[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, December 3, 1996
.1535 
[English]
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): I call the meeting to order. The stragglers will have to pick up what they can later.
I presume you would like to proceed with an opening statement first.
[Translation]
The Honourable Paule Gauthier (Security Intelligence Review Committee): Yes,Mr. Chairman.
[English]
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Let's proceed with that and then move on to questioning.
[Translation]
Ms Gauthier: Fine. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
[English]
It gives me great pleasure to appear before you today on the subject of our most recent annual report. I think you already know my colleagues: Mr. Vari, Mr. Goodman and Mrs. Brown, and also our executive director, Mr. Maurice Archdeacon.
Unfortunately, the newest member of our committee, Mr. James Andrews Grant, had a very long-standing engagement that he was unable to change, so he cannot be here today.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say how honoured I was to be appointed chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee. I served as a member of the committee for a little over eight years all told, so I am very much aware of the importance of its work. I would like to assure you that I will do my utmost to maintain or even improve the quality of research conducted by SIRC and its staff.
During the years I served on the committee, I appeared before you or the justice committee on many occasions. In general, it was my impression that the members of SIRC were always sensitive to the important role you and your colleagues play, and that your committee was always aware that the information we could provide was limited, in some circumstances, by the law under which we were appointed.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, this was generally the case. However, in recent years it became fairly evident that the relationship between your committee and SIRC had become strained. The members of your committee believed that they needed more information than they were receiving. Our members sincerely believed that the law prevented them from answering some of your questions. It was not an easy situation for either party.
I hope we can now put the past behind us, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues and I will make every possible effort to give you the information you require to judge whether we are satisfactorily carrying out the mandate Parliament has given us. There will be occasions when we believe that we cannot go into detail about specific operations, targets or human sources, but I am sure that you are as aware of those limits as we are. An intelligence service cannot reasonably act against terrorism or espionage if its activities or methods are made public.
I sincerely hope that with goodwill on both sides, we can establish a reporting relationship with your committee that includes the openness and mutual trust Canadians expect of us all.
Finally, I would like to briefly mention what we, my colleagues and I, believe to be the most important points discussed in this year's annual report. We will, of course, expand upon those points if you wish during the round of questions.
First, we strongly recommend that any reference in a request for authority to target an individual or group be made available to SIRC upon request. We also recommend that the policy guidelines governing the community interview program be more precisely defined. And we recommend that a record be retained, on a single headquarters file, of all senior management decisions regarding investigations touching upon lawful advocacy, protest and dissent.
And now, Mr. Chairman, we will do our best to answer your committee's questions.
.1540
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Thank you very much.
Mr. Langlois, do you have any?
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois (Bellechasse): Thank you, Ms Gauthier. Am I to understand from your presentation that if we were to ask more specific questions you would be ready to answer them if the committee were to sit in camera without staff. Would you be ready to give your answers only to the members of this committee?
Ms Gauthier: That's not exactly what I said. I said we'd like to establish the most open and frank relationship possible, but within the limits that are imposed upon us by law.
Mr. Langlois: Have you had the opportunity to consider the opinion of the House's general Lead Counsel, Mr. Davidson?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, I have seen many legal opinions and I know that points of view differ. Of course, Parliament is the supreme body in our country and we must all recognize that. However, there is legislation that tempers that power, if I may express it that way, and we must also submit to that.
Mr. Langlois: It was for the record, Mr. Chairman, because I don't intend to make a federal case out of it here today. My position is known. What is lacking is political will, not legal niceties. I am in no way casting any blame upon you, Ms Gauthier. Of course, you do not have to answer questions when a majority of people wish you not to answer them.
So here is my first question. On page 16 of the English version of your report, point g) entitled File Management, you say that 500, 000 files inherited from the RCMP were destroyed by CSIS.
I'd like you to be more specific about those files. What do they deal with? How many years did it take to destroy them all? In terms of files and itemization by province, as I am a member from Quebec, I'd like to know how many of those files dealt with Quebec.
Ms Gauthier: You do understand that this is a long story. When SIRC and CSIS were set up in 1984, all the files concerning national security were transferred to CSIS.
Over time, SIRC noted that many files opened during previous years were not quite in conformity with legislation. So, for many years, in its annual reports, SIRC suggested solutions and help SCIS with the closing of these files.
They came from all areas of the country, not necessarily more from the West or the East. These files simply did not meet the requirements of the Act.
Mr. Langlois: Ms Gauthier, you have seen the breakdown of those files. To your personal knowledge, was the number of files having to do with Quebec proportional to the Quebec population and did it appear to you that more emphasis had been put on Quebec during certain periods?
Ms Gauthier: Listen, those files go back to the years 1970, 1975 and so on. I couldn't tell you. Sincerely, it would be impossible for me to tell you whether there were more files on Quebec. We didn't look at all those files ourselves, but what I remember very well is that during our examination, there never seem to be more on Quebec than on any other region.
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Mr. Langlois: When you examined the files that were destroyed and the others that are being kept, did you see whether CSIS and the RCMP, when they had a section specialized in security services targeted political people in Quebec who were engaged in legal activities either at the federal, municipal or provincial level?
Ms Gauthier: You mean before 1984?
Mr. Langlois: Before and after, concerning destroyed and still existing files.
Ms Gauthier: The RCMP now plays a specific role. As an organization, we have no power over the RCMP. So I can't tell you anything about the RCMP. Before 1984, there were all kinds of files, but they were destroyed.
Ms Langlois: As the monitoring organization for CSIS, do you have any files on Quebec political parties, either the Parti Québécois, the Quebec Liberal Party, l'Action démocratique, the Union nationale, let us say, any and all parties in Quebec and on political men and women such as Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard and so on.
Ms Gauthier: I'd rather you talk to me about today's current files because the files from past years were destroyed. It's impossible for me to tell you what these files were. I can only tell you that these files did not meet the requirements of the definition of a threat to the country's security as it is set out in today's legislation and as it is applied today.
Mr. Langlois: As certain events happened in Quebec - I'm thinking about stolen dynamite, burnt down barns and blaming certain activities on third parties - and all the information surrounding this came out a bit late, so do you agree that it is legitimate to suspect that amongst those destroyed files there were in actual fact files on political parties, on political activities and on more or less well known political personalities?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, but you know what happened. There was an investigation and all that came out, as you say. After that, CSIS and SIRC were set up. So some Canadians may have thought that perhaps those files existed because there was such a lot of talk about those things.
Mr. Langlois: At this time, as you share responsibility with your peers for this service, since we know that CSIS opened a file on Preston Manning, isn't it legitimate to think that the Quebec sovereignty movement which, apparently, in the Canadian universe, represents a rather more serious threat than the Reform Party, may have been infiltrated by a human mole or that humans sources were planted to provide information to CSIS or other organizations?
Ms Gauthier: The Reform Party was infiltrated? What exactly is your question?
Mr. Langlois: Since we know that in this context there was a "frame up"...
Ms Gauthier: That's what you say.
Mr. Langlois: If you'll allow me to put my questions, I'll let you decide what you want to answer.
Now we know that in the Heritage Front affair, by planting a human source to broaden the movement, people were made to appear in Mr. Manning's entourage whose goal was to discredit the movement like the honourable member for Surrey - White Rock - South Langley has shown here and as the honourable for Scarborough-West, when he still has permission to sit here with us, also showed. In view of what happened in the case of the Reform Party, the Official Opposition can only feel more concerned. You're the watchdogs for this sort of affair and you must reassure the Canadian population through its parliamentarians. What can you tell us to reassure parliamentarians that the Quebec sovereignty movement to which, apparently, until October 30, 1995 did show some strength, was not targeted by CSIS while engaged in its democratic activities?
Ms Gauthier: These matters always come up every time we meet CSIS as a group.
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I can tell you that when a movement acts in a democratic and open way, then it is considered as a legally established political party, and not a threat to the country's security so the service plays no role. These are the questions which are put most often to the service and that is the answer given every time. I can assure you of that.
Mr. Langlois: To your personal knowledge, were any recommendations made concerning disciplinary action or was any disciplinary action taken in the case of some members of the SCRS who changed the name on the Preston Manning file to lose it in the midst of all the others?
Ms Gauthier: I know that disciplinary steps are taken when members of the service do not act according to the legislation or do not follow the directives that are given them. Unfortunately, at the time of the Heritage Front affair, I was not a member of the committee and I cannot assure you that in this specific case any disciplinary action was taken.
[English]
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Mr. Hanger.
Mr. Hanger (Calgary Northeast): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At this point certainly I'm not going to follow along the lines of Mr. Langlois's question in reference to Reform and anything that may have happened there, but I do have some questions about the first point in your outline, Ms Gauthier; that is, the recommendation that any reference in a request for authority to target an individual or group be made available to SIRC upon request. Why would you want that, immediately on request?
Ms Gauthier: During the last year in our activities it happened that we were reviewing some files of the service and there was mention of a document. We asked for a special document and we were told this particular document was not available. We really insisted on receiving the document and seeing it, because it was very important for us to evaluate the decision made by the service. If they used that document to make their decision, we wanted to see the same document to see if their decision was appropriate. So we asked for the document, and we were told it was impossible to get it. After some discussions, and also explanations for why the document was not available at the time, we were given the document.
That's why our recommendation is there: to make sure that any time we want to have a document it's clear we will get the document.
Mr. Hanger: Do you have that authority right now?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, we do. In accordance with the act, we have the authority.
Mr. Hanger: Do you have that authority and that power to look at any document upon request, or are there some restrictions?
Ms Gauthier: No, there are no restrictions except cabinet confidence. That's all. In the act that's the only exception.
Mr. Hanger: So in the course of whatever analysis you were doing on one of these particular targets or whatever, you sought to have the document and there was resistance. Did you ever get the document?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, we got the document, and we were given an explanation why the document was not available. It was because it had been provided by a third party and the document had been given back to that party.
Mr. Hanger: If this is all available to you, why the recommendation?
Ms Gauthier: Because we had this difficulty, we wanted to tell them and the public we really are serious about getting documents when we ask for documents. We thought it was important to put that in our annual report.
Mr. Hanger: You look at collected statistics, do you not?
Ms Gauthier: Yes.
Mr. Hanger: For what purpose? Sure, a number of targets may arise throughout the process of investigation or analysis by CSIS, but for what purpose do you use those particular statistics in your analysis?
.1555
Ms Gauthier: First of all, under the act we are obliged to ask for statistics. They are useful.
Mr. Hanger: What do they show you?
Ms Gauthier: Statistics are statistics, so they show us trends. For example, are there more warrants than there were the year before? Are they more in CI or in CP? It's things like that. They only give you trends, and from there they maybe help in other research.
Mr. Hanger: Has SIRC ever been concerned over the noted influx of terrorist-type people into the country to the point of wanting CSIS or the government to address the matter in a more effective or efficient way?
Ms Gauthier: Terrorists, you mean?
Mr. Hanger: Terrorists or those who have been actively involved in organized crime, those with very questionable backgrounds in other countries who have come to Canada to seek refuge or have come in illegally.
Ms Gauthier: As you know, terrorism is certainly a high priority for the service.
Mr. Hanger: Well, so I've been told, but I don't see the action on the part of CSIS, or the guidance of SIRC in that area to the government or to CSIS for that matter.
Ms Gauthier: What do you mean you don't see it? Why?
Mr. Hanger: I don't see that concern translate into any action on the part of the government or any departments.
Ms Gauthier: It's hard to tell, because of course it's covert expeditions from the service. They won't tell you publicly what they're doing to counter terrorists in our country. But they are certainly very much aware of the danger and are very active in that field.
Mr. Hanger: I don't think you're quite grasping my point, but....
Ms Gauthier: I would like to, but I'm not sure I understand exactly.
Mr. Hanger: Let me put it another way. After having spoken with CSIS members and the director at one point over a concern about the types of people that have come into the country illegally, through whatever source, it was pointed out to me that while they're strictly an information-gathering agency, they will direct that information to different departments for action. But what happens there is of no concern once it goes out of their hands.
Ms Gauthier: The service told you that?
Mr. Hanger: Yes, they did.
Ms Gauthier: That's possible, but we don't review -
Mr. Hanger: You don't review those -
Ms Gauthier: We review the service, but we don't review what immigration or the departments are doing with what the service is giving them.
Mr. Hanger: Then what do you do with those statistics if noted terrorists come into the country and it's a concern to CSIS? It is a concern to such a degree that if you look back to April 1994, the Solicitor General made note of that fact and felt that the country was in an unstable situation should some of these people act up.
Ms Gauthier: I can assure you that our research tells us that the service is active in counter-terrorism. They put great emphasis on this issue and they do everything possible to prevent acts of terrorism on our territory.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Your time is up.
Nick.
Mr. Discepola (Vaudreuil): I don't have very many questions, because I thought we had dealt with the Heritage Front report.
I am intrigued by one thing. I think some members of this committee would agree that it's like trying to pull hens' teeth to get information from you guys when you appear here. I'm intrigued as to why in the world you would ever want to even think of opening up a web site. What possible useful information could you put on there that would be relevant? How much did it cost? How much is it going to cost you to maintain?
.1600
Ms Gauthier: We're very proud of our web site. I have the numbers and the cost is not that high. It costs around $3,000 a year to maintain and it cost us approximately $8,000 to organize it and to put on. In six weeks, we have received about 14,000 hits, about 362 a day and -
Mr. Discepola: Was that you, Art?
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Hanger: Anything is possible.
Mr. Discepola: What kind of information do you have that would be relevant to somebody wanting to be intrigued by accessing your home page?
Ms Gauthier: We give information on our mandate, on different reports that we have prepared and on our annual reports. We also have information on complaints and what a citizen can do if he or she is not happy with the way the service has treated that person. We have all of this different information.
Mr. Discepola: Would an individual citizen be allowed to file a complaint through the Internet and keep his anonymity?
Ms Gauthier: No, because there is an act, and I think we have to abide by the act for a formal legal complaint.
Mr. Discepola: So there's no way around somebody being intimidated or feeling the threat of intimidation from his or her name being disclosed. You can't get around that.
Ms Gauthier: Not that I know of. No.
Mr. Discepola: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms Gauthier: As you know, we never disclose the name of a complainant, so we would never give out the name of a complainant on the Internet.
[Translation]
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Mr. Langlois, five minutes.
Mr. Langlois: Ms Gauthier, on page 8 of your report, the only thing that appears in extenso - if you'll allow me that expression, because there are two paragraphs - is item e), entitled Forum interference with democratic processes. The year 1995 is reviewed.
In 1995, the democratic process in Canada was the referendum of October 30 unless you can tell me what other major event occurred. Do you have any reasonable reason to believe that any foreign country intervened directly or indirectly in the referendum process in Quebec? If so, how, financially or otherwise, did this or these foreign countries intervened? If not, how can you prove they didn't?
Mr. Discepola: Mr. Pierre-F. Côté.
Ms Gauthier: Someone told our services that there perhaps might have been interference by a foreign country in the democratic process. So the Service examined the matter, found the information was not credible and decided not to pursue it any further.
During our examination process, we looked at what was done and found the Service did receive information that was not credible, that was not worth pursuing and the whole matter was dropped. That's all.
Mr. Langlois: In another area, Ms Gauthier, concerning arms trafficking, we found out the RCMP may have authorized one of its sources, Officer Audet, to engage in arms trafficking with the network established around the area of Akwesasne, if not in Akwesasne itself. Apparently this operation was not finalized. Do you know whether the Canadian Security Intelligence Service took over from them or set up a parallel operation and engaged in arms trafficking in Canada or with people in Canada going through a foreign country?
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Ms Gauthier: You are asking if the Service is engaging in surveillance itself as to whether there is any arms trafficking in Canada?
Mr. Langlois: Not only if it is engaging in surveillance but if it is actually engaged in the trafficking using human resources.
Ms Gauthier: If the Security Intelligence Service itself is engaging in arms trafficking?
Mr. Langlois: If the RCMP is doing it, why not SCRS?
Ms Gauthier: Look, do you think that would be legal according to its terms of reference under the Act?
Mr. Langlois: I can draw my own conclusions about that.
Ms Gauthier: So can we. What do you think?
Mr. Langlois: You know what I think. SCRS did engage in that. Just to have this on the record, could you assure me that to your personal knowledge, SCRS never planted any sources to engage in arms trafficking in Canada and abroad? No? Should the shaking of your head be interpreted as a no for the record?
Ms Gauthier: Yes.
Mr. Langlois: Fine. I have so many things to deal with that I'll change subjects. Concerning francophone staff, French Canadians in general and more specifically Quebeckers, what is their proportion within SCRS and what is the proportion of francophones from Quebec as compared to francophones to the rest of Canada, if you have those figures?
Ms Gauthier: I might not have the exact figures.
Mr. Langlois: I think that a specific approximation would be a great step forward.
Ms Gauthier: In the Quebec area, I think about 90% are francophone and 4% anglophone and the rest are other languages.
Mr. Langlois: And as compared to the total Canadian staff that gives...
Ms Gauthier: No, to the whole...
Mr. Langlois: I understand quite well. Your answer if very specific, Ms Gauthier, but compared to the entire Canadian staff of CSIS members, what proportion does the Quebec francophone section represent?
Ms Gauthier: As compared to the total number of members, it's hard to tell. I don't know the exact number of staff in the Quebec region. I know what it is for Canada as a whole because the figure of 2000 is always being given. We're not supposed to say what it is, but it's basically public; everybody knows that's about the figure. For Montreal and the Quebec region as a whole, I can't tell you how many employees there are. However, approximately 90% of that staff is francophone. So it's rather significant for a major region.
Mr. Langlois: I understand that you don't have the data at your fingertip to answer this question, but could you perhaps send the figures to the committee clerk, Mr. Farrell, who will distribute them to us?
Ms Gauthier: Certainly. I must also tell you that there are francophones in the other provinces. There are francophones all across the country.
Mr. Langlois: That was what I was getting to with my question. I wasn't interested only in Quebec. I meant francophones in general and in Quebec in particular.
At the bottom of page 5 of your report, Ms Gauthier, you mention that CSIS did not take the precaution of informing the minister concerning threats posed by foreign representatives in Canada. I'd like to know what kind of threats were involved and what level of foreign representatives we were dealing with? Was this at the consular or ambassadorial level?
Ms Gauthier: Read the title of the paragraph. It says "Investigation of a foreign state's intelligence services". So we are talking about the intelligence service of a foreign state.
.1610
Mr. Langlois: That was operating on Canadian territory and represented a threat to Canada at that time?
Ms Gauthier: We checked to see whether CSIS was right in considering that group as being a threat to our country's security. Yes, that's it.
Mr. Langlois: Did you come to the conclusion that CSIS was right?
Ms Gauthier: Yes.
Mr. Langlois: And you came to the conclusion that CSIS was remiss not to have informed the minister in charge?
Ms Gauthier: Not for the whole matter. We found that the minister did exchange information with CSIS even though no agreement had been entered into under section 17, because it is known that an agreement must exist when there is an exchange. These agents explained that they had mistakenly thought that the agreement submitted to the Solicitor General had been approved. Let's say there was a bit of a slip up here.
Besides, CSIS did not consult with the minister in a timely fashion concerning threats posed by foreign representatives as is required by a ministerial guideline. So the department was not informed about the authority that had... You know, they need a mandate to act. When exactly was the minister not informed? He should have been consulted and was not in a timely fashion. That was a slip up and we told them.
[English]
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Mr. Hanger.
Mr. Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I am particularly interested in the area of organized crime. Where on the list of priorities does it sit with CSIS, and certainly with SIRC, in their overview?
Ms Gauthier: I think SIRC is playing an important role there, because they act as the in-between with respect to the intelligence services of other countries and with respect to the police. Instead of having the police talk directly to intelligence services of other countries about transnational crime, the service is helping the RCMP or is the in-between to make the lien and help in that sense.
Mr. Hanger: There is, of course, a growing concern about international crime and international crime figures. I was certainly hoping to see a high level of concern with that particular issue, not only because of my own experience but from the experiences I've picked up through others who are dealing with and fighting organized crime.
I had an opportunity to go down to an Asian crime conference in California this year. It was rather interesting to see some of the points that came forward and to see the position Canada plays when it comes to Asian organized crime, drugs in particular, and the movement of drugs throughout the country, especially heroin, specifically looking at Vancouver, of course, as the key point of entry. In fact, it's almost the distribution point for heroin throughout North America, and the crime in the region of Vancouver's lower mainland of course reflects all of that.
It's all well and good to know that, and it's becoming more and more evident to the population, but my concern is that there are a lot of things not happening, too, when it comes to this kind of activity and the enforcement, if you will, of the law. In part, that's because some of this information doesn't seem to be ending up in the hands of the appropriate people. I don't know.
So I'm asking SIRC, since you say it is a priority with you to monitor what is happening in that area, just exactly where changes could be made to make sure the information is disseminated and the enforcement of the law in these areas is carried through.
.1615
Ms Gauthier: What I can tell you is that CSIS has a mandate to collect information and to divulge information when there is a threat to the security of Canada. Of course, you can say crime is a threat to the security of Canada -
Mr. Hanger: Organized crime.
Ms Gauthier: Organized crime. We are aware that's the way CSIS sees it, but the main actor on the criminal scene is not CSIS, it's the RCMP. So CSIS cooperates and gives information it collects, but it doesn't collect information relating to crime itself as a priority. You understand that.
Mr. Hanger: I understand that. I understand it is more targeted to crime figures and how they may be part and parcel of the bigger picture when it comes to the security of the country. I guess that's my point.
Has SIRC monitored the dissemination of that information specifically to the appropriate agencies? Can you say to me that you are 100% satisfied that the appropriate information, when it comes to organized crime and organized crime figures, has ended up in the appropriate hands of the responsible agencies?
Ms Gauthier: If and when CSIS is aware of information that would be of help to the police, it would certainly divulge the information to the police agencies and try to help.
Mr. Hanger: I assume, though, from your answer that you're not completely sure yourself other than giving me a generic statement saying that -
Ms Gauthier: I'm sure, but I haven't seen all the files on all the crimes and I don't know all the information it has.
Mr. Hanger: So this is one part of the activities of CSIS that SIRC really doesn't monitor that closely when it looks at statistics and other information.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): She didn't say that.
Ms Gauthier: We monitor the exchange of information between the federal departments or agencies and between CSIS and the provincial police and courts and the federal courts to make sure they don't divulge information on the private lives of Canadians. In the same way, we make sure they give information about criminals when it's necessary.
Mr. Hanger: That's fine.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Mr. Gallaway.
Mr. Gallaway (Sarnia - Lambton): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must apologize for being late, but I had another meeting that went into overtime.
I don't have to tell any of you here that this is a place of stories and rumours, but I wanted to ask specifically about the relationship between SIRC and CSIS. I have either read - I'm not saying any of this is confidential - or heard references to the fact that the relationship between SIRC and CSIS is uncomfortable at the moment. I won't say there's a certain level of distrust, but you're lining up and sizing up each other because you don't feel you're getting all of the information. Is there any basis to that? Secondly, as an overview committee group, how can you be certain you're getting all of the source?
Ms Gauthier: All the information.
Mr. Gallaway: Yes.
Ms Gauthier: First of all, are you sure you're talking about SIRC and CSIS or are you talking about CSIS and the Inspector General?
Mr. Gallaway: No, I'm talking about SIRC and CSIS.
Ms Gauthier: Through the act we are allowed to receive all the information we want, so normally we receive all the information we want. It happened last year, and we said that in our annual report. We want to make it clear that this will not repeat.
There will always be a tension between SIRC and CSIS, and this is very healthy. This tension has to be there. We review its activities, and being reviewed by somebody else is never something you like in your life or in your mandate. But apart from that, maybe you're right, there are rumours, but nothing we really know of.
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Mr. Gallaway: So for the record you would say those rumours circulating that are not terribly positive are not true.
Ms Gauthier: They're not reliable sources.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Parliament never deals in rumours anyway, Roger.
Mr. Gallaway: No. Of course, as parliamentarians we are subject to review. But in any event....
As politicians we always become very anecdotal, and I received a number of phone calls about the Zundel case. People called me to suggest that the fact Mr. Zundel would even be considered as a candidate for Canadian citizenship was repugnant to them. That's an opinion expressed by various people.
I understand the court ruling said basically - and please correct me on this - that you really couldn't intrude into that. Is that correct?
Ms Gauthier: We don't know yet because it's still before the court. The judge and the first level of the court decided there is a possibility that SIRC will be biased in its opinion in its review of the case of Mr. Zundel. This case is still before the court. But impartiality, to be biased...you look at that on a case-by-case basis.
So that's one case. There is an appeal at the moment. We feel we have good reasons to appeal. The Department of Justice has decided to appeal this decision and we feel we have a good case.
The reason we feel we should appeal is because there are two members who were not involved at all in the Heritage Front affair...so that could be very objective to hear the case, first of all. We also have rules of procedure, like Chinese walls and rules for conflicts of interest, and things like that. It will be debated and we will see what happens.
Mr. Gallaway: In light of the decision of the court of first instance, what effect has that had on your consideration of citizenship matters, whenever they come to your attention?
Ms Gauthier: For the moment there has been no change at all, because as I told you and as the judge said in his decision, it's a case-by-case thing. So you cannot decide -
Mr. Gallaway: It hasn't had a freezing effect, the.
Ms Gauthier: No, not at all.
Mr. Gallaway: Secondly, based on something you have said, as I understand the statutory basis for the creation of CSIS, you are in one sense an autonomous committee, separate and apart from this place. I appreciate that you're appointed. In terms of your appeal of that case, is the decision to appeal a result of the decision of SIRC, or is it a result of a decision of somebody in the Department of Justice?
Ms Gauthier: The Department of Justice decided it would appeal, and as an independent agency we decided we had an interest in the case and we should intervene.
Mr. Gallaway: Fine. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Arising out of what you said, does the conflict between CSIS and the Inspector General compromise either party from doing its job?
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Ms Gauthier: We are assured by the director, and also by the letter from the Solicitor General to CSIS and to the Inspector General, that each of them will have to learn their roles and how to work together. For the moment we don't see any difficulty.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): This was a letter from the Solicitor General?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, to CSIS and to the Inspector General, establishing their respective roles.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Could that be made available to us?
Ms Gauthier: It was not sent to us. Maybe you can find out.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Okay.
Sorry to intrude. Mr. Langlois.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Ms Gauthier, are you comfortable with the fact that the CSIS director for Quebec, Normand Chamberland, was involved in the theft of dynamite meant for terrorist groups in Quebec?
Ms Gauthier: It's been a few years, hasn't it?
Mr. Langlois: Well, I'm not talking about prescription.
Ms Gauthier: You are the one saying so. Personally, I didn't know he had been involved in dynamite thefts. Was he found guilty? Was there any...
Mr. Langlois: I have here the report of commissioner Jean Keable. That's the conclusion the commissioner arrived at. He says that Chamberland and officers Richard Daigle and Bernard Dubuc were involved in the theft of dynamite to be used to comfort a source that they had placed with a terrorist movement in Quebec.
Ms Gauthier: Richard Daigle and...
Mr. Langlois: Richard Daigle and Bernard Dubuc.
Ms Gauthier: So, what did Normand Chamberland...
Mr. Langlois: He was the third person, now Director of the Service, who was involved.
Ms Gauthier: He's not mentioned in the report.
Mr. Langlois: Oh yes, he is mentioned on page 317 of the report, at points 1.22 and 1.3. It states:
This operation took place without incident in the night of April 26 to 27, 1972. Three members of "G" Division participated, namely Corporal Bernard Dubuc, Constable Richard Daigle and Corporal Normand Chamberland.
Therefore, let me rephrase my question. Doesn't the Canadian public have a right to be concerned that the Director General of the Service in Canada was recognized by a commissioner as having taken part in the theft of dynamite intended for terrorist movements in Quebec?
Ms Gauthier: It's in the commissioner's report. Jean Keable is my associate. Therefore, it must be a good report. We're talking about 1972 and I would have to be better informed about all the details. If you wish, I can look at the issue and perhaps we can discuss it again on another occasion.
We made a thorough examination of the region recently and there are some things... Not everything is perfect, but in fact, there was nothing major worthy of mention for the moment.
Mr. Langlois: Mr. Archdeacon, you had a comment about that?
Ms Gauthier: No, it was simply to tell me that this was in 1972.
Mr. Langlois: In the Auditor General's report for this year, in chapter 27, page 19 of the French version at point 27.62, the Auditor General indicates, among other things, that he's concerned about the possibility that continuing strange relations with the sub-committee, that is, us, could lead to an erosion of Parliament's and the public's confidence in SIRC to the point where its effectiveness would be compromised.
Earlier, you spoke of strenuous relations between you and the Service, whereas last year, when Mr. Robert was pro tempore chairman of the SIRC, he told us that he had the full co-operation of the Service. This year, it's the Auditor General who refers to strenuous relations. You spoke of tension with the Service. So this seems to have appeared since you have taken over his chair.
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Ms Gauthier: They're not the same organizations. I am sure you would agree that it's normal and healthy that there be some tension between the Review Committee and the Service.
Mr. Langlois: Yes, I do acknowledge that, but what I'm surprised about is that last year, Mr. Robert told us that there was no tension, that it was full discovery, that it was practically an open bar with the Service. They had access to all the documents, people were helping them and this was done in an atmosphere of camaraderie. But since you've arrived, this has deteriorated. This is probably a good sign because perhaps you're perceived as more of a threat than the former members of the committee.
Ms Gauthier: We have access because the law says so. If the law allows us to, we will exercise our powers. Yes, this does lead to tension which I think is healthy and that's the way things should be. This is how I see the matter. If Mr. Robert had another vision, that's his business.
Now, as regards the strenuous relation mentioned by the Auditor General, this is not the same thing.
Mr. Langlois: Indeed, because two different levels are involved. Therefore, we can assume that from what you say, and I presume you're also speaking on behalf of your colleagues, that the climate of camaraderie that may have existed between the service and the review committee no longer exists. This is a much more professional operation than it used to be.
Ms Gauthier: I do not promote this kind of camaraderie under my chairmanship.
Mr Langlois: You're also speaking on behalf of Mr. Goodman, Ms Brown and Mr. Vari?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, on behalf of all members.
Mr. Langlois: Thank you.
[English]
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Mr. Goodman.
Hon. Edwin Goodman (Security Intelligence Review Committee): We thought the Auditor General's report on the way we've gone about our business was very favourable. As you can see on the same page, the Auditor General is very complementary about the way we've exercised our authority, or our jurisdiction.
Mr. Hangar: I'm quite familiar with the process where CSIS operates in some of the ethnic communities, paying a little more attention to some than others, of course, depending on what is happening, and I'm curious about how that process has been monitored by SIRC. There is always a tendency, of course, when so much attention is paid to a community, that Canadian citizens are going to be caught up in any surveillance or intelligence gathering. I'm wondering how close SIRC has monitored that process of CSIS.
Ms Gauthier: There is a recommendation in our report this year concerning the ethnic community interviews. Is that what you're referring to?
Mr. Hangar: In part, I guess. I'm aware, through one means or another, that CSIS, for instance, is targeting a certain element within a certain ethnic community right now. Some of it goes on in my own city and some of it goes on -
Ms Gauthier: And they meet with members of this community?
Mr. Hangar: No, I don't mean that. I mean there's a concern about their activity.
Ms Gauthier: Do you mean somebody in your riding is a target of CSIS? What do you mean?
Mr. Hangar: I'm saying probably more than one person is the target of CSIS in my riding.
Ms Gauthier: Yes, and what is the difficulty with that?
Mr. Hangar: I don't see that there's any difficulty with it. I'm wondering how -
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Are you under suspicion?
Mr. Hangar: If such a target has been set up, I'm wondering how SIRC monitors the event. Are they monitoring it during, or is it all after the fact?
Ms Gauthier: No, it's before, after, and during, because when there is a target we monitor the activity of CSIS in obtaining the authority, the warrant to act, and we make sure what they say in their affidavits when they go to court, what they tell the judge, is true according to the documents they have in their files. That's one way we monitor. We monitor in the sense that we make sure the target is a threat to the security of Canada according to the act. Then we monitor what they collect and what they do with the product and how long they retain the product and how they destroy it. So we do a full, thorough and complete review.
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Mr. Hanger: Any citizen caught up in that investigation, if it's initiated as a result of outsiders coming into an area and they're being monitored by CSIS.... Those documents that may pertain to specific people who may not be directly involved in any activity, but they are citizens and they are members of a specific ethnic community, are they in fact destroyed?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, because if the person is not a threat to the security of Canada and by accident that person was in a place, SIRC is not allowed to keep that kind of information. We review their files on a daily basis and make sure they don't keep that information. That's the real mandate we have and that's what we're doing.
Mr. Hanger: So the review committee - -
Ms Gauthier: And if a person is not happy or has a suspicion, they can complain to us.
Mr. Hanger: The target review committee, then, is constantly monitored by you.
Ms Gauthier: And our staff.
Mr. Hanger: And your staff. In fact, I guess this would pretty much be a focal point of all of your requests for application, or whatever the case may be, and that information is accumulated until the project is finished by SIRC. Is that right?
Ms Gauthier: Well, yes. We review. Yes, we start and we go to the end. When we review a file, we review it completely from the beginning to the end.
Mr. Hanger: Thank you.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): On the government side...?
Ms Gauthier: Yes. And in your riding, if a person is not satisfied they should file a complaint.
Mr. Hanger: I have no complaint.
Ms Gauthier: No.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): That's on the record, Art.
Mr. Hanger: I'm satisfied.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): That's on the record, too.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois.
Mr. Langlois: On page 29, you mention a Russian spy or a Russian source. Did you do any follow-up of the recommendations that you made? If so, what were the results?
[English]
Ms Gauthier: This is a particular complaint, a case that we heard.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: This is matching of information. We know, through matching up with the information that came out of the media, that the person that you referred to was a Russian spy. I would ask you to confirm that this was someone who came from the Russian federation or from a former Soviet Bloc country.
Mr. Gauthier: This is a case that I didn't hear about personally. It was even before I became a member of the committee. What part of the report are you alluding to exactly?
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Mr. Langlois: Is it your three recommendations that are marked by a period.
Ms Gauthier: Yes, the security investigation.
Mr. Langlois: What follow-up took place after those recommendations? Did the people from the service come back to tell you what they had done? If so, in what sense? If not, what additional measures did you take? You are requesting a re- examination. Was the investigation reopened?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, the investigation was reopened. They reexamined the file thoroughly and told us that they had completely reviewed the file and that there was no problem.
Mr. Langlois: Was additional evidence gathered during the reopening or was the file considered closed?
Ms Gauthier: We are not the ones that reopened it, they did.
Mr. Langlois: You ordered it or asked for it.
Ms Gauthier: We were told that after the file was reopened, the employee in question had resigned. That contributed to the closing of the file.
Mr. Langlois: He resigned because he was involved in activities that were reprehensible in the eyes of the service or in your eyes?
Ms Gauthier: I could not say why he resigned. Perhaps he was nearing retirement age and decided to leave.
Mr. Langlois: Mr. Archdeacon, did he simply retire?
Ms Gauthier: He took his pension, right?
Mr. Archdeacon (Executive Director, Security Intelligence Review Committee): Yes,-
Mr. Langlois: Perhaps I've now arrived at the conclusion. Given the extremely tense relations that the review committee had with the 35th Parliament and all the questions that were asked during that Parliament, don't you think the time has come to have a royal commission of inquiry on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service so that the Canadian public can see, as we have seen in the Kreger Commission and the Somalia Commission presided by the Honourable Judge Létourneau, what really goes on within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service? As a parliamentarian, I'm totally dissatisfied with what occurred during the 35th Parliament.
You're answering me very nicely and with a great deal of relevance. The problem is that we never get to the bottom of these issues. We would have to sit in camera and the report that you table with the Solicitor General would have to be sent to members for examination in camera. We don't have it.
Earlier, you stated that the law gave you access to all documents. According to the General Legal Counsel of the House, the law also allows us to have access to all the documents. But you don't give them to us. All we have, Ms Gauthier, are the documents prepared by the Service for publication purposes. We can't work with that and I'm asking you, first as a lawyer, because you have a broad experience.
Ms Gauthier: As a lawyer and also as a Canadian. First, as a lawyer, I don't think it is an appropriate time to have a royal commission. I think that the legislation that has existed since 1984 did allow all the organizations involved, and particularly the Security Service and this is the one we're talking about, to change their attitude a great deal. I'm not saying it's perfect, it never will be, but at least the law made them much more aware of the role and much more cautious in their approach.
Since the Review Committee exists, I think that Canadians can still have confidence in the organization and in the process as it currently exists.
I know it's sometimes frustrating, but as I said at the outset, we want to do everything in our power to give you as much information as possible. I think it would be best to wait a while before asking for a royal commission. I'm saying this as a lawyer.
As a Canadian, I would say that Canada may have other more pressing priorities at the moment.
Mr. Langlois: Fundamentally, is that because you believe that the fabric of Canadian democracy is not solid enough to withstand the revelations that could be made?
Ms Gauthier: Not at all, not at all. I think we'd be wasting our time.
Mr. Langois: So why has omerta taken over the Review Committee, which has generally refused to answer our questions except to say vaguely: "I cannot answer these questions"?
Ms Gauthier: Look...
Mr. Langlois: Ms Gauthier, you weren't there...
Ms Gauthier: I'm aware of that.
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Mr. Langlois: You pleaded before the courts, of course, and you're an associate of Mr. Keable, whom I knew very well, and of Mr. Robert, your predecessor. If we were before a regular court, with someone other than you, Ms Gauthier - I'm making this notable exception so that it will appear in the record - we could have requested that the members of the Review Committee be declared hostile witnesses because they have categorically and repeatedly refused to answer our questions. Despite the orders given to them by the Chair, they took refuge behind an extremely narrow interpretation of the law and refused to obey the orders of this committee, which is a creation of the House of Commons. That's pretty serious to me, Ms Gauthier.
Ms Gauthier: You may have been unfortunately present at a bad time and perhaps your actions will help improve things.
Mr. Langlois: I thank you, Ms Gauthier.
[English]
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): I should tell you we had a parliamentary study of CSIS. It was completed in 1993. It was a brilliant document, as I remember.
Phil, you wrote it, didn't you? So it had to be brilliant.
Mr. Hanger.
Mr. Hanger: You note in your report that the investigation of complaints is the most expensive area in operations.
Ms Gauthier: It's expensive, yes, but as much as possible we try to keep it at a low cost.
Mr. Hanger: I'm curious about the type of complaint and why it would be so expensive to follow through on. What is the type of complaint SIRC is going to get? Is it against an individual CSIS officer? Is it against CSIS in general?
Ms Gauthier: It can be against an employee of CSIS who didn't do his or her work very well, so a person is not satisfied with the way he or she was treated by the service and there is a complaint. Of course, many of the operations cover a long period. It may not be a precise case, so you have to go through a file and it takes time. Our staff normally do that. We act as a tribunal, so you have to have a lawyer there and they have their lawyer. There are some delays and it can get costly, as with any other suit in a normal tribunal.
Mr. Hanger: So somebody who was a CSIS target might complaint.
Ms Gauthier: Yes.
Mr. Hanger: Since CSIS is operating in a more or less clandestine way, without the knowledge of so many others, where does the complaint come to bear? How is it that the target can complain?
Ms Gauthier: It may happen that a person is not satisfied...they think they are a target but they are not sure. There are many cases where it may be a fishing expedition by a complainant, so you have to be very careful. It's a sensitive way of processing each case.
You have refusal for citizenship. That's another example of when we hear cases. Also, you have persons who are refused security clearance, and that's very important because it's to be hired or for their work or a promotion. So it's very, very serious and it has to be looked at very seriously.
Mr. Hanger: If CSIS does a wire-tap on a target, it's obliged to let the target know at some point after the investigation is over.
Ms Gauthier: No, because they have a warrant.
Mr. Hanger: I'm very much aware of that, but if you're looking at the nature -
Ms Gauthier: You have to be careful there not to mix this up with a criminal case. It's a different field of activity.
.1650
Mr. Hanger: It's rather interesting that you would say that. I'm very much familiar with a circumstance in Calgary where notification was given to an individual just after or during the Gulf War. He was of Arabic background, and information was passed to this individual that he had been a target of a wire-tap.
Ms Gauthier: By whom was the information given?
Mr. Hanger: That's interesting, because that part I do not know. But it certainly was passed.
Ms Gauthier: That's important.
Mr. Hanger: It certainly was passed on, but it was in reference to his potential association to others of Arabic background who had slipped in and out of the country. It would appear to me that this is operating more in the mandate of CSIS as opposed to criminal activity.
Ms Gauthier: It could be, but if that person is not satisfied, he could complain. That's always the solution.
Mr. Hanger: He would complain directly to you?
Ms Gauthier: Exactly, directly to us. We'll tell them what they have to do, but they complain to us.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): This will be the last bit of questioning, because we have two minutes of housekeeping. Mr. Gallaway.
Mr. Gallaway: This is more of an administrative nature. I wanted to know how many staff SIRC has.
Ms Gauthier: We have 14 persons.
Mr. Gallaway: How many of those staff members worked for CSIS previously?
Ms Gauthier: None.
Mr. Gallaway: Did any of them come from the RCMP when it was charged with similar concerns?
Ms Gauthier: No.
Mr. Gallaway: So there is something of a fire wall between your staff and their staff, if I might refer to it that way.
Ms Gauthier: Oh, yes. If I can assure you on that, at CSIS the staff is moving quite a lot. It's almost impossible to develop a friendly relationship, and we're very much aware of that.
Mr. Gallaway: At a meeting of this committee a year or so ago, one of the witnesses pointed out that it's very difficult to combat certain types of what I would refer to as international terrorists, simply because of the Internet. Meetings can be held and information can be conveyed quickly, and you can have people spread all over the world. I don't how this is done, but to your knowledge does CSIS monitor the Internet for such activities?
Ms Gauthier: Yes, of course. They're very concerned about the changes in information technology. It costs a lot of money, as you know, and they want to be on top of it and well equipped to be able to follow it. Yes, it's a high concern for them and for us, and also for CSE.
Mr. Gallaway: In your opinion, do they have the resources necessary to carry out this part of their task?
Ms Gauthier: We asked that question and at the moment, yes. If you look at the long term, they will tell you more. It's not our role to tell you. It's their problem; it's not ours. But it's our concern also because we want to ensure that they function effectively. At the moment they can manage, but it's a high priority for the future, in the short and long term.
Mr. Gallaway: I asked that question because the CRTC has announced that it is going to monitor for Canadian content, which I find amusing.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank SIRC and all of the members for coming today and enduring the discussion. It's been most helpful to us, and we look forward to meeting with you again soon.
Ms Gauthier: The same for us. Thank you very much.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): On a quick housekeeping matter, there is a conflict with the meeting we have scheduled for December 11 with the Auditor General. The justice committee is going to be meeting during that same time. I don't know whether there are any other dates that could possibly work.
.1655
This may not happen on top of that, but I thought we should allow for scheduling. When we get near the end everybody gets jammed for time.
Mr. Gallaway: The rule is clear that we can meet when the justice committee is meeting. That's number one. Second, if it's at all possible, I would really request that it not be held next week. Next week would not be conducive to that. It would be better to have fewer meetings than more next week.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Okay. What's the mood, the ambience?
Mr. Langlois: To make sure that we have no meeting in the coming week, maybe I could move that we adjourn to the call of the acting chair.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): Okay. That sounds fair. So it'll be up to Derek.
If it's agreeable, then, we will aim tentatively for a meeting with the Auditor General the first week in February, because that's when we're due back. We'll have that as the first item on the agenda.
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Acting Chairman (Mr. Rideout): All right. Well, Merry Christmas and Joyeux Noël.
The meeting is adjourned.