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EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 6, 1996

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[English]

The Chairman: I call the meeting to order. I'm sorry for the delay.

Just to explain it, through a lack of communication, our presenters today only have their presentation here in English, so it will not be handed out according to the wishes of the committee. However, there is one chart that they wish to hand out, and it is being photocopied at the present time. The staff will translate it in due course, so that portion can be handed out and referred to.

With that, we will continue our discussions on Bill C-60, an act to establish the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

Our presenters today are from the Food and Consumer Products Manufacturers of Canada. We have Mr. George Fleischmann, president and CEO, and Laurie Curry, vice-president, technical.

Oh, there are three people down there now. George, you'll have to introduce him.

Mr. George Fleischmann (Canadian Food, Beverage, Consumer Goods and Services Industry Coalition): I will, Chairman.

We have with us Mr. Blaine Long, plant manager with General Mills Canada.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Welcome, gentlemen and lady. If you wish to proceed with your comments now, we welcome them.

Mr. Fleischmann: Thank you very much, Chairman.

We're here on behalf of the Canadian Food, Beverage, Consumer Goods and Services Industry Coalition. That's a coalition of about 25 Canadian associations representing a variety of companies engaged in the agrifood, beverage and consumer goods and services industries. When we do distribute and when the clerk does translate the document, you will see the list of the 25 associations represented by this coalition.

We thank you for the opportunity to discuss the proposed Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

Building a single agency is a great idea. Building an agency that performs well is a necessity. As a group, we applaud the intent of Bill C-60. This single agency can be a great step forward. It promises greater effectiveness and efficiency and a more responsive and consistent approach, and this is the direction we believe it should go in.

However, we have strong fears that the new agency described in Bill C-60 will not perform well.

I should say at the outset that it is in no way due to lack of consultation. Mr. Ron Doering, the assistant deputy minister responsible for putting this bill forward on behalf of the government, did an admirable job of consulting with all of us. I've never seen such a good job of consultation. Unfortunately, it would appear that very few people have listened to what we said during those consultations.

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As you see, we're worried. We think the new agency is a great idea, but will it work as well as it must work? It will not with the legislation as it is currently written.

We do have questions about numerous items. For example, will there be a real commitment to dialogue with the private sector? Will it be enshrined in the act? I don't see it anywhere.

There are massive penalties for food offences versus minuscule penalties for drug offences. This could be of grave concern to companies. What method of appeal will be available? I saw nothing in the bill about appeals. Are we to have the agency as judge, jury and executioner?

Will national uniformity be the objective rather than regional authority, which can result in different priorities and different levels of enforcement?

I give those, but we're not here today to discuss any of them. We're here today because we're concerned that the bill as written now will result in the leadership or senior management of the agency not being nearly as effective as it needs to be.

Second, there is a major missed opportunity as described in the bill, because it will not create, in our belief, less costly services. In other words, the auditing and inspection functions will go on pretty well as they are now rather than giving the users the opportunity to come up with alternatives.

Third, we feel there will be disruptive turf wars. Bill C-60 doesn't acknowledge how departments will work together. We're concerned most specifically about how the Canadian Food Inspection Agency will work with Health Canada. I believe I read one paragraph, towards the end, about the varying responsibilities of the agency versus the department.

Finally, our concern is, as the bill is currently written, the agency's activities are extremely vulnerable to political considerations.

Let me begin first with leadership. The agency needs effective leadership, effective senior management. Inserting specific requirements into the bill about the role and function and job description of the CEO would have been critical, in our opinion, but there is nothing in the bill about the job description or the nature of the CEO. There are no specific requirements in the bill for the president, the vice-president, or for any of the people who will fill advisory positions on the advisory committee to the minister.

The new agency requires excellent management. It's absolutely essential, given its responsibilities. Ideally, senior management and the advisory committee would be apolitically chosen and highly skilled. The adviser should provide expertise and insight from every area of the food supply chain. Given that the agency will inspect both primary and value-added food products, representation from the industry is key.

None of that is ensured as the current legislation is being proposed. There should be specific requirements for all of those positions to ensure apolitical, skilled, highly effective leadership. The advisers should be experts, and if they are experts, they should be allowed to be proactive. Yet the bill makes the minister totally responsible for the advisory committee's agenda, unnecessarily limiting the ability of the advisory committee to contribute. Genuinely knowledgeable advisers should be able to introduce issues and concerns through a defined process. If they're experts, give them the chance to be proactive.

A board of directors would have been far more effective than an advisory committee. We requested this repeatedly of Ron Doering and we discussed it with the deputy minister of agriculture, to no avail. Given the eleven acts that the new agency must handle and the range of expertise required, the agency would have been much better off supported by a full-time, accountable, proactive board of directors. A part-time advisory board will not be able to handle these functions well.

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It doesn't sound as though they're looking for any kind of industry response. I don't see anything in the legislation about user pay, user say. If we had a board of directors, they would be able to review, on an annual basis, the five-year business plan that the legislation speaks about.

I'd like to go on now to speak to the second area: opportunities to reduce auditing and inspection costs. We hoped this would have been one of the principal objectives of the government, not just to hive it out of the government but also to reduce costs to the industry to make it more efficient.

Unfortunately, an efficient audit process is not guaranteed by Bill C-60. In the past, inspectors from various departments and different levels of government inspected individual products. But our industry is now moving towards certified safety systems like HACCP, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points and like ISO. These will require the agency's inspectors to move towards auditing these systems rather than continuing to inspect individual products, which is very, very costly. Most of the world is moving towards quality control and inspection through ISO and HACCP systems.

That progression towards safety systems provides a win-win for food safety and production efficiency. In the face of this very positive trend, we should look at what Health Canada's two roles are. According to the bill, the two roles of Health Canada will be setting food safety standards and assessing the agency's enforcement of those standards, in other words, the audit function. This assessment role may be Health Canada's sole opportunity to re-enter the plant and maintain an inspection presence, which encourages them to do as much as possible to ensure food safety. In other words, in order to maintain their authority, Health Canada may do more than is required. If instead of inspectors we're going to have quality assurance systems like ISO and HACCP, then surely the role of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency will be to audit that.

What's Health Canada going to do, audit the auditors? We don't understand that. It's quite conceivable that in the future Health Canada will send auditors into plants to audit the auditing of the agency. There has to be a better way. Let's make every effort to avoid the costs and inefficiencies of duplication and an unnecessary Health Canada audit force.

Inspection service costs could be reduced. The bill essentially will establish the agency as the sole provider of compulsory services and contains numerous provisions addressing fees and service charges.

I have read the bill. It has 94 clauses, and 7 of them deal with how they're going to collect money and get cost recovery from the users. There isn't one single clause about a committee of users and how it's going to work with the agency to suggest how things will be improved.

This is an opportunity to create a more efficient system and reduce costs to government and industry. Canada could use certified inspection organizations to provide many inspection services. Let's take advantage of this opportunity to allow competitive alternatives. There is nothing in the bill to encourage competitive alternatives, and I believe, if given an opportunity later, Mr. Long may discuss specifically how his company uses those kinds of alternatives.

We're concerned that costs could be increased without consultation. The bill requires the minister to consult with interested parties before fixing a fee, and specifies publishing a new fee in the Canada Gazette. But it doesn't say Canada Gazette part I, which would allow comment from interested parties, or part II, which makes it law. Failure to allow trading partners to comment could violate Canada's obligations under NAFTA and WTO agreements.

Given that the bill targets cost recovery, we're also concerned that costs could be increased without rigour or adherence to Treasury Board principles. Our experience is that the words we hear are very promising, but the rigour and principles just aren't applied.

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Let me give you a case in point. We've had assurances there will be no further cost recovery in this area in the next fiscal year, 1997-98. However, we've also learned that due to interdepartmental rivalries not all operational dollars may have flowed into the agency with the transfer of staff.

Let me just explain this to you, because a long time ago I used to be a public servant here in Ottawa too. What happens is when something is transferred, there is a salary component with the person-years that are transferred. Obviously those go to the agency, but how much of the operating budget that goes with those positions was transferred by each of the three departments to the agency? Do we know this? Is there any transparency? Have we ever seen this? The answer is no, and we don't know.

So the agency may not cost-recover next year. But there is absolutely nothing stopping them the year after from cost-recovering as much as they want to make up the gap for lack of funds not transferred with those people from the three respective departments. Those departments are Fisheries, Health and Agriculture.

We have one more issue. Health Canada has proposed to publish in Canada Gazette, part II amendments that would move all fee-related regulations from drugs from the Financial Administration Act to the Department of Health Act. This would create a means for government to revise any freeze through a ministerial fees order. This has a possible impact on payers in that there would be less formal requirement for government to consult with payers before amending the fees. These are the kinds of things we're really worried about.

Point number three is about disruptive turf wars. Can we avoid split responsibilities and the resulting confusion? Let's define exactly what Health Canada will and will not do, and exactly what the Canadian Food Inspection Agency will and will not do. The bill states that Health Canada will take a lead role in developing food safety regulations, and that the agency will take a complementary role. It also states that Health Canada will take the lead role as the authority for international food safety issues, with the agency having the complementary role. But the issue is how you define where the lead role ends and the complementary role begins. There is no definition in the bill.

Given Health Canada's very limited human resources, the agency activities are likely to expand. This role has to be clarified, and we have to see some way where Health Canada will set the standards but they will be enforced by the agency. The proposed type of situation creates confusion and uncertainty among the regulated industries, something the creation of a single agency was supposed to reduce.

Finally, point four is vulnerability to political considerations. Our first concern in this area has already been discussed. It is the need for very specific and clear job descriptions for everybody. These will ensure that the need for highly skilled leadership throughout the future is met and not overmatched by political considerations.

Our second concern deals with the autonomy of the new agency. Will it be immune from the historical producer bias of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada? Going back more than 15 years ago, I was the senior assistant deputy minister of this department. We were still trying to convince further processors we were actually going to work for them as well as for the farmer. Our concern is that notwithstanding all the good words, it is still very much oriented toward the primary producer.

Our third concern deals with granting the minister the power to issue recalls. It doesn't increase food safety, but it makes a form of law enforcement highly vulnerable to political pressure. We have a very effective system in place right now. Manufacturers manage the recall process under close government scrutiny and oversight. Consumers are protected, and within this requirement manufacturers can work to maintain their brand equity. The high level of goodwill existing between government and industry results in part from the success of this well-established approach.

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In any case, the powers of seizure found in almost all food and agriculture statutes are quite sufficient to contain and control product should a manufacturer ever be unwilling to voluntarily recall a product. And I've never heard of such a thing happening.

Please keep the power to issue recalls in law and away from any possible political considerations. In this bill the minister can issue recalls. We are not in favour of the minister doing so. This change doesn't help and it's not necessary.

So as you see, we're worried and we have grave concerns about the agency's senior management missing all kinds of opportunities to reduce costs by going from day-to-day grinding inspection to quality control systems. We are worried about possible disruptive turf wars between Health Canada and the agency because their respective roles are not clearly defined. Finally, we are worried about political vulnerability.

Again, I hope you will forgive us for not having the French translation available. We learned from the clerk about this approximately 24 hours ago. The French translation will be available.

The one thing I would like to conclude with, and I would like it distributed if possible, is this document. Do you have this now?

The Chairman: No. You still have the copies of that. We have one in French, but the rest of us don't have it in English. Could you get us copies of this in English?

Would there be any problem, Mr. Chrétien, if the English copies were distributed? Rather than take them out of the page, we could just go to this chart.

Okay. We'll just go to this page. Please distribute them, Laurie.

Mr. Fleischmann: Mr. Chairman, while Laurie is distributing those for us, I must say I was quite amazed by the contrast between the experience we have had with the federal government and what the Ontario government has done.

I didn't even know about this until one week ago. It was brought to my attention. The Ontario government, just like the federal government, has to reduce costs and downsize. They too have already removed 50% of OMAFRA, the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food and Rural Affairs. One of the things they did was form an agency very much like the Canadian Food Inspection Agency in order to inspect crop insurance claims by farmers and in order to do vegetable inspection. So they formed an agency called AgriCorp.

Lo and behold, I ask you to look at it. There you see that the chief executive officer does not report to the minister. The chief executive officer reports to a board of directors, a real board. Who makes up the board of directors? It's very interesting. There are six members, five from the farming community because five-sixths of the work relates to crop inspection, and one from the manufacturing community to look after vegetable inspection.

The minister appoints the board on the recommendation of the industry. In other words, Minister Villeneuve, the Ontario Minister of Agriculture, will receive suggestions from the farming community and from the further processing manufacturing community. From these suggestions he will appoint the board.

The board will direct the chief executive officer. Needless to say, accountability is still to the minister, but look at the way it's done. What this means is you truly have the users in a position to work with the chief executive officer for the best possible results. I would like to read you one single paragraph from the vision of AgriCorp.

Listen to those words - ``customer focused'' and ``industry driven''. I couldn't find it in the whole of Bill C-60. This is our great concern.

I think, having spoken for nearly 20 minutes, I'll stop there.

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The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Fleischmann.

Mr. Long, did you wish to make some comments? Mr. Fleischmann said you might.

Mr. Blaine Long (Canadian Food, Beverage, Consumer Goods and Services Industry Coalition): Yes, I just wanted to give some background on the third-party process Mr. Fleischmann has talked about.

We produce Cheerios at my plant, and it's a non-regulated product, unlike meat. We have at least as much concern over product safety and the safety of our consumers as any outside federal or provincial inspector could ever possibly have. We have a very stringent process. It's internally controlled. Every day our quality insurance people are there. We also have a provision where our corporate auditors will come in unannounced and provide a full-fledged inspection of their own.

To make sure we're not missing anything and we're doing the right things, we contracted a third party. They come in. Again, they are unannounced. They show up at my door one day at about 9 a.m., saying they're there to inspect my facility. It's essentially equivalent to a federal inspection that would go on, except I find them slightly more rigorous than the federal inspection. At the end of it they provide a report that gives us a rating and identifies all the key issues that may possibly exist, and we come up with corrective action to respond to that.

We find we are very responsive to that third party. I would have a difficult time understanding why a federal inspector couldn't come in and we would say here's our third-party accreditation, done under inspection from a company that is recognized as an authority on that, and that would suffice as the inspection.

We've been very successful with that process. We will continue it regardless of what happens with any of the regulatory systems.

The Chairman: Mr. Long, did you say how the third party is selected in your case?

Mr. Long: We select them ourselves. It's from an international organization that we select. They do not have an ISO accreditation now, but they are working towards it. It's a type of agency that, if it is accredited, would be available. We use one. Several competitors providing similar services are available. It's the one we have chosen to inspect it.

The Chairman: All right, thank you.

Mr. Chrétien.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien (Frontenac): Mr. Fleischmann, Ms Curry, Mr. Long, we want to thank you for being here this afternoon. We appreciate it all the more so as you were advised only 24 hours ago of your appearance before this committee.

At the outset of your presentation, Mr. Fleischmann, you said that you agreed with the intention of bill C-60, but during the twenty minutes your spent talking on the bill, I did not hear much praise about that legislation, and in particular concerning the appointment of the president, the first vice-president and the members of the advisory board. Could you clarify that for me?

You were assistant deputy minister of Agriculture. Have you been in that department for a long time? Could you tell me when you were appointed to that position and when you left it?

[English]

Mr. Fleischmann: I was the senior assistant deputy minister of agriculture from 1978 to approximately 1980. I left that position in 1980.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: So, you spent two years there. You stressed the point that the most competent people should be appointed in that office, and also that it is essential to make sure that the agenda of the Agency, as described in the bill, be not be hampered by political interference.

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Therefore, I had the impression that you were critical of the way the appointments would be made, just as I have been trying to be critical too on that point ever since we started our study of bill C-60. Tomorrow morning, we are going to hear the labour union viewpoint. For a while, the formal rules governing the hiring of public servants are going to be suspended, which would give the advisory board, be it against the will of the vice-president and the president, the opportunity to appoint "tons" of new employees for the new agency. I am, of course, against that.

My concern is that by doing so, we are wide opening the door to nepotism. When nepotism is in place, the best candidates are not necessarily engaged. During the last nine months, we have seen this government make appointments which in some cases led to resignations. Sometimes, employees have been forced to resign within a relatively short term.

You did raise that issue. In your opinion, how should the government proceed to make those appointments? Do you agree with the proposed scheme? You have showed us the one from Ontario, which is of course different, but is the proposed structure described in bill C-60 agreeable to you?

[English]

Mr. Fleischmann: I don't wish to broaden the debate beyond Bill C-60 and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. I do not wish to comment on anything beyond that, and I want to make that very clear.

My interest is in the success and efficiency of this agency, and nothing further. But as far as this agency is concerned, I would have to agree with you, sir, that a weak, minister-directed advisory committee is certainly not the way to go. We don't even have a job description enshrined in the proposed act.

It is critically important to Canada and the efficiency of our industry to have the industry very much involved in the operations of this agency. After all, industry will be using its services and paying for them.

I would like to add something to what Mr. Long was saying, because I don't think there is an adequate appreciation of this. The individual companies that have products to sell have so much equity invested in those national name brands that if they were to lose public credibility as a result of any safety issue, it would cost them millions and millions of dollars.

As Mr. Long has indicated, usually most of our companies do quality control beyond what the government requires. Given that knowledge, it would have made sense for the government to have more adequately involved the industry in the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and I do not see it enshrined in the bill at all.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: Mr. Chairman, I would like to come back to the turf wars issue. I almost jumped off my chair every time you alluded to turf wars, biases and parochial rivalries between Health Canada, Agriculture Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the minister. Would it not be better to maintain the status quo precisely to avoid turf wars? Although turf wars are almost unavoidable, what suggestions would you make to the government to minimize the possibility of turf wars if ever we decided to create that agency?

[English]

Mr. Fleischmann: I would say that is not the general tenor of my remarks. My concern is that the support and major roles of Health Canada and the agency with respect to audit are not adequately defined, and that is what may cause struggles. That's one concern.

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My second concern is the lack of transparency. I have not seen how much of the operation and materials budget of each of the three departments was or will be moved to the single food inspection agency. Does it correspond to what was in those departments when they were acting within the department?

However, I would like to say, as I indicated at the beginning, that I still feel the creation of a single Canadian food inspection agency is a very good idea in terms of moving together all of the different inspection systems we have. Hopefully, down the road, they will also include reconciling federal, provincial and municipal inspections. Some of our plants are inspected by hundreds of inspectors over the course of a year.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: I would like to raise a last point, Mr. Chairman.

I noticed that you seem to apprehend some duplication of services and that fees imposed to processors be eventually increased without consultation.

At a former meeting of the committee, last week, we were told that 20% of the costs would be recovered, in other words, that the industry would pay 20%, and that the rest, that is 80%, would be financed through our taxes. In one way or another, directly or indirectly, we do pay for those services.

How can you say that inspection fees could be raised by 1% per year? Should they be raised according to the cost of living, there would be no criticisms, I think, since it would be a 1% increase per year. Even if we were to wait five years until those fees are raised, the resulting increase of 5% would be easily accepted.

Why then are you afraid that the government might raise the inspection fees dramatically without consulting the industry and the consumers?

[English]

Mr. Fleischmann: For two reasons.

First of all, they have only said they will not do further cost recovery in 1997-98. They have said nothing beyond that. I fear there will be increasing cost recovery as pressures mount on the agency, particularly if there isn't some motivation for them to use more efficient alternatives, such as quality control systems rather than the grind of daily inspection of every single product.

Mr. Long: Mr. Chair, I can add to that.

Within the proposed act, in clause 24 it does say the minister may fix the fees for services provided by the agency, and that's followed up by the provision that the fees won't exceed the costs of providing those services. In no place does it say ``competitive costs'' or ``costs available from an alternative source''. Whatever it's going to cost the government to provide those services to us, which we by regulation have to obtain, they can fix the fee to recover it all, versus the 20% Mr. Chrétien mentioned.

The Chairman: Okay.

There is a document - and I believe it's a public document, Mr. Fleischmann - on the business alignment project. Have you seen that document? You've said a number of times that you haven't seen the figures on who's transferred, what's transferred and the cash that goes with it, but you are now saying you have seen that document with those figures in it.

Mr. Fleischmann: I'd ask Ms Curry to comment on that.

Ms Laurie Curry (Canadian Food, Beverage, Consumer Goods and Services Industry Coalition): The concern is not that the targets have not been identified in terms of a total of $44 million. It's about the status of that transfer.

The Chairman: You're concerned about what the status of the transfer is at the present time.

Ms Curry: Right. We know what the targets are, but what is the status?

The Chairman: Okay. That's the question. All right.

Mr. Hermanson.

Mr. Hermanson (Kindersley - Lloydminster): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Ms Curry, Mr. Fleischmann and Mr. Long, for appearing before us. Your presentation created a whole long list of questions that I want to ask, and we'll move as quickly as we can through them.

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You talked about an industry inspection service or an independent inspection service. You said it's competitive, that there are a number of services provided, that you can pick and choose who you want to do it, and that they've been effective and done the job. I sensed you thought they might be superior to what was being put in place here. And, at the very least, we have to be careful we're not duplicating, because you use these services anyway.

Why are these services more cost-efficient than a government food inspection service? How can they be held accountable? How can you ensure the reliability of their service in making sure that Canadians have safe supplies of food?

Mr. Fleischmann: I think the government always reserves the right to audit anything it releases to the private sector.

I'll give you an example, Mr. Hermanson. Five or six years ago the government decided to get out of the business of advertising pre-clearance. It was released to a group in the private sector called the Canadian Advertising Foundation. But to this day, the government audits the performance of the Canadian Advertising Foundation in pre-clearing ads.

In the same way, regardless of who would be doing the actual inspection or certification or even quality control, I think the government would always reserve the right to audit it and to withdraw the right to do it should it not be performed adequately and effectively.

Mr. Hermanson: But how would this reduce your costs? What would happen to this department? If you could set it up the way you want to, using independent inspection services, audited, monitored and regulated by the federal government, what would the budget of the federal food inspection agency be? And what would the costs be for you, the consumer and the producer?

Mr. Fleischmann: I think that's very hard to determine. We don't know because we have never had the opportunity to look at that different direction. But as all of the world moves more towards alternate systems of quality control such as ISO and HACCP, there will be greatly reduced costs, because instead of inspecting every single widget, they'll inspect 1 in 100 or 1 in 1,000 on a spot basis. And provided that it works well - and it seems to work well - enormous savings should be related to that. There are currently hundreds of millions of dollars being spent on inspection.

There's another thing to remember. If we could ever lower the cost, it would provide Canada with an enormous competitive advantage for its own agribusiness community.

Mr. Hermanson: Thank you. We certainly agree with you that we need to look at cost avoidance and cost reduction as a priority over cost recovery.

You talked a bit about national uniformity versus regional differences. We know the provinces also provide food inspection services. There is some overlap and some duplication of services. It wasn't clear from your comments whether you would prefer one national agency that demanded uniform standards for abattoirs, say, in Saskatchewan as well as in Ontario and New Brunswick, or whether you suggested that those regional differences were a positive thing and that perhaps the federal government should back away from some involvement in inspection services.

Mr. Fleischmann: We certainly don't feel that different levels of inspection are a good thing. We would like to see one national inspection service. I don't think it will be a reality in the near future, but because of the pressure on other levels of government, they are certainly interested in joining with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, if it is possible.

Let me give you an example. Yesterday, I was told by the deputy minister of agriculture in Ontario, Mr. Ken Knox, that they would love to join in with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency on meat inspection. The problem is that the costs in the agency are 30% higher than those of the Ontario meat inspectors.

Mr. Hermanson: But isn't that meat going to be inspected federally anyway? Why do they need an inspection service?

Mr. Fleischmann: There are different inspections at federal and provincial levels, but they could be brought together.

Mr. Hermanson: But do you prefer that the inspection be done just by this food inspection agency, or would you prefer that the provincial government - if they can provide the service more economically - do so and that the federal government just act as an auditor or a monitor of that inspection service?

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Ms Curry: Our preference has been that there would be a single inspection. Even when we went through the original discussions on this, we never actually supported any of the options. We came forward with objectives in terms of what the agency should meet. Our main criterion was to reduce the number of inspections that are happening in plants and to reduce the duplication. In fact, when we were looking at who it might be or whether it was an outside agency, we originally never had a preference. So we were going more principal-based. We would still want to have a single inspection of the plants.

Mr. Hermanson: I was told that a meat processing plant in Canada required, I think, 28 inspectors - I'm not sure of the figure - to be on the premises on a shift basis. A similar plant in the United States would require three inspectors. Can you substantiate that type of statistic, or is that a wild figure that someone gave me?

Ms Curry: It sounds consistent with what we have heard from some of the other sector associations.

The Chair: Mr. Hermanson, what was the size of that plant?

Mr. Hermanson: It was a major meat processing -

The Chair: Are you saying what you heard? Just so we get the right message, are you saying that every meat inspection plant in Canada, no matter what the size, has 28 inspectors?

Mr. Hermanson: No. This particular plant, I believe, had 28 inspectors. A processing plant of a similar size in the Unites States would require three federal inspectors.

You talked about the structure of this board, and I couldn't agree more with you on that. Of course, we've been through the whole debate in western Canada over the Canadian Wheat Board. It is of course accountable to the minister, and there's been no end to the problems with accountability. Producers are unable to have input into changing the board. I've looked at this diagram, and I think you've made a very good point that would remove political interference.

I just want you, though, to elaborate a bit more on who would select the members of this board. I would suspect your industry would be involved. Do you see any involvement by the producers of food? How do you handle this if there is some division in the industry as to who should sit on this board? I think the minister probably looks and says that they'll never agree, so he might as well, in all his wisdom and omnipotent power, select this board, and they'll just have to like it or lump it. I like your approach, but how do you propose to make it work?

Mr. Fleischmann: Here is one more paragraph to answer your question specifically. It's not mine; it's the Ontario government's:

Mr. Hermanson: But how formal is this process? Is the industry going to nominate 100 people? What are the guidelines? How does this work?

Mr. Fleischmann: I think the way it works in reality is that the industries will provide the minister with some options. They may provide a dozen names from which the minister will select half a dozen, or they may provide 18 names. Clearly the names will come from the industry, and they will not have any political overtones to them.

Mr. Hermanson: Then how often would this board come up for review or reappointment, and how would they connect with the industry?

Mr. Fleischmann: The board would connect with the industry, because the board would be of the industry. The board here is appointed for three years, and it's subject to renewal or reappointment after three years.

Mr. Hermanson: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mrs. Ur.

I'm sorry, Mr. Long, you did want to speak. Go ahead.

Mr. Long: Mr. Chair, I just had some additional information on your question about the number of inspectors. Recognizing again that we are a non-regulated industry, I do find it unusual that a meat facility needs to have on-site, 24-hour inspection, essentially. Whether it's a manufacturer of cake mix, bread, pasta, or cereal, we generally see our federal inspector once per year.

To me it's because I have ownership for the quality of my products. I have total responsibility for the quality of my products, and I'm not relying on the regulators coming in and telling me what to do. We all know what the right things to do are. As Mr. Fleischmann had mentioned, we can't afford to tamper with the equity we have in our brands. We can't afford to have concerns about the safety of our products. But it's an interesting difference.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Long.

Mrs. Ur.

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Mrs. Ur (Lambton - Middlesex): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In your delivery this afternoon you have stated that you felt an advisory committee would not be as good or as effective as a board of directors. I was looking at the bill here, and it states that the minister will appoint twelve members to the advisory board, and these people will include people from agriculture, fisheries, food processing, food distribution and public health, consumer groups, or provincial or municipal governments. I think that pretty well covers the gamut. What do you see as the difficulty there?

Mr. Fleischmann: That will almost guarantee it will be totally ineffective, because what will happen is this. There is a twelve-person advisory committee. By the time they get through appointing from all the different sectors, the actual users of the service and the payers will be in a minority.

It's at the minister's pleasure that he appoints. So the minister can make that into any kind of advisory committee he chooses.

Mrs. Ur: Is it any different, other than in the sex and the twelve - the numbers?

Mr. Fleischmann: It's vastly different, because that board of directors appoints the chief executive officer, and the performance of the chief executive officer is subject to the board, just as in any company. It's a real board, with real responsibilities.

Ultimately, as you see in the diagram, the accountability is from the board to the minister. Therefore, consumers are not on that board. There are the people who are doing the work or paying for the work or responsible for the activity. There are no other interest groups on the board. It's a working board.

Our concern about the advisory committee is that it will be the classic government solution, a multi-stakeholder group. You'll have somebody from every section and their interests will be diverse.

Mrs. Ur: Of course their interests are diverse, because they're representing different segments. If you leave one or two or three of those off, the red flags go up, ``Oh, we're not represented on the board''. I think this is why we are directing to a single food inspection.

Mr. Fleischmann: You have just heard Mr. Long and me repeatedly say companies have so much at stake in their products, in the equity in the brand names, that under no circumstances would they ever allow public safety to be at risk.

Mrs. Ur: I would challenge that, under various things that have come out in the past. They were passed, and down the road they have been seen not to be of benefit to human life. There have been checks and balances. It doesn't necessarily have to do with agriculture. I'm thinking of health situations where that has arisen.

You say you don't need inspectors to inspect every widget. On the other hand, Canada has a reputation for quality across the world for its food inspection, the quality of its food products. Do you really think we will sustain that reputation if we just have spot checks, as you indicated?

Mr. Fleischmann: I certainly hope so. I know it would be a disaster if we didn't. I agree with you on the reputation Canada has, but I just think it can be done in a very effective, cost-conscious way, and with the industry far more directly involved in directing it than this bill and this agency will allow.

The Chairman: Ms Curry.

Ms Curry: I would just like to add the comment that moving to a certified system in no way, shape, or form compromises food safety. All that is happening is that it's moving to a different type of system, an audit system. When you move to the basic principles of HACCP, or Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points, all those key safety factors are already being taken into consideration and are put right into the system. So when the inspectors come in, as a new shift - there's going to be quite a shift in their requirements - they will be there to audit the system to make sure a system is in place to pick up any concerns along the way.

So it's a shift in focus, yes, but it does not compromise the food safety system in this country.

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The Chairman: Ms Curry, you seem to be leaving me with the impression that you don't think we are going that way now with HACCP and ISO methods of doing things. You don't seem to think this piece of legislation or this agency will allow things to go that way. You seem to think this agency will continue - could I use the words - double inspection, when it's my understanding that the provinces and the federal government are both very much interested in going to, in very simplistic terms, one inspector so we don't have people chasing through the plants.

You're leaving me with the impression in your comments that this agency is not going to allow that type of thing to happen. Am I reading you correctly?

Ms Curry: I must be leaving you with the wrong impression.

The Chairman: It's very clear to me what you're saying, because you said the province doesn't want to have any part of it. You're asking why we can't go to HACCP and ISO when, quite frankly, Canada's leading many other countries in the world and has been going in exactly that direction for some time. So maybe you would like to clarify what you're saying.

Ms Curry: Please, I will. That is definitely the wrong impression I'm leaving you with. Dr. Anne MacKenzie from Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, who heads up the food inspection area, has already stated that this is the year of HACCP, so the department is already clearly committed in terms of moving in that direction.

Our fear is not in that area. Our fear is that right now in the bill itself there is a clause that describes Health Canada's two roles. The first role is setting food standards, and that's exactly what Health Canada should be doing.

The second role it talks about is assessing the activities of the agency. That to us raises a red flag or a question mark, because from our perspective that is not defined. We are asking what that means exactly.

Does it mean that potentially Health Canada, which is now going to be pulled out of the food plants when the agency comes into existence, will now want to carve out a new role for itself so it can re-enter the food inspection system? If that is the case, there is a possibility it could carve out this new role called auditing the auditors, because ideally we already know the departments and the agency will have to move toward auditing systems, and that is how they'll have to go in terms of retraining. But what will Health Canada's role be in this? We fear there might be a duplication of effort if that role is not clearly defined for Health Canada.

The Chairman: Just to get more specific about your concern, you're referring to clause 11, responsibilities of the agency.

Ms Curry: It's on page 4, subclause 11(4). It says the following.

The Chairman: You mean the last part after ``and''.

Mr Curry: There are ways it could assess those activities through a process other than re-entry into the plant in terms of an audit system.

The Chairman: Okay. You're concerned that's going to give Health Canada a physical re-entry into the plant?

Ms Curry: That is correct.

The Chairman: Okay. Mr. Easter.

Mr. Easter (Malpeque): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that clause has been questioned before as well by some of us and it has certainly been looked into.

I want to come back to this board of directors, but before I do - and I'm sorry I wasn't here for your presentation, but I had another committee I had to attend - you talked about an efficiency audit.

One of the witnesses before us yesterday had this suggestion, and I wonder what you think of it. He suggested that the Auditor General be required to provide an annual report on the cost-effectiveness, in other words, the cost of service, the percentage allocation of that cost - what's for the public good versus the private good - and a comparative cost of services in other countries.

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I think it stands to reason that, with cost recovery in place, all of us are concerned that agencies or departments don't go hog wild and expect those services to be paid for, for an inflated bureaucracy. We're trying to avoid that by all means.

What are your thoughts on that?

Mr. Fleischmann: We would be very positive towards seeing the Auditor General review it. Anything that could lead to increased transparency and review for the agency would be something we would be very much in favour of.

You mentioned the public good, and it's a very interesting thing in cost recovery. The Treasury Board has indicated that whatever is in the public domain will be paid for through the consolidated revenue fund of the government, and whatever is in the private domain will be subject to cost recovery, which does make a lot of sense.

The issue is that the government seems to have an enormously difficult time separating what's in the public good from what's in the private good. One of the concerns is that as we move down the road everything may be deemed to be partially or completely in the private good, which would argue for more and more cost recovery.

Mr. Easter: That's a concern, yes. I think you'll find that many of us believe a lot of the food inspection fees and so on are in fact in the public good, both from a health standpoint and from an economy spin-off point of view.

There is the question of whether it should be a user-pay policy or benefactor-pay. It seems many in the agricultural industry are considered users but may not ultimately be the benefactors, and so I guess that's another debate.

Anyway, to move from an area we agree on to one I'm sure we disagree on...and I know from where I sit I certainly don't support the board of directors proposal, and I'll look for your response on this.

It's true, as Mr. Long says, you can't afford to jeopardize the safety of your products. I recognize that. But we all know of cases in the past and farms in the past that have been in financial trouble, and when you're in financial trouble as an operation you're going to cut corners come hell or high water, whether it's safety or anything else, because the name of the game is survival: I'll get away with it just this once. Maybe you won't.

With the board of directors approach versus the government, I think there is a real danger in terms of cutting corners that could impact on safety. Secondly, I think there's a real, or at least perceived, conflict of interest, in that industry is in fact policing itself in terms of health and safety. What's your view on that?

Mr. Fleischmann: I think, Mr. Easter, this has been an argument I have heard from Mr. Olson, the assistant deputy minister in the department, who is running the food inspection area. He said, oh, it's not you large companies; we're worried about the little person making kielbasa in Swift Current who will cut a corner. But the reality is that would adversely affect the entire meat industry. It would hurt all of us, and my argument is that if you had a real board of directors made up of members of the industry, their first responsibility would be - and they would do a better job than anyone else - to make sure that never happened, or if it did, the penalties would be so serious that it wouldn't be likely to happen again.

Your best defence is in a very strong industry. There are all kinds of independent methods of policing the industry. It would seem to me that the board of directors would be as protective of the need for quality control as could possibly be.

Mr. Easter: I think what we're really coming to here is a difference in philosophy. We've had debates before on supply management, and we'll not get into that one -

An hon. member: God save us from that, Mr. Easter.

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Mr. Easter: But I think the best defence, versus your point, is a political system that works. I see a move here by some in industry to get the government out of government, and I think that overall government is responsible for public policy.

In terms of this particular food inspection agency, it is audited. There is a report through the minister to the Parliament of Canada. It's in the public domain. Government members, opposition members and third-party members can question it. The public in general can question it. There is the advisory committee there to do some of the things that you suggest should be done, and maybe that advisory committee needs to be looked at in terms of its representation from industry.

But ultimately, the accountability and responsibility for public policy rests with the government, and there's no area of public policy more important than health and safety of food. So from my perspective it makes sense to have the government in control and in charge of it rather than the board of directors.

The Chairman: Are there any comments? Mr. Easter, have you any further questions?

Mr. Easter: That's it.

The Chairman: Before I go to Mr. Chrétien and then to Mr. Hermanson again, Mr. Fleischmann, in that subclause 10(3) on representation on the advisory board - and we went over the list before, and it includes public health sectors and consumer groups, and so on - do you see, then, on the board of directors that you envisage, a position or a role for, for example, consumers?

Mr. Fleischmann: I think there would be a role for a consumer advocate, a consumer representative, yes. But beyond that role of a very responsible consumer advocate, I think the rest of the board should be made up of members of the industry.

The Chairman: Other than industry people, that's as far as you would expand the make-up of a board of directors, if you were to make one up.

Mr. Fleischmann: Yes.

The Chairman: Okay. Mr. Chrétien.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: The new Agency should be in operation on January 1, 1997, which means within two and a half months from now. By then, we will probably already have got its organizational chart and the names of the different people appointed as president, first vice-president and members of the advisory committee. Given your objections concerning the fact that job descriptions have not been provided for any of those positions, do you think it would be in the best interest of government to delay the coming into operation of the new agency?

Mr. Fleischmann: Yes. I guess it would be worth waiting. If we could be given a few months delay, it would allow us to specify the duties of each function. Anyway, I think that the new structure is much better than what we have now in that area. However, I am concerned that the government appoints to the different offices within the agency people who have no expertise in the private sector.

[English]

I'll say it in English: if they appoint people who have only government experience in their backgrounds to run this agency, there will not be the assurances that they will look for the efficiencies that the industry itself wants and needs.

I think an outside appointee with good general management abilities would have far more confidence from the industry as a whole than someone selected who is currently in the government, has worked in the government for many years, and has no experience outside of the government.

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[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: Given that this bill is an extremely important one, that several hundred millions of dollars are involved in relation to that new agency, and that the relevant jobs from three different departments are going to be brought together, do you feel that the government, and in particular the department of Agriculture, have consulted enough the different interest groups all across Canada?

[English]

Mr. Fleischmann: It's not a question of consultation. If we're any example, as I indicated at the beginning of my discussion, we have been consulted. Yes, we have. Mr. Doering has done a superb job, and I stressed that at the beginning, Mr. Chairman.

However, we have not been listened to at all. That's the difference.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: You will agree with me that this bill is very important. However, we all recognize that this committee had very few applications for appearance, despite the fact that this is an extremely important bill which will bring about enormous changes all across Canada. I would like to know if it's your group itself who asked to be heard by the committee, or if it is the committee who invited you to appear, given that you were advised only yesterday of the time of your appearance?

[English]

Mr. Fleischmann: No, no. I meant that only yesterday did we get a letter from the clerk concerning the number of English and French copies we had to bring. But you do raise an interesting question about the number of people applying.

We are a coalition. Today I am representing some 25 or more associations. It is very rare for a coalition of this size ever to be formed in Canada, believe me. As the chairman knows very well, each association is fiercely independent and very rarely wants to get together with any other association.

The situation with respect to food inspection is so serious that, both for food inspection and cost recovery, these 25 or more associations decided we had to get together and in a single voice discuss this with the government.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: I see. You are representing 25 different groups, which means virtually several hundred thousands of Canadians. I do have much confidence in you, Mr. Fleischmann, but do all the members of the 25 different associations or groups that you represent trust you that much too and feel confident that you are going to represent adequately enough their interests to bring the government to be sensitive to your representations?

[English]

The Chairman: I think I know what you'd better say, since they're paying your salary.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Fleischmann: I just wish to point out to Mr. Chrétien that every single one of the members of the coalition has, in addition to the right to being a member of the coalition, the right to come forward to this committee on an individual basis. I'm sure the committee would have given them time. And yes, we did ask to come before the committee as a coalition.

The Chairman: I'd just point out that I believe the Canadian Poultry and Egg Processors Council is coming before the committee, is it not? They are a member of your coalition.

Mr. Fleischmann: Right.

The Chairman: I was unable to be here yesterday, but the Fisheries Council of Canada was here yesterday.

Do you want any more time, George, to justify your existence to your 25 members?

Mr. Fleischmann: No, no. I'm too old.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: I'm just teasing.

Mr. Hermanson.

Mr. Hermanson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your observations, and of course you're very polite. Being on the opposition side, I can be fairly blunt and say your interpretation of Liberal government consultation is absolutely correct: they tell you what they're going to do. And as to appointments to their boards, as long as you're a faithful Liberal, merit is the last criterion on the list, and if it happens to be there, you're fortunate.

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You gave me your report, which I guess we have here, but we haven't looked at your presentation to the committee.

This bill is following a new route down the legislative path - and it's just happened in this Parliament - where a bill goes to committee prior to second reading. Theoretically that's supposed to give us more latitude in mending and changing the bill. To this point we haven't been very successful, but of course we're eternally hopeful that we will be able to have an impact and create better legislation.

I didn't hear too much in your presentation about the specifics you want to see changed. You outlined a lot of flaws in the bill. We've talked about subclause 11(4) and clause 10. Clause 10 is on the advisory board and subclause 11(4) is about what the auditing by the Department of Health means.

You've touched on some other areas, such as the minister having the power to recall food and the need for better job descriptions of what everybody does. Have you proposed or can you propose more specific clauses of the bill that you feel need to be overhauled, deleted or substantially changed?

I'm asking so that when we get to clause-by-clause on Bill C-60, we as members of Parliament can be more effective in trying to see if we can overcome this obstacle of ``government knows best'' and actually create a better vehicle for the industry.

Mr. Fleischmann: Once again, before I answer Mr. Hermanson, I'd like to say I do not want to make this into a political situation. I certainly was not referring in a general way to the government's consultation. I was referring to this specific consultation.

Mr. Hermanson: I understand that, but I was making a general comment.

Mr. Fleischmann: Having said that, if we were given an opportunity, before third reading, of providing the chair with a very specific list of how we would recommend changing or amending the bill before the final reading and promulgation, we would take the time and make the effort to do so very quickly.

Mr. Hermanson: That's too late. This committee is our last chance. Once it leaves this committee, it doesn't get a second reading. It goes to third reading, where it's approved in principle. The amount of amending we can do at third reading is minuscule. It doesn't even deal with the content of the bill. All we can do is ask that the bill be returned to committee or be hoisted into the future. We can't do anything substantive.

The Chairman: If I could expand on that, Mr. Fleischmann, the staff has seen your presentation. It is quite general, and your comments were general. The duty of this committee is to give you the opportunity to be more specific, at which time we can review those specific concerns and address them in one way or the other, and then discuss them with the department.

So as Mr. Hermanson says, now is the time, not way down the road. That's what we're in now. If you can get them to us, the quicker you get them to us, the quicker we'll be able to deal with them.

Mr. Fleischmann: If you give me a timeframe -

We can do it in a week. We could provide you with the specifics on the board of directors, clarification of the job descriptions - a pretty complete list that is far more detailed.

The question is, what is your -

The Chairman: The House will not be sitting next week. We will be coming back to this and continuing the discussions on Bill C-60 the following week. So perhaps you could provide that to us next week. It could be later in the week, if that's convenient. At your convenience next week, get that to the clerk, and we will deal with it from there.

Elwin, are you finished?

Mr. Hermanson: Yes, I'm fine.

The Chairman: You mentioned again, Mr. Fleischmann, the words ``job description''. You, having been a senior deputy minister, have seen more legislation than I have. I don't recall very often, if ever, seeing a job description in a piece of legislation.

My personal view is that would be incredibly binding, because as you know, we don't redo legislation that often, in any country. If a job description were in a piece of legislation, the job described would be a beautiful position to have. If someday somebody said they'd like you to do something else, you could say, the law of Canada says I can't, so stuff it.

Mr. Fleischmann: That's a very good point. I guess going to the actual job description may be further than is reasonable to expect. However, some very clear guidelines as to the requirements for the chief executive and for the executive vice-president would be in order, I think. For instance -

The Chairman: Could you address those in your more specific comments?

Mr. Fleischmann: We will. Okay.

The Chairman: That would be useful for discussion and debate.

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Mr. McKinnon (Brandon - Souris): I'll withdraw my question.

The Chairman: Okay. Mr. Easter.

Mr. Easter: If you do come forward with further correspondence, it would be useful to have a list of some of those duplication inspections that do happen in plants.

We're dealing sometimes with the province in terms of the inspection of meat plants and sometimes the feds in terms of inspections. Where can we reduce some of those areas? To be quite honest with you, there are some areas we don't know.

I've met with the people who have meat plants in my riding. They might have one inspector in the morning and another in the afternoon. It just doesn't make sense. If you have specific information on that, it would be useful to have it.

Ms Curry: I would just like to respond in terms of the general nature of our presentation.

In working with the coalition, it was the intention that we would cover off the broad aspects and leave many of the specific aspects to the individual sectors that would be also appearing before this standing committee. We were trying to lay the framework and the foundation. We will need to work with those sectors in bringing back some specific recommendations.

The Chairman: The staff and the committee took note of some specifics that came forward yesterday. I'm not naive enough to think that there may not be some specifics coming forward. From your coalition, if you could collectively make sure we get them all, that would be appreciated.

Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: I'll just touch on that one. In relation to some of the commentary yesterday, I got a feeling that maybe some of the persons in the industry feel that there may be a different model depending on the product that's being produced.

Is that something to which you were alluding in your final comment there, Ms Curry?

Ms Curry: Overall, I might have more specific points of interest. When we had our meeting with the coalition, there was broad agreement among those in the coalition for it to be industry directed in terms of a structure such as a board of directors.

Mr. McKinnon: Might I just comment? I see a distinction between a Cheerio and a prepared rabbit stew. Perishable items certainly require a different level of inspection.

I can see industry being very good at the Cheerio level, whereby everyone has the same shape - if that was the concern - the same flavour and the same coating. Mr. Easter's point was about somebody who's struggling to stay in the rabbit stew business. They're going to have more difficulty if they have to discard half their supply because of some kind of coliform or other bacterial infection.

This is my comment to you. It's when you get down to where the rubber hits the road, which is where you guys are. Is there a different model that we should be looking at, depending on the kind of product we're dealing with?

Mr. Long: I can respond to that. I agree with you 100%. There are apples and oranges. There are totally different products. I think if I were Maple Leaf or Schneider or whoever, and I were making hot dogs, I would give you the same assurance about my hot dogs as I'm currently giving you about Cheerios.

I think your point is this. Within the industry, we want our regulators to focus on those areas that require the focus and the attention. If I have facilities and programs in place, whether they're -

We have HACCP programs and GMPs. There are agencies that are ISO accredited. If you have an agency like that, you know that the products coming out of it are going to be good.

Any trained inspector who walks into a facility can tell really quickly whether or not this is a place to be basically concerned about. It's very apparent. For those places where the concern is very apparent or where they don't have a system in place, I think they do need additional attention from a third party, probably from a regulatory source that will make sure the right things are being done.

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For those companies that you can walk into and see demonstrated compliance with all the regulations and requirements, the inspector's visit should be a very short one. He would review the process and then leave, without saying that he would be there every minute, 24 hours a day, just because the regulation says he has to be there every minute, 24 hours a day. The attention has to be paid where the need is.

I know the regulations. The AAFC inspection protocol is set up to address the higher-risk facility with repeat inspections. They do a lot of that, and they do it very well, but those companies that do comply still have an ongoing inspection all the time.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions or comments?

I thank you very much, Ms Curry, Mr. Fleischmann and Mr. Long. I really don't think we're that far apart. There's no question in my mind that we all want to get to the same place in the end.

As for whether we need to spike it up or clear it up in different places with the assistance and observations of the legislation so that we all have the same interpretation of it, that's the duty and the opportunity of the committee.

I know there's an intention, a desire and a necessity in all of us to have a system that is as economical as possible. We cannot put our industries in a non-competitive situation, but at the same time, we have to continue to provide to Canadians and customers outside the country what we have now, which is the reputation we've earned of having the highest-quality food in the world.

I thank you for your contribution today. I look forward to your further comments.

Mr. Chrétien.

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: Mr. Chairman, we had agreed that any document submitted in only one of the two official languages would not be handed out to delegates and members of this committee. Are you going to respect that decision? Can we expect to have those documents translated so that all of us can receive them at the same time as soon as possible?

[English]

The Chairman: Yes, they will be. Mr. Chrétien, are you asking for these to go back to these people until -

[Translation]

Mr. Chrétien: Yes.

[English]

The Chairman: Okay. The staff should collect these back and then they will be - Thank you, Mr. Chrétien. It was not my intention to do otherwise, because that's the way we deal with it. They'll go back to our guests today. When they're translated, we'll circulate them to everyone.

The meeting is adjourned.

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