SECU Committee Report

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ANNEX

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S FACTUAL INQUIRY

Recommendation 1

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) should ensure that its activities in matters relating to national security are properly within its mandate as a law enforcement agency.

(a) The RCMP should take active steps to ensure that it stays within its mandate as a police force to perform the duties of peace officers in preventing and prosecuting crime. It should ensure that it respects the distinct role of Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in collecting and analyzing information and intelligence relating to threats to the security of Canada.

The RCMP and CSIS have adopted a Joint National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the goal of which is to promote a thorough understanding of the RCMP/CSIS mandates by those involved in national security activities, and advance mutual assistance and cooperation.

The RCMP has strengthened central control of the National Security Program, resulting in more diligent oversight of all national security criminal investigations, including monitoring of each investigation to ensure that the RCMP stays within its law enforcement mandate.

The RCMP and CSIS entered into a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in September 2006, outlining the respective roles of each organization in support of counter‑terrorism investigations and promoting joint training initiatives and other means of providing mutual support consistent with respective mandates.

The RCMP has redesigned its National Security Criminal Investigators Course, placing increased emphasis on the differences between RCMP/CSIS mandates.

A Common Framework for national security has been adopted by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) to better outline the complementary, but distinct roles of all members of the law enforcement and security and intelligence community.

(b) The RCMP should continue to develop its capacity for intelligence-led policing while ensuring that it remains within its law enforcement mandate.

On October 1, 2006, National Security Investigations (which later became known as National Security Criminal Investigations) separated from the Criminal Intelligence Directorate and became a stand-alone program headed by an Assistant Commissioner. This separation recognizes the distinct nature of national security criminal investigations and the need for careful monitoring and oversight, including ensuring that the RCMP remains within its law enforcement mandate.

CSIS National Strategic Priorities on terrorism now inform the RCMP National Tactical National Security Priorities, thereby ensuring that national security criminal investigations are aligned with intelligence developed by CSIS.

(c) The RCMP should establish internal controls for all national security investigations to ensure that, when commencing and carrying out investigations and collecting information, it is properly within its law enforcement mandate to prevent, investigate and prosecute crimes.

The RCMP has strengthened central control of the National Security Program, resulting in more diligent oversight of all national security criminal investigations, including monitoring of each investigation to ensure that the RCMP stays within its law enforcement mandate. This new governance framework outlines the way in which central control of national security criminal investigations is exercised.

National Security Criminal Investigations developed a National Quality Assurance (QA) Review guide to be used by national security investigative units in their annual Unit Level QA processes, ensuring a structured monitoring process and providing assurances that all national security criminal investigations are conducted in compliance with RCMP policy and mandate.

In order to improve centralized oversight of all national security criminal investigations and major projects, the RCMP adopted a new secure records management system, allowing centralized real time access of ongoing investigations, and is implementing a national secure electronic major case management system in support of major projects.

National Security Criminal Investigations employs Major Case Management principles, the consistent application of which has proven to enhance the likelihood of success in criminal investigations. In early 2008, National Security Criminal Investigations established the Office of Investigative Standards and Practices, an oversight section committed to propagating the consistent application of Major Case Management principles in national security criminal investigations and which serves as an additional safeguard. The Office of Investigative Standards and Practices conducts reviews of ongoing files in a fashion that complements ongoing day-to-day oversight by national headquarters. In performing its oversight duties, Office of Investigative Standards and Practices ensures that national security criminal investigations stay within the RCMP’s law enforcement mandate. Office of Investigative Standards and Practices communicates the results, including recommendations, of its assessments directly to the Assistant Commissioner of National Security Criminal Investigations.

Recommendation 2

The RCMP should continue to engage in integrated and co-operative operations in national security investigations, but agreements or arrangements in this respect should be reduced to writing.

(a) The RCMP’s integrated policing initiatives with other Canadian police forces are necessary and beneficial and should continue.

Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams are established in four major Canadian cities.

In August 2007, the CACP adopted the Common Framework for National Security in recognition of the role and value added by Canadian police forces in investigating threats to national security.

(b) While respecting their different mandates, the RCMP and CSIS should continue to co‑operate with one another and expand upon the ways in which they do so.

The RCMP and CSIS entered into a revised MoU in September 2006, outlining the respective roles of each organization in support of counter-terrorism investigations and promoting joint training initiatives and other means of providing mutual support consistent with respective mandates.

RCMP National Tactical National Security Criminal Investigations Priorities are now informed by the CSIS National Strategic Priorities.

The RCMP (Division Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams and National Security Enforcement Sections) and CSIS (Regions) attend joint monthly meetings to engage in a de-confliction process and identify investigations of mutual interest. Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams and National Security Enforcement Sections then forward their case inventories to headquarters for review, including review of mandate.
The RCMP and CSIS developed two joint workshops allowing employees of each organization to share ideas, learn about each other’s mandates, and expand upon ways in which they could work in a more cooperative and effective manner.

In addition to existing CSIS-RCMP secondment agreements, an additional CSIS secondment has joined the National Security Criminal Operations Branch located at RCMP headquarters, thereby expanding cooperation between the two organizations.

While respecting their different mandates, the RCMP and CSIS have expanded their cooperation in support of recent international investigations.

(c) The RCMP should continue to adhere to and refine its policy of co-operating with other federal agencies or departments involved in national security investigations.

The Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams include representatives of other federal departments and agencies (e.g. CSIS, CBSA, Department of Justice), as well as provincial and municipal police forces, for optimal management of national security criminal investigative activities and inter-agency cooperation.

The RCMP and Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) continue to work cooperatively and entered into a revised MoU in June 2009.

The RCMP and CSIS entered into a revised MoU in September 2006, outlining the respective roles of each organization in support of counter-terrorism investigations and expanding on the ways in which they cooperate, including joint training initiatives and other means of providing mutual support consistent with respective mandates.

(d) The RCMP should continue to work co-operatively with foreign agencies in pursuing its law enforcement mandate in national security investigations.

Cooperation with foreign partners is essential to investigating threats to national security. In pursuit of its law enforcement mandate, the RCMP continues to cooperate with both law enforcement agencies and security and intelligence agencies from other countries.

This cooperation is wide-ranging. A few recent examples include Winter 2008-09 visits to the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland and Austria by RCMP national security program leaders; the Spring 2009 assumption of the Chairmanship of the multi-lateral Leadership in Counter-Terrorism training program, and deepening operational cooperation in Southwest Asia and Africa.

Cooperation and information sharing with foreign law enforcement and security/intelligence agencies is subject to central control and conducted by National Security Criminal Operations Branch at national headquarters.

Information received from foreign security and intelligence agencies is received, reviewed and centrally controlled and disseminated by the Sensitive Information Handling Unit located at national headquarters.

(e) The RCMP’s agreements or arrangements with other entities in regard to integrated national security operations should be reduced to writing.

Agreements/arrangements, where appropriate, are reduced to writing and are approved by the Assistant Commissioner National Security Criminal Investigations.

The MoU template is regularly reassessed to ensure compliance with national security policy and ministerial direction, such as the ministerial Direction on National Security-Related Arrangements and Cooperation issued in November of 2003.

Recommendation 3

The RCMP should ensure that those involved in national security investigations are properly trained in the particular features of such investigations.

(a) Investigators in the national security field require all of the skills and expertise of investigators in other criminal investigations, but they should also be given training relating specifically to national security aspects.

The National Security Criminal Investigators Course has been reviewed and redesigned and includes training in areas such as the Anti-Terrorism Act, information sharing with domestic and foreign partners and within the RCMP, policy and procedure, anti-terrorist financing, cultural diversity, privacy and human rights, and national security criminal investigative techniques.

2007-08: five courses were delivered (132 candidates in total).

2008-09: six courses were delivered (142 candidates in total).

Total number of employees successfully completing the training during the 11 courses is: 274.

The RCMP and CSIS developed the Joint Operational Workshop, allowing employees of each organization to share ideas, learn about each other’s mandates, and expand upon ways in which they could work in a more cooperative and effective manner.

2007-08: two workshops were delivered (24 candidates in total).

2008-09: two workshops were delivered (22 candidates in total).

The Cultural Awareness Orientation Workshop.

2007-08: five workshops were delivered (approximately 100 candidates in total).

2008-09: one workshop was delivered (approximately 20 candidates).

The RCMP and CSIS developed the Joint Strategic Workshop for Senior Management, the first of which was held in February 2009.

Pre-incident Indicators (online) course is currently being developed by Learning and Development with the involvement of National Security Criminal Investigations Subject Matter Experts.

Additional courses specific to national security criminal investigators: Tactical Use of the Internet Workshop; and Terrorist Financing Investigator’s Course have been developed and are delivered as needs arise.

(b) The RCMP should ensure that the specific types of information at the basis of national security investigations are analyzed with accuracy, precision and a sophisticated understanding of the context from which the information originates, with a view to developing intelligence that can lead to successful prevention and prosecution of a crime.

National Security Criminal Investigations has revised its policy to ensure that all information is accurate and precise when sharing information that describes persons or events.

Prior to dissemination, all information must be assessed for reliability, relevance and accuracy by:

assessing the reliability of the information including an assessment of the information source;

considering why another department/agency is requesting the information (need‑to‑know), the nature of the investigation and how the information might be used; and

making all best efforts to ensure that the information is accurate and precise when sharing information that describes facts or events.

Any doubt concerning the reliability or accuracy of the source or the information must be clearly communicated to the recipient.

A new governance framework has been implemented, outlining the way in which central control of national security criminal investigations is exercised. This involves a higher level of accountability when information is shared with foreign and domestic agencies.

The National Security Criminal Investigations Office of Investigative Standards and Practices, established in early 2008, is an oversight section that reviews major case investigations and ensures that major case management principles are applied to national security criminal investigations. Office of Investigative Standards and Practices, through its training initiatives (e.g. Critical Thinking Workshop) and oversight duties, promotes and reinforces critical thinking at all stages of an investigation.

(c) The RCMP’s National Security Enforcement Course curriculum should be reviewed in the light of the findings and recommendations of the Inquiry. In future, training curricula should be reviewed periodically by the RCMP and by the proposed independent review body.

In light of the recommendations of Justice O’Connor’s inquiry, the National Security Enforcement Course was reviewed and revised and is now the National Security Criminal Investigators Course. It includes training in areas such as the Anti-Terrorism Act, information sharing with domestic and foreign partners and within the RCMP, policy and procedure, anti-terrorist financing, cultural diversity, privacy and human rights and national security criminal investigative techniques.

The RCMP regularly evaluates its training and continues to develop its curriculum on social contexts, information sharing, training and cultural sensitivity, ensuring that training in matters related to national security is relevant, timely and current.

(d) Training for national security investigators should include a specific focus on practices for information sharing with the wide range of agencies and countries that may become involved in national security investigations.

The National Security Criminal Investigators Course has been reviewed and redesigned and includes training in areas such as information sharing with domestic and foreign partners and within the RCMP, policy and procedure, privacy and human rights, and cultural diversity.

The RCMP and CSIS have developed a Joint Operational Workshop for senior investigators and intelligence officers. Topics discussed include the differences between the organizations’ respective mandates, differences between security intelligence and evidence, information sharing between organizations, and lawful authorities.

(e) The RCMP should continue and expand upon its social context training, which is necessary to be able to conduct efficient investigations while ensuring fairness to individuals and communities.

The National Security Criminal Investigators Course has been reviewed and redesigned and includes training in areas such as the Anti-Terrorism Act, information sharing with domestic and foreign partners and within the RCMP, policy and procedure, anti-terrorist financing, cultural diversity, privacy and human rights and national security criminal investigative techniques.

RCMP analysts involved in national security criminal investigations also receive this training and contribute to the understanding of the context, nature and origin of national security related information.

The Cultural Awareness Orientation Workshop continues to be core training for national security employees.

2007-08: five workshops were delivered (approximately 100 candidates in total).

2008-09: one workshop was delivered (approximately 20 candidates).

The Canadian Muslim community was consulted in the development of the RCMP’s cultural sensitivity training program. For example, since its creation in 2005, the National Capital Region National Security Community Advisory Committee has participated in several initiatives including: developing cultural awareness training modules on Islam, Muslims and Arab culture; presenting a Muslim/Arab cultural awareness course to approximately 300 RCMP members; providing input on the Bias-Free Policing Strategy; supporting recruitment initiatives; providing feedback on issues such as grooming exemptions for Muslim cadets; and developing guidelines for national security investigators.

Recommendation 4

The RCMP should maintain its current approach to centralized oversight of national security investigations.

A ministerial direction, issued to the RCMP in November 2003, requires that all national security investigations be centrally monitored by national headquarters. Since the release of Justice O’Connor’s Part I report, the role of national headquarters has expanded. National Security Criminal Operations Branch (headquarters) monitors and provides oversight to every national security file; provides guidance, tasking, and direction to the national security investigative units, particularly with respect to information sharing, sensitive sectors, national security-related foreign travel and relations with foreign agencies; administers domestic and international partnerships; and, controls foreign information sharing. National security policy was reviewed and re-drafted to ensure compliance with Justice O’Connor’s recommendations, with emphasis on the recommendation that central oversight continue.

Since the release of Justice O’Connor’s Part I report, the RCMP has strengthened its approach to centralized oversight of national security criminal investigations by adopting a governance framework for central control of national security criminal investigations, whereby accountability and responsibility for all aspects of the national security program, including national security criminal investigations, ultimately rest with the Assistant Commissioner National Security Criminal Investigations.

The adoption of a new secure records management system allows centralized real time access to ongoing investigations by National Security Criminal Operations Branch and Senior Management.

In addition to a secure records management system, secure electronic major case management software is being deployed throughout the National Security Program, including national headquarters, thus allowing centralized real time access to major investigations.

Receipt, review and dissemination of information received from foreign security/intelligence agencies is the responsibility of the Sensitive Information Handing Unit at national headquarters, thereby providing central control and oversight of security intelligence.

The governance of national security criminal investigations – namely, central control – is a significant departure from the traditional decentralized operational culture of the RCMP. Like any change in an organization’s culture, implementation of central control has been a challenge at times, particularly with regions far from Headquarters such as British Columbia. Effective implementation of central control is based on the need to increase vigilance at all levels on national security criminal investigations.

Recommendation 5

The minister responsible for the RCMP should continue to issue ministerial directions (MD) to provide policy guidance to the RCMP in national security investigations, given the potential implications of such investigations.

Ministerial Direction was issued in November 2003 with respect to the RCMP’s national security activities:

The National Security Responsibility and Accountability Directive requires central coordination by RCMP Headquarters of all national security investigations across the country;

The National Security Related Arrangements and Cooperation Directive requires Ministerial approval when entering into an arrangement with foreign security or intelligence agencies; and

The National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors Directive requires enhanced centralization and Headquarters approval of all sensitive sector national security criminal investigations.

The Government monitors this issue on an ongoing basis and will continue to issue ministerial direction as deemed appropriate.

The RCMP will continue to implement ministerial direction with respect to national security criminal investigations.

Recommendation 6

The RCMP should maintain its policy of sharing information obtained in the course of national security investigations with other agencies and police departments, both domestic and foreign, in accordance with the principles discussed in these recommendations.

The RCMP continues to share information obtained in the course of national security criminal investigations with domestic and foreign partners in accordance with the principles discussed in Justice O’Connor’s Part I recommendations.

The RCMP reviewed and redrafted its national security-related policy to ensure compliance with the recommendations and with MDs in matters relating to information sharing with domestic and foreign law enforcement, with foreign security/intelligence agencies, and with other agencies involved in national security.

National security policy includes requirements such as:

information sharing with foreign law enforcement and with foreign security/intelligence agencies is centrally controlled and disseminated by National Security Criminal Operations Branch located at national headquarters and is reviewed for relevance, reliability and accuracy;

consideration be given prior to sharing information with countries with questionable human rights records; and

caveats be applied to all information shared with foreign and domestic agencies and within the RCMP at all times.

The revised National Security Criminal Investigators Course, provided to all national security criminal investigators and analysts, emphasizes not only the benefits and need to share information with partners, but also the need for safeguards and the process by which information is shared, as per policy and ministerial direction. The course also covers the rationale for the policy and procedures dictating the sharing of information (e.g. rationale for central control and caveats).

Caveats are an integral part of any information shared with domestic and foreign partners and within the RCMP.

The RCMP continues to receive information from foreign security/intelligence agencies but it is now centrally controlled and disseminated by the Sensitive Information Handing Unit at national headquarters. This process ensures that information is handled appropriately during the course of a criminal investigation.

One example of the RCMP’s commitment to maintain and improve its practice of proper information sharing was the February 2008 National Security and Police Conference jointly hosted by CSIS, the RCMP, and the CACP Counter Terrorism and National Security (CTNS) Committee. This conference aimed to increase linkages amongst law enforcement criminal intelligence officers at all levels of domestic policing (municipal, provincial, federal) and increase proper national security-related information sharing practices.

Recommendation 7

The RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate or another centralized unit with expertise in national security investigations should have responsibility for oversight of information sharing related to national security with other domestic and foreign departments and agencies.

National Security Criminal Investigations, the successor to the Criminal Intelligence Directorate and centrally located at national headquarters, has the responsibility for oversight of information sharing related to national security.

An integral component of National Security Criminal Investigations is the Sensitive Information Handing Unit at national headquarters. Its mandate is to receive, review, centrally control and disseminate information from foreign security and intelligence agencies.

The new secure records management system provides centralized real time access to ongoing investigations, thereby significantly improving the ability of National Security Criminal Operations Branch and senior management to provide oversight of information sharing with domestic and international partners and direction when appropriate.

In addition to the secure records management system, secure electronic major case management software is being deployed throughout the National Security Program, including national headquarters, thus allowing centralized real time access to major investigations.

The revised National Security Criminal Investigators Course, provided to all national security criminal investigators and analysts, emphasizes not only the benefits and need to share information with partners but also the need for safeguards and the process by which information is shared, as per policy and ministerial direction, and the rationale for the policy and procedures dictating the sharing of information.

MoUs and information sharing agreements with partners are reviewed by National Security Criminal Investigations for compliance with RCMP policy on agreements, with ministerial direction, and with national security policy.

All information-sharing agreements related to national security criminal investigations are approved by the Assistant Commissioner National Security Criminal Investigations.

Recommendation 8

The RCMP should ensure that, whenever it provides information to other departments and agencies, whether foreign and domestic, it does so in accordance with clearly established policies respecting screening for relevance, reliability and accuracy and with relevant laws respecting personal information and human rights.

(a) The RCMP should maintain its policy of screening information for relevance before sharing it.

The RCMP ensures that, whenever it provides information to other departments and agencies, whether foreign or domestic, it does so in accordance with clearly established policies respecting screening for relevance, reliability and accuracy.

(b) The RCMP should ensure that information provided to other countries is reliable and accurate and should amend its operational manual accordingly.

The revised national security policy stipulates that all information must be assessed for reliability, relevance and accuracy prior to dissemination and that before it is shared, the “need to know” and “right to know” principles must also be assessed.

Any doubt concerning the reliability or accuracy of the source or the information must be clearly communicated to the recipient.

(c) Information should also be screened by the RCMP for compliance with the applicable law concerning personal information before it is shared.

Information sharing conforms to all relevant laws respecting personal information and human rights (e.g. Privacy Act).

Recommendation 9

The RCMP should never share information in a national security investigation without attaching written caveats in accordance with existing policy. The RCMP should review existing caveats to ensure that each precisely states which institutions are entitled to have access to the information subject to the caveat and what use the institution may make of that information. Caveats should also generally set out an efficient procedure for recipients to seek any changes to the permitted distribution and use of the information.

(a) The RCMP’s current policy of requiring caveats on all documents being provided to other agencies is sound and should be strictly followed.

RCMP national security policy requires that all information relative to a national security criminal investigation is shared with appropriate caveats. This requirement and its rationale form part of the National Security Criminal Investigations course.

Information sharing with foreign agencies is reviewed by National Security Criminal Operations Branch located at national headquarters and approved by the Director National Security Criminal Operations Branch. Information sharing with provincial and municipal agencies is reviewed by the field investigator and approved by the Division Criminal Operations Officer.

(b) The RCMP should review the language of its existing caveats to ensure that it clearly communicates the desired restrictions on the use of information being shared. Caveats should clearly state who may use the information, what restrictions apply to that use, and whom to contact should the recipient party wish to modify those terms.

Existing caveats have been reviewed and rewritten to precisely state what use the institution may make of that information and what procedure to follow should the recipient seek changes to the permitted distribution and use of the information.

Caveats were rewritten with consideration given to the category of the recipient (i.e. foreign agency; domestic agency; RCMP program other than National Security Program). The use of caveats, rationale and policy are addressed during the National Security Criminal Investigators Course.

Caveats:

All outgoing classified or national security-related information that is shared with a foreign department/agency must include the following caveat:

This document is the property of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), National Security Program. It is loaned specifically to your department/agency in confidence and for internal use only. This document is not to be reclassified, copied, reproduced, used or further disseminated, in whole or part, without the consent of the originator. It is not to be used in affidavits, court proceedings or subpoenas or for any other legal or judicial purpose without the consent of the originator. If you are subject to freedom of information or other domestic laws that do not allow you to protect this information from disclosure, notify the RCMP National Security Program immediately and return the document. This caveat is an integral part of this document and must accompany any extracted information. Should the recipient wish to modify these terms, contact the OIC National Security Criminal Operations Branch, RCMP.

All classified and national security-related information that is shared with a domestic department/agency must include the following caveat:

This document is the property of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), National Security Program. It is loaned specifically to your department/agency in confidence and for internal use only, and it is not to be reclassified, copied, reproduced, used or further disseminated, in whole or in part, without the consent of the originator. It is not to be used in affidavits, court proceedings, subpoenas or any other legal or judicial purpose without the consent of the originator. The handling and storing of this document must comply with handling and storage guidelines established by the Government of Canada for classified information. If your department/agency cannot apply these guidelines, please read and destroy this document. This caveat is an integral part of this document and must accompany any extracted information. For any enquiries concerning the information or the caveat, please contact the OIC National Security Criminal Operations Branch, RCMP.

All internal correspondence that contains national security-related information must include the following caveat:

This document is the property of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), National Security Program. It is provided to your section/unit and should not be disseminated, in whole or in part, without the prior consent of the originator. This document will not be declassified without the written consent of the originator. This document may constitute “special operational information” as defined in the Security of Information Act. The handling and storing of this document must comply with handling and storage guidelines established by the Government of Canada for classified information. If you cannot apply these guidelines, please read and destroy this document. Failure to comply with this caveat will constitute a breach of RCMP policy and federal legislation. For any enquiries concerning the information, please contact the originator of the document.

Recommendation 10

The RCMP’s information-sharing practices and arrangements should be subject to review by an independent, arms-length review body.

The RCMP’s information sharing practices and arrangements are subject to review by the Commission for Public Complaints and by the Auditor General in accordance with their mandates.

The Government is committed to enhancing Canada’s national security review framework. The Government is currently assessing options for modernizing and strengthening the current RCMP review and complaints body in light of this recommendation and those outlined in the second report released by the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities.

Recommendation 11

Canadian agencies other than the RCMP that share information relating to national security should review recommendations 6 to 10 above to ensure that their information‑sharing policies conform, to the appropriate extent, with the approaches I am recommending for the RCMP.

To the extent that recommendations 6 to 10 may apply to CSIS, the policies and practices that are recommended have been implemented, and in many cases, have been in place since the creation of CSIS. For example:

CSIS continues to share information with other agencies, both foreign and domestic in accordance with the principles outlined in the O’Connor Inquiry (Rec. 6);

International and domestic information-sharing policies and practices are, and have always been, centrally controlled by branch managers at national headquarters (Rec. 7);

CSIS policies require that all information it collects be screened for reliability and accuracy before it is shared further. When it is impossible to make definitive conclusions, the information is shared with caveats expressing the Service’s degree of confidence in its accuracy and reliability (Rec. 8);

It has always been the policy of CSIS to attach the appropriate caveats to every exchange of information with another agency, both domestic and foreign (Rec. 9); and

Since its creation, CSIS has been subject to the regular and ongoing arm’s length and independent review of its activities by both the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the Inspector General of CSIS (Rec. 10).

A comprehensive review of the CBSA’s information sharing policy guidelines and procedures on intelligence sharing has been completed. A new information sharing policy for intelligence has been completed and approved. The development of caveat policies has been done as part of the new information sharing policy for intelligence.

Training for CBSA intelligence officers has been developed regarding proper lookout procedures and the sharing of information, which covers: the circumstances in which information can be shared, what information can be shared and with whom, the restrictions on disclosure, the proper use of caveats, and the obligation for written documentation when information is shared. Integrated information sharing and disclosure training began in the fiscal year 2007-08.

While the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) does not participate in national security investigations, it fully respects the caveats attached to any national security-related information it receives from CSIS and the RCMP.

The sharing of information by CSEC with domestic and foreign partners is subject to comprehensive policies and procedures, which are subject to full legal review. Information sharing with foreign allies is subject to agreements with those allies on the handling and use of information. All of CSEC’s activities, including information sharing, are subject to the review of the CSE Commissioner and other review bodies, such as the Privacy Commissioner.

Recommendation 12

Where Canadian agencies become aware that foreign agencies have made improper use of information provided by a Canadian agency, a formal objection should be made to the foreign agency and the foreign minister of the recipient country.

In the event of such an incident, CSIS will take the necessary measures to ensure that the appropriate authorities are notified, that an objection is registered, and that measures are taken to minimize further dissemination and future misuse of the Service’s information by the particular agency, up to and including the possible suspension of an information-sharing arrangement made pursuant to section 17 of the CSIS Act.

As part of CBSA’s new information sharing policy for intelligence, new procedures have been approved to respond immediately to situations where CBSA’s information has been misused and to prevent further misuse.

Should Canadian information be improperly shared, DFAIT will be made aware, and will pursue the problem directly and formally with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country concerned.

Recommendation 13

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade should provide its annual reports assessing the human rights records of various countries to the RCMP, CSIS and other Canadian government departments or agencies that may interact with such countries in connection with investigations.

For many years, DFAIT’s human rights reports have been distributed to other government departments with programs or interests in the countries concerned, including CSIS, although not the RCMP. All departments and agencies belonging to the Government of Canada security and intelligence community, including the RCMP, now have access to these reports, which DFAIT posts in the government’s secure communications system.

CBSA distributes all DFAIT human rights reports to its regional intelligence offices.

CSIS continues to use DFAIT reports and reviews information from human rights and other organizations when assessing the human rights record of foreign agencies and countries with which it deals under section 17 of the CSIS Act.

Recommendation 14

The RCMP and CSIS should review their policies governing the circumstances in which they supply information to foreign governments with questionable human rights records. Information should never be provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute to the use of torture. Policies should include specific directions aimed at eliminating any possible Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring accountability.

The RCMP has reviewed and revised its policy governing the circumstances in which it supplies information to foreign governments with questionable human rights records.

The RCMP’s information sharing with foreign agencies is reviewed and approved by the Director of National Security Criminal Operations Branch. Information sharing with provincial and municipal agencies is reviewed and approved by the Division Criminal Operations Officer, thereby ensuring increased vigilance at every level of the process.

The RCMP conducts analysis of the human rights record of a country with which it intends to share information. Analysis is based on DFAIT annual reports assessing the human rights record of that country. Reports from other human rights organizations may also be consulted.

The RCMP does not condone or support torture or other abuse of human rights. In assessing the implications of sharing information with a country with a questionable human rights record, every effort is made to ensure there is no appearance of support or condonation of torture or other abuse of human rights.

DFAIT is consulted regarding decisions to interact with a country with a questionable human rights record.

All decisions to interact with a country with a questionable human rights record will be documented, including the importance of supplying/receiving such information and the implications of doing so for Canada’s human rights obligations.

When it is determined that a Canadian is being detained abroad in connection with a national security-related investigation, National Security Criminal Operations Branch will immediately notify DFAIT.

The Assistant Commissioner of National Security Criminal Investigations must approve all sharing of information with a country for which credible information has been received about the possibility of torture.

Awareness and policy surrounding the sharing of information with countries with questionable human rights records forms an integral part of the National Security Criminal Investigators Course.

As per ministerial direction and internal policy, CSIS takes into account human rights concerns in managing and assessing its current and potential new foreign arrangements. This practice is reflected in the existing body of CSIS operational policies dealing with investigations and foreign arrangements.

CSIS updated its internal directives on information collection and sharing to re-affirm that the human rights records of the countries with which CSIS shares information, are a central consideration of the Service’s activities. The internal directive on information sharing with foreign agencies with poor human rights records sets out specific and detailed principles to guide the actions of all employees when sharing, seeking and using information from agencies or governments with poor human rights practices. These guidelines underline the specific processes that must be followed by CSIS employees in instances where there is any suspicion that information received from a foreign agency may have been gleaned from mistreatment.

CSIS has developed a caveat (consistent, as well, with Recommendations 8 and 9) to accompany information shared with foreign agencies, which seeks assurances that any Canadian detained by a foreign government as a result of the information exchanged “will be fairly treated within the accepted norms of international conventions, that [the individual] is accorded due process under law and afforded access to Canadian diplomatic personnel if requested.”

Recommendation 15

Canadian agencies should accept information from countries with questionable human rights records only after proper consideration of human rights implications. Information received from countries with questionable human rights records should be identified as such and proper steps should be taken to assess its reliability.

The RCMP may accept information from countries with questionable human rights records but only after proper consideration of human rights implications.

Information received from countries with questionable human rights records is identified as such and assessed accordingly by the RCMP.

In assessing the human rights record of a country from which the RCMP has received information, DFAIT annual reports assessing the human rights record of that country are consulted. Reports from other human rights organizations may also be consulted.

Any decision made by the RCMP to interact with a country with a questionable human rights record will be documented by the RCMP, including the importance of supplying/receiving such information and the implications of doing so for Canada’s human rights obligations.

Awareness and policy surrounding the sharing of information with countries with questionable human rights records forms an integral part of the RCMP’s National Security Criminal Investigators Course.

The CSIS Act specifically requires two Ministers to be personally involved in the process for approving every CSIS foreign liaison arrangement. When seeking Ministerial authorization to enter into such an arrangement, both the Service’s MD and CSIS policy require that CSIS specifically assess and report on the particular country’s human rights record.

CSIS updated its internal directives on information collection and sharing, and its policies on foreign arrangements to re-affirm that the human rights records of the countries with which CSIS shares information, are a central consideration of the Service’s activities. The directive on information sharing with foreign agencies with poor human rights records sets out specific and detailed principles to guide the actions of all employees when sharing, seeking and using information from agencies or governments with poor human rights practices. These guidelines underline the specific processes that must be followed by CSIS employees in instances where there is any suspicion that information received from a foreign agency may have been gleaned from mistreatment.

The standard practice of the CBSA is to review and assess the reliability of all information received from outside sources, including determining if there is a possibility that the information was obtained by means that violate human rights. Direction to this effect is included in the policy on Information Sharing for Intelligence, which has been completed and approved.

To the extent that DFAIT receives information from foreign sources, it will continue to ensure that the human rights implications related to its collection are weighed carefully, including identifying the source and its past record.

Such assessments are normally part of DFAIT’s appraisal of all information relating to a country’s policies and behaviour, and our decisions on the implications for appropriate Canadian interaction with the country.

CSEC is committed to ensuring that relationships formed with foreign partners are compatible with the values of Canadian foreign, defence and security policy. CSEC’s policy of consultation with DFAIT helps achieve this objective.

Recommendation 16

The Government of Canada should develop a protocol to provide for coordination and coherence across government in addressing issues that arise when a Canadian is detained in another country in connection with terrorism‑related activity. Essential features of this protocol should include consultation among relevant Canadian agencies, a coherent and unified approach in addressing the issues, and political accountability for the course of action adopted.

Through an exchange of letters, Canada and the United States agreed to the Monterrey Protocol on January 13, 2004. The Protocol commits each party to notify the other and consult in cases concerning the removal of Canadian and United States nationals to third countries.

Closer cooperation has developed between DFAIT, CSIS and the RCMP, both at Headquarters and at missions abroad in a concerted effort to manage sensitive consular cases involving national security.

The Consular Bureau and missions are in closer contact by telephone or electronically.

Heads of Mission are aware of the different mandates of the various Government of Canada programs under their authority. Consular officers at missions are making their program responsibilities clear to the RCMP Liaison Officers and CSIS FCO.

CSIS and DFAIT signed a MoU on November 2, 2007, which reaffirms the primacy of DFAIT’s consular mandate and outlines steps each party will take in consular cases with a national security or terrorism dimension. DFAIT and the RCMP signed a similar MoU on April 5, 2008.

DFAIT’s Director General of Consular Affairs is engaged in an ongoing dialogue with key CSIS and RCMP officials to make consular program objectives better known.

Recommendation 17

The Canadian government should develop specific policies and training to address the situation of Canadians detained in countries where there is a credible risk of torture or harsh treatment.

(a) Consular officials posted to countries that have a reputation for abusing human rights should receive training on conducting interviews in prison settings in order to be able to make the best possible determination of whether torture or harsh treatment has occurred.

(b) If there is credible information that a Canadian detained abroad is being or has been tortured, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be informed and involved in decisions relating to the Canadian response.

(c) Canadian officials should normally insist on respect of all of a detainee’s consular rights.

In February 2005, DFAIT developed a torture awareness workshop in partnership with the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture. It was revamped in the fall of 2006. The enhanced two-day workshop is designed to raise awareness of consular cases that may involve torture or abuse. It provides consular staff with tools to help them better recognize signs of torture or abuse, and to make suggestions as to the appropriate action to be taken.

The workshop is offered regularly to consular staff at headquarters and in the field and is part of the mandatory training for new Management/Consular recruits and the annual training for consular officers going abroad.

The workshops have led to an improved quality of prison visit reports, which increases confidence in our assessment of the treatment of a detainee.

The DFAIT Legal Bureau participates in training for CSIS officers on international human rights issues, with a focus on issues raised when a Canadian is potentially subject to human rights violations at the hands of the detaining government.

Recommendation 18

Consular officials should clearly advise detainees in foreign countries of the circumstances under which information obtained from the detainees may be shared with others outside the Consular Affairs Bureau, before any such information is obtained.

In 2005, DFAIT amended the website, the “Registration of Canadians Abroad” form and the booklet “A Guide for Canadians Imprisoned Abroad.” The information makes clear that, under the Privacy Act, personal information may be disclosed to other government departments or agencies in certain circumstances.

Consular staff and Heads of Missions, through training, conferences and workshops, are reminded of their duties and obligations under the Privacy Act.

Training for consular officers includes a presentation by the Access to Information Division.

Recommendation 19

Canadian agencies conducting national security investigations, including CSIS, the RCMP and the CBSA, should have clear written policies stating that such investigations must not be based on racial, religious or ethnic profiling.

RCMP National Security Policy states that all National Security Criminal Investigations will comply with the requirements of the RCMP bias‑free policing directives.

RCMP bias-free policing directives state, in part, that: “Bias-free policing means equitable treatment of all persons by all RCMP employees in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the law and without abusing their authority regardless of an individual’s race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation, marital status, age, mental or physical disability, citizenship, family status, socio-economic status, or a conviction for which a pardon has been granted.”

CSIS does not base its security intelligence investigations on racial, religious or ethnic profiling. Rigorous targeting and warrant application processes are currently in place, involving both internal oversight mechanisms, and independent external review by independent counsel with the Department of Justice, the Minister of Public Safety and the Federal Court of Canada. Finally, the CSIS Act provides for review by SIRC of any activity undertaken by CSIS to ensure compliance with policy, ministerial direction and Canadian law. Together, these mechanisms have made CSIS the most externally reviewed intelligence service in the world.

The CBSA’s intelligence procedures, used to provide guidance to all field officers in national security investigations, clearly establish that targeting and lookouts are to be based on objective risk-assessment formulae. Race, religion or ethnicity are not risk factors used in targeting calculations or in the production of lookouts.

Recommendation 20

Canadian agencies involved in anti terrorism investigations, particularly the RCMP, CSIS and the CBSA, should continue and expand on the training given to members and staff on issues of racial, religious and ethnic profiling and on interaction with Canada’s Muslim and Arab communities.

The Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security – established in 2005 and comprised of six representatives of Canada’s ethnic and religious communities – supports and facilitates outreach.

The RCMP continues and has expanded on the training given to employees on issues of racial, religious and ethnic profiling, on interaction with Canada’s Muslim and Arab communities, on human rights issues, and on social contexts and cultural sensitivity.

In addition to the cultural awareness training provided on the RCMP’s National Security Criminal Investigations course, the Cultural Awareness Orientation Workshop continues to provide core training to national security employees.

2007-08: five workshops were delivered (approximately 100 candidates in total).

2008-09: one workshop was delivered (approximately 20 candidates).

The RCMP Outreach Program, at both the Headquarters and Division levels, has shown great success at building mutual trust and understanding between the Force and members of communities most affected by national security criminal operations. It remains a best practice but is delivered on an ad hoc basis.

Furthermore, the Canadian Muslim community was consulted in the development of the RCMP’s cultural sensitivity training program. For example, since its creation in 2005, the National Capital Region National Security Community Advisory Committee has participated in several initiatives including: developing cultural awareness training modules on Islam, Muslims and Arab culture; presenting a Muslim/Arab cultural awareness course to approximately 300 RCMP members; providing input on the Bias-Free Policing Strategy; supporting recruitment initiatives; providing feedback on issues such as grooming exemptions for Muslim cadets; and developing guidelines for national security investigators.

CSIS training curriculum for its intelligence officers includes numerous briefings and sessions on the importance of the respect for cultural diversity and human rights when dealing with the public, as well as interacting within CSIS. CSIS also continues to take full advantage of its own in-house diverse population by regularly inviting members who represent minority groups to educate their colleagues.

CSIS interacts with significant sectors of the Canadian Muslim and Arab communities. Ongoing efforts to improve on and expand understanding of cultural values, mores and perspectives. CSIS personnel all over Canada have met and will continue to meet with representatives of various community groups.

CSIS is continuously examining its recruitment and training programs to ensure they meet the principles of employment equity and cultural sensitivity.

CSIS has established partnerships with ethno-cultural groups, via the Service’s Public Liaison Officer, and participates in outreach events on an ongoing basis.

A booklet entitled “Religions in Canada” published by the Department of National Defence continues to be distributed by CSIS to all senior managers and to new supervisors to assist them in understanding and dealing with cultural differences.

Training on diversity and race relations is available to all CBSA employees, and is a compulsory part of CBSA’s Port of Entry Recruit Training, which aims to “provide strategies that CBSA employees can apply, on the job, towards promoting a professional and equitable service to CBSA’s multicultural clientele, and employees.” On-line diversity e‑learning is mandatory for all border services officers. In 2007-08, 1,037 border services officers took the course. Many of the CBSA regions develop and deliver diversity-related training events relevant to the communities they serve.

Recommendation 21

Canadian agencies should have clear policies about the use of border lookouts.

(a) The RCMP and CSIS should develop guidelines governing the circumstances in which border lookouts may be requested both in Canada and in other countries.

The Minister of Public Safety sent a letter to the US Secretary of Homeland Security identifying the measures taken with respect to CBSA lookout lists.

The RCMP has developed clear policy governing the circumstances under which border lookouts may be requested.

National Security Criminal Operations Branch at RCMP national headquarters must approve requests for border lookouts in foreign countries and must be advised of all border lookouts sent to CBSA by the investigating units. The requesting unit will review its border lookout requests on a regular basis to determine their relevance and requirement for continued use. The requesting unit must also promptly modify or remove a lookout request to reflect any change of status of the individual or circumstances of the investigation.

CSIS has a number of policies that provide direction and guidelines on cooperation and assistance to CBSA and Citizenship and Immigration Canada with respect to border enforcement or screening. These include a policy governing the provision of personal information to CBSA on persons who are of a national security interest.

CSIS, in collaboration with CBSA, reviews guidelines regarding border lookouts on an ongoing basis.

(b) The CBSA should establish clear, written criteria for placing individuals on lookout list

A new CBSA lookout policy (2006) and accompanying procedures (2008) have been completed to establish internal controls and proper oversight for the issuance, maintenance, reporting and closing of CBSA lookouts.

(c) The CBSA should establish clear policies or guidelines concerning criteria for examining and photocopying documents and retrieving information from computers and electronic devices when individuals are seeking entry into Canada.

As part of the commitment to fully comply with recommendation 21, the CBSA has begun clarifying guidelines on the examination and photocopying of documents found in the possession of travellers. Intelligence Directorate is in the process of gathering information in order to draft a document photocopying policy.

(d) Canada Customs should purge the information about Dr. Mazigh and her children from the Intelligence Management System.

The names of Dr. Mazigh and her children have been purged from the CBSA Intelligence Management System.

Recommendation 22

The Government of Canada should register a formal objection with the governments of the United States and Syria concerning their treatment of Mr. Arar and Canadian officials involved with his case.

The Prime Minister of Canada spoke with the President of the United States, and Canada’s Minster of Foreign Affairs wrote on October 6, 2006 to the US Secretary of State and the Syrian Foreign Minister to register Canada’s objections to the actions of their governments in the Arar case. The Ambassadors in Washington and Damascus discussed the issues raised by the report at senior levels in the US State Department and the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Minister of Public Safety wrote to the US Secretary of Homeland Security to advise of some of the report’s findings and explain that Canada had removed all references to Mr. Arar from Canadian security lists and asked that US records be amended accordingly.

Recommendation 23

The Government of Canada should assess Mr. Arar’s claim for compensation in the light of the findings in this report and respond accordingly.

Mr. Arar was compensated by the Government of Canada.