[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, December 12, 1995
.1605 
[Translation]
The Chairman: Please be seated, Excellency. I wish to welcome you on behalf of the members of the committee. It isn't often that we meet in a room as impressive as this one. It's what comes closest to Versailles here, and it is the best we have to try to impress our colleagues from France.
[English]
Excellency, it's very good of you to come and speak to the committee today and explain the policy of France on your nuclear testing. You will appreciate, of course, that Canada has deplored the French policy on nuclear testing. On the other hand, I think it would be fair to say Canada has also welcomed certain very positive steps France has recently taken, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, notably a commitment to a zero-threshold test ban treaty, which will allow no tests whatsoever; your announcement that you will sign, along with the United States and the U.K., the Treaty of Rarotonga, creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific; and your recent announcement that you intend to end your testing program no later than the end of February of next year.
[Translation]
Before I give the floor to His Excellency, I wish, on behalf of my staff and of committee members to congratulate his government on the liberation of the pilots who had been held captive by the Bosnian Serbs and who were released this morning, if I'm not mistaken. Your government must be congratulated on the safe outcome of this operation. We extend our very best wishes for the holiday season to these pilots and their families.
His Excellency Alfred Siefer-Gaillardin (Ambassador of France): Thank you,Mr. Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Thank you to all the members of the committee for their welcome and for the opportunity they have given me to better explain France's point of view on the resumption of its nuclear testing.
Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate the comments you have just made concerning the liberation of the two French pilots who had been held prisoner since August 30th in Bosnia, liberation which, as you know, comes the day before the meeting in Paris of the leaders who will be signing or countersigning the agreements negotiated in Dayton, which will, we all hope, lead to the progressive return of peace in Bosnia and Croatia.
Mr. Chairman, do you wish me to go directly to the heart of the matter? How would you like us to proceed?
The Chairman: I believe you have prepared a statement. I would suggest that you go ahead with it, following which we will have a question period. If I understood correctly, you have brought along some slides. I would ask that you motion to us when you would like them to be projected onto the screen.
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, committee members, I had delivered to the Chair and to each one of you a small package summarizing the main elements of France's position on the resumption of nuclear testing, as well as notes for the briefing I will be making to you.
[English]
On June 30, 1995, the President of the Republic of France announced the resumption of French nuclear testing. Allow me to recall what he said: a limited number of tests, ending no later than May 1996, to enable France to make the transition to computerized simulation with a commitment to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
.1610
What are the reasons? This decision has not been an easy one for France. It was not the result of whim but based on the observation that without the tests we would not be able to guarantee the reliability of existing strategic weapons and we would not be able to make the transition to computerized test simulation, which was required to enable us to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than September 1996. In short, we need to conduct these nuclear tests to abide by our international commitments without abandoning the backbone of our defence.
We have abided by our commitments. As you know, we have adhered to the agreement on the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 11, 1995 at the General Assembly in New York, subject to the statement in this agreement that the nuclear powers should demonstrate the utmost restraint - and I underline those words - in nuclear testing. Utmost restraint doesn't mean to forbid or to postpone or whatever. By taking the unprecedented step of announcing our timetable for the tests, our objectives, and the number of tests, we think we complied with this condition.
On October 23, President Chirac indicated on CNN that if all the scientific data gathered were consistent with our expectations, we would need only six tests, not eight, not seven, to achieve our objectives. The Ministry of Defence added on December 6, 1995, that we were considering ending the tests in February 1996, three months earlier than initially planned.
Finally, and again this is unprecedented, we have been as open as possible under the circumstances during the initial tests. Invitations have been handed to journalists to visit Mururoa and Fangatofa, and there have been missions from the International Atomic Energy Agency and from the Commission of the European Union, although we were not legally required to do this. All these precautions undoubtedly explain why the most responsible countries have understood and sometimes supported our decision.
With regard to Canada, Mr. Chirac informed the Prime Minister of Canada, the Hon.Mr. Chrétien, of his imminent decision before announcing it, and Canada subsequently adopted fairly moderate positions on the issue. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ouellet, summarized the Canadian position before the House on September 18 saying, and I quote a translation from Hansard:
- Canada deplored the decisions of France and China to continue nuclear testing. However,
Canada mentioned that it wanted the recently unanimously approved UN resolution to end
nuclear testing by 1996 complied with by all parties that already have a nuclear strike force. We
expressed our satisfaction to the Americans as well as to the French who said they intended to
comply with the 1996 deadline.
Let me just say that we have been a little bit confused by the vote cast by Canada in the United Nations first committee on November 16 in support of a resolution that not only condemned the nuclear tests but also, and most significantly, reproached France for failing to comply with its international commitments. We are confused since it is admitted that this resolution contains statements that are not proven. The references to France's alleged non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty were groundless, as were the alleged risks to the environment.
.1615
Please let me list the complaints levelled against us. There are basically three: environmental concerns, non-proliferation concerns, and the moral issue about the need to keep up nuclear strategic forces after the end of the Cold War era.
First, we have been criticized for harming the environment. This charge has proved groundless. Several independent reports have testified the harmlessness of underground tests in view of human health, wildlife, fauna, and all components of the physical environment.
I do have a chart here that gives you a view of the atolls of both Mururoa and Fangatofa. As you may see, there is a drill going from the top of the sea within the lagon to 900 metres deep in the basaltic volcanic rock, which underlies both of the atolls. That is to say that this drill, at the end of which the test is going to be conducted, is completely sealed off throughout the tests and not a single radiation or earthquake would come up to the surface.
Unfortunately you can't see the colours, which would be more relevant, but basically until now this has been proven by all missions to be the safest way to conduct those tests without any outcome either on the surface of the lagon or in the neighbouring area of both Mururoa and Fangatofa.
When reports by French scientists like Tazieff or Cousteau support those facts, everyone seems to doubt their independence. However, can there be any room left for doubt when this finding is confirmed in reports by a group of Australian scientists and a team of New Zealander experts to a meeting of South Pacific ministers for the environment held in Brisbane on August 10, 1995? We noticed that the press quickly dropped this point once factual arguments were put forth.
Some media then asked why we were conducting these tests, which we claim are safe, in the Pacific instead of in our own backyard. Let us suppose for a moment that in six months' time, at a cost of billions of dollars, we could reconstruct a test ground in the centre of France and were also able to find a site as stable and solid as the basaltic rock of Polynesia. In that case the tests would be conducted, amazingly enough, 4,500 kilometres away from Halifax, whereas they are currently being conducted 7,000 kilometres from Vancouver. May I just add that both those atolls are located 6,900 kilometres from Sydney, 4,500 kilometres from Oakland, approximately 7,000 kilometres from Santiago in Chile, and practically 7,000 kilometres from Los Angeles. That is just to give an idea of the remoteness of the place where those tests are made.
You also have to remember that when we originally selected the Mururoa test site in the early 1960s, the tests were still atmospheric, and the site was far removed from any human settlement. The island closest to Mururoa Atoll is Tureia, which has about 100 inhabitants and is 110 kilometres away.
.1620
Within a 1,000-kilometre radius around Mururoa there are approximately 4,200 inhabitants. In an equivalent radius around the Kazakhstan sites in the former Soviet Union there live approximately 4 million inhabitants, and there are approximately 7 million around the Nevada sites in the United States of America.
So the environment grounds were dropped rather quickly.
The debate then shifted to another issue. In making the decision to resume nuclear testing, France would place non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in jeopardy. Here again, facts are pointing to the opposite direction. Our announcement of resumption of nuclear tests was tied to the decision to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by September 1996.
Then, on August 10, France was the first to propose the zero threshold option, a ban on all nuclear tests or explosions, whatever the level, which initially was not the clear intention of all the nuclear powers. Canada congratulated us for this initiative. We noticed that Great Britain and the United States followed closely on our heels. It is no exaggeration to state that we created a momentum favourable to the CTBT negotiations and nuclear disarmament.
To allay the concerns of the Pacific countries, we announced, along with the United Kingdom and the United States of America, our intention to sign the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga.
Finally, in New York on November 15, we voted with Canada in favour of a resolution calling upon all states to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty no later than September 1996. We also voted for one other resolution on nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
In the light of the inability to sustain this second set of criticisms, the very legitimacy of nuclear arms has been contempted, denying any more grounds for detaining a nuclear deterrent in the post-Cold War era. In short, we are asked why we need this terrifying weapon, since the Berlin wall has collapsed and the threat has disappeared.
[Translation]
In response to these questions, let us derive a first observation. Despite the East-West tensions that characterized the Cold War and despite the accumulation of nuclear weapons, peace reigned over Europe up until the fall of the Berlin wall. From our point of view, this was the result of nuclear deterrence.
Second observation: the fall of the Berlin wall, though it did give freedom back to a number of countries friendly with Central and Eastern Europe, which we are very happy about, and also lead to the break-up of the Soviet empire, did not eliminate these tensions. The splitting-up of former Yugoslavia and the troubles in the Caucasus give sufficient proof of the risks of the resurgence of nationalisms that are most destabilizing for peace in Europe.
Third observation: no one is unaware of the appearance throughout the world of new hot spots that could very well fragilize and even destabilize the international balance as we know it today.
Fourth observation: the end of the Cold War did not bring about the miraculous disappearance of the gigantic nuclear arsenals that had been built up, nor did it reduce certain conventional forces that are far stronger than those of Western Europe's democracies. Here I have a second slide, that unfortunately is not very legible, but that gives an idea of the status of the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers in 1990, of what they should be as of today and of what is planned for the years 2000 and 2003.
.1625
Must it be repeated that with the fulfilment of the START 1 agreement signed in July 1991 there will still be more than 6,000 Russian warheads and more than 8,500 American warheads?
Must it be repeated that the START 2 agreements have not been ratified by Russia nor by the United States and that their coming into force will allow the two signatories, in the year 2003, to retain more than 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons?
Lastly, must it be repeated that should be added to these numbers between 12,000 and 16,000 tactical weapons in Russia alone, the destruction of which is as of yet not provided for? These nuclear arsenals are still there.
Faced with world instability, France as well as Canada had, in 1949, established the Atlantic Alliance with their American and European allies. I know that the ultimate means of defence for the Atlantic Alliance is the nuclear weapon and that NATO's entire strategy is based upon nuclear deterrence.
When France, after having, in the space of a single century been subjected to the trauma of two invasions and two occupations of her territory, decided to, it too, arm itself with nuclear weapons, it did so in the same spirit, that of deterrence. Canada, as well as the other members of the Alliance, recognized the contribution of the French forces, as well as that of the British, to the Alliance's global deterrence, in the Ottawa Declaration of 1974, that was renewed in Rome in 1991, following the fall of the Berlin wall.
Must I insist on the exclusively defensive character of the French concept of deterrence: it is the purpose of France to possess and to maintain strategic nuclear weaponry at a sufficient but minimum level to ensure, whatever the events, the protection of the vital interests of our country and ultimately of the European Union in its entirety?
I insist on the concept of a minimal deterrence, because it is in this spirit that France has, since 1991, reduced the number of its nuclear armaments by 15 %, bringing them down to under 500 today, a fact which no one has seemed to notice.
More generally, France recognizes its own principles in the recommendations made by the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy in October 1994, and I quote:
- We cannot predict the future.
We cannot tie our future security to assumptions about growth or stability, or indeed the lack of it.
We must prepare for instability because instability in the world inevitably will affect Canadians and their interests.
- The Committee does not take it for granted that democracy and free markets will prevail
everywhere in the world. We think Canadians must be ready for bad news as well as good. That
is the only responsible attitude in relation to something as important as the defense of the
country, and the security of our children.
I would like to conclude by saying a few words about the real issues here. France and Canada are two long-standing allies that are very close politically, economically and culturally speaking and that each have a major interest in co-operating together in the international arena. Our brotherhood under arms in Bosnia, where Canada has just announced an important participation in the effort, is the most recent manifestation of this old and active friendship.
.1630
Upon completion of our tests, in order words in just over two months, France will more than ever appear to be playing its rightful role in disarmament control. We must work together in order that the CTBT, despite the reticence of certain nuclear powers, be negotiated along with all its conditions and that the nuclear disarmament of the two superpowers be fully engaged.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We will now move on to questions.Mr. Bergeron.
Mr. Bergeron (Verchères): Excellency, I too wish to thank you for having accepted the invitation made to you by our Chairman to come and explain to the committee France's policy concerning the resumption of its nuclear testing.
You are no doubt aware of Canada's and Quebec's attachment to peace in the world and to disarmament, and we are also aware of and sensitive to France's will to maintain an independent defence policy,based largely on its nuclear strike force. We are also aware of France's unfailing attachment to the defence of peace and democracy throughout the world.
Consequently, Excellency, I pondered the matter for a few minutes when the Chairman announced the holding of this briefing session. As a matter of fact, I suggested to the Chairman that we also welcome the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China so that he might explain to the committee his country's policy on the pursuit of its nuclear testing. It is my hope that the Ambassador for the People's Republic of China will be as open as you were to the idea of coming to meet with the members of the committee to explain his country's policy in this area.
This having been said, Excellency, and aware that I am of France's attachment to the defence of peace and democracy, we have been witness to the fact that France was in a way the victim of a lot of media hoopla that brought about throughout the world reactions on the part of the people of various countries, and more particularly those neighbouring the archipelago.
Furthermore, you rightly made mention of the various criticisms that have been made of your country and you outlined some of the arguments made. I have here before me three reasons that explain the resumption of French nuclear testing. My question to you, Excellency, deals with these three reasons.
Let me go through them. You say that without the resumption of these tests, France would not have been able to guarantee the reliability of existing weapons, would not have been able to make the transition to computerize test simulation and that these tests are required in order to enable France to sign the CBTB.
The question I would like to ask you, Excellency, is the following. These reasons would be equally valid for other nuclear powers, such as the United States or Russia, who could use the same arguments to justify their resumption of nuclear testing. How can we avoid seeing these same arguments used by other nuclear powers? How is France's situation different? Why should it be allowed to use these arguments to justify its resumption of its nuclear testing?
.1635
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Mr. Chairman, I thank the Vice-Chairman of the committee for his question.
The answer is extremely simple. In the beginning of the 1990s, France launched the type of experimentation that we are now bringing to its conclusion. In 1992, our experiments were suspended before we were able to compile the necessary scientific data to allow us to on the one hand use computer simulation for future nuclear arms and, on the other, verify the reliability of the weapons in our possession at the time.
A nuclear weapon has a life expectancy of approximately 20 years and by the year 2005, our weapons will have reached the end of their useful life and will have to be replaced.
In order for these weapons to be replaced as of the year 2005, it was indispensable that we possess the scientific information that we had begun to gather in the early 1990s, but the gathering of which came to an abrupt end in 1992 for reasons you are aware of. This is why it was necessary for us to resume our testing.
Why should we feel particularly free to do so compared with the two countries you mentioned? Simply because the first of the two has carried out more than 1,000 experiments, the second over 700 and to date our total is at 160. This being the case, we were not able to gather all of the data that we required.
However, in order to be in a position to sign the treaty banning all nuclear tests and explosions for good, we had to undertake these tests or give up the guarantee of security that our nuclear deterrence provides us.
That is the simplest answer I can give you.
[English]
Mr. Mills (Red Deer): I'd also like to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador.
I have several questions, which I will try to put together. Along with what Mr. Bergeron just said, I read in the Manchester Guardian on Saturday that the U.S. are considering starting nuclear testing, because they don't want someone to get ahead of them. I think the example that France is setting for countries like India and China is of major concern.
I have had a couple of things put to me in discussing this topic. One is that this is more of a political play between Germany and France for military control within the EU.
The other thing I'd like you to verify or to say is not true is that computer models today are of such quality that now nuclear testing is more a flexing of the muscles than it is actually a necessity in order to develop the nuclear capability.
That's one question. It's sort of two put together, if you want.
Also, I'd like to have you comment on the landing of aircraft containing nuclear material in Winnipeg for refuelling and the level of communication that existed among you, your government and our government to make that possible.
[Translation]
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Mr. Chairman, I thank the member of the committee for his question. May I answer in French?
The Chairman: There are three questions.
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Indeed, three.
[English]
On the first point, you referred to China and India. There's a basic difference between China and France. We have announced well ahead of time for what purposes, how many and for how long we would conduct a limited number of tests. China has tested without saying anything. They just made it blow up.
.1640
But China is one of the five countries recognized as nuclear powers by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India, to the contrary, is not. India is one of those member states of the UN that should comply, according to our views of law, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and of course adhere to the CTBT, once prepared.
We do not think our attitude is of any relevance in the case of India, nor that of other countries that would have the technical capacity to start to become new nuclear powers. This would be in contradiction to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Second, you have stated that we are conducting those tests because there might be a kind of political rivalry between France and Germany. I cannot understand this. We have a basic friendship and cooperation with Germany on all grounds except the nuclear deterrent one, whereas we do have another relationship with the United Kingdom. It is quite different, because the United Kingdom is a nuclear power already.
What we have stated, to the contrary, is that in the future, once the European Union is built, once the European Union has a foreign common policy and a common security policy, about that time we would discuss what could be the use of European deterrents, in the hands today of the U.K. and France; whether that would be of any relevance for the defence of future Europe, in close relationship with NATO, and that is to say with the United States. This is a question mark open to the future, but not a political issue today.
Third, the agreements France has with Canada to fly over Canada and eventually to land in Canada can only be done when we announce what is aboard those planes. There have been no nuclear parts or whatever on the planes that have recently landed in Canada. The slightest ammo aboard those aircraft - that is to say, the individual arms of the crew - are always listed and the Canadian authorities are clearly told. So we comply completely with existing agreements between France and Canada as far as overflights and landing rights are concerned.
The Chairman: Before I pass to Mr. English, who is the next questioner, Excellency, I would like to follow up. I don't think you answered the question about computer simulation.
Perhaps I could explain to you that our own nuclear disarmament ambassador came before this committee and told us that today testing can be done by computer simulation. Certainly many of the members of the committee would be anxious to know why France chose this particular way of going about this. If in fact it can be done by computer simulation, it would seem outrageous that one would engage in the environmentally hazardous risks involved in the testing. In fact, this could be done by a computer simulation.
.1645
[Translation]
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: First of all, let me repeat that the French tests have not and do not create risks for the environment. As a matter of fact, we and the entire international community are hoping to have definite confirmation of the innocuousness of these tests confirmed by a mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Director General of which has agreed to take groups of experts to the two atolls the day after the tests.
Concerning simulation, I wish to stress that computerized simulation must be based upon prior modelling of nuclear explosions. Models must therefore be built and in order to do so one must carry out full-scale trials in order that once simulation is used, the results can be compared with the pre-established model. That is what the Americans did after having, as I explained, carried out more than 1,000 experiments, and this is what we were prevented from doing with the premature interruption of France's final set of nuclear tests in 1992.
The Chairman: Would it not have been possible for you to share the results of the American and British tests in order to develop your own computer simulations?
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: First of all, as far as our nuclear weapons are concerned, we developed them on our own. Technically - but I am not a technician - , the two types of weapons, the American and British perhaps and in any case the French, are not identical as far as their firing and their internal composition are concerned.
As we said at the outset, our intent was not to develop new weapons, new generations of weapons, but simply to rebuild those that were going to be lapsing. Our model must be suited to the type of weapons we have. We have no intention of equipping ourselves with American weapons.
The Chairman: Thank you.
[English]
Mr. English.
Mr. English (Kitchener): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ambassador, for coming to this committee and for making this very good presentation. I have a couple of questions I want to ask you. I think I'll try to take it to a more general level.
In 1968 when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated, the wording was:
Desiring to further the easing of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;
That was 28 years ago. We have states like India, which argued on principle in the recent negotiations that the fact the five states named at that treaty have not moved along the road towards complete elimination and cessation gives them the right to develop nuclear weapons until that goal is attained.
Of course, the response of India leads to a response in Pakistan. One might argue that the tests by France could lead to tests by China - and we could go on. The whole question of non-proliferation foresees a situation where one step leads to another.
During the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the states there - including France at the time, I believe - made a commitment to show the utmost restraint in the period leading to the negotiation of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Would you not think that the French tests at this point do not reflect that utmost restraint and that they might be seen to be encouraging this kind of process that states have so much feared since 1968, or indeed since 1945?
.1650
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the hon. member of Parliament for his question.
I totally disagree with that point of view.
Again, point number one: utmost restraint. It doesn't say prohibit or suspend; it says observe ``the utmost restraint''. I want to state once more that announcing a comprehensive program of testing two months beforehand and announcing the number of tests, the period of the tests and the objectives of the tests does comply with what we signed in May in New York and complies with the ``utmost restraint'' of my country.
Number two: this doesn't give any new rights to a country that has not been recognized by the international community, the same international community that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, among them your country and my country. It doesn't give a place or a rank, nor does it give the capacity of becoming a new nuclear power to a country. And this, of course, applies also to Pakistan.
We say some countries may cheat. That is the reason why, along with you, within the first committee of the United Nations on November 16 in New York we signed a resolution calling - I tried to figure out its exact wording - upon all states to complete a universal, multilateral, effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty no later than September 1996.
So, in our view, there is absolutely no encouragement by the French testing program now under way in the desire of all the countries to go and join the five nuclear powers. It is the duty of all to have the Non-Proliferation Treaty and then the CTBT complied with by all member countries of the United Nations.
Mr. English: You referred earlier quite legitimately to France's security interests and you referred, indeed, to the history of the 20th century where there are certainly good grounds to have that type of concern. You referred to the situation to the east. In your defence review in France - I think it was two or three years ago - one of the areas mentioned as a possible future concern was to the south, with some of the tensions developing across the Mediterranean.
In terms of security concerns, you also referred to our foreign policy review, which many on this committee participated in. We discussed it, and at no point in our case did we believe that Canada, which could have acquired nuclear weapons at the same time as France did but chose not to, thought nuclear weapons would be a force for stabilization within this region. Of course, there was the pact with the United States. But in the case of the concerns to the south, do you consider that the presence of a French nuclear capability adds to the security of the Mediterranean region?
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Mr. Chairman, as far as Mediterranean security is concerned, again, I'm not a specialist in those questions. But I may state that a nuclear deterrent is not intended to be used as a military weapon. I have never heard any strategist or any French President of the republic, when speaking about the nuclear deterrent in the context of a ban, say that it would deter any other nuclear attack on France or maybe in the future on Europe. So I think there is no relevance in having a nuclear deterrent and coping with the difficulties around the Mediterranean area.
.1655
Mr. English: Thanks very much.
[Translation]
The Chairman: Mr. Leblanc.
Mr. Leblanc (Longueil): Welcome, Excellency.
You have given us a very good explanation of the reasons why you carried out the nuclear tests and we fully understand them. However, I am wondering why you did not put in place a clear strategy to prevent the wave of protests that has come from all over the world. What you have explained to us here today seems quite clear but does not fit with the reactions that we have been witnessing since the recent resumption of your testing program. I would like you to explain why you chose to remain silent rather than explaining the situation beforehand, so as to not provoke the protests waged against you.
Secondly, it seems to me that it is in poor taste to carry out nuclear tests at a time when we're talking about demilitarisation. You gave us a good explanation of the reasons why you had no choice. But I nevertheless believe that your move has not been well received in the world because everyone is talking about demilitarisation, and here you are going about new experiments.
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Mr. Chairman, Jacques Chirac, when he was candidate to the presidency of the Republic, explained as early as January of last year that if the experts, the scientists came to the conclusion that the future maintenance of a French deterrent force was conditional upon the resumption of nuclear testing, then his government would not hesitate to make such a decision. Jacques Chirac repeated that throughout the entire election campaign.
On June 13th, the President of the Republic, after having consulted scientific and military experts, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to resume this final series of tests in order to maintain the reliability, efficiency and safety of France's deterrent force.
Since then, Sir, our explanations have been consistent. It is true that not many people have been listening to us, though they have been listening to some organizations that, in the name of the defence of the environment, defence that we fully subscribe to - I don't whatsoever hesitate to say - , launched a gigantic disinformation campaign.
I am nevertheless convinced that if we continue to give the plain facts on this matter, the authorities will know what the situation is. What we also witnessed with public opinion is that the arguments very quickly moved from the environment issue, that went nowhere, to the non-proliferation treaty, that went nowhere, to the latest criticism, namely that nuclear weapons are morally unacceptable.
.1700
This proves that there is certainly tremendous confusion in the public's mind, but that it is still possible to continue to give explanations. And this is why I have come here today.
The second question...
Mr. Leblanc: Well, it seemed to me that the timing wasn't very good because there had been a decision to reduce nuclear weapons as well as all other types of weapons. It's not very good timing to pursue nuclear tests at a time when most of the talk is about doing the very opposite.
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Is there ever good timing for difficult decisions? I don't believe so. We were faced, on the one hand, with the presidential election scheduled and, on the other, with the negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear test ban that we wanted to sign. We made that commitment, and we will carry it out.
There you have it! We had six months, a six-month window. This six-month window, we used it well aware of the fact that it was coming on the heels of the renewal of the non-proliferation treaty and very close to a sinister anniversary of the use of such a weapon, that no one would like to see used again. But we held the deep conviction that by carrying through with these tests now, we would be drawing these tests to their final conclusion for all nuclear powers and for all countries who might wish to equip themselves with nuclear weapons in the future.
I believe that not enough has been said about France's proposal of a future zero option for the CTBT, namely a ban on all nuclear tests or explosions, whatever their level. It is indeed a zero option. In this context, even if conditions on the international scene are not favourable, in two months, this whole affair will be over. We will be assured of the reliability, efficiency and durability of our deterrent weapons and will be able to contribute to the negotiation and ratification of a treaty banning all nuclear testing in the future.
As for nuclear weaponry, I reminded members earlier of the enormousness of the existing nuclear arsenal. When we talk about it, nine times out of ten, we are only thinking in terms of strategic weapons, altogether forgetting that there are tactical weapons that are at least equivalent in number, but none of which belong to France.
There is therefore an enormous effort to be made and we salute what was accomplished by President Bush and President Yeltsin when they signed START 1 and, later, START 2, that was ratified neither by the Russian Parliament nor by the American Congress. In any event, there will remain a total, strategic and tactical weapons combined, of more than 20,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of these two powers, shared roughly 50-50 between them.
I don't have to draw you a picture. We are certain of one of our allies, and we have been so from the very start. Period.
The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Caccia.
Mr. Caccia (Davenport): I wish to thank Ambassador Siefer-Gaillardin for having come here today and made this presentation to us.
.1705
[English]
As Mr. English has already indicated, it seems to me the presentation this afternoon reveals a serious conceptual problem, because it links security with nuclear activity and readiness. In a way it is reminiscent of the language of the Reagan years. In a way it is reminiscent of the notions of the Cold War, even if that has been dealt with in the ambassador's remarks in a careful manner.
It is bringing forward, however, an outdated concept of global security, which instead requires more and more answers in terms of equity, redistribution of wealth, a sustainable use of our natural resources - some of the environmental issues if you like - but it's definitely a shift away from nuclear.
That is very distressing for all those who have a great admiration for l'esprit français, which is felt not only in Canada but, as we all know, in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. That admiration, as you know, is slowly but gradually evaporating as these tests continue in full disregard for global public opinion - global disapproval. It has led to a boycott of French products on the part of some, particularly in Scandinavia and Australia, and I'm sure the ambassador is fully aware of that.
One would hope that France, instead of painting scenarios inspired by fear, as page 3 of this paper does, would come forward and take the lead in the field of test suspensions, as two other nuclear-weapons-holding nations have already done.
The ambassador has indicated to us that the charts of the explosion have led to some scientific conclusion that the tests are safe, from an environmental point of view as far as wildlife, fauna, etc., are concerned. This has been confirmed by such well-known French scientists as Tazieff and Cousteau.
In pure Cartesian logic, if they are so safe, why are they not held in France in a remote location in the Pyrenees? That is a legitimate question. If the Government of France is so sure that there are no consequences, and if the scientific community is willing to verify that - it is not a unanimous view, but surely names like Cousteau and Tazieff invoke full respect - then it is legitimate to conclude, why not in France?
Third, can we know who is threatening France? To what extent would the national safety of the Government of France be weakened if these tests were not conducted? Can we learn that? What would be the handicap of France in not holding these tests? Against whom is France preparing itself to use nuclear weapons?
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The ambassador has told us it is certainly not Germany, because relations are perfect except on this item. Relations are very good with the U.K. Obviously it is not Italy. Evidently it is not Algiers or north Africa. It is probably not Greece. Is it to come from Russia, or is it to come from China?
We would like to know who the enemy is because we hold the belief - rightly or wrongly, and perhaps we are wrong - that the Cold War is over and we have entered a phase of peace dividends. We've entered a phase where these types of expenditures, which are considerable, could be used in the direction of peace, the reduction of poverty and the elimination of other methods that are disturbing us.
Mr. Chairman, I think I have used up the time allocation. I thank you for your generosity.
I can only conclude by saying there is a very serious conceptual problem here in the approach on the part of the Government of France, which we thought was not the case - and maybe we were wrong - under the regime of President Mitterrand.
We had the impression that this phase of nuclear tests was over, that France was adopting the same stance as the U.S. and the U.K. and we would never have tests or come to the day - embarrassing as it may be - when hearing the decision to sign the CTBT by September 1996 would be something about which we should rejoice.
To me, it is just a way of buying time in order to conclude the tests. I am sorry to say that,Mr. Ambassador. I would welcome any comment or answer to some of my questions.
[Translation]
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of questions. I will do my best to answer them in accordance with my understanding of them.
First of all, concerning the location of the tests, I would like to remind the member that the choice and preparation of a site for nuclear explosions aren't the same as for a firing point for trying out a new pistol or rifle. Indeed, one must have a subsoil that is sufficiently solid and then create around it a whole environment. This cannot be accomplished overnight and costs millions of dollars.
It so happens, as I explained earlier, that Mururoa et Fangatofa atolls were chosen at a time when France was conducting other open tests and was thus required to find a location far removed from inhabited areas. I gave you the numbers for the inhabitants within a 1,000 kilometres radius around Mururoa and Fangatofa.
Concerning the harmlessness of these tests, it is not only French experts who have confirmed this. The member mentioned Cousteau and the volcanologist Haroun Tazieff. I would add that a New Zealand mission led by a well-known scientist from that country, Professor Atkinson, and an Australian mission went to our test sites and made a report on the harmlessness of our tests that was presented to the Environment Minister in Brisbane in August 1995. If there might have been some doubts concerning the French experts, I believe that we can put a certain amount of trust in the New Zealand and Australian experts.
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Secondly, we were, as I said earlier, faced with a very short time frame, and this is why we used the existing facilities at Mururoa and Fangatofa for the carrying out of our nuclear tests, using a technology that we have perfect mastery of.
Thirdly, the member referred to a vision or a concept of defence that he qualified as antiquated. I would have two things to say in this regard. France is part of Europe, and it is situated 5,000 kilometres from Canada's shore, in a geopolitical context such that France is not, contrary to Canada, under the protective umbrella of the United States of America and that, however excellent relations with our American friends might be and however deep are our transatlantic relations, experience has taught us that in certain circumstances no one but ourselves can save us. That falls in with the conclusion of the committee report that I read excerpts of earlier and that you, among others, participated in.
As for the question concerning against whom France would use its weapons, I believe that the same question could be asked of Washington or Moscow, who hold arsenals that are such that they can in no way be compared with the minimal deterrent weaponry of France.
Once again, and I wish to stress this, France's nuclear weapons are not intended to be used. Their purpose is to deter. If these deterrent weapons were used, in some future we cannot foresee, this would mean the failure of its policy of deterrence.
This is what I wanted to say in answer to your questions, being as brief as possible but nevertheless having one last point. A nation's defence is not something that can be built up overnight. It is a long-term exercise.
The development of a nuclear weapon takes approximately ten years and its life expectancy is of about twenty years. In today's geostrategic context, in the name of what principle do you want to deprive your children and grandchildren of the security we have known since 1945 thanks to nuclear deterrence?
That does not mean that we are not in favour of a policy of disarmament. We have said repeatedly that we hold the deep conviction that the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is essential for non-proliferation.
Secondly, we fervently hope that the agreement between the two superpowers on the reduction of their strategic arsenals will continue to be implemented and, when the time has come, that is to say when the levels of the respective arsenals have become reasonable, you can be assured that France will participate in the general movement of nuclear disarmament.
[English]
The Chairman: Mr. Morrison.
Mr. Morrison (Swift Current - Maple Creek - Assiniboia): Mr. Ambassador, my question is in two parts. First, it's my understanding that the principal objective of these tests is to develop weapons of a lower yield - perhaps smaller physical size but primarily lower yield - through a higher degree of technology. Is this true? Is this correct?
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[Translation]
M. Siefer-Gaillardin: I'm sorry, I don't think I quite understood.
The Chairman: Before you answer the question, I would remind members that the bell has been ringing for 15 minutes. A vote will be held at 5:35 PM. We therefore still have five or seven minutes maximum left.
[English]
Mr. Morrison.
Mr. Morrison: Did you understand my question, sir?
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: I fear not, sir.
Mr. Morrison: In the first part of my question I asked whether it is correct that the object of these tests is the development of lower-yield or less powerful weapons that are perhaps smaller in size than existing nuclear weapons.
[Translation]
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: No. The purpose of the tests now underway is strictly to ensure the reliability of our existing weapons, to facilitate their reconstruction once they have expired and, thirdly, to enable us to carry out computer simulations down the road, once we are no longer able to carry out real life tests.
We have completely excluded, and we have clearly said so, the development of any new weapons.
[English]
Mr. Morrison: If that is the case, it obviates the second part of my question. You must realize, Mr. Ambassador, it was fairly widely reported that you wanted to do some computerizing, but the whole thrust behind it was to develop smaller weaponry or less high yields. But if that's not true, then I have no need to ask the second part of my question.
The Chairman: In that case we'll pass to Mr. Patry.
[Translation]
Mr. Patry (Pierrefonds - Dollard): Good afternoon, Excellency. I am very happy to see you here today before us and I wish to thank you for the clarifications you have supplied. I have a very small technical question. It is a concern of mine.
During the 1981 nuclear tests, radioactive waste material was produced and dispersed throughout the Mururoa atoll during a cyclone. Today, you say that France could undertake two other nuclear tests within the next two months.
Since these two tests would take place during cyclone season, which extends from December to April, and since you have stressed the safety of your testing, my question is very simple: is there any risk that these tests might produce radioactive waste material in the event of a cyclone?
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: Not at all, Mr. Chairman. These tests will be carried out at a depth of 1,000 meters and no cyclone reaches such a depth.
Mr. Patry: Perfect. Thank you.
[English]
Mr. Flis (Parkdale - High Park): Mr. Ambassador, I would like to ask, on behalf of this country, whether your country, together with Canada and others, will honour the conclusion of the universal, multilateral, effective, verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban no later than September 1996.
The Chairman: Are you nodding your head in the affirmative, Mr. Ambassador?
[Translation]
Mr. Siefer-Gaillardin: That is our commitment.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you.
In that case, I will have to - in view of the vote - call an adjournment.
Your Excellency, I'd like to thank you for coming before the committee.
In the interest of members, I would like to announce the fact that the vote has taken place in the United Nations. Your Excellency might be interested to know that 85 voted in favour of the motion condemning the tests, 18 voted against, and 43 abstained. Canada voted in favour of the motion along with Portugal, Belgium, The Netherlands, and the Nordic countries.
I'd just like to say, Excellency, that we very much appreciate your coming here in the spirit of an allied country. We will better try to understand this, in the interest of ensuring a comprehensive test ban that will be to the benefit of all humanity. I do hope you will take back to your country and your government the concerns the members expressed here about the present testing program of France.
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I think you've understood, from the tenor of the questions, the concerns the members have, and I can assure you those concerns are reflected in the Canadian population as a whole. Thank you very much for coming to us today.
We adjourn until Thursday at 9 a.m.