[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, March 18, 1997
.0911 
[English]
The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Rosedale, Lib.)): This meeting of the committee is called to order. We seem to be more than usually well amplified. We're hearing voices coming at us from all over the room.
This is the opening session or first public session the committee has held in respect of the minister's request for us to consider issues of nuclear disarmament and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. As this is a televised session of our committee, I think it is important to start with a brief statement as to what the committee will be doing.
We as a committee have probably received from the Canadian public more correspondence and interest on this subject than any other study we have undertaken to date. The Canadian public is very interested in the issue of nuclear disarmament, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and the elimination of land mines and other forms of weapons around the world. I think this is something to be encouraged, and the Canadian public's participation with us as members of Parliament can be very helpful to us in our deliberations.
However, the members of the committee will recall that when we met to discuss this issue we had to face one very important constraint that we always face here in Parliament, and that is the constraint on our time. We have now until perhaps May for the end of this parliamentary session, and then we will go into the fall. There are some suggestions or a thought in the minds of some that there may be an intervening event that might have an effect on the life of Parliament.
[Translation]
The Sub-committee on Agenda and Procedure met and we decided to examine, in a preliminary way, some of the questions concerning the matter of nuclear disarmament and other forms of disarmament. Today we will be hearing from the representatives of Project Ploughshares, The Physicians for Global Survival (Canada), Lawyers for Social Responsibility and the Centre de recherche sur la non-violence. This will be the opening phase of our examination.
As we are to complete our examination of the circumpolar matter, the question of opening up NATO that we might be able to finish Thursday, as well as the Main Estimates, we will shall clearly find it difficult to hand the minister a detail examination of all the questions he put to us. However, we will make a start of it today and do our best. We will at least open the case file and, if need be, hand the whole thing to our successors in the next Parliament to finish the work.
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[English]
Good morning to our witnesses. Thank you very much, Mr. Roche, Mr. Robinson, and Mr. Regehr, for coming with us this morning. We'll go until 10:30 with you, and then we'll move to the next three groups of witnesses.
As usual, I think you are all experienced before committees. We'd appreciate it if you would make an opening statement, and then the members will be anxious to ask you questions. Thank you for coming.
Mr. Ernie Regehr (Director, Policy and Public Affairs, Project Ploughshares): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before the committee. We have a prepared statement that we'd like to present to you, and in doing so we'd like to congratulate the committee for undertaking the review of Canada's nuclear weapons policy.
Your study is of historic importance in the evolution of Canadian foreign policy, because the International Court of Justice, as you know, the highest legal body in the world, has brought long-standing international concerns over the nuclear weapons to a watershed moment. In effect, the World Court has de-legitimized nuclear weapons as a war-fighting strategy. The court's decision is thus in direct conflict with NATO's continued policies. Canada, wishing to uphold international law on the one hand and committed to the military alliance on the other, must resolve the most severe foreign policy dilemma it has faced since the end of the Cold War. It is the purpose of our testimony to help Canada to respond constructively to this challenge.
Mr. Roche is going to present the main body of the brief now, I will close with the latter part of it, and then we'll welcome the discussion.
[Translation]
Mr. Doug Roche (Member of Project Ploughshares and Former Ambassador for Disarmament): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you don't mind, I'll make my presentation in English.
[English]
Following a recent visit to Japan, where we once again saw the horrors of nuclear devastation, we have received from the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki messages of solidarity and support for this committee, which are hereby tabled.
On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of humanitarian law.
Although the court believed it could not be determined definitively whether there might be an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which nuclear weapons could be used lawfully, it did conclude that all use or threat of use of these weapons must comply with international law.
Also, the court said unanimously and clearly, and I quote:
- There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
The court said, and I quote again:
- ...any realistic search for general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament,
necessitates the cooperation of all states.
.0920
Nuclear weapons are the antithesis of security, and their continued existence will only guarantee disaster. Recourse to nuclear weapons, with their indiscriminate consequences, can never be compatible with the rules of humanitarian law and must therefore be considered prohibited.
Although the court itself did not feel that it could conclude that the current state of international law definitively rules out recourse to nuclear weapons in all circumstances, it did state that the use of such weapons seems ``scarcely reconcilable'' with respect for the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict. Even in the case of what the court called ``an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake'', the court was unable to conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful.
However, contrary to the statements made by some nuclear retentionists, this aspect of the court's ruling in no way endorses their claim that the strategy of nuclear deterrence is legal.
The court warned that the stability of the international order will suffer from the continuing difference of views on the legal status of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is the best means of resolving this dilemma.
Accordingly, the court pointed to the famous article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, obliging nations to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament. It is not enough to promise to negotiate. As the court said,
- The obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects.
- The nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's
strategy of war prevention.
- [no] need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and we do not
foresee any future need to do so.
- remains an essential and enduring political and military link between the European and North
American members of the Alliance.
Mr. Chairman, I draw to the attention of the committee the fact that the three nuclear weapon states that are members of NATO, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, are deliberately pursuing new deployments of nuclear weapons, despite their assurances that they stand for what is called ``ultimate'' nuclear disarmament.
First, this year the United States will spend $24 billion to maintain the capability to deliver 7,000 strategic warheads anywhere in the world. The U.S. is preparing to deploy the new B61-11, known as a ``bunker-busting'' nuclear weapon, designed to strike command bunkers that are buried hundreds of metres below the ground as well as other deeply buried targets. With a yield varying between 300 tonnes and and 300 kilotonnes, even in its ``micro-nuke'' setting, such an underground burst would create massive radioactive fallout.
Despite the new Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was supposed to end all nuclear testing in all environments for all time, the U.S. plans to conduct what it calls underground ``subcritical'' tests to learn how to design more reliable and survivable nuclear weapons.
.0925
Second, the U.K. missile program threatens limited nuclear strikes to defend vital interests, defined in the 1995 defence white paper as British trade, the sea routes used for it, raw materials from abroad, and overseas U.K. investments. Each U.K Trident submarine has a killing capacity equivalent to 640 Hiroshima bombs.
Third, France, through its recent round of nuclear tests, continues to develop a selective nuclear capability directed against specific military forces or sensitive installations. Two new nuclear weapons programs are going ahead.
Though NATO operates in great secrecy, it is clear that the alliance has no intention of renouncing nuclear weapons. It is determined to maintain the capability of fighting a nuclear war and it's prepared to use low-yield nuclear warheads first.
NATO's continued massive deployment of nuclear weapons, along with a refusal to enter into comprehensive negotiations, is in direct violation of the pledge made by nuclear weapon states at the time of the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, which was to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. Now a number of non-nuclear nations are charging the nuclear weapon states with bad faith and threatening the unravelling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Next, Mr. Chairman, I turn to a new course for Canada.
The conflict between the World Court and NATO came into the open at the United Nations General Assembly last December. A resolution was presented by Malaysia with 45 co-sponsors that followed up on the World Court's decision. It called for negotiations to begin in 1997, leading to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention that would prohibit the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons.
The resolution, which is non-binding in the General Assembly, was adopted by a vote of 115 in favour, 22 against, and 32 abstentions. The three NATO nuclear weapon states, which are the countries I referred to above, vigorously opposed the resolution and exercised influence on their NATO colleagues to vote against it. Three NATO countries, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, despite this pressure, abstained. Canada, revealing the tension it feels between the World Court and NATO, called for a separate vote. Canada voted yes on the paragraph to uphold the World Court, but it then voted no on the paragraph to start negotiations and on the resolution as a whole.
Such a Canadian split vote might suffice as a transitional strategy, but it cannot endure with any credibility. The government statement in 1995, called ``Canada in the World'', solemnly affirmed that:
- The rule of law is the essence of civilized behaviour both within and among nations. ...Canada
will remain in the forefront of those countries working to expand the rule of law internationally.
Canada has long followed a step-by-step approach to disarmament. Going step by step is insufficient because it allows the nuclear weapon states to perpetuate their nuclear arsenals under the guise of disarmament.
There were 40,000 nuclear weapons in existence as of 1995, which is more than were in existence when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970. Even with the full implementation of START II, which is still to be ratified by the Russian Duma, there could be as many as 23,000 nuclear weapons in 2003.
.0930
The central objective must now be - this is as called for by the World Court, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, and the statement by the international former generals and admirals - an unequivocal commitment from the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapons and to start a program now to leads to that goal.
The centrepiece of such a commitment is a nuclear weapons convention that would anchor a program for elimination. A comprehensive approach represented by a convention does not preclude incremental steps to nuclear disarmament; it would indeed foster them. This was the rationale for the plan submitted to the Conference on Disarmament last August 8 by a group of 28 nations that called for a three-phase program of action for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020, which is almost a quarter of a century.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in discussing the role of Canada, we put to you, sir, that Canada staying in NATO must work with like-minded countries to convince the nuclear weapon states that the time has come to start a comprehensive program of mutual, verifiable nuclear disarmament under strict international control. Just because it would take many years to achieve nuclear abolition, the goal is not thereby invalidated. What counts is a realistic commitment now to reach that goal.
Canada should call publicly at the forthcoming NATO summit for a full review of NATO's nuclear weapons policies. Canada should contribute actively to presenting the case for the rule of international law to supersede NATO's outmoded reliance on nuclear weapons.
We respectfully urge the committee to impress upon the Government of Canada this great responsibility and to serve notice that if NATO fails to respond affirmatively to the World Court and growing world public opinion, it will be necessary for Canada to review its continued membership in a nuclear weapons alliance. The Cold War is over.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will ask Mr. Regehr to deal with the rest of the brief.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Roche. Mr. Regehr.
Mr. Regehr: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In concluding the brief, we want to emphasize that popular support for nuclear disarmament remains strong. It's now reasserting itself in the post-Cold-War international security debate.
When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, a grassroots movement called Abolition 2000 began. The goal is to secure the political will and commitment of the world's governments to complete negotiations by 2000 on an international convention that will set a firm timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. To date, some 700 organizations around the world have endorsed the Abolition 2000 statement.
The Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which is comprised of 11 organizations in Canada, was formed as a Canadian component of that international campaign.
Project Ploughshares, a founding member of the Canadian network, recognized that a window of opportunity has been opened by the World Court and other recent developments to obtain that which during the Cold War years seemed impossible: the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Thus, Project Ploughshares, working together with local organizing groups, conducted a series of consultations across Canada to advance knowledge on the nuclear weapons issues. The consultations took the form of round tables in 18 cities in all 10 provinces during September 1996.
Attending the round tables were 404 persons in total. There was a range of occupations: members of Parliament, members of provincial legislatures, mayors, city councillors, bishops, clergy, university professors, teachers, physicians, lawyers, judges, journalists, editors, first nations leaders, labour leaders, directors of foundations, peace activists, school board trustees and administrators, and students. Some people from the business community also participated.
.0935
By engaging a range of community leaders and activists, including persons and constituencies - and this is important - not usually associated with disarmament advocacy, the round tables made the point that all levels of communities, from the international to the local, have an opportunity and a responsibility to face the reality of the nuclear threat and to demand concrete action.
Mr. Roche was the resource person for these round tables. The report has been distributed to the committee. We tabled it here this morning.
It happened that just as the round tables were beginning, Minister Axworthy solicited the Canadian public's views on how Canada should respond to the World Court's advisory opinion. Mr. Axworthy's questions became an added incentive for the participants at the round tables to express their views. The comments made at that time were also incorporated into the report. We believe they constitute a significant response to Mr. Axworthy.
At the round table, there was a sense of amazement, widely expressed, of how little the general public seems to know about the important events over the past year that have restored nuclear weapons to being a central issue on the international agenda. Thus, there is today perhaps little public clamouring for the Canadian government to foster and promote a comprehensive program for nuclear weapons elimination. On the other hand, there is certainly no public opinion for the retention of nuclear weapons.
But when the situation is laid out, the World Court's call for the conclusion of nuclear disarmament negotiations and the untenability of the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five permanent members of the Security Council, while the rest of the world is proscribed from obtaining nuclear weapons, a sense of urgency for action emerged among the participants. This led to discussions of more education programs and efforts to get the media to pay more attention to an issue that is central to the post-Cold-War security agenda.
Many participants said that the lack of public agitation should not be used by the government as an excuse not to take a strong stand on implementing the World Court's opinion that nuclear weapon abolition is essential.
The round tables demonstrated that Canadian values are firmly rooted in the pursuit of peace. Significant cross-sections of Canadian society would welcome and rally behind a clear commitment by the government that it will work immediately, not in the distant future, to secure a nuclear weapon abolition program.
In conclusion, we hope the committee will examine the moral and strategic arguments against nuclear weapons: the uselessness of nuclear weapons; the risk of disastrous war posed by them through accidents, miscalculation, madness, desperation or deliberate terrorist acts; the immorality of potential participation in mass murder; and the repercussions of the continuing disparity among nuclear haves and have-nots.
These arguments, which are compelling in their own right, are now reinforced by the International Court of Justice's confirmation of the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. The legal, moral, and strategic arguments against nuclear weapons intertwine.
Since nuclear weapons can destroy all life on the planet, they imperil all that humanity ever stood for, and humanity itself. That is why the president of the World Court called nuclear weapons the ultimate evil. In fact, he added that the existence of nuclear weapons challenges the very existence of humanitarian law.
During the acrimonious years of the Cold War, the emphasis on the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence was a constant justification for the nuclear arms build-up. The public and government seemed blinded to the horror of nuclear weapons, but now, in the post-Cold-War era, there is no excuse for shielding ourselves from the assault on life that nuclear weapons represent.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Regehr.
I would like to make a couple of comments about your brief, which is very helpful to us. It sets out very well the link between the NATO policy and nuclear armament and disarmament. It also sets out very well the stages and the elements that we'll have to consider in our study. You are an excellent opening set of witnesses for us, and it's a very helpful brief.
.0940
I have two very short comments.
I must say, Mr. Regehr, that I can't quite agree with your assessment of the Canadian public opinion and interest in this subject. As I said at the opening of these hearings, this committee has never received as much correspondence on any single issue as we have on this one. I think the members would agree with me on that. We have seen a great deal of interest from the Canadian public, and we certainly intend to pay attention to it and to listen to it. I would like to congratulate your organization for having taken the time to do a lot of the groundwork to pull that public opinion together. It has been very helpful.
Mr. Roche, sir, I hope your point about the British government using its nuclear weapons to protect its investments abroad does not get into the hands of Senator Helms, or we may get ourselves nuked in Cuba by the Americans, who are desperate to protect their investments by means other than humanitarian ones, if I may put it that way.
Again, thank you very much for your presentation.
I have several members on my list, beginning with Madame Debien.
[Translation]
Ms Maude Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good morning, gentlemen, and all the best to you.
This morning, we're dealing with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their possible prohibition. You have drawn a rather broad portrait of the whole problem our committee will be examining.
I also thank you for being here as well as for your presentation. We can talk all we want about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but I think we have to go back to the source and the origin, in other words to the nuclear material itself. I have a concern about that.
We know that the federal government, in co-operation with Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, is getting ready to implement a plan to bring in to Canada 600 grams of plutonium taken from American weaponry stockpiles. We were told that they will be running combustion trials in a Chalk River, Ontario, reactor. I'd like to know what you think about this new plutonium economy that Canada intends setting up which, fundamentally, is indirect way of supporting the declining Canadian nuclear industry.
I'd also like you to tell us what you think about this way of producing electricity which is contrary of the principle of sustainable development. I'd also like you to tell us about the dangers of transporting this plutonium as the International Association of Physicians for The Prevention of Nuclear Warfare - an organization which has actually received the Nobel Peace Prize - has said that the 600 grams to be imported from the U.S.A., if they are not properly handled, could lead to the death of the entire Canadian population. I'd like to hear your opinion on the different points I have just raised.
Mr. Roche: Thank you for your questions, I'll answer in English.
[English]
The focus of our presentation today is on nuclear weapons. The centrepiece of our concern is that the non-proliferation treaty be upheld fully. The non-proliferation treaty is a treaty that provides not only the obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament, it also provides for the safe transfer of nuclear materials for peaceful use of nuclear energy.
We want to concentrate on the destructive capacity of nuclear power, as evidenced most vibrantly in the massive destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. We would not be opposed to being drawn into a debate in this country on the efficacy of nuclear power at this stage. However, from our point of view, we want to concentrate on nuclear weapons, and we ask this committee to do the same. I do not want to dismiss the importance of your question with respect to the hazards of nuclear power, though. In this respect, I will ask my colleague Mr. Robinson, also from Project Ploughshares, to add a word in answer to your question.
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Mr. Bill Robinson (Researcher, Project Ploughshares): Good morning. I'll speak to the issue of the use of plutonium in reactors, the use of MOX fuel.
As you know, this position of plutonium that was formerly in weapons stockpiles is a crucial issue, and it's one we do have to deal with. At this point, there are two alternatives that are considered to be fairly similar in feasibility. One is vitrification, the locking up of plutonium in glass with reactor waste. The other is running it through reactors as MOX fuel, producing similar results.
Both of these things are a long-term approach to dealing with the plutonium problem that we are facing. The immediate problem that we face is the security of that plutonium - making sure it doesn't get into the wrong hands. It's a problem we face right now, and it is a problem we will face 25 years from now, even if we proceed down the road of MOX or vitrification. What we are talking about is a program that will take at least 25 years, and which will leave tens of tonnes of plutonium in stockpiles outside of these programs even then - and that is thousands of nuclear weapons worth of plutonium.
Either way, vitrification or MOX fuel is not the solution to the security problem for plutonium. That, on short term, is guarding the stockpiles, accounting for them, and making sure they are under proper safeguards. Arguments that we are in a hurry, that we have to deal with this right away, shouldn't railroad us into proceeding with the MOX option. This MOX question and vitrification are long-term questions. There is time to check out the feasibility of both approaches, and there is time to determine if one won't work, whether both will work, or whether one is better than the other. In that respect, I would argue that the plutonium MOX option is probably not the best option because it carries the risk of encouraging the use of plutonium in the civil economy, of plutonium recovered from civil reactor waste in reactors.
If we end up with a world in which there are many countries recovering plutonium and using it in reactors, there is going to be a lot more weapons-usable fissile material in the hands of a lot more countries than there is now. So we do not wish in any way to encourage a plutonium economy. I think that is a major risk that will arise from going down the MOX route, so we certainly shouldn't be rushed into it by arguments of security.
The Chairman: Thank you very much. That is an issue we have been trying to deal with for some time now, so that's very helpful.
Mr. Assadourian.
Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Don Valley North, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome back, Mr. Roche. You have been here many times before, but this is the first time I have had a chance to say welcome back to the House of Commons. I have just a few questions for you.
First, you did not discuss at all the concept of the first-strike capacity of NATO. That is the first issue.
Second, safety is an aspect of nuclear weapons in Russia or the former U.S.S.R. We know the Russians don't have enough money to maintain an effective program for nuclear weapons safety. Even if they fire, they might miss their targets and hit their own bases. That's what we were told previously.
The third point I have is about something on page three. You say in paragraph 3.5 that nuclear states are in direct violation of their own agreement. Who is in charge here? Who's calling the shots? If these states make a policy and oppose their own policy, how do you explain this contradiction? Besides the United States, England and France, who are the weaponed states in NATO? I don't think there is anybody else, but can you can confirm that there are only three of them? Do they have the capacity or ability to use their weapons as they see fit, or do they have to consult NATO because they are members of NATO? What I want to know is whether their national priority comes ahead of NATO or whether NATO comes ahead of their priority to use their weapons of mass destruction.
.0950
Mr. Roche: Thank you for your question, Mr. Assadourian.
I'm going to take the first and third parts of your question, and I'll ask Mr. Regehr to deal perhaps with those also, but specifically with the second part on Russia.
There are five nuclear weapons states in all. We've referred to three so far - the United States, Britain and France - all of which are within NATO. The other two are Russia and China. So let's discuss those first and get them out of the way.
At the United Nations, China has consistently voted for a time-bound program for nuclear weapons disarmament.
When it was still the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, Russia brought a program to the United Nations calling for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in fifteen years - and Gorbachev actually announced that in 1985. In the last stages of the Cold War, the position of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was to support complete nuclear elimination.
When Mr. Yeltsin succeeded Mr. Gorbachev, and when Russia succeeded the Soviet Union, Mr. Yeltsin came to the first and only meeting of the summit of the Security Council in January 1992. He reaffirmed that the new Russia would follow the old policies introduced by his predecessor - namely that Russia would commit itself to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Since that time, Russian dependence on western economic assistance has been so great that Russia has pulled back in voting at the United Nations for a nuclear weapons program, for a convention. It is now voting in an ambiguous manner. On some resolutions it abstains, on others it lends its support. But it's not clear. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Russian vote is being driven by the western position.
I referred to the western position earlier. You asked if the western powers are in control of their own destiny. The answer is yes, but for NATO itself to use nuclear weapons, I would assume the consent of the NATO nuclear planning group would be needed. After all, why else would they have a nuclear planning group?
The problem we are facing with NATO is the secrecy with which it operates. We find it surprising that NATO decided to maintain nuclear weapons as an essential aspect of its military doctrine without any debate or any visible feed-in from parliaments or governments around the world. It is this that we are challenging.
On first-strike capability, NATO has maintained for a long time - from its inception - that it won't use weapons first. It is a defensive alliance. But NATO has decided that in the event of an attack - and this was always the doctrine during the Cold War, on the assumption that the Soviets had superior conventional strength - and if it decides that it is losing, it has reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first. Thus, it has never joined that sort of club called the ``no-first-use club''. NATO has specifically stayed out of that club, and has said that it will use nuclear weapons first in the event of an attack on it.
We think that policy should certainly change, but that such a change is itself insufficient. As we said in our brief, in order to comply with the requirements of international law as set out by the International Court of Justice, NATO must now review its whole nuclear weapons strategy and proceed to a program of elimination of nuclear weapons as an instrument within the organization. That, of course, would involve the compliance of the three nuclear weapons states.
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We cannot force those states to take action, but it is our submission that a group of like-minded states, of which Canada would certainly be in the forefront, can work to advance the interests of international law and put pressure on the nuclear weapons states.
Mr. Regehr: I have a brief addition to that part of it.
What's new in the current situation is that the World Court has made a very clear expression of opinion that nuclear weapons, if they are to be used, have to be used in accordance with humanitarian law, and it casts huge doubt upon whether that would be possible in any circumstance. Furthermore, the court declared that the nuclear weapons states are under obligation by international law - article VI of the NNPT - to proceed to actual nuclear disarmament.
So for NATO, in the period following that, to issue a public statement saying, ``Nuclear weapons are essential and we have no intention of reviewing our policy'' is to thumb its nose at the international court. In domestic law we might say one is in contempt of court, at the very least, to have a judgment rendered by the court and then to state publicly that one has no intention of paying any attention to that opinion.
There is an obligation at the very least to reject the notion that nuclear weapons are essential, in the same way that we reject the notion that torture, in violation of humanitarian law, is ever essential - it cannot be such - and to publicly commit to a review of the matter.
If we are at any time going to address the question of security and effective nuclear disarmament in Russia, the absolute minimal requirement is that we do not pursue a nuclear policy that drives the Russians into a reassertion of their nuclear strategy and a recommitment to the development of nuclear weapons, which will only compound the problem of the disposal of the materials in the future. We have to advance a nuclear strategy now that encourages the elimination of nuclear weapons there and here and then provide the kind of technical cooperation that would be needed in order to dispose in a safe way of the waste materials from the dismantling.
The Chairman: Thank you.
I wonder if I could follow up on Mr. Roche's answer to Mr. Assadourian. We heard - I can't remember from whom, but from one of the strategy analysts who was speaking to us about the issue - that perhaps one of the advantages of the NATO position is positive ambiguity: the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons restricts others in a way that, if NATO made itself formally bound not to, would be dangerous.
The example of the Gulf War was given. What restrained Saddam Hussein from perhaps using chemical weapons was the fact that he was never too sure what somebody else might use, either before or in return. This acted as the restraint.
I know this is a terrible dilemma we're in here, but the use of terror against the use of terror is the argument. We're all trying to wrestle with what in the end is the best issue for humanity in this, and I know you've wrestled with that. I wonder if you would have a comment on that, because it feeds into Mr. Assadourian's question.
Mr. Roche: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In short, the present NATO position of holding nuclear weapons in reserve on the grounds that it restricts others does not contribute to stability in the world. The western nuclear powers are going to have to face the fact that the leading nations of the world that are ostensibly non-nuclear are not going to go into the 21st century as second-class members of the international community. They've said this.
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The fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council are the same five nuclear weapons powers is held to be an abuse of their power. As we are all too well aware, countries such as India are now stepping forward and saying they want a global ban on nuclear weapons. India has so voted. Absent a global ban on nuclear weapons, they're going to reserve the right to develop their nuclear option. This is a profound instability as the world goes forward.
Moreover, now that the Cold War is over - and whatever justification for nuclear weapons existed during the Cold War is an argument all by itself, which I'm not addressing here at the moment - there is absolutely no justification whatsoever in the post-Cold War era for NATO to maintain a weapon that has such massive destructive capability.
In some ways we're getting farther and farther away from Hiroshima and Nagasaki in time lines and so on, but I went back to both cities just a couple of weeks ago, and I saw again the artifacts and displays and I talked to some of the survivors to see once again the massiveness of destruction and the colossal amount of human suffering by weapons that are indiscriminate in their destructive capacity. The then president of the World Court called them the ultimate evil.
In your comments and questions you have raised a very important issue, namely that NATO says, ``Well, maybe we're restraining some other evil out there by this''; in other words, ``Nuclear weapons are a necessary evil and we have to maintain them''. We firmly and vigorously reject the notion that you can combat some sort of evil out there by the supreme, ultimate evil.
The development of the strategies of preventive diplomacy, peace-building, peacekeeping, and so on, as advanced in the former Secretary General's An Agenda for Peace, provides ways to help build the peace process in the world. By simply sticking to an outmoded military strategy, NATO is deficient in its duty to build peace processes in the world.
The Chairman: Thank you. That's helpful.
[Translation]
Mr. Bergeron.
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères, BQ): Good morning, gentlemen, and welcome.
I must say that I also appreciated your presentation. In it, you present a decision of the International Court of Justice not as something abstract, but rather as you mentioned, as a decision that has concrete application for a country like ours participating in the Atlantic Alliance.
Did you actually say that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did not change its policy on nuclear weapons, that you would then recommend that Canada withdraw from NATO?
Mr. Roche: Thank you for your question.
[English]
I would like to be precise in our position. We believe it is incumbent on NATO to review its policy. We believe that Canada, as an important member of NATO, as a member of the nuclear planning group, and as the author of article II, the political clause of NATO, has a specific obligation to lead NATO in the review we have called for. If that review goes ahead, let's see what happens.
Right now NATO has said they're not going to review and they're not going to discuss it. We find that untenable and objectionable. Particularly to a country such as Canada, which is paying something like 6% of the NATO bill, whatever that amount is in dollars - $150 million or $200 million - and which is paying for the cost of expansion and so on, we believe that is not acceptable to the Canadian public.
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I must say, Mr. Chairman, that you rightly picked up on our comment that we felt that public opinion is not yet strong. What we were thinking of was that they are not clamouring on the doors like in the 1960s. It is a different period we are in now.
The Chairman: We had someone try to drive a truck through our door. I hope you are not going to try that, Mr. Roche!
Mr. Roche: You are absolutely right that within the Canadian public there is a deep feeling that we've tapped into in the series of round tables to be held across the country. I want to affirm that there is that feeling in the country.
Mr. Bergeron, it does embrace a resistance to NATO maintaining its business-as-usual attitude despite the end of the Cold War. That is what people are asking. So there is, as you have said, a very concrete application to Canada of this.
Finally, you were trying to ascertain whether I said that Canada would leave NATO. I did not say that. I said that Canada should push for the review. If NATO absolutely refuses to review its position on nuclear weapons, then it is our position that Canada must review its continued membership in NATO, because Canada cannot have it both ways.
Canada has espoused following international law. It is a hallmark of the government's position, which we applaud. The International Court of Justice, the highest legal authority in the world, has spoken and it has in effect de-legitimized NATO's war-fighting nuclear strategy. Therefore, Canada is going to have to choose down the line whether we are going to follow the dictates of international law in our espousal of the development of civilization as we go into the next century or succumb to the pressure and insistence of a military alliance driven by three nuclear weapon states that are maintaining nuclear weapons for their own power interests.
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: May I continue? I raised a question with the officials of the departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade concerning the usefulness of nuclear weaponry as described by its advocates. Apparently, because of its dissuasive effect, nuclear weaponry is useful in keeping the world in a state where there is no major conflagration, insofar as any one of the protagonists is certain that if he uses nuclear weaponry, the other one will also use it and thus we could be facing massive destruction.
If we undertake a denuclearization process, the danger is that at some point one of the protagonists might get the impression that there could be an advantage to using nuclear weapons because the use of nuclear weaponry in itself might lead to a reaction by the other protagonist which would not lead to massive destruction any more as the stock of nuclear weapons will be at a sufficiently low level. What is your perception of this view that a progressive decrease could lead to a point where some countries might be tempted to use nuclear weaponry?
[English]
Mr. Regehr: The first thing that needs to be said is that nuclear weapons are, of course, singularly incapable of deterring the kind of conflagration the world is currently experiencing. The world is currently experiencing a great deal of warfare, a great deal of destruction and insecurity. Of course nuclear weapons have no impact on that and they have no capacity to maintain stability in those areas of the world where there is the greatest instability.
Secondly, one could not conceive of law-abiding nations threatening rogue states such as Iraq or Iran with a nuclear attack in the event they are viewed to have acquired a very minimal nuclear capability. Clearly, the only option for responding to that is the way in which the international community has now responded, through UN non-proliferation legislation, through expert investigative teams, through diplomacy and those kinds of angles.
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There isn't a means of addressing the nuclear threat from rogue states by nuclear retaliation. They are not intimidated by that because they know it is not a credible threat that can be used against them. It is the normal course of international law and diplomacy that we have as a means of combating that kind of proliferation.
Bill, did you want to add to that?
Mr. Robinson: Yes. When you talk about the fact that perhaps the existence of nuclear weapons has induced a certain amount of care on the part of the great powers, that's undoubtedly a fact. But you have to balance that against the fact that this existence has also exposed us to great risks from non-deliberate use of nuclear weapons - accidental use, miscalculation, some kind of madness, a country pushed into a situation of desperation, or terrorist use where they feel they can accept the costs of breaking out of deterrence.
If you look at the likelihood of facing nuclear threats in the future, I think you have to agree that the odds of great-power war are very low compared to the likelihood of these arsenals being used accidentally or otherwise. So you are actually increasing the risk by maintaining that factor.
One of the reasons you could do without that so-called security blanket is that war between the great powers, at this point of industrial civilization, would be enormously destructive, regardless of whether nuclear weapons exist, and they realize that. There is an existential deterrent factor that will exist even after the abolition of nuclear weapons, largely because conventional warfare is now extraordinarily destructive and it would never be in the interests of any great power to go to war against another, but secondarily, because the world could be re-nuclearized very quickly, despite abolition, and that danger will remain.
That doesn't mean abolition is not a good idea. It is a very important, excellent idea. But that fact will remain out there, that if great-power war takes place, weapons of mass destruction may very well be reached for, whether they are re-nuclearized arsenals, biological weapons, or whatever. That knowledge exists now. The great powers will realize that or they are insane.
So that element of existential deterrence, if you will, continues to exist and makes the risk of great-power warfare very, very low. Therefore we have to focus on the risks of accidental use of these arsenals or otherwise engaging them unintentionally.
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Of course, I think that everyone here agrees that in an ideal world we would have absolutely none of these weapons. I think that goes without saying.
However, I think that in an ideal world, we should move from the nuclear world as we know it today to a totally denuclearized world tomorrow morning: instant denuclearization. The problem, of course, is that this would be in an ideal world. But if we're committing to a process of denuclearization, we're going to have to proceed in a progressive manner.
The fear entertained by some specialists is that at some point, in the denuclearization process, we'll get to a level that is sufficiently low that someone with nuclear armaments may see an advantage to using them as there would be no further danger of massive and total destruction. That is the gist of my question.
[English]
Mr. Roche: Thank you, Mr. Bergeron. First -
The Chairman: I am sorry to interrupt you, but I have to ask you to give a fairly short answer to that question. I know it's a difficult question, but there are three other questioners and we only have fifteen minutes left.
Mr. Roche: Very good.
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It is not idealism any more to call for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is realism. It has to be done in progressive steps, as you have said, but what is needed is a commitment that we will get to zero. It is not a question of doing it overnight. It is a question of phasing it, as the group of 28 nations said, over a period of almost a quarter of a century.
A commitment is needed now for the reasons given by the Canberra commission, in addition to the World Court, and by the international group of generals and admirals, namely that the continued presence of nuclear weapons without any attempt to get to zero is fomenting other states to develop them as conditions of power.
So we can take a series of steps within a framework, and that framework is called a ``nuclear weapons convention''. And for states to say that they are for nuclear disarmament and vote against the beginning of negotiations to obtain nuclear disarmament is an inconsistent position.
The Chairman: I think there are other questioners, but you might reflect on this. I think Mr. Bergeron's point was directed toward a specific strategic analysis, which is that in this road to disarmament that you say goes progressively - and everybody agrees to that - when you get to 15%, at that point there is a fear that somebody on one side or the other can say ``Now I can quickly use a pre-emptive strike on this because I don't risk a massive retaliation that will either destroy me or destroy everybody.'' So then in fact, like chemical weapons or some other weird thing, it becomes a usable force. It's just like the fact that one wouldn't have thought those missiles they used in Afghanistan would get out and be used all over the place, but they are being used all over the place by all sorts of folks now.
That's the question. I am not asking you for an answer now. You might want to reflect on it or you might want to write to us. That is Mr. Bergeron's specific question. That is something we want to and have to deal with in the committee. We would like you to think about it, but I don't want to interrupt the flow of other questions.
Mr. Flis.
Mr. Jesse Flis (Parkdale - High Park, Lib.): I think this morning's exchange has already highlighted Canada's dilemma. On the one hand, Canada is pushing for world nuclear disarmament; on the other hand, we belong to an alliance that promotes the use of nuclear arms.
In the executive summary of ``Canada and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons: A Window of Opportunity'' - I like that title - Ploughshare's working paper 96-1, you state:
- The Canadian government should put its commitment to international law ahead of allegiance
to NATO, and it should follow the World Court's admonition to conclude negotiations for the
elimination of nuclear weapons.
Surely to goodness you are not serious in your recommendation that Canada abandon its NATO alliance at a time when these countries really took risks in abandoning the former Soviet Union and are looking for European security through NATO. How do we get out of this dilemma?
Mr. Regehr: One certain way of heightening our insecurity - if not our dilemma - will be the expansion of NATO while it retains nuclear weapons, a first use option, and excludes Russia from its circle. That's the worst case scenario and that's a kind of credible scenario that the current policy is leading us towards. That's a policy we must be utterly committed to changing: the progressive drawing in of the former Soviet Union into a security cooperation with western Europe. Surely we are all supportive of that.
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Encircling and drawing Russia into security cooperation with western Europe is absolutely essential. But to extend a military alliance that declares itself to rely on nuclear weapons as essential, to refuse to reconsider that policy, and to go forward and exclude Russia from that involvement is a road to disaster. Canada cannot allow itself to be a part of that.
There comes a point when the decision is not Canada's, but NATO's. One thing we also have to acknowledge is that in the pursuit of nuclear abolition - and the same policy on the part of NATO - Canada is not isolated. There are like-minded countries in NATO, like Denmark, the Netherlands and so forth.
Canada is an expert at coalition-building to get things done in the international community. And that's what we actively have to pursue now within the European and NATO community to build that coalition of like-minded states that will help NATO move to a more credible policy.
Mr. Jesse Flis: I am wondering if we could just turn your recommendation around and say that the Canadian government should put its commitment to international law together with NATO enlargement so that as we are enlarging NATO, we are expanding the global security at the same time because we are a member of the alliance working towards negotiating to ban all nuclear arms.
Mr. Regehr: A very clear unequivocal commitment on the part of Canada to work within NATO in pursuit of nuclear disarmament and to reject as its own policy the idea that nuclear weapons are essential to security would then make our position much more credible.
Mr. Jesse Flis: I have many more questions, but I know my colleagues also have questions.
The Chairman: Mrs. Gaffney.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney (Nepean, Lib.): Thank you very much.
I too welcome you to the committee. After listening to your comments, my question probably follows along the lines of Mr. Flis' statement. I sometimes think the Cold War really isn't over when I listen to what you are saying about NATO, its intransigence and its unwillingness to listen to the people of the world in regard to what they feel about nuclear weapons.
In recent months the committee did travel to Russia and to the northern countries to look at circumpolar issues and circumpolar cooperation. I was part of the Russia contingent. At meeting after meeting we heard from the Russian people that if Russia was not drawn into NATO, it would increase its nuclear submarine capacity. I take this very seriously.
Obviously somebody is not listening. When they are going to draw countries into NATO that sit on the very border of Russia, do you think Russia wants nuclear weapons sitting on their border? Of course they don't. It's a threat, and I think we should take this threat very seriously.
Based on the question that Mr. Flis was asking, allow me to go one step further. Why is no one listening to what Russia is saying? Why are they not taking that threat seriously?
Secondly, if Canada takes an approach on nuclear weapons that is contrary to what the other countries of NATO are saying, where does that put us in terms of our relationship with, let's say, the United States? Does that jeopardize where we stand?
I will stop there. I could go further, but because time is of the essence, could you respond to those two questions, please?
Mr. Roche: Thank you, Ms Gaffney.
Mr. Chairman, there is a lot in Ms Gaffney's questions. I will try to be very brief.
First, on Canada and the U.S., it is our view that the Clinton administration may well welcome friendly pressure put on it by states it respects and is allied with in order to help it move forward in fulfilling its own commitments.
Within the United States there are important organizations, of which the Stimson Center is but one. And we hope that this committee, sir, will examine what the Stimson Center has said about the need for the United States to get into a nuclear weapons abolition program.
The friendly pressure from states like Canada might indeed be welcomed by the United States administration to counter its own obstinate forces within that country that are holding back the forward movement of the United States. We think Canada is in a particularly useful position to exercise that kind of friendly pressure.
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Why are we not listening to Russia? I do not know. I think it is a long answer that the chairman won't encourage, so I'll just say in one sentence that there is so much confusion going on in the world today that people are not sure. There is no plan. There is no clear, definitive program ahead.
But I would say that the program of action submitted by the 28 states - and this is partly in answer to Mr. Bergeron's earlier question, Mr. Chairman, about the strategic use of nuclear weapons when we get down to 15% - is foreseen in the three-phase program of action lasting between now and the year 2020. And because the 28-nation program of action was included in the terms of reference for the committee, we hope the committee will look at it, because it deals with the question of the strategic vulnerability of states when we get down to minimum deterrence.
The Chairman: Monsieur Dupuy.
Mr. Michel Dupuy (Laval West, Lib.): I wish to join you, Mr. Chairman, in thanking the witnesses for their excellent presentations. With Mr. Roche there, who has so much experience to draw on, we are certainly comforted.
As I understand it, there are now two instruments in terms of international conventions that can be used to bring about nuclear disarmament. One is a proposal, and that is the nuclear weapons convention to which you made reference. There is now a UN resolution, a General Assembly resolution, behind that convention. But as you reported, some of the key nuclear weapons states have taken a negative attitude.
The other one is not a proposal. It is there. It is the non-proliferation treaty. All the nuclear weapon states are committed under that treaty to eventually getting rid of their nuclear weapons.
What the treaty, the NPT, is missing is a timetable. It actually has a verification instrument, which is the IEA. So if the timetable is missing there, my question is basically this: why are you putting the emphasis on Canada's position in NATO and vis-à-vis the proposal for a nuclear weapons convention rather than on the position of Canada within the NPT?
We have been very active in promoting non-transfer of nuclear material and equipment to the non-weapon states, but we have been rather inactive in promoting the other aspect, which is nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapons states.
Is there any reason in your own experience that leads you to the feeling that we have little prospect of achieving progress within a convention that works, that has been made permanent, that has been renewed many times and in which Canada has played a leading role?
Mr. Roche: Thank you, Mr. Dupuy.
Mr. Chairman, I'll just say a word and then Mr. Regehr will conclude the answer.
First, Canada was instrumental in the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty at the review conference in 1995. We really went forward in ensuring that there would be sufficient votes.
Canada thus has a moral obligation to ensure that the NPT will be implemented and not fall apart in the opening years of the 21st century, as even Mexico - and countries like it - our own partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement, has said that it will consider leaving the non-proliferation treaty, not because Mexico is going to make a nuclear weapon, but because Mexico is resenting the discrimination, as so many other nations are. Canada has an obligation to see that the NPT is fully implemented.
You mentioned the timetable. The closest the World Court came to that was in referring to the non-proliferation treaty's article VI, which says that nations must negotiate. The World Court said that was not good enough, that nations must ``conclude'' negotiations for total nuclear elimination.
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So this comes into play in the resolution of the nuclear weapons convention that we have already voted against because of the NATO pressure. We have a new opportunity. On April 7 a model nuclear weapons convention will be unveiled in New York at the non-proliferation treaty preparatory meeting, which is going on for two weeks in April, and we believe that Canada should work with the states that are advancing that to refine it, to improve it, to do perhaps a lot of things with it, but at least to support the intrinsic idea that negotiations must begin now for nuclear weapons elimination, and thus be faithful to the World Court.
Mr. Regehr: Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman, the issue now is political will and how we get the thing moving along.
As we've pointed out, there are more nuclear weapons today, even after significant nuclear disarmament, than there were when the major powers signed the NPT and committed themselves to nuclear disarmament. We went far beyond that, and now we still have more weapons than they said we had when they would begin nuclear disarmament. So nuclear powers make regular rhetorical nods towards nuclear abolition, but then, on the other hand, in their realpolitik moments talk about the essential nature of nuclear weapons for their security.
So we are talking about the creation and the development of political will that actually gets them to undertake the obligation, which the World Court has reinforced, to significantly pursue nuclear disarmament under article VI.
Mr. Michel Dupuy: Would you support, for instance, a recommendation by this committee to our Minister of Foreign Affairs to have our delegation take a leading role in this April meeting concerning the future of this convention?
Mr. Roche: My answer to that, Mr. Chairman, is unequivocally yes, I would strongly endorse Canada taking a leading role at the non-proliferation treaty preparatory meeting. It is going on for two weeks.
Part of the very review process of the NPT that was set up in 1995 was occasioned by Canada saying that we have to have a better review process, and thus they said in preparatory committees every year leading up to the year 2000, starting in 1997, Canada has an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its bona fides in aspiring to a world free of nuclear weapons and following international law by working actively with those who are so pursuing that goal.
The Chairman: Mr. English, you're on the list as the last questioner in this round, but we are really at the end of the time. Did you have a short question, or do you want to save it and maybe use it on the next group?
Mr. John English (Kitchener, Lib.): I will just ask a short question.
The last time I saw you two was at a conference that focused on this subject. I recall, Mr. Roche, that you gave a presentation and our friend Dr. Kapur responded by saying basically that deterrence works and we should stop worrying and start to love the bomb a little more than we do.
His analysis in response to your presentation was that the real obstacles are Britain and France. He asked the question, how can you ever expect Britain and France to give it up when it is so much wrapped up with their prestige as nations? We have a British election going on where the Labour Party has accepted nuclear weapons. To those of us who remember Hugh Gaitskell and the great debate and the debates in the 1980s as well in the British Labour Party, it does suggest that perhaps Canada's efforts should be directed towards those two nations that within NATO seem to have political consensus within their countries on the necessity of maintaining nuclear capacity within NATO.
I wonder how you respond to that question.
Mr. Roche: Thank you, Mr. English. I don't imagine the chairman wants to receive my views on the British election at this moment.
The Chairman: You're an experienced politician, so you can tell us who you think is going to win. Rupert Murdoch has already said who he thinks is going to win, switching sides.
Mr. Roche: I learned long ago, Mr. Chairman, not to make political predictions.
Anyway, Mr. English's point about the attitude of the British and French is extremely important. Of course it is. They are clearly using the perpetuation of nuclear weapons in their own inventories for political power purposes.
I think that the key to influencing the British and the French, as with the Americans, is through like-minded states - that is, Canada working with Norway, Denmark and Iceland, three NATO nations that did already abstain at least on the vote for a nuclear weapons convention. There are within NATO other countries that would respond to this new opportunity of putting pressure the nuclear weapon states. I already gave reasons why the United States - the Clinton administration - may well indeed welcome friendly pressure.
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I wouldn't give up on the British and French just because they say they're going to continue nuclear weapons. I think when START III occurs and there are more reductions between the Russians and the Americans, inevitably the other three nuclear weapon states, including China, will be drawn into multilateral negotiations.
The key to it now is, as Canberra has said and as the generals have said, and as I hope this committee will focus on as it continues its study, the reasons why important cross-sections of thinking leaders in the world are saying that there must be an unequivocal commitment made now by the nuclear weapons states that they will proceed to a nuclear abolition program, because the alternative is chaos in the 21st century.
The Chairman: Thank you very much.
Mrs. Beryl Gaffney: That's a fairly strong final statement.
The Chairman: Yes.
Thank you for coming. We appreciate very much the quality of your brief and your observations.
We would ask if you would be good enough to write us concerning specifically Mr. Bergeron's issue - and I know you sought to address it - the issue of the program of action of the 28 states. That is a rather complicated strategic notion. We would appreciate your reflections on it. I think that would be helpful to us.
There is one other issue that might be helpful to us, and I would have asked you about it if we had time; that is, whether you see any linkages between nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. I know we want to focus on perhaps getting rid of the one set of weapons, but we are reminded recently of the United States, and there are problems in ratification of the chemical weapons convention there because of verification and other issues and the Senate committee being hesitant to ratify it. Have you had any thoughts about the linkages between nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and particularly the verification process, which clearly is an extremely important part of building confidence? We would appreciate it very much.
We will adjourn for two minutes and have our next group of witnesses come to the table.
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The Chairman: We have with us now a group of representatives from three organizations: the Physicians for Global Survival (Canada); Lawyers for Social Responsibility; and Centre de ressources sur la non-violence.
If it is all right with our witnesses, I think we will go in the order in which you are on the order paper. If you can keep your observations to about ten minutes each, that will leave us more time for questions. It does depend on how you are able to go, but we will try to follow along with you.
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Madam Grisdale, were you the lead-off for Physicians for Global Survival?
Ms Debbie Grisdale (Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)): Mr. Chairman, I would like to pass over to Konia Trouton. Dr. Trouton is the president-elect of PGS.
The Chairman: I take it that it is Dr. Trouton, then?
Dr. Konia Trouton (President-Elect, Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)): Yes, it is.
The Chairman: Welcome, Dr. Trouton. Please go ahead.
[Translation]
Dr. Trouton: Good morning. I am Konia Trouton and I practice both family and public health medicine. I'm the president elect of Physicians for Global Survival (Canada).
[English]
Dr. Alex Bryans (Member, Board of Directors, Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)): I'm Alex Bryans. I'm a physician, a pediatrician, and past president of Physicians for Global Survival.
[Translation]
Dr. Trouton: Do you all have a copy of our presentation?
[English]
I will read some extracts from our presentation in English, and I'll skip over those details that you will have heard from previous speakers.
Physicians for Global Survival is a physician-led organization of approximately 2,400 members. It was founded in Canada in 1981, and was formerly called Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Our mission statement reads:
- Because of our concern for global health, we are committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons,
the prevention of war, the promotion of non-violent means of conflict resolution and social
justice in a sustainable world.
We would like to begin by commending the Canadian government for undertaking to review its policy related to nuclear weapons. Our members see nuclear weapons as a health hazard and also as a moral issue. These weapons have the potential of creating the most massive human catastrophe, ``for which health services in the world could not alleviate the situation in any significant way.'' There can be no effective treatment for the immediate or ongoing damage it will cause to people or to the environment in which we live. Physicians for Global Survival has therefore dedicated itself to the only rational and moral medical action - prevention by the elimination of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, there will always exist the possibility of nuclear war, initiated deliberately or through miscalculation.
The voices of the public and the non-proliferation treaty, which you will have heard articulated by the previous speaker, reinforce our long-held and profound conviction that nuclear bombs must be abolished. This leads us to our first recommendation on page 2:
- That the Canadian government fulfil its responsibility to the implementation of the
non-proliferation treaty and work to ensure that all signatories honour their obligations
embodied in it.
The next argument that we find convincing is from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which released its report in August, 1996. The commission was comprised of a panel of distinguished global leaders, it urged a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it outlined realistic steps to achieve this. This leads us to our third recommendation: that the Canadian government call for the immediate implementation of the steps outlined by the Canberra commission.
The commission further concluded that the spread of nuclear-weapons-free zones around the globe, with specific mechanisms to answer the security concerns of each region, can progressively codify the transition to a world free of nuclear weapons. Therefore, our fourth recommendation is that the Canadian government support all efforts to establish or strengthen nuclear-weapon-free zones.
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We wish to address in some detail the issue of deterrence - the notion that an overt or implied use of nuclear bombs improves security by decreasing the likelihood that another party will use their nuclear bombs.
The argument premised on the need to maintain nuclear bombs to deter their use by recalcitrant states, terrorists, or by one nuclear weapon state against another is flawed. If certain nations claim to need nuclear weapons for their security, many other nations will conclude they need them even more. The only effective way to remove the threat nuclear bombs pose, regardless of who possesses them, is to create a world free of nuclear bombs.
In the absolute vast majority of conceivable situations, the use or threat of nuclear bombs is considered illegal. NATO policy that is built on deterrence is illegal.
Nuclear arsenals do not threaten or deter terrorists. It would be unthinkable to punish a terrorist group, even if it could be identified beyond a doubt, by means of a nuclear bomb. The continued existence of these weapons makes it possible for terrorists to obtain them, but does not prevent them from using them to achieve their objectives. As long as nuclear bombs exist, the danger of nuclear terrorism will exist.
Although the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War has ended, the danger of a nuclear catastrophe still exists. Political upheaval, or the weakening of state authority in a nuclear weapon state or a threshold state, could compromise the ability of states to safely handle and control nuclear weapons and weapons material. As a result, the safety margin protecting humankind from nuclear bombs shrinks, while there is a high probability that human error is increasing.
The Canberra commission describes this environment in some detail, and goes on to say:
- The proposition that large numbers of nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never
used - accidentally or by decision - defies credibility.
I would like now to turn to a discussion about the nuclear weapons convention. There is growing legal, military, and public opinion that nuclear weapons have no defensible role. All efforts must lead to a determined end to nuclear weapons. The commitment to this goal must be made by the nuclear weapon states at the highest political level. Non-nuclear-weapon states should support this commitment and join in international cooperative action to implement it. Canada has much to offer to support this commitment through - among other strategies - confidence-building measures to reduce the climate of hostility, and verification processes.
We believe the ICJ decision provides a judicial determination that the next logical step is a nuclear weapons convention that defies a comprehensive approach and leads to their elimination. We urge Canada to study the draft nuclear weapons convention Ambassador Roche alluded to, which will be unveiled on April 7 at the beginning of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review preparatory committee.
Our sixth recommendation, then, is that the Canadian government support negotiations through to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention that will lead to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
Canada's leadership toward the achievement of a worldwide ban on anti-personnel land mines is exemplary. Learnings from the Ottawa process, as it is now known, can be applied to efforts to achieve an unequivocal commitment on the part of nuclear weapon powers to move with urgency toward the goal of eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
This leads us to our seventh recommendation: that the Canadian government work with other middle power nations to achieve commitment from nuclear weapon states to move toward the goal of abolition.
I am now going to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite the end of the Cold War, NATO continues to insist on a policy that promotes the maintenance of nuclear weapons, as you have heard alluded to in the other presentation.
We ask where in Canada's foreign policy is it stated that nuclear weapons are ``essential'' for our well-being? The indifference of the Alliance to the ICJ decision is of concern. The ICJ decision puts Canada in conflict with the nuclear policies of NATO.
Withdrawal from NATO represents neither a realistic nor a viable option for Canadian policy. There are areas for dialogue within NATO that are mutually beneficial for Canadian and NATO credibility. We recognize that NATO requires a transitional period to bring it in line with international legal opinion and growing public concern.
Our eighth recommendation, then, is that the Canadian government work within NATO for change in NATO's nuclear dependency and nuclear war fighting strategy.
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Canada is a member of NATO's nuclear planning group, as you are all aware. This group meets twice a year and issues a communiqué following each meeting. Its work is carried out largely in secrecy. We are concerned about a growing gap between its public statements and its actual doctrine. It is our understanding that NATO has revised its nuclear strategy twice since the Berlin Wall came down and the Warsaw Pact folded. Both of these documents, however, remain classified.
There does exist a split within NATO, evidenced, as Project Ploughshares explained, by the vote on the resolution presented by Malaysia to the General Assembly of the United Nations in December. This resolution called for states to begin multilateral negotiations in 1997 that would lead toward an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. Denmark, Iceland, and Norway abstained, breaking rank with other NATO members.
This has led us to our ninth recommendation: that the Canadian government work with like-minded states to call for a review of NATO's nuclear fighting strategy in a public and formal manner.
As some of you brought up in the last question period, the concerns of Russia related to the expansion of NATO are legitimate. The so-called concession to Russia that there will be no nuclear weapons deployed on the soil of new members is merely a distraction, given the range of nuclear weapon capability. We feel the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is a more appropriate solution to the Cold War definition of security. We support the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe.
Our tenth recommendation is that the Canadian government work to strengthen the OSCE and examine means by which the OSCE could push for the abolition of nuclear weapons within NATO.
Lastly, I would like to spend a few moments on what is known as ``Additional Protocol I''. Canada ratified Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions in 1990 with the understanding that the rules it introduced did not apply to nuclear weapons. This understanding is indefensible in the view of international law. In its ruling on this subject, the International Court of Justice concluded that
- ...states must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary
and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.
In conclusion, we of Physicians for Global Survival believe that Canada can provide, by working in multilateral forums and with like-minded states, the leadership to bring the nuclear weapons era to a close.
Thank you.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Trouton.
I would like to now call on Mr. David Matas from Lawyers for Social Responsibility.
Be careful, now, as this committee has a regard for lawyers that is sometimes somewhat contentious. There are those who might think it is an oxymoron to say that lawyers are for social responsibility. I of course am not one of those, being a lawyer like yourself, but I just wanted to warn you.
Mr. David Matas (Member, Board of Directors, Lawyers for Social Responsibility): I hope, after my presentation is through, the committee will never have that point of view again.
The Chairman: Hopefully it will restore our faith in the profession.
Mr. Matas: I want to thank you for inviting us to appear. My name is David Matas. I'm a Winnipeg lawyer and a member of the board of directors of Lawyers for Social Responsibility.
Lawyers for Social Responsibility is an organization of Canadian lawyers committed to the abolition of weapons of mass destruction. We are a member of IALANW, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Weapons.
We participated in the drafting of a model brief for the World Court prepared by IALANW and circulated to states. Our contribution as Lawyers for Social Responsibility was an argument that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons violated international human rights law.
The World Court, on July 8, 1996, ruled on the legality of use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. The judgment of the court is 37 pages, answering eight different questions. There were 14 judges, and all 14 judges gave separate opinions, totalling another 230 pages. Summarizing this lengthy judgment adequately would take all the 10 minutes you suggested for me, and a good deal more. What I propose to do instead is to suggest to you the consequences for Canada, as we see it, that flow from the decision.
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One of the 14 judges, Judge Vereshchetin, in his separate opinion described the decision of the court as not just a legal pronouncement but a guide to action. We would go further. We consider the judgment a call to action and a warning against inaction. Now that we know what the law in this area is, we ignore that law at the peril of all humanity.
To us there are nine separate action principles that flow to Canada from the judgment, nine different initiatives that Canada not only should but must take as a result of the decision. The first is to call on NATO and NORAD to conform to the decision in their nuclear planning. Canada, as we have heard, is part of the nuclear planning group of NATO and a deputy commander of NORAD. Canada should use these positions to bring the World Court judgment to the table.
Right now the nuclear policy of NATO and NORAD, although somewhat unclear partly as the result of confidential decisions, appears to be far broader than what is allowed by law according to the World Court. The NATO and NORAD public position on nuclear policy is a policy of deterrence, not only against nuclear attack but, as well, against conventional attack.
The World Court held that the nuclear threat and use of nuclear weapons is illegal in every and all circumstances but one, that is, self-defence in extreme circumstances that threaten the survival of the nation. Even in this exceptional circumstance, the court did not say use or threat of use was legal, but only that they could come to no firm conclusions. The fact that the court on July 8, 1996, could come to no firm conclusions on the state of the evidence and argument before them does not mean that no firm conclusions could be made at a later date with more and different information before the court. The judgment holds out the possibility that even in the exceptional circumstance stated by the court, the use or threat of use in the case of extreme circumstances that threaten the survival of the nation, the court at a later date could hold that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be illegal.
What that means is that NATO and NORAD court the possibility of illegality when using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance. What is certain is that if NATO or NORAD use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance other than in the exceptional circumstance carved out by the judgment for which there is no formal statement of illegality by the court, then NATO and NORAD would be violating international law. Canada should do everything in its power to ensure that this does not happen.
The second consequence that flows from the judgment is the obligation on Canada and of course on others to pursue nuclear disarmament everywhere, including through NATO and NORAD. Complete nuclear disarmament should become the stated goal of both NATO and NORAD.
The World Court held unanimously that there is an obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament. The obligation is not just to pursue a process of negotiations but to achieve a precise result. Canada should bring this obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament to NATO and NORAD.
The third consequence of the judgment, we suggest, is that Canada should refuse to participate in any component or aspect of NATO and NORAD that violates the World Court judgment. If the nuclear planning group of NATO refuses to recommend conformity with the World Court judgment, then Canada should resign from the group. If NORAD refuses to conform to the World Court judgment, then Canada should resign as deputy commander. If NATO and NORAD are to persist in illegality, then Canada must do everything possible to distance itself from that illegality.
The fourth consequence is that Canada should step out from under the nuclear umbrella of NATO and NORAD. NATO and NORAD are collective defence agreements of which the nuclear threat forms part. It is our view that the nuclear threat is severable from collective defence. NATO and NORAD can exist as two-tier systems.
Any country in either alliance can renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in its defence. That is what Canada should do. It should tell NATO and NORAD that it does not wish to be protected by the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.
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The fifth consequence is that Canada should bring the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament into the international arena outside of NATO and NORAD. Canada should vote for any and all resolutions at the United Nations or other international fora that support the banning of nuclear weapons, that call for total nuclear disarmament.
The sixth initiative we propose is for Canada to seek a treaty like the Treaty of Tilatelolco or Rarotonga to cover Canada. Right now, the Treaty of Tilatelolco makes Latin America a nuclear-free zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga does the same for the South Pacific. All five nuclear powers have signed both treaties, although the U.S., the U.K., and France have not ratified the Treaty of Rarotonga.
Under those treaties the nuclear powers - admittedly some have signed with reservations - have committed themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states in the region. Canada should seek a similar commitment from all the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Canada.
The seventh consequence of the World Court judgment is that Canada should declare itself a nuclear-free zone. That means not only that Canada should refuse to station nuclear weapons on its soil, but further, not allow the use of Canadian airspace, land or water for patrols or exercises that may use or prepare to use nuclear weapons. Any defence treaties we have must clearly forbid overflights of nuclear-armed weapons, refuelling of nuclear-armed transporters, docking of nuclear-armed ships, landing of nuclear-armed planes or targeting nuclear-armed missiles over Canada.
We need to revisit all our defence agreements - and the Lawyers for Social Responsibility have prepared for this committee a list of 49 such agreements - to ensure these agreements do not allow the use of Canadian air, land or water for nuclear purposes.
We suggest the eighth consequence for Canada of the World Court judgment is to mend our own statutory law. The World Court again unanimously held that international humanitarian law applies to the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. International humanitarian law is part of Canadian law: the Geneva Conventions Act, which is part of the Revised Statutes of Canada.
The Geneva Conventions Act makes punishable in Canada grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, the laws of war, international humanitarian law. Jurisdiction is universal. Provided only the accused is found in Canada, Canadian courts have jurisdiction to punish anyone who commits grave breaches of international humanitarian law.
We propose that the Geneva Conventions Act be amended to incorporate into Canadian law what the World Court has said, that the violations of international humanitarian law can be committed though the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Canadian courts should have exclusive jurisdiction to punish those found in Canada who have committed grave breaches of international humanitarian law through use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
The ninth recommendation we wish to make, and the final one, is to reiterate a recommendation that was previously made by our colleagues, the Physicians for Global Survival, that Canada withdraw its reservation to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war about the use of nuclear weapons. The reservation, which is an understanding that the rules in the additional protocols do not apply to nuclear weapons, is a reservation whose legal effect can be questioned in light of the judgment of the World Court. It is a principle of international law that a reservation to a treaty that is contrary to the sense of the treaty is of no force and effect.
It is our reading of the judgment of the court that the reservation is indeed contrary to the sense of the treaty, that except for this very small situation where there is no pronouncement, the effect of international humanitarian law is that it applies to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Rather than muddy the waters with the reservation that there is no force and effect, Canada should simply withdraw the reservation.
The legality of use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, like any legal question, can sometimes seem technical, referring to provisions in treaties and case law, but what we are dealing with in this area is the very survival of humanity.
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We can and must look at the issue now about the use of nuclear weapons because after nuclear weapons are used it will be too late. The timing we have now is propitious, because we have both the World Court judgment that gives us an impetus to abolish nuclear weapons and the end of the Cold War that removes the justification for their existence. We must seize the timing and the opportunity, and we must work towards nuclear abolition now.
That concludes the remarks I want to make, but let me say finally that what we've been trying to say here in these remarks is not simply policy advice about what Canada should be doing, but our view is that these are things Canada must do if it is to conform to the judgment of the World Court.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Matas. In introducing you, I should have perhaps drawn to the attention of the members that you've been recently appointed as a member of the board of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Montreal. Congratulations on that, another contribution you'll be making to an institution that we in the committee follow very closely.
[Translation]
We will now hear from the representatives of the Centre de recherche sur la non-violence. I believe you wanted to give us something before going ahead with your presentation. No? Sorry.
So, go ahead.
Ms Judith Berlyn (Centre de ressources sur la non-violence): Do you mean our map or our...
The Chairman: Okay, but...
Ms Berlyn: We'll be referring to this map.
The Chairman: Thank you very much.
Mr. Boucher, you have the floor.
Mr. Jacques Boucher (Director, Centre de ressources sur la non-violence): I am Jacques Boucher. I'll be introducing the Centre and we will then make a presentation in three points: first, the matter of Canada's dilemma, something that's already been mentioned of course, by the groups appearing ahead of us; second, the matter of the myth of deterrence; finally, Canada's participation in nuclear proliferation.
The Centre de ressources sur la non-violence goes back to 1988. Our mandate is to promote non-violence in all areas of life and society. We have a documentation centre with 4,000 documents available to the public; people can come in and consult them. We have periodicals and files on different matters concerning violence and non-violence.
We also have a quarterly Bulletin d'information and few publications we've put out on different subjects. We have an education, conciliation and consultation service on peaceful interaction working on violence prevention and conflict resolution in high schools at this present time. We have also published a guide on conflict resolution.
Finally, the Centre de ressources has an involvement tier, a native solidarity tier, an international solidarity tier and a tier on disarmament and peace. It's within the context of the last tier that we're making this presentation all the more so as we often have campaigns within the context of coalitions that are either international, national or local in scope. In Canada, we belong to the Canadian Peace Alliance. We're on the board of directors.
Our presentation draws its inspiration somewhat from the Canadian Peace Alliance position. The Canadian Peace Alliance is a coalition of over 200 organizations working for peace all across Canada.
Ms Berlyn will address Canada's dilemma and the myth of deterrence.
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Ms Berlyn: Thank you, Jacques. The document was written up in both languages. I speak French, but as I wrote the English text, I would find it a bit difficult to present it in French. So, if it's acceptable, I will do that part of the presentation in my mother tongue.
[English]
Since July 8, 1996, nuclear weapons have not only been immoral, they have also been illegal under international law. The International Court of Justice advisory opinions of the above date put nuclear weapons in the same legal basket as chemical weapons and biological weapons. It is now up to governments to do the same. This will require a United Nations convention banning nuclear weapons, similar to the conventions that already ban chemical and biological weapons.
We see a great dilemma for the government in this situation, and that comes with Canada's NATO and NORAD connections. We believe the International Court of Justice advisory opinions make NATO's current nuclear weapons policy illegal under existing international law. This creates a dilemma for the Government of Canada because it is no longer possible to uphold Canada's tradition of respect for the International Court of Justice, while at the same time continuing to support NATO's nuclear weapons policy. Forced to choose between the two, the Government of Canada should favour international law over alliance policy. Membership in NATO should not be allowed to interfere with respect for the International Court of Justice.
We want to also note that we were very disturbed by a CTV news report that ran on September 8, 1996. It showed Canadian military involvement in NORAD plans for the weaponization of space. We hope this committee will take note of that and share our concern.
Turning to deterrence, we feel the doctrine of deterrence is a very dangerous delusion - and I'll just add this as another note that's not in the text - because it's based on an assumption. In order to work, it has to work perfectly forever. Nothing human has ever worked perfectly forever, so we feel it's just playing with fire. It's not really practical. It's a theory based on a false premise that nuclear weapons can prevent war.
The history of the last fifty years clearly shows that the existence and possession of nuclear weapons do not prevent conventional warfare. We've had twenty million people killed in wars since the end of World War II. Since you couldn't have a nuclear war if there were no nuclear weapons, it's obviously not necessary to have nuclear weapons in order to prevent nuclear. The only way of really preventing nuclear war is to eliminate nuclear weapons, because then the possibility of nuclear war won't exist. So, as I say, deterrence is a logical fallacy.
On Canadian nuclear disarmament policy, the Government of Canada has thus far supported the policies of the NATO nuclear weapons states, as we've been discussing. This support helps to perpetuate the existence of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice opinions provide a wonderful opportunity to change that. We believe Canadian disarmament policies should no longer support the policies of the nuclear weapons states, particularly those in NATO, and should not be made by the Department of National Defence. It's natural for the military to want the latest, most sophisticated weapons and equipment, but it's the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to see to it that Canada honours its commitment to international law and to the UN treaties to which it's a party.
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This is where you get out your maps, if they've been distributed. Have they?
I would like to point out the map in this leaflet was made for the 1988 federal election campaign -
The Chairman: I was a little disturbed when I realized our government was going to buy nuclear submarines. I thought we were into something we didn't know about.
Thank you for explaining.
Ms Berlyn: I'm about to point out the only two changes to it that you can make.
But I'll just finish saying that choosing in favour of international law obliges Canada to end all activity that encourages or supports military policy based on the use or threat to use nuclear weapons.
I'm not a teacher by profession. I'm a librarian. I guess that's why I like reference material. Still, if you look at this map there are only two things you can change on it. In the upper right-hand corner there is a change: we are not planning a cruise missile test this year, but the agreement that provides for testing the cruise missile is still on the books. We're just not doing it at the moment. So you can scratch that off, because there are no plans for that this year. And, second, we did not buy the nuclear-powered subs. Everything else on this map is still either going on or allowed for under international agreements. In fact, there are five B-52 flight corridors, not just three. There's also one in Quebec and one in Ontario.
The activities mentioned for Quebec and Ontario, namely production of components of nuclear weapons, is actually delivery systems and scientific research and so on, and applies equally to both. It's not that Ontario does one and Quebec does the other. Both Quebec and Ontario do both kinds of activities mentioned for them.
This is a situation we would like to see change a lot more. We've changed only two things on this map in nine years, and for us that's not sufficient.
[Translation]
Mr. Boucher: There is something of concern with Canadian policy. Canada has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but its economic activities, basically speaking, encourage nuclear proliferation. Canada says that it makes people buying elements used in the production of nuclear weapons sign a commitment not to produce nuclear weapons. However, how far can Canada trust that commitment?
First, one of the fundamental elements in producing nuclear weapons is uranium and Canada is one of the biggest uranium exporters in the world. It exports it to produce electricity, but it has also exported some to the USA for nuclear weapons production.
Without uranium, it eventually becomes impossible to produce nuclear weapons. That is one of the objectives of the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty and it's one of the objectives of the international legislation, according to the opinions given by the International Court of Justice.
Then there's also plutonium, which comes from uranium. In fact, if uranium is enriched it can be used to produce atomic bombs. At this point, plutonium is the material of choice to build atomic bombs. The Canadian CANDU reactor is one of the world's biggest plutonium producers.
Of course, there are plutonium generators that produce more, but CANDU is one of the biggest producers.
The way the reactor is designed means you can take out fuel bundles while it's working which means it makes accounting very difficult... Of course, Canada does do an accounting for what goes into the reactors in the way of fuel bundles, even abroad.
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However, it is possible for another country to put in other bundles that aren't necessarily fuel bundles, for example what is known as depleted uranium. These are byproducts that remain after the concentration process used to manufacture fissionable uranium. It's possible to bundle that uranium without counting it as fuel and then withdraw it when you have the plutonium that's good enough to make an atomic bomb.
Canada has sold its reactors all across the world even though it did sign the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty and they have been sold to countries that were military dictatorships or in conflict with their neighbours. During the seventies, we witnessed India exploding an atomic bomb made with the help of an experimental reactor that Canada sold them.
Pakistan, a country in conflict with India, bought another reactor from Canada. We now know, informally, that India and Pakistan have atomic weapons. South Korea is another area where there is conflict; it's a military dictatorship. Argentina, under the generals, and also under military dictatorship, bought a CANDU reactor. Romania did the same under Mr. Ceausescu and we're now selling some to China.
These are countries which, even in full view of international opinion, don't hesitate to violate human rights. How can Canada expect those countries to honour their commitments and not produce nuclear weapons when they have the ideal instrument for producing them?
Canada also expressed an interest in taking whatever plutonium might be available from the dismantling of US and Russian nuclear weapons.
We are one of several other groups within the Canadian Peace Alliance who consider that such a policy would mean that plutonium would become a commercial product. There are already countries who are going in that direction, France, Germany and Japan. Once again, in Japan, last week, there was an accident in an irradiated fuel treatment plant. There was a fire, an explosion and workers were contaminated.
So these are countries that don't hesitate in treating the new irradiated fuel to extract plutonium. The abundance of that material means that it will be more and more difficult to control it, to prevent it being rerouted towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons and even, eventually, to prevent terrorist groups getting their hands on the material.
It's irresponsible to continue this plutonium production today. It's the key to the nuclear problem. It's the key to producing nuclear bombs. If Canada accepts this plutonium, instead of eliminating the problem it will be contributing to its institutionalization because it will become acceptable at the international level. Our planet is being threatened by that policy.
Finally, we consider that Canada should firmly state that it is in favour of prohibiting the extraction of plutonium anywhere in the world as well as prohibiting the commercial use of plutonium internationally. Existing plutonium stocks should be warehoused in appropriate sites under the strictest surveillance and under the control of international authorities until a way is found to make them totally inaccessible. Judith will now present our recommendations.
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[English]
Ms Berlyn: Briefly, our recommendation - we were very restrained at only seven - is that the Government of Canada declare its commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We know that it has this commitment under the non-proliferation treaty, but it would be nice to hear it as a policy statement. The last white paper on defence says nothing. The Canada in the World document says nothing. It would be really nice to have that reaffirmed.
We also think that Canada should become and declare itself a nuclear-weapons-free zone, and that means not doing any more of the things on this map, as well as other points; that Canada should vote for all UN resolutions favouring the earliest possible elimination of nuclear weapons, especially a UN convention banning nuclear weapons; and that it should work with the other allied non-nuclear weapon states to de-nuclearize NATO's military policy.
We always go around saying that we're a non-nuclear-weapon state. We profess that, but then we support the policy of the nuclear weapon states. We think we should both be a non-nuclear-weapons state and not support the policies of the nuclear weapon states. It's inconsistent.
We want a declaration, too. We hope the committee will agree that the government should declare its opposition to the weaponization of space. We really urge you to look at that CTV news clip from September 8. It was very disturbing.
We also would ask that the Government of Canada disallow all new contracts for the export of uranium and CANDU reactors, for the reasons Jacques has just elaborated, and that the Government of Canada declare its opposition to the extraction of plutonium from used nuclear reactor fuel.
Thank you.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Ms Berlyn.
Mr. Bergeron.
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Following on your comment, I'd like to say that we're happy to learn there are some lawyers in favour of social consciousness.
The Chairman: A few members of our committee also, Mr. Bergeron.
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: I'd simply like to put to you the same question I put earlier to the people from Project Ploughshares concerning the denuclearization process and the danger that, during the process, any State with nuclear weapons could see a strategic advantage in using the nuclear weapons because at that point there would be no danger of a nuclear response leading to massive destruction.
Could you give us your point of view on that matter which, in my opinion, is fundamental? If we're to engage in a denuclearization process, we must necessarily be able to ensure that the process will be safe until it is completed.
[English]
The Chairman: There seems to be a legal issue around a secure inspection system. We faced it when we were ratifying the chemical weapons convention. We considered it here. So it relates, I think, to a lot of issues around removing weapons of mass destruction, not just nuclear. From a legal point of view, had you any comments?
Mr. Matas: You're setting up a hypothetical scenario. Obviously it's difficult to talk about a hypothetical scenario because we're never faced with hypothetical scenarios, we're faced with realities. Reality has many circumstances surrounding it that are always going to be different from any hypothesis one can imagine.
But I will say this. What we're talking about is the total abolition of nuclear weapons by everybody, not by some and not others. The idea is not to say let's abandon all nuclear weapons on one side first and on the other side second. I don't know if we even have sides now, with the end of the Cold War, but with one nuclear weapon state first and then the other it is indeed a question of agreements and verifiability.
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Your question hypothesizes a situation in which only one state would have nuclear weapons left, but our hypothesis is that all states at the same time would not have nuclear weapons left.
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: I have another question, but I'll have to be more specific. I'm talking about a generalized process of denuclearization. It's important to point that out.
During the process, the whole logic of deterrence stems from the fact that no State will want to use a nuclear weapon because it would be afraid for its own safety as it would be understood that in the present order of things, if another State were to use a nuclear weapon, it could lead to total destruction.
If we undertake a generalized denuclearization process, we might come to a point where a State might make the judgement that it is strategically useful to use a nuclear weapon because, at that specific point in time, that State would know that it could not be subject to retaliation from another State which might lead to total destruction.
That is the purpose of my question and it's far from being hypothetical. If we engage in a denuclearization process, we must be sure that during the process, there's no danger of it blowing up.
[English]
Mr. Matas: Let me try again, then. As I understand it, what you're saying is not that there would be one side with nuclear weapons and another without, but that at some point the level of nuclear weapons would be so low that we couldn't have total destruction, that we'd only have partial destruction, and that represents a problem.
I don't see that as a problem. Surely the further away the possibility of total destruction, the better off we are.
The Chairman: Certainly it's a hypothesis we've heard explained, and that's a helpful response. I think Mr. Bergeron is probably putting in the context of India and Pakistan or something like that. I think you can envisage a concrete possibility, but that answer's helpful.
[Translation]
Do you have any further questions?
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: No, but I might have another one later on.
The Chairman: Would anyone care to comment further?
Mr. Boucher: I'd like to repeat that it is hypothetical, but there also remains the hypothesis that with the arsenals we have today, there might be some sort of accident.
An atomic bomb has already exploded over a city. We have seen what that does, and we have seen what happens with nuclear accidents such as Three Mile Island and Tchernobyl. We have to get rid of this stuff. It makes no sense. The fewer nuclear weapons we have, the better.
Even if only a few nuclear weapons remained, if someone decided to use them, we still would be threatened by the people who have them. We have to achieve a balanced reduction, of course, but we also have to achieve total elimination of these weapons. Above all, we have to stop making them, and we have to stop providing the material used to produce them.
The Chairman: Thank you. Ms Bakopanos.
Ms Eleni Bakopanos (Saint-Denis, Lib.): Mr. Bergeron, it seems to me that your question is based on the assumption that a regime or an individual might think that using nuclear weapons can be beneficial.
Given the nature of these weapons, since even the bombs we have today are 10, 20 or perhaps even 50 times more powerful than those used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I have a very hard time imagining a rational human being thinking that the use of these weapons could be advantageous.
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Fallout is carried by the wind. Not just one location is threatened. It is impossible to have just a limited area of destruction.
The Chairman: Doctor Trouton.
[English]
Dr. Trouton: We would also say from a health perspective that the present era of deterrence poses more threat to human health and the environment for our continued survival. To maintain our current position as it is now, there is far more risk.
If we draw a comparison to the existence of guns, for example, the twin city study comparing Seattle and Vancouver showed very clearly that the higher proportion of guns per capita in Seattle was a cause of more accidental use and occasional use, which caused higher morbidity and mortality in Seattle. So that is a very good example: the existence of these weapons as things are in the current state poses more threat of accidental use, mishap and getting into the wrong hands than is posed by us gradually reducing them and encouraging other ways of safeguarding the world.
The Chairman: Thank you, Doctor. That's helpful. And I hope that our members from the Reform Party are listening to this very helpful analogy -
Voices: Oh, oh!
The Chairman: - to gun control legislation that has managed to creep into our committee. We believe very strongly in this committee that there's a strong link between domestic and foreign policy, and I think you've just now proved it.
Madam Bakopanos.
[Translation]
Ms Eleni Bakopanos: I'll begin by thanking the witnesses and saying that I agree with all the principles that were stated during today's presentations. However, I do have a few questions for the Centre de ressources sur la non-violence.
[English]
I'll do it in both languages if that's okay.
Excuse my ignorance, first of all, but I'd like to know a little bit more about your group. I didn't see this during the 1988 campaign. I suppose you are planning a similar one for the coming campaign. Or is this just to give us an idea of where the different weapons or other test facilities are located?
Ms Berlyn: Yes, we do intend to update it, but as we've pointed out, there are not many changes to make.
Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: For example -
Ms Berlyn: That was the point. It was used by the Canadian peace pledge campaign, which the Canadian Peace Alliance facilitated. The alliance is the umbrella organization of peace groups in Canada, and our centre is a member. I work at the centre as a bénévole.
[Translation]
Ms Eleni Bakopanos: The Montreal Centre?
Ms Berlyn: Yes, the Montreal Centre.
Ms Eleni Bakopanos: How many members do you have?
Mr. Boucher: Our membership is not very large. We have volunteers who come and work there.
Ms Berlyn: But we distribute a newsletter.
Mr. Boucher: We send out about 1,000 copies throughout the world.
Ms Eleni Bakopanos: You have described a doomsday scenario to us,
[English]
because that's what it looks like in some ways. Somebody who is uninformed might take a look at this and say ``Oh my God, we're going to have a war tomorrow!'' That's exactly the type of reaction some people would have if they weren't also given other information.
For instance, I agree with your principle of a nuclear-free zone, and I said that at the beginning. I want to be clear about that. I'm in favour of it, and I think most of the members of the committee would probably be in favour of it. But I'm not so sure that giving this type of information out to the public without at least.... For instance, stating that B-52 flight training corridors that you indicate in this map are the training facilities for equipment that will perhaps be used in a nuclear war.... If you're asking Canada to stop training, I take objection to that, the reason being that we should have a say, in my opinion, in our commitment to NATO to continue training. We're not training people on equipment armed with nuclear weapons, though, are we?
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Ms Berlyn: No, the nuclear weapons are not coming into Canada, as far as we know. However, the warships that visit Canadian ports will neither confirm nor deny that they're carrying nuclear weapons.
There is a change in U.S. policy, I understand, whereby they say that in normal peacetime, or some such phrase, they are not equipping their naval vessels with nuclear weapons. However, they don't define ``normal peacetime'', and they will still not confirm or deny that they're actually carrying them.
The reason for this, in our view, is that all this activity supports a military policy based on the use of nuclear weapons, and that policy of NATO's is now illegal. It's all related.
There's a very good video called Deep Water Danger, about the naval training in Nanoose Bay. Although nuclear weapons as such don't come in, the training is done in support of the U.S. Trident submarines, which are certainly carrying nuclear warheads, and it was mentioned how many.
So it all supports the nuclear weapons policy of NATO and of the nuclear weapon states within NATO, and that's why we say it is support for nuclear war. Not having nuclear weapons on Canadian territory is a very good thing and it is a first step, but in addition we feel that we should not permit any activity that is related to a policy based on using and threatening to use nuclear weapons.
Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: But that's exactly my point. When you're telling the public that nuclear-armed warships are landing in our ports but you're not 100% sure that they are armed with nuclear weapons -
Ms Berlyn: But if they won't deny it, you have to presume they could be.
Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: - I think you're giving a presumption to the public that is happening, when in fact you do not have the facts regarding that.
Ms Berlyn: When we update this, we'll word it very carefully.
Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: That's what I'm asking for.
The Chairman: You'd better consult.
Ms Berlyn: I will. I value her comments.
Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: The reason I'm raising the issue is because I feel that Canada has in the last three years made a lot of effort to try to be a broker in the world in terms of having better-trained people to run some of those airplanes. We do not want to have nuclear weapons on them, but we want to at least have people who will be trained just in case there is a problem. Take the doomsday scenario. I know this is a hypothetical situation also, but if we take it further, as Canadians we want to have a say in terms of the fact that we will be able to broker either with the United States or with the United Kingdom or with France.
We've played a leadership role, for instance, in terms of the banning of land mines, and I think we have to continue along those lines. The reason we've been so effective in terms of the land mines is because we have been part of that discussion.
I'm saying that in terms of saying to the public that nothing has been done, I would not like to see that in the next campaign.
Ms Berlyn: I would value you as a consultant, if you have the time.
Mrs. Eleni Bakopanos: Also,
[Translation]
you say that up until now, there has been nothing done at the government level to lessen...
[English]
As a government we have not accepted the recommendations of the defence white paper. I hope I'm not wrong on this. I believe that was the former government's stand. Ours is certainly different. This committee is studying this issue for the outcome hopefully that we all want to see in the act.
Ms Berlyn: Thank you.
[Translation]
The Chairman: Mr. Sauvageau.
Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Terrebonne, BQ): Now that we've heard the Liberal government's policy, I'm going to try to get back to the issue and ask the Physicians for Global Survival a few questions.
I'd like to refer to your own document, as well as a report that was done by our own research unit. This is a very broad topic. As my colleague, Mr. Bergeron, was pointing out earlier, reducing the number of nuclear weapons is a topic that makes us constantly ask questions.
We can see that Canada signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995, that the International Court of Justice handed down a decision in 1996, that the Canberra Commission was held in August 1996, and that Canada has always taken part, or at least shown itself to be a good player in these various decisions.
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In its brief, the Physicians for Global Survival association quotes the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
- Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith...
- That seems to be fairly reasonable language.
- ... on effective measures relating to...
- That seems to be rather reasonable language to.
- ... cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date...
- The Canadian government has signed this, but it really doesn't commit the government to all
that much. A little bit further, the Association quotes a decision by the International Court of
Justice:
- There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament...
I won't say that the government should do it as soon as possible, even though that's what I was going to say, because we know that "as soon as possible" can last 30 years, depending on the negotiations that have been started. In light of the decision by the International Court of Justice and Canada's signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shouldn't we recommend that the government set a schedule for it and its partners to look at the progress that has been made, and to agree on proper measures in good faith?
[English]
Dr. Trouton: No, we fully agree. We take your comments to heart. We do agree that there should be a timetable for the policy and the action that follows that policy. So we do agree with the concept of a timetable on both counts: the political signing of documents, and our subsequent action as indicated by that.
Is there anything else you would add, Dr. Bryans?
Dr. Bryans: I agree that we need to get moving on it. The intention of our message is that ``Canada should''. To digress, the fudge word that so often gets into legal documents is ``ultimate''. Ultimately, we'll do this; ultimately, we'll do that. We don't want that; we want dates.
The Chairman: Yes, it's sort of what we call ``in the fullness of time'' principle.
Mr. Matas: My recollection was that this issue of a timetable and deadlines was very much a matter for discussion at the renegotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There was a group of countries that wanted to include a timetable within the renegotiated treaty, but that effort failed at that time. However, simply because it failed at that time doesn't mean the issue should now be dead. On the contrary, the fact that it was an issue shows that there is a coalition of states that believe in this issue of a timetable.
My own view is that we should build on that coalition and history rather than just push it aside. We should see if we can now get that timetable accepted, even if it was not accepted at the time of the renegotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Dupuy.
[Translation]
Mr. Michel Dupuy: I'll be brief. My questions are for Mr. Boucher and Ms Berlyn. I want to make sure I understand the philosophy of their Resource Centre. Your arguments are based on the fact that nuclear technology is dangerous, even perilous, because it can be used to reek extraordinary destruction. I agree with you completely on that point, for I believe it is a viewpoint that can be defended quite easily.
However, do you think that part of the nuclear industry is not military in nature, and that this sector, this technology can be used in a reasonably safe way to serve humanity? I'm thinking of medical and energy-generating uses, because when you consider them, your vision becomes totally different.
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We can debate your desire to do away with nuclear technology throughout the entire planet. But if you agree that civilian uses do exist, then the problem changes. How can we make sure that this sector continues to operate without any spillover to military uses?
I would certainly like to hear your opinion regarding this point.
Mr. Boucher: With nuclear medicine, isotopes can be used to treat people without having commercial nuclear reactors to produce plutonium, as is the case in the United States. Reactors have been built in the United States solely to produce plutonium in order to make atomic bombs.
Plutonium and uranium are the number one problem. As long as nuclear reactors operate using uranium and plutonium, it is very difficult to keep plutonium from being used to make a nuclear weapon. That is our main concern.
Of course, accidents always can occur in nuclear reactors, and Canadian nuclear reactors are no different from any other. CANDU reactors in Canada and other reactors have the same potential for catastrophe as reactor number 3 at Tchernobyl. They contain exactly the same kind of products, perhaps slightly different, depending what type is present. If an accident occurs, millions of reactions occur every second, particularly when the reactors get older, as is the case here in Canada. At present, our reactors are getting old, such as the Pickering, Darlington and Bruce reactors, particularly in Ontario. We are downwind from them.
People can argue that nuclear technology can be used to generate energy. However, you have to realize the dangers involved. The greatest danger clearly is the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons and the proliferation of these weapons, particularly given the way commercial production is going in countries such as France, Germany and Japan. At times Canada is tempted to get into reprocessing of irradiated fuel.
The Department of the Environment is currently looking at the whole concept of burying radioactive waste in the Canadian Shield. Canada is reluctant not to reprocess this waste before burying it. That point is mentioned on the first page of the impact study by Atomic Energy of Canada.
So, all these concerns are related, and the technology is dangerous. That's our position. You may not share our views.
Mr. Michel Dupuy: If we could get back to Canada's policy, we should keep the facts in mind, shouldn't we? Plutonium does not exist naturally; it is extracted from irradiated fuel. Of course, Canada does manufacture irradiated fuel, since waste from nuclear reactors is in that form.
However, it has always been the policy of Canadian governments of all stripes to not extract plutonium from this irradiated nuclear fuel. We haven't even, except perhaps in laboratories, any plants capable of extracting plutonium. Consequently, there is no chance that Canada will become an exporter in the international plutonium business.
Secondly, you will tell me that we may import plutonium. If we were to do so, and it has not yet been decided that this will be the case, we would only do this in order to dispose of it. I do not believe, therefore, that Canada can be accused of engaging in dangerous operations, because the objectives sought by this policy would in fact be to dispose of plutonium.
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I do not want to say any more, but you are casting some doubt on the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, because the specific mandate of this agency is to ensure that fissile material is not diverted from the civil to the military sector.
I would like to know whether you have serious doubt about the ability of this agency, located in Vienna, to fulfil its mandate.
The Chairman: I would ask you to provide a brief answer, because we have already gone beyond the time allotted for this meeting.
Mr. Boucher: I will conclude in very simple terms.
Do you think that other countries could do the same thing as India did and say that they will possibly explode an atomic bomb for peaceful purposes? Why dig a hole? This is what India said with respect to the explosion that it triggered. It said that it had used plutonium from an experimental Canadian reactor.
Do you think that other countries may do the same thing? What role does the International Atomic Energy Agency play at that point?
Mr. Michel Dupuy: Mr. Chairman, this could involve us in a very lengthy debate, but I can tell you now, very briefly, that I don't feel that other countries will do this. This is a very singular case. I don't think that other countries will do this, simply because if they were to explode a nuclear bomb, they would be categorized as a country with nuclear weapons. India was a very special case. It wasn't able to do this because it was the leader of the non-aligned countries against nuclear weapons. Therefore, I think that India is a special case and that we will no longer see this type of thing happen in the future.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you very much.
Mr. Flis, did you wish to ask a question or just make a quick statement?
Mr. Jesse Flis: I'd like to ask a question, please.
All the witnesses mentioned that Canada should work together with other like-minded countries in ridding the globe of nuclear weapons. One country that comes to mind is the Ukraine. When it was working towards its independence, the Ukraine was saying ``As long as we have nuclear arms the west will listen and pay attention to us. The minute we get rid of the nuclear arms, you people will forget about us.'' This was from a high-ranking leader in the Ukraine. Yet very soon after they got their independence, they did get rid of their nuclear arms. I'm wondering if any physicians from the Physicians for Global Survival or any lawyers from the Lawyers for Social Responsibility are familiar with why the Ukraine moved so quickly in ridding itself of nuclear arms. Is that a country we can learn from?
Mr. Matas: In answer to the first question, I'm a bit familiar with the history about why they moved to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. It was partly, or maybe largely, due to international pressure that they do so, and there was some money actually transferred to the Ukraine for that purpose. As far as I'm concerned, that was a success of the international community in relation to nuclear weapons, in which, of course, Ukraine was a main player.
What I think it shows us is that the international community working together with a country that is sympathetic can lower the nuclear threshold. I don't see why what happened in relation to the Ukraine cannot happen in relation to other countries. The Ukraine in effect has been de-nuclearized as a country, one can say, a step in advance of the total global de-nuclearization. I don't see why Canada or other NATO members cannot also be de-nuclearized in advance of total global de-nuclearization.
The Chairman: I think we'll have to draw our hearing to a close. On behalf of the members of the committee I just want to thank very much all of the witnesses who came this morning. Obviously this is an extraordinarily important issue for us as Canadians and for the world. We're very privileged to have had the benefit of the evidence of such distinguished and expert witnesses. We appreciate your coming very much.
I think the questions from the members of the committee demonstrated the interest we have. We intend to pursue this seriously. We may run into some problems in being able to do the full study because of the summer and our other charged agenda, but we're certainly taking this as much we can. As you know, we will be looking at NATO expansion as well, and this is linked.
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We have looked at the Chemical Weapons Convention. That has also given us some background in this issue, where we recognize the need for proper verification techniques, so we're familiar with that.
Mrs. Gaffney mentioned that we had been in Russia. We're concerned about the situation in Murmansk. Going back to the observations from the Centre de ressources, you can be assured that we're very aware of the problems that are there in terms of the nuclear issue.
We appreciate very much all of your evidence this morning.
I would remind members of the committee that we will be adjourned now until
[Translation]
tomorrow at 3:30 in the afternoon. We will at that time be holding a joint session with the Senate to play host to members from an Irish delegation, a community delegation from the Irish Parliament. Then, on Thursday morning at 9 o'clock, we will be holding another joint session with the Senate to hear Mr. Axworthy talk about the expanded NATO, which will be followed by our own debate on the same subject, from 10:30 to 12 noon.
[English]
For those of you who are here and came as witnesses and would be interested in knowing, this televised session of the House or the committee will probably be shown this weekend on Saturday between 2:30 p.m. and 7 p.m., or possibly starting on Sunday at 11 a.m., and maybe reshown next week, since the House will not be sitting.
Thank you very much for coming. We're adjourned until 3:30 p.m. tomorrow.