Rules of Debate / Curtailment of Debate

Time allocation: appropriate use

March 1, 2001

Debates, pp. 1415-6

On February 13, 2001, Chuck Strahl (Fraser Valley) rose on a question of privilege with regard to the adoption of a time allocation motion moved by Don Boudria (Leader of the Government in the House of Commons) in relation to Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Employment Insurance Act and the Employment Insurance (Fishing) Regulations. Mr. Strahl argued that this was the second Parliament in a row in which the first bill introduced by the Government had been subjected to time allocation after only a few hours of debate, that it was the 69th time allocation motion moved by the Government and that it was time to declare the measures imposed by the Government to be excessive and unorthodox. He stated that the Speaker could and should intervene when a Government abuses its power and the rules of the House and added that by allocating only the minimum amount of time to debate each stage of a bill, the Government prevented the opposition from the exercise of its right to dissent. He also suggested that the Chair should intervene to protect the collective rights of parliamentarians against the Government’s use of time allocation motions to limit debate on bills. Mr. Strahl concluded by stating that he believed that the Chair possessed the authority to intervene to protect the rights of the minority, and to ensure reasonable debate, and he urged the Speaker to refuse or to delay premature attempts to curtail debate to prevent it becoming a pattern. After hearing from other Members, the Deputy Speaker (Bob Kilger) took the matter under advisement.^[1]

On March 1, 2001, the Deputy Speaker delivered his ruling. Noting that the Speaker has no discretionary authority to refuse to put a motion of time allocation if all of the procedural exigencies have been observed, he stated that there had been no suggestion that, by moving the time allocation motion, the Government had in any way deviated from the procedure laid out in the Standing Orders. He emphasized that the House protects itself against abuses not by the authority of the Speaker, but by means of the rules it imposes on itself. The Deputy Speaker pointed out that if the existing rules concerning time allocation were no longer considered satisfactory or acceptable by Members, then they should amend the rules, but that it would be inappropriate for the Chair to intervene unilaterally where the Standing Orders provide him with no discretionary authority to do so. He also reminded the Members that the Standing Order with respect to time allocation had been invoked only once in the Thirty-Seventh Parliament and that the Chair does not rule on hypothetical cases or on questions raised only in the abstract. Accordingly, he concluded that the matter did not constitute prima facie a question of privilege.

Decision of the Chair

The Deputy Speaker: I am now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised by the Opposition House Leader, the hon. Member for Fraser Valley, on February 13, 2001.

Subsequent to the adoption of a time allocation motion in relation to Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Employment Insurance Act and employment insurance regulations, the hon. Member rose on a question of privilege to express his concern and dismay about the frequency with which the Government had resorted to time allocation to cut off debate prematurely on legislation during the Thirty-Fifth and Thirty-Sixth Parliaments, a trend he believes is to continue in the present Parliament.

The hon. Member claimed that the Government’s use of time allocation was a misuse of its authority and that the time had come “to declare the measures imposed by the Government today as excessive and unorthodox”.

The hon. Member argued that the Speaker has the authority to refuse to put a time allocation motion if, in his judgment, the Government is abusing its powers and the rules of the House by not allowing a sufficient amount of time for debate. He concluded his argument by suggesting that the Speaker consider the amount of authority and discretion available to the Chair to decide not to propose to the House a motion of time allocation if there has not been a sufficient period of time for debate.

I wish to thank the hon. Government House Leader, the House Leader of the Bloc Québécois, the hon. Member for Roberval, the House Leader of the New Democratic Party, the hon. Member for Winnipeg–Transcona, the House Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, the hon. Member for Pictou–Antigonish–Guysborough, and the hon. Member for St. Albert for their interventions.

The request that is being made of the Chair in this instance is one which places me in a position of some delicacy. It is, of course, true that the Chair uses its discretion on every occasion on which it intervenes. That is not to say, however, that rulings are made simply on the Speaker’s personal authority. Nothing could be further from the truth.

House of Commons Procedure and Practice states, at page 570, and I quote:

—the Speaker has ruled that the Chair possesses no discretionary authority to refuse to put a motion of time allocation if all the procedural exigencies have been observed.

In a ruling on a similar case, Speaker Fraser said, at Debates, March 31, 1993, page 17860:

—it is not always understood that the Chair is constrained in what the Chair can do by the rules which this House has passed. It is not surprising that sometimes some hon. Members, or even members of the public, feel that the rules we have set for ourselves may in some cases be unreasonable or even worse. However, it is extremely important I think that the Chair be bound by those rules until the House decides to change them.

In the case which gave rise to the point which I am addressing, there has been no suggestion that the Government in any way deviated from the procedure laid out in the Standing Orders. I do not feel, under those circumstances, that there are any grounds whatsoever which would lead the Chair to intervene. The Chair wishes to be very clear on this point. The rules and practices established by this House with respect to time allocation leave the Speaker with no alternative in this matter. Speaker Fraser said in the case to which I have already referred, at Debates, March 31, 1993, page 17861:

I have to advise the House that the rule is clear. It is within the government’s discretion to use it. I cannot find any lawful way that I can exercise a discretion which would unilaterally break a very specific rule.

In making this ruling, Speaker Fraser was faced with arguments very close to those before us in the present case.

The question of the extent of the Speaker’s authority has been raised and reference has been made to the practice in the United Kingdom. The Government House Leader indicated in his comments on this question that in other jurisdictions greater use is made of the scheduling of work both in the House and in committee. It may be that the House is no longer satisfied with the manner in which the time allocation rule works. If that is so, it is for the House to consider and, ultimately, to determine what procedure will best suit its current circumstances. Planning done on the basis of consensus could be a significant benefit, not only for the business of the House but also in promoting an atmosphere of decorum and respect in which that business is conducted.

Our system has always been one which functions on the basis of rules established by the House itself. However, under our current Standing Orders, it would be highly inappropriate for the Chair to take unilateral action on issues already provided for in the Standing Orders. Where the Standing Orders give the Speaker some discretion, then it is the Speaker’s responsibility to be guided accordingly; where no such guidance is provided, no such action can be taken. It is certainly not up to the Chair to establish a timetable for the business of the House.

It is by its rules and not by the authority of the Speaker that the House protects itself from excesses, both on the Government side and on that of the opposition. The Speaker’s role is to judge each case as it arises, fairly and objectively, and in so doing, to ensure that those rules are applied as the House intended.

Speaker Lamoureux, when faced with a similar situation stated in Journals July 24, 1969, page 1398:

The Speaker is the servant of the House. Honourable Members may want me to be the master of the House today but tomorrow, when, perhaps in other circumstances I might claim this privilege, they might have a different opinion—I am not prepared at this time to take this responsibility on my shoulders. I think it is my duty to rule on such matters in accordance with the rules, regulations and Standing Orders which honourable Members themselves have turned over to the Speaker to administer.

I would also like to remind the House that the Standing Order with respect to time allocation has been invoked only once in this, the Thirty-Seventh Parliament. I have indicated clearly that this use of the Standing Order does not represent a matter of privilege. If further cases arise, the Chair will deal with them individually, on their merits. I remind the House that the Chair will not rule on hypothetical cases or on questions raised only in the abstract.

Once again, I would like to thank hon. Members for their carefully considered arguments on this question. The Chair is conscious of the importance which Members on both sides of the House attach to it.