.
I would like to continue discussing the communiqué in which you also say that a sovereign Quebec will need a defence force, an army.
Is the idea of having an army in a sovereign Quebec a new one?
Mr. Jacob: Absolutely not.
Mr. Bellehumeur: How long has it been around?
Mr. Jacob: I don't know whether committee members know, but the first statements about a Quebec army dates back to the first referendum, in 1980. Mr. Lévesque said at the time that Quebec would have an army. Over the years that followed, many things were done and ENAP did a number of studies. In addition, presentations were made by university professors and former members of the military who gave their opinion of the possibility of setting up a Quebec army.
I will spare you the details, but if you want to come back to this issue, I could bring in 10, 12 or 15 quotations from individuals or groups who commented on the possibility of a Quebec army in a sovereign Quebec.
Mr. Bellehumeur: But were any of them contemporary politicians, from the 1990s for example, since the Bloc québécois came into being in the 1990s?
Mr. Jacob: I could mention the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, which, in the 1990s commissioned a number of studies on the possibility of setting up an army in Quebec, on Quebec defence policy and foreign affairs.
I would also remind committee members that when Mr. Bourassa was premier of Quebec, bill 105 was passed, and it was one of the few pieces of legislation passed where a consensus by the Liberal Party and the Parti québécois was achieved. This was the Quebec Referendum Act.
.1115
At the time, and some of you may remember this, general de Chastelain made some statements about the possibility of the Quebec army. I have some supporting documents with me.
There was also a document put out by the Parti québécois entitled Des idées pour mon pays (Some ideas for my country), which deals with issues of a defence policy and a Quebec army.
I would like to table this document, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Yes.
Mr. Jacob: I might also mention the document entitled La souveraineté: des réponses à vos questions (Sovereignty: some answers to your questions), which was very important during the referendum campaign. I would like to point out here that my communiqué cannot be dissociated from a referendum context and all the events that occurred around this time.
I also have a document here on the army. The Bloc Québécois distributed some information sheets to a number of ridings. They discussed Quebec's participation in regional and international military alliances. They also talked about the possibility of setting up an army, about its establishment and the equipment it would have.
In another document put out by the Bloc Québécois entitled ``Des idées pour gagner" (Ideas for winning), there is a clear reference to defence matters. All these documents were put out in August, September and October.
Mr. Bellehumeur: I would like to table these documents, Madam Clerk.
In Bill No. 1, an Act on the future of Quebec, and in the tripartite agreement signed by Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard and Mario Dumont is there a clear reference to the need for an army and a defence policy in a sovereign Quebec?
Mr. Jacob: Yes, both the bill and the tripartite agreement state clearly that Quebec will need a defence policy and an army. However, since there were no further details in these documents, I released my communiqué.
Mr. Bellehumeur: Fine. I heard a member of the Reform Party say in the course of this committee's deliberations that Canadian soldiers were not informed about the referendum issue. Do you have anything to say in that regard?
Mr. Jacob: Yes. I think that the majority of members present here were definitely aware of the referendum issue. Even though they do not share our ideas, as the member for Kingston and the islands was saying, they respect them nonetheless. I'm sure that most people are aware of what happened.
The Quebec government distributed this bill and the tripartite agreement to all households in Quebec.
Mr. Milliken (Kingston and the Islands): Propaganda!
Mr. Jacob: Propaganda? The member for Kingston and the Islands may say that, but in our view, they remain information tools.
I would also point out that these documents were even distributed to military personnel in Bosnia at the time of the referendum. In September and October, between 1,300 and 1,400 members of the military from the base in Valcartier were on a mission in Bosnia. Captain Redburn confirmed that members of the armed forces in Bosnia received a copy of the bill, the referendum question and the tripartite agreement.
I think that members of the military are much more open minded than our colleagues in the Reform Party who want to ensure that members of the military receive no information. While some would disagree with our ideas, call these documents propaganda, we call them information.
We've heard many comments, even from military personnel on the subject, and I will come back to it later. However, this information was distributed to all Quebec citizens, some of whom are members of the Armed Forces. So they are both military personnel and ordinary citizens.
Mr. Bellehumeur: If we want to talk about propaganda, we could perhaps mention the Red Book, but this is not the time to discuss that.
Before the referendum campaign itself, the Quebec government held a series of public consultations know as regional or national commissions on the future of Quebec.
Could you tell us whether the matter of setting up an army in a sovereign Quebec came up during these consultations?
.1120
Mr. Jacob: I know that the matter was raised at at least two of these regional commissions that were important for the people of Quebec. One was the regional commission held in Montreal, where a former professor from the Military College in Saint-Jean, Charles-Philippe David, presented a brief entitled ``Le Québec ne peut se payer le luxe de ne pas avoir d'armée" (Quebec cannot afford not to have an army). He also explained how to proceed.
In the Quebec City region, former General Ronald Michaud also presented a brief on the possibility of setting up a Quebec army. I read it, and I can tell you quite frankly that he goes much further than I did in my communiqué.
Mr. Bellehumeur: This question has, therefore, been dealt with amply.
Mr. Jacob: Indeed, this is a question that has been fully discussed at all levels, at the university level, at the military level, at the public level and at the level of certain government authorities. In addition, given that the Bloc Québécois represents the citizens and interests of Quebec and that our role is to promote sovereignty, we also had to inform military people. As there is no equivalent to the Department of National Defence in the Quebec Government, I thought, as a parliamentarian, it was my role to talk about eventually creating a Quebec army so that military personnel and their families would be well-informed. I had to tell them that if the Yes side won in Quebec, the people who wanted to could have a job within the Quebec Armed Forces.
Mr. Bellehumeur: I would point out that the period under review goes from 1980 up until the time of the referendum. You named two or three other individuals, including yourself, who talked about the possibility of a sovereign Quebec having an army. In your opinion, were there any other commentators or individuals who talked about eventually setting up a Quebec Army in a sovereign Quebec?
Mr. Jacob: If you are referring to the period from 1980 to 1995, I could give you several names, but I am certainly going to forget a few. I even have some documents to table.
Starting in 1990, after the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, some of the first, more recent comments were made by individuals such as Albert Legault who is a professor at Laval University, Charles-Philippe David and former General Belzile who worked for ENAP on the training that would eventually have to be given to the Quebec army and who submitted reports to the Bélanger-Campeau Commission.
And then there was the military columnist from the Devoir, Jocelyn Coulon, who also participated in these studies. He even went to the Strategic Studies Centre in Toronto in November of 1991 to explain that Quebec could set up an army, with a change to the Constitution. We must recall that in 1991, the referendum question stipulated in Quebec National Assembly's Bill No. 150 had been put on the table and that the federal government had counteracted with Charlottetown. In 1991, the referendum issue was a hot topic and Mr. Coulon, as a well-known columnist, went to the Toronto Strategic Studies Centre to talk about this subject. In this document that I would like to table, mention is made about the possibility of creating a Quebec army and various other things that committee members could check later on.
Mr. Bellehumeur: Mr. Jacob, you are referring to Mr. Jocelyn Coulon's document that I am now tabling with the Clerk.
Mr. Jacob: That's right.
Mr. Bellehumeur: You also referred to the bibliography pertaining to military issues and Quebec sovereignty. This bibliography contains quotations of everything that was written or discussed with respect to the issue of an army in a sovereign Quebec. It is this four-page document that I have here before me.
Mr. Jacob: That's right. I mentioned several documents, such as the study done by Charles-Philippe David.
Mr. Bellehumeur: I am also tabling this document with the Clerk.
.1125
I also heard Mr. Hart who, during two days of testimony, stressed one very important thing, namely, that the communiqué you released on October 26, 1995, reportedly hurt the morale of Canadian soldiers. Tell me if I'm wrong, but did you not yourself raise this question in the House of Commons some time ago? Did you not talk about the morale of Canadian soldiers in the House of Commons?
Mr. Jacob: Absolutely.
Mr. Bellehumeur: When?
Mr. Jacob: In May 1995, for two weeks in a row in the House of Commons, I questioned the Minister of Defence about Colonel Oehring's report on the morale of the soldiers. At that time, the minister answered me by saying that these questions had already been raised by the Reform Party with respect to Colonel Jeffries' report. There are therefore two reports dealing with the morale of soldiers, the report produced by Colonel Jeffries and the one by Colonel Oehring. I also have a report produced by some chaplains, a major and a captain, who did some very exhaustive work on army morale.
I have a pretty good knowledge of the Armed Forces and also I do not think that a simple informative communiqué such as mine can have influenced, to any extent, the morale of the troops, confused matters or destabilized force morale or authority. I will get back to this issue a little later on.
Mr. Bellehumeur: As we are dealing with a public matter, I would like to table the question that Mr. Jacob raised in the House of Commons in March 1995. I will also table the two reports that you mentioned, the two studies indicating what lies at the root of the morale problem experienced by Canadian soldiers. I would like you to tell us what is, according to these studies, the precise cause for poor morale in the Canadian Army.
Mr. Jacob: I would like to answer your question, Mr. Bellehumeur, but it has not very much bearing on the communiqué. I think that this problem has been discussed to great length at all levels. On several occasions, the member for Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt has tried to establish a link between low troop morale and the communiqué. I think that this has been exaggerated. The fact that we are referring to reports and questions of a year ago is, I feel, adequate. In my opinion, there is no cause and effect link. If you would like me to go into more details, I can do so.
Mr. Bellehumeur: No, thank you. I think that you have established the link and you have provided a very good explanation about the morale problem raised by Mr. Hart.
I will conclude with this other affirmation made by Mr. Hart when he testified, stating that the letter under review had shocked and revolted the people in the Canadian Army and that Mr. Jacob had acted dreadfully by sending this communiqué to people in the army. Do you have anything to say that will demonstrate that Mr. Hart is totally mistaken when he makes such wanton affirmations?
Mr. Jacob: As Mr. Hart said, one of his constituents who used to fly Her Majesty's plane was no doubt shocked by my communiqué at that time, but I like to think that the members of the Armed Forces are more intelligent than Mr. Hart wants to give them credit for and that they're able to distinguish between a communiqué and a government order.
Moreover, the various invitations that I have received from the Department of National Defence testify to this.
.1130
The very day of the vote in the House, I received an invitation from Brigadier General Émond to discuss the Bloc Québécois' defence policy at the military college in Kingston, where I met with professors from Queen's University and from the Royal Military College in Kingston as well as some officer cadets. I accepted this invitation with respect to the defence policy and I answered all of the questions.
The first questions dealt with the dissenting report that the Bloc Québécois, namely myself and my colleague from Shefford, had made with respect to the defence policy review.
The second part dealt with the interest that officer cadets and professors had in the possibility of a Quebec Army being set up subject to a constitutional change or should Quebec become sovereign. I even pointed out to them, when the questions began, that the members, professors or officer cadets could possibly be called upon to testify before this committee, and I can tell you that they were rather amused by this thought.
I do not think that our military people took this communiqué literally or interpreted it in the twisted way that the member for Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt did.
I would also like to say that I have received other invitations from the Department of National Defence, particularly on March 19, which was the day after the vote took place in the House, to meet the defence minister from Argentina who was visiting Ottawa. A short while later, I received another invitation, around March 24 or 25, to meet a South African general about security in his country. I received yet another invitation this morning from the Defence Minister himself to attend the inauguration ceremony of the emergency response centre.
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Jacob, could you conclude your remarks so that we could move on.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I'm getting to that, Mr. Chairman. I thought you would give me time to provide explanations on this issue which has been on the table for five months now.
I therefore think that if the Department of National Defence, the people from the Military College and officers continue to have completely normal relations with a member of the Standing Committee on National Defence, it should be clear that members of the committee cannot acceptMr. Hart's explanations, when he says that I spread confusion and discredited the army and that these people don't know what to think anymore. Given the way the army behaves towards me, you will note that the interpretation of the member for Okanagan - Similkameen-Merritt is completely false.
Mr. Bellehumeur: Given that the member wants to table documents, we have evidence of what we're stating. We are also tabling the formal invitations that were sent to Mr. Jacob.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you.
Mr. Frazer, of the Reform Party.
Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): I think no one would question the right of a sovereign Quebec, should Quebec become sovereign, to have an armed force. The question is how would that force be constituted, from where would it come, and when would it be constituted?
Mr. Jacob, who was the author of the October 26 communiqué?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: That's me.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Strictly yourself? No one assisted you? You didn't consult with anyone in the construction of the communiqué?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: There are certainly people in my office, including my assistant who's been handling defence issues with me for a few years now who is aware of the situation. I would also mention that Bloc Québécois' researcher and the honourable member for Shefford who helped me and collaborated with me on the drafting of the dissenting report concerning the review of defence policy.
The communiqué itself comes from my office and I submitted it to the press service so that they could familiarize themselves with it and translate it. The communiqué was then issued like any other one, be it on transportation, agriculture or anything else.
.1135
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Would it be normal practice for you to issue this communiqué without having it approved by your leader, or by a leadership or a caucus within your party? Was it on your own initiative alone that you released it?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: No, not necessarily. If you'd been following the proceedings, Mr. Frazer, you would know that earlier I handed over documents that contain Bloc Québécois information sheets on defence. These information sheets are prepared by the research service and were then distributed to every member in every riding where there are reserves or a military base.
At that point, caucus members were aware of the fact that Quebec was advocating the creation of an army and that we had certain information sheets to publicize that.
In my capacity as defence critic, and since there has been some discussions in caucus, I personally made the decision to publicize that portion of it, knowing that many military officers or members of military families were wondering about their future in the case of a yes vote in Quebec. They were wondering whether they'd still have a job in a Quebec army once Quebec became a sovereign state, since they were currently in the Canadian army.
The purpose of this communiqué was therefore to clarify the situation. We all know the results of the referendum, but I'm now convinced that everyone in Canada knows that Quebec will have an army after negotiations and an amendment to the legislation.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Did you meet with members of the armed forces for advice and assistance in crafting the communiqué?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: No.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Am I to understand from what you said a moment ago that Mr. Bouchard, your leader at that time, neither knew of nor approved this communiqué before it was sent out?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I can't tell you whether Mr. Bouchard himself analyzed the communiqué, but there's no doubt that his close political advisers did take note of it and approved it since they sent it out.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: You said you hadn't met with any members of the armed forces on it. Did you meet with any of the ministers, the Minister of National Defence, department officials, and were they aware that you were sending out this communiqué?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: No. You're asking me whether certain military officers helped me draft the communiqué? My answer is no. And if you're asking me if I had relations with certain public servants concerning the drafting or distribution of the communiqué, my answer is also no.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Mr. Gauthier said in the House that your press release was sent to all journalists in the press gallery. Was it sent through the normal channels of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, or just how was it sent?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: It was sent out in the usual manner. As I mentioned earlier, I drafted the communiqué myself in French and it was sent to the Bloc Québécois press office which translated it or had it translated by the House translation service, and then the communiqué was distributed according to the rules.
I also faxed my communiqué to military bases in Quebec.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Would you have available a list of the fax addresses to which you sent the communiqué, and could you table it for the committee, please?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Yes, Mr. Frazer.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: I take from what you said, then, that the communiqué was sent to journalists across the country, not just to journalists in Quebec. Is that correct?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: As I told you, I sent my communiqué to the Bloc québécois press office. Normally, when we send a communiqué, it's in an envelope and there are 200 copies that the press office looks after distributing.
.1140
I seem to remember that Mr. Hart pointed out that in the November 4 or 5 issue of the Toronto Star, Allan Thompson mentioned that he had received a press release from the Bloc québécois. That must have come from the press office because I didn't sent anything to the Toronto Star myself.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: You said, I think, that you personally, on your fax machine, sent them to the military bases. Is that correct? It was not done through your press bureau?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Yes, my office sent that communiqué directly to the military bases in Quebec.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: When that was sent to military bases, was it sent to specific individuals at those bases or just to the base generally or to several addresses on the base? Just how was that addressed? You will be giving us that address, I take it?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Absolutely not. That was done in a general way. I could find my list amongst my papers, but I think I sent them to Valcartier, Bagotville and Saint-Hubert, to engineering centres and elsewhere. Everywhere it went, the communiqué was identified the same way and was not addressed to anyone in particular. It was general information for whoever was interested.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Yes. But you will provide us with that list?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I can give it to you.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: I'm a bit perturbed. You said that the communiqué was translated. I became aware of your communiqué having been sent out only several days later. When I became aware of it, I approached your office for a copy of the communiqué so I could have a look at it. When it came to me, it was sent in French, although Mr. Leroux said twice in the House that it was translated when it was distributed and it was distributed in both official languages.
The only translation I've seen of it in English is the one that was done in Hansard by the House translators. Are you sure that it was in fact sent out in both official languages?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I'm sure it was sent in both official languages. But I do remember that when you asked my office to send you a copy, Mr. Frazer, we only had it in French, unfortunately, that's why you received it in French. If you had called the Bloc québécois press office, it's highly probable that you would have received it in your mother tongue. For my part, I sent it to you in the language in which I'd written it.
I can tell you that I wasn't the one who translated the communiqué into English, but the press office. The English language communiqué received by Mr. Allan Thompson of the Toronto Star was translated by the press office. It was therefore available, but when you called my office, I unfortunately didn't have a copy.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Did you have a specific purpose in sending that? I think you've addressed this to some extent, but may I go back to it? What was your specific purpose in sending the communiqué just before the referendum?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: The purpose of the communiqué was to clarify a certain situation, as I said earlier. But I must say that as I attended further meetings, others factors led me to send this communiqué. During the referendum campaign, like my other colleagues of the Bloc québécois, I met with my fellow citizens when going door to door in my riding.
Since the Valcartier base is in my riding, there are a lot of military personnel who live in Charlesbourg, Loretteville, Saint-Émile, Lac-Saint-Charles. I met a lot of them, as well as people from the Coast Guard.
People were asking me whether they'd still have a job if they voted yes. Or they told me that they were in the army and they were wondering if they'd have to travel less to pursue their career in a sovereign Quebec with a Quebec army, because of language, family constraints or other reasons.
At that point, my tendency was to believe that the military were certainly not prepared to pursue their career in a future sovereign Quebec.
.1145
There's something else that I want to point out and I'm glad that you've given me this opportunity to do so. Around October 24th or 25th, Radio-Canada broadcast a program at the Valcartier base and asked military personnel about their choice in the referendum. I have press clippings about that that mention what I'm about to say and what we saw on television. There were military officers who said: "I'm proud to serve Canada, I'm going to vote no and I'm a federalist." There were others who said: "I'm not getting involved in this issue". And yet others were saying: "I'm a sovereignist and I would like to work within a sovereign Quebec".
It's weird, people didn't even know... I can tell you about a service man whose face, unfortunately, couldn't be seen on television. When you're a sovereignist in the armed forces, you run a bit of a risk of discrimination. I almost feel like asking the government to submit a bill against discrimination on grounds of political orientation. I'm convinced the Reform party would be against that kind of bill, but it might be interesting to implement.
If people make a choice in their individual lives and can't mention it, if they have to hide like criminals, it's a concern. At the time, my goal was to reassure those people that in Quebec, when the negotiations were over, it was clear that after a yes, even though some federalists don't believe us or did not believe us, there would be a period of negotiations and from that point on, the bases whether in the area of transportation, communications or the armed forces, that don't have their provincial equivalent, would be under the obligation to somewhat prepare for such a project.
Federalist often accuse us of not being specific enough. I was specific as to the Quebec army and said that all Quebec members of the armed forces could join a Quebec army if they so wished. There was no obligation at all. I saw no obligation in that, no more than Mr. Hart did.
That position was clarified. Once it's clarified, you're held for contempt of Parliament. I think it's a bit much.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: So you were inviting members of the Canadian Armed Forces to join a Quebec armed force.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Yes, within the limits negotiated for all...
[English]
Mr. Frazer: No, you didn't say that though. You invited them to join the Quebec armed forces.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I can invite them a year later, Mr. Frazer, and I'll take the time to explain this. Mr. Hart played around a lot with the wording of the oath and contract. I think I know all about that. Even if he said that the members of the committee should be told about it, you don't know what goes on in the army. As an ex serviceman, I'll try to relate what you don't know and what I know.
Unfortunately, I know a little bit about it. I know there are contracts and I know a lot of people in the army who won't be renewing their contracts in May or June and will seek out other careers. It's quite normal in the army. It's hypothetical. Everything is in the future. Of course, I'm inviting the Quebec service people who so wish to pursue their career in a hypothetical Quebec army but within the period provided for during the negotiations within the time period of Quebec's accession to full sovereignty and not before that.
No one, at any level, could ever say that I helped prepare the army before Quebec's legal accession to sovereignty. All that was simply fomented in the mind of people who wanted to get it.
You yourself, Mr. Hart, said that there was absolutely nothing in my communiqué inciting mutiny, sedition or desertion. Having worked with me for over two years on the Defence Committee, you know full well that I've never gone down that path.
All the interpretations your party made, Mr. Hart made, were only interpretations. There was no provable and proven fact.
.1150
[English]
Mr. Frazer: But Mr. Jacob, you have said after a period of negotiation.... Your communiqué said immédiatement. It did say au lendemain, and I understand the subtle difference there, but you did say immédiatement. That doesn't sound to me like a period of negotiation. Would you agree?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Let's say yes. It says: ``Au lendemain d'un OUI, le Québec devra créer immédiatement..." ``Au lendemain", in French can mean weeks, months and even years. Even if English, it says, The day after. I don't know if you've seen that movie on nuclear war The Day After isn't the following day. To destroy the planet it didn't take just one day. It's not the following day at all. The people of Quebec know that in all the premises of the legislation passed by the national assembly as well as the tripartite agreement, there was never any mention that anything would happen without negotiation.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Then why did you use the term immédiatement?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Before saying ``immédiatement", I say ``Au lendemain d'un oui". If there's no yes, then nothing will happen. As soon as there's a yes, negotiations will commence. From that point on, any responsible government will have to draw up plans for the foundations of a defence department and set up the embryo of a defence staff.
We shouldn't forget one thing: the sovereignists have always said that we would accept an equitable share of the debt but that implies that, in return, we'd keep some infrastructures, ports, post offices and military bases.
In order for negotiations to be valid, certain specialists, both military and civilian, would be needed to hold positive negotiations. That was the basis for that thing. Following a yes, it could have been prepared during X number of weeks or months.
Of course, there are fanatics in sovereignist ranks, but you have them in the federal ranks too. When you try to make out the intent of that communiqué to be creating an army to achieve sovereignty through force, I'm sorry, but I have problems understanding that some parliamentarians I respect could even think such thoughts.
[English]
Mr. Frazer: Mr. Jacob, I'm not for a moment suggesting you were advocating use of force in achieving sovereignty - not at all. My concern is that you have to recognize that military people cannot work for two countries at the same time. You have said there was a group of officers ready to form a headquarters, and your term ``immediately'' implies they were ready if there had been a yes vote in the referendum. Don't you think there is some controversy here as to whether these people could be loyal to Canada at the same time as they were considering defecting to Quebec?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: No, absolutely not. You always have to come back to the history of the negotiations. With the utmost respect, I'm convinced that you did not follow the referendum debate in Quebec and that you're not aware of all the details. You took the communiqué and you gave it your own interpretation. At the outset, you yourself had the proper interpretation. On the other hand, your colleague probably listened to suggestions made by certain media people we won't mention and changed his approach somewhat.
You say that no one thought that I wanted to achieve sovereignty by force of arms. When a member of Parliament is accused on the floor of the House of Commons of encouraging sedition and issuing a call for arms, I wonder what that is if it's not being accused of trying to destabilize the country by force and I'm sure that you don't harbour that thought. The member for Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt doesn't think it either, but he acted because of undue pressure from unknown quarters
.1155
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Jacob.
[English]
Mr. Boudria, please.
Mr. Boudria: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Translation]
I also have a few questions for Mr. Jacob. However, I will share my time with the next person on your list. I believe it's Mrs. Catterall.
I raised this matter of the communiqué with Mr. Hart because I get the impression it has a different scope in French and in English. I'm not saying that it's sedition in one case or the other, but I am saying the two versions are different.
Mr. Jacob, was the original press release in French or English? That may go without saying, but I think it should be said.
Mr. Jacob: It was in French. If it had been written in English, there would be far more mistakes.
Mr. Boudria: You've said a few words about that. The French text says: ``Au lendemain d'un oui." However, when one is knowledgeable about the sovereignty project - and I don't support it at all - one knows that it did mention, in November 1995, negotiations over a one year period. Was it your intention, through your communiqué, to set up the embryo of a defence staff before that one year consultation period was over if, most unfortunately, the vote had been favourable to sovereignty.
Mr. Jacob: Still concerning those negotiations you've just mentioned, the communiqué spoke in fact, as I said before to Mr. Frazer, about what could be called an embryo. Actually, it was only an embryo. I'll talk in medical terms, because I'm a veterinary. An embryo is an extremely small thing. If I mentioned it in my communiqué it's because in Quebec, once the negotiations would have been under way with the federal government, especially concerning the sharing of some of the infrastructures, there certainly would have been a need for people with military knowledge to negotiate in that area. In Quebec, just as any other province, there are individuals who have left the army, individuals who have just left the army, others who are going to leave the army, and others who are going to enlist.
It involved preparation for a function that does not have its counterpart in Quebec and which, unfortunately in my view, has too often been neglected and sometimes completely ignored because it was a sort of taboo.
I realize that the subject was taboo because I can honestly confess that I never would have imagined that my communiqué would cause such an uproar in Parliament where I sit with you. That is why I did it publicly with no attempt to disguise what I was doing. In any case, all the members of Parliament know why the members of the Bloc Québécois were elected by their fellow citizens. That is my answer.
Mr. Boudria: You may have already answered this question. Please excuse me if I didn't quite understand the response. Was your communiqué distributed here in the Parliament buildings to the organizations that normally receive press releases?
Mr. Jacob: I already answered and I'll answer again. As I explained, the communiqué was drafted in my office by myself with the help of my assistant. When it was finished, I sent it to the press service of the Bloc Québécois here in Ottawa. They corrected a few mistakes and I asked them to translate it. They then called my back to tell me that they would be issuing it according to the usual procedure. I didn't go to the press service of the Bloc to find out whether they had sent it to all the newspapers. No, I didn't do that.
Mr. Boudria: I see. So the fact that you knew...
Mr. Jacob: We followed the normal procedure, as far as I know.
Mr. Boudria: I see. Can you tell me whether the English and French versions of the communiqué were issued at the same time?
.1200
Mr. Jacob: According to what the press service told me, yes.
Mr. Boudria: Was it your intention for the communiqué to have the same scope both in English and French?
M. Jacob: Certainly.
Mr. Boudria: It may be obvious but it is nonetheless important for us to put it on...
Mr. Bellehumeur: If one were to look at the French translation of various English texts, one would often discover differences.
Mr. Boudria: Exactly, when I look at the text, it seems to me that the English version is more clear cut and goes much farther. I also raised this point with Mr. Hart.
In the French text, your intention was to say ``le lendemain" rather than ``au lendemain"?
Mr. Jacob: ``Au lendemain" was what I intended.
Mr. Boudria: I see. In other words, later on.
Mr. Jacob: Definitely, since it was necessary to comply strictly with the bill on the referendum adopted by the Quebec government. I certainly wasn't going to go against the laws of Quebec.
Mr. Boudria: There's an English term here that causes me some difficulty. When you say major state in English, I suppose it is meant to be a translation of the French term ``état-major" since that is the word you used in French. It is not normally the English equivalent.
Mr. Jacob: As I mentioned, I didn't do the translation. I drafted in French and the press service made the translation. So I can't really answer...
Mr. Boudria: I'm not criticizing your talents as a translator.
Mr. Jacob: I cannot say whether major state is the equivalent. As I explained, I was referring to a kind of skeleton defence staff. I don't know whether ``état major" should be translated as major staff or major state.
Mr. Boudria: Mr. Jacob, when you issued your communiqué, was your intention to set up such a staff after a no vote in the referendum?
Mr. Jacob: No, by no means. It was clearly stated. In any case, there was a no victory, unfortunately for us. I'm convinced that the Department of Defence must have checked into whether I had formal or informal meetings or if I had set up the embryo of a defence staff. So the answer is a definite no.
Mr. Boudria: Although this is not in the motion we are debating, since it was amended, it could have been. So I'm asking you whether your intention was to encourage the defection of Canadian service men.
Mr. Jacob: Thank you for the question. When I heard Mr. Hart say that the communiqué was a call to desertion and that young soldiers of 18 or 19 might feel that their oath of loyalty was called into question, I wanted to say something in response and you have given me the opportunity.
With respect to the transfer of loyalty, I think that that's what you're alluding to, I must say that I trust the loyalty of Quebec and Canadian soldiers. I know perfectly well that they are able to make a distinction between a communiqué issued by the Official Opposition and an order from army staff. I think that they're intelligent enough for that.
Furthermore, I know perfectly well that this communiqué, in the form it was sent out, contained no incitement to desertion or mutiny.
As a matter of fact, I can refer to the statement made by General Dallaire whom I quote in English: ``it simply arrived, we read it and that was it."
Another said: ``We received the communiqué. We didn't give it any importance. It was part of the referendum debate and we all anxiously awaited the results."
It was a matter of information. Since that time, and it goes back to the month of November and the end of October, I haven't met any people in the forces who told me: ``you really destabilize things" or ``you were encouraging soldiers to desert." I've maintained my relations with officers in the army, like the General of the Valcartier base, I've had other meetings on different matters and never was this subject brought up. It's strictly in the mind of the member of Parliament who has accused me. That is the end of it.
.1205
Mr. Boudria: I think you said that you had this communiqué circulated in Parliament and on military bases. In the latter case, in addition to sending it to the base itself, did you also send copies to particular individuals calling on them?
Mr. Jacob: Not at all.
Mr. Boudria: Did you send any other correspondence or representations to individuals asking them to set up this staff you described in your communiqué?
Mr. Jacob: Not at all.
Mr. Boudria: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Boudria.
Mrs. Catterall, please.
Ms Catterall (Ottawa West): How long do I have, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman: About ten minutes.
Ms Catterall: As critic for your party on national defence issues, had you ever before sent any communication to military bases and establishments to inform them of the positions of the Bloc?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: To the military bases, as critic, no. However, as critic for Defence, I have sent press releases to newspapers before.
[English]
Ms Catterall: So you didn't have these fax numbers before you sent out this communiqué, you got them for the purposes of sending out this communiqué?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: No. I had them before sending the communiqué. For example, when some changes were made to the Valcartier base, at the end of 1994, and some buildings were put up for the reserve school, that is residences for reservists in their summer camp and school, I did send a press release about the economic spin-offs.
As I said, I do have a directory of telephone numbers for military bases throughout Canada. On that particular occasion, I did not think it was of interest to send to all bases a communiqué dealing with the economic spin-offs of the expansion of the military base for the Quebec region.
In the case of the communiqué we are dealing with, I did think it was relevant to do so because those who would be most affected by a proposal for a future Quebec army were those force members. That is why I decided to do so.
I can tell you, Mrs. Catterall, that a number of members of the forces, on receiving this communiqué, did call my office to ask me whether I had received authorization from the Department of Defence or the chief of staff allowing them to distribute it. I answered no, that I was sending it as information material and that they could do what they wanted with it.
In some cases it was posted, in other cases it was thrown in the waste paper basket. It depended to some extent on their opinions or political orientation, as I already explained. It's as simple as that.
[English]
Ms Catterall: Your communiqué wasn't targeted to particular fax machines, it just went to general fax machines at the bases. What kinds of people did you hear from from within the military?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: As I said, one person called me back to ask me if I had the authorization. He decided that if I did not have it, the document would be thrown directly into the waste paper basket.
Aside from that comment, and I am saying this in all sincerity, I did not call or communicate with any member of the armed forces about the communiqué.
The first time that I heard my communiqué mentioned was in a Toronto Star article and, later on, during a call from Ms Diane Francis of the Financial Post. I can say to you quite clearly and frankly that no member of the armed forces, of any rank, communicated with myself to tell me if he agreed or not with my communiqué.
It occurred essentially in the media or in the House, with addresses by the Reform Party.
.1210
[English]
Ms Catterall: So you did have people, though, who did receive the communiqué who then contacted you to see if you had authorization to send it out. Some of them distributed it and some of them posted it.
In any case, aside from whoever might have received the communiqué at any one of the 15 numbers you sent it to, did you hear from any member of the armed forces as a result of that communiqué?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: No. What was the number you just mentioned? I'm not sure if it's the interpretation that...
[English]
Ms Catterall: I believe you said you sent it to 15 numbers.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: Oh, yes! The interpreter had said 1,500. Roughly 15 to 20, with regard to Quebec bases.
With regard to comments, as I said earlier, the only ones that I was aware of.... Earlier I quoted what Major General Roméo Dallaire said in La Presse, that he had received the communiqué and that was all. Another officer also said in La Presse that the communiqué had not been the object of discussions and that he did not give it any importance. I was not called personally to make any comments, except the one that I just mentioned, and I did not get any reaction to this faxed document at all.
[English]
Ms Catterall: But in your responses earlier you said that one of the reasons you sent out this type of communiqué was that people you ran into in your constituency who were members of the armed forces were concerned about their future if there should be a vote for separation. Now you're telling me that not one of them called you after this communiqué to comment on it or to ask you about it?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: No. If the communiqué was addressed to members of the armed forces, I could reply that they judged its pertinence and reacted by voting either positively or negatively. In my opinion, it was not necessary for them to call me to say that I had done something either wonderful or dreadful. It was a communiqué that provided information; from then on, it was up to them to make a decision in the debate that we were living.
[English]
Ms Catterall: There's not much time, Mr. Chair, and again I suspect we're going to have to have this witness back for a second round.
Let me go back to the earlier point and let me leave out ``The day'' from the English version of your communiqué in the second paragraph on page 2. If we take that out it gets rid of the problems around whether it was properly translated or not. If I take that out, what I then read is ``After a YES win...Québec should immediately create a Department of Defence''. It doesn't say after negotiations, after discussions, or after agreements; it says ``After a YES win...immediately''.
Let me put that together with your comment on the bottom of the first page that ``a sovereign Québec should make the best use of the resources already deployed on its territory''. What would have been your reaction if, immediately after a yes win, somebody in the military or several people in the military had responded to the establishment of a department of defence and responded to your invitation to join? Would you have expected that they would bring the resources of Canada with them, their uniforms, their armaments, the planes they flew, the bases they lived on?
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I'm tempted to answer your questions in the reverse order. If the Yes side had won in the referendum, the next day, would the Department of Defence have given the order to send all F-18 to Cold Lake or to Goose Bay and to deploy all military personnel? This is a hypothetical question. To come back to the one you asked, there was never any question of asking military personnel to show up with their boots, their weapons, and their uniforms. We must always try to look at the situation in the context of the referendum, with regard to what is said in the communiqué, that is ``the day after", and keep in mind the bill that provided for a certain period of negotiation.
.1215
Given that in the specific field of defence the provincial government does not have any expertise or counterpart, it would have been necessary for certain experts in the military field to negotiate the division of this equipment and the uniforms. I am convinced of one thing. This would not have occurred ``the day after", but rather ``after" the referendum, during a period of negotiation.
We must also be aware that in such a context, during a negotiating period of 8, 10, or 12 months, while Quebec should have, has and will have taken on the project of creating a Quebec army, the Canadian government will not want to maintain military infrastructure and military personnel without receiving taxes from Quebec in exchange. At a certain moment, we will surely say that Quebec will shoulder a certain portion of the debt and that the military personnel who want to come under Quebec must join it.
By saying ``should immediately create a department", the communiqué simply recognizes that after a yes vote in the referendum, when negotiations will begin, the Quebec government will have to effectively find people who have military knowledge in order to carry out these negotiations. It was not at all a question of establishing an army or pretending that we already had our army and that we were getting ready to run off with everything by force of circumstance. Negotiations were to have taken place. I think that all federalists as well as sovereigntists recognize this. There would be a sharing of the debt, but there would also be a sharing of the assets. This will require competent people in specific areas. That would then be the case for defence.
[English]
Ms Catterall: We are not dealing with this document. We are dealing with your communiqué. We are dealing with a communiqué that not only came out referring to your position but also came from the office of the leader of the opposition, who at that time was also the leader of the yes campaign in Quebec and of the committee for the yes campaign. So this communiqué not only carries the weight of Mr. Jacob as critic for national defence but also carries the weight of the leader of the opposition, the leader of the yes campaign.
Regardless of how one might want subsequently to refer to other documents, what this document says is that after a yes vote there should immediately be established a department of defence to which members of the Canadian Armed Forces would be invited to transfer their loyalty. That seems quite clear to me, Mr. Jacob. You were inviting members of the Canadian Armed Forces to join the armed forces of Quebec immediately after a yes vote. How can you explain that discrepancy? And not only are you doing it in your own name, but in fact the leader of the opposition at the time, who now is the Premier of Quebec, was doing it.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: If you want to disassociate my communiqué from the bill, will you at least allow me to put it within the context of the referendum? In my opinion, the military personnel in Quebec who were members of the Canadian Armed Forces - whose loyalty I do not question, as opposed toMr. Hart - were completely aware of the referendum debate.
.1220
As I mentioned at the very beginning, even the 1300 to 1400 military personnel based in Valcartier who were in Bosnia on a peacekeeping mission received the bill as well as the referendum question and other information documents. It was therefore in the interest of the Canadian Forces to at least inform their members so that they may make an enlightened decision.
If one considers the communiqué without taking into account the referendum context, certain people might eventually question the opportunity of transferring or creating a department of defence and an army immediately after a yes vote. But because of the respect that I have for the armed forces, I am convinced that their people are intelligent enough to put it in the context of the referendum.
This is the reason why no member of the armed forces, except perhaps major general MacKenzie to whom we will have to come back later... When we compare Iran to Canada, this comparison doesn't seem quite right. No senior or junior officers, among those who are there, said that they were shocked or insulted, that they had not understood the context in which it was published, that they considered the communiqué as an incentive to desert or to transfer their loyalty while they were still active members of the Canadian Forces. Mr. Hart has not been able to prove this. Nowhere in the news media or in meetings have we heard such a statement. I think that people were able to put the communiqué in the appropriate context. I repeat that even if you wanted to disassociate the documents from this context, we repeated a number of times in the media that there would be a negotiating process and that after that, the other processes would begin.
I do not think that in any way these people expected that, on the morning of the 31st of October, there would be a Department of Defence, a headquarters, and that they would be asked to desert and to move to Quebec. This is a complete distortion of my intention. This can only be justified through the context or the interpretation of the text itself.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Ms Catterall.
Mr. Bellehumeur, do you have another round of questions?
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Yes. I won't use up all the time that has been allocated to me, Mr. Chair, because I believe that what Mr. Jacob has said has let a lot of air out of the balloon. I simply want to ask him, in conclusion, to jog Mr. Hart's memory, because it was very selective during his testimony. Can Mr. Jacob tell us, and even table documents to this effect, if Mr. Hart was truly present at the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs on November 28, December 5, 6, 12, and 13, 1995? Can you tell us, Mr. Jacob, whether or not Mr. Hart was present at these meetings? If so, would you like to table the minutes of these committee meetings?
Mr. Jacob: Yes, Mr. Hart and I attended the five meetings in question. Here are the minutes.
Mr. Bellehumeur: The Clerk will take those. You may remember that on November 29th, 1995, Mr. Hart made accusations against you in the House for the first time by referring to section 62 of the Criminal Code. He said that what you had done was terrible and so on. Did he raise the issue of the now infamous communiqué released on October 26th, 1995, at the Standing Committee on Defence, when he had the opportunity to do so on November 28th, or December 5th, 6th, 12th or 13th 1995?
Mr. Jacob: No, it was never mentioned. Neither Mr. Hart nor any other committee member raised the issue. Mr. Hart had said that the subject was not on the agenda. However, if my action had been serious enough to destabilize the entire armed forces and to challenge my right to sit on the defence committee -
I think it happened at a time when other questions were being raised because I remember clearly that, at one point, when we entered the meeting room of the Defence Committee, Mr. Hart had asked me whether I would produce a minority report as I had done in the case of the review of defence policy. At the time, we were working on the reorganization of the reserves. I remember tellingMr. Hart that I had six or seven proposals for the committee and that if the Liberal majority agreed to them, I would support their position on the review of the reorganization of the reserves. I made my suggestions and the Liberal majority supported them.
.1225
So I supported the report, as opposed to Mr. Hart. But he had asked me whether I was going to table a minority report. If I had indeed become a public threat because of the communiqué, I think he would have raised the issue earlier in the committee and I especially believe he would not have asked for my advice.
Mr. Bellehumeur: This is my final question, Mr. Jacob.
You are a member of Parliament. You were elected to represent a riding and to defend the interests of Quebec. Do you feel - and I would like you to tell us in detail - that the accusations made against you by Mr. Hart and the following uproar prevented you from carrying out your duties as a member of Parliament; in other words, were they an impediment to your job? Was your parliamentary privilege breached?
Mr. Jacob: It was said a little earlier that because of the accusations made against me by the member for Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt, I had been stripped of my position as Vice-Chair of the defence committee. In my opinion, the committee has always been and is still very important. I had acquired a certain expertise and I enjoyed the work. I am still the Opposition defence critic, but I am no longer Vice-Chair of the committee.
Regarding the issue of privilege and my role as a member of Parliament, I don't think there has been a clear evaluation of how much Mr. Hart's accusations and the remarks of my colleagues in the House have had on me. The papers have put their own spin on these accusations and have even greatly exaggerated them.
Let me tell you that when you go to your riding and see the headline in the Quebec City newspaper which reads ``Jacob may face imprisonment" or ``Jacob in hot water" or ``Jacob will lose his seat", it seriously damages your reputation as a member of Parliament.
It's clear that when the House decided to let the committee on procedure and House affairs consider the matter, it had not assessed how the media would react. It is unacceptable that the House on the basis of a misinterpretation of my communiqué and other fals information should decide to study the content of said communiqué, a decision that the print media blew sometimes out of proportion.
When some reporters asked me whether I was afraid of going to jail, it represented a breach of my parliamentary privilege and certainly interfered with my public role as a member of Parliament. When the House voted on the issue, I don't think the significance of it was weighed enough.
Mr. Bellehumeur: The last question to the witness will be asked by Mr. Laurin. I'm done.
Mr. Laurin (Joliette): I only have one question, Mr. Chairman, and it deals with the matter raised by Ms Catterall a little earlier regarding your communiqué. To her mind, your communiqué was an invitation to members of the Canadian Forces to join a Quebec army. Please tell us exactly what the purpose of your communiqué was. Were you in fact inviting members of the Canadian Forces to form a Quebec army or were you telling them they might eventually be part of a Quebec army.
.1230
Mr. Jacob: As I've repeated several times, the communiqué...
[English]
Mr. Frazer: I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman. At the time this was going on there were no Quebec military officers. I think the question is out of order.
The Chairman: I must confess I wasn't paying attention to exactly what the question was. What was the question?
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: Mr. Chairman, Ms Catterall implied that the communiqué incited members of the Canadian Armed Forces to join the ranks of an eventual Quebec army.
I am asking Mr. Jacob whether his intention was to invite members of one army to join another which would eventually be created or whether it was to inform members of the Canadian Forces that they may one day be called upon to join a Quebec army.
[English]
The Chairman: I'm trying to listen through the translation, but as I understand the question it's a hypothetical question about a hypothetical Quebec army, Mr. Frazer. Is that not the way you're interpreting the question? I don't see anything inappropriate about the question being asked. It's a hypothetical question.
Mr. Frazer: It was worded somewhat differently this time, Mr. Chairman, from how it was worded before.
The Chairman: I'll allow the question.
Please answer the question.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I have already answered that question, at least in part.
Besides, it's nice to hear that this was a hypothetical question regarding a hypothetical Quebec army. The entire communiqué was hypothetical.
Its premise rested on a Yes victory, which would have been followed by a period of negotiations. I have an article here, which I could quote, in which a member of the armed forces said that he was leaving, that he would vote yes in the referendum and that he hoped a sovereign Quebec would find a place for military personnel. The person made this statement even before my communiqué had been issued. So people were not sure what to expect regarding their future, as was the case for most Canadians or Quebeckers throughout the referendum debate.
I don't see why the armed forces should be kept under a glass bubble to prevent them from receiving any information on the pretext that their oath of loyalty is too fragile and that as soon as it is threatened, it is forgotten. Are you insinuating that they are not smart enough to understand what they hear and that they have to be protected? I don't think members of the military are like that at all.
The communiqué said something which had never been clarified before, despite the fact that several people in Quebec had mentioned the possibility of a Quebec army. I simply clarified the issue for people who were not sure about voting yes in the referendum because they did not know whether they would be able to pursue their military career in a Quebec army if the province became independent.
I have always said that this was the purpose of the communiqué, but some people interpreted it differently depending on their political views.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Since we still have a few minutes left, I want to advise the committee that I intend to table a motion calling for an end to this kangaroo trial and this waste of time.
I am advising the committee of this immediately. The motion is ready in both official languages and I will table it at the end of this meeting.
Thank you.
[English]
The Chairman: You're giving a notice of motion, you're not putting a motion. Is that correct?
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I move the motion.
[English]
The Chairman: You want to present a motion.
Mr. Bellehumeur: Yes.
The Chairman: First of all, perhaps my translation was different, but for the record I think it's important, Mr. Bellehumeur, that the language you've used is inappropriate. This is not a trial. So I want to pull you up short here and remind you that this isn't a trial. This is just a parliamentary hearing.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I used the expression ``kangaroo court". Call it what you want, but I believe this is a waste of time and everyone will reach the same conclusion this evening.
I simply want to submit a motion to the committee, asking it to decide if it wishes to continue after we have heard Mr. Hart and Mr. Jacob. If that is what the committee wants, we will go ahead.
.1235
I myself think that the government and the members around the table should realize that Canadian taxpayers are fed up of paying for puppet committees like this one. These interpretation are not in the least reliable or based on anything at all. No real evidence has been submitted againstMr. Jacob. Mr. Chairman, I think it is time to vote on the motion which I will table momentarily.
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Bellehumeur, I'm wondering whether, out of respect for your colleagues.... In view of the fact that we allowed Mr. Hart to have a full, frank airing, I thought there was general agreement that there would be a full and frank opportunity to hear also from Mr. Jacob.
With the greatest of respect, before I hear from Mr. Milliken, as your chairman I'm trying to impose the agreement on which I believe there was general agreement. It sounds to me as if you're now changing the terms of what you agreed to, which was that -
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Not at all.
[English]
The Chairman: - Mr. Jacob would be given an opportunity to be questioned by the entire committee. I have a list -
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Mr. Chairman, these are exactly the same questions put to the same witness and we are now hearing the same answers. If you have any more time to waste and if you want to waste the time of Canadian taxpayers, then we can quite simply continue, Mr. Chairman. But we will not learn anything new.
[English]
The Chairman: I'm going to hear from Mr. Milliken.
[Translation]
Mr. Milliken: Mr. Chairman, the problem is that Mr. Bellehumeur has already had two opportunities to ask questions of the witness. I have not yet had such an opportunity. They have had numerous opportunities to ask the witness questions which provided information that we had already obtained from the only other witness. We have not asked this witness enough questions. Not enough for me.
As a member of the committee, I want to have the opportunity to put my questions on this subject. Otherwise, it would not be fair. I did not object when he asked to be heard on a second round, before I had my first round. Mr. Chairman, I would ask him to withdraw his motion so that I can put my questions today, or even on Tuesday. I don't really mind when, but I do want to ask my questions.
Mr. Bellehumeur: I have tabled my motion and it remains on the table. I tabled it in both official languages. Mr. Chairman, you have it in your hands, and I even have copies for the members of the committee. I do not intend to withdraw it. The motion is on the table.
Mr. Milliken: Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee adjourn for today, so that we can meet Mr. Jacob once again.
[English]
The Chairman: The adjournment motion takes precedence.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Does the government's...
[English]
The Chairman: I'm sorry, but there's no debate on an adjournment motion. Mr. Milliken has moved to adjourn.
Motion agreed to
The Chairman: This meeting stands adjourned.