As a result of their deliberations committees may make recommendations which they include in their reports for the consideration of the House of Commons or the Government. Recommendations related to this study are listed below.

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada prohibit Chinese state-owned enterprises, partial state-owned enterprises, including companies receiving undisclosed government subsidies, and technology companies from obtaining federal contracts related to information technology or security equipment or services.

Recommendation 2

That the Privy Council Office be mandated to develop, implement and oversee a policy to direct all government departments and agencies to review current contracts with China related to information technology or security equipment or services.

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada demonstrate stronger leadership on the issue of procurement and national security, including at the highest echelons – the Prime Minister, ministers and senior officials.

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada implement strategies to encourage procurement officials and suppliers to place greater emphasis on best value for Canadians, by including value propositions that give greater weight to qualifications and value rather than primarily focusing on price.

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada ensure that all departments and agencies screen suppliers and their employees through a security clearance before granting them access to the federal government’s assets and facilities.

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada enforce a more stringent security clearance of companies bidding on federal contracts by following the example of leading security technology countries.

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada establish mechanisms to ensure that departments and agencies collaborate to assess the risk to Canada’s national security at the beginning of the procurement process for certain security-related goods and services, such as security screening equipment in Canada’s embassies.

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada ensure that a rigorous risk assessment is conducted at the outset of any procurement process by strengthening the security requirement checklists used by departments and agencies.

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada require a supply chain integrity assessment conducted by the Communications Security Establishment at the beginning of the procurement process and strengthen considerations for the national security exception for goods and services that have a potential security impact on Canada’s assets.