[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Wednesday, December 6, 1995
.1630 
[English]
The Chairman: Gentlemen, I first of all want to apologize for the delay, but as I said when I came in, the only thing for certain in politics is nothing is certain. We got tied up in a vote.
Even though we don't have a quorum, I would like to welcome retired Brigadier-General Pierre Boucher, who is presently honorary colonel of le Régiment de Maisonneuve de Montréal.
During his military career, Mr. Boucher served as commanding officer of le Régiment de Maisonneuve and as chief of staff for the reserves mobile command. He's also president of the land force Quebec area advisory group of honorary colonels.
With him today, we're pleased to welcome honorary Lieutenant-Colonel Gérard R. Huot,4th Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment, Chateauguay; and honorary Lieutenant-Colonel George Javornik, Royal Montreal Regiment.
Gentlemen, I would appreciate it if you would make your statements. We'll go around the table, and hopefully by the time you get into your statements more of the members will have arrived. I know Mr. Hart has to leave at about 5:15 or so, and Mr. Bertrand also has to go. Please proceed.
[Translation]
Brigadier-General Pierre Boucher, CD (Honorary Colonel, Régiment de Maisonneuve): Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am Brigadier-General Pierre Boucher and I am honorary colonel of the Régiment de Maisonneuve. In addition, I have the honour to be President of the Honorary Colonels of the Quebec Sector and Joint Chairman of Reserve 2000. In the course of my military career, I have commanded the Régiment de Maisonneuve, Québec's number2 district and the Eastern Sector, served as Reserve Force Chief of Staff in the Mobile Force and been senior fellow at the National Defence College.
We are pleased to be here today and to present to you our views on the report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.
We do not intend to review every detail in the Commission's report; in general, we support and endorse its philosophy and conceptual approach. For almost the first time, it recognizes that:
- the Reserves are essential to mobilization and play a fundamental role in Canada's defence plans;
- a mobilization plan must be developed as soon as possible;
- the Reserves are a vital link with the community;
- the corps concept is fundamental to the restructuring;
- the signals component needs to come under the Land Force Command; and
- Militia units must have operational roles and their own budget.
With respect to these very positive aspects of the report, we would like to underline the importance of defining the mobilization plan as soon as possible so that specific operational roles can be assigned to Militia units; this will give their members additional motivation.
However, it would be utopian to ask for divisional and brigade headquarters, with all the manpower that implies. It must be clearly understood that in peace time this must be seen as an objective to be achieved when mobilization occurs.
To repeat, the Report is in general a very sound document. However, we feel that the following points were either not fully grasped by the Commission or not dealt with at all in its Report:
- the number of Militia brigade groups and the number of members the Militia should have;
- the Reserve Force budget; and
- system of staffing Militia units according to their strength.
.1635
Number of brigade groups and militia members: the Report recommends seven Militia brigade groups with a paid ceiling of 14,500 members. We are convinced that, because of geographic and demographic factors, these figures are unrealistic and were dictated not by operational considerations but by interpretations of the 1994 White Paper on Defense.
With seven brigade groups and an average of ten units per brigade, only 70 of the existing133 units would remain. While we realize that the number of headquarters has to be reduced, a reduction on this scale is unacceptable for the following reasons:
- it would deprive a large part of Canada of any Militia unit at all, and of the economic spinoffs associated with such units, and this would be especially true of rural areas;
- it would take away an opportunity for training and discipline from too many of our young people; and
- there would no longer the critical mass needed to meet the Militias's basic objectives: reinforcing the Regular Force, and mobilization.
With respect to personnel, the Report calls for a paid ceiling of 14,500 by 1999. The 1994 White Paper on Defence identified a number of areas where the Canadian Forces will have to call on the Reserve Force in addition to maintaining the infrastructure needed for the various phases of mobilization.
Given the special characteristics of the Militia, this country's size, the organizational structure of the Canadian Forces and the tasks that have to be performed, we estimate that Canada needs10 Militia brigade groups to support the Regular Force plus three Militia groups per Regular brigade and one militia group per Combat Training Centre. What must be understood here is that for the principle that we want to advance, you need the same number of Militia brigade groups in each Regular brigade. Whether it's two, three or four, it's a basic principle. Canada also needs 9 to 11 units per Militia brigade group.
This distribution would ensure an adequate distribution nationally and one that would take into account the location of Regular brigades, the linguistic make-up of the brigades and their surrounding population, and their links with the community. It would require a paid ceiling of 17,500, which would make it possible to have about 22,750 reservists on stength and would represent a reduction of 13 per cent in the paid ceiling.
Reserve force budget: One of the surprising things about the Commission's Report is its silence about the cost of its recommendations and the savings these would generate as compared with the existing situation. The Commission was set up to make recommendations that would maximize the cost-effectiveness of the Reserves. In the beginning, there were a number of suggestions to the effect that the Reserves cost too much and that substantial savings could be made.
The following facts have emerged over the past six months regarding the cost of the Militia. Initially, costs were estimated at $674 million, with $161 million, or 24 per cent, controlled directly by Land Forces Command and about $45 million, or 7 per cent, spent at the unit level. The 1995-96 National Defence Estimates brought the amount down to $546 million.
We are convinced that it is not by trying to snip away at the Militia's 7% share of the budget that the greatest savings can be made. The $161 million controlled by LFC represents scarcely 1.5% of the National Defence budget. This is the reality that should be spotlighted in the effort to identify places where real savings could be made. They include the high cost of administration, recruitment and the pay system, all identified by the Commission.
Moreover, the costs charged to the Militia budget which represent almost 76% of that budget, must absolutely be clarified. A 25% cut in personnel will not result in an equivalent reduction in the budget. A clear, detailed budget is essential.
.1640
Staffing system for militia units: Lastly, we would like to draw to the Committee's attention the danger of making changes too rapidly before their impact can be evaluated. The total staffing system is a good system, but the Militia's unique characteristics must be allowed for.
We consider that a major Militia unit must be commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel if the unit's supplementary duties and relations with the community are to be assured. This holds true even when the Militia unit is smaller than a Regular Force unit.
The command structure will be somewhat more expensive, but money will be saved on the problems avoided while an infrastructure will be in place at minimal cost in the event of mobilization. Furthermore, a depth of command will be guaranteed that is capable of handling any of the imponderables that can rise in the life of a Militia unit.
Such a structure will also make it possible to preserve the regimental system that is so intricately tied up with Canadian history. We are not at all opposed to rationalized and more effective Reserves as recommended by the Commission, but we want to preserve the units that deserve preservation. This can be done without making such drastic cuts.
In conclusion, we are convinced that the Commission has produced a good Report with valid recommendations which should be implemented. However, we recommend to the Standing Committee on National Defence that:
- the number of Militia brigade groups be revised upwards along with the corresponding number of Militia units and the paid ceiling;
- the drastic cuts in Militia units recommended by the Commission not be implemented;
- an investigation be carried out to determine where more judicious cuts could be made instead of slashing personnel, and that a well-defined budget be required for the Reserves;
- the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel be retained for commanders of major Militia units, to ensure a basis for mobilization and a depth of command; and
- the implementation process be delayed at least six months so that the appropriate analyses and simulations can be carried out.
Ladies and gentlemen, we will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you very much. Proceed, please.
[Translation]
Lieutenant-Colonel Gérard-R. Huot (4th Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment (Châteauguay)): Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, I would like to start by thanking you for the opportunity you've given me to offer my views on the Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves. More specifically, I will be addressing the recommendations in chapters 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Report.
It goes without saying that all the work done to produce this report and all the comments you will be hearing take into account the fact that the Canadian government is still a party to international alliances - in that respect, it's the status quo - and also the fact that Canada is still concerned with peace, security and stability, both nationally and internationally.
Primary roles of the first reserve: First of all, there is reinforcement. It is clear that some units are capable of providing action-ready platoons and sections ready for incorporation into the Regular Force units sent out on peacekeeping missions. However, for all kinds of reasons, it seems impossible, based on the opinions received from many units, that this recommendation could be implemented. The first factor playing against this recommendation is the availability of members with civilian jobs. However, in the past, there have been some exceptions for some Quebec battalions.
As for recommendation 2, experience to date seems negative because no official or unofficial source has been able to tell us if subaltern officers had been put in positions of command. If we want to proceed with this recommendation, an opportunity will have to be created rather than being waited for.
.1645
As for the third recommendation, many reservists wonder why they must serve an additionalsix weeks in the unit where they have served. The militia-man should have the choice to pursue that course or return to his unit during that six-week period.
Bases of mobilization: As for recommendations 4 and 5, one could say that recommendation4 is self-evident, while recommendation 5 should be defined as soon as possible.
The Militia: Chapter 5 includes many points concerning restructuring, size and composition of units as well as fund allocation.
Revised structure: With respect to the revised structure, the Commission recommends that districts be eliminated and replaced by seven Militia brigade groups, each commanded by an officer at Colonel rank.
It can be seen that the Report of the Special Commission would almost bring us back to the structures existing in 1964, which were replaced by the present structure as a result of the work of the Suttie Commission. It's clear that doing this would partially reduce administration by eliminating districts but there would have to be real elimination and not merely relocalization, as is too often the case.
Recommendation 7 speaks of a reorganization of headquarters without in any way touching upon what financial impact this would have on the Militia's budget. In view of this financial impact which was shown in a table on page 39 of the French version of the report, it would have been preferable for the Commission to elaborate on this reorganization.
As for the brigade system, it should be added that this method should be compatible with Regular Force, both at command and operational levels.
Size, composition and number of Militia units: We're comfortable with recommendation8 defining the criteria for keeping viable units. However, we should add that roles and objectives must be very carefully defined.
With respect to recommendation 9, we recommend that total staffing be implemented for the army and that the Land Force Command Headquarters take all appropriate steps to so inform the units with a view to correcting the false impressions surrounding the project.
At this stage, a sharp distinction should be made between the Regular and the Militia Forces. We often tend to say that some Militia battalions have too many officers. A good number of militia officers are college and university students, and it often happens that an officer is still registered on the unit member list while, in reality, a sabbatical has been taken to finish a thesis, attend a strategic studies session or other parallel courses that preclude active participation for an indeterminate period. When this authorized leave is over, the officer rejoins the unit. It should be pointed out it would be preferable to quantify and compare the number of officer/hours instead of the number of officers.
The reorganization process: The Commission, in its tenth recommendation, lists guidelines for the reorganization process. Many units have already had to reduce their numbers drastically because of cuts in the budget. If present policy is pursued, some even doubt whether it will be possible to reach a ceiling of 14,500 Militia troops for April 1, 1999. Many think it won't be possible to reach that number if budgets and the other conditions mentioned in the report are not met.
As for the other guidelines, it is clear that no one is in a better position than Militia Command, together with LFC, to implement the different recommendations and decisions flowing from them. However, it is imperative that Militia Command be fully involved in decisions concerning its future.
.1650
Allocation of funds, operational staff and maintenance: A majority of the Council of Honorary Colonels of Quebec is in favour of implementing those recommendations as soon as possible. It is high time a unit commander should have the power to administer and manage the budget for operations and management as well as for infrastructure.
We could quote many examples of extravagant expenditures in some services because the systems' archaic guidelines had to be followed. The decisions made at the unit level would translate into appreciable savings and decrease the administrative burden for the proposed brigades and the proposed divisional headquarters.
Presently, it can be said that transparency does not exist in unit budgets. We believe greater transparency and more active participation by the Militia in the allocation of funds are more than desirable.
Cadet infrastructure framework: In Chapter 9, we would simply like to add that cadet infrastructure support should be improved through an increase in financial support and not slowed down as indicated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence.
I personally have the opportunity of visiting cadet corps, and there are eight cadet corps affiliated with our unit. It's comforting to see what our Militia are doing for those young boys and girls. They might be attracted some day by a military career, or they may never be, but we will have contributed, through this experience, to making them better citizens.
Administration of reserves: We are reproducing here the table on page 39 of the French version of the Commission's Report which clearly shows the portion of the militia's budget going to each administrative level.
This table shows clearly that 70% of the budget goes to administration and only 30% to operations. Infrastructure, that is drill halls, equipment and other needs must be taken into consideration.
Some of us working in private enterprise are sometimes asked whether we could survive with this kind of system. I don't need to answer that one for you.
We have often tried to obtain the real figures on the cost of the Militia. Our sources have mentioned figures showing differences as high as $300 million. On page 14, you have the total cost of the Primary Reserve; the figure of $1.028 billion for 1994-95 is mentioned. Using a revised methodology, the cost estimates go down to $875 million. How can one claim to be able to make changes when, at the outset, one doesn't even know how much the Militia costs? Why not establish a ``zero'' budget and determine the real cost for each unit from that?
We'd at least have a basis that would let us demonstrate the real operating costs of the units and add to that the cost of the administrative superstructure. Right now, we're working in reverse. Everything is absorbed into administration and what's left over goes to the units. We're still trying to cut at the unit level, which is totally inconsistent if the Militia is to survive.
In recommendation 27 it is also suggested that Operation ``Red Tape'' be extended to the Primary Reserve. When the Commission addresses the administrative burden, on page 58 of the French version of its report, it says that ``complaints are so persistent that the Commission is convinced they reflect of a real problem''. The Commission does add, however, that very few examples were given. We think it is up to the Commission to do a more detailed study of this part of the administrative burden with a view to uncovering the real administrative problems and clearly identifying them.
It would have been desirable to have a bit more information on Operation ``Red Tape'', in order to express an opinion on its impact on Militia administration.
Again according to the table, at unit level, there are 30 person-days for completing the training of a Militiaman and we have serious questions. Should the number of person-days be cut while the Commission recommends that, from September to May, the militia be guaranteed funds equivalent to four days' training per month?
.1655
Reserve pay system: the reserve pay system is a fiasco. We heard comments giving figures as high as $18 million. We believe the Commission has come up with very valid recommendations. However, in the course of its report, the Commission did mention several possible alternatives in the area of pay.
We believe that, in the recommendations, there should have been a mention of private enterprise which, according to our sources and figures, can provide those services at minimal cost, compared to the RRIP. Some sources have said it would cost 10 times less to produce a check and accompanying reports.
The committee studying the Report and the summaries of the Report on the Special Commission were unanimous in rejecting the recommendation concerning job protection legislation. Many factors explain this approach, in particular the experience of other countries such as Australia where this approach did not meet with success.
If this were to become law, all civilian employment forms would contain a clause requiring anyone in the Militia to declare that fact. This could become an embarrassment for the job holder who could be refused access to a desired position. If, on the other hand, the person in the Militia were to make a false statement, there is a risk the employer might dismis him for cause. We firmly believe this recommendation should be eliminated.
Previous studies have all tended to emphasize military structures, and that was probably a good thing. However, we see today that the administration has not kept pace with technological advances, and that the structures have become cumbersome, placing an overly large burden on budgets. This is cause for concern. It is high time to cut here - for considerable savings - and give the Militia back the budget it needs to accomplish what the Department of National Defence expects. Thank you.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you.
Mr. Javornik.
Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) George Javornik (Royal Montreal Regiment):Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, my name is George Javornik. I am a retired colonel and currently am honorary colonel of the Royal Montreal Regiment. I have been associated with the reserves for the last thirty years. Fifteen of those years were in the communication reserve and fifteen have been in the militia.
I commanded units in both reserve components. In that regard, I have seen closely how both of those reserve components function. I also commanded a militia district before retiring in 1988, and since then have been honorary lieutenant colonel and now honorary colonel of the Royal Montreal Regiment.
In my other life, my professional life, I am a principal with an international management consulting firm. I have no formal brief to present to you this afternoon, but I am here in support of the briefs made by both General Boucher and Colonel Huot.
The Chairman: Thank you very much. I certainly thank you all for your presentations. They put some new light on some of the areas we've heard comments made about already.
We said at the end of the Cold War we didn't have an enemy, but we in political life seem to have one, and that's time. Mr. Hart and Mr. Bertrand have asked if they might leave at 5:15, so I wonder in the first round of questioning, Mr. Jacob, if you could be as quick as possible.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob (Charlesbourg): Absolutely.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacob: I could give up my turn, if Mr. Bertrand would like to...
[English]
The Chairman: Okay. We'll move up Mr. Hart and then Mr. Bertrand.
Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your presentation this afternoon.
On pages 72 and 73 of the report the commissioners say that as they got into this report they felt they were only looking at a small slice of a much bigger apple - a costlier apple. Do you feel one of the things this body should do is suggest to the government it look at that bigger, costlier apple and try to find other areas where cost efficiencies can be found?
[Translation]
BGen. Boucher: I perfectly agree with a comment in the Report that the Armed Forces must be considered as a whole.
.1700
However, I would like to clarify one point. I said that we were satisfied with the Report. We are satisfied with 35 of the 41 recommendations. We have separate views on two or three recommendations.
Some recommendations should be implemented immediately. However, we should still consider the Canadian Armed Forces as a whole, if only for the very good reason that the study is not a recent one.
I am just talking about the Army here, not about the Air Reserve and the Naval Reserve, which I know much less about. We are talking about total strength. According to what I know about total strength, the two components of the Armed Forces - the Reserves and the Regular Army - must learn to work together and know their own limitations.
We agree with the concept, provided that both sides are ready and willing to do the work involved. We cannot look at a single aspect without considering the problem as a whole.
[English]
The Chairman: Does anyone else want to comment?
LCol Huot: I agree with your question. There is a lot more to be added with regard to page 72 and afterwards. I don't know whether the question of time was involved or whether they didn't get the information as far as the administration is concerned.
Mr. Hart: Do you think it might have had something to do with the mandate they were given? You questioned the numbers. That was one of the things that was -
LCol Huot: We questioned the numbers because there was no sufficient explanation as far as overhead is concerned. In one area in which we look at the days involved for the overhead for the headquarters, that is the question to which we'd like to have more answers. It's a place where the commission could have shed some light that we didn't shed.
Mr. Hart: If the government does stand fast on the figures they presented to the commission, what is that going to do to the militia? What is the net result of the 14,500 paid ceiling figure on the militia?
LCol Huot: I think the net result on the militia is that we can expect more funds and we can expect to be able to maintain the militia with proper units instead of maybe some other recommendations on larger units that came from some of the discussions we had in meetings today. What we've learned today is that we're looking at units of 300 to 500 members. If we look at the report and if we look at the situation in the Quebec section, we don't see one unit of that size. That's a question we would like to....
LCol Javornik: The paid ceiling of 14,500 would certainly be limiting. It's tied in with the recommendation that there would have to be some amalgamation of units. In that respect, our experience has been that whenever those amalgamations have taken place, two plus two has not equalled four. The amalgamated unit takes on all the warts of a stand-alone, single unit that we have now; it has all the difficulties a current one has.
The other sense is to be able to look at numbers for the sake of numbers versus looking at numbers for the sake of fulfilling a role. I think we've made the case here that there should be a relationship between the number of reserve brigades that are tied in with the number of regular brigades they have to reinforce. That should be a basis of structuring a reserve force in the militia. In that respect, that's why our recommendation goes up to ten brigades from the number of brigades that are there and the number of units that are there. We feel it will just stretch beyond the 14,500 paid ceiling, but not in an uncontrollable fashion. It will give us a lot more latitude to do something that makes sense rather than something that is jury-rigged to try to fit under the umbrella of an apparently mandated number.
Mr. Hart: Where would those additional brigade groups go?
BGen Boucher: I will answer the previous question and I will follow with that one.
.1705
The problem I'm seeing with the paid ceiling of 14,500 is that we will not be able to fill all the tasking we are receiving at this moment. We have a paid ceiling of 19,957 at this moment. If we decrease the paid ceiling by 25% - that's what is asked - we will not be able to fill all the positions.
I was saying in my presentation that we will deprive rural regions of the benefits of having militia units, and also on the tasking, we will not be able to fill all the positions there.
I was reading the 41 recommendations in the report, and I was asking myself if each recommendation had been written in isolation, not considering all the resolutions together. This morning we received a briefing from the commission, and we asked one question: was the 14,500 determined for an operational reason or was it imposed? The answer was that it was imposed. If we take the operational reason at the moment, we disagree with the 14,500.
This morning we asked them what they see as the size of a unit, and they said 300. But if you multiply 300 by ten, it's 3,000, and if you multiply that by seven brigades, it's 21,000. How can we arrive at 14,500? It's pure mathematics. That's why I'm saying some of the recommendations have been written in isolation without looking at the impact.
My personal feeling, having experience there - I've been their area commander, their district commander and the chief of staff of the reserve - is maybe we can decrease the 19,000. I recommend 17,500. Because not everybody is parading each month, we can have 20% or 30% more, so we can have 22,000 people enrolled, with a paid ceiling of 17,000.
One fact is that cutting the manpower by 25% will not decrease the budget by 25%. You have 74% dedicated to things other than manpower. If you cut by 25%, you are just cutting 6% of the total budget of the reserve. Maybe we should look at the 74% of the budget of the militia. Maybe we can cut over there with the same result and save the manpower. That manpower will give us the possibility to fill all of what the government will ask of us.
Mr. Hart: You mentioned the rural areas may be affected in a severe way. The report does tend to indicate that maybe they should be looking at having the militia units and the reserve units in larger centres. What is that going to do to the reserve and to those rural communities? How important is it for Canada to have militia units and reserve units in rural areas?
BGen Boucher: I will start and I will ask my two colleagues to answer also. I will do it in French. It will be easier for me.
[Translation]
I have been with the Militia for 32 years. I believed in it then and I believe in it now. Personally, I feel that the Militia is a direct link with the community. The Militia has helped Canadians all over Canada understand the Armed Forces.
When we try to streamline - and I agree with streamtining when it is not drastic - 300-person units, we fall back on the cities. However, we must not neglect rural areas, where units provide a measure of training and discipline for young people. We should be well aware that the funds invested in the Militia justify a long-term, rather than a short-term, study.
When a militiaman spends four or five years in the Militia, the community benefits from the training he receives. In my view, an investment in the Militia is a good investment.
.1710
Outside large cities, I don't see how we're going to be able to form 300-strong units. Just look at the figures at the end of the Report.
[English]
LCol Javornik: Anecdotally, I was part of the first militia fly-over to Europe back in 1967. We assembled a task force to go over and augment the Canadian army to help out in a NATO exercise.
I was from Montreal, and there were chaps there from Pictou, from regions out west and from regions in between both coasts. From a point of view of contribution to society in the Canadian spirit of nationalism, we got to know more about our differences and our similarities in a very short period of time, which aroused curiosity about different regions of the country and appreciation for different outlooks and different ways of doing things. It also built some very long, life-lasting friendships, those types of ties. If they're important to a country such as Canada, they certainly figure strong and large in my mind.
To forsake that for the sake of number-crunching and for the sake of economies, to create mega-complexes and large centres at the expense of being in touch with the national fabric in the communities, I think would be a big mistake.
Mr. Hart: Thank you very much, gentlemen. I apologize for having to leave. Your testimony has been very important to me and the committee. Thank you.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hart.
Mr. Bertrand.
[Translation]
Mr. Bertrand (Pontiac - Gatineau - Labelle): I would first like to welcome our witnesses. I have some comments to make, and then a short question.
Mr. Huot, in the table you presented, we saw that 70% of costs associated with the Militia are charged to administration, while the remainder - 30% - are charged to operations.
First, I'd like to tell you that this is the first time we are seeing such detailed figures.
If I read the Report correctly, I see that Commission members recommended that the amount earmarked for operations be increased from 30% to 40%.
LCol. Huot: That is what this table shows. The table is on page 39 of the French version of the Report and on page 37 of the English version. The Department of National Defence is preparing a budget based on 100 person-days per militiaman.
The Commission uses the table to show that National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa absorbs 15 days, LFC headquarters absorbs 15 days, sectoral headquarters absorbs 35 days and district headquarters absorbs 5 days. When we get down to the unit, we're left with just 30 person-days per militiaman. Everything else is taken up by administration.
It's quite true that some infrastructures have other needs that have to be met, but, in the final analysis, we are left with 30 days. The calculation is very simple. A hundred minus 70 is 30. That means 30% for operations.
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If we eliminate district headquarters, we need five person-days. We wouldn't eliminate them all. If we go with two or three brigades, there will be savings, but I think we need to do more. We have to look at sectoral headquarters, the LFC and National Defence, because it is where the real figures are. Those are amounts that are really being spent.
So there are certainly areas where savings can be generated, and this could improve our30 person-days per unit problem. First, the Commission recommends that, between September and May, four days a month be set aside to train militiamen. That's already 36 days. That leaves 30 and we are hearing about budget cuts. So we will have to find the money somewhere. We know that budgets aren't going up, since there are going to be cuts.
In the private sector, major corporations did not cut the fat from the bottom but from the top. Large national institutions are doing the same. I think that National Defence will have to follow suit.
Mr. Bertrand: Cutting fat from the top.
LCol. Huot: From the top, not from the bottom.
Mr. Bertrand: I see that you do not agree on our proposed job protection legislation. If there was some compensation for employers, would you change you mind about the bill?
LCol. Huot: Perhaps, but on certain conditions. No explanations were given. All we heard was that this was a bill that would reqiore employers to comply with provisions governing the duties of militiamen.
Mr. Bertrand: Thank you very much.
Mr. Boucher, in your presentation, you raised a point we have never heard before - the economic spinoffs of armouries in rural areas of the province.
If those armouries were closed, I suppose there could be an impact, not on the social aspects, but on the economic situation of the region involved. People working in the armouries pay taxes and spend their money in the village or city where they the armoury is located. Do you have any figures to show what the tax impact of such closures would be?
BGen. Boucher: I didn't do that calculation. Let's take some units in Quebec that I know well. Let's say Matane or Rivière-du-Loup - two sub-units of the Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent - were closed. The two units have some 100 people who train there and receive approximately 30 days' pay each year. Multiply that by 65, and you can see that the units have a definite economic impact. These people inject money into the community.
As for the armouries, there is no doubt that maintenance costs... In the table on page 39 of the Report, infrastructure has not been taken into account. We should be very careful with these figures, particularly those on sectoral headquarters. The table has figures relating to the training of soldiers. The soldiers earn money in the summer, but spend very little where the units are, because they are restricted to their camps. They spend the money when they go back to their own regions. That impact is difficult to assess, but it is undoubtedly there and it is very real.
As for the armouries, we pay municipal taxes, maintenance costs, heating costs, and so on.
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What is the impact of these armouries? There has been no cost analysis of the Commission's recommendations. Before we know the impact, we have to implement the principles and see how they translate into costs. If I'm told to aim for 300-person units, I believe we will have to close the units in rural areas.
The Militia has always been perceived as a federal presence and has an armed forces presence in the regions. I think that this is an extremely important factor, which should perhaps be given priority over purely financial considerations.
As for those financial considerations, if the government wants to cut 25 per cent of Reserve personnel, that does not translate into 25 per cent budget cuts. We have to take into account the infrastructure that remains. We should really be looking at spending as a whole. If we look very carefully, we may be able to find other areas where we can cut.
Let me give you an example from eight years ago, when I was Chief of Staff of the Reserve Force. When the White Paper came out in 1987, it was politically correct to allocate 20% to 25% of all armed forces budgets to the Militia.
We might perhaps ask whether that money really goes to the Militia. Do we have the right to charge it to the Militia budget? We could perhaps save some money by taking a good look at this.
I can give you other examples, but we would be getting into details. In any case, this is how I see the regional impact of the closures. Personally, as a militia man by training, I deplore the fact that the Militia is pulling back into the large cities and abandons rural areas.
LCol. Huot: Let's not forget that a continued militia presence in rural areas is very important to provide support for the Cadet corps.
As I said in my brief, these young people may not all go on to have a military career, but they will stand out from the crowd and become better citizens. That is a valuable contribution by National Defence.
Mr. Jacob: Mr. Boucher, Mr. Huot, and Mr. Javornik, I'd like to welcome you here today.
In listening to your testimony and to Mr. Huot's, I noted a contradiction. You may perhaps be able to explain it.
On page 4 of your brief, you state:
- The command structure will somewhat be more expensive, but money will be saved on the
problems avoided, while an infrastructure will be in place at minimal cost in the event of
mobilization.
BGen. Boucher: We're talking about structures at two different levels. In my brief, I was talking about units - the unit structure. A 150-strong unit must be commanded by a major. Technically, however, the major deals solely with training.
.1725
Thus, when administrative problems arise, when ties with the community need to be created, when we try to recruit and train recruits, there won't be a structure to do it. In my brief, I said that units had to be commanded by lieutenant-colonels, with an adequate but streamlined structure. I agree that we could go down to two majors instead of four. The impact on cost is minimal, however. A lieutenant-colonel may cost between $8,000 and $10,000 at most.
This cost is minimal when you consider the advantages of having a lieutenant-colonel in place. The lieutenant-colonel has more experience, has connections and has the time to deal with both training and administration. Administration for Militia units is a very serious problem. I will let Colonel Huot take over at this point. I think he'll be talking about headquarters.
As for myself, I don't want to have brigade and divisional headquarters at full strength, for the simple reason that it's enormously expensive. But it does give us a basis on which to build.
As for keeping the Militia unit, let me tell you about a personal experience I had. I ceased to command a Militia unit in 1975. I had four very well-trained majors, so I assumed the Militia unit was in good hands and that its future was assured. One of the majors replaced me and two others were transferred because of their civilian duties. One year after my departure, there was only one major who had trained in the unit left.
If we had not had the required command depth, we would have had serious problems. That's how things are in Militia units. Militiamen are part-time soldiers. They are both soldiers and civilians. And as civilians, they can be transferred. Let's say that a Militia unit is composed of 150 men plus a major. The major is transferred and the unit is left for the captain - this increases administrative problems. Furthermore, the unit no longer meets infrastructure needs for mobilization phases II and III, and even less for phase IV, which I hope never to see. But we still have to be prepared.
So with a Militia unit, we have the infrastructure to provide both command depth and, at a lesser cost a sound but genuine mobilization infrastructure. We won't have that if we limit command to the rank of major.
I will ask Colonel Huot to comment on headquarters. I hope I have answered your questions.
Mr. Jacob: Yes. In the same section, you say you want to preserve the units that deserve preservation. How do you decide whether a given unit deserves preservation or not?
BGen. Boucher: The criteria are listed in recommendation 8 of the Commission's Report.
In my view, recommendation 8 is sound and reliable. Let me point out that I am not recommending we preserve the 133 units across Canada.
If there are units that have been inefficient for several years, do not successfully recruit and cannot cover their costs, then, given current budgetary constraints, it would not make sense for me to request they be preserved.
What I do not want to see is that units that have performed well be dismembered for no reason because of amalgamation or drastic cuts. The decision will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. I agree with the criteria in recommendation 8, but I do not agree with a ceiling of 14,500.
.1730
Mr. Jacob: But the units in rural areas are very likely to disappear or be amalgamated, in spite of their involvement in the community, if we follow the recommendations in the Report. If I understand correctly, that's what you're afraid of.
BGen. Boucher: I'll talk to you about the Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent as an example. They are not my unit, so I can speak freely about them. They have three detachments, one in Rivière-du-Loup, one in Rimouski and one in Matane. The Rimouski and Rivière-du-Loup detachments are covering their costs very well. You might say that Rivière-du-Loup is not a rural area, but it's fairly rural.
Of course we can't go set up a unit in a small village. The unit needs some kind of population base for its... But I don't want to see everything concentrated in Halifax, Montreal, Quebec City, Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, and so on. If all units were in major cities, we would lose that link with the community.
Mr. Jacob: When you talk about a 25% reduction, do you think this will have a greater impact - particularly in Quebec - on small units like those you've just mentioned, units like Matane which do not cover their costs or which are not recruiting successfully?
As for the reduction and redistribution of some units which, in your view, are not cost-effective, will that reduction have a greater impact in Quebec or will the impact extend to all Canadian Militias?
BGen. Boucher: I don't think we can say we'll cut 25% equally throughout Canada. There are efficiency considerations. But we mustn't strip one region more than another. How can we find a balance? The answer is simple: don't bring down the ceiling by 25% as recommended. Doing that would completely strip some regions. As for the efficiency report, on the basis of figures in the appendix, we could argue that... Mr. Richardson, who is here today, is familiar with the situation in Ontario, I am familiar with the situation in Quebec.
We would be safer waiting a year instead of a month before deciding whether a given unit is efficient. I could cut 25% across the board in Quebec, for example, but every unit needs a minimum of resources to survive.
The current paid ceiling in Quebec is 4,713. Reduce that by 25% and you are down to 3,500. If that ceiling of 4,713 were reduced by 13%, we would end up with a new ceiling somewhere between 4,200 and 4,300, which would make it possible for us to apply a considerable portion of the recommendation. But reductions of 25% everywhere in Canada is a problem, in my opinion. You did ask about Quebec.
Mr. Jacob: Lieutenant-Colonel Huot, in your presentation, you stated that the cost of the Ready Reserve had been estimated at $1.028 billion, but that by using a revised method the cost had been reduced to $875 million. The Auditor General's report indicated that the reserves were costing one billion dollars. In your opinion, is this to some extent related to the mobilization of funds by the Regular Force for equipment, infrastructures and so on? Is the Regular Force sometimes a little difficult when it comes to allocation of funds to the Reserve?
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How could we prevent the Regular Force from transferring costs that do not necessarily apply to the Reserve in an effort to show that the Reserve is more expensive than the Regular Force? This creates some antagonism between the Reserve and the Regular Force, let's be clear about that. We have heard enough testimony to know that there are some minor problems that are sometimes related to the budget. How could these be corrected?
You also said that it was time you managed your own budgets, but that things were done differently at the top of the pyramid. The Commission's Report made no recommendation on that matter. I would like to hear a suggestion from you.
LCol Huot: I took the figures from the report and, after reading and reading them - I am a certified accountant by profession - I wondered whether we couldn't come up with a difference of $138 million just by using a different accounting method. Personally, I don't think we can. I think the problem lies in cost allocation. I have said that the process for allocating budgets to the Militia is not transparent. But the Militia, in conjunction with the Regular Force, should take an active part in preparing its own budget. To solve some of the problems, the Militia should stop depending on the Regular Forces to prepare its budget. We should not just be saying: "There's your share". I think we must go further and encourage them to take a more active part in the process.
Mr. Jacob: You're asking the Department of National Defence for some profound changes.
LCol Huot: That's true, but it's never too late to do things better, to make changes.
Mr. Jacob: With regard to the payroll system, you say that we could even call on private enterprise, which would cost 10 times less than the Reserve's payroll service. I think everyone here is aware that the Reserve payroll is a serious problem. I see some difficulty getting a private enterprise involved in the whole string of controls that exist for the Reserve's payroll service.
How could you maintain control over that? If an individual worked six hours per weekend, he would be monitored by his immediate supervisor and later there would be another level of control to sign his time sheet. It would be never-ending.
LCol. Huot: That's one of the points we discussed. When we talk about cutting the fat from the top, we're talking about an archaic system that requires 14 forms to approve six hours of work.
Mr. Jacob: That's about the case.
LCol. Huot: How does an international institution prepare the payroll for its employees? It chooses a specialized company, a bank or some other kind of company and, in each unit, administrative staff prepare controls for all this.
Instead of sending all this to the department, we would send it to a private institution which would prepare the pay cheques, by direct deposit or otherwise, and provide all related reports. In my time, a few years ago, in the business world, for a payroll of 300 or 400 people, we paid 50¢ per cheque, including the related reports. It may be up to a dollar today. In the current system, it costs the department almost $10 dollars to produce a cheque.
Mr. Jacob: And to top it off, they are late. Thank you.
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Richardson.
Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
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It's nice to see you three gentlemen from Montreal. I want to tell you that the quality of your work is first rate. Some of the things you've put on the table here have not been presented to us, and they give us a new slant. It's nice to see my old friend General Boucher and Colonel Javornik and Colonel Huot.
We are in the midst of some very serious discussions here. The struggle to maintain some presence across Canada is very important to all of us, it doesn't matter where we live. To do that we're faced with making recommendations from this committee based on the work of the commission.
I want to say at the outset that I think the commission has set for us an organization and structure and a target, along with good reasons for us to look at it and to make amendments to it. The amendments would enhance it and make it more acceptable across the country, and hopefully more efficient.
I would like to pick up on the question Mr. Bertrand asked. We know some of the units will have to either step out of the order of battle and set aside or be put on the supplementary, but others may be part of a unit that's an amalgam. It may be headed up by the Royal Montreal Regiment but be wearing the cap badges of the Grenadier Guards and the Black Watch. Wouldn't that be a nice thing? I use that as an example, but that will happen. The cap badge won't die because in stages three and four of the mobilization program those regiments will have to be born again, and that's the balance we have to look at.
I admire the work of the commission, but I think there can be some fine-tuning. Cost seems to be the fortune. Don't think that 14,500 is a personnel figure; it is a budget figure. It was named first in the budget to take so much money out of defence, and that was the part that would be allocated to the militia. If we can make cost efficiencies elsewhere they should be turned back to the militia, because those efficiencies would be in place and you would be working within the budget figure so that the numbers could exceed 14,500 based on efficiencies gained.
I'm going to say this. We've looked at everything, and some people have recommended that we look elsewhere because there are other places in the armed forces that could take the cuts and not have such a serious effect on this national institution. With your background, do you think it's possible for us to extend that mandate and make recommendations that maybe they look at other parts of the forces or organizations within the forces for that money? Can anyone answer that?
[Translation]
BGen Boucher: You could add to the mandate. The Commission has produced a very good report. Because of the timetable that was imposed on them, the members of the Commission were not able to go into detail concerning the costs of the recommendations.
They made proposals - and this responds somewhat to what Mr. Jacob was asking earlier - on the needs of the unit level. For example, they're proposing nine months at four days a month, which works out to 36 days per person. That's a very good idea. Starting from there, we could determine a budget without changing the entire Department of National Defence procedure. Once we know the cost of the personnel for all the units that we decide to keep, we'll be able to work out the National Defence's budget.
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I would be curious to find out the final cost of the operation once it is established from the bottom up. Would it be less, more or equal to what we have right now? The Commission has not had time to answer that question, for the very good reason that it would have required more time and research.
With regard to the other question, I fully agree that, starting with the figure of 14,500, we can do budgetary planning. There's no doubt in my mind about that. But I think that, between 14,500 and 19,957, the cut is too drastic.
I proposed 17,500 so that we could have an actual staff of 22,000 effective people. You'll tell me that we're adding 3,000 that we'll have to pay, but I have the impression there would be a way... I have no way to prove this, because it's a personal impression, but I believe that it could be possible to find another way to cut within the Militia budget, above the Land Force Command, at the higher echelons of headquarters, and streamline the Militia budget.
Mr. Jacob: Thank you, gentlemen. I must leave. The Department of National Defence has just announced it will be sending 1,000 troops to Bosnia.
[English]
LCol Huot: Mr. Richardson, I have something to add to that.
You're reflecting part of the comments I made in my report that hopefully we do think the commission should have done more work administration-wise. As General Boucher said, General Belzile confirmed to us this morning that time was of the essence, that they had to produce. They were very happy to tell us that they produced a report within time and under budget, but they can use the rest of the budget to get more detailed figures on the administration.
The solution would be very much appreciated and I think we could find the money we're looking for in the upper grades of the headquarters.
Mr. Richardson: I appreciate that. I wanted to make sure you get this on record, and that's why I'm asking you the questions.
Colonel Javornik, would you like to say something?
LCol Javornik: Mr. Richardson, I was just saying that if the 14,500 as a paid ceiling is a forcing mechanism, it seems to be a very high-risk, small potatoes return. We think there are a lot more savings elsewhere, rather than at the sharp end of things or at the cutting edge of things when it comes to people. However, if it is and has to be a forcing mechanism to incite some kind of reduction, so be it.
Mr. Richardson: I'd like to follow this up, if I could, because it's so important. I think it was Colonel Huot who mentioned, and we all know it, that the outstanding cadet corps in Canada are all in Quebec. That's my impression, my judgment, and I've seen them. They are well-founded, they're large, the community spirit and the regimental affiliation are quite apparent when you see them coming into Valcartier.
I don't think we took into consideration what happens to these valuable youth training programs we have across the country if we move units out or if units die. So I appreciated seeing that in there.
There are other things we would be looking for down the line, such as the concept of three brigades to support one regular force brigade. We may be getting some kind of development, and I just put this as an aside. We hear in the debates about participation in Bosnia that the regular force is worn out because of the turnover.
Maybe we should be training our reservists as general-purpose combat soldiers, but with a specialty bent on peacekeeping. They could pick up the peacekeeping role because it's been shown in the after-action reports from Bosnia that those militia units we sent to Bosnia performed very well. I can't say there weren't any bad comments about their performance, but there weren't any I know of. The attitude was first class and the performance was first class.
.1750
To save the regular force this continual disruption from their homes.... Because we're always flying them out, flying them back. It seems - at least that's the impression being given by certain parties in this House - morale is low because of that. I'm not sure if that's the truth or not, but it's being said.
I would like to see some real tasking given in the meantime, the two parallels: general-purpose combat training, along with some specialty work, incorporated in the training program for the leaders in particular - young officers, captains, majors - in negotiations, when you're negotiating at the peace line, how you get in and out of situations. The rest of it is pure, basic soldiering, but it's that specialty they have when a conflict takes place: how you negotiate, from what positions. I don't think the militia has ever been exposed to it. Many of the regular force people have been.
LCol Huot: What I mentioned in my report is that I had the occasion to discuss things with two officers just recently back from Bosnia. One of them served with the second battalion of the 22nd Regiment. The other one served with the second battalion of the 3rd Regiment. They were in two different places.
Their experience made them grateful. The only comment they had.... For one, the integration with the regular forces was normal. Unfortunately, the integration for the other officer, with the third battalion, which is the ``1090'', as we call it, was not as good. But the experience was good too.
These two officers came back. Their comment was that they had lived a good experience. They were happy, but they would have liked to do something more than to be a liaison officer.
Mr. Richardson: Agreed.
LCol Huot: They would have liked to participate in a more active way.
Mr. Richardson: I think the commission did pick that up. They did report on that. The officer goes with his troops and stays with the troops. They command their own soldiers.
I was thinking of the kinds of situations we got into in the Middle East and in Cyprus. There are certain conflicts...and there's the techniques of negotiation applied by the platoon commander or the company commander, not a liaison officer.
LCol Huot: No, this might be possible if we could send a complete unit, with an officer commanding his or her own unit.
Mr. Richardson: I have a lot of things.... I'm glad you have it all in writing here.
I'm going to make a recommendation to this committee, though, that because we hear so much about the militia we should maybe get out as a committee and watch the training manoeuvres at Valcartier and Gagetown or some place like those, so we could see the improved quality of reserve training that's taken place in the past ten years.
The Chairman: Mr. Leroux.
[Translation]
Mr. Leroux (Shefford): Good afternoon, gentlemen. I have one question to ask you. Perhaps you could comment afterwards. On page 5 of the document presented by Brigadier-General Boucher, it says:
- an investigation be carried out to determine where more judicious cuts could be made, instead
of slashing personnel...
Without going into detail, I would ask you simply to indicate where we should be looking. Earlier, you talked about the payroll and the way it could be organized, and you gave other examples.
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Is there any other concrete action that could be taken to reduce costs and maintain an acceptable number of reservists? If the three witnesses wish to comment on that, I think that it would help the committee in drafting its report.
BGen. Boucher: I will begin the debate and I will let my two colleagues intervene later.
We are fully aware of the budget crisis we're going through. Everyone must make an effort. It's not just part of the organization that must make an effort.
The entire debate at the Commission began with questions about the cost of the Reserves. It was said that the cost of the Reserves was inflated, overestimated, etc. I'm not familiar with the minute details of the National Defence budget at headquarters.
However, I find it surprising that 76% of the costs are not under the direct control of Land Force Command. It's understandable. It could represent the cost of capital expenditures for infrastructures or services needed to maintain the reserve. I don't deny that these figures exist. We have to ask ourselves what mission we want for the Reserves. The report presents some very good recommendations and insists on the fact that we have to define the role of the Reserves. It is important that we give the units operational missions and that we know exactly what we expect from the Reserves.
Once we've defined these principles, roles and mission, we can ask: what do we need to complete this task? We're told to cut drastically, but this operation could be risky. It's very difficult to reopen a unit once it has shut down.
To answer your question directly, I would say that it may be a good idea... I don't know any examples. I said earlier that it was politically correct, but that is not done anymore.
It is important to define a role and to establish a mobilization plan. We've been asking for a mobilization plan for 10 years now. This will have to be done if we are to know what the role of the Militia is.
By reducing staff and increasing tasks, we will succeed. We've made recommendations. Let's set a paid ceiling of 17,500, which will enable us to keep a force of 22,000. There will always be some way to compensate elsewhere for the 3,000-person surplus. We would thus avoid useless cutbacks.
Unfortunately, I'm not familiar with National Defence in detail and I can't tell you exactly what should be cut. Is there any way of doing so? That's a good question. I would underscore the fact that we have to define the roles and ask ourselves what we expect from the Militia.
If we only expect the Militia to guard vital points in conflict situations - phase IV of the mobilization - it's not the same as if we expected it to give continuous support to the Regular Force to participate in all peacekeeping missions and all NATO missions.
Definition of this role becomes crucial and essential. The Commission has done excellent work in that regard. It simply says that these roles must be defined and that the mobilization plan must be defined. From that starting point, I can live with 14,500 if I have a minor mission to accomplish. It must be realized that I will ensure that my units are concentrated on that very minor role.
You may be wondering where I got that figure of 17,500. I simply made the following calculation: ten brigades, ten units, means 100 units with a paid ceiling of 175, which gives you 17,500. With 175, I can maintain a unit of 220 to 225 people. Naturally, that's an average. In some places I can have a unit of 250 to 275, but in the case of a medical unit, I could have one with only 150. You have to understand that this is all averaged out.
.1800
I would then maintain a minimal infrastructure and, once the roles are defined, I could have them implemented. According to all the militia, men I've consulted - it's a kind of gut feeling - there is a way to save money elsewhere and to achieve the government objectives by cutting into the fat.
Let's cut the fat before we start cutting the staff. That's the message I wanted to leave you with. I agree that at the unit level - there is currently one lieutenant-colonel and four majors - we could live with one lieutenant-colonel and two majors. That's the kind of exercise we should be doing.
The Commission did not have a mandate to go that far and I think it's a good thing that it did not deal with those kinds of details.
[English]
LCol Javornik: To answer your question on where one can find savings, from a general principle and without getting into too much detail, I would suggest the effective use of flexible outsourcing under local contract control would greatly reduce the amount of moneys - what we call overhead - that are spent in getting things done. That includes anything from fixing roofs to maintaining grounds to the whole procedure of renting vehicles and then hiring militiamen to go to get their vehicles.
Sometimes vehicles are rented at point A but you need them at point B. Since we can't deliver them to point B because we have control over having them at point A, which is where we are going to sign for things, you then have to hire two militiamen. One drives the other one to get the vehicle, and both now drive the two vehicles back to point B where they should be. We often have instances of this type of sloppiness.
At the stage of what manpower costs these days, it's getting to be awfully expensive for nothing. That is what Colonel Huot was saying before. You take your role, you take what it requires to finance it at the bottom, and the money will come from the rest. Things will have to fall off the top if you don't have enough money, but now it's the reverse. I don't know what forcing mechanism you can put in place to require this; there is no guarantee these other things will not carry on even if you do things the right way from a budgeting perspective. Maybe someone has a solution, but I believe flexible outsourcing with controls that are adequate for the business world should be adequate for our business as well. We don't have to have more and more layers of control than are necessary to work elsewhere.
[Translation]
LCol. Huot: The situation could be summarized as follows: decentralizing the administration, more powers to the unit commander as I defined it and stated in my report. I sincerely believe in reorganizing and cutting the fat at headquarters.
Mr. Leroux: That reminds me of Quebec in the area of social spending. Some things are done by hospitals and CLSCs, and it's extremely expensive. But when these things are done by agencies, it only costs 25% to 30% of what it would cost otherwise. My percentages may not be accurate, but decentralize and give the battalion commander a budget so that he can manage that money; when he runs out, he simply won't have any more money. Is that what you are suggesting?
LCol. Huot: The unit commander should have the power to decide whether to repair his vehicles without having to fill out 40 different forms, going through headquarters and requesting approvals, and just have them repaired as close to his unit as possible at the best possible price.
I'm familiar with Colonel Javornik's example. In a battalion station 45 miles from Saint-Hubert, in order to get a vehicle repaired, you're sent another vehicle along with the first so that you can bring personnel back to the base. One week later, the process is reversed. It's ridiculous. We can tell you lots of stories like that.
The unit commander has to be able to administer his budget and make those decisions and an audit should be done as it is elsewhere.
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Mr. Leroux: We will have to take that into account when we draft our report and recommendations to the Minister. I thank you very much, gentlemen.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Leroux.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here. We certainly have to take this into consideration, because many times since our hearings began we have heard of the atrocities that take place out there. They are not really things that need to happen, and I think that's quite well known by all of us. We spent a few months doing the defence review in 1994, and those same stories tend to come back again.
Just before we go, I believe Mr. O'Reilly would like to say something.
Mr. O'Reilly (Victoria - Haliburton): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to compliment you on your presentation and thank you for it. As you know, we have 41 recommendations. I had 12 questions here, but most of them have been covered during this period of time.
Somewhere along the line, I think someone is going to have to give us a clearer understanding of where we cut at headquarters, as well as of the dollars-versus-bodies concept. And the other thing that has never been properly answered by anyone is the lack of a mention of the medical component cost in the report. That is something that has baffled me. I still don't have an answer for it.
Thank you.
The Chairman: Thank you very much for your presentation, gentlemen. You brought some things to light that haven't been brought out before, and you of course reinforced many others.
A witness: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.