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EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 28, 1995

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[English]

The Chairman: Welcome, everyone, as we continue our examination of the report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.

I'm pleased to welcome representatives of Reserves 2000, a coalition of Canadians concerned with security and defence matters.

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We have with us today retired Brigadier-General Peter Cameron. Along with a host of senior business appointments, Mr. Cameron served in the Canadian militia from 1948 to 1970, returning in 1975 first as commander of the Montreal Military District and then as land chief of the reserves council. Mr. Cameron is also the honorary colonel of the 48th Highlanders of Canada.

Mr. Cameron, I'll invite you to introduce the people with you. You can then make your presentations, after which we'll have questions from the members. I certainly welcome you here. I understand you had problems getting here. We thank you all the more for making the effort. I know our deliberations will be very fruitful.

The floor is yours, sir.

Brigadier-General (Ret.) Peter Cameron (Co-Chair, Reserves 2000): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

With me today are Brigadier-General George G. Bell and Lieutenant-Colonel Peter W. Hunter.

General Bell is a former colonel-commandant of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and a gentleman who has enjoyed a long and distinguished military career. In civilian life General Bell was vice-president of administration at York University and a founder of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Colonel Hunter is a co-chair of Reserves 2000 and honorary lieutenant-colonel of the Governor General's Horse Guards, which regiment he commanded a number of years ago. In civilian life Colonel Hunter is chairman of MacPhee Jesson, an advertising and public relations firm.

We welcome the opportunity to meet with you today and offer our reaction and response to the report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.

Clearly the subject of the commission's work is a matter to which we attach great importance. We believe the reserves are a vital and essential component in Canada's military. They are critical to our nation's defence and to our nation's internal and external security, and a trust that must be preserved for future generations.

The reserves, more particularly the militia, are the basis for mobilization should such ever again be necessary. History does have a habit of repeating itself, I regret to say. The reserves are the most cost-efficient element of the Canadian forces and are the point of contact for the military with the Canadian population from coast to coast.

It is not our intent, sir, to delve into extensive detail. That has been covered thoroughly in the Reserves 2000 submission to the commission, copies of which we provided the committee members a number of weeks ago, and by the commission itself. Our objective at this meeting is to register firmly three critically important points in relation to the commission's report. For your later examination, at the back of this document we've provided our position vis-à-vis each of the commission's 41 specific recommendations.

In their general philosophy and concept, we accept and support the findings of the commission. Indeed they reflect the proposals contained in the Reserves 2000 submission. To be absolutely clear, specifically we agree with: a core division brigade structure and organization; a reduction in size and number of the present headquarters; the reserves as a basis for mobilization; the absolute and critical need for a mobilization plan; the reserves as the link to communities; and the return of the communications regiment to land forces command.

There are three issues, however, about which we feel very strongly and that we feel were wrongly or improperly addressed by the commission: the number of militia brigade groups and the number of reservists, the involvement of the reserves in planning and decision-making, and the cost-effectiveness of reserves and the control of the reserves budget.

If I may, sir, I would like to invite my colleague, Peter Hunter, to take the next section.

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Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret.) Peter Hunter (Co-Chair, Reserves 2000): Thank you, Peter.

Mr. Chairman and committee members, the report envisages seven reserve brigade groups across the country, with nine to eleven units in each. At an average of ten units per brigade, this would cause 73 of the present 143 units to disappear through elimination or amalgamation. Such a reduction, in our view, is unacceptable. Reduced to such an extent, the militia would lack the critical mass necessary to meet its basic objectives of augmentation of the regular force in the short term and mobilization in the longer term.

History has taught us that amalgamating units is usually counter-productive. Normally two and two equals four. When militia units are amalgamated, most often two plus two equals two. Simply put, this means when two units are put together, the resulting unit will initially experience higher enrolment, which quickly drops to the size of one of the former units and ultimately stabilizes at that level.

Reserves 2000 strongly advocates a minimum of nine reserve brigade groups in order to meet the demographic and population demands of central Canada and the command-and-control exigencies of western Canada.

In terms of personnel, the report calls for a paid ceiling of $14,500 by 1999. This makes no sense in light of the tasking assigned to the militia by the 1994 Defence white paper, which requires the militia to provide up to 7,500 reservists to be available for assignments outside our borders or for internal security missions.

Experience has proved a minimum ratio of at least three to one is required. That is, to produce 7,500 reservists for deployment requires a pool of serving militia soldiers of 22,500 from which to draw. Therefore the absolute minimum number of reserve personnel necessary for the militia to do its job is 22,500. Also, without a critical mass of that size, there would be a dramatic reduction in the so-called footprint across the country of the military in Canada.

The reserves are different from the regulars. They require unique handling and special leadership skills. The issues with which they must deal in order to complete their militia commitments are complex and must be understood. Essentially, you cannot tell militia soldiers; you must sell them. If militia soldiers do not agree with something they are being told to do, they will simply walk.

For planning and decision-making to take place without the benefit of experienced reserve leaders is to court disaster. The acumen and knowledge of these people must be at the table. It is therefore essential that seasoned reservists play a key role and have full status at all levels of planning and decision-making for the reserves.

The commission calls for ``currently serving reservists'' to fill this role. These people must be involved, as must appropriate representatives outside the chain of command who will be objective, thoughtful and constructive and not influenced or intimidated because of position, rank or responsibility. This group includes honorary appointments, former qualified reservists and others whose opinions and points of view would be valued and respected. With this kind of contribution from all aspects of reserves experience, a reserve that will be effective, efficient and a source of pride for all Canadians will be assured.

The commission report does not include any estimates of costs or savings anticipated if their recommendations are accepted. This is a surprising omission for a commission that was tasked to make recommendations for the reserves to maximize their operational and cost-effectiveness. Before any move to a restructured militia takes place in any configuration, Canadian taxpayers will want to know what the real costs will be.

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To assist your committee, Reserves 2000 has developed a cost model you might find helpful. This is for a militia of 100 regiment- or batallion-sized units and 40 smaller-sized units and would deliver the requisite 22,500 personnel. There is additional information in the booklets we provided you earlier to support what I'm going to tell you now.

Class A pay, which is to the part-time soldier, would amount to $65 million annually. The other costs, which are listed here, are the bigger part of the package, and they come to $380 million, for a total cost of $455 million to operate the land portion of the Canadian reserve force. The cost of $455 million is $91 million lower than the comparable figure of $546 million in the 1995-96 National Defence estimates, or in other words 16.5% lower than the existing number. The militia costs of $455 million are only 4.1% of the total 1995-96 DND budget of $11.08 billion.

The Reserves 2000 financial model is for pay and operations and management only and does not include capital costs, which are impossible to separate from regular army figures. The above model is after a one-time restructuring cost, which must be quantified by DND and made available to reserve planners.

It is acknowledged that reserves deliver more bang for the buck versus their expensive regular counterparts. For example, a class A reserve corporal, which is a soldier who trains at a local armoury, is, at $4,500, 8.5% of the cost of a regular corporal, who costs $52,964. This price differential is consistent at all rank levels and will in effect deliver more than ten soldiers for the price of one, a real value to Canadian land forces and, more importantly, to the Canadian taxpayer.

Many reservists, through their civilian training and occupations, are highly qualified managers, financial planners, and administrators. These talents should be utilized by assigning the control and administration of reserves budgets to them. This concept should apply at all levels: the unit, the brigade group, division, and corps. Resources of this type have historically been ignored. There is great value here, which should be utilized by the militia and Canadian land forces.

General Bell.

Brigadier-General (Ret.) George Bell (Adviser, Reserves 2000: Mr. Chairman, committee members, there's another point of vital importance we'd like to make.

The commission's recommendations to cut the reserve regiments by 50% will deprive many communities of any military presence at all. The militia historically has represented communities across the country. Its soldiers have been drawn from these communities and its existence there has represented the army's footprint or visibility in the local area. To reduce the presence in 73 communities will have serious and negative consequences in terms of the army's image in the localities affected. It will also have a negative economic impact in each of these areas.

With this loss will go opportunities to practice good citizenship for thousands of young men and women of English, French, and other ethnic groups. The value of loyalty, dedication to unit and country, teamwork, and discipline now instilled by part-time service in our militia units will be denied to citizens of all origins. The chance to learn to put value and meaning into being Canadian, which is offered by serving in one of the only truly national organizations in this country, will be lost and the consequences to national unity, which is presently at risk in our great country, will be significant.

It will be a loss for all the other community organizations related to the local reserve units: the various Old Comrades associations, the Ladies' Auxiliary, the IODEs, the Legion branch, and the service clubs such as Rotary and Lions.

In national security terms these communities will also lose the only existing back-up to civilian police forces. In the event of civil disorders or other emergencies the lack of such back-up could have serious consequences for the communities concerned.

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In summary, the commission's report does not appear to take into account world trends in strategic defence. Our major allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, each of whom is facing the same economic pressure as Canada faces, are maintaining at least the status quo or are increasing the size of their reserves as they downsize their regular forces. These countries have correctly concluded there is more value in strong reserve forces rather than in a large and expensive regular force.

The militia units should not be cut by 50% as recommended by the commission. Militia should probably be increased from its present level by at least 50%. The funds to do this can be found in other less cost-efficient areas of the defence budget, as recommended in several recent Auditor General reports.

We therefore suggest that SCNDVA recommend against accepting the 50% cut in the numbers of Canada's reserve units as recommended by the commission. Such a deep cut will destroy the militia in a few short years and with it the mobilization base on which Canada must rely in future times of crisis. Once destroyed, it would be difficult if not impossible to ever rebuild. In short, the reserves should be increased as we downsize the regular forces in keeping with the prudent practices of our major allies.

Reserves 2000 urges the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, in its report to the Minister of National Defence, to strongly recommend, first, that there be no less than nine reserve brigades in a restructured Canadian land force, with no less than 22,500 reserve personnel; secondly, that appropriate qualified reservists with full status be included in all deliberations, planning and decision making pertaining to the reserve force; and thirdly, that proper financial accounting and monitoring processes are put in place for the reserves.

I'll now turn you back to Mr. Cameron.

BGen Cameron: Mr. Chairman, this will be the conclusion to our remarks and then we'll be available for your questions.

The commission in the concluding section of its report, entitled ``Afterword'' - for your reference, pages 72 and 73 - put forward a suggestion that this committee should make as its central recommendation to the Minister of National Defence. The commission complains here that its mandate was too narrow and that it makes no sense to study only one component of the Department of National Defence. The commission report states, ``...we were studying only one slice of a much larger and costlier apple'', and a broader study encompassing the whole defence structure and programs was needed.

Reserves 2000 advocates that no elimination or amalgamation of militia units or personnel changes be initiated until such a study has been commissioned and its report completed. While this new and expanded study, which need not be a commission and should be scheduled for completion by the end of 1996, is carried out, much progress can be made.

Many of the recent commission's concepts and proposals can be actioned concurrently, namely, the implementation of the corps division brigade group structure and organization and the assignment of all presently existing units to brigade groups or as corps or divisional troops. We believe these could both be completed by December 1996. Remember, this is running concurrently with the study we are recommending.

We also believe the development of an implementation strategy, standards and criteria for judging units for rerolling, amalgamation, or transfer to the supplementary order of battle could be completed by December 1996. The majority of the commission's 41 recommendations could be put into effect on a timely basis. These are some of the ones we referred to in the back of their books with terse comments from us as to whether we agreed or disagreed. Indeed, in most cases we agreed.

Recognize and convert the infrastructure to a new command structure, that is, the brigade division and corps group structure we were talking about: we believe that could also be done by December 1996. When I talk about infrastructure here, we're talking about supply depots, the Meaford training installation, workshops, those types of things where the infrastructure would support the forces.

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Finally, reconfigure brigade groups, utilizing the new study results - that is, the study that we're recommending take place - implementation strategy, and standards and criteria for judging units. Amalgamate or retire units, if indicated. We think this can be done in the January 1997 to December 1997 timeframe. Again, I repeat, this timetable envisages all restructuring to be completed more than a year ahead of the deadline suggested by the commission.

Mr. Chairman, that brings us to the end of our formal remarks. We'd be very happy to answer the questions of the committee for as long as you'd like.

I would draw your attention to one chart in the back of the book, not mentioned, I think, by George Bell when he was covering this section. It's called appendix A. It is a comparison of military manpower, armed forces versus reservists. I'm afraid the copy machine didn't do quite as good a job as we'd hoped it would, but it pretty much shows you what other countries are doing.

The Chairman: I think we have one of these.

BGen Cameron: If you do have the copies of Reserves 2000 commission...you'll find it's a little clearer in there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members.

The Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen.

We have a great turnout today. I'll start questions with Mr. Jacob from the Bloc Québécois.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacob (Charlesbourg): Brigadier-General Cameron, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter, Brigadier-General Bell, welcome. You have raised many issues but there is one which is not quite clear in my mind. I would like to have some clarifications.

About the effectiveness of the reserves, do you feel that there is some lack of cooperation between the regular forces and the reserves and, if so, would it be possible to improve that through a reorganisation, that is either by reducing the number of regiments or by establishing a new command structure? That is my first question.

[English]

BGen Cameron: Mr. Chairman, I would answer the question this way...and I think it addresses the heart of the relationships between the regular forces and the reserves. In fact, it is not an easy relationship. I wouldn't deny that. That probably stems from the fact that one controls the other's budgets.

In historical terms, a number of promises have been made - in terms of equipment, training areas, and that sort of thing - that have not been met. Every time that happens, a reservist tends to look to the promiser and to blame the promiser. It may not be entirely fair, but I believe this is the case.

Over the 30 years that I've been active - I guess it's really 40 years; I don't like to admit my age - I believe the reserves have had something like four major changes of roles. Again, these changes come down from the regular force. Perhaps the regular force is possibly unfairly blamed for this, but I said the relationship between the regulars and the reserves is uneasy. I think that is the right choice of words. I tried to give you a sort of smorgasbord of reasons as to why that would be so.

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As to the question of whether this would improve in a reorganization of the type we have outlined for you today, and in fact, the commission dealt with, I believe with goodwill on both sides it probably would. One of the advantages of this organization forum is that it is a functional forum, a recognizable army formation that both regulars and reserves are used to dealing with, rather than the static location concept we have now.

On the other hand, I would be less than honest if I said that going to this reorganization forum would cure all ills. It probably won't, but in this forum and structure I think there's a better chance that the enmity - that may be too strong a word - that exists between the regulars and the reserves would be lessened because command and control would be shared all the way up the command chain. My experience in business has been that the more you put people together, the more you find a cooperative effort developing.

I'm not sure if I've answered your question, but I tried. Maybe Peter Hunter or George Bell would like to say more.

[ Translation]

Mr. Jacob: I will make myself clear. Do you think that reducing the number of regiments, as the commission suggests, would allow for a reduction of the number of actors in the command structure? Could we not in this way ensure more cooperation between the command of the regular forces and the command of the reserves, in order to avoid having a whole series of regiments which all want their own identity?

[English]

LCol Hunter: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can add to the discussion. The practice of total force has been developed over the past few years and is being applied throughout the army, regulars and reserves together. It is reinforced in the commission's report, and Reserves 2000, in its submission to the commission, endorsed total force. Total force means that regulars serve with reservists and reservists serve with regulars. If this activity is intensified, I think it will tend to ameliorate the relationship between the two.

Mr. Jacob's point about fewer units and fewer command elements making it easier to reach more people - I don't think that is the basic issue. I think it's putting the people together, and this is starting to happen. I have watched it in the units that I visit from time to time, and when the regulars and the reservists work together, the pressures between the two tend to melt away.

BGen Bell: I think the key element in bringing people together is that the reservist needs to be involved in all the planning levels and decision-making affecting the reserve so that the dialogue takes place before the action is initiated.

[Translation]

M. Jacob: A while ago, you compared the pay of a corporal in the reserves and in the regular forces. You probably know better than me that, as far as the effectiveness of the reserves is concerned, we can only use 25 to 27 percent of their members.

When you suggest an increase in the number of reservists, I cannot avoid thinking of the 70 to 75 percent of those persons who take up the training but who cannot be used when the army needs them, for various reasons: they have a job, the regular forces do not want to use their expertise, etc.

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It seems to me a bit contradictory that you would want to increase the number of reservists when, on the other hand, you will only be able to use 25 to 28 percent of them. How can you reconcile these two facts? In the final analysis, the percentage of members of the reserves that can be used ends up being rather costly!

[English]

LCol Hunter: There are several questions embodied in your overall question, Mr. Jacob. First, in terms of total number of reservists, we've pointed out that on the ground for deployment purposes, you can only realize about one in three, and that may be an optimistic number. Reservists have other jobs; they go to school and they have families. There are a lot of reasons why they cannot immediately free themselves when called upon to serve with the regular army.

As you pointed out, about 25% or 30% seemed able to do that. That makes the point about the one in three, and the reservists who went to Bosnia constituted about 25% to 30% of all of the Canadians who served over there.

I think the other part of your question was about the quality of reservists vis-à-vis the regular soldier, and I think no one disagrees that a person who is training 100% of his working time will be somewhat advanced over a person who is only doing it part-time. Having said that, however, when both regular or reservists are called for duty in peacekeeping missions or whatever it might be, they are given about a 90-day intensive training program prior to being shipped off. It is the same for the reservists and the regulars. History has shown that the reservists are able to bring themselves up to the level of the regulars during that 90-day period.

I have to point out, however, that this mainly applies to the lower ranks - the private soldiers, corporals and to some extent the non-commissioned officers and junior officers. For more senior people, where the responsibilities are more complex and demanding, what I've said doesn't hold true in the same way. More training is required.

BGen Bell: One should also remember that the reserves are a pool of resources for all levels of emergency the country may have to deal with, and that within the Emergencies Act there are four levels of action that governments may take. So you're not looking just at the immediate availability of reservists in terms of our peacekeeping operations, but in areas where we might be dealing with assistance to civil authority, or floods and emergencies. At different levels of emergency affecting the interests of the country, reservists can be mobilized based on the actions of Parliament.

So you have to look at this pool for mobilization of capacities over a period of time. It isn't just the immediate day-to-day thing you're looking at. You're looking at your investment in the human capital for the future.

BGen Cameron: Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure I can address Mr. Jacob's question, because that needs a cost-analysis capability that I and my colleagues in Reserves 2000 have never been able to establish fully. However, I would point out that while it may seem inefficient that for a single assignment one might be able to rely on only one-third of the serving militia soldiers, that third is still extremely cost-efficient - probably more cost-efficient than three regulars, if you want to make that kind of comparison.

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We're talking about 4.1% of the National Defence budget. I think we came up with $455 million out of a Defence budget of some $11 billion. To us it seems like taking a hammer to a tack to pull $100 million out of the $300 million allocated to the militia, when in fact that $100 million could be found much more readily in less cost-efficient areas of DND.

I'm straying from the point you raised, and I apologize for that. I can see how you would regard its ability to produce only one-third of the serving soldiers as being a bit inefficient, but if you take George's point that we're talking about a mobilization base as well as making soldiers available for specific assignments, and that's been the case in the last few years.... It does look a little that way.

With proper cost accounting I am sure we could prove that point, but that doesn't seem to be available to anybody these days.

The Chairman: Before I go to my next questioner, I'd like to get some clarification on your conclusions and summary. In the conclusion you say that a broader study encompassing the whole defence structure and programs is needed.

Seven of us sitting around this table completed a study in 1994 and made recommendations to the government on defence policy. This commission has just completed its study on restructuring the reserves.

After these two studies - ours was probably one of the biggest ever undertaken in Canada - rather than go to the studies that you recommend be carried on over the next year and a half.... Do you think that out of these current hearings of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs we could reach these goals when our hearings end later this month or in January? Is it possible that we could make this thing work?

BGen Cameron: In an ideal world, all studying and planning is time well spent. It is the commission's recommendation that this broader study be taken, and we support it.

On the basis that you can't do too much work, particularly in these times of economic stress, diminishing world threat and advancing local threat - we think the uncertainty of the world situation merits at least continuing the study of the armed forces.

Mr. Chairman, we certainly were not trying to second-guess the work of this committee. We are very aware of the work that has been done and we are very familiar with the terms of your paper.

We're simply saying that we really ought to take another look at this apple. It changes every couple of years, and the time is probably right to do it. Because of all of the work that has gone before, we believe you can do this work in 12 months. We would envisage this committee or some subcommittee of this committee, a working group perhaps, pulling together all of the recommendations, information and facts and figures that have been available, and doing it very quickly. The purpose would be, as the commissioners said, to look at the larger, costlier apple before you make decisions on one slice of it, a decision which, if the recommendations of the commission are followed to the letter, will probably finish the militia in real terms. For the reasons we advanced, we do not wish to see that happen.

The Chairman: Thank you.

My next questioner will be Mr. Richardson.

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Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to welcome the three distinguished presenters today. These gentlemen have given freely of their time, through the years I've known them, on behalf of Canada, particularly in the area of defence and in other areas as well. They bring with them a tremendous amount of credibility.

I have two things. I'd like to start off with the general one first and not take too much time on it. We're looking at a proposed cultural change here, but this is a cultural change that requires two partners in total force. We're asking for a reserve cultural change and acceptance of a way ahead, and we're saying that indeed this time promises will be kept.

On the other hand, we've had a cultural change in the regular force from 1945 to now, because they are the key decision-makers. The reserves were high in the 1950s. The need was not seen. With the opportunities on the battlefield, as General Bell will know from when he was a brigade commander, the forces-in-being concept was in place. It was the nuclear battlefield. A target could be a squadron of tanks. We had a massive involvement in NATO in the sense that we had a full air division. We had a brigade group that was almost the size of some of the British divisions in NATO.

Now that has declined, and with the concept of forces in being, there was the attitude that there was no longer a need for reserves because mobilization would not be swift enough. This happened to the navy as well as the air force and the army. They were all in the same boat. This was the national rescue mission. I forget what we called it at the time. Someone jog my memory.

BGen Bell: It was National Survival.

Mr. Richardson: Yes, that's right. We plotted at headquarters the downwind effect of an atomic bomb. We plotted routes in and out of major centres for survival and rescue operations. It was not a bad idea at the time, if in fact those facts were in place.

Then that was over and there was a need to bring back some action. The navy always kept its plotting of shipping of federal...and I'll explain that at some stage. But the reservists had been given that job, I think, in the 1960s. I may be wrong about that.

There has always been a problem. Look at the chart. Canada's regular force hardly shows on it, and you can hardly see Canada's reserve force. The United States is almost ten times larger. Canada is not in the game. All of the cuts have been imposed to some degree by the political masters, and the cuts on the reserves have been imposed on the decisions of how the next war will be fought by the regulars.

So we have the two cultures. I think they need each other now, they badly need each other, and they don't know how to ask each other to dance. They're at the party, but no one's dancing. They want to, but no one is prepared to show.... There's some genuine goodwill shown out there by some of the senior officers on both sides, but....

That has to be overcome. I've seen it for the past fifteen years. Just charts won't solve the problem. We have a systemic problem, both in the reserves and in the regular, and it's called trust. There is mistrust on both sides.

Would anyone like to speak to that? Do you feel that is a wrong conclusion to make?

BGen Bell: The question of trust is part of the interaction of the two bodies in terms of implementing a total force and what the future will be.

Quite clearly what we have needed and what is recommended in this commission's report, which we support, is a mobilization concept, a doctrinal basis we will both share and can build upon.

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Quite clearly the issue today is to try to stop the erosion of the operational capability and work on maintaining that capability both in the regular and in the reserve as a composite element so that the tensions created by sharply proposed reductions are removed from these so that they can in fact develop the doctrine and practice for the future - working effectively together.

You had a significant number of reservists participate credibly in the missions we had over the past few years. I think the appreciation of that is there within the regular force, but when you're dealing with a constant reduction in budgets the tensions are increased by the way you apply that. So the important aspect, as we mentioned earlier, is to get people planning together at the outset so that the decisions are reached with understanding and the capabilities of the force are built...to the most effective force between the two components.

Mr. Richardson: I just have a follow-up question, Mr. Chairman.

LCol Hunter: If I may, before you go on, Mr. Richardson, on your first point, I'd like to read to you from the submission by Reserves 2000 to the commission. We said:

Mr. Richardson: On the comment about the 7,500 being available for tasking inside the country with the reserves, was that the white paper or the defence report?

BGen Cameron: That was the 1994 defence review.

Mr. Richardson: This wasn't followed up in the white paper, though. It was part of this committee's review.

BGen Cameron: I'm not sure.

Do you remember, George?

BGen Bell: It's also part of the commander land force's way ahead, as the numbers required, in order to sustain a brigade group in deployment.

Mr. Richardson: Partly through reinforcement and augmentation - sustainment?

BGen Bell: Yes.

Mr. Richardson: You covered a lot in that document. It's quite a comprehensive document and I don't think it's too out of sync with a lot of the things that were brought. But you point out where you feel you are at odds with the commission's report. I really don't have much at this time to question you on that.

I see you're asking fundamentally for some growth, based on demographics...to others, by geographics. I'm going to ask you one question that deals with command and control and its part of the structure.

All land forces headquarters across the country have a deputy commander who is a reservist. There is a feeling among some of the presenters that this position could easily become redundant and that it should be transferred to...if nothing else under the control of budget and other activities of a small headquarters for those brigade headquarters reporting there. The reason that's been presented is that there would then be a reserve commander reporting along equally with the brigade commander in each command, and they would be talking commander to commander instead of part-time deputy commander, who is out of the chain.

BGen Cameron: I'm not sure I fully comprehend the question, but it is our view that the deputy commander position as it is presently and at the higher headquarters and at the district headquarters is probably a very worthwhile position for a reservist to hold. Our point is that if this is a planning position it ought to be augmented with the addition of experienced reserve planners, not only at that level but at all planning levels down to and including battalion commanders.

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I have no problem with.... I think I understand what you're saying, that here is a militia deputy commander; is he in fact a deputy commander or does he represent and advise the commander on the...?

Mr. Richardson: The comments you're receiving here are from former deputy commanders. There's a feeling of that.

Why would they want the three full colonels reporting directly to the major-general? This schematic doesn't make a lot of sense to me. The militia brigades are reporting directly to the commander.

BGen Cameron: To the divisional commander - in ours.

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

BGen Cameron: That is pretty typical army structure. If there is some reason why they shouldn't, I suppose we would be perfectly willing to have a look at that.

Mr. Richardson: In this case, though, if we accept your recommendations we'll have three brigades reserve and one brigade regular in each of the commands except the Atlantic command.

BGen Cameron: No, senator, I think our call is for nine brigades overall, just a minor difference. So in our scheme we would have three brigades in the west. Not that in western Canada you find it so easy to justify on population, but when you consider the huge mass of western Canada and the problems with command and control that it would present, you almost are forced to consider three brigades.

An important distinction that we see in the brigade scenario is that we recognize we might have what one might term ``light'' brigades and ``heavy'' brigades, not in World War II terms but in the sense of numbers of units belonging. So we might have three lighter brigades in western Canada, three heavier brigades in Ontario, because in Ontario it appeared that the commission did not take into account demographics of the population and did not take into account the geography of the province. So if you add all those things up and do your additions and subtractions, you might come up with three heavier brigades. In Quebec we might have two brigades, which more or less, on a population basis, represent about what they should have, and Atlantic Canada, simply because of its separation, probably would earn the right to what we would have called a light brigade with not quite so many units in it. If that makes any sense.

Mr. Richardson: That's fine. Thank you very much.

LCol Hunter: If you would like to look in appendix 2, under point 6 of the commission's recommendations, the Reserves 2000 comment says:

The Chairman: That's an argument.

LCol Hunter: - to represent the views of the reserves at the table with their regular counterpart. I think it's important that the reservists not be simply advisers but actually people with standing and with the ability to make decisions, as well as just provide information.

The Chairman: That's one of the comments we had from different people. The commission recommended a colonel, let's say...and you and others are saying a brigadier-general. I'll defer this to my military colleagues to argue for or against.

One of the reasons they said a colonel was that this would then allow more money. I understand what you're saying, and Mr. Mannix also brought this to our attention...that then you're setting up two different organizations between the regulars and reserves again.

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BGen Cameron: Mr. Chairman, if I could make one point here, I frankly don't think we're fussed about whether it's a colonel or a brigadier-general. The fact of the matter is these are training brigades. The configuration is strictly a hypothesis. It's not really a brigade, nor a brigade group; it's a training brigade. It'll never go to war in that configuration.

As a training brigade, perhaps a full colonel is sufficient to command that. In the case of the regular force, you clearly have a brigade group and it should be commanded by a brigadier.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Frazer.

Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Cameron, General Bell, Colonel Hunter, welcome. It's good to be back in your company again.

I would like to say I agree with your summary recommendation that appropriate, qualified reservists be part and parcel of the deliberations, planning and decision-making. I think that's vital if there's to be a mutual understanding between the regular and the reserve forces.

I also agree with your proposition that a proper financial-model accounting and monitoring process be put in place for the reserves. A recurring theme we've had from the witnesses who have appeared before us is the difficulty to capture the costs of the reserves' activity. I think that's maybe one of the more vital things that has to be captured before we get too deeply into it.

I would like to pick up on our chairman's comments a few moments ago with regard to your concern. You quoted from the commission where they were studying one slice of a much larger and costlier apple, but a broader study encompassing the whole defence structure and programs was needed. If that study were to be commissioned, what would you see as being its mandate?

I ask that because, as the chairman mentioned, many of us were part of the special joint commission on Canada's defence forces and we studied things in fairly good detail; we weren't able to get into the nitty-gritty on a number of things. The government adopted much of that in the white paper, although they did reject our recommendation that there be a study of national defence headquarters and its relationship.

What would you suggest as being the mandate of a study to look at the whole apple?

BGen Cameron: I'm going to call on my colleague, Dr. Bell, to answer that.

BGen Bell: Without defining a whole mandate here, the first and most important thing would be to have a mandate to look at how you maintain the greatest operational capability in the Canadian forces.

Mr. Frazer: Would you start that with NDHQ?

BGen Bell: I would include NDHQ in the whole package. I think you need to look at the whole.

The difficulty, as in the question posed by the chairman earlier, is that some of the options to find the resources to make the savings were not looked at. You cut the reserves first or you cut the regular force first, and you're not looking at the other soft areas identified by the Auditor General.

So the thing is to look at the whole, with having as your primary objective maintaining the best operational capability regular and reserve for the forces. If you have that as your objective at the top, then you can in fact look at all the package and see how it actually contributes to maintaining that objective. That means you aren't savaging the capital program but you're looking at whether the structure we have supporting the forces now is overburdened with capabilities that it no longer needs or that are no longer required.

The problem with looking at one slice, as this looked at, is you looked at that slice separately from everything else and didn't look at the alternatives to making that cut. I think the key thing is you have to have a primary objective that starts your mandate, and then you can detail the mandate out from there. The reserve commission was far too structured and too narrowly drawn to allow for any movement to look at the other alternatives to making those cuts.

Mr. Frazer: Thank you, General Bell. I'll put on my political hat for a minute and say I don't really agree with any of the structure of the regular or the reserve forces that the government has brought in. I question whether there has been sufficient study given to them on exactly the points you've raised.

The commission recommended that reserve units, wherever possible, be used as units, as opposed to piecemeal substitution of reservists into regular force platoons, companies, and so on. Do you agree with this? Do you support this recommendation and do you see it as being a distinct possibility, or is there a problem with this?

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BGen Cameron: I'll let my colleagues answer if their answer differs from mine, but no, we see that as the only way to proceed.

Mr. Frazer: If that were to be the case, what would you say would be the minimum amount of notice required for a reserve unit to bring that unit, whether it would be a platoon, or a company, or a battalion, up to speed so that they could be inserted into an actual operational commitment and fulfil the responsibilities adequately?

BGen Cameron: Well, sir, to some extent that's being done now, certainly in Ontario.

Mr. Frazer: No, I'm talking about...let's look at Bosnia, Croatia, or this type of thing.

BGen Cameron: Well, if we were starting from the start line now, I would say it would take a year to eighteen months for a militia unit. This is starting from now, starting fresh.

Mr. Frazer: What size?

BGen Cameron: A unit of say, 300, in order to produce a 100-man company for deployment elsewhere, I would say, if you're starting from scratch. But as I was trying to say, senator, in Ontario at least - and I don't have detailed knowledge of the other areas of the country, but I believe this to be the case as well - most major units, certainly the three units represented at this table, already are doing that.

My whole regiment will produce one company, formed and ready to go at any time you call it. That's on sort of a training basis. You have to overlay the point that your colleague Mr. Jacob made, that if you call up a company - and let's say for the sake of argument it's a company of the 48th Highlanders - you're not going to get the full 120-man company. They'll go out on a training scheme with lots of notice, but to get them to do overseas service, for the reasons that the senator mentioned - they do have families, and they do have businesses - you will get a third of them. That's what we're saying.

Mr. Frazer: What I'm looking for is the actual capability of the militia to provide a company, in this case, a full company to participate as a part of a battalion in Bosnia.

BGen Cameron: Forgetting the constraints of civilian job, families, and...?

Mr. Frazer: No.

BGen Cameron: Including that.

Mr. Frazer: I'm asking how much notice is required to produce.... You want to work in units. Now we're talking about actually utilizing a militia unit as an effective force. Are you saying we can't do that?

BGen Cameron: No, what I'm saying is you can task a militia unit to produce a company, a squadron, or a battery, and they will do that. When you say, okay, now we're going to take that battery, or squadron, or company, and we're going to send it over to Bosnia -

Mr. Frazer: Yes, I'm tasking them for that duty.

BGen Cameron: - you won't get the full 120-man company, battalion, or battery. You can't; you won't get them. You'll get a third of them, or maybe you'll get a half of them. But you can't take that formed unit as is, where it is, and shift it over for its 30- or 60-day indoctrination training and send it overseas.

Mr. Frazer: Am I understanding you correctly, then, that you're saying the commission's recommendation, with which you agree, doesn't work except for a training unit? It doesn't work for an operational unit that you can commit to action.

BGen Cameron: If we assume that the job-protection legislation is enacted, yes, you could.

BGen Bell: The other thing that I think needs to be looked at here is, when the commission was talking about subunits - and you have platoons and troops that can be developed in much shorter time now - given three months' notice, some of the units in the armoured element, some of the artillery, and some of the infantry could in fact produce trained platoons with their platoon commander ready to go. With six months' notice, you might produce two or three platoons.

A company task would take much longer, largely because of the volume you have to develop. But the capabilities of building subunits and the possibility of using subunits in missions is there now. It's a question of tasking from the commands in areas to in fact ensure that it happens.

LCol Hunter: If many of the 41 recommendations of the commission that would give substance to the reserve soldier - in other words, the days of pay and all the things that made him a pretty regular attendee - were put in place, and the total army establishment, which is the numerical content of the unit was put in place, and that has not been done yet, that would provide units of close to 300 in a major unit - an infantry battalion, an armoured regiment, and so on.

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If the 300 soldiers were there, and it was made possible by the implementation of the recommendations of the commission, you would then have 300 soldiers in a unit. It probably could, on 90 days' notice, produce a company-strength unit to go, out of the 300.

Mr. Frazer: What about consolidating those units to form a battalion? Is that possible? For instance, at Workpoint barracks, before the PPCLI were off to Croatia, I saw units on parade with militia. This was evident by their berets, and so on, which were on parade with them.

Because they did it there, this would sort of fly in the face if you're saying you can't put two units together and have them work efficiently.

BGen Cameron: Could I make a point? Incidentally, I'll make apologies to the chairman. I know I've been promoting you all by calling you senators.

A voice: That's not a promotion, though.

Mr. Frazer: We were looking for an apology, actually.

BGen Cameron: My father always said when you're in doubt, promote.

The Chairman: The only thing different is the tenure.

BGen Cameron: To respond to your question, I would answer it this way. We have the example of the 27th Brigade. It was a consolidation of units in battalion formation. You had the highland battalion, which I think had four highland regiments in it. Each one was of a company size. For an action, you could do that. There's no question about that.

If that's what the commission was recommending, I wouldn't have any problem with that. You put these four companies that four of these infantry units can produce together and train them up as a company on a collective exercise and you've got no problem whatever. In fact, that's what goes on at summer concentrations anyway. So, yes, you could do that.

We were addressing what we believed to be the commission's recommendation. In getting down to the number of 70, which is 7 brigades of 10 units each, they would, in order to do that, be eliminating and amalgamating units.

The point Colonel Hunter was making was that amalgamating militia units doesn't work. Soldiers join units; they don't join the army per se.

Mr. Frazer: Then how do they work together when you put them into a battalion? The 27th, if I may, is a coat of another colour, because a lot of those people had war experience.

BGen Cameron: It works fine. There's no problem as long as he is representing an active company of his regiment in some kind of training formation or field formation. He's wearing his own hat badge. He has his own company commander, platoon commander, and sergeant major. Yes, it can work.

Mr. Frazer: How about the deficiency identified by Colonel Hunter, I think it was, who said that this works fine at the platoon level, but when you get into the more senior ranks of company commander or battalion commander, as they lack the experience of dealing with this type of activity all the time, that would take much longer to develop?

BGen Cameron: You can answer that one.

LCol Hunter: That's a slightly different issue. It's easier to train up junior ranks for quick deployment because -

Mr. Frazer: I understand that. This is why I was asking how long would it take you to form a unit. Would it be necessary to parachute regular force officers into that unit to make it work?

LCol Hunter: No. In a reserve battalion or regiment, there are enough officers that you could certainly field qualified...at the company or squadron level, officers included. You couldn't field a whole regiment, but at the company, squadron, or battery level, you could.

Mr. Frazer: The commission also recommended what they called ``permeability'', which is letting reserves serve with regulars, and regulars serve more regularly with the reserves. Do you support that one as well?

BGen Cameron: Yes.

Mr. Frazer: This is the idea of getting them to know each other better in total -

LCol Hunter: Yes, we do; that's total force, really.

Mr. Frazer: All right. When you calculated your cost of $65 million, I think it was, for reservists, was that based on the 36 days of activity during the September to May timeframe? Was that also taking into account the current rank structure, or was that the reduced rank structure as recommended by the commission?

LCol Hunter: It is worked on a blended rate. It takes from the lieutenant-colonel down to the private soldier and works out a per diem of $70, which is the generally accepted number.

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Mr. Frazer: But they reported that there was a surfeit of senior officers, senior ranks, in the organization now. Did you dilute that or did you leave it at the present level?

LCol Hunter: We took the total army establishment complement, which has been designed by the regular force, and put that number of officers into the model. We did it on 40 days, not 36.

We don't know what happened to the month of June. We feel June should be put back into the calendar, and it should be for the period September through June, because that is the training year of the reserve units. They then go to summer concentration at some point during July or August. But the training year historically has been from right after Labour Day through until the end of June.

Mr. Frazer: I have more, Mr. Chairman, but I suspect you're going to cut me off very shortly - you usually do. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you.

We'll go to Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Bertrand (Pontiac - Gatineau - Labelle): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a couple of questions on a few things you mentioned in your report.

On page 12, you say, ``These talents should be utilized by assigning the control and administration of Reserves' budget to them''. By ``them'' I presume you mean some of the reservists. Are you suggesting that the reserves have their own budgets? If that is not the case, how much arm's length freedom should be given to the reserves regarding their own budgets?

That's my first question; I'll give you both my questions right away.

On recommendation 41, which deals with job creation, you say it is ``A great idea that is rife with problems!'' Could you just elaborate on that, on where and what those problems are?

BGen Cameron: Well, I'll take a crack at the reserve budget question. Could you restate that question so I make sure I've got it right?

Mr. Bertrand: Okay. Referring to what you say on page 12, what I'm asking is, are you suggesting that the reserve have their own budgets?

BGen Cameron: That's what I thought you said, but I wasn't sure.

No, we are not. Many of our members in Reserves 2000 would advocate that the reserves have a separate budget, say a pegged percentage of the national defence budget. There are good reasons why they would make that recommendation. It would be something that could be counted on; it couldn't be pirated away; it couldn't be used for purposes other than for the welfare and well-being of the militia. There are many good reasons.

But the consensus of opinion across the country is that we don't need to take that step provided we have consistency of policy-making, consistency of application. It isn't necessary to have a separate budget. But I certainly concede there are very good reasons for doing so.

Have I answered the question?

Mr. Bertrand: Yes.

LCol Hunter: On your second question, Mr. Bertrand, on recommendation 41 of the commission, the concept is laudable. The idea of assuring a reservist that he is going to be allowed time away from his regular job in order to train with his reserve unit is a wonderful idea.

The types of problems that can occur are that when a person applies for a job at a given company or organization and they discover he's a reservist and they are going to be compelled to give him extra time, maybe top up his pay and that sort of thing, they're going to say, ``Well, there's another fellow over here who's not a reservist, and we'll take him instead.'' I think there's a real potential for problems there.

If indeed - and this is political dynamite - the Government of Canada decided that all able-bodied young people between the ages of 18 and 22, for example, were to serve in the reserves, then they could put in legislation telling employers what they had to do, because everybody would have to do it, but when it's a voluntary thing, it will create employment problems for those people who are in the reserves.

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There is an organization.... I don't know whether John Eaton has been here or not, but he represents an organization that goes out and implores employers to indeed support reservists. They're having some success. Without the necessity for all people to serve, I think you would be creating more problems than you would solve. But the idea is lovely.

Mr. Bertrand: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Hart, do you want to piggyback on this?

An hon. member: He wants his own space.

The Chairman: Fine. Continue, Mr. Hart.

Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you very much for coming before us today. I would like to congratulate you on the format that you've chosen to present to the committee. It makes it a lot easier for us to see exactly what you're thinking. I wish more groups would have adopted this format of saying what they think about each particular recommendation.

I'd like to clarify what you mentioned in terms of a couple of areas where you disagree. One is on the number of reservists and the number of brigade groups. The other point you've raised is that you feel there should be an expanded commission or a group or body to look at the bigger picture. Does that mean that where you say you agree with these recommendations, you agree if those three conditions are met? In other words, if we don't have 22,500 and we don't change the number of brigade groups, you don't agree with what's in the document you've presented?

BGen Cameron: I think where we've indicated agreement, we agree, so whether there were five or ten brigade groups we'd still agree, because we are really talking about things that improve the lot of the individual militia soldier. It is you gentlemen, the minister, the Prime Minister and cabinet who will decide ultimately what the correct defence strategy should be vis-à-vis the reserves. We are trying to make the point that it is critical to Canada's defence policy to have a viable and strong reserve, at least to the level we're recommending.

Mr. Hart: It is critical, then, to have 22,500 reservists. That is the absolute minimum militia.

BGen Cameron: That is our belief.

Mr. Hart: Then you wouldn't agree with instituting any of these recommendations unless 22,500 was the militia level. Is that right?

LCol Hunter: Perhaps I could step in. The way the commission reported there was really a philosophical and conceptual portion to their report, leading into 41 specific recommendations. We agree with the concept and the philosophy of the thing. We think they made a mistake in the number of brigades by two, which are necessary to do the job in Canada. So we have an argument with them there.

We also feel that at 14,500 soldiers, which they advocated, there are not enough to do the tasking that has been put before the militia. Having said that, of the 41 recommendations, many are not at that conceptual level. They are day-to-day operating, make-the-pay-system-work issues, which you can't disagree with. So where we say we agree, we agree regardless of what happens on the bigger issues, but we feel very strongly about the bigger issues.

Mr. Hart: You've stated that 22,500 was the minimum. What was your optimum number or the most efficient number you would like to see? Did you have one?

BGen Cameron: No, there are some doctrinal issues here that could give you a guideline.

BGen Bell: If you look back a little in distance to 1987, we were talking about a reserve structure of 90,000 with 25,000 supplementary reserve and 65,000 primary reserve. As the adjustments took place in defence policy and our posture within NATO, we came down to 45,000, and then we came down progressively to where we are now at 29,000 overall, including navy, air force and militia.

.1650

The numbers we have, at 25,000, are really a floor. You really should be looking at close to double that if you want a solid mobilization base in the country. As we said, it should more likely be twice as much, but in the area of 22,500 or 35,000 would be the appropriate planning base.

You may not have those in terms of paid positions here, but at least you should be looking at how you would develop forces of different sizes for different emergencies. Therefore, you need to have a planning base from which to work.

Mr. Hart: The other question I have....

Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, could I piggyback for a minute?

Mr. Hart: Sure, go ahead.

Mr. Mifflin: Mr. Chairman, this is one of the fundamental assumptions made here, and I'd like to ask - it's really paramount to your number of 22,500, which we take seriously, coming from you - where you get the figure of 7,500.

BGen Bell: I think in the development of the way ahead by the land force commander in terms of what was required to support the mission of the deployment of the brigade group, he saw 7,200 to 7,500 as being the number that would be necessary to put a brigade group overseas and begin to sustain it.

Mr. Mifflin: In fact, your report says ``white paper''. I can assure you it's not in the white paper; nor was it in the standing committee's study. We didn't talk numbers. If it is in the land forces planning document, then that's -

BGen Bell: That's where it is.

Mr. Mifflin: Okay, that's fine. Thank you.

BGen Bell: Sorry for that slip. Cross it out.

BGen Cameron: We won't hold you to it.

Mr. Mifflin: Thanks, Jim.

Mr. Hart: No problem.

The other point, I suppose, is that the Minister of Defence has said we're constrained to a certain number, which is lower than your number. So we're in a very difficult position when it comes to that. We could oppose that, but I doubt very much the finance minister would agree with that recommendation. I may, but the minister wouldn't.

BGen Cameron: Could I respond this way? It is our understanding, from a number of sources, that the number of 14,500 was budget-driven and not really arrived at by a process of taking a look what Canada's strategic defence should be. If the number was budget-driven, that implied a certain amount of saving. We have heard figures from many sources that suggest the army would be required, under the aegis of both Mr. Martin and the minister, to produce savings of about $1 billion a year.

In very round terms, $900 million of that was to come from the regular force and $100 million of the militia's $300 million was to come from the militia. That is a cut of one third, budget wise, versus a cut of 10% for the rest of the army's budget.

I've heard those from very reliable sources. I don't want to embarrass anybody here, but the minister is also aware of these numbers. I can personally attest to that. I think what we're saying is that if Mr. Martin and the government want to save $1 billion from the army, perhaps it would be more prudent for the army to look elsewhere in areas less cost-efficient than the militia to find that $100 million that's coming from militia.

Mr. Hart: So we can find efficiencies in other places. Is the feeling, then, that the reserve is kind of taking a bad rap on this one?

BGen Bell: I think what we're saying also is that it's imprudent to make a cut in operational capability and that it's not in the interest of national security to do so without investigating the other areas in which the saving is required to be made. We're not saying the defence budget has to be increased. We're saying that, within the total pie, there are other ways of looking at it.

What we are concerned about is that there is sort of tunnel vision here, even with the commission's report, because it was restricted so much by the mandate it was given. If you looked elsewhere - and again, going back to having the operational requirement as the primary objective - you would find different solutions.

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LCol Hunter: The amount for the reserve militia in 1995-96 was $546 million. Our model shows that it can be done for $455 million while achieving these numbers. The problem of the $546 million is that a lot of it gets eaten up and we can't find out where it goes. The blue book produced by the government shows that as the number, but it sure doesn't get to the reserve units. So the accounting problems come up and rear in our face and we can't get -

Mr. Hart: Where is it lost? In the levels of bureaucracy in the department?

LCol Hunter: We don't know. We can't find it.

BGen Cameron: The allocation of capital costs - no one can tell us where and how much of that is being charged to the militia. If you took a normal capital item like ten new tanks that the militia would get to use two out of every four weekends, a charge out of that capital budget probably should be made to the militia. That is what I would do as a businessman, but we can't find any record of how those capital allocations are charged against the militia.

Mr. Hart: Should that be acceptable to Canadians?

BGen Cameron: Absolutely not.

Mr. Hart: So it's just unbelievable.

BGen Cameron: If the Canadian public were aware of the deficiencies in DND accounting.... It may be that it's systemic, it may have been going on for years, but we simply have to get to the bottom of this. I think the regular force would benefit from this as much as we would, because the only way you can come to an intelligent decision - I am speaking as a businessman here - is to have a firm, accurate cost base. Then you can make decisions.

LCol Hunter: I won't mention any names, but we know of a former senior officer in the Canadian army who was recently called back into service for a particular project. He was paid at his former level, which was substantial, in the range of $150,000, and he was charged to the militia. What he is doing has nothing to do with the militia, but it was a good spot to tuck in that particular charge.

Mr. Hart: I think that happens quite often in the cadet organization as well.

LCol Hunter: That's why the number is $546 million in the budget. If it was properly administered it would only have to be $455 million, and would produce a bigger group of people.

Mr. Hart: The other area I'd like to touch on is in the province of British Columbia. It seems to me the reserve and maybe the army in British Columbia is getting the shaft as well. CFB Chilliwack will be closed and we will have no land force regular base. What will that do to the militia structure in the province of British Columbia? Is it good enough to say that Edmonton can look after it?

BGen Cameron: We don't believe it is. When we say we were talking...Reserves 2000 right across the country. As you are aware, we have 14 co-chairmen representing every area of the country. We have heard from our colleagues in British Columbia just what damage that will do to the military footprint in that province. In our model we recognize that single remaining presence, that being the militia, ought to be preserved.

Mr. Hart: I think there is a strategic importance there because of our increasing trade with the Asia-Pacific. Looking at that, would you agree that there's a solid reason why we should have a presence in British Columbia?

BGen Cameron: It may be a stretch to suggest that in terms of our foreign policy or trading policy the presence of a dozen militia units would be important.

Mr. Hart: I'm talking about them being combined with the regular forces as well.

BGen Cameron: There is no question. It's the most important seaboard, with due deference to those who live on the east coast. The trading patterns are all the other way. So we agree with you.

Mr. Hart: Okay.

I'm getting too much agreement. I can't think of anything else. Okay, we'll quit for now. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: The next questioner has a couple of points that I know he wants to bring up, and then he'll go on from there. One is the footprint and the other is the size of his riding.

Mr. O'Reilly (Victoria - Haliburton): Mr. Chairman, you could always talk about the fact that Lucy Maud Montgomery is from St. Albert, Ontario. You didn't want me talking about that.

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Gentlemen, thank you for attending. I want to compliment you on the way you put your report together. I'm impressed. Some people come in here and slam the report, and some come in and compliment a very specific part of it. Yours, although I would like more clarification on certain points, agrees with some and disagrees with others.

Mr. Chairman, to me a footprint is something that's left. I know it's a military term, but to me a footprint is something that's left. So when we talk about British Columbia and a lot of reserve units in Ontario and Quebec being just a footprint - people will say that's where they used to be. So I would ask that the report change that to ``presence'' as the operative word.

In number 30 you say the commission recommends the equipment required and so on. You indicate that this is urgent and you talk about access and distance by units. Are you talking about west only, or are you talking about Ontario and Quebec?

Before somebody tags onto that, I had a letter from someone who claimed to be from Reserves 2000. Now I'll have to check out their qualifications. I didn't bring it with me, but they had indicated something entirely different from this report. I don't know if they were trying to create something that didn't exist, or whether actually they were part of you. I was surprised after reading the letter and then reading this -

BGen Cameron: Let us know the name, and we'll tell you.

Mr. O'Reilly: I will.

Second, in your cost model, who did these numbers? Where were they derived from? What is your opinion on the limiting factors in dollars versus numbers? Someone gives us a budget and then we decide what the numbers should be from that budget, but I think you're coming at it from a different point of view: here are the numbers, work it into the budget. I was particularly thrilled to see Mr. Hart advocating that we should have a bigger budget.

Those would be my basic questions.

LCol Hunter: I will attempt to answer your questions on point 30 of the commission's recommendations. Training centres are contemplated across the country. The only one functioning at the moment is the new set-up at Meaford, Ontario. So the units in southern Ontario have access to a training centre that is reasonably close to where the units are located. They can go there and there is grouped equipment and that sort of thing. The procedures that have been put in place to take over that equipment for a training period and so on are running very well. It's a good set-up.

Others are being contemplated - one at Gagetown; I forget where the others are - but they will still be a long way from many of the units. It is very difficult for a unit doing a training weekend to access the equipment when they have to spend a big part of the weekend getting to and from it. That's what we mean when we say access must be reasonably close in order for it to be a viable proposition, in order for units to be able to take advantage of the equipment.

Mr. O'Reilly: Is this where your nine versus seven comes in?

LCol Hunter: That's part of it.

Mr. O'Reilly: Is it only in the west?

LCol Hunter: The Maritimes will have a problem. I think the training centre is to be at Gagetown -

Mr. Mifflin: It's at Aldershot.

LCol Hunter: That's great for the units close to Aldershot, but for the ones in.... The Maritimes is a big area. Getting there to do a weekend training exercise will be difficult because they'll consume a good part of the weekend just getting to the place and back again.

Mr. O'Reilly: On 41 - a great idea, but rife with problems - do you not agree that people in civilian roles that are considered primary function should not be included in that type of legislation, or do you think it should be general legislation and not specific to the job?

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For instance, people in emergency services or on specific call could be exempted from legislation that requires the job protection legislation in number 41.

BGen Cameron: My understanding is that those in EMO are exempted, in any event. So it would apply to those who are not already tasked to emergency positions in the emergency organization.

I think I'm right on that, George?

BGen Bell: Yes, I think you are. The question here is, are there other emergency roles with specialized employment where people shouldn't be excluded from this legislation? I would think that in writing it for an emergency situation, you would define those categories of people, as has happened in provincial legislation in a number of cases.

Mr. O'Reilly: Do you see getting the role of the reservists in being called out to disasters changed from a local disaster now when a request from a municipal council to the provincial government is required to have a call-out? Do you see that as part of a change that should be in place?

BGen Cameron: I have never heard any serious criticism of the present process in calling out the reserves municipality by municipality, or for that matter -

Mr. O'Reilly: We have, so I just wondered if -

BGen Cameron: I think that's certainly something that should be addressed if there is a problem. If it's a cumbersome process, too lengthy, there are too many bureaucratic obstacles in the way, then certainly it should be addressed.

Mr. O'Reilly: Okay.

Mr. Mifflin: There's a problem with the pay. You can't get paid.

Mr. O'Reilly: You didn't yet answer my question on the cost model. You come up with a cost model that I could spend some time discussing, but I just wanted to know who exactly draws the parameters for your cost model.

LCol Hunter: The basic numbers we started with are in the National Defence estimates; that was where we started. We also have made assumptions. When you have a moment, if you would refer back to our original submission to the commission, there's a great deal more detail in there.

We didn't attempt to give all the background. But we have used generally accepted accounting principles, such as those used by the army, like the cost per man per day, the number of training days, etc. All of that is laid out, and from there it becomes simple arithmetic, really.

Under these other costs a study was made by Colonel Brian MacDonald. He analysed the other costs, which are operating and maintenance costs generally. There is detailed information on that in that earlier document that explains how those numbers....

It comes out to something like $5.75 in other costs for every dollar of pay. So all of that is explained in considerable detail in that other document, but we thought it would be too much for today to try to -

BGen Cameron: But based on published sources, I think that's the key point here.

Mr. O'Reilly: Okay. That was my question and it was answered well.

I have another question. You don't have to answer it if you don't want to. When you come here are you intimidated by the military wall here?

BGen Cameron: A military wall?

Mr. O'Reilly: We have here two ex-servicemen, a retired rear admiral and a retired brigadier-general. I didn't know if we had a military wall here. I may be the only reservist here, who's out of the reserves -

LCol Hunter: I'm a reservist.

BGen Cameron: I'm a reservist.

Mr. O'Reilly: Oh, oh. Okay.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I'm going to go to Mr. Frazer for one question, and then I'm coming to Mr. Mifflin. I see no one else. Probably the bells will be ringing. We have another item of business before we conclude.

Mr. Frazer: I want to turn to the availability of the militia. I noticed that in recommendation 17 the commission recommended that retiring service personnel be in the supplementary reserve for a period of 5 years, or at age 55, I think, and then on.

It struck me a bit that if this force was properly utilized, these supplementary reserve people might very well be able to provide the substitutes for primary reservists called to active duty. That is, they are disciplined, not necessarily expert, in the regime in which they are going to be employed. But the employer would know that they're not looking for a long-term job, and they are experienced and capable because they've come from a background that says they are well-disciplined and intelligent.

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Do you think this would provide a potential for overcoming some of the drawbacks we have when we try to call up a primary reservist to active duty? Would it still be necessary to institute legislation, or would this help out the situation?

BGen Bell: I think the supplementary reserve list, if properly maintained with the capabilities related to the individuals, is there to be used in the way you talk about. In fact in some of the situations we have called out medical people from the supplementary reserves to provide service to people in Bosnia and other places. So the operation is there.

The supplementary reserve has broader possibilities for the future, if broader study is done. Again you may well be able to just go beyond the list recommended by this commission. You could have some framework of organized structures within a supplementary reserve, with fewer training days as a means of getting the specialist groups you need.

So a number of capabilities surrounding the supplementary reserve could be developed.

Mr. Frazer: You paid rather short shift to this recommendation. In your response you said you agreed in principle, but we're just going to require a lot of -

BGen Cameron: Well, because we all know the supplementary reserve very well, and we know that.... If we were being very specific, we would have said DND should establish a senior level task force, probably of six or seven people, with the objective of taking a good, hard, analytical look at the supplementary reserve. It would categorize it, make sure it was up to date, make sure it can be broken down by geography.

Therefore, in the event of the very situation you have brought up, perhaps a unit or a brigade headquarters could reach out to a specialist, a vehicle bank, or a weapons tech, and either utilize them in some local unit task or make them available, if they are available and want to go for an overseas posting or some internal national security.

Mr. Frazer: I just have a closing comment. Right now it appears to me that supplementary reservists basically drop into sort of an empty bag, and nobody hears from them again. It's a resource that is perhaps grossly underutilized.

BGen Cameron: It certainly is. I can speak from personal experience. I go up to Downsview once a year, sign my name three times, and that's it. But I don't do that any more, because I'm over 65 now.

The Chairman: Mr. Mifflin.

Mr. Mifflin: Thank you, Mr. Proud. On behalf of all my colleagues I want to welcome the three gentlemen here today.

General Bell, it's nice to see you again; it's been some time. It's always a pleasure.

General Cameron, Colonel Hunter, welcome.

Mr. Chairman, some of my questions have been addressed, so I'll just accept the discussion and for the sake of clarify and brevity just get on to the items that concern me.

The Chairman: I'd just like to clarify that we'll probably be hearing the bells at 5:15 p.m., as I understand.

Mr. Frazer: It's 5:30 p.m.

The Chairman: It's 5:30 p.m.? Thank you. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. Mifflin: When we did our study.... As the chairman said, seven of the ten here were on the joint committee. So our background is not just this report but the report we compiled that led to the study.

One of the things we heard from the reservists, the militia, the CDA and honorary colonels who appeared in front of us was that whatever was happening with the militia right now wasn't right, and it needed to be fixed.

One of the things you made note of.... I'm glad I know where you got your 7,500....that is not totally compatible with the white paper, as I see it. We'll write that out of the assumptions.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but if I've understood it, one of the difficulties with the militia, as it is now set up.... I may be out by 2 or 3, but I have it in my mind that we have about 140 militia units in Canada. In Ontario there are 40. Some of these have 27 people in a unit, whereas some others have 10 times that many, 270.

I doubt this is the case for the 48th Highlanders, but perhaps it is for the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, whose company is in Corner Brook.

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So my understanding was that the militia considered this to be a difficult issue. I understand equally from the tenor of the report from the commission that they were hoping that by their recommendation to reorganize they would avoid this. Is that an oversimplification?

BGen Cameron: No, I think not. That's absolutely right. The strength of militia units does vary. There are reasons for this variance, and they cover a wide spectrum. Occasionally you don't have a good leader, so a militia unit's strength will drop.

Occasionally, and more often than not, the militia unit loses its appeal to the young men and women it attracts, because it doesn't have enough training, because of a lack of training areas. It can't pay them on time, because somebody screwed up the pay system. It can't provide the training equipment, the guns and ammunition to make an exciting life, which, after all, is what young people are looking for when they join the....

So units do go up and down, not in a wide graph, but inevitably, even in consistently good units, there is a variation for those and perhaps other reasons as well.

I would like to say on behalf of Reserves 2000 that we recognize that where a unit consistently has persuaded.... There is an example quoted in the commission's report on page 27. That unit really shouldn't exist; we don't argue with that.

Where this has happened - and it can happen - I think the commission is right: that unit should be eliminated, or, if it can be, perhaps amalgamated with some neighbouring unit, always bearing in mind the footprint, your definition -

Mr. O'Reilly: The ``impression'' for the present.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

BGen Cameron: The value of that can't be overstated. We are deadly serious about this. All you have to do is go to St. Catharines or any town, community or village in this country that has a militia unit. It's there, and has links and ties with the entire community.

So I can't overstate the importance of that, however we define it.

Mr. Mifflin: No, and I think all members of the committee appreciate that.

LCol Hunter: Mr. Mifflin, if I may remind you, on page 17 of what we've presented today there is an implementation strategy and standards and criteria for judging units for rerolling, amalgamation or transfer to the supplementary order of battle. We do recognize that some have to go or have to be changed, and we would be naive to think otherwise.

Mr. Mifflin: Rank recommendation 10 in the report gives the criteria for judging the units that would have to be looked at very closely. Thank you very much.

I'd like to now go on to the next question. I have looked at the overall tenor of the report and your recommendation that we have another study. Quite frankly what concerns me, not just as parliamentary secretary but as a previous member of the military, is that if we keep studying ourselves, we may not be able to do what we're supposed to be doing. The Somalia commission particularly has been very bothersome, but apart from that, it has taken up a lot of time.

As a personal thing I always feel that if you're doing 75% negative stuff and only 25% positive stuff, you better look at your whole operation and see what you're doing.

With that background I'm not precisely clear on the overall, bigger picture you want us to have a look at. We just finished 10 months and 1,200 witnesses in 30 different locations for a study that we put in as our report. That resulted in the white paper; at least 95% of it did. Now we have this to pick and choose from.

First, I just wonder what it is you visualize. Second, do you think it's wise to now piggyback another study on top of all the...?

I mean, we're looking at the material branch, moving the headquarters back in and so on. I think the ratio of people doing studies in National Defence is about 1:2. I'm exaggerating, but I hope to make my point.

So in that background, could I have your comments on that?

BGen Bell: I think the question we're dealing with here is whether something we've suggested as imprudent should go ahead without some really solid, sober second thought and reconsideration. If we go ahead with the reports as put before us now, we're actually making a cut that is likely to be very damaging to the national position over all time.

How do we get from there to a changed dimension? It does mean some change in the contents of the 1994 white paper. It does mean you're looking at things other than the reserves.

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What we're saying is, you need to look at the whole to solve your total problem, not just pick on one piece of the operation and slash it and then forget about it. I think the implications of that, the impact analysis of what that would mean across the country, has not been done, and I think that has to be looked at very carefully.

Mr. Mifflin: If I could, in response to that, General, I understand where you're coming from. In my mind, the process, if I could be allowed to discuss this, is too close, back to back. We just finished the biggest study that was ever done in Canadian history, from the bottom up, to arrive at where we did in the white paper - right or wrong...very judgmental, and I don't disagree. We were constrained by budgets.

BGen Bell: But you were constrained also in what you could look at, too, were you not?

Mr. Mifflin: We were not constrained. We had absolutely no constraints at all. We had an open door and we could look at anything we wanted. Time was our only constraint.

BGen Bell: Do you then have the information that would allow you to look at the whole and compare what might be done rather than this kind of decision? In other words, as a committee, with the resources as already expended, would you have the data and the capacity to do that?

Mr. Mifflin: I think this is something we have to decide as a committee. It's not our role, as I see it, to do anything other than take the report as written, without fighting the setting, and report to the minister that the report is here and we make our recommendations.

We can make any recommendations we want. It may not be followed, but we can recommend that we need to do another study. But when do you stop recommending studies?

I understand; what you are saying, then, is that you don't accept the white paper as the parameter. You're fighting the setting of the white paper.

BGen Bell: What do you mean?

Mr. Mifflin: That's perhaps a bad term.

BGen Bell: I'm not fighting the setting of the white paper. I'm fighting the result of the white paper in choosing to cut reserves as opposed to cutting -

Mr. Mifflin: Something else.

BGen Bell: - something else.

Mr. Mifflin: And I think that's eminently sensible.

I want to impress upon our witnesses today that we're very conscious of the seriousness. If we were to recommend that we go ahead with the report and implement it from recommendations 1 to 41, it has serious implications.

What would you think of the idea of an implementation team combined of various reserves, senior reservists, and maybe some civilians and members of the regular force? Would that do something to appease your concerns...with the mandate that if they're proceeding and they find out in their sort of instantaneous impact analysis that it's going to have negative effects, then they would be authorized to come back either to this committee or the minister, or something of that nature - in other words, a built-in safety valve?

BGen Bell: The fundamental thing is the question of whether we're implementing the cut or having a moratorium on account of our looking at the impact analysis of what the implications could be if a proper balance was struck.

Mr. Mifflin: I can't answer that right now because we have to decide how we're going to write our report and where our parameters are.

BGen Cameron: I, too, Mr. Mifflin, share George's concern.

Certainly we would feel that starting an implementation process is virtually saying we accept what's here. I mean, an implementation process is going to have to follow anyway, and it is included in our time scale, which is in the book, but I think that could be highly dangerous. In effect you've made the decision and now you're in the implementation phase.

Could I ask you a question, sir? I know I'm here to be questioned, but....

Mr. Mifflin: No, that's fair enough.

BGen Cameron: Again, like my colleague Peter Hunter, I won't name any names, but a member of your committee did observe to me that although you had worked long and hard and produced a very good report, which we agree with, you had not spent perhaps quite the time you might have liked to have spent on the reserves.

Mr. Mifflin: We admitted that in the report. There's no secret about that.

BGen Cameron: Right.

Mr. Mifflin: This is exactly and precisely why we recommended to the minister that a commission be put together. But we didn't decide that until well into....

At one point in time we thought maybe we could make some pretty meaningful recommendations, but we found that if we had gotten tracked off on the militia and the reserves, then the rest of the report would have suffered because of the time constraint we had.

BGen Cameron: I understand, but it is for that reason that I think we tend to agree so wholeheartedly with the fact that some kind of second thought, some kind of overall look, ought to be taken.

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We assumed that with all of the material you had gathered, all of the processes you had found, it would take a very short period of time to sit through all that to come up with this bigger picture, see how this particular slice of the apple now fits, since you didn't have time to really do that before.

We weren't thinking of a huge commission spending millions of dollars or anything like that. We were talking about some working stiffs, perhaps ourselves even -

Mr. Frazer: I wish you would.

BGen Cameron: - perhaps one or two of you gentlemen and a couple of our regular force colleagues, and doing it that way.

Mr. Mifflin: So you are going to study the study or start from scratch?

BGen Cameron: We assumed with all of the material you had we would not be required to start from scratch.

Mr. Mifflin: This is in fact not the case. We didn't collect that much material. We had some witnesses, but I don't believe we have that compendium of information.

BGen Cameron: We may have made an improper assumption, but surely there must be reams and reams of material that could be looked at, brought up to date, put into an overall package. Certainly I don't like to keep saying what I would do as a businessman, but that is in fact what we do when we hire a consultant. We assign him a project, we assign him three or four people from our organization, they work away at it for six months and come away with the answer, and we go on.

Mr. Mifflin: Look, Mr. Cameron, we'll take all the help we can get. You understand where we're coming from. I agree with my colleagues, Mr. Hart and Mr. Frazer; I'm absolutely delighted with the format you've used. We've had witnesses here - no names and no cap tallies - who repeatedly said they didn't agree with the report. And what about recommendation 41? Well, they didn't want to talk about it, because they just didn't like the report.

I'm in fact delighted that your Reserves 2000 agrees with all but four of the recommendations with, of course, the serious caveats you attach to that. I appreciate this.

The Chairman: Before we move on, we do have another item to come back to after we finish this regular.

BGen Cameron: It may be quite improper of me to suggest such a thing, Mr. Chairman, but if you do have other questions we could certainly make ourselves available to you on another occasion, if not collectively then individually. We will be quite happy to do that.

Mr. Hart: The admiral was talking about where we might find these efficiencies in the report we did in the special joint committee. I have a sneaking suspicion the efficiencies can be found right here in Ottawa at NDHQ. What's your feeling on that?

BGen Cameron: Yes.

Mr. Hart: I'm finished with my questions.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

BGen Cameron: I said that rather grimly, but I think it is true. Really you don't need to look too much further than the last two or three reports of the Auditor General. I speak from having served with one of the admiral's colleagues as a special adviser to the Auditor General for the DND study and for the study on the reserves. Without benefit of any staff, I went through myself and found $813-million worth of savings identified - hard numbers, not those numbers the Auditor General is fond of using when they don't want to name names and point fingers. I'm referring to the millions of dollars that could be found if we did this or that. I'm talking about $813 million hard dollars. They're all there.

Mr. Mifflin: Twice the reserves budget.

Mr. Frazer: I take it you would support the committee's recommendation for a study of NDHQ?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Mifflin: Jack, we don't want any minority reports.

BGen Cameron: The Auditor General has done a pretty outstanding job on it, I must admit, but I should also add, not always fairly.

Mr. Mifflin: Mr. Chairman, one of the major concerns we have - or should have - as parliamentarians is the last recommendation.

I won't rehash what you said. I think your views on that are very clear. It's a shame, because we started off, as the joint committee, saying we're prepared to do this. But people like yourselves said no, we're not sure you should be doing that.

I don't want to sound machiavellian, and perhaps...I can't rephrase it any other way. Would there be any benefit if we were to make the recommendation that at least it be put forward, even if it were not passed in the House, to raise the level of debate on the militia and the reserves in the House of Commons, in the highest court in the land? I think that was alluded to in the detail of the text of the commission's report. Could I have your views on this?

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BGen Cameron: I'll lead off, but I hope while I'm talking my colleagues can think about it. I would have assumed there would have been some debate in any event - and frankly, I don't know the process and how the commission's report will be studied and recommended - but having appointed a commission, won't the minister have to report back to the House that he has looked at the restructuring of the reserves, the report done by the commission, and give his government's position?

Mr. Mifflin: No, in effect he has to report back to us in 150 days.

BGen Cameron: Then if there is no impetus to do so, I personally see no harm in having a debate in the House of Commons since, after all, it is the forum for Canadian citizens to have issues discussed and decided.

I would add that this is not an easy subject for the average citizen to grasp. It is a very complex one, although the story is simple. In fact, the ideas are quite complex and so tied up in Canada's history that they're difficult to get across. My worry would be that the debate might tend to become a little superficial and some of these very important issues might not be addressed.

LCol Hunter: I think Peter has really identified that it is a very complex issue and unless you've lived with this and been a part of it, it takes a long time to learn about it. To put it before all the members of the House of Commons, many of whom have had no experience whatsoever with the military, you might be going back to square one, and that might not be too productive.

I think your suggestion of a working group to do some of the things we're recommending that would incorporate regulars, reserves, whatever the proper constitution is, and giving pretty tough marching orders to get moving - but not called an implementation committee because of the points Mr. Cameron raised - might be more beneficial with their work going forward to the House of Commons more as a recommendation for analysis and decision by them.

Mr. Mifflin: An impact group?

LCol Hunter: Yes.

BGen Bell: I think we need the impact study. I think that probably if you proceed with the report as it is currently set out and were to set up implementation of it you would have that debate in parliament.

I would think many of the local members would want to have a debate about the prudence of doing what you're doing. I think the key problem is a question of how we deal with this in the matter of time so that a decision might be reversed, delayed or deferred.

Mr. Mifflin: Just as a closing comment, once again, I thank you for your frankness and your candid answers to the question. You may find it of interest, at least from my perspective, that the interest of members of Parliament who (a) have no military experience, or (b) do not serve on this committee, in this issue of restructuring of the reserves is in my personal knowledge as parliamentary secretary about 4:1 compared with the broader study we did on national defence. So I can assure you that there is no lack of interest in the subject and hopefully for the right reasons.

LCol Hunter: They want an imprint, not a footprint.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've been very generous with your time.

The Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us today. Certainly you've given us a good report. We hope the decisions we have to make in the next few days are going to be the ones that you and everybody else feel will make the reserves a better organization. That's the object of the exercise.

BGen Cameron: On behalf of my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for allowing us the opportunity. I repeat, if you do need to talk to us again in this forum or individually, we'll be very happy to oblige.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

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We have a budget we need to get approved.

Mr. O'Reilly: I so move.

Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chairman: We're adjourned.

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