[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Wednesday, February 12, 1997
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[English]
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): I'd like to call the meeting to order.
Welcome to our witnesses coming in from Vancouver, Professor Paul Brantingham and Professor Stephen Easton, from the Department of Economics at Simon Fraser University. We hope it's not snowing out there. We know you already had that round, but it's still snowing here.
They're here to testify on both Bill C-55, an act that amends the Criminal Code, and Bill C-254, with respect to corrections and conditional release.
Professor Paul J. Brantingham (Department of Criminology, Simon Fraser University): I should say that I am Paul Brantingham. I look like Santa Claus. Steve Easton, the economist, is the smooth-shaven fellow. I am a professor of criminology, not of economics. Dr. Easton is professor of economics, and we're both at Simon Fraser.
Our remarks are relatively short on this and go mainly toward raising a few issues around the sides. In principle, we think what's being proposed here makes good sense and holds real prospect for effective tertiary prevention of some kinds of violent crimes.
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In general, we think both bills represent a good idea, but we're concerned with a couple of apparent assumptions that seem to be built into them. We're concerned with some of the possibilities for net widening, increasing the sweep of correctional control, and the costs that might be associated with that. We're also concerned with a more general, long-standing problem that has to do with our inability to evaluate the consequences of this, or a lot of other things that happen, in reform of criminal law. So those are the things we're going to talk about.
I will mention some matters and Dr. Easton will talk about the costs. Do you just want us to plow on through here?
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): That would be wonderful.
Prof. Brantingham: One of the concerns that struck us in working through the two bills was the apparent working assumption that sexual offenders have significantly higher recidivism rates or repeat offending rates than other offenders - property offenders or other kinds of violent offenders. Much of the direction of the bill seems to be focused on that problem based on that working assumption.
The best data we can put together suggests that, appalling as sexual offenders' reoffending rates are, they are a relatively low end of the spectrum in Canada. That's been true for a long time. We think the concern about that assumption underlies some possible problems in terms of what the act might do once the modifications to the code are proclaimed.
A second assumption seems to be that, because of the way in which things are focused, the dangerous offender provisions are not being implemented as they should be against sexual offenders. Again, the best research we can find tells us that the dangerous offender legislation is focused almost exclusively on sexual offenders and is used for almost no other type of serious personal injury offender. So we're concerned that there will not be the reach in this act that some people might be expecting.
We are concerned about the possibility for expanded costs that are likely to flow out of the various sections of these two bills. In particular, we have a concern because we've had a difficult time trying to estimate how many people, how many potential offenders, how many recidivists, might actually be affected by all the different components of the legislation. This is partly because we simply don't have systematic information from the key central elements of the criminal justice system, particularly from crown counsel and from the courts. We won't be able to tell what the impact of this act is unless some things are modified.
We don't think there is likely to be very much expansion in the use of dangerous offender proceedings against people at early stages. Crown counsellors already targeting sexual offenders indicate that they almost never target any other kind of offence, and most of the things that modify the legislation focus on expanding the use of this category against sexual offenders.
We don't think much is likely to change on the basis of the introduction of what you might call the six-month slow plea or slow proceeding that Bill C-55 introduces, which allows crown counsel to give notice before sentence, and then, if they come up with appropriate information, to seek dangerous offender status or a finding in court up to six months after a sentence has been handed down.
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The best evidence we've been able to find indicates that most crown counsel believe they have the information they need that's easily available to trigger dangerous offender proceedings before a sentence is handed down under the current law. Since we're only talking about something like eight to ten dangerous offender proceedings in Canada a year anyway, we don't expect to see any significant increase.
There is one potential built into Bill C-54 that allows an end-of-sentence proceeding that we think will have some potential for the substantial expansion in the use of this and some real incremental costs in the operation of the justice system that would come directly back to the federal treasury in a real way.
Steve, do you want to talk about that?
Professor Stephen Easton (Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University): Sure. Let me just mention that in order to try to cost this kind of a program out, we looked at the maximum possible cost that could be on the table for this kind of proceeding. Now this is not necessarily realistic, but it certainly gives an upper bound to what could be going on.
In particular, there were roughly 376 inmates last year who would have been eligible for the new categorization of an offender. These are people who had been refused statutory release and yet were at the end of their warrants, so they were let go. These are people who potentially could be identified as dangerous offenders.
With 376 of them, suppose they were all designated dangerous offenders and kept in prison. Then you're looking at roughly $50,000 per inmate per year. One year's cohort adds about $18.8 million to the cost of keeping these inmates incarcerated.
We may choose to do that. It may be a good use of public funds. They may be sufficiently dangerous, but nonetheless, you realize that over a ten-year period we're talking about bumping up the budget of Correctional Services by about $200 million. So there are some cost implications if it were to be expanded.
Now we're talking about the maximum possible who would be eligible under today's current system. So that's an upper bound.
How many are actually going to be eligible remains to be seen. We'll talk about other costing estimates for other kinds of offenders when we get there.
Prof. Brantingham: Did you want to talk about the long-term benefits?
Prof. Easton: We could. Perhaps then let me just talk about the other possible designation, which is the long-term offender designation.
Again, we tried to put some sort of what I'll call generous cost estimates, although in this case, unlike the previous example, there are some incentives in the corrections system that may lead to these kinds of costs being actually more realizable.
In particular, who's eligible for the long-term offender designation? I certainly won't tell you what the long-term offender designation is. You obviously know it better than we do.
Currently, who would be possibly eligible? At the present time, we release around 4,000 prisoners a year on statutory release. Of these offenders, some 20% will be returned to prison, having been convicted of an additional crime while they're on statutory release.
In addition, if we look ten years into the future, of those who are released at the end of their terms, some 30% will be reconvicted of a crime.
So if you take a cohort from any given year, in the next ten years, under the ambit of that ten-year probationary period that the long-term offender designation gives you, what you're looking at is possible recidivism of about 50% of that cohort.
Now what's interesting about it, of course, is that if you allow Correctional Services to identify people whom they think are likely to reoffend and therefore fall under the ambit of the legislation for being on probation during that period of ten years, then we're looking really at adding 2,000 supervisions a year. If we assume that those in Corrections can in fact identify and make an appropriate designation, then roughly 2,000 additional supervisions per year will be eligible for this kind of designation.
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That amount over a period of ten years is roughly 20,000 additional supervisions. Given that today, in 1994 and 1995, there are roughly 9,227 parole supervisions, we're talking about potentially tripling the number of supervisions currently established.
Canada's parole board currently costs about $24 million a year. The cost of the rest of the parole system adds another $52 million a year. An increase in the scale of the operation by a factor of three means an increase in costs to the federal government for the parole system of roughly $240 million each year simply because of the change in this legislation.
Is it reasonable to expect that the Correctional Service of Canada will in fact try to identify long-term offenders in this way? I think so. I think it's not unreasonable to expect that they will look at the most dangerous part of the population, in their view, to try to have them identified as such so as to reduce their probability of reoffending.
That brings something else up, of course. If we're going to go into a program that can potentially cost $240 million, I hope we've done the research and can find the research or can institute the appropriate structure to permit us to evaluate whether in fact putting these people on supervision means this supervision reduces the average rate of reoffending and reduces the recidivism of the current population. It seems to me that this would be a very important component that Parliament would certainly want to consider.
Paul will talk of some of the other aspects now.
Prof. Brantingham: The other major point beyond the continuing pleas from academics for more and better data and the need to expand what Statistics Canada does in the crime and justice area is to remark on the possibilities with the expansion of section 810.
The new section that Bill C-55 adds, you will remember, makes it possible for the Attorney General to seek peace bonds in cases that are not brought forward by individuals. It explicitly allows the introduction of some form of electronic monitoring along with some other things like weapons prohibitions. We expect that explicit indication on electronic monitoring is likely to expand backwards into many peace-bonding situations.
The focus of this is almost certainly to deal with domestic violence problems, and we think it holds real prospects for accomplishing something and keeping a lot of harms that currently occur from happening.
We just wanted to alert you to what we see as the potential - nationally - for cost in this area. To do that, we've talked to the people who maintain the British Columbia registry of peace bonds and no-contact orders coming out of family court. At present, it appears that on the peace bond side there are going to be something like 1,300 new cases a year registered. That's the historical record in the time they've operated. We believe any of those are likely to be candidates for monitoring under this bill, and to make this bill effective in practice, electronic monitoring is going to be the key.
We think it's possible to have about 2,600 cases a year in British Columbia on electronic monitoring. If that estimate is correct, we have some estimates from the electronic house arrest program in British Columbia that suggest it will cost $47 per diem for each case on monitoring, which works out to about $44 million a year for British Columbia. If we say that British Columbia is in the range of about 10% of the Canadian potential and expand that, we think the potential cost here is going to be in the order of $400 million a year. We think the harm being done may be well worth it, but we want to point out that the cost exists.
I think those are the main points of the remarks we would like to make. We'd be happy to take questions.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you to both witnesses.
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There will be ten-minute rounds of questions from each of the parties and then we'll go to five-minute rounds. If you both want to comment, just put up your hand and I'll be able to figure out that the other person would like to make an additional comment.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois, you have 10 minutes.
Mr. Langlois (Bellechasse): I would like to hear your view on two points which I feel are critical to this bill.
I would like us to deal with section 753, in combination with section 752 with regard to finding the offender to be a dangerous offender. What bothers me a little about subsections 753.2 and 753.3 is the famous six-month waiting period.
So far, our criminal justice system has been quite strict when it comes to criminal proceedings. When someone is arrested, he or she must appear before a justice of the peace within 24 hours of the arrest, unless no justice of the peace is available; in that case, it must be done at the earliest opportunity. If the proceedings continue, a preliminary inquiry must be held within eight days, otherwise the judge loses his jurisdiction over the individual. The time allowed here would be much greater, namely six months.
I would feel much more comfortable if the bill did not allow for this type of hybrid decision. In other words, an accused could initially be sentenced to, say, ten years in prison, but for six months, the accused may have to come back for submissions on sentencing to determine whether he will be deemed a dangerous offender.
I would have much preferred to see the Crown prosecutor forced to indicate - and when I say forced, it would not be a huge burden - as soon as the verdict is handed down, if it is a guilty verdict, that he plans to use the provisions of the Act and take six months to make his submissions on sentencing.
My understanding of the legislation is that it will apply to those found guilty of crimes for which the minimum sentence is obviously much greater than six months. I don't think it is a good idea to impose this double burden on someone who has been found guilty.
I would like to hear your comments on the fact that, when there is a guilty verdict, the Crown prosecutor can just inform the court of his intention to make use of those six months.
I also have another question, but it is not on the same provisions.
[English]
Prof. Brantingham: Fair enough. I will try to handle that.
It gave us considerable pause when we saw it, because it's very unusual in the context of criminal proceedings. My initial reaction on first reading was to be quite hostile to this bill. I had to read it very carefully, because of the format of it, to try to understand what is going on.
I believe two protections are built into the bill and they perhaps reduce the civil liberties concerns, which are quite proper. One of them is the notice requirement you referred to. The second is that the crown counsel has the burden of demonstrating that there is evidence that could not have reasonably been available at the time of ordinary sentencing in order for the proceeding to go forward during the six-month period. So there must be notice that it might go forward and there must be a showing that evidence tending to establish the dangerous offender standing could not reasonably have been available at the time.
Presumably this is addressed to problems of finding and certifying prior criminal records. We don't think this is going to be a significant player in practice, because as we say, the best research seems to show that at present crown counsel have ready access to the materials they think they need to go forward under the current status of the legislation. But we presume this was written in contemplation of the fact that criminal record keeping is sometimes difficult. It is sometimes difficult to get information on the details of prior convictions from courts across the country.
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[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Thank you for your comments. The legislation does indeed clarify that. Now, I would like to respond to your comment.
Let's say someone has just been sentenced to ten years in prison, immediately after the verdict on the submissions on sentencing, and asks for an appeal and expects to be released during the appeal process. Then the Crown prosecutor uses the provisions in section 752 and 753, and asks that the individual be declared a dangerous offender and for a new order for committal.
Are people are going to go back and forth between the Superior Court or the provincial Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal to determine whether the individual should be released during the proceedings? That is what will probably happen. I would hope that the rules of practice of our various courts, the higher courts and the court of appeal, are clear enough to avoid all the back and forth between courts.
I would now like to draw your attention to another point I had thought of earlier. The provision that bothers me the most out of the entire bill, is the famous section that allows that a peace bond be issued to someone who has not been found guilty of any crime or of any offence, either criminal or penal.
If there is a preponderance of evidence, which would thereby transcend the general rule of our criminal law, evidence can be presented before a judge showing that the individual is a threat to others thereby subjecting him to certain commitments, otherwise the individual will be breaking the law and guilty of an offence. I mentioned that yesterday to a representative of the Criminal Lawyers Association of Ontario, who obviously didn't quite agree with me given the nature of his occupation.
So far, peace bonds have always been kept for conflicts between individuals. I'll give you the example of the ones I have encountered; they were rejected lovers who stalked their mistress or spouse. Peace bonds were issued. Peace bonds were established for society as a whole so Crown prosecutors can use them against private citizens.
What worries me the most is this opens up a grey area in our criminal law. I thought our criminal system had always been based on whether you were guilty or innocent. Now, you can be half guilty or half innocent, because without a guilty verdict, you may nonetheless be restricted in your movements and where you can go, without any law being broken.
I don't know if you share our concerns, but I would at least like to hear your comments on subsection 810.2.
[English]
Prof. Brantingham: Obviously it is a significant concern when the state exercises some kind of criminal restrictive power through the Criminal Code on someone who has not yet violated any criminal law. Of course, we already have two sections that allow peace bonds to go forward and in practice do not require a finding of guilt for either of those to go forward.
It seems to me there are two differences at the threshold. At present the person who fears they may be attacked or who is being harassed has to come forward and say ``I'm being attacked or harassed by X and I ask that the court give me some help in stopping it; I'm afraid they're going to attack me''.
The proposed new section allows the Attorney General - I found that ambiguous, but I presume it means the attorney general of the province - to come to court and say ``we believe X is likely to engage in dangerous, violent behaviour unless we restrain him''. That's a change.
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The second change is that the Attorney General doesn't have to specify who exactly might be the target of that dangerous behaviour but apparently under current wording could specify ``world at large''. That's a matter of some considerable concern.
We believe the law has been drafted to focus particularly on domestic violence situations, dealing with two kinds of concerns. One is that some people caught in violent relationships may be afraid to come forward themselves and seek a peace bond, and it might make sense for the Attorney General to come forward, much as a modification in the law of arrest has significantly increased the ability of the police to deal with assaultive behaviour in domestic situations where the victim is reluctant to press charges. We think the law is aimed at that situation.
We think the law is also based on a working assumption that a substantial number of peace bonds at present, where a no-contact order is issued out of family court in the alternative, are simply ignored by the person who is placed under the peace bond or who is placed under the no-contact order. This legislation makes explicit the ability of the court to set monitoring conditions to make sure that is honoured in a way that makes it very difficult for the person to breach the order.
There are a couple of things we would probably be concerned about. One of them is that in the current state of information available to us we don't really know...and I checked in British Columbia. No one in British Columbia has any idea how many breaches of peace bonds and no-contact orders there were last year. Although we know how many were enforced, we don't know how many were violated or how many times they were violated, and under what circumstances. It would be useful to know something more about that as background to understanding whether this legislation is working appropriately.
The second issue is a matter of more concern for us. It is that under the current wording the Attorney General is not required to specify who might be the victim of intended offences. While that could have a preventive effect, the possibility for net-widening, for increasing the sweep of criminal control when people have not done anything they can prove, and for tempting police into using this procedure in circumstances where they can't make a case otherwise are very troubling. We agree with you on that.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Thank you.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you, Mr. Langlois. Mr. Ramsay, you have 10 minutes.
[English]
Mr. Ramsay (Crowfoot): Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank our witnesses for their presentation.
Gentlemen, you have indicated your estimation of the cost to implement some of the conditions of the bill. Of course, we always are interested in knowing what we are going to get for that expenditure. Have you conducted an estimation of the saving that will occur to society, including lives that might be saved and the economic ramifications of that? Have you done an estimation of the cost on the other side of this bill?
Prof. Brantingham: No, at present we have not done that estimation. We agree that one needs to be done. We've begun to rough out the data needs we would need to work with to produce that. We think the potential savings are quite substantial. We think the monetary savings could be quite substantial, offsetting some of the incremental costs we've talked about, even if we leave aside the pain, suffering, and agony issues, which we think are perhaps qualitatively the most important here.
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Unfortunately, much of the information that we would need to begin to move this from very crude estimates to reasonable estimates on that side of things either simply doesn't exist, or if it exists, it is buried in inaccessible operating files, in particular crown counsel or judicial registries.
One of the other pleas we would make is the need for more data in this arena and an expansion of some of the things Statistics Canada does. In particular, we cannot at present estimate the number of people convicted of any particular crime across Canada, and we cannot estimate the number of persons who are reconvicted of offences across Canada.
We have some small look at convictions in some small provinces and the province of Quebec, but for British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario, we simply have no information. We don't know how many people were convicted of what crimes. The sad thing is, from Confederation until the late 1960s, we did know that information.
So the short story is, we agree that needs to be done; we don't think it's possible at the moment. Perhaps there are resources available to you in the House that are not available to us that would make that possible in a satisfying way. We would be delighted to do it with the right....
Mr. Ramsay: All right. I thank you for that. We have some idea from your testimony what it will cost to implement some of the provisions of the bill, but we don't have any information as to what the pay-off would be for the expenditure of those funds. I accept that.
It would be a difficult task, certainly, but I'm sure we should be looking at that.
Prof. Brantingham: Absolutely. We would be delighted to do it, if we could find the information sources that would make it possible, and we're sure that many others would.
Mr. Ramsay: Let me go on to another area. The concern that the bill addresses in part, with the dangerous offender designation, is a very real concern, in that individuals have been released from prison, either after serving their complete sentence or upon early parole, who have gone on to commit violent offences.
What the bill fails to do - and I'd like your comments on this - is to provide for any action that can be taken on the part of the Crown if information surfaces after the six-month period that would have supported a dangerous offender designation. That means that at the end of the warrant period, even though the evidence is clear that the individual poses a high risk to reoffend, nothing can be done about it. That person goes back into society with the likelihood that he may be targeting some innocent individual.
Do you have any thoughts on that? I see this as a weakness in the bill, and I really don't know how to address it, other than to place the designation further down the line.
Prof. Brantingham: It's possible that we have misread things, but we believe that possibility is addressed in the components of the two bills that permit the Correctional Service of Canada to come forward and suggest that a dangerous offender designation might be appropriate for people who are approaching the expiry of a warrant after having been denied statutory release.
Our reading of things is that CSC, becoming apprised of new data that was not available to crown counsel either at sentencing or in the six-month notice period afterwards, can take that to the parole board for review during a period commencing one year prior to warrant expiry, and if the parole board agrees that the new information supports the idea that a dangerous offender finding might be appropriate, they can then forward that to the provincial Attorney General with the recommendation that it be looked at, and if the provincial Attorney General ministry agrees, they can then open a dangerous offender proceeding at that point, prior to release.
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If we're reading these bills correctly, then that possibility that you proposed is built in, but it's in Bill C-254 rather than in C-55.
Mr. Ramsay: Well, yes, and that's a private member's bill you're referring to. The government bill is C-55, and the purpose of C-254, if it was adopted, was to allow the designation of dangerous offender to occur at any time, including at the termination of the sentence if rehabilitative programs had not had the desired effect upon an individual and they were still considered to be a high risk to reoffend. Society could then be protected by extending the period of incarceration.
But that's not in Bill C-55, and I don't hold out too much hope for C-254, because it is a private member's bill. We were hoping that in C-55 that portion of C-254 would have been adopted, but it hasn't. Perhaps an amendment might be in order.
The justice minister stated that he felt the six-month period itself, if it went beyond six months, might be challenged in the courts as unconstitutional. At the same time, as legislators, we're grappling with the need to protect society from people who obviously pose a serious risk to reoffend after their warrant is expired. Bill C-55 does not contain that potential, except to equip potential offenders perhaps with an electronic monitoring device, but I don't know how successful that would be if someone is determined to commit another rape or murder or whatever.
I want to thank you for that. I just have a minute or so left, and there's another area I wanted to touch on.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Do you want to wait for the next round?
Mr. Ramsay: Yes, I will. Thanks, Madam Chair.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you, Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Telegdi, ten minutes please.
Mr. Telegdi (Waterloo): Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you very much for your presentation. I'm interested in following up on the economic modelling you did.
You mentioned that section 810 would result in a cost of $45 million in British Columbia and something like $400 million a year across Canada.
Prof. Brantingham: Yes, we think that's an upper-bound potential, from the limited amount of information we're able to obtain. These are rough estimates based on limited information, but that's what we think, yes.
Mr. Telegdi: Is it because of the electronic monitoring?
Prof. Brantingham: That's right, and we suspect that is the principle tool that makes proposed section 810.2 particularly useful.
Mr. Telegdi: Interesting. I'm trying to envision how this electronic monitoring would work. Could you tell me from your end how you think it would work?
Prof. Brantingham: Sure. I can give you an example of one commercially available system used by some states in the U.S. This is a system that puts an electronic broadcasting device attached to the ankle of the person who's under the peace bond, and it sets a safe zone around the probable victim's home and around the probable victim. This anklet broadcasts when the person wearing it comes within - for the commercial systems I've seen - 400 feet, or 150 metres or so, of the potential victim's home, or the potential victim at work carrying a special pager. An alarm goes off, and that alarm not only sounds in the home and alerts the potential victim with the pager, but it also signals in a monitoring station. The monitoring station then notifies the police. The concern involved here will almost always be that a violent spouse or former spouse will attack a victim by kicking in the door at home or stalking them at work, and this is a way to intercede in that.
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That's a working assumption. There's a general public perception that it happens frequently, and we simply don't know at present how often that happens. We know it happens occasionally, and those get prominent news coverage, as you know.
Mr. Telegdi: That's interesting, because some of the witnesses discounted the value in that area because of the reliability of the devices - I believe they said 85%. So you need some further evidence that when the alarm goes off, in terms of the victim, it goes off because the person who is wearing the monitor comes within the radius. They suggested it could be a real problem because people could drive by, triggering the alarm, and of course, unless there is somebody there to catch him in the act, it is very hard to prove, given that it is only 85% accurate.
Prof. Brantingham: Fair enough. Those are reasonable concerns. They are in a sense, though, technical engineering problems. I suspect with sufficient expenditure it's possible to deal with those problems, but I can't really speak to the engineering side of it.
Mr. Telegdi: If this device was going to be used specifically for house arrest or making sure you are in on curfew, and if the device goes off, then somebody would respond to check out physically whether or not the individual is where he's supposed to be - at home, or at work for that matter - or in the case where it's to warn the victim, that the individual is in the vicinity of the victim.
Prof. Brantingham: Such devices are used at present in British Columbia for house arrest in minor offences, summary conviction offences, apparently with great success. They've had considerable success reported in the States in a number of different jurisdictions with a house arrest program.
I don't think any reasonable person is contemplating house arrest on the basis of a peace bond where someone has not yet done anything wrong but there's an allegation they might if they keep doing what they're doing. So presumably it's to stay away from a particular location or from a particular person.
I have not seen any studies or data to indicate how effective those are. Presumably, we would have to expend a lot of money on the monitoring side of this and on the police response to this. Doubtless, we would have problems in the beginning ironing out operational concerns. So there is a problem. I think the hope is that there will be a significant deterrent effect, that people who know they have one of these broadcasting anklets on are going to be sufficiently rational that they will avoid going near the people we're seeking to protect. In the current status of information collection, we could implement this, and it might be almost impossible to evaluate its actual impact.
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Mr. Telegdi: What would be the total cost, in your best estimate, if Bill C-55 were implemented?
Prof. Brantingham: We're looking at a potential of something in the order of $800 million to $900 million a year incremental to current correctional expenses, if a worst-case scenario in terms of cost develops.
Is that a fair bid, Steve?
Prof. Easton: I'm a little worried that we have not separated out Bills C-55 and C-254. We received them as a package and did not realize that one was a member's bill and one was a government bill.
I think that's still a rough estimate, but now I'm a bit concerned. The $800 million to $900 million is certainly an upper bound on these kinds of measures of the government bill, I believe.
Mr. Telegdi: Let me say I applaud your efforts to cost these things out, because I think it's important, particularly in light of the resources available. Obviously, putting in resources at one end, we have to be aware of what the cost savings are, so we can best allocate resources.
What is interesting when I look at the figure of $47 a day for electronic monitoring.... The bail program in the city of Toronto, which just got cancelled by the provincial government, had a cost associated with it of $4 a day. Now, granted it wasn't the same kind of device, where you would set alarms off, but it's also a program that promotes public safety. From all the studies that have been done on it, it has been quite successful - very successful - and it's supported by all players in the justice system. That's where cost allocation becomes a real concern, because obviously if you take it from one and you spend it on one side, you don't spend it on the other.
I'll leave this for you to respond to at some future time. When we look at the cost-effectiveness of the judicial system, have you done a breakdown between, say, Quebec and the rest of Canada? I think Quebec could be a model for us in the rest of Canada. Have you looked at programs in Europe compared with those in Canada, and of course doing the comparison with the States as well?
Prof. Brantingham: We have not done a comparison between Quebec and other provinces, because although Quebec has very good data, we have a difficult time obtaining data on judicial activities, on number of convictions, on sentences handed down for other provinces. We can get data for P.E.I., but we can't get data for Ontario or Alberta or British Columbia or Manitoba, which we think are more reasonably comparable in size and intensity of the crime problem. Those data exist for Quebec and for some of the Atlantic provinces, and for Saskatchewan and the territories, but they don't exist in Ontario or B.C. or Alberta or Manitoba.
We would like to see the court reporting program of the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics expanded to all the provinces, putting us essentially in the position we were in before 1968. We think that would help and we would like to do that.
We have not yet run comparisons against the States or Europe in general, but in crime rate, imprisonment rate, and general crime patterns we fall somewhere between Europe as a whole and the States as a whole. We're substantially better on most indicators than the States and we're somewhat worse than many European countries.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): I just want to make two points of clarification. First, you said no statistics are available for those various provinces. Why is that?
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Prof. Brantingham: A judicial reporting system came in shortly after Confederation and it operated until 1968. In that year, different provinces began to withdraw, and although there were attempts to keep it going, it collapsed. My best understanding is that each provincial judicial administrative agency went in a different direction in terms of record keeping and systematic reporting of information. It is therefore very difficult to extract similar information from the files and records kept by the provincial or supreme courts in British Columbia and, say, those in Quebec or Ontario. The data need to be worked on in order to extract them.
In many cases, courts of superior jurisdiction across Canada are not yet computerized, so data have to be extracted from manual record keeping systems to go beyond crude case counts. My understanding is that the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics has a program that has restarted this, and it has begun to try to talk the provinces into participating. But as I say, the four large provinces I mentioned do not yet participate.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you.
I think you came up with some figures about the cost. I think it was about $8 million or $9 million, assuming that electronic monitoring would or could be used in all peace bonds, including the new ones, under section 810.1.
Prof. Brantingham: Yes, my reading of the current sections in the act suggests that a judge, thinking it appropriate, could set electronic monitoring as a condition of the peace bond presently, but whether or not it would be appropriate would be a litigable issue or an appealable issue. Expressly mentioning it under proposed section 810.2 will, I suspect, point the courts in the direction of thinking it might be appropriate as a condition in any circumstance, and that's why I make that -
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): In your costs.
Prof. Easton: Of judgment.
Prof. Brantingham: Yes.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Okay, thank you.
Mr. Ramsay, I thought that might help you with your questions, too.
Mr. Ramsay: I just have two points on the electronic monitoring section of Bill C-55. The first point is how effective it will be.
Mr. Auger, who was a prime suspect in the murder of Melanie Carpenter, simply moved out of the area. He didn't have a target that the authorities could protect. In other words, there wasn't a spouse who was a target; it was just a random selection at large. I think there would be a considerable number of those, particularly when it comes to sex offenders. How do you keep a sex offender from little children? You can keep them away from schoolyards and playgrounds, but children frequent other places, including shopping malls, and so on.
So I think there is a significant limitation on the effectiveness of it. You can comment on that, but I would like to make my other point before listening to whatever comments you might have.
The other thing is the concern about the authority that would be granted in the first place through this section. The present law allows for peace bonds and restraining orders, which may include a prohibition ordering the subject to stay away from certain locations and certain people. However, it doesn't amount to a 24-hour monitoring system. What it relies upon is the responsibility of the individual to adhere to the conditions of the order.
The present bill seems to offer a significant advance upon the existing law, in that not only will the individual be ordered to stay away from certain individuals, but there will also be an electronic monitoring device that will in fact be on that individual on a 24-hour-a-day basis.
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My concern, and the concern I've heard, is that justification is needed in order for someone to enter into this arrangement. If there is no evidence sufficient for a charge, or if the person has not been convicted, then this moves down the line beyond what the present law provides for, in my estimation. Could you comment on that point in terms of whether or not you feel it is a departure, or whether you feel it's a significant departure to the existing peace bond and restraining order powers? I'd appreciate it, of course, if you'd care to comment on my first point.
Thank you.
Prof. Brantingham: Your first point is well taken. This is not a solution to every kind of problem. In British Columbia, we're particularly aware that some persistent criminals are extremely mobile, because we seem to get a large number of them out here from out there. The sun here is shining and the Victoria flower count is soon to come, and we seem to get people here with that.
Nevertheless, most offenders stick pretty close to home most of the time, so this will probably reach some, but it certainly won't reach all possible offenders and all possible situations in which we think it might be desirable. There's no question about that. On the other hand, I can envision technology that would make it feasible to monitor people anywhere in Canada by using satellites. I'm not sure we would want that. In fact, I have real doubts about that; however, I can think of technology that might make it feasible.
Your second point is one that concerns us. We think this is principally aimed at breaches of peace bonds or of no-contact orders, and at domestic violence situations. As we said, there seems to be a working assumption that there is a high violation rate. We suspect that you will hear testimony - if you haven't heard it already - to the effect that the current peace bond structure doesn't work because people enter into them and then simply ignore them. This is an expansion in the reach of the criminal law into controlling people's lives in circumstances in which they have not yet committed an act for which they can be criminally charged. That's a matter of concern.
It concerns us particularly because it's working on an assumption about the current state of facts, and other than anecdotal accounts in the newspapers, we can't find any facts to demonstrate what the situation really is. We've given you some estimates about what we think the potential is, but those are rough estimates. We think the possibility is that we could be looking at 2,600 of these things in place in British Columbia on an annual basis before very long, with all of them in situations in which there's been no crime committed yet.
I don't know if that's fully responsive, but it's the best I can do at the moment.
Mr. Ramsay: Yes, and I thank you very much for your submissions and your responses to the questions.
I have no further questions, Madam Chair.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you, Mr. Ramsay. It worked out nicely because you used up a minute from the last time and the five from this one. It's incredibly fair.
Mr. Maloney, five minutes.
Mr. Maloney (Erie): Thank you, Madam Chair.
As I understand it, the assessment of an individual as a dangerous offender is currently done by two psychiatrists, with one being nominated or suggested by the offender. Under the new legislation, the court will appoint an individual to do the assessment. With a finding of such gravity, do you feel it is sufficient that one individual makes that finding, either one way or the other? Do you think we'll have more or -
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Prof. Brantingham: I would like to see multiple measures on this. We're making a decision that someone should be permanently housed in prison, that they cannot reasonably be released into the community. Or, in the alternative, under the long-term offender provisions, if we are releasing somebody we're going to monitor them fairly intensively for a period of up to ten years after we release them from custody, and that's probably a substantial extension of the monitoring we do of even the worst of offenders that we currently release on statutory release. I'd like to see more than a single individual involved in making that judgment.
Mr. Maloney: Are you suggesting two?
Prof. Brantingham: Two at minimum, certainly, and possibly three. I'd like to see more than a single judgment.
Mr. Maloney: Would this impact significantly on the cost you've already indicated the system will require?
Prof. Brantingham: At present it costs money for two psychiatrists. If you use three psychologists or four criminologists, it probably would not cost more, given differential consulting. On the other hand, if you brought an economist into play, cost would be out of sight.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Maloney: Which leads us, perhaps, to the next question about experts. Who should be making this finding? You've indicated a psychologist, a criminologist -
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): An economist.
Mr. Maloney: - an economist, as the chair said, or should -
Prof. Brantingham: I certainly think the expansion should take into account the fact that many people who work in this area and are knowledgeable are not medical doctors first, but do specialize in psychology or in the study of criminals. That's worthwhile. That's a possibility. Presumably, qualifying experts in this arena is one of the areas we might leave to the judges.
Mr. Maloney: Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you.
Are there any other questions?
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I will ask one last question which is perhaps much broader in scope. In our legal system, the jury is hardly involved at all in the sentencing. It analyzes the facts and brings in a verdict. But when it comes to sentencing, the only time it does anything is in the case of second degree murder. In that instance, it can make a recommendation on the sentence, but the judge is not bound by the jury's recommendation.
Are you pleased about the fact that a jury, who represents the government, will have more say in whether someone is a dangerous offender or whether he should be given an indeterminate sentence, rather than all that being left entirely to the judge's discretion?
[English]
Prof. Brantingham: This is a topic neither of us has discussed. My own inclination - and I should tell you that in addition to being a criminologist, I am a lawyer - is to say that I don't think it's appropriate for the jury to become involved in this particular determination.
I'm concerned that the designation would be used in inappropriate cases because of community sentiment. I think this designation should be limited. I would personally like to see it left in the hands of the judge, without jury input.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: The way I see it, if a jury can do the sentencing, it would be annoying for the person who was found guilty. In cases of foul crimes, when the accused have a choice, they generally chose to be tried by a judge alone so they won't be given a harsh ruling by a jury. Is that what you are referring to?
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[English]
Prof. Brantingham: To a certain extent my concern is that the jury, looking at not merely the current offence but at the sentencing stage looking at the offender's past criminal record, might well become inflamed and recommend dangerous offender designation that means, in effect, permanent imprisonment in cases where it's probably not warranted. So yes, I'm concerned.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Thank you, Mr. Brantingham.
[English]
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): Thank you. Since I see no other questioners I'll thank the witnesses very much for appearing with us today by television, and I thank our technical staff at both ends. There were no interruptions. It was a very good day for us and for videoconferencing in the nation. You didn't even have to experience our weather, so it's a great deal. Thank you very much.
To the economist professor, if you did have some changes in your numbers and you wanted to get them to the committee, that would be great. I know you weren't quite sure initially. If you do have some revisions, we'd be happy to have those. Thank you.
[Translation]
An honourable member: Thank you very much.
[English]
The Vice-Chair (Ms Torsney): To my colleagues, tomorrow the meeting will be here in room 701 at 11 a.m.
The meeting is adjourned.