[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, October 22, 1996
.1107 
[English]
The Chairman: Good morning. Call to order.
Colleagues, the order of the day involves our colleague and friend, Mr. Milliken. We're resuming consideration of Bill C-270. As we left it prior to the break, Mr. Milliken was to prepare a couple of revisions, which I believe he circulated. We can quickly dispense with them and have a clause-by-clause consideration.
If there are some points of order or other matters relating to some other business to come before the committee, I'd appreciate your forbearance to dispose of Mr. Milliken and then move on to the other matters.
Would that be agreeable, Mr. Langlois?
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois (Bellechasse): I'm a bit stymied, Mr. Chairman, because my point of order is precisely about the agenda. It seems difficult to begin a meeting if there is no agreement on the agenda.
You will recall that last October 8 we had ``invited'' Mr. Kingsley, the Chief Electoral Officer, to come before the committee on the 10th, that is to say two days later, but Mr. Kingsley was travelling to the Northwest Territories at the time and could not come here. Mr. Chairman, I submit that it was incumbent upon Mr. Kingsley to come before the committee at his earliest convenience and I note today that he is still not present in this room. I also note that he is not on the agenda and I would like you to order that he appear before the committee after we hear Mr. Milliken.
[English]
The Chairman: I'm prepared to consider your request. As your chair, I would have something to add to that about what I've been trying to arrange. I will share with colleagues my conversation with both Mr. Kingsley and my colleague, Mr. Langlois, if we all agree that we can dispose ofMr. Milliken's matter. Is that agreed?
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Yes.
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Milliken, the floor is yours. Perhaps you'll want to take us through the amendment you're proposing, and then we'll go from there.
Mr. Milliken (Kingston and the Islands): Mr. Chairman, thank you.
In accordance with the discussion we had at the last meeting, there was some concern expressed in Mr. Robertson's legislative summary of this bill concerning whether or not the amendment I had proposed was sufficient to do what was intended by the amendment.
.1110
Accordingly I met with legislative counsel, and with some cooperation from Mr. Robertson and me, she has drafted a new amendment to do exactly what was intended by the one that was in the bill.I have circulated it to members today.
Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): Are you saying you made a mistake?
Mr. Milliken: No, I'm not. I just think there's a better way of drafting it to make clearer what was intended.
Mr. Frazer: I've never heard of that happening before.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
The Chairman: Trifles make perfection.
Mr. Milliken: We're exercising our skills as lawyers here and trying to make the thing read in a way that makes sense to everybody.
The new draft will read:
30. (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), where a payment is urgently required for the public good
(a) at any time that Parliament is not in session from the date of a dissolution until sixty days following the date fixed for the return of the writs at the general election immediately following that dissolution, and
(b) there is no other appropriation pursuant to which the payment may be made,
- the Governor in Council, on the report of the President of the Treasury Board that there is no
appropriation for the payment and the report of the appropriate Minister that the payment is
urgently required for the public good, may, by order, direct the preparation of a special warrant
to be signed by the Governor General authorizing the payment to be made out of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund.
(1.1) The Governor in Council shall not, in the sixty days referred to in subsection (1), direct the preparation of a special warrant referred to in that subsection when Parliament is not in session on any of those days by virtue of the fact that it is prorogued.
In other words, you can't have Parliament recalled for a certain date and then call it for a day and prorogue it and then start issuing warrants. It's designed to prevent its use between sessions of Parliament, and I think we've covered it more effectively with this wording.
Just for members' interest, through Mr. Niemczak of the library, Mr. Robertson came up with the number of days between the date of the return of the writs and the first sitting day of a Parliament for the last 10 Parliaments, back to 1962. Throughout that period, the average number of days between return of the writs and the first sitting day was 51.
The longest was 120 days. Members will recall that was after the election in June 1979, when the Conservative government took over and didn't recall Parliament until October, so there were120 days there. The next longest was a 94-day period in 1993, when, after an election in October of that year, the Parliament did not meet until January and there was a 94-sitting day period.
So this bill, in my view, will not pose a serious inconvenience. We've chosen 60 days in the amendment we've drafted, and I hope that's satisfactory to members, given the record.
If that's satisfactory, when we start clause-by-clause, Mr. Chairman, I would move this amendment on clause 1.
The Chairman: Colleagues, you've had an opportunity to review this. On this amendment being proposed, does anyone wish to make a comment? Mr. Strahl.
Mr. Strahl (Fraser Valley East): I just have a general comment.
You'd mentioned in your previous visit to the committee that the idea of ``where a payment is urgently required for the public good'' has also been abused in times past. I don't know if there's a way to prevent that or not, but you'd mentioned it.
We think in terms of making sure the pension cheques are filled out. The government - no particular government, but a government - at times may say they need office renovations for the executives' bathroom or something, but I guess there's no way of being more specific than that. Have you thought about that?
Mr. Milliken: Well, I didn't, because we restricted the timeframe in which these are available so greatly that, in my view, it isn't going to be so important any more. We've left the words the same in that respect.
But remember, these are only available after a Parliament has been dissolved until a date 60 days after the return of the writs, so the abuses we suffered before, where they were used between sessions of Parliament to avoid having the House sitting, will no longer be available to the government.
.1115
Mr. Strahl: That's probably sufficient. Thank you.
[Translation]
The Chairman: Mr. Laurin.
Mr. Laurin (Joliette): Mr. Chairman, I have two questions. The first concerns the second paragraph of the amendment Mr. Milliken is proposing this morning. I would like Mr. Milliken to give us a full explanation of what he means by ``direct the preparation of a special warrant''. I don't quite see the difference between this new text and the old one.
Mr. Milliken: The difference is in subclause (1.1). Just a moment, please.
Mr. Laurin: The old text says that the Governor in Council may not ``authorize a payment'' and in the second text, you suggest that we say, rather, that the Governor General may not ``direct the preparation of a special warrant''.
What is the difference?
Mr. Milliken: In that paragraph, we have replaced the words ``authorize a payment'' by ``direct the preparation of a special warrant referred to''. The text prohibits the preparation of a special warrant: it does not prohibit the authorization of a payment. There is a slight difference because according to the procedure the Governor in Council directs the preparation of a special warrant and the Governor General must sign it. We have, thus, clarified the text of the law so that the Governor in Council cannot direct the preparation of a special warrant.
Mr. Laurin: Does that mean that under the new text, the Governor in Council could authorize a payment?
Mr. Milliken: No, not at all. With the text that is currently in the Act and which we maintain here, the Governor in Council must direct the preparation of a special warrant which must be signed by the Governor General for a payment to be made out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
Mr. Laurin: My second question concerns the summary of Bill C-270. It seems that this summary does not correspond to what we are trying to prevent. In the summary, it says:
This bill would ensure that special warrants of the Governor General being used to authorize payments out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund could be issued only during a dissolution of Parliament. And yet I believe I understood that that was precisely what we wanted to prevent.
Mr. Milliken: The dissolution is in effect from the date of the dissolution until the new Parliament sits. In the text of the bill, it is said that Parliament is deemed to not be in session from the date of dissolution until the day two weeks prior to the first date fixed by the proclamation summoning Parliament to meet for the dispatch of business following the said dissolution. My amendment changes that period to a fixed date, which would be 60 days after the return of the election writs.
Mr. Laurin: Before this bill, the Governor in Council could do that during the period mentioned, while in the summary of the bill, it states that the Governor in Council can only issue these warrants during that period.
.1120
Mr. Milliken: Yes, because before -
Mr. Laurin: So, he will not be able to do so.
Mr. Milliken: Previously, the special warrants could also be used during periods when Parliament was not in session, and not only during a dissolution of Parliament.
Mr. Laurin: Ah, I see.
Mr. Milliken: That is the problem. Between parliamentary sessions, during prorogations of Parliament, special warrants can be used and an administration can continue to govern while the House of Commons is not sitting.
Mr. Laurin: Thank you.
The Chairman: Is everyone in agreement? Yes.
Mr. Langlois, please.
Mr. Langlois: Mr. Milliken, with subsection 30(1.1), you dilute the intent of the principle stated in the summary of the bill, because there could be special warrants during a prorogation of the House.
An honourable member: No, they could not use special warrants.
Mr. Milliken: No, it would only be possible during a dissolution.
Mr. Langlois: During the 60 days following a dissolution.
Mr. Milliken: That's it.
Mr. Langlois: I would like to ask Ms McMurray about the difference in the two versions. First of all, we were to amend subsection (5) of section 30 of the Financial Institutions Act, and now we are no longer amending it; we are amending subsection 30(1.1) and repealing subsection 30(5). Why was it necessary to proceed in this way and what will be the effect of this amendment? Are we being faithful to the pith and substance of the bill as passed in second reading?
[English]
Ms Diane McMurray (Legislative Counsel, House of Commons): Yes. In my opinion, we're certainly within the pith and substance. The reason that proposed subsection 30(1) was changed from the original version was that.... When you're drafting, drafting is very precise, if indeed you can use the word ``very'': precise is precise; it's like being pregnant. But I'm using ``very precise'' to convey an idea. And when you're asked to do it very quickly, as I'm sure you can appreciate, you're working with language, and language is not precise.
When I had another look at this, I was somewhat concerned that proposed subsection 30(1.1) as originally drafted essentially said that the Governor in Council - keeping in mind that the Governor in Council is the cabinet for all intents and purposes - could not authorize a payment during a prorogation. Essentially, that's what it boils down to.
When I look at it.... We all understand that the legal fiction in Canada is that cabinet essentially runs government. It makes the decisions, but in black letter law if you read proposed subsection 30(1), the actual authorization is not coming from the G in C; it's coming from the GG, from the Governor General, not in council - ``the Governor General not in council'', if you want to put it that way.
So just to be sure that Mr. Milliken achieved what he wanted to, and to close the door as tightly as possible so that it could never be argued it didn't make any sense.... Because if you read proposed subsection 30(1), it's not technically in black letter law the G in C who authorizes the payment. What the G in C does is direct that an order be issued, which will be signed by the Governor General, and that signature will then be an authorization.
That's why the change from the Governor General in Council may authorize to the Governor in Council may direct the preparation of a special warrant, because that's the condition precedent to a warrant being signed. Without that warrant, there's nothing to sign. That's why there is the change from the original to this present version.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Again to you, Ms McMurray, my second question; does the bill affect the rights of the Crown in such a way that royal assent will be required to pass this bill?
[English]
Ms McMurray: No. The royal recommendation and royal consent are two different concepts. One is legal, one is procedural. The requirement of the royal recommendation is part of our Constitution. Essentially, if you're going to be spending money you must have a royal recommendation. That is in the Standing Orders, but it's simply a reflection of what's in our Constitution. Because it's cast in mandatory language, it must be obeyed. If it is not obeyed then legal consequences can flow from that. That's what the Supreme Court has essentially said about mandatory procedural things in the Constitution.
.1125
The royal consent is a procedural thing. I know it sounds a bit weird, but just bear with me. The royal consent must be given by the Crown when any statute is affecting a prerogative of the Crown. The GG is essentially Her Majesty in another form. When you are affecting in any way, or impinging upon, that royal prerogative, there is a procedural requirement in the House that even though the Crown may sign the bill eventually, to become law, the Crown must be essentially aware of the fact that its prerogative is being impinged upon and must therefore consent to that infringement.
What normally happens in the British house, and I'm assuming happens here, is sometimes before third reading a minister of the Crown gets up and says ``We agree to the statute''...or to the fact that the royal consent is being given to the statute. If that consent is not given - and I stand to be corrected by a proceduralist here - my understanding is that procedurally the bill is defective, but it is not defective legally. The royal consent is not part of the Constitution. It's not part of the law. It's procedural only.
Now, to answer Mr. Langlois' question specifically, does this affect the royal prerogative, an argument could be made that it is already being affected in the original bill and what we're doing is just playing in the same ballpark, we're just in a bit of a different pew.
You might see it as affecting.... The G in C is still part of the Crown; it's just less visible. If you talk about the Governor General, you immediately think of the Crown. If you talk about the Governor in Council you don't think of the Crown, because the Governor in Council we all know in legal fiction is the cabinet. But in fact technically yes, it's still part of the Crown. Are we affecting its prerogative by simply saying it shall not direct? Well, you will have to do some research into that, to find out whether or not this is simply a statutory imposition of the Governor General that he would not normally have by virtue of the prerogative at common law. My feeling is no, probably you're not; and if you are, fine. If the government's going to support this anyway and if it's an issue, they can give the royal consent before third reading, and if they don't get it, who cares? It's good law anyway.
The Chairman: It's like dancing.
Parfait?
Mr. Langlois: Oui.
The Chairman: Mr. Frazer.
Mr. Frazer: The sixty days, Mr. Milliken - as I read it, that means the government could in fact issue a consolidated revenue allotment in those sixty days.
Mr. Milliken: Correct.
Mr. Frazer: Once the writs are returned, why shouldn't the government, if they need money, recall Parliament and do it by the normal process? Why give them the sixty days?
Mr. Milliken: Well, they should, but sixty days seems to be a normal time for the government to change, get new ministers sworn in, get briefed, and so on. I thought the sixty days was a compromise, based on the evidence I mentioned -
Mr. Frazer: You mentioned the fact that it varies from -
Mr. Milliken: It varies, and the average was 51 days. I debated whether to go 30, 60, or 90, and I chose 60. If the committee felt strongly it should be 90 or 30, I don't care. I thought it was something acceptable and reasonable, given the restrictions that are still on there: the money has to be urgently required for the public good and so on. It struck me as reasonable.
In other countries, at least in the United Kingdom, supply is normally voted before an election and these warrants are not available. We could make a complete change to that system, but that's not what my bill did and I couldn't amend it that far. While that might be desirable, in our political climate and history that hasn't been the normal thing. In Britain there's agreement among the parties to pass the supply bill in time for an election and we get on with it. Here there might not be such agreement, the parties might not want an election, so you might have stalemate and delay in the House in getting on with an election.
I didn't want to change our political history. I just wanted to restrict the use of these warrants so they couldn't be used between sessions of Parliament.
Mr. Frazer: My concern is, fine, it's the government's prerogative not to recall Parliament for whatever time they deem, but if they need money, then maybe that should be an overriding thing that says, well, we need the money, so we had better recall Parliament in time to provide the money required. I really thought we were going to the time of the return of the writs, because once the writs are returned Parliament can be recalled at any time.
.1130
Mr. Milliken: Yes, it can.
The one thing with that, Mr. Frazer, is that if a poor government walked out of office while leaving no supply voted, and then ran things through warrants during a general election in which it was properly defeated and thrown out, the new government might be seriously inconvenienced in calling Parliament back to deal with supply if it had to call it within a day or a week of taking office.I think it's reasonable to give a new government some opportunity to get in and to learn what's going on before it meets Parliament and has to face Question Period, present proposed legislation, and so on.
Mr. Frazer: But with all due respect -
Mr. Milliken: That's why I suggested the sixty days. But if you feel strongly, you can move an amendment to try thirty days.
Mr. Frazer: But if the Governor in Council - basically the cabinet - is astute enough and capable enough to ask the Governor General to sign a writ giving it some money, surely it should also be willing to provide that to Parliament in order for Parliament to make the decision it would normally make on it. And if the cabinet wanted to call Parliament back for one or two days to pass this money bill, that would be fine by me, and it could then prorogue for whatever period of time.
It just strikes me that the essence of your bill, which was to provide a restriction on the use of these Governor-in-Council writs, should be more rigidly adhered to. To my mind, that could happen after the writs are returned.
Mr. Milliken: The worst scenario under this bill compares to what happened before. Parliament could be called to meet once a year, and then the Governor in Council could use warrants. In other words, Parliament could meet for a day and then be prorogued, and the Governor in Council could then run the country with warrants until Parliament had to be recalled within a year. But that is not possible under my bill.
The most that could happen here is that during the sixty-day period following the return of the writs, the government could vote itself supply by warrant for an extended period, but I don't think it could go beyond the end of the current financial year with that warrant. In any event, it would be under the obligation to recall Parliament within a year. So the most that could happen is that it would run for a year without calling Parliament, but I don't think most governments would do that. In fact I don't think any government would do it.
What I think is important is that there be a limited period in which a government can adjust to getting into office and to coming to Parliament to clean up a mess created by the previous government. While helpful, perhaps, I don't think this should be forced on it as a matter of immediate urgency on taking office - and this, finances, would be the mess that it would have to clean up. SoI don't know why it couldn't run with a warrant for a maximum period of time.
Sixty days may be too long. As I say, if you want to suggest a thirty-day period, that's fine. But Parliament doesn't normally meet on the day of the return of the writs.
Mr. Frazer: No, I understand that.
Mr. Milliken: So you have some period of time in there in which there's a discretion. I don't think the sixty days is too long, based on history. But as I say, if you think thirty should be it, I'm not going to argue. I think I'm trying to be reasonable in giving a new government an opportunity to adjust, though, because as you know, sometimes an old government doesn't resign for ten or fifteen days after the election, even after the return of the writs. So this is allowing for that and is allowing for a new government to come into office and to have some reasonable time to get briefed and so on. And you have to assume it's going to be a new one in those circumstances - that's the worst-case scenario.
An hon. member: Hope springs eternal.
The Chairman: I'm going to jump in here. I'm going to allow two short interventions, and then we have to move on here.
[Translation]
Ms Dalphond-Guiral.
Ms Dalphond-Guiral (Laval-Centre): Yesterday, when I read Mr. Milliken's bill, clause 30 and subclause (1.1), in particular, I detected what seemed to be a contradiction. In one case, the Governor in Council may act, and in another case, he may not. But after sleeping on it I saw things more clearly and when I reread it this morning, I understood.
I came to the conclusion that when Parliament has been dissolved, it cannot be in session. I hope I have understood this correctly. Thus, it no longer seems necessary to include subclause 30(1.1), since we are talking about prorogations. I think that bills should be understandable to ordinary mortals. So if we say that when Parliament has been dissolved the Governor General may order the issuing of a warrant, a warrant which must be signed, that seems clear to me. It is during the dissolution and there are specific dates. I wonder, then, whether it is quite necessary to add subclause (1.1) unless we really want to repeat something that has already been included in the first subclause. Can you explain this to me?
.1135
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Milliken, did you wish to respond to that?
Mr. Milliken: No, I think I'll leave that to the legislative counsel.
The Chairman: Ms McMurray.
Ms McMurray: Subsection (1.1) is absolutely essential, and the reason it's absolutely essential is because subsection (1) says ``at any time that Parliament is not in session''. Parliament is not in session in two situations: a dissolution and a prorogation. This what could happen: the writs are returned; Parliament comes back, sits for a day and is prorogued. It's not in session.
Mr. Milliken does not want the Governor in Council to be able to use this undemocratic - if I may use so bold a term - an instrument to affect the payment of money at the time of a prorogation. It says ``at any time that Parliament is not in session''. If we had not put in subsection (1.1), the case scenario.... And I understand that's happened, in fact, where Parliaments were recalled perhaps for a day and then prorogued. It's not in session, but it's technically -
Mr. Milliken: And you're still in the sixty-day period.
Ms McMurray: - still in the sixty-day period. And that's why it's essential.
[Translation]
Ms Dalphond-Guiral: Thank you.
Mr. Laurin: Mr. Chairman, during the last federal elections, for instance, on what date would the government have had to recall the House to vote on such a bill?
[English]
Mr. Milliken: It would have been about December 15.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: The elections being on October 25, you are looking at a 60-day period after the return of the writs. Does that mean that the government would have had to recall Parliament during the winter holiday period?
[English]
Mr. Milliken: Yes, definitely.
A voice: If they needed money.
Mr. Milliken: If they needed money.
The Chairman: Okay.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: I find this problematical.
Mr. Milliken: But, Mr. Laurin, the budget appropriation had already been passed in the House in June, before the elections. So it might not be necessary that the House be in session to adopt a supply bill before the end of March.
Mr. Laurin: Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether this is reasonable. It seems to me that it is unreasonable to think that the government might recall Parliament for one day only, December 24, for instance, under this bill, when Parliament was convened at the beginning of January during the last session. Recalling the members to Parliament for one day means incurring a lot of expense to have them travel here and leave again, especially before the holidays. Would the bill make such a scenario possible?
Mr. Milliken: That is why I proposed a 60-day period. A new government can surely arrange things so that a special warrant can be issued to authorize payments up to the date when Parliament sits. That is what has to be done.
[English]
In my view, if the election had been in October, as in this case, you have sixty days from that date to pass special warrants, on my bill. So if you know you're going to need money before Parliament is going to be recalled on February 1, then you vote yourself the money within the sixty days by a special warrant and then call Parliament back on the date and then start passing your bills. But if you don't.... Sure, there could be an urgent situation arise between the expiry of the sixty days and the date Parliament is coming back. But the government has to take a calculated risk: is it going to wait that long, has it got enough money in its contingency fund, which is voted by Parliament, and so on.
.1140
Those options are all open to a government. I think they can prepare for this and organize things correctly and not worry that this is going to cause serious inconvenience. If the sixty days were a lot shorter, it might. That's why I proposed that. Maybe it should be ninety. But I think sixty is reasonable, and that's what I'm going to move.
[Translation]
Mr. Laurin: Mr. Chairman, I want us to have a clear understanding of what we are going to be voting on.
Could the Governor in Council, for reasons of caution, under this special warrant authorize a higher figure to give the government greater latitude so that it could take the time it needs to reconvene Parliament? I had understood in the beginning that the special warrant had to deal with a specific matter; for instance, the government might need so many million dollars for such and such a purpose.
But you seem to say that the government, in order to give itself as much latitude as possible before reconvening Parliament could say that it needs 600 million dollars to pay public servants, for instance, when it only needs 300 million dollars, simply to allow for contingencies that would require quick action. Is this special warrant designed to avoid that type of situation? Under this special warrant which could be issued during a dissolution of Parliament, could the Governor in Council ask for more money for unforeseen or non-specific expenses?
Mr. Milliken: Forgive me for answering you in English but it is much easier for me when I have to provide technical details.
[English]
If you look at the precedent of the last parliament, as I've been using throughout in my discussions on this bill, the government gave itself, by special warrant, interim supply for I think three months, on April 1, 1989. In effect it took one-third of the estimates and said ``those are all available to us''. By the time the three months had expired they had adopted the supply bill.
I'm assuming a new government that came in could in effect give itself interim supply for a limited period. That could operate to allow them to refrain from calling Parliament as quickly as they might. But having exercised the right during the sixty days, they couldn't do it again; and that's the purpose of this bill, to ensure that once you start a Parliament you stay with it.
And the government could do this before the election, after the dissolution. The government, by a special warrant, could give itself sixty-day supply if it interprets the act the way it did the last time, in 1989. I assume that same interpretation might apply; it's now a precedent. But having given themselves that right and in effect extended the period during which Parliament need not sit for the purpose of voting supply, at least you've restricted it to the one time. It's a one-shot deal. They can't do it again. If it happened in the sixty days, that's it; the Constitution provides for Parliament to be recalled.
I believe quite firmly that particularly if it were a new government it would want to meet Parliament very quickly. So you would have them go back to the House and you wouldn't have a problem.
But this does allow, I agree, for an extended period between dissolution and the recall of Parliament, should a government choose to stay out of Parliament and avoid it. They could avoid it. But it can't happen between sessions, which was the purpose of the amendment in the first place. We've given a window of opportunity for the use of these warrants, and I think it's a narrow one.
The Chairman: Do we have an amendment, then, on clause 1, Ms Catterall or Mr. Milliken?
Ms Catterall (Ottawa West): I think he's already moved it.
The Chairman: He moved it? I'm sorry. Mr. Milliken.
Mr. Milliken: I move that Bill C-270, in clause 1, be amended by replacing lines 4 to 13 on page 1 with the following.... And the following is attached in the document I've circulated.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
Clause 1 as amended agreed to
The Chairman: Shall the title carry?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chairman: Shall the bill carry, as amended?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chairman: Shall I report Bill C-270 as amended to the House?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chairman: Shall the bill be reprinted for use by the House at report stage?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chairman: Okay. That was easy. You're such an agreeable lot.
.1145
Thank you, Mr. Milliken, and congratulations.
For your information, colleagues, I wish to inform you that the next meeting of the committee will be on Tuesday at 4 p.m., at which time the Honourable Herb Gray will be present as the first witness for Bill C-63, which will be received by our committee probably later today or tomorrow.
On Wednesday, at 3:15 p.m., Mr. Kingsley will be here to explain himself with regard to Bill C-63 and any other questions that honourable colleagues may wish to present to Mr. Kingsley at that time.
We have also asked the clerk to contact somebody in the Privacy Commissioner's office, if not the Privacy Commissioner, for Thursday at 11 a.m.
I would propose, as your chair, that after Mr. Kingsley, or before Thursday, one or the other, we would have a steering committee meeting to assess what other witnesses, if any, would be required. That is my proposal as your chair. If you wish to put more proposals to me, as your chair, to be considered, I'm happy to have them.
Mr. Langlois, I know you wish to put something on the floor.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Yes. After hearing Mr. Gray, who sponsored the bill, I think we're going to talk about the case of Mr. Kingsley again. I would have liked us to meet with Mr. Kingsley before studying Bill C-63, because in fact that bill had not been tabled when we were supposed to meetMr. Kingsley on the 10th. If memory serves, Mr. Kingsley was on Radio-Canada on October 3, and that is what we particularly wanted to discuss with him. Now, we are going to be mixing up the topics; we'll hear about the bill and the prior interview in our discussion. That is why I was hoping that our meeting with him would be on today's agenda, but I suppose you will explain what happened.
It would also be useful to meet with the Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec, Mr. Pierre F. Côté and his team, as they are putting the finishing touches to a permanent voters' list for Quebec. I am told that Mr. Côté is in fact entirely willing to appear before the committee. He has appeared on a few previous occasions and his comments were useful and enlightening.
[English]
The Chairman: That will be something I think the steering committee will want to consider. At the end of the day, it's your committee, colleagues, and you'll decide who should or shouldn't come before the committee, or who we should hear on Bill C-63.
On the specific point you raised about Mr. Kingsley's appearance, you will recognize that in a conversation I had with him I quickly ascertained that he was en route to Yellowknife. He in fact called me from the airport in Toronto.
I explained that there was some irritation in the committee from the last time - it was openly expressed by all sides - about certain comments that appeared in the media. I asked him if he would contact the committee members directly to explain those points. I'm just your chairman. I did do that. I had a conversation with him.
On the specific issue of his appearance, I think Mr. Kingsley felt that he would be available to the wishes of the committee, but because of the fact that Bill C-63 was imminent, he would present himself in relation to Bill C-63 and any other matters that colleagues wished to ask about. If it's the committee's wish to have him appear separately - I've heard Mr. Langlois's view - please advise me. I'm in your hands.
Mr. Strahl: I think what you've proposed here makes some sense. The minister should appear. The bill is now before the House. We've already debated it a little bit. I think Mr. Gray should come to talk to us, then Mr. Kingsley, and then any witnesses who are deemed necessary by the steering committee and the committee as a whole. Then we could proceed. There may be a few. I would think there would be. If necessary, we could have Mr. Kingsley back later on.
.1150
I don't know what other order makes sense now that the bill is before us. When the bill wasn't before us, it made sense to talk in general terms about electoral reform, but Mr. Kingsley now can hardly comment without commenting on the bill.
The Chairman: That's exactly it.
Mr. Strahl: Now that it's tabled, it frees him up to do that.
The Chairman: Further to what Mr. Strahl is saying, as your chair and trying to plan our future business with the staff here, if you wish to give me the name of a witness, the clerk and researcher of our committee have advised that all they would recommend would be Gray, Kingsley, and somebody from the Privacy Commissioner's office. That's if they had an interest in commenting. All we can do is invite them to participate. If they don't have any interest or can't meet our schedule, then that would be it.
Mr. Langlois has given me, as your chair, a suggestion. If anyone has any further suggestions, I would ask them to put those matters in writing. The steering committee would convene a quick meeting after Mr. Kingsley to determine if we want Mr. Côté. The difficulty as I see it - I'll share that as your chair - is that if there are ten provinces, then there would be perhaps ten participants who would want to participate.
For example, British Columbia has a registry operating right now. I don't know how much time we wish, as a committee, to study this. Mr. Langlois I know will tell me that we spent a great deal of time on Jacob. It was a serious matter. I know this is a serious matter.
But as it relates to this bill, I think that we, as a committee, have a broad mandate. It has come to us after first reading. If we have some interventions or suggestions, I know the minister has expressed himself openly in the House this morning as being interested in representing the government and having those matters put forward.
Electoral reform is a matter that is complicated and simple. I don't think that anyone has particular ownership of this. Mr. Kingsley I think will have to explain or argue his point of view to our committee, and we'll have an opportunity to interface with him.
Ms Catterall, please.
Ms Catterall: I think what I heard you say is that we'll meet on the fourth with the minister. What day is it with Mr. Kingsley?
The Chairman: It's Tuesday at 4 p.m. and Wednesday at 3:15 p.m.
Ms Catterall: Okay. Then, if necessary, we'll meet with with the Privacy Commissioner.
It seems to me, Mr. Chair, that there is general agreement among the parties that this is a good way to proceed. We might be satisfied to deal with the bill having heard from those two or three witnesses you've named. I think I would personally like to, having heard from them, determine at that time if I need to hear from more witnesses.
My concern would be yours, which is that we have to deal with ten provincial elections officers. I'm not sure that's helpful.
My second concern is that I'm not particularly interested in getting into how this is going to be done. We can deal with that subsequently. The purpose of the bill is to make it possible for it to be done.
An hon. member: Exactly.
Ms Catterall: While Mr. Côté or the person from B.C. might have some interesting information to pass on to us as to how it might mesh, I'm not sure that's going to affect anybody's decision about whether this is or is not a good bill. Anyway, I'd be happy to see us proceed with our first three witnesses, and then have the entire committee look at whether we need more witnesses.
The Chairman: Thank you, Ms Catterall. Mr. Langlois, and then we'll conclude.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I appreciate what Ms Catterall has just said, but I think that the Official Opposition has made only one request which is that we would like to hear the Quebec Chief Electoral Officer. That is the only witness we are asking the committee to call at this time and I don't think that this is excessive. Our Reform colleagues will probably have a witness to suggest on the same topic. If that is the case, all the better. And even if ten persons were to come, they would appear if we thought it would be useful.
If in some provinces returning officers think that they would have interesting things to say to us, all the better! There is an interaction between what happens at the federal level and at the provincial level, especially where electoral laws are concerned, and also because the laws are very similar. What has been useful in one province may perhaps allow us to improve our work.
So in that connection, I have a single request to make. I would agree to any others straightaway. I'm happy that we will be able to hear Mr. Gray, Mr. Kingsley and one other person, but I do want to submit this request on behalf of the Official Opposition. I don't think this is excessive. It is my first and last request.
.1155
[English]
The Chairman: We hear you.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: It is probably the last, according to Ms Dalphond-Guiral.
[English]
The Chairman: Colleagues, thank you very much. Then we'll agree to proceed this way?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.