[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, November 5, 1996
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[English]
The Chair: We have three statutes today: Bill C-17, Bill C-27, and Bill C-235, which is Madame Gagnon's private member's bill.
We have with us from the Canadian Bar Association Tamra Thomson, who is the director of legislation and law reform, and Sheldon Pinx, who is the chair of the national criminal justice section.
Mr. Ramsay (Crowfoot): On a point of order, Madam Chair, when are we going to deal with the motion?
The Chair: I thought we would after our guests were gone, if that's okay.
Mr. Ramsay: Fine. Thank you.
The Chair: Do you have to leave early or anything?
Mr. Ramsay: No, that's fine.
The Chair: Okay.
Ms Thomson.
[Translation]
Ms Tamra Thomson (Director, Legislation and Law Reform, Canadian Bar Association): Thank you, Madam Chair. The Canadian Bar Association is a national association representing over 34,000 lawyers across Canada. Our presentation was prepared by the National Criminal Justice Section. The National Section represents criminal lawyers across Canada. The section comprises Crown and defence lawyers.
[English]
One of the principal objectives of the Canadian Bar Association is to work towards improvement in the law and improvement in the administration of justice. It is with those objectives in mind that we are pleased to present our submissions to you on Bills C-17 and C-27 today.
I will pass the microphone to my colleague, Mr. Pinx, who is the chair of the national criminal law section.
The Chair: I see you have two briefs, so maybe we'll do Bill C-17 after our questions and move on. Are you comfortable with that arrangement?
Ms Thomson: Our opening statement had been on the basis of both bills, and we are willing then to entertain questions on both bills.
The Chair: Okay, fine, thanks.
Mr. Sheldon E. Pinx (Chair, National Criminal Justice Section, Canadian Bar Association): Thank you very much for having us here today. Hopefully our views on some of these issues will be of assistance to you in your deliberations on these two pieces of legislation.
I'll speak firstly to Bill C-27. The criminal justice section supports a number of significant improvements to the legislation dealing with child prostitution, child sex tourism, criminal harassment, and female genital mutilation. However, there are two areas of concern that arise in respect of mandatory minimum sentences that are of concern to us as a section.
The Bar Association has always and historically been opposed to the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. We have always been of the view that leaving with trial judges a broad discretion to address each case on its own facts and merits has always been a preferable course of conduct for us to follow in assessing issues relating to sentence in our justice system.
However, with that having been said, it's also important to be mindful that judicial discretion is there for a very good and important reason. It not only determines the sentence and ensures that the sentence fits the crime, but also that the sentence fits the offender. So we have always encouraged a legislative regime that would advance that particular issue.
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Dealing specifically with the first amendment I would like to comment upon - and this deals with what I call the broadening of the offence for those who live off the avails of prostitution involving young people under the age of 18 - we as a section would support the language that would appear to capture a wider net, so to speak, of conduct, both in the sense of going beyond simply the issue of living off avails but directing its intent to areas of profiteering, aiding and abetting that particular kind of conduct, and as well, using threats to use or attempt to use violence and intimidation to gain the advantage, which of course at the end of the day is that profit.
We agree that all of that is important and necessary and I think advances many important ends in this particular area. However, having said that, we are not in favour of the amendment that would suggest that there should be a minimum five-year term of incarceration upon conviction. As I noted earlier in my opening comments, we don't believe that particular sentence is necessary. Clearly this particular offence is deemed by Parliament to be a very serious offence. It has a maximum penalty of 14 years, which will certainly convey to any sentencing judge that it is to be viewed as a very serious crime. In our view, at the end of the day, trial judges should be trusted with the kind of, I would hope, assistance they will be given by prosecutors who will be presenting these cases and trusted to do the right thing in the given circumstances.
At the same time, there may be that exceptional case, those unique circumstances, or the unique offender for whom a five-year term of incarceration, simply put, is excessive. For those reasons, we would not support that particular aspect of the legislation.
The next area we would like to address is the area dealing with the criminal harassment provisions. Again we support the recognition that the commission of an offence such as stalking while on a form of probation or peace bond is to be recognized as an aggravating circumstance and certainly keeps with, in our view, appropriate sentencing principles. Clearly it is an aggravating circumstance, and the fact that Parliament intends to recognize it as such would in our view be consistent in keeping with what I think is already accepted practice in the criminal courts.
However, again in that regard, we do have a concern that now there is a proposal that this particular offence - that is, criminal harassment coupled with murder - will now be treated as a crime of first-degree murder as opposed to second-degree.
We have some concerns in respect to that. Our reasons for those concerns are as follows. First, in most cases, in our view, where in fact there may be a history of criminal harassment you will often find in any event those elements of planning and deliberation. In most cases they will be there in any event, and for that reason we don't think it's necessary to move forward to a regime that would capture and create and transform every second-degree murder situation into first-degree simply because there has been some history of criminal harassment.
Secondly, many of the offences now classified as second-degree murder are cases that involve acts by the accused that are not thought out - impulsive, momentary loss of control, which will still meet the definition of second-degree murder but have nothing whatsoever to do with notions of planning or deliberation or any thought having been given in advance of the event to the consequences of what in fact ends up occurring. Our concern is that cases where clearly the intent will only be to commit the crime of murder, nothing more, will now be classified as crimes of first-degree murder, where minimum parole eligibility now will be 25 years as opposed to a minimum of 10 years.
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Another concern we have is that in order to prosecute this kind of offence - that is, if indeed Parliament proposes this legislation and it is passed - the Crown will then be able, almost as of right, to lead the entire history of conduct between the accused and the victim. That kind of evidence today would be vetted under a voir dire to determine whether or not it is of sufficient probative value to be admitted at a trial involving a case of second-degree murder. Is it relevant? Is it probative? If it is probative, does its prejudicial value exceed its probative value? These issues would be addressed by a trial judge.
None of that would happen under this proposed system, because evidence that clearly could be highly prejudicial to the accused's right to a fair trial would be automatically admissible as necessary by the Crown to prove its case of stalking. In order for that proof to be led, of course that particular evidence would be presented.
One of the concerns we have is that cases that might otherwise be arguably manslaughter could be elevated from manslaughter to murder because of the potential prejudice of the evidence being presented at trial that could sway a jury, though not intentionally by the prosecution. That would not be their purpose. However, that might be a byproduct of the presentation of that kind of evidence. So you in theory could have a manslaughter becoming a murder and that murder then becoming first-degree murder and not second.
In this regard as well, there is a wide range of behaviour that would amount to stalking under this particular provision. You could have a minimum course of conduct by an offender that could be stalking. You could have a much more aggravated course of conduct. You might have, at the end of the day, a minimum course of conduct that in and of itself would be worthy of a fine if prosecuted alone, and that kind of conduct could amount to forming the basis on which a charge of first-degree murder would flow.
Finally, we're of the view that the 10- to 25-year discretion given to a trial judge dealing with cases of second-degree murder would allow for a trial judge, in those aggravated cases, perhaps of stalking, where the prosecution would say there may have been this history, to deal with it as a more aggravated case and up the minimum period from 10 to something approaching 25 years.
For all of those reasons, we're of the view that the creation of this new crime of first-degree murder is not necessary. The existing law, we believe, addresses it. There is certainly a potential at the end of the day for injustices to occur as a result of this proposed change to the law.
We'd like to move now to three areas of Bill C-17 for comment. We have chosen these three areas because we hope they will address some perhaps more important concerns we have in respect to some of the provisions of this bill.
I'll deal with clause 15, on occupancy in a stolen vehicle. For those of you who have our brief, this is on page 5.
We have two major concerns with respect to this proposed piece of legislation. It's our understanding that one of the rationales behind it is that there's been a lot of concern raised about young people stealing cars. They're in groups, they flee the scene and it's difficult to know who the driver was and who the occupant was. Apparently because of that problem, this proposal is now appearing.
Our concerns in this regard are twofold. This amendment appears to not really address, in our minds, issues relating to what we understand to be mens rea and actus reus.
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Being an occupant in a vehicle does not necessarily constitute, as we know, possession of the vehicle. We believe the law should require some evidence of participation rather than criminalizing passive acquiescence. This particular offence would in effect make the mere passenger in a stolen car, who has done nothing whatsoever to aid and abet in its being stolen but simply is there riding along, guilty of an offence under the Criminal Code.
What it fails to address is although it allows for an exception to be created - that is, a defence where the offender has taken certain reasonable steps to remove himself from the vehicle - if one deems that they are reasonable then of course he will have a defence. I think we're losing sight of one very important issue, which is that teenagers sometimes don't think the way we do as adults. With all due respect, at the end of the day teenagers will not behave in the much more mature way we might behave in a given circumstance.
Young people, because of their lack of sophistication, may not remove themselves from the vehicle as the proposed law requires. However, this does not mean that they should be held criminally blameworthy for their youthful misjudgments. This is, in part, at the heart of our concern with respect to this particular proposal.
The next area we'd like to comment on is the area with respect to exigent searches. This is noted at page 12 of our brief on Bill C-17. We have some concerns in respect to this particular proposal for the following reasons. As the law currently stands in this country, being mindful of the Supreme Court cases that have dealt with this area, starting with Hunter v. Southam and onward, we require prior judicial authorization before any search should be conducted. That's the law. As the law is interpreted today, it should only be in those rare and exceptional cases that police should be permitted to conduct searches in, as we call it, exigent circumstances.
Our concern in respect of the language being used here is that the word ``impracticable'' is being used. Our concern in that regard is that firstly, there is no definition of what exigent circumstances are. That is, the bill does not define what this term means. It doesn't convey a message to law enforcement, in my view and in the view of our section, that this is to be restrictively applied, narrowly interpreted in a way that does not allow them to use it as an alternative with respect to obtaining a search warrant, but rather should be used in only those very exceptional circumstances where indeed it's not possible for them to get a warrant.
Our second concern is that in addition to not defining what are exigent circumstances, it doesn't address the situation where a police strategy may be used that will encourage the police not to get a warrant. The very strategy employed by the police to conduct a particular investigation may result in them not having, let's say, sufficient time to get a warrant. We're of the view that police strategies that can be thought out in advance of an investigation should not be a justification to say they don't have to go and get a warrant. If the police by their choosing an investigative technique in a particular case end up having to use the exigent argument, in our view that should not be where the exigent argument should be available to them to use.
The final point we'd like to comment on - and I think I'm getting to the end of my oral remarks to you in this regard - is on the expanded search amendments. This is at page 14 of our brief. This is clause 48 of the bill. This proposal, on its face, may seem to be not unreasonable, in that what it's basically suggesting is that the police, if they are already lawfully in a residence executing a warrant, should be able to seize those other things which they, on reasonable grounds, believe have been used either in the commission of an offence or in furtherance of the commission of an offence.
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Our concern is that the police will use this provision to conduct fishing expeditions, that they will go into residences, will take the jurisdiction given to them by their search warrant and will expand it to the point where they will not just simply be looking for those articles in plain view. We worry that they will, for example, walk around your house and check your VCR, check your television, begin phoning in serial numbers, start looking at labels on clothing, start phoning in reports to the police station while checking to see if there have been any losses of similar kinds of coats and materials, goods and things of that nature on police records. In our view, the problem is that you end up with a warrant issued for one purpose, but it will then be expanded and used by the police for a much broader purpose.
We believe this section really is intended to cover those cases of expanded seizure of those items in plain view. You go in to search for stolen property and there's a bag of marijuana sitting on a table. No problem, you should be able to seize that marijuana because it's in plain view. So we think the legislation should be crafted in such a way to restrict expanded searches to those items in plain view. And in our view, it certainly might be advisable for the police to then have to go back and justify the seizure of anything beyond plain view by obtaining a second warrant.
Those are our comments with respect to the two bills. I hope I can be of further assistance to you in respect of any questions you have.
The Chair: Thank you.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur (Berthier - Montcalm): First, I would like to thank you for presenting your two briefs. I know that the briefs of the Canadian Bar Association are usually well structured, and it is a pity that we did not have time to read them in detail so as to be able to ask you more specific questions.
I will nevertheless ask you two short questions related specifically to Bill C-27 because I can follow more clearly your brief on C-17 and any questions I may have will be answered simply by reading the brief.
You made two statements about Bill C-27 which I would like you to explain further. The first concerns the minimum sentence of five years. I can understand that the Bar is against the principle of a minimum sentence. However, do you not consider that a mandatory five-year minimum sentence sends a message to those people living off the proceeds of prostitution by someone under the age of 18, thus informing them that their crime is considered very serious?
In this case, do you not also consider that the legislator wanted to impose a minimum five-year sentence in order to indicate the seriousness of the offence?
[English]
Mr. Pinx: I completely agree with you. There may be that case, or those cases, out there in which a five-year sentence - or a longer term of incarceration in some instances - would be required. At the same time, there may be many cases out there for which less than five years would be an appropriate and fair sentence when you look not only at the circumstances of the offence, but the circumstances of the offender - and I would like to give you one example of that.
Many years ago, Parliament had passed a seven-year minimum term of incarceration on the offence of importation of narcotics. That is, people who imported drugs were facing seven years in jail. That law was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada as being cruel and unusual punishment. The court said the reason was that in theory you could import one marijuana cigarette and face seven years in jail.
I'm not trying to trivialize this kind of offence in any way, and I don't want this to be interpreted in that manner. This is a very serious offence. However, you may have a very youthful offender committing this kind of crime with a youthful victim. So when you look at what we call the new sentencing regime of Bill C-41, let's say, Parliament has asked not only that judges look at aggravating circumstances, but that they look at other alternatives to incarceration where necessary, and at when those can be addressed.
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So we're of the view that providing judges with discretion will address your concern. That very bad case is deserving of serious punishment. However, in the case in which the offender is perhaps not deserving of that punishment, provision should be made so that a judge has available to him or her the ability to address that case as well.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: You referred to the offence of importing and possessing marijuana. This carried a minimum seven-year sentence, which judges considered too long. Moreover, this punishment was not ratified by the Charter. Do you believe that this bill, as currently drafted, could be thrown out by higher courts, who might consider that a five-year sentence is too harsh for this kind of offence?
[English]
Mr. Pinx: Two weeks ago a Nova Scotia Supreme Court judge struck down four years as the minimum sentence for using a firearm in the commission of a criminal offence. So if you ask me if the potential is there, the potential is certainly there. As to whether or not that will definitively be the result, I certainly can't say.
The court's concern at the end of the day is obviously to, on the one side, balance the message that Parliament wants to convey - which is, don't do this - and hopefully long sentences will deter this kind of activity. However, at the same time, lengthy minimum sentences could create an injustice in certain circumstances. That's why we are in favour of the judicial discretion approach to sentencing.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: The clause should therefore be redrafted so as to provide a maximum sentence of 14 years. Anyone found guilty of a criminal offense would therefore be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years. There would therefore be a maximum, but no minimum.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: The maximum sentence - What I also think could be done - and as you know, a list of aggravating circumstances are listed in Bill C-41 - is to tell judges that if they come across these kinds of aggravating circumstances, they should treat the offence more seriously. I would think this would be an appropriate kind of offence or principle to address: the exploitation of children for any criminal purpose whatsoever should be viewed as a very aggravating circumstance, and it would have a proper place in an amendment to, let's say, Bill C-41, which has now become law.
The Chair: Thank you. You still have about three and a half minutes.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: On the same bill, I have another question concerning genital mutilation of female persons, to which you referred under item IV of your brief. You state in your brief that genital mutilation of female persons is prohibited and constitutes a serious offence.
I would therefore ask you the same question as I asked Mr. Roy, a senior official of the Department of Justice, when he appeared before us. In your view, can a person agree to undergo such criminal practices?
[English]
Mr. Pinx: No, in R. v. Jobidon, the Supreme Court of Canada made it very clear that you cannot consent to the application of bodily harm to your own person, but that's only bodily harm. Of course aggravated assault is a level higher than bodily harm, so in my view the current law clearly prohibits this kind of defence. Consent to bodily harm is not a defence.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Therefore, at present, we agree on the legislation. In the present act, excision is considered as aggravated assault. Therefore, regardless of whether the individual is 16 or 19, she cannot give consent to such a practice. Have I interpreted the provision correctly?
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Mr. Pinx: Yes.
Mr. Bellehumeur: Yes? But I find it strange that the bill now allows a woman of 18 years of age or older to consent to excision being practiced on her, and this is with the blessing of the Department of Justice. According to Bill C-27, a woman 18 years of age and over could give her consent to such criminal practices.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: That's not the way I read it. I read it as making it clear that children - There's no reference in the bill to the fact that if you're over 18 years of age you can consent, although there is the medical exception, but that's a different issue. A very narrow medical exception has been proposed, but that's entirely different from that saying women over 18 years of age implicitly can be assumed to consent to aggravated assault on their person or bodily harm.
I don't read it that way. I read the legislation as conveying a very clear message here. As I have understood the history of this particular activity, these were parents who were encouraging their children to participate in this kind of activity. So the message being sent out loud and clear is forget about the children consenting, we're telling you that up front, let's move on to the other issue, which is that our existing law, say those drafters of this bill, covers the adult situation. We don't have to specifically spell it out in the bill, because it's already there protected by common law. That's the way I read the bill.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Perhaps I am going past my time, but I would like to say that clause 5 of the bill refers to the excision of children. Do you have the bill handy? On page 6 you will find the proposed subsection 286(4), which has to do with consent. It clearly says, and I quote:
(4) For the purposes of this section and section 265, no consent to the excision, infibulation or mutilation, in whole or in part, of the labia majora, labia minora or clitoris of a young person under the age of eighteen years is valid, whether the consent is given by that young person or by any person on that young person's behalf.
Conversely, can someone give her consent if she is 18 years of age?
[English]
Mr. Pinx: I'm sorry, I don't understand your question. The words ``by any person on the young person's behalf'' - is that your point? Provision four only addresses the consent of the young person so that a young person can't consent. A parent can't, on behalf of the young person, say they are consenting.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Yes, but at 18 years of age, a young woman can give her consent.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: You can consent but that's not a defence. The person's consent to the application of bodily harm is not a defence for you, if you are the person who has carried out this particular procedure.
If you carry out the procedure and the person is over 18 years of age, that person can't consent and it's not a defence for you. That's the whole issue. The question is whether consent is your defence. It's not a defence. The Supreme Court of Canada says the victim cannot consent to bodily harm if they are an adult.
The Chair: Do you want to let it settle for a minute while I go on to some other questions?
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I am making this point because you do not interpret this clause in the same way as Mr. Roy.
Mr. Roy clearly said that a woman of 18 years of age could give her consent to undergo excision and that the person who carried out the procedure, whether a physician or some sort of charlatan, could not be prosecuted. Some people do not agree, and Mr. Roy even said that he would suggest an amendment to make everything clearer.
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[English]
The Chair: I'm going to let you answer, Mr. Pinx, but I think we have a misunderstanding here. You answer and then we'll try to sort it out with the parliamentary secretary, if you don't mind.
Mr. Pinx: Briefly, I think we're at cross-purposes. What I'm speaking about is consent - not to a medical practitioner but to that third party who is not a medical practitioner performing this procedure. There is the medical practitioner exception, and you're right. In the case of a medical practitioner who is apparently providing this procedure for the benefit of the physical health of the person, you're right, you can consent, but only in that very limited exceptional situation.
The Chair: There's nothing in this bill to change the common law -
Mr. Pinx: Exactly.
The Chair: - as it exists for someone over the age of 18, or for someone under the age of 18 except that - I think the interpretation would be that the bill is saying someone else can't consent for you if (a) you're under the age of 18, and (b) you can't consent.
We can get the Hansard on that evidence, and I think the parliamentary secretary can have something to say on it at the end.
Mr. Pinx: I just want to add that Mr. Roy and I very rarely disagree.
The Chair: Thanks. Typical criminal lawyer.
Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Ramsay: Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank our guests and our witnesses for being here and for the testimony they've given.
I want to touch on clause 23 of Bill C-27 and your objection to the minimum sentence of five years. The minimum sentence of five years would not be there if the government didn't want to signal to the courts, to you folks, to us and to Canadians that they want to protect children from this kind of behaviour, and that anyone coming near that kind of behaviour had better be aware of what they're approaching.
I support that portion of this bill very strongly. In fact not only should that particular clause deal with individuals who would use violence, intimidation or coercion to force young people into prostitution, I think that kind of offence should be used against them if they used honey to get our young girls or boys into prostitution.
It is interesting to see that in Bill C-17 the government is reducing the maximum penalties for some offences under the Criminal Code. Why? The explanation we received from the department officials was to the effect that the offences, some of which carry a 14-year maximum penalty, have never been used. To expedite the court process and reduce the costs, they want to use summary conviction processes and so on.
In one case we see where the government is reducing the maximum penalty, and also reducing it by way of dual procedure. At the same time they're saying here that although we're prepared to lower the maximum penalty in this area, in this particular case, when it comes to our children, the justice minister and Government of Canada want to signal to the people and to the pimps of this country that if you touch our children this is going to be the result.
I am completely in support of that, and I can understand the rationale you've given this committee supporting your recommendation not to impose a minimum penalty of this nature for this particular offence, but what are the legislators of this land to do to protect our children? We see, not only in this area but in the recent incident at Kirkland Lake, that we must have the tools, and we must give the police the tools and the courts instructions that will protect our children.
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So I understand that when minimum sentences are imposed upon our courts, it is an imposition upon their flexibility. I understand that, but I think it's justified in certain cases. And with respect to your recommendation, I submit that in this particular case, when it comes to our children, it is justified.
As I said earlier, I would go beyond that. I think anyone inducing children into prostitution, whether by way of intimidation, force or coercion, ought to receive the same sentence. It doesn't matter to me how they're induced into this heinous type of activity, those who do so and are responsible for this ought to face a very severe sanction by law.
Do you have any comments? I'd like to give you an opportunity to comment on that.
Mr. Pinx: You've heard my views and you've seen my views in writing, because those are the views of our section. Obviously you and I have a philosophical difference.
I think our goal at the end of the day is exactly the same, but I think it's a question of how we get to the end, as opposed to being a disagreement about the nature of the offence. I find this a heinous crime as well.
I'm a parent, and as a parent I understand how a parent would react to having their children exploited by others. Although I am a defence lawyer, I can well appreciate, as a citizen of my community and of this country, the kinds of horrors that are created by the exploitation of children. There is no disagreement from me on that, and I agree with you completely in terms of your comments as to the kind of offence, but in our view we don't need a minimum sentence to address that kind of crime.
Let me give you an example. One would say that the offence of manslaughter, which is the taking of a human life, is equally serious if not more serious in the minds of many citizens of this country. I invite you to look at the Criminal Code. Is there a minimum sentence for manslaughter? There is not, and the reason is that we all recognize there may be, even in the case of taking a human life, an exceptional set of circumstances that may, in certain cases, not require the person to be jailed at all.
We have seen that in cases of domestic assault. The wife, who has been the subject of abuse, ends up either being convicted of manslaughter or something related, and in mitigation counsel says she has been the subject of horrific abuse for all of these years, this was an unpremeditated crime - it was a manslaughter - and looking at what happened to her in these unique circumstances, she shouldn't be jailed.
You're not going to suggest that a judge shouldn't have the discretion to accommodate that kind of case, and all we're saying is that there may be a case or cases out there where you have an 18-year-old offender with no criminal record who got off the rails, so to speak, and involved in pimping a 17-year-old girl.
I don't say that's good, and don't take this wrong, that's a bad crime, but some of us might stand back and ask whether five years is a little too much for an 18-year-old first time offender to spend in jail for this kind of crime. All we're saying is that the crime, although serious, should also take into account the circumstances of the offender, which in some cases would warrant much less than the kind of sentence that's being proposed.
To address another point that you raised, and I take it as some criticism of the hybrid offences that Parliament is proposing in another portion of Bill C-17, I must disagree with you on that. I don't view that as Parliament taking a more lenient view of crime. I think Parliament is saying that you can proceed by indictment and still get the maximum sentence, or seek the maximum sentence in that serious case; you can proceed in another way and get, still by indictment, a higher sentence but less than that original maximum; or you can proceed by summary proceeding.
All it's doing is vesting in the crown - your representatives and mine - a discretion. It's not creating a lower sentence. It's allowing the crown to exercise a discretion to proceed in a particular way, which, if they choose to proceed that way, could result in a lower sentence. Why? Because the representatives you and I pay to appear in court on our behalf have chosen, in their discretion, that would be a fair and just way to proceed in a given case.
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I'm confident that our crown attorneys do their jobs. I hope you are as well. So I don't see Parliament saying to us and sending a message to the community that it's getting soft on crime. Parliament is taking, in my view, a very intelligent approach to the practical problems and the real world problems of prosecuting crimes in this country, and it's simply giving the crown a little more discretion, which is long overdue.
Mr. Ramsay: I appreciate that.
If the Parliament of Canada, the Minister of Justice, and the Department of Justice thought that the justice system, including the crown prosecutors and the courts, were properly and adequately addressing the problem of child prostitution, why then would they place this minimum sentence upon them? It's obvious that the Department of Justice, the Minister of Justice, and the government of this country, if this part of the bill passes, are saying that they are not satisfied that the judges and the courts are looking at this problem seriously enough; this is an instruction to them.
As legislators, the only way we can tell the courts what to do is by passing laws, and that's exactly how I interpret what we are doing. That is a clear signal that, up until now, someone within the justice system, in the Department of Justice, and within the Government of Canada is saying that the signal is not getting through. The message is not getting through. Let the 18-year-olds know that if they get involved in this mess, they could face a five-year penalty. Let them know that. If they then choose to indulge in that, they face the consequences of their actions. What's wrong with that, bearing in mind that we must come down on the side of the protection of our children? That's what this part of this bill is saying to me: that we're going to come down on the side of society and the safety of our children.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Thank you.
Did you want to comment?
Mr. Pinx: No, that's fine.
The Chair: That's great.
Ms Torsney. Mr. Telegdi also has a question.
Ms Torsney (Burlington): I guess I could belabour that whole thing, but I won't, except to ask you this question.
If there is a situation, as you suggest, with an 18-year-old or a 17-year-old, is there something else they could charge them with, proceed with, or convict them of to get them out of this problem?
Mr. Pinx: What you're now embarking on is a discussion on crown discretion.
Ms Torsney: Right.
Mr. Pinx: The example I used is when the crown chooses to proceed this way -
Ms Torsney: In the first place.
Mr. Pinx: - in the first place. I can assure you that it probably would if indeed the accused fit this definition of this kind of activity. The crown would be hard-pressed to justify why it's making an exception for an 18-year-old, if in fact the 18-year-old commits the same crime as a 21-year-old, a 25-year-old, or a 27-year-old.
To answer your question, prosecutors can obviously be creative. That's what plea bargaining, in part, is about: trying to find creative resolutions to criminal cases. But the concern we have, as I say, is a real concern. This is not a figment of defence lawyers' imagination or crown prosecutors' imagination, because, as you can well appreciate, when we present a brief on behalf of our criminal justice section, that's a section that represents defence lawyers as well as prosecutors.
The concern we put forward is that a five-year sentence could, in effect, be an extraordinarily cruel and unusual sentence for certain offenders. It may be appropriate for many offenders. Demonstrative sentences certainly can be justified for serious criminal offences, but there may be other cases out there in which the sentence is far in excess of what's required.
Ms Torsney: What's interesting is that in the lead-up to this legislation - and there were some who debated that this would cost us too much, believe it or not - some people felt that there were so many people out there who could be held under this provision after being successfully prosecuted that our jails would be full and that we should be doing it only on second conviction. It scared a lot of us to think what price the life of a child who's been involved in this activity is worth.
From talking to the kids who are involved in the streets of Toronto, I understand that the pimps who are generally working with the 11- to 13-year-olds - The 17-year-old girls are usually working on their own and get more of the money. So it really is intended for those people who are dealing with much younger children. I have less of a problem than you do, but I appreciate your concern.
.1625
I wanted to ask you a question on Bill C-27 as well. You didn't talk much about your clause 5, on page 5, about child sex tourism. It's been proposed to us by a family from Winnipeg that we amend the clause and take out ``commercial sexual exploitation'' of children and leave it as ``sexual exploitation'' of children. I appreciate that your argument could be similar, in that there could be a resource dedication problem, but there are cases that exist in which two Canadians have been involved in another country. There is a lot of opportunity for us to do something, except for the way our law would be written in this case.
Would you be supportive of what we call the Prober amendment?
Mr. Pinx: I'll be honest, I really haven't heard of the amendment until you mentioned it just now, although I certainly know the family you're speaking of. Before I would want to comment on that, I truly would want to give it more thought. I focus obviously on this particular bill and the whole issue of commercialism. I can certainly see that expanding it to the non-commercial world might have its problems, but I'd want to give that more thought before giving you my views on that.
Ms Torsney: I'd appreciate some feedback on that. I guess the particular issue is that in many cases it's hard to prove that money transacted or other commercial benefit.
While you were talking with my colleagues, I was looking through the front part of your submission on Bill C-17, which has the positive changes. I want to just clarify what you mean by what's written on the top of page 2. I wonder if you could just tell me about these situations for the non-legal crowd.
Mr. Pinx: Sorry. What are you looking at in particular?
Ms Torsney: It's at the top of page 2. I gather that people are -
Mr. Pinx: Is that the one dealing with -
Ms Torsney: It deals with bank notes.
Mr. Pinx: The amendment that's being proposed actually comes as a by-product of what the Bar Association had proposed at the Uniform Law Conference. I will just give you a 30-second snapshot of why this came about.
There is a provision now whereby if the police in Canada execute what's called a special search warrant and are looking to investigate and prosecute a designated drug offence or enterprise crime offence, they search your residence. Let's say they come across $100,000 in cash that you've been able to save and they seize some boats, some cars, your wonderful jewelry, and all the other things, totalling several hundreds of thousands of dollars. At this point you're locked up in jail because you're deemed to be, let's say, a very major figurehead in crime. You have no resources to pay your lawyer.
Under the special or living expenses, once we get you back out on bail, there's a special provision now in the special proceeds legislation to allow for an application to be made to a Supreme Court judge. The hearing is ultimately ex parte, in front of that judge, for you through your counsel to ask for money to be given back, even though it may arguably be proceeds of crime on its face, so that you can live and your lawyer can be paid. That's the law in Canada.
What was happening, we found, is that the police forces in Canada were not resorting to the special warrant applications. They were using what we call the conventional search warrants. This was your regular search warrant regime: executing you but ending up charging you with enterprise crime offences, drug offences, or proceeds of crime. The same seizures were being made, but because they were under a different warrant regime you couldn't apply for the release of the money for legal expenses or living expenses.
We did some checking with lawyers across the country. We found it to be a rather common problem in many jurisdictions. What the bar proposed - and we're very pleased to see that this has ultimately shown up in the bill - is that any seizures made under the Food and Drugs Act, the Narcotic Control Act, or the Criminal Code that result in the kinds of charges we're talking about will allow you to apply for the relief I've just discussed even though it's not a special warrant regime.
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Our concern is that they've restricted it, as you see in the legislation, to the banknotes. There's reference to those kinds of assets: money or banknotes. We're of the view that the same language used in other provisions of the Criminal Code in dealing with special warrants should just be transposed and used in these provisions. It shouldn't just be restricted to cash or banknotes.
You may not have cash or banknotes; you may have a car, vehicles or a boat. These are other things that you can apply to be released to then be liquidated to serve the same purpose. That's our only complaint. We're very much in favour of this in principle, but we think it should not be restricted down to just simply cash or banknotes.
Ms Torsney: I have never personally been involved in one of these situations, thank God, so in the case of property, I wonder if you can just tell me whether it goes to a trustee who has to get a good fee for it, or can you sell it to your brother for a discount and pass the property on?
Mr. Pinx: Is that in terms of the actual procedure?
Ms Torsney: Yes.
Mr. Pinx: My understanding is that the judge orders its release. I think it would be released - I may stand to be corrected by the learned counsel from the Department of Justice sitting behind me - to you for the purposes of sale. That would be my understanding.
Ms Torsney: Okay. Well, I guess I'd have some concerns such that we should tighten that if we were to make an amendment to that effect.
Thank you. I'll give the rest of my time to whomever.
The Chair: Thank you. Mr. Telegdi.
Mr. Telegdi (Waterloo): I guess the member for Crowfoot posed a question: what are legislators of this land to do to protect our children?
Ms Torsney: Pass gun control?
Mr. Telegdi: Well, gun control is a good one. Pass it? Yes.
I guess we could try to deal with the lack of resources in social services so we can end child poverty. That's one area. I hope that the member for Crowfoot will push for that in the future.
I guess when I look at this section I always have trouble in terms of minimal sentences. When I look at the section and say we'll give a five-year minimal sentence, that makes it very black and white. There's no question that if you're dealing with organized crime, such as bikers, then you're dealing with adults, so that would be appropriate. But in many cases you're dealing with street kids who have a pathological lifestyle. You have emotional and psychiatric problems. You have drugs and alcohol.
So the situation becomes very grey. You could have elements in which violence could be used. You could have two people. One could be 16 or 17, while the other could be 18. They are street kids who have been existing in some kind of a relationship. It doesn't even matter who's male or female, because it can go both ways.
All of a sudden you have these kids with incredible problems getting trapped in this mess. A minimum sentence of five years could be totally inappropriate in the extreme. Chances are, they will have a previous record, given the lifestyle they have. I guess that's where I have much better comfort in giving discretion to the judiciary.
Here's the other problem I have. I know there's a movement afoot to not give discretion to judges. A lot of that movement comes more from perception than reality. The perception is that we have a crime rate that's going down. We have media who are reporting more on crime than they used to, so the crime rate goes higher. It seems to be the inverse to the way it should be going.
The other one is about studies that have been done on the whole issue of whether the courts are doing a good job. The minister cited it in the House the other day when he talked about Dr. Anthony Doob and his study on the public perception of the sentencing process. His study showed that when people get their information from the media, they tend to think that the courts are not working and the judges aren't awarding appropriate sentences. But then he had another group who, instead of getting media reports on the case, got the report from the transcripts in the courts. They heard what went into the sentencing and what the underlying circumstances were. In those cases, the people getting their information that way would believe that the judge was being too harsh or just right in the vast majority of cases.
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So on the one hand we have perceptions, and on the other hand we have reality. Reality tends to be grey.
I might support your concern. I guess maybe I would ask you whether you can give some examples or scenarios - I mentioned this - from your experience with the courts.
Mr. Pinx: The difficulty with examples is that I can give you an example going one way. Then I'm sure my colleague here can give you an example going another way. The difficulty with examples is that it really doesn't, in my view, do anything other than give you the application of the principle in a particular case.
I think what we're speaking of on behalf of our section are principles. The principle to which we're trying to adhere is really not a question of simply trusting judges to do the right thing, but of vesting in them the ability to be able to tailor a sentence for a particular set of circumstances and a particular offender.
We all recognize, as you pointed out - I think it's a very important point - that sometimes perception and reality are two different things. People around this table may say they can't conceive, on the one hand, of a case of child prostitution involving a young person under the age of 18 that should not be deserving of five years of incarceration. I can say on the other hand that I can give you scenarios that I could perhaps create for you, both hypothetically and otherwise, that would suggest something else.
I think what we really have to address - this is the point of our submission - is whether or not you as a committee have a problem philosophically with the idea that we should tie the hands of a judge or judges in such a way that they should not have the flexibility to be able to craft a sentence. It's not only for this area, because then we start with the slippery slope: we'll do it here, then where do we move from here? What other areas do we say are also equally serious or more serious whereby we end up with a sentencing regime that's built around minimum sentences? This is as opposed to a system that allows judges to do what I think in most cases are the right things.
The Chair: Thank you. Mr. Bellehumeur.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I have the notes from Tuesday, October 1, 1996, when Mr. Yvan Roy, senior counsel, appeared before the committee. I just want to make sure that we are on the same wave length. In your opinion - after you give it, I'll give you Mr. Roy's opinion - after Bill C-27 is passed in its current form, will a woman who has attained the age of majority be able to give valid consent to undergo excision?
[English]
Mr. Pinx: With a doctor?
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: Yes.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: With a doctor, under proposed subsection 268(3) under clause 5 -
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: With a doctor or any other person.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: I don't see it with any other person; I see it with a doctor. It's only the medical exception. Only the medical exception is covered.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: With a doctor, but not for the reasons found in subsection (3). In the final analysis, you seem to be saying that subsection (4) has no purpose.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: She cannot consent without a doctor. She can only consent with a doctor if it's ``for the benefit of the physical health of the person or for the purpose of that person having normal reproductive functions''. Even the consent to a doctor is restricted to those situations. So in my view, you cannot consent to anybody other than a doctor, and you can consent to a doctor only for a very limited and narrow medical purpose.
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[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: The proposed subsection (3) does say that "wounds" or "mains" includes to excise. It says that excision is an offence, except for an operation, which is an exception.
The proposed subsection (4), which follows, has to do with the application of this clause and section 265 which refers us to the Criminal Code regarding wounds and aggravated assault:
- ...no consent to the excision, infibulation or mutilation, in whole or in part, of the labia majora,
labia minora or clitoris of a young person under the age of 18 years is valid, whether the consent
is given by that young person or by any person on that young person's behalf.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: I think the difficulty we're having - I speak of you and me on this point - is that you're interpreting the silence of Parliament with respect to the adult to be an implicit authorization whereby the adult can consent. That's not statutory interpretation, sir, with all due respect.
What is then covered, in my view, by Parliament's silence on the adult is brought then into the common law, meaning the principles in Jobidon and the Supreme Court of Canada.
So I don't think you should be interpreting the absence of direction from Parliament as in effect sending a message that we're saying an adult can consent. That's not in effect what Parliament is saying.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I think you should read the transcript of the discussion I had with Mr. Roy on October 1, 1996. I will tell you a little bit about that.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: Did Mr. Roy have legal counsel appearing on his behalf, or was he speaking -
I'm just joking. If he had me there, I know what I would have said for him.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I want you to understand that if you interpret this clause one way andMr. Roy interprets it another way, it means there's a problem that has to be cleared up. I told him that if a young woman cannot, today, give valid consent to aggravated assault under section 268 and if we consider excision to be aggravated assault, we could now prosecute the person who has committed it.
I also said, unless I've misunderstood the suggested amendments, that excision is defined very carefully. Furthermore, according to my own humble opinion of the Jobidon ruling, subsection (4) allows consent that is not available.
Mr. Roy said in response to that that I was asking the right question. If we do not amend section 268 as it is found in Bill C-27, what will happen? A Crown attorney could lay a charge under section 268, but he would have to determine whether the child or the adult woman was able to give valid consent. For his purposes, under Bill C-27 as it is currently drafted, a woman could give valid consent to undergo excision. That's slightly different from your interpretation.
[English]
Mr. Pinx: Maybe Mr. Roy and I don't agree on everything, but I can say that it just seems to me that if you apply the Jobidon principle to an adult and a child, it operates the same way. I think all we're doing by this particular proposal is simply saying that we want to make it very clear that the child can't consent and nobody else can consent on their behalf. To me, that's all that Parliament is really saying.
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The Chair: Isn't the fundamental difference in the Jobidon principle - I mean adults and kids in this - that a person under the age of 18 couldn't consent, for instance, to that charming habit of cosmetic body piercing, but an adult could consent because the court would have to define bodily harm? Isn't that so? An adult woman could have part of her genitalia pierced or have a tattoo or something like that, whereas a child under no circumstances could do that. I thought that was the point of that argument, Mr. Bellehumeur, but I don't have the blues in front of me.
Mr. DeVillers (Simcoe North): I had a question on the minimum sentence, which was whether you felt that the term of five years was too long or whether you were objecting to the principle, but since I asked to be put on the list, I realize you're objecting to minimum sentences in principle.
Mr. Pinx: Yes.
Mr. DeVillers: It seems to be a very controversial issue.
At a previous committee that was doing a review of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, there were witnesses who gave us evidence that the judiciary doesn't give the same regard to environmental offences. They don't consider them in the same light or see them to be as serious as the Criminal Code offences they're used to dealing with.
I was trying to float a trial balloon on the concept of minimum sentences in that case to focus the judiciary on the seriousness of the offence. But that wouldn't fly even in that context. The officials from Environment Canada, etc., who are the people doing the actual work in the field, were in agreement that it wasn't such a good idea. So I think I share those concerns with you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. DeVillers. Mr. Ramsay, did you have a brief point?
Mr. Ramsay: With regard to your recommendation on the minimum sentence, would you have no minimum? Would you recommend no minimum?
Mr. Pinx: We'd recommend no minimum.
Mr. Ramsay: Do you see in proposed subsection 231(6) in clause 6 of Bill C-27 that there is a new definition of first-degree murder emerging?
Mr. Pinx: Yes. It's a reclassification of murder. It's creating a new offence of first-degree murder, which would be murder in the commission of stalking.
Mr. Ramsay: Do you have concerns about that?
Mr. Pinx: Yes.
Mr. Ramsay: Yes, I share those concerns. We have concerns about that in our caucus, as well.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Mr. Ramsay, we've got your motion. Did you want to bring it forward?
Mr. Ramsay: Yes, thank you. The motion is on the record, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Yes.
Mr. Ramsay: Then I won't bother reading it. This, of course, was Mr. Thomson's motion. I asked him basically about the rationale behind it.
I would like to place on the record the concern that through Bill C-41, there are options now through alternative measures and conditional release and sentencing that would allow this kind of an offence to be treated very leniently. We're very concerned about that. We think it should be brought to the attention of the justice minister that this whole area of dealing with young children, the protection of young children, should address perhaps some of the things that maybe the justice department wasn't aware of at the time Bill C-41 was passed.
The Chair: Okay. That's it?
Mr. Ramsay: That's it.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ramsay. Are there any comments? Mr. Gallaway, and then
Mr. DeVillers.
Mr. Gallaway (Sarnia - Lambton): I'm not aware specifically of the problem Mr. Ramsay refers to, but for discussion purposes let's assume there is a problem with the legislation.
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I think the place to move or to raise the concern is in the House, not in the committee. The committee is here to consider policy, not to generate policy or to send concerns directly to a minister on a matter of general policy. Through amendments to legislation, the committee can in fact say to a minister or to a department that we don't agree with this or we do agree with this. If we don't agree with it, we're going to amend the bill.
This is not the place to send a message to the minister saying that we urge him in a general way to bring forth legislation that toughens penalties against convicted pedophiles. There are a number of ways of raising it in the House, certainly through Standing Orders and members' statements.
I would also point out to Mr. Ramsay that there is a provision under Standing Order 68.(4)(b) that allows a member to bring a motion to the House and have that motion debated. If the House agrees that in fact the penalties are not sufficiently tough with respect to pedophiles, for example, then the House can instruct this committee to draft legislation that would toughen the penalty provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with that particular offence.
I don't want to get into an argument on the merits of whether the legislation is sufficiently tough or whether there is a problem with the legislation; I just do not believe that a committee is the venue in which to raise this.
The Chair: Mr. DeVillers.
Mr. DeVillers: I agree with my colleague's submissions as far as the proper procedural place to raise questions or motions of this nature, but I also find the motion extremely broad and general and vague, and I think it's of little value for that reason.
With some of the issues of toughening penalties, I think you have to ascribe to a certain political philosophy and you have to agree that toughening penalties is going to reduce the amount of crime, etc. I think the motion is politically motivated to that extent, but the government has already taken measures such as the high-risk offenders legislation, etc. So I think the motion is redundant to that extent and there are measures that have been taken. For those reasons I would speak against the motion.
The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I don't think this is the right place for that motion.
If the Reform Party wants a stricter bill or wants to impose harsher sentences upon some kinds of criminals, it can table a motion in the House or it can table private member's bills, before the Justice Committee. Furthermore, I believe that the government has already tabled legislation that is intended to strengthen certain provisions of the Criminal Code.
I also think that the courts have enough tools to handle pedophiles and to protect young Canadians against these odious crimes. For the time being, I don't see any need to introduce a bill or to ask the minister to act and to make decisions in haste.
[English]
The Chair: Do you want the last word, Mr. Ramsay?
Mr. Ramsay: Yes, very briefly, Madam Chair.
As the months go by we will see if there's any further fallout from Bill C-41. When Bill C-41 went through the clause by clause we raised our concern that we wanted it restricted to the non-violent offences. I have some concern, and I want it on the record, that the courts now have options that could see these very serious offences being dealt with in ways that the justice department and the justice minister and the Government of Canada perhaps never foresaw and wouldn't approve of.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ramsay. Do you want a recorded vote?
Mr. Ramsay: Sure, we'll have a recorded vote.
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Motion negatived: nays 6; yeas 1
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ramsay. Sorry I took you by surprise this morning, but I'm just trying to claw through this stuff.
The next thing is the seventh report of the steering committee, and that was held this morning. If we're in agreement, could we have a motion to proceed to clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-17 on Thursday, November 7, 1996? I can tell you that one of the reasons for this is that the provincial governments are screaming for it. I think Mr. Bellehumeur actually spoke to the offices of a couple of Attorneys General, and I know that I'm getting screamed at about it. They're just dying to get ahold of it so that they can streamline some of their procedures.
So could I have a motion to that effect?
Mr. DeVillers: I so move.
Motion agreed to
The Chair: On Bill C-27, you'll see that we have a list of witnesses here. I just want to commend our staff for pulling together in a really organized fashion what in my view is a very comprehensive list. I think we're going to have a good discussion on this bill. I'm hoping that - I can tell you that we added more people this morning in order to try to cover off everything that we could. So could I have a motion to accept this witness list on Bill C-27?
Ms Torsney: Can I just clarify something? We made two additions to it, did we not?
The Chair: They're on there.
Ms Torsney: Goa Action Watch is there, but where do I see Sherri Kingsley?
The Chair: Is it Go Action Watch, or is it Goa?
Ms Torsney: It's GAW, which is ``Goa Action Watch''.
The Chair: Ah, GAW. Okay.
Ms Torsney: And the city is Goa.
Sherri would go up with Wayne Holland probably.
The Chair: Okay, put her with Wayne Holland.
Ms Torsney: And yes, I'll move this list now.
The Chair: With the additions, the list is printed with Sherri Kingsley and GAW.
Ms Torsney: So for those who are interested, the acronym is GAW, and the full name is Goa Action Watch, for the place in Goa.
The Chair: All right. Now, is there any need for further discussion on that? Is that agreeable to everyone?
Motion agreed to
The Chair: Moving right along, we come next to the comprehensive review of the Young Offenders Act, phase III. That's on page 4, and you have in conjunction with this - I just need to slow down for a minute here because I know there is going to be some discussion on this. If it's agreeable, I'll set it out and then we can see where -
Mr. Bellehumeur, did you have some comments for the record? No? Well, I think Mr. Ramsay does, but I'll set it out first.
[Translation]
Mr. Bellehumeur: I made some comments, which I will repeat for the record. Given the cost of this forum and the work that has already been done in this area, I really think it is pointless to have this forum on November 22, 1996. I wouldn't spend $60,000 just to put on a little show on television. Even if we want to make people more aware of this issue, I don't think this is the right way to go about that.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Ramsay, do you have any comments?
Mr. Ramsay: I have difficulty with the cost as well; that's a problem with me.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ramsay.
Can I have a motion on this?
.1700
Ms Torsney: I move that we should have this forum, and that it in fact will form part of the basis of the research and the review we've been doing when we set out back in the spring.
The Chair: Ms Torsney, does your motion include, then, adoption of the budget and the outline?
Ms Torsney: Yes.
The Chair: We have an outline?
Ms Torsney: I think the budget is especially defensible, given what it costs to get even half of the committee any place in the country, and that we'll be able to reach many, many Canadians, everywhere they have CPAC and a VCR, because you can take the tapes and pop them in. It will form a great tool for lots of young people across the country.
The Chair: Do you want a recorded vote, Mr. Ramsay?
Mr. Ramsay: It doesn't matter.
Motion agreed to on division
The Chair: The last thing is our budget, both the national forum and operations, which I've divided up now. We have an operations budget here of $106,500, which covers the budget for the national forum plus all of our witnesses on the other legislation we have in front of us, and miscellaneous expenses. Will somebody move that budget?
Ms Torsney: I will.
Motion agreed to on division
The Chair: Thank you for your cooperation.
The meeting is adjourned.