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SECU Committee Report

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APPENDIX C

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR

List of Recommendations Arising from Factual Inquiry

Recommendation 1:

The RCMP should ensure that its activities in matters relating to national security are properly within its mandate as a law enforcement agency.

(a) The RCMP should take active steps to ensure that it stays within its mandate as a police force to perform the duties of peace officers in preventing and prosecuting crime.  It should ensure that it respects the distinct role of CSIS in collecting and analyzing information and intelligence relating to threats to the security of Canada.

(b) The RCMP should continue to develop its capacity for intelligence-led policing while ensuring that it remains within its law enforcement mandate.

c) The RCMP should establish internal controls for all national security investigations to ensure that, when commencing and carrying out investigations and collecting information, it is properly within its law enforcement mandate to prevent, investigate and prosecute crimes.

Recommendation 2:

The RCMP should continue to engage in integrated and co-operative operations in national security investigations, but agreements or arrangements in this respect should be reduced to writing.

(a) The RCMP’s integrated policing initiatives with other Canadian police forces are necessary and beneficial and should continue.

(b) While respecting their different mandates, the RCMP and CSIS should continue to co- operate with one another and expand upon the ways in which they do so.

(c) The RCMP should continue to adhere to and refine its policy of cooperating with other federal agencies or departments involved in national security investigations.

(d) The RCMP should continue to work co-operatively with foreign agencies in pursuing its law enforcement mandate in national security investigations.

(e) The RCMP’s agreements or arrangements with other entities in regard to integrated national security operations should be reduced to writing.

Recommendation 3:

The RCMP should ensure that those involved in national security investigations are properly trained in the particular features of such investigations.

(a) Investigators in the national security field require all of the skills and expertise of investigators in other criminal investigations, but they should also be given training relating specifically to national security aspects.

(b) The RCMP should ensure that the specific types of information at the basis of national security investigations are analyzed with accuracy, precision and a sophisticated understanding of the context from which the information originates, with a view to developing intelligence that can lead to successful prevention and prosecution of a crime.

(c) The RCMP’s National Security Enforcement Course curriculum should be reviewed in the light of the findings and recommendations of the Inquiry.  In future, training curricula should be reviewed periodically by the RCMP and by the proposed independent review body.

(d) Training for national security investigators should include a specific focus on practices for information sharing with the wide range of agencies and countries that may become involved in national security investigations.

(e) The RCMP should continue and expand upon its social context training, which is necessary to be able to conduct efficient investigations while ensuring fairness to individuals and communities.

Recommendation 4:

The RCMP should maintain its current approach to centralized oversight of national security investigations.

Recommendation 5:

The minister responsible for the RCMP should continue to issue ministerial directives to provide policy guidance to the RCMP in national security investigations, given the potential implications of such investigations.

Recommendation 6:

The RCMP should maintain its policy of sharing information obtained in the course of national security investigations with other agencies and police departments, both domestic and foreign, in accordance with the principles discussed in these recommendations.

Recommendation 7:

The RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID) or another centralized unit with expertise in national security investigations should have responsibility for oversight of information sharing related to national security with other domestic and foreign departments and agencies.

Recommendation 8:

The RCMP should ensure that, whenever it provides information to other departments and agencies, whether foreign and domestic, it does so in accordance with clearly established policies respecting screening for relevance, reliability and accuracy and with relevant laws respecting personal information and human rights.

(a) The RCMP should maintain its policy of screening information for relevance before sharing it.

(b) The RCMP should ensure that information provided to other countries is reliable and accurate and should amend its operational manual accordingly.

(c) Information should also be screened by the RCMP for compliance with the applicable law concerning personal information before it is shared.

Recommendation 9:

The RCMP should never share information in a national security investigation without attaching written caveats in accordance with existing policy.  The RCMP should review existing caveats to ensure that each precisely states which institutions are entitled to have access to the information subject to the caveat and what use the institution may make of that information.  Caveats should also generally set out an efficient procedure for recipients to seek any changes to the.

(a) The RCMP’s current policy of requiring caveats on all documents being provided to other agencies is sound and should be strictly followed.

(b) The RCMP should review the language of its existing caveats to ensure that it clearly communicates the desired restrictions on the use of information being shared.  Caveats should clearly state who may use the information, what restrictions apply to that use, and whom to contact should the recipient party wish to modify those terms.

Recommendation 10:

The RCMP’s information-sharing practices and arrangements should be subject to review by an independent, arms-length review body.

Recommendation 11:

Canadian agencies other than the RCMP that share information relating to national security should review recommendations 6 to 10 above to ensure that their information-sharing policies conform, to the appropriate extent, with the approaches I am recommending for the RCMP.

Recommendation 12:

Where Canadian agencies become aware that foreign agencies have made improper use of information provided by a Canadian agency, a formal objection should be made to the foreign agency and the foreign minister of the recipient country.

Recommendation 13:

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) should provide its annual reports assessing the human rights records of various countries to the RCMP, CSIS and other Canadian government departments or agencies that may interact with such countries in connection with investigations.

Recommendation 14:

The RCMP and CSIS should review their policies governing the circumstances in which they supply information to foreign governments with questionable human rights records.  Information should never be provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute to the use of torture.  Policies should include specific directions aimed at eliminating any possible Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring accountability.

Recommendation 15:

Canadian agencies should accept information from countries with questionable human rights records only after proper consideration of human rights implications.  Information received from countries with questionable human rights records should be identified as such and proper steps should be taken to assess its reliability.

Recommendation 16:

The Government of Canada should develop a protocol to provide for coordination and coherence across government in addressing issues that arise when a Canadian is detained in another country in connection with terrorism-related activity.  Essential features of this protocol should include consultation among relevant Canadian agencies, a coherent and unified approach in addressing the issues, and political accountability for the course of action adopted.

Recommendation 17:

The Canadian government should develop specific policies and training to address the situation of Canadians detained in countries where there is a credible risk of torture or harsh treatment.

(a) Consular officials posted to countries that have a reputation for abusing human rights should receive training on conducting interviews in prison settings in order to be able to make the best possible determination of whether torture or harsh treatment has occurred.

(b) If there is credible information that a Canadian detained abroad is being or has been tortured, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be informed and involved in decisions relating to the Canadian response.

(c) Canadian officials should normally insist on respect of all of a detainee’s consular rights.

Recommendation 18:

Consular officials should clearly advise detainees in foreign countries of the circumstances under which information obtained from the detainees may be shared with others outside the Consular Affairs Bureau, before any such information is obtained.

Recommendation 19:

Canadian agencies conducting national security investigations, including CSIS, the RCMP and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), should have clear written policies stating that such investigations must not be based on racial, religious or ethnic profiling.

Recommendation 20:

Canadian agencies involved in anti-terrorism investigations, particularly the RCMP, CSIS and the CBSA, should continue and expand on the training given to members and staff on issues of racial, religious and ethnic profiling and on interaction with Canada’s Muslim and Arab communities.

Recommendation 21:

Canadian agencies should have clear policies about the use of border lookouts.

(a) The RCMP and CSIS should develop guidelines governing the circumstances in which border lookouts may be requested both in Canada and in other countries.

(b) The CBSA should establish clear, written criteria for placing individuals on a lookout list.

(c) The CBSA should establish clear policies or guidelines concerning criteria for examining and photocopying documents and retrieving information from computers and electronic devices when individuals are seeking entry into Canada.

(d) Canada Customs should purge the information about Dr. Mazigh and her children from the Intelligence Management System.

Recommendation 22:

The Government of Canada should register a formal objection with the governments of the United States and Syria concerning their treatment of Mr. Arar and Canadian officials involved with his case.

Recommendation 23:

The Government of Canada should assess Mr. Arar’s claim for compensation in the light of the findings in this report and respond accordingly.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM THE POLICY REVIEW

Recommendation 1:

Existing accountability mechanisms for the RCMP’s national security activities should be improved by putting in place an independent, arm’s-length review and complaints mechanism with enhanced powers.

Recommendation 2:

The review and complaints body should be located within a restructured Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, and be renamed the Independent Complaints and National Security Review Agency for the RCMP (ICRA for short) to reflect its expanded role.

Recommendation 3:

ICRA’s mandate should include authority to:

(a) conduct self-initiated reviews with respect to the RCMP’s national security activities, similar to those conducted by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) with respect to CSIS, for compliance with law, policies, ministerial directives and international obligations and for standards of propriety expected in Canadian society;

(b) investigate and report on complaints with respect to the RCMP’s national security activities made by individual complainants and by third-party groups or individuals;

(c) conduct joint reviews or investigations with SIRC and the CSE Commissioner into integrated national security operations involving the RCMP;

(d) conduct reviews or investigations into the national security activities of the RCMP where the Minister of Public Safety so requests;

(e) conduct reviews or investigations into the activities related to national security of one or more government departments, agencies, employees or contractors, where the Governor in Council so requests; and

(f) in exercising its mandate with respect to the matters in paragraphs (a) to (d) above, make recommendations to the Minister of Public Safety, and with respect to matters in paragraph (e), to make recommendations to the relevant Ministers.

Recommendation 4:

ICRA should have the following powers:

(a) extensive investigative powers, similar to those for public inquiries under the Inquiries Act, to allow it to obtain the information and evidence it considers necessary to carry out thorough reviews and investigations; those powers should include the power to subpoena documents and compel testimony from the RCMP and any federal, provincial, municipal or private-sector entity or person;

(b) power to stay an investigation or review because it will interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution;

(c) power to conduct public education programs and provide information concerning the review body’s role and activities; and

(d) power to engage in or to commission research on matters affecting the review body.

Recommendation 5:

ICRA’s complaints process should incorporate the following features:

(a) in the first instance, ability on the part of ICRA to refer a complaint to the RCMP or investigation or to investigate the complaint itself, if deemed appropriate;

(b) ability on the part of the complainant to request that ICRA review the complaint if the complainant is not satisfied with the RCMP’s investigation and disposition of it;

(c) ability on the part of ICRA to dismiss a complaint at any stage of an investigation as trivial, frivolous or vexatious, or made in bad faith;

(d) establishment of a program providing opportunities for the use of mediation and informal complaint resolution, except where the complainant does not have the information about the RCMP activities that are relevant to the complaint;

(e) with respect to complaints, opportunity for the Commissioner of the RCMP and affected members of the RCMP to make representations to ICRA and, where a hearing is commenced, to present evidence and be heard personally or through counsel;

(f) opportunity for the complainant to make representations to ICRA and to present evidence and be heard personally or through counsel at a hearing;

(g) open and transparent hearings of a complaint, to the extent possible, but authority for ICRA to conduct all or part of a hearing in private when it deems it necessary to protect national security confidentiality, ongoing police investigations or the identity and safety of sources;

(h) for purposes of hearings of complaints, discretion by ICRA to appoint security-cleared counsel independent of the RCMP and the government to test the need for confidentiality in regard to certain information and to test the information that may not be disclosed to the complainant or the public;

(i) ability for ICRA to seek the opinions or comments of other accountability bodies, such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Information Commissioner of Canada.

Recommendation 6:

ICRA should be structured so that complaints and reviews related to the RCMP’s national security activities are addressed only by specified members.  Appointments of such members should be aimed at inspiring public confidence and trust in their judgment and experience.  Appointees should be highly-regarded individuals with a stature similar to SIRC appointees.

Recommendation 7:

CRA should prepare the following reports to the Minister of Public Safety (the Minister) and the Commissioner of the RCMP:

(a) Reports arising from self-initiated reviews and investigations of complaints, which should include non-binding findings and recommendations.

(b) Annual reports on its operations to the Minister, who should lay an edited version of the report, omitting national security information, before each House of Parliament.

All of the above reports may include confidential information (including information subject to national security confidentiality) and should also include an edited version that ICRA proposes for public release.

Recommendation 8:

ICRA should have an adequate budget to fulfill its mandate in relation to the RCMP’s national security activities, including for purposes of self-initiated review.

Recommendation 9:

There should be independent review, including complaint investigation and self-initiated review, for the national security activities of the Canada Border Services Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Transport Canada, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.

Recommendation 10:

ICRA should review the national security activities of the Canada Border Services Agency, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee should review the national security activities of the other four entities.

Recommendation 11:

The government should establish statutory gateways among the national security review bodies, including ICRA, in order to provide for the exchange of information, referral of investigations, conduct of joint investigations and coordination in the preparation of reports.

Recommendation 12:

The government should establish a committee, to be known as the Integrated National Security Review Coordinating Committee, or INSRCC, comprising the chairs of ICRA and the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner and an outside person to act as Committee chair.  INSRCC would have the following mandate:

  • to ensure that the statutory gateways among the independent review bodies operate effectively;
  • to take steps to avoid duplicative reviews;
  • to provide a centralized intake mechanism for complaints regarding the national security activities of federal entities;
  • to report on accountability issues relating to practices and trends in the area of national security in Canada, including the effects of those practices and trends on human rights and freedoms;
  • to conduct public information programs with respect to its mandate, especially the complaint intake aspect; and
  • to initiate discussion for co-operative review with independent review bodies for provincial and municipal police forces involved in national security activities.

Recommendation 13:

In five years’ time, the government should appoint an independent person to re-examine the framework for independent review recommended in this Report, in order to determine whether the objectives set out are being achieved and to make recommendations to ensure that the review of national security activities keeps pace with changing circumstances and requirements.