[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Monday, June 5, 1995
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[English]
The Chair: I'd like to call the meeting to order. We are continuing our examination of Bill C-68, an act respecting firearms and other weapons. In particular, we are continuing with the clause-by-clause consideration.
When we adjourned this afternoon we were on clause 133. The next amendment we have to deal with is amendment LW-002.
Mr. Wappel (Scarborough West): Mr. Chairman, I won't be proceeding with this amendment because it deals with the definition of length of gun. But I want to commend the definition to members, should we decide to do something in the future involving the length of a gun, because I think the definition is kind of neat.
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The Chair: That disposes of amendment LW-002.
The next amendment is government amendment G-65 regarding antique firearms. Mr. Bodnar will move that amendment. Is there any explanation of G-65, Mr. MacLellan?
Mr. Russell MacLellan (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada): We don't need this amendment because we have defined ``antique firearm'' in amendment G-59, clause 133 on page 59.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments with respect to amendment G-65?
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: The next amendment is G-66. LP-14 was withdrawn by Ms Phinney.
Amendment G-66 is moved by Mr. Bodnar. Mr. MacLellan, please give us an explanation of amendment G-66.
Mr. MacLellan: This amendment deals with storing, handling, and transporting these items. I just want to check paragraph 110(h). Safe storage requirements do not apply to antiques.
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Mr. Lee (Scarborough - Rouge River): Paragraph 110(h) referenced in this amendment, as I read it, has to do with storage, handling, transportation, and the expression ``mail-order sale''. Could I just ask the witness to clarify whether we're dealing with storage, handling, etc., or with mail-order, or are we dealing with both?
Mr. MacLellan: We're just dealing with safe storage.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments with respect to amendment G-66?
Mr. Wappel: I don't quite understand the purpose of this. The purpose of this is to exempt antique firearms from storage requirements. Is that correct?
Mr. Richard G. Mosley (Assistant Deputy Minister, Criminal and Social Policy Sector, Department of Justice): The purpose is to actually bring back into the operation of the act antiques that are otherwise exempted.
Mr. Wappel: That's correct. I thought I heard the parliamentary secretary say the purpose was to exempt them.
Mr. Mosley: It's to include them for the purposes of safe storage requirements and the offence under proposed subsection 86(2) of the act.
Mr. Wappel: Right. So notwithstanding that they are not firearms for the purposes of the act, for the purposes of safe storage they are.
Mr. Mosley: That's correct.
Mr. Wappel: That's the purport of this amendment. Okay.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Those are all of the amendments we have under proposed section 84 of the Criminal Code. There have been no amendments tabled in advance under proposed sections 86, 87, 88, 89, or 90. However, under proposed section 91 we have two amendments. We have LW-003 and BQ-16. First I call LW-003.
Mr. Wappel: I would ask members, in order to understand this amendment, if they would simply - this is for the English version; it's going to be a little more difficult in the French version - take their bills and flip page 68 over in half. You will be able to have beside you, simultaneously, proposed section 91 and proposed section 92. If you have them beside you, you will see that they are virtually identical. Proposed subsection 91(1) reads, ``Subject to subsection (4) and section 98, every person commits an offence who possesses a firearm''; if we stop there, the wording is exactly the same as in proposed subsection 92(1).
What is the only difference? The only difference is that in proposed section 92 the word ``knowing'' is inserted. Of course, this is because we want there to be intent in order to commit an offence under proposed section 92. The problem is that if you put the word ``knowing'' in proposed section 92 and omit it in proposed section 91, the obvious implication is that there need not be any "knowing" in proposed section 91. In other words, there need not be any intent, and therefore one could argue that you are creating an absolute or strict liability offence in proposed section 91.
Members of the committee will remember that I quizzed the minister on this very point. His answer was that notwithstanding the fact the word ``knowing'' is not in proposed section 91, the meaning is clear and that a person would have to - and I'm using his words now - knowingly or recklessly possess a firearm in order to be guilty of an offence under proposed subsection 91(1).
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In order that there be absolutely no doubt whatsoever that this is not a strict or absolute liability offence, I took the exact words used by the minister at committee and I inserted them immediately before the word ``possesses'' in proposed subsection 91(1). I did that so there is no doubt whatsoever that there is an element of intent required in proposed subsection 91(1), particularly in view of the severity of the sentence that flows as a result.
As you will see in LW-003, which is in the package that somehow got lost but may not be in the whole package, my amendment in effect does nothing more than insert at line 29 immediately before the word ``possesses'' the words ``knowingly or recklessly''.
Mr. Chairman, I did not make those words up. I did not pluck them out of a hat. I took them directly out of the words of the Minister of Justice. With this amendment proposed subsection 91(1) would then read:
- Subject to subsection (4) and section 98, every person commits an offence who knowingly or
recklessly possesses a firearm, unless the person is the holder of a licence or a registration
certificate.
Under those circumstances, it seems to me incumbent on this committee to ensure that intent is a requirement. I couldn't think of better words than the words used by the minister himself. That is the purpose of my amendment.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, I don't recall the minister using the word ``knowingly'' with respect to proposed section 91.
Mr. Wappel: He did.
Mr. MacLellan: I do recall him saying the test was recklessness and that there would have to be a knowledge the firearm was there.
I want to say, too, that this is not going to be any different from other provisions in the Criminal Code that don't use these words ``knowingly and recklessly''. The test is still attributed by the courts. I think if we do put it in here, we're going to change a lot of law. I don't think it will be necessarily for the better. I think a lot of cases will be put into question if similar wording is not there.
Mr. Lee: I suppose we're dealing with Mr. Wappel's amendment.
The Chair: Yes, we are. It is LW-003.
Mr. Lee: If we're dealing with it exclusively, I have a couple of questions about the section. This is probably an appropriate time to ask, and it has to do with the same issues raised by Mr. Wappel, so maybe I will ask.
The Chair: Yes, I think that's a good idea.
Mr. Lee: In the event Mr. Wappel's amendment did not pass, how would officials in the Department of Justice describe this particular offence as it is set out in proposed subsection 91(1)?
Would it be an absolute liability offence or a strict liability offence, or would it have some other characterization given the development of the case law here in Canada? Irrespective of how it's categorized, would it be possible, for example, to convict people of this offence of having an unregistered firearm somewhere in their car or in their house if they didn't know the firearm was there?
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Mr. Mosley: We wouldn't describe it as an absolute liability offence, nor would I even describe it as a strict liability offence.
The reference to possession of a firearm, as the minister explained when he appeared here before, has to be construed as importing the minimum mental elements into the offence. It is a crime under the Criminal Code, and the courts would clearly read into that requirement that the person knew or was reckless as to whether or not they were in possession of a firearm. That doesn't go to the issue of whether or not they have a licence or a registration certificate.
The distinction drawn by Mr. Wappel with proposed section 92 is that it's clear in 92 that an essential element of that offence is knowledge that the person is not the holder of the licence or registration certificate. That is the key difference between the two offences in terms of their constituent elements. But with proposed section 91, you still have to be aware or be reckless as to whether you are in possession of the firearm. That is the bare minimum that the code would require.
The existing provision that is most comparable to this is proposed section 91, which relates to possession of a restricted weapon for which the individual does not have a registration certificate. That does not contain any words that relate to the mental element, but the courts would read into that the requirement that the accused was aware of the presence of the firearm.
Citing examples from the case law in Tremeear's Criminal Code 1995, this relates to the subsequent offence, subsection 91(3), which is being found in a motor vehicle in which the individual - no, sorry, that is not the one I'm looking for.
The point I'm trying to make is, that offence does not spell out either knowledge or recklessness in relation to the element of possession, but those mental states will be read into any prosecution under subsection 91(1) as it currently reads in the Criminal Code.
Quite frankly, the difficulty I have with the proposal is not that it would change the substantive effect with regard to this particular offence, but more that it might call into question other offences in the Criminal Code that have been there for many years where those words are not expressly set out. So it might lead to some inquiry in the courts as to whether a distinction should be drawn, because in the one case Parliament has seen fit to spell out the words relating to knowledge and recklessness, but in other provisions within the same statute there is nothing of a comparable nature.
I have some difficulty with the motion for that reason and would suggest it may be preferable simply to rely on the common interpretation of this type of provision that would in fact require the court to apply those mental elements.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois (Bellechasse): I share the position stated by my colleague from Scarborough-West a few minutes ago. Reading proposed section 91 leads us to believe or to conclude that this is an absolute responsibility offence resulting in sentences of great severity. But we do have case law to guide us in the interpretation of absolute responsibility offences.
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Since 1978, three Supreme Courts decisions have squarely set the rules. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind the committee of those decisions. First, there is the 1978 Sault Ste. Marie decision reported in 2 RCS 1978, starting at page 1299; second, the appeal concerning the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act appeal reported in 2 RCS 1985, starting at page 486 and finally, the Wholesale Travel Group decision reported in 3 RCS 1991, starting at page 154, in which the Supreme Court clearly established that when an offence is punishable by a prison term, even if a clause appears prima facie to create a strict liability offence, the Crown still has to prove the mens rea, that is the mental element.
If we follow the case law established by the Supreme Court through the decisions I have just mentioned, that element is implicitly included in the clause.
In those circumstances, I believe there is no difference between clauses 91 and 92 and that while they establish different penalties, they mean exactly the same thing.
I would like to ask our legislative counsels what they think of the drafting of clauses 91 and 92 and what difference they see between the two.
[English]
The Chair: Legislative counsel, do you wish to comment?
Ms Diane McMurray (Legislative Counsel, Legislative Counsel Office, House of Commons): If I'm going to be frank about this, I have to say I have some concerns. As a drafter I've always been taught to draft as clearly as possible.
Mr. Mosley is quite right in stating there have been two Supreme Court decisions, both in 1979, one called Proulx and the other Barie. In its rulings the court said that when you're looking at Criminal Code offences and there's no express mens rea, unless there is a clear indication otherwise, normally they will read into it a subjective mens rea.
There is such a thing as an objective mens rea; I'll leave that aside for the moment. By ``subjective'' I mean either intent, wilful blindness or recklessness. Those are all subjective mens rea. The court basically said, we will read that in if there's no clear indication that we should not do so.
Unfortunately a case out there that bothers me somewhat is Metro News, an Ontario Court of Appeal case. It dealt with subsections 163(1) and 163(2) of the code, which address obscene material. Subsection 163(1) had no express mens rea for distributing obscene material; subsection 163(2) had an express mens rea for selling obscene material.
The court looked at it and said, one doesn't have and one does have; what should we do? According to Proulx and Barie, they should have read in a subjective mens rea. But the court didn't.
The case law has been annotated by Professor Don Stuart from Queen's University. But rather than reading into it a subjective mens rea, the court actually read into it a simple negligence test with the onus reversed on the accused. But this was on an evidentiary burden only; it was not in the balance of probabilities. In other words, you didn't have to persuade the jury; the accused simply had to raise a reasonable doubt. That's a far cry from a subjective mens rea, where the Crown has to do all the proving.
So it's not true to say the courts will not or will always take their lead from the Supreme Court. The Metro News ruling was contrary to Pappajohn, which was a Supreme Court case. It didn't bother the Ontario Court of Appeal; they went ahead anyway. Lower courts sometimes will do that. It seems to me everything is to be gained and nothing is to be lost.
If you mean this to have a subjective mens rea test, then simply say something like, ``subject heretofore every person who commits an offence, who possesses a firearm and is reckless as to whether or not that person holds - ''. That's very clear. You know it's a subjective test of recklessness, or is wilfully blind, or whatever you want the subject test to be. What you don't want the court to do is to read in an objective mens rea, that is, a negligence test.
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In certain circumstances the courts in Canada have read into the code a negligence test, a negligent or an objective mens rea. They've done it for the unlawful act part of Criminal Code paragraph 29(25)(b) on manslaughter. They've read negligence into certain criminal negligence offences, the wanton limb offences, if you want to put it that way.
I don't think the court probably would do it, but I don't like drafting that way. If I draft, I like to draft with precision. If I want it to be ``reckless,'' I say ``reckless''. If I want it to be an objective test, ``careless,'' I say ``careless''.
Otherwise, you're leaving it open and the lower courts are going to have a field day with this. I don't know what they're going to do with it. Quite frankly I don't think anybody around this table can say with any precision what the court will do given Metro News.
Mr. Bodnar (Saskatoon - Dundurn): Mr. Chairman, obviously I've had the benefit of hearing legislative counsel, and I must admit I don't agree. For once I get a chance not to agree. I would suggest proposed sections 91 and 92 remain the same. I'll indicate the reasons.
Proposed section 91 indicates that every person commits an offence who possesses a firearm and then continues. The other section says the same. The courts have defined possession as having control and having knowledge. Knowledge is in possession; that's going back to the Beaver case in the Supreme Court. It's there.
The second part of the offence in proposed section 92 deals with knowledge, knowing that a person is not the holder of a licence. It makes sense that in order for the accused to be convicted, he should know the other person doesn't have the licence.
In proposed section 91 the person who has the knowledge is the accused himself or herself. That person should be in a position of being able to establish, I have a licence; here it is. That's the distinction.
Those two sections should be left alone, because if they're touched we're going to mess up the law.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chair, I have three points. I would like to deal with Mr. Bodnar first. With great respect - and we can ask Mr. Mosley and Mr. MacLellan - I think he's wrong if he says there's a distinction between ``every person'' in line 2 of proposed section 92 and ``the person'' in lines 3 and 4. I think those two words refer to the same person; there can be no doubt of it.
Secondly, with respect to what our legislative counsel said, for me a cardinal principle of my role as a member of Parliament is that I will never leave to the courts to read in that which Parliament can write in. You never know what the courts will read in, but we will know exactly what we write in.
Thirdly, in his explanation and arguments against my motion Mr. Mosley used both the words ``knowingly'' and ``recklessly'' as requirements for this offence. So I see absolutely nothing improper in using those words.
I note it doesn't say ``knowingly and recklessly''; it says ``knowingly or recklessly''. So if somebody argued they didn't know, the Crown could still prove they were reckless in failing to know. So it doesn't in any way weaken proposed section 91.
I'll leave it at that, because there's no use beating a dead horse.
Mr. Hill (Prince George - Peace River): I want to follow up on those comments. I wonder if Mr. MacLellan and Mr. Mosley could then explain the difference between proposed sections 91 and 92. As has been pointed out, other than the word ``knowing'', which is found in proposed section 92, they're virtually the same.
The other distinction I would note is that in the case of proposed section 91 the maximum imprisonment is 5 years; in proposed section 92 it's 10 years. If the intent is that the court would read ``knowingly'' into proposed section 92, why then is there a difference in the maximum imprisonment term of 5 years versus 10 years?
The Chair: Mr. Mosley, there were several questions. You could deal with the last one and others, if you wish.
Mr. Mosley: In response to Mr. Hill's question, I think it's important that he focus on the different placement of the word ``knowing'' in Mr. Wappel's motion and the word ``knowing'' in proposed subsection 92(1).
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The distinction is that proposed section 91, as it currently reads, and proposed section 91, if amended as proposed by Mr. Wappel, would deal with the knowing or reckless possession of a firearm in circumstances where the holder is not in possession of a licence or registration certificate.
Proposed section 92 deals with precisely the same circumstances, but with the additional element that the accused would also have to know and the Crown would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that person, the accused, is not the holder of a licence or registration certificate.
There's a key distinction between the two offences. On the one hand, it's enough that the person is aware they were in possession of the firearm and at that time did not have a licence or registration certificate.
In proposed section 92 they not only have to know or be reckless with respect to their possession of the firearm, but they also have to know that they were not the holder of a licence or registration certificate. Proposed section 92 is aimed at the person who deliberately chooses to evade the application of the firearms act, the person who says, I'm not going to register my firearms, or I'm not going to get a licence.
Mr. Hill: I just have a quick supplemental question. So what you're saying is that proposed section 92 is aimed at that person and they would therefore possibly be subject to the ten-year penalty versus five years for the other?
Mr. Mosley: That's correct.
The Chair: Are there further comments or questions with respect to this amendment, LW-003, by Mr. Wappel?
Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Next we have amendment BQ-16. Madame Venne.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne (Saint-Hubert): Mr. Chairman, this was consequential to the amendment we submitted to clause 91. So you can forget about BQ-16; I do not submit that amendment.
[English]
The Chair: Next on proposed section 92, we have two amendments, LW-004 and G-67. First we'll deal with LW-004.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chair, in proposed section 92 we have this really serious offence involving a person who knows what he's doing. It's so serious that in the case of a first offence he is liable to imprisonment, to a prison term not exceeding ten years, if you please. It must be a pretty serious charge.
In the case of a second offence, if he's done it a second time, he's liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of one year.
If he's done it a third time, he's liable to a prison term of up to ten years, but not less than two years less a day.
Now, what does two years less a day mean? It means the person who has committed this offence for the third time is going to reformatory. That's what it means. He's not even going to penitentiary for the third offence for this serious crime for which he could get ten years.
Ludicrous is the only way I could describe it. From my perspective, third time - give me a break, folks!
My amendment is very clear and takes out the words ``less a day'' in line 9 so you go to the penitentiary if you're a three-time loser under this proposed section.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, match that.
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Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, we're talking about a case of minimum punishment. The fact is that there may be circumstances and you have to leave discretion with the court.
Even though it is a third offence, you have to leave discretion with the court to perhaps not send someone to a penitentiary. If it is the opinion of the judge that a stricter or heavier penalty is warranted, that could be accommodated, but I think you have to leave some latitude with the courts not to send someone to a penitentiary for this offence.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments with respect to this article? Mr. Langlois.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: For the first time today, I do not share Mr. Wappel's point of view... I do not really trust minimum sanctions that do not leave to the court the discretion to judge according to circumstances. Generally speaking, there are few exceptions, and mandatory sanctions certainly did not make easier the rehabilitation process of the accused. So with some regret, Mr. Wappel, I cannot support your amendment.
[English]
The Chair: Any further comments?
Ms Meredith (Surrey - White Rock - South Langley): Yes, Mr. Chairman, I'm afraid I do support Mr. Wappel's amendment.
Mr. Wappel: Don't be afraid.
Ms Meredith: Like him, I cannot believe we would look at registration as being a serious offence with up to 10 years for non-compliance and yet when it comes to somebody who possesses illegal weapons for a second or third time, you give him a slap on the wrist.
I must agree it doesn't make sense why, on the one hand, you would supposedly come down heavily on registration and yet when it's a criminal use of firearms, you walk away from it.
I think Mr. Wappel is right on.
Mr. Ramsay (Crowfoot): Mr. Chairman, I can hardly believe what we're discussing. If you take a situation where a farmer has 10 or 15 rifles or shotguns and he says, look, I'm not going to register, and he doesn't do anything, he doesn't commit any kind of overt act.
The police come in and find his one shotgun or his .22 and say, well, there you are, why didn't you register it? Well, I knew about it, but you guys go to blazes. If you want my shotguns or you want me, take me.
So he's susceptible to 10 years?
A voice: That's right.
Mr. Ramsay: So they do whatever they do with him on the first offence and they found out, hey, we missed a bunch. They come back and get another two or three and he hasn't done anything. All he has done is fail to comply. No one has been endangered. There's no evidence of it and he can be sentenced again to a minimum sentence. I can't believe this. I can't believe what we're doing.
There are supposedly three million gun owners. Most of them are law-abiding, hard-working taxpaying people who are so fed up with bending over backwards and trying to comply that many of them are saying they won't comply. Many of the aboriginal people are saying that as well and their leaders are urging them not to comply.
What are we going to do with those people? Are we going to send them to jail for 10 years?
When this act comes into force, who is not going to be aware of this? Therefore, what gun owner, aboriginal or non-aboriginal, is not going to be susceptible to a 10-year term?
I think this is the most absurd piece of legislation I have ever seen in my lifetime. I just can't understand what we're doing and I can't understand what the government is doing. Other than that, I've got nothing whatever to say about Mr. Wappel's motion.
Mr. Bodnar: I thought we were speaking to that amendment. In fact, with respect to the sentence of two years less a day, if you look at parole eligibility, at least in our province, if you get two years in the penitentiary, you're eligible for parole before you are eligible for parole if you get two years less a day.
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So two years less a day is harsher than two years in the pen. That's my sole concern. I cannot support the proposed amendment because two years less a day is in effect a harsher sentence.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, this is fascinating. Here's Mr. Bodnar supporting a harsher sentence than Mr. Wappel. And we have Mr. Ramsay over there, a member of the Reform Party, outlining a scenario where a person knowingly contravenes a very serious provision of the Criminal Code, presumably passed by this House of Commons. He's saying that this person should not even have a slap on the wrist. This is the Reform Party that wants people to respect the criminal law of Canada!
When the criminal law is passed by this House - whether we agree with it or not - it's the criminal law of the land. If you have disobeyed it knowingly for the third time.... I'm flabbergasted to hear that Mr. Ramsay would think that's quite okay. I'll be sure to pass his remarks on to the first guy who commits his third B and E because he doesn't agree with the section because he has to feed his drug habit. It's not his fault, and he doesn't like the terms of the law.
Well, it's up to us to make the law. When we make the law, then that's the law and people have to obey it. Civil disobedience doesn't work that way. With respect - because we get along well on this committee - I'm amazed that the Reform Party would pick and choose the criminal law.
It was just amazing to me to hear Mr. Ramsay say that the guy who for the third time says go to blazes to the authorities, that is to say, to the House of Commons that has passed this law - go to blazes; I'm not obeying your law - should get nothing. Mr. Bodnar says he supports less a day because it's more harsh than my amendment.
It's an amazing world.
Mr. Hill: Mr. Chairman, I think we're really getting to the crux. As outlined by my colleague, the problem is that you're going to have people out there who are not going to comply and yet they never have any intention of committing an offence with that firearm.
Then you're going to have the problem of trying to deal with the criminals who knowingly possess a firearm, fully intending to use it in a criminal offence. They need to be dealt with quite differently.
In questions in the House, the minister has responded by saying that's why the discretionary power...and he would hope perhaps the courts would deal with the one on a summary conviction and with the other under indictable offences.
I guess the difficulty we have is that we've talked to countless gun owners across this country who have said they're not going to comply. They don't agree with this, because they don't intend to be criminals. They don't believe they are the problem in this country. They've repeated it time and time again. Yet here we see that there is discretionary power granted to the courts to impose up to 10 years for a first offence.
I don't understand why our honourable colleagues across the way cannot understand our concern with that and the possibility of abuse in the court system. I've had hundreds of law-abiding Canadian gun owners - up until now, law-abiding Canadian gun owners, I guess I should emphasize - who are saying they are not going to register. They're asking me, what are you going to do, build more prisons? That's our concern.
Certainly our concern isn't with the criminals who possess unregistered firearms for criminal purposes. By all means, get tough with them, but how do you distinguish between the two? That's the difficulty.
An hon. member: And unlump them.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, I think it's important to distinguish. Not only will we have the minimum sentence and maximum sentence in proposed section 92, but you also have a lot more discretion than that. I'll just give an example.
Mr. Hill mentions the criminal and the law-abiding citizen. This is certainly why you need the difference in the minimum and the maximum. You need some common sense and discretion.
Mr. Ramsay talks about the farmer. Even if the farmer knowingly...and meets proposed section 92, if an officer feels this person is a good citizen and really is a law-abiding person, maybe just someone who perhaps has something in his craw and just as a matter of principle doesn't want to register that firearm knowingly, that doesn't mean the charge has to be brought under proposed section 92. It could still be brought under the firearms act. It's a discretionary move, in the same way as the arresting officer.... The charge may not even be laid at all and the person could be given another chance. Those discretions are there.
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No one is saying we're going to go out after people who are law-abiding citizens and use every extent of the law to give them the most severe punishment possible. That is not the intention. We want registration of firearms but we also want people to do it voluntarily. We want them to realize that this is not going to be a threat and, hopefully, between now and January 1, 1998, that will happen.
But also, if there is somebody who is arbitrarily determined not to register because of a commitment, or because he's told all his friends he's not going to and is caught in a difficult position as to credibility, there is still that lighter sentence under the firearms act.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments?
Mr. Hill: I have a quick follow-up question. I guess our concern here is with giving the firearms officer or the police officer, or whoever, the discretionary authority in a situation like that.
What about the case where common sense should prevail but for whatever reason the particular officer laying the charge has it in for an individual? There's nothing here that distinguishes or offers any parameters for the charge. That officer can still bring the full force of the law on that person, even if that person never intended to commit an offence with the firearm.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chairman, surely the judge will have something to say about that. That's what I say, Mr. Chairman. If there is harassment or if there is a bad relationship between the officer and the person charged, there still has to be a court hearing and that person still has the right to bring forward witnesses or other evidence that would indicate that this firearms officer is not being objective and unbiased. That certainly has happened before and has had a significant effect on a judge's ruling. That would not make these particular areas any different from other areas under the Criminal Code.
Mr. Ramsay: Mr. Chairman, I have a short comment. I always start with short comments.
Perhaps the bill should separate those two elements, that is, the penalty for an individual such as Mr. Wappel talks about who has a firearm and intends to commit a criminal act, a break and enter or whatever, and the penalty for a person who does no overt act other than fail to register, whether deliberately or inadvertently. After all, these penalties are extremely severe.
Mr. MacLellan is pointing out that in the majority of cases the peace officer will use discretion, and he may be right. But the fact of the matter is that we have put these very serious penalties within this bill and a person can be subject to those types of periods of imprisonment.
Common sense has always appealed to me and I cannot for the life of me see the common sense in that. I don't know what should be a fair and just penalty for someone who inadvertently fails to register, or someone who deliberately fails to register, but all I can say is that, as far as I'm concerned, ten years and five years is extraordinary to me.
Mr. Lee: Mr. Chairman, I don't want to leave this without reminding us all, as we all know, that earlier today we did pass new clause 107.1, which is the low threshold of simple possession for not having registered. That's a summary conviction offence, and it is a very low-threshold disposition under the firearms act.
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We escalate into proposed section 91, a summary conviction offence still, but with some enhanced penalties. Then we get to the more serious proposed section 92, with not only significant potential penalties, but some minimum offences for second and third offences.
I think that's a reasonable smorgasbord of options for the policeman, who will usually operate under a police force policy; for a prosecutor, who will be working with the police force, advising or taking the case into the courtroom if so advised; and for all citizens, who will have a judge. We have covered the gamut of procedures and penalties available.
I want to also point out that I think the minimum sentences have been selected carefully with a view to the economics of new legislation, and, like it or not, economics is a factor in everything we legislate now. While some of us might like to see higher minimum sentences, we have to realize that the minimum sentence should be set with a view to the seriousness of the offence in relation to the rest of the Criminal Code.
I think the government has done a reasonable job of setting out a good list of available options for prosecution.
The Chair: I've been pretty tolerant up until now, but we can't continue to repeat the same arguments. I think we've been on this clause for almost half an hour, and I've heard some repetition.
Mr. Hill: I appreciate your tolerance. These two clauses are very contentious to the people out there, though, Mr. Chairman. But I do appreciate your tolerance.
I just want to ask Mr. MacLellan why he feels the ten-year provision has to be in there. To me it sounds unduly harsh. Recent legislation, Bill C-37, doubled the penalty under the Young Offenders Act for first-degree, premeditated, cold-blooded murder from a five- to a ten-year maximum, and we're talking about putting someone away for ten years for possession of an unregistered firearm.
Mr. MacLellan: It covers people at the other end of the spectrum - people who have been involved in actions that are not as savoury as those of the farmer Mr. Ramsay mentions. Also it talks about other types of weapons - restricted and prohibited weapons. There's quite a smorgasbord of possibilities of people and firearms, and I think you have to have that maximum to take into account some people and situations that are not very savoury.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments on this proposed amendment?
If not, we will now put Mr. Wappel's amendment, LW-004, which is to amend the law so that there is a minimum of at least two years for the third offence of knowingly disregarding registration.
Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Next, on the same proposed section of the Criminal Code, 92, we have government amendment G-67, moved by Mr. Bodnar. The side note says ``Evidence of previous conviction''.
Mr. MacLellan, do you have some comments?
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Mr. MacLellan: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
What we're saying is where a person is charged with an offence under proposed subsection 92(1), evidence that the person was convicted of an offence under new subclause 107.1(1) of the firearms act is admissible at any stage of the proceedings as evidence to be taken into consideration under proposed section 92.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: Mr. Chairman, when a second offence carries a heavier penalty, usually the accused is being served a notification of second offence before charges are laid. In this case, at the very start of proceedings or at any stage following that, the Crown could always ultimately mention or introduce as evidence the fact that the accused had previously been convicted for the same offence.
With this amendment proposed by the government, the balance between the Crown and the defense is completely upset and I think it should remain with the usual practice of serving a notification of second offence. Without such notification, there should not be a heavier sentence.
If somebody is accused for the second or the third time for the same offence without being served a notification of second or third offence he will not prepare his defense in the same way. He is likely not to try and negotiate with the Crown, to use plea bargaining. However, at the end of the proceedings, he might be in such a position where he doesn't have the choice anymore if the Crown introduces as evidence a previous conviction. Mr Chairman, we should load the dice even more because the penalty under clause 92 are extremely harsh and by this amendment we would escalate them unduly.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, have you any response?
Mr. MacLellan: No, Mr. Chair. I think it's fairly straightforward. We're saying it's if the person knowingly does it. One of the reasons it would be knowingly is if that person had been charged and found guilty under new clause 107.1. They obviously would know then that they didn't have a licence or a certificate. So that's proof that the criterion was knowingly met.
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: No amendments have been received to proposed sections 93 and 94.
On proposed section 95 we have Mr. Wappel's amendment, LW-005.
Mr. Wappel: Colleagues, proposed section 95 deals with a person who is in possession of a loaded prohibited firearm or restricted firearm - loaded, mind you - or an unloaded prohibited firearm or restricted firearm with readily accessible ammo. It deals with a person who is in possession of those items without proper authority.
We're talking about people who are using those weapons in the commission of other offences, generally speaking. There is a dual regime for dealing with them, either by way of indictment or by way of summary conviction, depending on the circumstances of the case. That's for possession.
However, my amendment would add proposed subsection 95(4) - and I know some members may not have the amendment in front of them - so that in the event someone is convicted of an offence under proposed subsection 95(1) and is also convicted of other offences arising out of that same incident, they would have to serve any sentence they obtained under proposed subsection 95(1) consecutive to any other sentence.
Did I suddenly pluck my proposed subsection 95(4) out of the air? In fact I did not, because one of the sections we have already gone by, proposed subsection 85(4), provides the exact words I provide for in my amendment, that in the case of using an imitation firearm in the commission of an offence, the sentence must be consecutive to any other sentence the court gives. So we already have tacitly approved a consecutive sentence in that particular instance.
.2030
Here we have something that could be much more serious. There we have an imitation firearm. Here we have a loaded restricted weapon without authorization. To give a perfect example, if it should happen that a person has an Uzi and is committing a bank robbery, they're clearly contravening proposed subsection 95(1). They are also committing a bank robbery.
It seems to me perfectly reasonable that in such circumstances they should receive a consecutive sentence to the bank robbery for breaching proposed subsection 95(1).
If it's simply a possession offence, because one might argue that this only deals with possession, that's fine, because there are no other charges to which they could have a consecutive sentence. They would be dealt with under proposed subsection 95(2), obviously.
My amendment would only kick in if they breached proposed subsection 95(1) at the same time as they breached some other Criminal Code section. Surely the government can see that if the government is giving a consecutive sentence for using an imitation firearm, if someone's using a loaded prohibited weapon in connection with another charge, they surely should receive a consecutive sentence.
Mr. MacLellan: As Mr. Wappel knows, the courts can now give consecutive sentences. There's nothing to stop them from doing it. In many cases, of course, they don't, and in many cases, if they did, they would reduce the other sentence so they would even out.
The discretion of the court, in this case, is going to come forward one way or another, whether we impose consecutive sentences or not. If we impose consecutive sentences then the sentences will be less. If we don't impose consecutive sentences then the total sentence will be higher.
I think that process is served as well. I don't think we have a problem here. If there is to be a change, then I think it's something that has to come from the bench. They have to see that there is a need for this; otherwise, I don't think we can impose this.
Mr. Wappel: In response, that's a perfect argument for why we shouldn't have gone past proposed subsection 85(4), which the government itself proposed as a consecutive sentence.
If the government is proposing a consecutive sentence for use of an imitation firearm, how can it argue against proposing a consecutive sentence for use of a loaded prohibited weapon? It is absolutely illogical.
Mr. Ramsay: From what Mr. MacLellan has said - and I listened to him with interest - I wonder whether the effort of the government to crack down on the criminal use of firearms is really here in this document. It isn't that I'm resisting, but I see the sense in what Mr. Wappel is saying here. The people we should be getting tough on are those people who deliberately use a firearm in the commission of an offence.
I think what Mr. Wappel has suggested here is what so many of the people across the country are concerned about - let's have crime control and let's not emphasize gun control so much.
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Nevertheless, if the government is saying that regardless of what we put into the law, the courts are not going to take cognizance of it or, putting it in the other context, that we might as well not put anything into the law because the courts are not going to take cognizance of it, I think that's the wrong way to go.
The courts cannot enforce a law that's not on the books. So I'm in favour of putting this on the books because it is aimed at the people we want to deal with, and those are the people who will use firearms in a criminal manner.
Ms Meredith: I, too, Mr. Chairman, will speak in support of this. For five weeks I've been trying to get across the message that we are not dealing with the criminal use of firearms in a serious way. When I hear the representatives of the government saying that we really haven't had a problem with this, that it's been working well over the past number of years, then I would ask why we are bothering with gun control at all.
We do have a problem with the criminal use of firearms. I think Mr. Wappel has hit it on the head. Let's start penalizing those who are using them for criminal purposes.
It really is ludicrous that for replicas you would have a much more severe situation than you do for the use of real firearms.
I fully support Mr. Wappel's motion.
Mr. MacLellan: I just want to deal with what Mr. Wappel said about proposed section 85, I think it is, and the extra year for the use of a firearm in the commission of an offence. That, of course, was put there to try to discourage firearms, and it's been there for many years. Of course, we've had a problem with it because it's been plea bargained away.
What we've had there are those two possibilities together, the robbery and the use of a firearm together, because they were related. They were the one incident.
Here in proposed section 95 we have a situation where this one offence could easily stand alone. There's not the same need for the consecutive aspect, as is the case in proposed section 85. We've also recognized the insufficiency of proposed section 85 by having the four-year minimum. I think we've recognized the various aspects of this, but I'd like to ask Mr. Mosley to say something as well.
Mr. Mosley: The purpose of Mr. Wappel's motion is, at first impression, very attractive. The difficulty is, in part, because proposed sections 85 and 95 are intended to do two different things.
In proposed section 85 the gravamen of the offence is the use of a firearm in the commission of another offence. The entire purpose of that provision, dating back to its enactment, was to add an additional penalty for that factor - the use of the firearm in those circumstances - and it had to be consecutive.
In proposed section 95, the offence stands alone. It's not dependent upon the commission of any other offence and it's not, on its face, related to the commission of any other offence.
The difficulty Mr. MacLellan was alluding to is not any motivation on the part of the courts to evade parliamentary intent, but over the years they have developed a principled approach to the application of consecutive and concurrent sentences. They clearly have the authority under section 717 of the code to impose consecutive sentences, and that should properly be the norm when it is a new offence and the offender is already serving a sentence. The new offence should be consecutive to the sentence that's already being served.
It becomes more problematic when dealing with other offences that may arise out of the same transaction. In those circumstances, the principle of totality is applied to the group of offences. This is reflected in Bill C-41, which this committee dealt with not too long ago.
The courts would normally impose the longest sentence that they deem appropriate for that group of offences for the most serious of the crimes that were committed, and then make the other sentences for the other crimes concurrent in time so that the total sentence that is imposed is that which is deemed appropriate for that group of offences and that particular offender.
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[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I have some difficulty with Mr. Mosley's line of reasoning. Section 95 as it now reads can be taken separately, in which case it is not related to the commission of another offence. However, when it is read in conjunction with subsection (4), as moved by Mr. Wappel, it becomes obvious that a consecutive sentence can only be imposed when another crime is committed at the same time. Thus, there are two events taking place at the same time. In that case, I have no difficulty in following Mr. Wappel's logic. He has just regained his 900 batting average. Therefore, I cannot understand Mr. Mosley's reasoning on that.
[English]
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments with respect to this amendment?
Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: With respect to proposed section 96, no amendments were received.
On proposed section 97, two amendments were received. First of all we have LP-15.
Ms Phinney (Hamilton Mountain): It has been withdrawn, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: Then we have government amendment 68. Who will move government amendment 68, keeping in mind the experience of Ms Phinney this afternoon? Mr. Lee is a gambler. Are you moving it?
Mr. Lee: Yes, I will be happy to move it. I'm bold and courageous.
This particular provision creates an exception for crossbows in relation to letting another person use them under supervision.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you want to give further explanation to this amendment?
Mr. MacLellan: No, Mr. Chairman. It seems to be fairly straightforward.
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: We now move to proposed section 98. We have six amendments here. The first is BQ-17.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: This amendment is intended to strike out the words ``or such other date as is prescribed'' at the end of proposed subsection 98(1). We want the date to be January 1st, 2001, and not such other date as may be prescribed by regulation. This is obviously a transitional provision, but it is very important to ensure the legislation comes into force no later than January 1st, 2001.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, what is your response to that amendment, please?
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, the Bloc amendment, as you know, would delete the words ``or such other date as is prescribed'', presumably not to have it put back. I can understand that and I appreciate the objective Madam Venne is seeking.
However, we have amendment G-69, which would deal with the same date or an earlier date, that I think would look after the concerns of Madam Venne and add a little more than BQ-17.
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Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Next we have G-69. Who will move G-69?
Ms Torsney (Burlington): I will move this motion.
Mr. MacLellan: What we're doing is adding the underlying words, Mr. Chair. We are particularly talking about proposed subsection 98(2), the last two lines, ``until January 1, 2001 or such other earlier date as is prescribed''. We're contemplating that if anything, this would come into effect earlier than January 1, 2001, but we're certainly not predicting it.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments with respect to G-69?
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: So, if I correctly understood how the government wants to go about this, the coming into force would be January 1st 2001 or an earlier date in all those clauses mentioned in the Bloc's amendments BQ-18 and BQ-20, so that we wouldn't have to come back to our amendments because they would have already been passed with respect to that provision. I just want to be sure that we are indeed pursuing the same objective. It's exactly the same, I think.
[English]
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: Thank you.
[English]
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Now we have BQ-18. It is covered by the previous one. Then we have BQ-19. Madam Venne.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: That is also covered by 69, if I'm not mistaken, since 69 covers page 74. Just a second while I check that along with you. We were dealing with lines 1 to 12 on page 74. So, that is covered by G-69. Excuse me.
The Chair: Next we have BQ-20.
Mrs. Venne: This deals with lines 5 to 11 on page 74. Again, that has been amended, I think.
As far as I'm concerned, this is the same as what's in G-69 except that we put in 2001, while the government put in 2003. I would like to ask whether there isn't a mistake in the government amendment, or if 2003 is really what was intended.
The Chair: There are two dates: 2001 and 2003.
[English]
Mr. MacLellan, Madam Venne was asking whether, when you handed in G-69, 2003 was a mistake?
Mr. MacLellan: No.
The Chair: You had in the first paragraph 2001 and in the next paragraph 2003.
Mr. MacLellan: Yes, that was licences. These are registration certificates, Mr. Chairman.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: So, there are indeed two separate dates.
The Chair: Yes. We now go to BQ-21.
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Mrs. Venne: This deals with what comes after line 13 on page 74. We are withdrawing this amendment which is consequential to an earlier amendment which was not agreed to.
[English]
The Chair: We've received no amendments to proposed sections 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, and 107, but we do have two amendments to proposed section 108. These are Reform amendments R-0019 and R-0020.
Mr. Ramsay: The first one, R-0019, would remove the reverse onus by striking out lines 27 and 28 on page 78. That's the rationale for it.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have any response?
Mr. MacLellan: This is not something new. This is a provision that's been there for years.
The Chair: Is this a provision in the law, not Mr. Ramsay's amendment?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
The Chair: Mr. Ramsay's amendment is new.
Mr. MacLellan: It hasn't been there that long.
The Chair: So what are you saying?
Mr. MacLellan: It's worked well and I don't think we'd want to change it.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments with respect to amendment R-0019?
Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: The next Reform amendment is R-0020.
Mr. Ramsay: Since R-0019 was defeated, I will not move this motion.
The Chair: Next we have proposed section 109, for which no amendments were received.
On proposed section 110 we do have an amendment. There were some new amendments. We have R-0021 and R-0022.
Mr. Ramsay: Amendment R-0021 would remove the words ``or discharged under section 736''. The rationale is this: why would an individual be subjected to a discharge under this particular section?
I asked earlier about the discharge, whether there's a difference between a discharge and an absolute discharge. It doesn't state here whether this is an absolute discharge or not. Nevertheless, if a person has been before the courts and received a discharge, why is that held against him under proposed subsection 109(1)? We would strike that. That's the rationale for this, Mr. Chairman.
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The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, have you a response to that proposal?
Mr. MacLellan: This practice is an existing practice and it's the existing law. We see no reason to change it, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Ramsay: It doesn't make it right just because it's been there for a while. I would like to understand why and I'd like the officials to explain why a record of a discharge would be considered in this situation. I haven't heard that and I would surely like to know the answer.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, I want to make one observation. These are very serious offences and a discharge is part of the result. A person who's discharged has still been found guilty, but they're discharged. It's not as if they've been found not guilty. It's impossible to take that out and still be able to cite the possibilities of those who have been found guilty.
Mr. Ramsay: Then let me ask this. If a person receives a discharge, do they have a criminal record?
Mr. MacLellan: I'll let Mr. Mosley answer this.
Mr. Mosley: I have to come back to the fact that there's no definition of a criminal record, but a discharge is kept on file in local police stations. The fact of the finding of guilt is kept in court offices. It may be included on the CPIC system. So the record of the discharge being granted or imposed, because it's in lieu of another form of sentence being imposed on the offender, is recorded and kept track of. It is in fact brought up again if that person is found guilty of a subsequent offence, so they are not given the benefit of a further discharge. And it could be used for aggravation on the sentencing for the second or subsequent offence.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments on amendment R-0021?
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I have a problem with the English version of 109(1). In the first two lines, it says:
[English]
- Where a person is convicted, or discharged under section 736, of
Any person given an absolute discharge must first of all be found guilty. There seems to be a distinction here between being convicted and being discharged. In order to be discharged, a person must first of all have been found guilty, as stated in section 736. The French version is probably more specific in that respect. I just wanted to draw that to the attention of the drafters. If you think I am mistaken, then please forgive me.
In addition, the French version should be amended to read: «lorsqu'il le déclare coupable et l'absout,» because section 736 of the Criminal Code is quite clear: «...Where an accused, other than a corporation, pleads guilty to or is found guilty of...» So, there has to be a guilty verdict, an offence and so on: «the court may...instead of convicting the accused, by order direct that the accused be discharged absolutely.» But section 736 says that the accused can be found guilty. It is a question of semantics and if it is clear to everyone else, we will try and make the best of it.
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[English]
Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Next we have R-0022. Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Ramsay: I would not move R-0022 because the rationale is the same as the previous amendment, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: We'll go to proposed section 110. We have three proposed amendments. First we have R-0023, then G-70, and then R-0024.
First we have the Reform Party amendment, R-0023.
Mr. Ramsay: Mr. Chair, I will not be moving these because they've all been dealt with under this discharge rationale as well as the crossbows rationale. I will not be moving any of these. They've been dealt with and voted on by this committee recently.
The Chair: We move then to G-70.
Ms Phinney: I move G-70.
Mr. MacLellan: We're just adding the reference to proposed paragraphs 109(1)(b) and 109(1)(c). We think it would give additional public safety to make these inclusions.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: We then move to proposed section 111. We have six amendments proposed. The first is R-0025 and the next is G-71.
Mr. Ramsay, amendment R-0025.
Mr. Ramsay: I'll not be moving these, Mr. Chair. They deal with the crossbow, and again these have been argued and turned down by the committee.
The Chair: All right. So that's R-0025 and R-0026.
Who will move G-71?
Ms Phinney: I move amendment G-71.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have any comment?
Mr. MacLellan: It deletes proposed paragraph 111(1)(b), the reference to cohabits and associates, Mr. Chair.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: We have BQ-22 right after this.
[English]
The Chair: I would just point out that if G-71 carries, then BQ-22 can't be put.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: Precisely.
[English]
The Chair: On the other hand, if G-71 is defeated, then BQ-22 can be put.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: Yes. It's the very reason I'm asking this question of the government. What was bothering us in paragraph 111(1)(b) was the fact that it mentioned a person who ``cohabits with or is an associate of''. This is what was bothering us, that is whether that person was cohabiting or was an associate of someone.
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If I understand correctly, we would be striking paragraph (d) from G-71 that I have just quoted. Am I right?
[English]
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: We are satisfied. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Amendment BQ-22 is not put.
Next we have G-72, moved by Ms Torsney.
Mr. MacLellan, can you explain G-72?
Mr. MacLellan: This is consequential to G-71. We don't have paragraphs (a) and (b) of proposed subsection 111(1) any more, so we have to make this change to take that into consideration.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Next we have G-73, moved by Ms Phinney.
Mr. MacLellan: This is consequential to amendments we'll be proposing in G-75.
The Chair: Amendment G-75 comes under proposed section 117.01.
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
The Chair: Perhaps you could briefly explain what you're going to do there so that people will understand what this amendment is all about.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Bodnar is going to be moving this. I'll let him do the explanation.
The Chair: We'll going to vote on G-73 now. If it's consequential to G-75, you might very briefly explain how it is consequential.
Mr. Bodnar: Shall we move to G-75 right now, Mr. Chair?
The Chair: Not entirely, but just the connection. In other words, why should we vote for G-73?
Mr. Bodnar: Amendment G-75 is on the proposed section that deals with the individual who's prohibited when an application is made to restrict the possession of prohibited guns by that individual. It's a change from what we have now, because now the judge can make the order simply by imposing such terms and conditions on that person's use as the judge considers appropriate. As the section exists before the amendment, the judge would have to prohibit that person from using it.
To know how it relates to G-73, I would have to look.
The Chair: Does anyone sitting up there know?
Mr. Bodnar: That simply defines a provincial court judge; that's all.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: That completes the amendments on proposed section 111.
Mrs. Barnes (London West): Mr. Ramsay may have said it, but was R-0026 not moved?
The Chair: It was not moved.
We've received no amendments for proposed section 112. We have an amendment for proposed section 113, R-0027.
Mr. Ramsay: We would strike this from lines 18 to 46. We question the lifting of a prohibition order, and we feel that any consideration with regard to not placing a prohibition order should have been made at the time of a conviction. I don't understand why, if someone is considered to be dangerous and irresponsible as far as firearms possession is concerned, a prohibition order should be lifted. That's the rationale, Mr. Chairman.
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The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have any response to R-0027?
Mr. MacLellan: It is a provision that largely applies, as I can remember it, in the north, for purposes of hunting for sustenance.
I'll ask Mr. Mosley to elaborate further, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Mosley: There have been several decisions. I refer to R. v. Chief, a 1989 decision of the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal, R. v. McGillivray, 1991, in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and R. v. Netser, 1992, in the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal. There is a decision to the contrary in Ontario in a case called R. v. Kelly in 1990.
In effect, the three cases that I mentioned have found that a weapons prohibition order could constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 12 of the charter for an accused who is dependent on hunting for income and food. In these circumstances, the proper remedy was to create a constitutional exemption.
In view of the debate in the courts over this issue, it was thought best to set out a statutory provision that would help to structure the decision-making in a bit more of an orderly fashion, with criteria fixed by Parliament as to when this should be done.
Mr. Ramsay: If I understand what Mr. Mosley said, it seems to me that anyone who can justify the need for a firearm based upon sustenance hunting is going to be immune, to a certain extent, to these provisions. Whether it is by a process, sooner or later, they are going to be immune, even though the evidence is that they may be dangerous if they have firearms. That would involve vast numbers of people who live in the north, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal. I see an inconsistency here within the law.
If a person is considered to be dangerous for having a firearm - what we are trying to do is keep firearms out of the hands of people who are dangerous in their use of them - then why would we allow this? It seems strange to me. It seems to be a glaring inconsistency that we would lift the prohibition and allow individuals to have firearms even though the evidence indicates that it would create a danger to someone in society. I thought that was what this bill was designed to deal with.
Mr. Wappel: I have a very brief intervention to point out to Mr. Ramsay, if he hasn't already seen it. Before an authority may make such an order, they must take into account certain factors as listed in proposed subsection 113(2). One of the factors must be the safety of the person or other persons. So the point you were speaking of earlier would have to be considered by the competent authority.
Mr. Bodnar: I'll just give an example of a situation in which this could be beneficial. It is simply that an individual is convicted of assault causing bodily harm. That may be simply from a fight the individual has. He strikes the person. Instead of hitting the person on the jaw, he hits him on the nose and cracks the nose. That's considered bodily harm. The person then is prohibited from having firearms even though a firearm was never used in the commission of that offence. That's what can happen.
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If that person at the age of 18 or 19 has that offence, and at the age of 21 has prospects for a job in a hardware store where the handling of guns is required to work, that person would be unable to take such employment because of the prohibition order. A section like this would give the flexibility and allow the young person to continue on with life after perhaps one indiscretion that involved a fight for whatever reason.
Mr. Ramsay: Following up on what Mr. Bodnar has said, it seems that the prohibition order ought not to have been made in the first place. That's the law that's been created and that's what we're talking about.
Mr. Bodnar: It's the law that's been in existence for a long time.
Mr. Ramsay: That doesn't make it right.
Mr. Bodnar: It's what it is now.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Mosley has mentioned some cases of decisions that have found, for one, that the decision to restrict hunting for sustenance is cruel and inhuman punishment. There are decisions that have allowed the person to hunt even after the prohibition order.
We're saying we want to promote the prohibition orders where either that person's life is in danger or the life or safety of another person is in danger. I don't think we'd ever want to back away from that. In fact, we'd want to strengthen this where we could. I think frankly this is what we've done here. Rather than leave the arbitrary decisions, which are applied in different fashion across the country, we have taken this proposed section 113 and put in some criteria, some points for consideration for the court.
I think the most important one is in proposed subsection 113(3), where it talks about terms and conditions so that if the person is hunting for sustenance and there is still even a remote danger that somebody's life could be in danger or there could be grievous bodily harm to some person, then terms and conditions could be placed - for instance, the fact that the person who was granted the licence would have to turn in his firearm after hunting and he wouldn't be able to use it for any other purpose. It would have to be stored in another location where some responsible person - perhaps the RCMP detachment, for instance, in a remote area - could keep it under surveillance. These are things that I think in the long run will go towards aiding the protection of others.
The Chair: Are there further questions or comments with respect to amendment R-0027?
Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: We've received no amendments for proposed sections 114, 115, 116, 117. We have four for proposed section 117.01. The first one is R-0028.
Mr. Ramsay: I will not move that; that has been defeated.
The Chair: So R-0028 will not be moved.
Next we have G-74. Who will move G-74?
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, I am moving G-74 because, as I'm delighted to note, it happens to be identical to LW-006. Therefore I am pleased to move it.
The addition of the word ``wilfully'' before the word ``fails'' in proposed subsection 117.01(2) was recommended by the Barreau du Québec.
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The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, is there anything to add?
Mr. MacLellan: No. It's just for greater clarity and so that the person can't be found guilty by omission.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Does this mean that LW-006 will not be put?
Mr. Wappel: It does indeed.
The Chair: Next we move to G-75. Who will move it?
Mr. Bodnar: I so move.
This is the one I had referred to. It refers to the situation in the past in which an application was made by a person who had some firearms and who was cohabiting with someone who was prohibited. If the judge found it appropriate, he had no discretion; he had to prohibit the lawful gun owner and possessor from having the firearm. This amendment allows the judge to make an order under ``Terms and Conditions'' on the person's use and possession. In other words, the judge can order that person to maybe not possess them in the home if there's someone who is prohibited. They could maybe have them elsewhere.
As indicated in proposed subsection 117.011(6), in determining terms and conditions under proposed subsection 117.011(5), the provincial court judge shall impose terms and conditions that are the least intrusive as possible.
Mr. Wappel: Point of order, Mr. Chairman. It may surprise no one on the committee that I'm confused. This apparently deals with proposed section 117.011, which is allegedly on page 87. However, the only thing on page 87 is proposed subsection 117.01. There is a proposed section 117.11, but no 117.011 as far as I can make out. Is this in fact a proposal to substitute 117.011 for some section? Are we on page 87?
Mr. MacLellan: I think it explains it in the first two lines of G-75:
- That clause 133 of Bill C-68 be amended by adding, immediately after line 28 on page 87, the
following:
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
Mr. Wappel: I guess that's only because ``Search and Seizure'' is proposed section 117.02.
Mr. MacLellan: Right.
Mr. Wappel: Sorry. Thank you.
The Chair: That was a good point of order.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: Has he completed his explanation?
The Chair: Yes, Mr. Bodnar has explained the amendment.
Mrs. Venne: In the French text, on line 5, it reads: «la personne visée par la demande habite ou a des rapports avec un particulier». Anything resembling that up until now has been removed. It should possibly also be removed in this case given that this notion is not recognized anywhere else in the bill.
[English]
Mr. Mosley: Mr. Chairman, perhaps there's some misunderstanding. The intent of the earlier motion was to delete that portion of the prohibition-order-making authority which pertained to persons who cohabited with or associated with. But it was intended to be replaced by this provision in G-75. So there's no mistake about the reference, in either English or French, to somebody who cohabits with the individual who would otherwise be the subject of an order.
.2125
[Translation]
The Chair: Ms Venne: Did you have any further remarks?
Mrs. Venne: No. I am not really satisfied, but I may come back to this later on. For the time being, there would be the other part, subsection 4, where it is mentioned that the ``judge may proceed ex parte to hear and determine an application in the absence of the person''. The principle involved here is that the accused must always have the right to be heard. I wonder why an ex parte hearing can be accepted in this case.
[English]
The Chair: Does somebody have an answer to that last inquiry?
Mr. Mosley: The ex parte procedure is exceptional. The norm would be proposed subsection 117.011(3), whereby the provincial court judge would hear all relevant evidence presented by or on behalf of the applicant and the person against whom the order is sought. The court could proceed ex parte, but only in the same circumstances as those in which a summary conviction court may, under part XXVII of the Criminal Code, proceed with the trial in the absence of the defendant. That would not be the normal circumstance.
[Translation]
Mr. Yvan Roy (Senior General Counsel, Criminal Justice Policy, Justice Department): Mr. Chairman, you may want to refer to section 803 of the Criminal Code, the one which would apply in this case and which spells out how proceedings are to be engaged whent the defendent fails to appear.
[English]
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments?
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I don't really have a problem with the ex parte hearing. I understand that the accused, under Part XXVII, can be represented by a lawyer or can be absent. The only case where he must be present is when he decides to testify. He cannot testify by proxy. However, in 117.011, subsection 1, line 5 in the French text, we are proposing as a subamendment to strike out ``ou a des rapports''. It would then become: ``que la personne visée par la demande habite avec un particulier qui est sous le coup d'une ordonnance, etc.''. This is to ensure congruence with amendment G-69.
The Chair: Are you tabling a subamendment?
Mr. Langlois: Yes.
The Chair: Could you repeat it please?
Mr. Langlois: Yes, Mr. Chairman. In section 117.011, line 5 of the first subsection, I am proposing that we strike out the words ``ou a des rapports'' in the French version. In English, in the first line, we should strike out ``or is an associate of''.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Langlois is proposing a subamendment to strike from G-75, in proposed paragraph 117.011(1)(a) in the English version at the end of the first line, the words ``or is an associate of,'' and in French, proposed subclause 117.011(1) in the fifth line where it says ``ou a des rapports''.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. Langlois could explain the reasons for his amendment.
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[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: The expression has far too much scope and I am not sure that it could easily withstand judicial testing, given its broadness.
The terms ``is an associate of'' are not sufficiently defined. They involve far too many people. The wood ``cohabits'', is precise and can be defined. But what is meant by ``is an associate of''? It could be defined, by association, in an extremely obnoxious way which does not determine the rights of an individual. The definition would require litigation.
Could people associate over the phone? Would they have to be in contact on a daily or weekly basis? Would they have to be married? What is meant by ``is an associate of''? We have no definition. Therefore, in the absence of a definition, litigation becomes necessary. As Mr. Wappel was saying earlier, if it is not spelled out, it will be up to the courts to decide. I support the subamendment for those reasons. If we want to have something written down, let's be precise.
[English]
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments with respect to the subamendment?
Mr. MacLellan.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Langlois' concern, I think, is in the English in paragraph (b):
- the other person would or might have access to any such thing that is in the possession of the
person against whom the order is sought.
The Chair: Mr. Ramsay, you had asked for the floor, but were you asking for the floor on Mr. Langlois' subamendment or on the general article?
Mr. Ramsay: No, not on the subamendment. I would like to know the English translation of the subamendment, where it fits into the English text.
The Chair: Okay. I'll read it to you again, because we'll dispose of the subamendment.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I would like to make one last comment, concerning a point which I had not...
The Chair: I will explain it in English.
Mr. Langlois: Excuse me.
[English]
The Chair: In 117.011, if you look at paragraph (a), it says ``cohabits with, or is an associate of''. Mr. Langlois is proposing that the words ``or is an associate of'' be taken out. He's not proposing to add anything; he's proposing to take out those words ``or is an associate of''. So it would read ``cohabits with another person who is prohibited''.
Mr. Ramsay: I would like to speak on the subamendment.
The Chair: All right. You may speak to the subamendment.
Mr. Ramsay: I think this is an extraordinary clause and I think everyone can understand the intent that if someone has proven by their actions that they ought not to have firearms, then the goal is to keep firearms away from that person. If that person has access to firearms through an associate or someone they cohabit with, then of course it defeats the whole purpose of the prohibition. However, it's like so much of Bill C-68. If we're going to deny an associate or one who cohabits with one who has been prohibited from having firearms, then what does that mean?
I looked up the word ``associate'' in the Gage Canadian Dictionary just before I came back and ``associate'' means ``to mix socially or to keep company with''. If we do not strike ``associate'' out of this clause, then we could condemn whole communities particularly - and to give the typical example, whole communities in the north, where everyone associates with everyone in those small, isolated communities. Does that mean we must, or that it's possible a court could deny everyone in that community from having a firearm?
I have the greatest difficulty with the application of this kind of law, when we do not consider the impractical consequences of it. I think that striking the words ``or is an associate'' goes toward alleviating a certain degree of impracticality of this clause as it stands now, or stands without the subamendment.
.2135
So I would support the subamendment. In fact, I would like to see the whole thing done away with, but then how do we deal with those kinds of problems?
The Chair: You can vote against it and vote against a clause. But right now we're dealing with the subamendment.
Mr. Mosley.
Mr. Mosley: It might be helpful in considering whether the subamendment should be adopted, Mr. Chairman, to look at the actual words of the order that is contemplated under proposed subsection (5) and, of course, the terms and conditions contemplated under proposed subsection (6).
Under proposed subsection (5) the provincial court judge shall make an order only if satisfied that the conditions exist in respect to the person against whom the order is sought:
- imposing such terms and conditions on the person's use and possession of anything referred to
in subsection (1) as the provincial court judge considers appropriate.
Further, in proposed subsection (6) it says:
- the provincial court judge shall impose terms and conditions that are the least intrusive as
possible
The Chair: Are there any further comments or questions with respect to the subamendment? Mr. Langlois.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I will not rebut the arguments which have been put forward and which all fit neatly together. In the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the freedom to assemble peacefully is protected under 2c) and freedom of association is protected under 2d).
I do not know whether this constitutional argument was considered in determining the use of such a broad term as ``associate''.
I strongly doubt that this could stand the tests which have been established in the Oakes decision with regard to the violation of limits that can be accepted in a reasonable society. For this additional reason, i will vote in favour of the amendment.
[English]
Subamendment negatived
The Chair: Now we return to G-75.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: I would like to say to Mr. Roy, who was mentioning section 803 of the Criminal Code, that in that case, a Summary Convictions Court may proceed ex parte, but only in the case of a person who has been issued an appearance notice. This not what is said here, in subsection (4).
Mr. Roy: In that regard, this is at least my reading of what section 117.011 would become. It says that the court may proceed ex parte, hear the application and make a determination in the absence of the person, in cases where there would be compliance with the rules we have in Part XXVII of the Code. This means that, according to my reading of the clause, that the person would have to be advised of the application and then, if the person is not present, the court could proceed ex parte. That is the intent of the provision, I believe.
[English]
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: We now go to proposed section 117.02. We have received an amendment to that section. It is Reform amendment R-0029.
.2140
Mr. Ramsay: I will not be moving that unless we want to debate another crossbow amendment.
An hon. member: Sure, why not?
The Chair: That is withdrawn. We have not received any amendments to proposed sections 117.03, 117.04, 117.05, 117.06, 117.07, 117.08, but we have two amendments proposed to proposed section 117.09. They are G-76 and G-77.
Who will move G-76? Mr. Gallaway.
Mr. Gallaway (Sarnia - Lambton): It simply adds to this proposed section the words:
- firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon,
- I believe they were inadvertently left out when the bill was drafted.
Mr. MacLellan: We deleted ``manufacture''.
The Chair: You deleted ``manufacture'' and you`re adding ``firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon,''.
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments with respect to G-76?
Mr. Wappel and Mr. Lee after.
Mr. Wappel: This says on page 96 to strike lines 6 through 8. I don't even see the word ``manufacture'' anywhere.
Mr. MacLellan: That's my fault. There's another section, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Very good. So you're simply to add.
Mr. Wappel: I gather that the intent of this is to remove the words ``anything'' and make it more specific, or what?
Mr. MacLellan: Sorry, Mr. Chair, it does delete ``manufacture'' in proposed paragraph 117.09(1)(b).
Mr. Wappel: Oh, in the reference to proposed paragraph (1)(b).
Mr. MacLellan: Yes. Sorry, that's where it is. I was looking for it myself.
Mr. Lee: I was just curious, Mr. Chairman, as to why ``manufacture'' was deleted.
Mr. MacLellan: I'll ask Ms Weiser to answer this please.
Ms Irit Weiser (Senior Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice): Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The amendment to this proposed section is to protect employees of carriers who are, in the course of their duties, transporting or touching firearms and other prohibited things.
Employees of carriers, if you recall, do not need to be licensed, and that's why we need the special exemption provision, but there would be no reason for employees of carriers to be manufacturing. Thank you.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Next we have government amendment G-77. Who shall propose G-77?
Ms Torsney: I propose G-77.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, would you please explain G-77.
.2145
Mr. MacLellan: Excuse me, Mr. Chair, but I just wanted to have another look at this. We may withdraw it and consider it further. If it is found that we need to put it in, perhaps we'll put it in at report stage.
The Chair: So you're not putting this. It was moved by Ms Torsney and it's on the floor. There has been a request to withdraw this. Is there agreement to withdraw it?
An hon. member: No.
The Chair: Are there any further comments or questions with respect to it?
Amendment negatived
The Chair: We move to proposed section 117.1 and no amendments have been received.
Next we have an amendment LL-7, which is to provide for a new proposed section 117.1.1.
Mr. Lee: Colleagues, you will recall us, as a committee, walking through the process of manufacturing and exporting for two or three different manufacturers. In the process it became apparent that this statute required the licensing of any person or outfit that would carry or transport a firearm in Canada. The question was raised by one of our witnesses as to whether or not an international air carrier being used as a courier to ship a firearm out of Canada would bother, or want to bother, becoming licensed just to do that one piece of work that might happen once or twice a year.
The feeling at the time - whether it was informed or uninformed I'm not sure - was that an international air carrier flying passengers and cargo wouldn't stop, wouldn't take the time to get a licence. That would effectively prevent the Canadian manufacturer from manufacturing and exporting.
.2150
So this particular amendment adds a new subsection. It says that notwithstanding any other provision of the act, no air carrier or employee would be guilty of an offence by reason only that they handled firearms for purposes of exporting them on a airline flight leaving Canada.
So they would be able to load the aircraft and have them on the aircraft for a flight leaving Canada, and would therefore not have to register or become licensed as a carrier.
This only deals with export, not import. It only deals with export and with an airline flight leaving Canada.
Mr. MacLellan: I don't understand why this is necessary. I think Mr. Lee is aware that right now in Canada we have 25 companies that have been designated to transport prohibited weapons. We also have another 41 outstanding applications awaiting approval by the respective provinces or territories.
There doesn't seem to be any problem meeting the need for people or organizations that can be carriers. I don't understand why we need this.
Mr. Lee: Can I ask Mr. MacLellan if any of the 25 or 41 parties either approved or waiting approval to carry weapons in Canada are international air carriers?
Mr. MacLellan: No, I couldn't give an answer to that, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Lee: Could I also ask Mr. MacLellan or officials this. If a manufacturer is shipping out of Montreal airport, Toronto airport or wherever, and there isn't an international air carrier that's licensed to carry, how can they ship by aircraft?
Mr. MacLellan: There's nothing to stop the international carrier from becoming a carrier in accordance with this provision.
Mr. Lee: What if the air carrier doesn't want to go through the aggravation of getting licensed? If that occurs, then the Canadian exporter is effectively stopped from shipping by air. Would that not be the case?
Mr. MacLellan: If the international carrier didn't want to do it, I'd find it hard to imagine that there wouldn't be some carrier who would do it.
It's not that difficult to obtain approval. If that was the case when that international carrier was necessary, then I'm sure every expediency would be arranged to allow for that approval as quickly as possible and with as little red tape as possible, provided of course that that the carrier met the criteria.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments with respect to amendment LL-7?
Amendment negatived
The Chair: We've received no amendments to proposed section 117.11.
.2155
Mr. Wappel: I have a question, Mr. Chair, of the officials. This puts the onus on the accused. I believe we were discussing this earlier during evidence. It puts the onus on the accused to prove a positive thing. Is that a reverse onus?
Mr. MacLellan: No, it isn't, Mr. Chair, but I'd like Mr. Mosley to comment on this.
Mr. Mosley: In the Schwartz case the Supreme Court of Canada held that the type of provision set out in proposed section 117.11 did not constitute a reverse onus. That was in the particular circumstances of a similar provision in the offence of being in possession of an unregistered restricted firearm where the onus in the statute - the existing code - is on the accused to establish possession or the holding of the registration.
Mr. Wappel: I wonder if legislative counsel would have any comment on that answer, and in particular on the Schwartz case.
Ms McMurray: Mr. Mosley is indeed correct. I listened very carefully during previous testimony, and it was said that in fact the Schwartz case did create a reverse onus. Now the officials are saying it does not. That is indeed the correct answer; it does not create a reverse onus.
The Chair: We've received no amendments to proposed sections 117.12, 117.13 or 117.1.4. But we have four amendments to proposed section 117.... The clerk tells me that the two LG amendments are not being put, so we have -
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I had an amendment prepared on this matter, proposed section 117.15, long ago. It deals with the laying of proposed regulations. It has been prepared and translated, and it should have been provided to the clerk.
I know I can move it in any event, but I'm a little concerned to see that it doesn't appear to be anywhere, whereas all my other amendments are in the possession of all committee members.
I will be able to synopsize it and I think I have a feeling of where it's going to go pretty quickly. But I'm just wondering if the clerk could enlighten me as to why it doesn't appear to be anywhere.
The Chair: Did the clerk put a number on it?
Mr. Wappel: As I say, there's not a thing on it, and yet it was prepared by the Department of Justice. All of my other Department of Justice amendments have numbers on them.
The Chair: What's happening here?
Mr. Wappel: The clerk suggested that we have it photocopied.
The Chair: In the meanwhile, perhaps we could deal with the other ones, unless they're contradictory.
Mr. Wappel: I don't know; let's have a look.
The Chair: The first one is R-0030.
Mr. Ramsay: Mr. Chairman, R-0030 would strike all of proposed section 117.15 from line 18 through to line 30.
The concern and reason for this amendment is that this proposed section grants the Governor in Council the power to create prohibited firearms.
Mr. Wappel: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, my amendment and proposed amendments deal with amendments to proposed section 117.15. If my amendments were not to carry, I might be disposed to support a motion to strike the proposed section. Therefore I would ask that we deal with my amendments before we deal with an amendment to strike the proposed section.
Mr. Chair, it's 10 p.m. and we haven't stopped. Perhaps this might be an opportunity for us to take a five-minute washroom break while we're awaiting the photocopies of my amendments.
Mr. Ramsay: I have no problem with Mr. Wappel's motion for amendments to be considered ahead of mine.
.2200
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I thought that before the adjournment at the end of the afternoon you had told the clerk to see that we get someting to eat, but there is nothing here.
The Chair: The clerk told me that it was ordered for 10:30 and it is now 10:00 p.m.
Mrs. Venne: Does that mean we will have another break at 10:30 p.m.?
Mr. Langlois: Mr. Chairman, I move that we call it 10:30.
The Chair: May be we could try to get the delivery expedited. Are you in favour of a short break?
Mrs. Venne: Yes, because it seems that we will have another one at 10:30.
The Chair: No, no. We can eat and drink at the table.
Mrs. Venne: It's not polite to speak with your mouth full.
[English]
The Chair: We'll have a short adjournment.
.2202
PAUSE
.2217
[English]
The Chair: Does everybody have a copy of Mr. Wappel's amendment?
Mr. MacLellan: We don't, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Wappel: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, there's no number on it. I wonder if we could designate it as LW-007, which I believe is the numbering that should be followed.
The Chair: Is your name Bond?
Mr. Wappel: I have no licence to kill.
The Chair: Mr. Wappel, would you like to explain your amendment?
Mr. Wappel: Again, on un rappel au Règlement, this particular amendment would add clauses. I note there is an amendment LL-8 that deals specifically with one of the clauses. I'm wondering if Mr. Lee is proposing to move that, because there would be no point in discussing mine in advance of amendments to proposed subsection 117.15(2).
The Chair: Maybe it's in order that we deal with Mr. Lee's amendment first.
Mr. Wappel: If he's going to move it.
The Chair: Mr. Lee, are you going to move it?
Mr. Lee: Yes, I'm prepared to do that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: Then let's deal with yours. We're going to deal with them in this order. There are three amendments. We'll deal with LL-8, then LW-007 and then R-0030.
Mr. Lee: Colleagues, as you can see, this particular proposed section deals with the delegation to the Governor in Council to make regulations that would prohibit certain firearms that are prohibited, restricted, etc. There is a test set out by Parliament in this proposed section and there is a similar test in the existing Criminal Code provisions. That test, as to whether or not the thing should or should not be proscribed or restricted or prohibited, was that the firearm should not be prohibited if the firearm was reasonable for use in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes.
.2220
That test has essentially been retained in this new provision that we're looking at now. However, it has been materially changed and the change is that the government has inserted the provision:
- in the opinion of the Governor in Council the thing could be prescribed as reasonable for use in
Canada for hunting or sporting purposes.
So in the event one were to look back retrospectively and say was or is the government following the test that is laid down by Parliament, if the proposed section is adopted the way it is proposed here the test will not be whether or not the thing was reasonable; it will be whether or not it was the opinion of the Governor in Council the thing was reasonable for hunting or sporting purposes.
That is a subjective test and one that in my experience in Parliament, including the field of review of the regulatory field and scrutiny of regulations, ought to be avoided because it muddies the waters. The test should not be what the opinion of the government is but whether or not the thing was reasonable for use for hunting or sporting purposes.
My amendment would delete the words ``opinion of the Governor in Council'' so that the objective test would remain, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, have you a response?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes. It's not unusual to have ``in the opinion of the Governor in Council'', Mr. Chair. We have it in paragraph 84(1)(d), the definition of a restricted weapon. It is a weapon of any kind, not being a prohibited weapon nor a shotgun or rifle, that in the opinion of the Governor in Council is reasonable for use in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes, that is declared by order of the Governor in Council to be a restricted weapon.
The test of the Governor in Council is a well-accepted executive procedure, and to restrict it, I think, would be a major change.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. MacLellan could refer us to that section again and the page number specifically?
Mr. MacLellan: Page 115.
Mr. Wappel: Page 115 of what?
Mr. MacLellan: Of Martin's.
Mr. Wappel: Okay, I'm looking at the wrong thing; page 115 of Martin's, yes.
Mr. MacLellan: It's section 84.
Mr. Wappel: But where is it in the new bill? Why look at Martin's if we're looking at this bill here? Where is it in this bill?
Mr. MacLellan: In this bill, proposed subsection 117.15(2).
.2225
Mr. Wappel: Oh. My understanding was that there's a change in wording.
Mr. MacLellan: Well, that's Mr. Lee's amendment.
Mr. Wappel: No, Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry. It's on page 115, and I believe he said it's paragraph (1)(d).
Mr. Ramsay: What's the section?
A voice: No, that's subsection 84(1).
The Chair: Mr. Wappel, you had a question. I'd like you to put your question, and if the officials can answer it, that's fine, but -
Mr. Wappel: No, my question is in fact for legislative counsel. My question is whether legislative counsel have any comment with respect to either Mr. Lee's amendment or what Mr. Lee said in support of it.
Ms McMurray: I have a lot of comments. Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the amendment.
An hon. member: It's just been moved.
Ms McMurray: As a drafter I have very grave concerns with this proposed section of the bill. The fact that it's used currently in the definition of restricted weapon does not mean anything, as far as I'm concerned, other than the fact that it's used in the current definition of restricted weapon.
Suddenly you have a major change from the present act when it comes to prohibited weapons, as opposed to what's being proposed. Under the present act it is an objective test. The door is open to the courts. If the cabinet were to exercise its power under the current legislation, ban something that was not considered to be commonly used for hunting or sporting purposes, I could go to court. I could get my day. The cabinet might be found to have acted illegally. The door is open.
In proposed section 117.15 you have a full-blown, 100% Henry VIII-plus clause, and it is essentially equivalent to a privative clause. For all intents and purposes it closes the doors to any kind of meaningful review.
The grounds for reviewing a cabinet decision have been reaffirmed once again recently by the Supreme Court in the Thoren's Hardware case, where they said they would not review policy decisions made by the cabinet. They were not reviewable by the court except on very narrow grounds. These grounds included a case where there were conditions precedent attached to the exercise of that power, which do not exist here because it's a go-forth-and-do-good or a go-forth-and-do-bad clause, depending on which end of the stick you're on.
They also talked of something they called ``egregious use'', never defining what ``egregious'' is.
To my knowledge there has never been a cabinet order struck down, not in Inuit Tapirisat, not in Thoren's Hardware. The last time I can think of one being struck down was Roncareli v. Duplessis, which was in the 1930s.
They don't just strike them down because they consider them to be legislative in nature. It's policy-making. Policy-making is not for the courts. The courts stay out. It's essentially closing the door to any kind of court review.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, I have another question for legislative counsel. Does Mr. Lee's amendment do anything to alleviate the concern you've expressed?
Ms McMurray: The words ``in the opinion of'' are the problem because ``in the opinion of'' makes it subjective. If the thing to be prescribed is reasonable, ``reasonable'' can be given definition by the courts. It's not just in the opinion of the cabinet. It says ``reasonable...for hunting or sporting purposes.'' It suddenly opens the door to the court in the way that the door is not now opened in the way the proposed section is worded.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, I have a further question. In the present Criminal Code, one of the definitions of ``prohibited weapon'' - this is on page 114 of Martin's - is a weapon of any kind declared by order of the Governor in Council to be a prohibited weapon. That is currently in the Criminal Code and in effect that doesn't even have a reasonable grounds principle.
In the way I see it, if for whatever reason the Governor in Council declares a weapon to be a prohibited weapon, then it is a prohibited weapon whether or not the declaration is reasonable, whether the Governor in Council has formed a reasonable opinion, or whether it's the Governor in Council's opinion. They've simply made an order declaring something to be a prohibited weapon.
.2230
How is that different from what you've talked about?
Ms McMurray: About the current law, Mr. Wappel?
Mr. Wappel: Yes.
Ms McMurray: The current law in (e) says that prohibited weapon means:
- a weapon of any kind, not being an antique firearm or a firearm of a kind commonly used in
Canada for hunting or sporting purposes, or a part, component or accessory of such a
weapon...that is declared by order of the Governor in Council to be a prohibited weapon
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chair, I have a question for the officials: ``commonly used in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes'' and ``reasonable for use in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes'' are clearly different; otherwise, you wouldn't be putting a different wording in proposed section 117.15.
We heard some witnesses complaining about the change and the effect of that change. Could I ask why the change is made specifically and what the effect of the change would be? I'd also like a comment on the views expressed by legislative counsel with respect to the danger of leaving in the words ``in the opinion of the Governor in Council''.
Mr. Mosley: Madam Chair, there is very definitely a change, and this is something the minister specifically addressed when he last appeared before this committee.
You may note that certain terms expressed his reasons for wanting to have the current different language used in section 84 with regard to restricted and prohibited weapons to be rationalized.
He very clearly expressed concern about the current regime under paragraph (e) with regard to the authority of the Governor in Council in declaring weapons to fall under the category of prohibited weapon. The hands of the Governor in Council could be tied if individuals could circumvent the intent of this provision simply by organizing a hitherto unknown competition or sporting purpose for a particular firearm that they had reason to believe might be the subject of a prohibition order.
With that in mind and with knowledge of the expressed intent of some groups to do precisely that, the choice was very deliberately made to change the terminology from ``commonly used in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes'' to the same terminology that is currently used in paragraph 1(d) with regard to restricted weapons and that kind that ``in the opinion of the Governor in Council...is reasonable for use in Canada for hunting or sporting purposes.''
It's strictly a matter of policy and a very deliberate choice of policy made by the government in this matter.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments?
Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Ramsay: I would like to ask a question. If a firearm is determined to have been commonly used in Canada, that means it hasn't been around for two or three weeks. Does that not mean it's been around for some time, first of all to be a common firearm and one that is commonly used in hunting, sport shooting or sporting purposes?
Why would we need to change that to deal with firearms that might come in but are not now commonly used in hunting or for sport purposes? I don't see the justification for the change in light of the very restrictive legislation in place now dealing with restricted and prohibited firearms, and any variant thereof, as the law reads.
.2235
If someone brings in a firearm that is a new type of firearm, it cannot be considered in any way or form to be a firearm commonly used in hunting or sporting purposes. I'm lost in terms of the justification for making this change.
The Chair: Mr. Mosley.
Mr. Mosley: Mr. Chairman, there's no definition of ``commonly used'' in the act. It's a phrase open to interpretation and to differing interpretations of what it means.
The point I made previously still stands, that some would interpret it as meaning used after a number of people have got together and competed against each other in a staged sporting event, in the hope that they would then be able to claim that this was a firearm of a kind commonly used in Canada for sporting purposes.
That's the problem the minister was attempting to address when he spoke to the committee on the last occasion, and that's the reason for the change in terminology. The same terminology that would be applied to prohibited weapons has been applied with regard to restricted weapons without causing any difficulty.
The question is a mixed subjective-objective test. I'm talking about paragraph (d) in the existing law. It's objective in the sense that it has to be reasonable for use in Canada for that purpose, and it's subjective in the sense that the determination of whether it is or is not reasonable is left to the Governor in Council.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments with respect to this proposed amendment?
Mr. Wappel: I'd like a roll call on this.
Amendment agreed to: yeas 7; nays 6
The Chair: Now, the next amendment we have to deal with is LW-007. That's Mr. Wappel's amendment.
Mr. Wappel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We've heard from legislative counsel characterizing this proposed section as a full-blown Henry VIII section. We've heard Mr. Lee and the reasons for his amendment. We heard in evidence how few people in Canada have an opportunity at any one time to have input as to what sort of weapons will be prohibited in this country and how few people it is who ultimately make a recommendation to a busy minister. That busy minister then ultimately makes a recommendation to an exceedingly busy cabinet.
.2240
In my opinion, it is absolutely critical that orders under proposed section 117.15 be reviewable by the House of Commons and thereby, through the House of Commons, the people of Canada.
My amendment proposes that if the minister proposes to prohibit any particular weapon, the proposed regulation would be laid before each House. In accordance with the previous clause 111, there would be a 30-day time limit and there would be a negative resolution, in the sense that the proposed prohibition would not occur if a committee reported the amendment or rejection of the prohibition order.
The amendment further proceeds on the assumption that there may very well be cases in which it is very urgent to prohibit a weapon. Something may be quickly designed and it may come to the attention of the minister. The minister may want to immediately prohibit such a weapon. This, of course, is understandable and reasonable.
I have dealt with that under proposed subsection (6) of my amendment, to permit the minister to make a declaration of urgency and to prohibit a weapon on that basis. However, in such circumstances the minister would have to bring the regulation before the House of Parliament as reasonably as possible after making the prohibition.
There would be deemed to be acceptance of that emergency prohibition, unless a report to the contrary were filed by the appropriate committee. In that circumstance, the House would be required to immediately either agree with the minister or agree with the committee. This would then permit the House of Commons and the people of Canada some say.
The reason I am particularly concerned about this is because of that particular prohibited weapon and the example I specifically brought up. I don't have the paperwork here, but it was that particular shotgun, the Benelli shotgun, I believe it was, model M3, or whatever it was. We clearly demonstrated that the weapon prohibited was not the weapon shown in the prohibited orders. The weapon prohibited was one that had a detachable handle or shoulder handle, or whatever it was, and the picture that was shown was clearly not the weapon that was intended to be prohibited.
I gather that the effect of the prohibition order was in fact to prohibit all models of that Benelli shotgun. I think it was a Benelli shotgun. If it isn't, the record will reflect what it was. Simply because of the sweeping nature of the prohibition order, a particular weapon was designed. The minister wanted to particularly prohibit an assault-type weapon, which he himself stated, and the ultimate effect of the prohibition order was to prohibit all models of that particular rifle.
It seems to me that is a circumstance where too few people are making too many important decisions and then reporting to a minister who is too busy. I don't mean this minister; I mean any minister who's too busy with a million other things to delve into the intricacies of firearms, without the benefit of the input of the industry, of people who are involved, of people who have some knowledge.
All of this is to say that this would give an opportunity for the House of Commons to review these very sweeping powers of the Governor in Council. That is why I am proposing these amendments.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have a response to this amendment?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes, this is not acceptable. It's very cumbersome. You can't even make regulations without the.... It takes away the executive power of government, and every time a change is made you have to come back again to the committee.
What we've had is something that works, and works well. We've used it in Bill C-17 and I think we got good regulations as a result. I think to go with this would be counter-productive.
.2245
Mr. Ramsay: I just want to touch on one other aspect Mr. Wappel got into in his previous discussion about that Benelli shotgun. He examined, at least to a degree, the formula the government uses to determine what is a prohibited weapon. To me, that was an ivory tower exercise not based upon any empirical evidence that a firearm was used in crimes or was a danger to society - other than someone's apprehensions or fears about it.
Not only are we responsible to ensure that there is a curb on the kind of scenario Mr. Wappel so eloquently described just now, as far as one person making a decision as a result of a handful of people making a recommendation to him or her, but we also should be looking at the very roots of this whole business of how a firearm is determined to be a prohibited firearm.
I will be supporting Mr. Wappel's motion.
The Chair: Are there any further comments or questions?
Mr. Wappel: I would like a recorded vote, please.
Mr. Thompson (Wild Rose): I have one question. I'd like to ask the composer of the motion for the amendment, Mr. Wappel, that when Mr. MacLellan said something in terms of the loss of executive power, is this exactly what your intentions are, to eliminate that source of power, or to reduce it?
Mr. Wappel: I suppose there are many ways of categorizing something. If the Governor in Council currently has the power to prohibit any weapon without it being looked at by anybody or without it being examined in any way, shape or form, and if this amendment provides that the House of Commons has the ability to review that decision, then I guess the answer is yes.
Mr. Thompson: Thank you.
The Chair: Mr. Wappel has asked for a roll-call vote on his proposed amendment LW-007.
Amendment negatived: nays 7; yeas 6 [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: We now go on to amendment R-0030. It deals with the same proposed section.
Mr. Ramsay, this is your amendment.
Mr. Ramsay: My amendment would strike the whole of the proposed section for the reasons we've discussed here over the last half hour or so.
.2250
Although the amendment Mr. Lee made goes to a certain extent in dealing with my concerns and our concerns on this side of the table about the almost autocratic powers the Governor in Council has to declare prohibited firearms, I don't think it goes far enough. To have Mr. Wappel's motion passed, then of course I would have been prepared to consider at least withdrawing my motion. Nevertheless, I am prepared to move this motion and let the committee decide.
I would like a roll call on this vote as well, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: All right, but we're not to the vote yet.
Mr. MacLellan.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Lee's motion, which passed, takes the opinion of the Governor in Council out of play. There's no subjective opinion of the Governor in Council.
What is left is a very straightforward reasonable use in Canada for hunting and sporting purposes, which is what we've all been advocating. I think all parties have said that's what we want, the use of firearms for hunting and sporting purposes. For Mr. Ramsay to say that's not suitable, to me, is a contradiction to what all parties have been striving for. I find it rather strange, frankly.
Mr. Ramsay: I appreciate Mr. MacLellan's interpretation of my amendment, but it is just his interpretation of it. I won't say anything further than that.
The Chair: The clerk is simply pointing out to me that if you were to carry Mr. Ramsay's amendment, it takes away the whole proposed section. Mr. Ramsay understands that himself. I think everybody understands that, so when they are considering it, they will take note of that.
Are there any further questions or comments with respect to this proposed amendment? If not, Mr. Ramsay has asked for a roll call vote on his amendment. We're voting on proposed amendment R-0030, proposed by Mr. Ramsay and the Reform Party.
Amendment negatived; 7 nays; 6 yeas [See Minutes of Proceedings]
Clause 133 as amended agreed to on division
On clause 134
The Chair: We've received no amendments to clause 134. Are there any questions or comments with respect to clause 134?
.2255
Mr. Wappel: I wonder if I could ask the blanket question that I asked when we concluded the firearms part? Where it says ``related and consequential amendments'' does that refer only to minor, immaterial consequential amendments and not to substantive changes?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
Clause 134 agreed to
Clause 135 agreed to on division
On clause 136
The Chair: We've received no proposed amendments. Are there any questions or comments?
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: We've just passed 135, 136, 137, 138, etc, and they all have the same objective, that is to bring the minimum sentence from one year right now to four years. As we have said several times before, we are against it because we do not consider a four year sentence to be any more of a deterrent than a one year sentence. Furthermore, with this type of amendment, we will simply crowd our prisons even more and give ourselves a good conscience. Thank you.
[English]
Clauses 136 to 146 inclusive agreed to on division
On clause 147
The Chair: On clause 147, we have received an amendment. The amendment is G-78. Ms Torsney will move. Mr. MacLellan, would you please explain amendment G-78?
Mr. MacLellan: This has to do with bail, Mr. Chair. We are adding such a condition, and not just ``consider'' adding when dealing with offences under this section.
.2300
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
Clause 147 as amended agreed to on division
Clauses 148 to 159 inclusive agreed to on division
On clause 160
The Chair: No amendments to clause 160 were received. Are there any questions or comments?
Mr. Langlois.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: I would like to propose an amendment to clause 160, at line 4 in the French version, immediately before the number 109.
The Chair: Just a minute, please. We do not have the amendment in writing. You are talking about clause 160?
Mr. Langlois: I propose that on line 4 in the French version and on line 3 in the English version of clause 160, the number 107.1 be added immediately before the number 109.
Mrs. Venne: It is on line 23.
Mr. Langlois: In French, it is on line 23 on page 107 and in English, it is on line...
The Chair: It is on which page of the bill?
Mr. Langlois: On page 107.
The Chair: On page 107, clause 160.
Mr. Langlois: In English, it is on line 19 and in French, it is on line 23.
The Chair: Can you tell us why you are proposing this amendment?
Mr. Langlois: It is being proposed to avoid including in the definition of criminal record the sentence which would be imposed under clause 107.1, that is, for a first offence in relation to the possession of a weapon without the required licence or authorization.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have any comment regarding this amendment? Mr. Roy.
Mr. Roy: I am afraid the amendment proposed by Mr. Langlois is not going to have the expected results. As Mr. Mosley indicated at least twice today, there is no definition of criminal record in the Criminal Records Act.
I am afraid that the proposed amendment is going to prevent someone in the future from applying for a pardon under the Criminal Records Act.
.2305
So, instead of preventing this from being included in a criminal record, it might very well have the opposite effect, which would be negative. It would result in preventing someone from taking advantage of the Criminal Records Act's provisions. In this context, I am afraid that this was not the intent and that it would create problems rather than be a solution.
Mr. Langlois: In that case, Mr. Roy, why include clause 109 or 110 and thus prevent offenders from taking advantage of the possibility of obtaining a pardon?
Mr. Roy: Correct me if I am wrong but what we are talking about here are orders made under these clauses, not sentences which can be imposed on someone who has contravened one of the Code's provisions. We are talking about clauses 100 and 259 of the Code. I believe that in neither case does it refer to prohibition orders.
The Chair: Are there any other questions or comments?
[English]
Mr. Wappel: I have a point of clarification, which might turn into a point of order. Do I understand the amendment to simply include proposed subsection 107(1) in front of proposed section 109?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
Mr. Wappel: I would suggest the motion is out of order because the proposed section being referred to is a section of the firearms act and not the Criminal Code. I suggest the mover would want to have the words ``of the Firearms Act'' after the words ``section 107(1)''.
You will note, Mr. Chair, that the sections currently referred to refer to sections of the Criminal Code, or if they do not, they specify the act.
The Chair: They say ``or subsection 147.11 of the National Defence Act'', for example.
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois, Mr. Wappel raised a good point of order. So, if you wish, you should change your amendment so that it refers to the Firearms Act. I think that is what you want.
Mr. Langlois: Yes, but there is also the comment made by Mr. Roy which is quite justified. You have convinced me, Mr. Roy, and I hope you will allow me to withdraw my amendment.
[English]
Amendment withdrawn
The Chair: Then we return to clause 160.
Clauses 160 and 161 agreed to on division
The Chair: We now have an amendment, G-79, to add a new subclause 161.1.
Mr. Gallaway: I so move.
This repeals a section of the Customs Act and substitutes this instead. It makes reference in proposed paragraph 28(1)(d) to the firearms act. It has to do with the payment of duties and tariffs levied under the Customs Tariff and the Excise Tax Act, for example. They're all listed there. It creates exceptions for non-payment.
Mr. MacLellan: This has been brought forward at the request of Customs, so I would ask Mr. Mark Connolly to explain this further.
.2310
The Chair: Would you explain this amendment please?
Mr. Mark H. Connolly (Director, Enforcement Operations Division, Enforcement Directorate, Customs Operations Branch, Revenue Canada, Customs, Excise and Taxation): Yes, Mr. Chairman. This amendment is required to relieve warehouse operators and duty-free shop operators, or bonded warehouse operators, of any duty liability if a firearm or a sample, which could include ammunition or other type goods, is removed from these warehouses by a firearms inspector. It allows customs to not charge duty on these goods should they be removed for testing or other purposes, or if they're subsequently seized. So it's primarily an amendment to allow us to relieve the duty and tax requirement of these individuals.
Amendment agreed to
Clauses 162 to 171 inclusive agreed to on division
On clause 172
The Chair: We have received two amendments: LW-008 and LW-009. Mr. Wappel, these are your amendments.
Mr. Wappel: Clause 172 will amend the Young Offenders Act to insert proposed section 20.1 therein.
The purpose of this is to provide for a mandatory prohibition order. In the case of certain offences that a young offender has been convicted of, in this case offences involving violence, offences involving the use of a firearm in the commission of the offence, certain offences under the Food and Drugs Act and under the Narcotic Control Act, and certain offences involving the use of various weapons, we in the government have deemed it advisable to have the court issue a mandatory prohibition order.
Under proposed subsection 20.1(2), the mandatory prohibition order will last not less than two years, so it's going to be at least two years.
My amendment would provide that in the case of these very serious offences that young offenders have committed, this mandatory prohibition order would end on the later of the young person's eighteenth birthday or two years after the making of the order.
.2315
So let us take two examples in order that I can explain what is happening here.
If a person commits a very serious offence, those delineated in paragraphs 109(1)(a) to (d) of the Criminal Code as stated - let's say an armed robbery of a Becker's store - and he or she is 14 years of age, currently the section would require a mandatory prohibition of not less than two years, so the person might be able to possess a weapon after that mandatory prohibition period of two years, i.e. when they're 16. My amendment would state that they would not be able to possess a weapon until they are 18. Conversely, if a person in exactly the same circumstances were 17 and a half at the time of the commission of the offence, they would not be able to possess a weapon under this mandatory prohibition order until two years afterwards, so they would be in fact 19 and a half.
The obvious intent here is that where there are very serious offences - I'm hard-pressed to think of a reason why a young person, after committing such a serious offence, should be entitled to possess a firearm until they become an adult.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you have any response to this proposed amendment LW-008?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes, Mr. Chair, we feel that the two years is satisfactory, and proposed subsection (2) says:
- An order made under subsection (1) begins on the day in which the order is made and ends not
earlier than two years after the young person's release.
- So it's not cut and dried at two years. When you're dealing with young offenders and the
progress they can make at that age, we feel the latitude there should be left the way it is now in
the interests of rehabilitation.
Mr. MacLellan: I'm not agreeing with Mr. Wappel.
The Chair: I see. I thought you were. When you said it was very flexible and it was very clear, I thought you were talking about his amendment.
All right. Are there any further questions or comments?
Amendment negatived
The Chair: Mr. Wappel, do you have another amendment?
Mr. Wappel: No, I won't pursue it.
Clauses 172 to 180 inclusive agreed to on division
.2320
The Chair: We now have an amendment to insert a new clause. This is amendment BQ-23. It says to add a new clause 180.1.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: This clause states that the act should be reviewed five years after coming into force and that there should be a comprehensive review of all the provisions in force at that time. This review should be undertaken by such Committee of the House of Commons as may be designated or established by that House for that purpose. So, we are asking the House to establish a committee to review how the act has been implemented five years after coming into force. Within a year after the review is undertaken or within such other time as the House of Commons may authorize, the Committee should submit a report on the review to the House including a statement of any changes the committee recommends.
This procedure would be quite appropriate to establish five years down the road where we are at since we know that this Bill is quite controversial right now. It would not be a bad thing if a committee were to review it at that time. This is the purpose of the amendment.
[English]
The Chair: Members of the committee, this amendment is to add a new clause that provides for a review after five years. If I recall correctly, this was done in the CSIS Act and also in the Access to Information Act and several other acts.
Ms Meredith: I have a point of order, Mr. Chair. Mr. Wappel had introduced amendment LW-30 earlier and he was putting it off to the end of this bill. It deals with the same thing, and I think maybe we should deal with them both at the same time.
The Chair: Mr. Wappel, you're being referred to. I don't know if you've taken note of this amendment BQ-23.
Mr. Wappel: I have.
The Chair: It's to provide for a parliamentary committee review of the act after five years. I understand you had an amendment on the same subject.
Mr. Wappel: I have an amendment, but it's a little bit later on and there won't be much point in moving it if this one doesn't pass. I don't have a problem with either of them.
The Chair: All right. This one comes first, so we'll deal with this one first.
Mr. MacLellan, what's your response to this proposal?
Mr. MacLellan: I have just a couple of comments, Mr. Chair. One is that the act doesn't really come into effect until 2003, when the period for licensing expires. From January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2003, is the period for obtaining a registration certificate, so that's when the act is really in effect. This refers to provisions of this bill in subclause (1) or any of its provisions or any provision enacted or amended by this act. What we could be having after five years is merely a review of certain sections of this act, and it seems rather pointless.
The other concern is that if we're going to have a review it should be meaningful. We do have reviews now and we're doing one on the young offenders, as the chair and all members of the committee know. But there are others in other statutes, and it seems that when they're passed, they're passed, and then when the time rolls around they're treated with indifference.
I think if there's going to be such a thing as a review, it has to be very comprehensive and it has to be at a proper time. I don't think five years from the coming into force of any of the provisions of this bill is the right time.
.2325
The Chair: Mr. Chairman, when I was on the review committee for access to information after five years, it was treated very seriously. For you to suggest it wasn't taken seriously.... We spent about a year redoing that act after five years. The CSIS Act was treated very seriously as well.
However, I'd like to hear from Madame Venne. You've made points with respect to the fact that the act won't really be totally in force until the year 2003.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: At that time, the Act will come into force. However, people will have had five years to register their firearms or to register themselves. The Act will have been operative. We will already know how the registration process works. We shall be in a position to see whether it works or not. We shall also know if the exceptions are appropriate or if they are too broad. I believe we shall be in a position to assess many aspects of the implementation process.
However, if you think that five years is not enough, we could replace that by eight years, if you prefer.
The Chair: Is this an amendment?
Mrs. Venne: I have no problem with making this an amendment.
The Chair: Eight years rather than five years?
Mrs. Venne: Exactly.
[English]
The Chair: Madame Venne is changing her amendment to read ``eight years after the coming into force of this Act''. The rest would remain the same.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: That's right.
[English]
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments with respect to this proposed amendment?
Mr. MacLellan: The only review that would make any sense - and I don't think we have the power to agree to a review tonight because we would need the approval of the minister - would be in the year 2008. I appreciate Madame Venne's attempt to be cooperative with respect to this, but I don't want to give the impression that I could agree to any review. It's a major change and certainly not one that has been approved.
The Chair: Are there further questions or comments with respect to this proposed amendment? If not, the amendment now reads ``eight years after the coming into force''.
Amendment negatived
Clauses 181 to 185 inclusive agreed to on division
On clause 186 - Coming into force
The Chair: There are two amendments proposed to clause 186, LW-30 and G-79.
.2330
Mr. Wappel: I'm not proceeding with LW-30.
Ms Torsney: I think there are two G-79s. The second G-79, which says clause 186, page 124, is supposed to be G-80.
The Chair: I see. I don't have it in any case. We'll call it G-80.
Who is going to move this amendment?
Ms Torsney: I'll move it.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, will you explain this amendment to clause 186?
Mr. MacLellan: The discretion can be there as to when this bill comes into effect, but there are three clauses that really aren't discretionary. One is clause 167, with respect to the Interpretation Act. The others are clauses 130 and 131, which relate to the Young Offenders Act and Bill C-7. When these come into effect the discretion will be determined by those particular bills. That's why those three sections have been excluded from the general provision here.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments with respect to this amendment?
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
Clause 186 as amended agreed to on division
The Chair: Members of the committee, we've completed all the clauses except clause 1, but we have a number of clauses that were stood.
I'm wondering if we might adjourn for a few minutes so I can regroup and get all the clauses that were stood in front of me so I can proceed in an orderly way. Don't go far away. I'm going to sit down with the clerk and put everything in order so we can go back over the stood clauses.
.2333
PAUSE
.2341
[English]
The Chair: The meeting will resume. We are returning to clauses that were stood.
On clause 2 - Definitions
The Chair: The first clause that was stood was clause 2, which is the interpretation clause. One amendment was carried there, G-3, but G-1 and G-2 were stood.
Amendment G-1 was stood because it was consequential on a proposed new clause 17.1. Perhaps the parliamentary secretary can recall to us what 17.1 was. That was the reason why it was stood.
It's a consequential amendment and it was stood simply because we hadn't reached new clause 17.1, but we carried 17.1.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, may I be of some help? It was G-11 and it was involved in transporting and the use of prohibited firearms. I believe Mr. Gallaway moved this because it involved transportation between two or more specified places.
My notes indicate that the clause was carried.
The Chair: Excuse me. We're dealing with G-1 and it was stood.
Mr. Wappel: I know. New clause 17.1, upon which this is consequential, was carried, and so obviously since we've carried 17.1, G-1 is merely consequential to it and therefore it makes sense to carry it.
The Chair: Yes, that's correct.
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Amendment G-2 -
[Translation]
Mr. Langlois: On a Point of Order, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wappel gives clear explanations because there may be seven nays and only six yeas.
[English]
The Chair: Amendment G-2 is also stood. Now, I can't recall why this was stood. It was stood because the word ``crossbows'' was in it. It was stood because I think at that point there were amendments that were going to come later to delete crossbows from the bill, but crossbows weren't deleted.
Are there any questions or comments with respect to G-2?
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
Clause 2 as amended agreed to on division
On clause 4 - Purpose
The Chair: Clause 4 was stood, BQ-1 was stood.
.2345
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, excuse me, I have in my book clause 3 on page 4, R-1.
The Chair: It was defeated.
Mr. Wappel: Thank you.
The Chair: The clause was carried. Clause 4 was stood and amendments BQ-1, LP-1 and R-2 were all stood.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: Regarding amendment BQ-1, at the time I still thought that subclause 101.1(1) would be carried by the committee. Since it was not, I withdraw the amendment.
[English]
Amendment withdrawn
The Chair: LP-1 was Beth Phinney's, and it had to do with crossbows. I presume you're withdrawing that. Are you asking that it be stood until we decide whether we're going to strike crossbows from the law later on? We didn't.
Ms Phinney: I withdraw that.
Amendment withdrawn
The Chair: Then we have R-2.
Mr. Ramsay: I'll remove that. That has to do with crossbows.
Amendment withdrawn
Clause 4 agreed to on division
On clause 5 - Public safety
The Chair: Clause 5 was stood. There we carried one amendment, defeated two others, and stood LP-2, which also related to crossbows.
Ms Phinney: I'll withdraw that.
Amendment withdrawn
Clause 5 as amended agreed to
On clause 6 - Court orders
The Chair: Clause 6 was stood at the request of the Reform Party, who also asked that their amendment R-4 be stood.
Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Ramsay: Just a minute. Let me just check.
The Chair: This is not your R-4.
Mr. Ramsay: I'll not move this.
Amendment withdrawn
Clause 6 agreed to
On clause 7 - Successful completion of safety course
The Chair: Clause 7 was stood. First we had amendment BQ-5 stood. This has to do with courses. This is the whole business of safety courses and so on.
Now, there were several conflicting amendments here. We stood BQ-5, G-5, BQ-3, LP-3, and G-6. Amendment G-7 carried. BQ-4 was withdrawn. We have another amendment R-001.
BQ-5, Mrs. Venne.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: If we were sure that the government still intends to propose G-5, we would agree to withdraw BQ-5 and BQ-3, since we asked that they be stood while we consulted with the Quebec representatives regarding these courses.
We are in agreement with amendment G-5, as it is. So, if the government still intends to propose G-5, we shall withdraw BQ-5 and BQ-3.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, do you intend to put G-5?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
Amendments BQ-5 and BQ-3 withdrawn
The Chair: Perhaps you can recall to the committee the purpose of G-5.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Chair, it's a section that is there to clarify the language regarding the dates.
The Chair: Do you mean the dates of the courses?
.2350
Mr. MacLellan: It has to do with the grandfathering of people who were previously approved for courses. Where the provinces of course have stated that certain courses were given and given successfully, they were granted as being courses acceptable under Bill C-17.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments?
Amendment agreed to
The Chair: Now we have LP-3.
Ms Torsney: Drop it, Mr. Chairman.
Amendment withdrawn
The Chair: Then we have R-001. At that time it wasn't drafted, Mr. Ramsay, and you said you were going to present an amendment. You might want to explain this amendment, if you wish to put it.
Mr. Ramsay: This would strike lines 36 to 45. There is no explanation of whom is being referred to in paragraph (a). What we have here is that subclauses (1) and (2) do not apply to an individual who, in the prescribed circumstances, has been certified by a chief firearms officer as meeting the prescribed criteria relating to the safe handling and use of firearms in the laws relating to the firearms. There's no explanation of why and to whom this refers. So we're asking that it be struck.
In (b), this is an exemption again for someone who is less than 18 years old. We wonder why someone would be exempted simply because they're under 18 years of age. Of course the explanation here appears to be that they require a firearm to hunt or trap in order to sustain himself of herself or his or her family in spite of the fact that they may be deemed to be an individual who would be dangerous having a firearm in their possession.
We've touched on this before today with regard to this.
Mr. MacLellan: Paragraph 7(4)(a), ``in the prescribed circumstances has been certified by a chief firearms officer'' and so forth, could apply to anyone. This could apply to someone who is illiterate. It could apply to anyone who, in the opinion of the chief firearms officer, has taken a course that is satisfactory and the person has proved himself or herself to be quite competent in the handling of firearms and the laws relating to them. It's a carry-over from Bill C-17.
It's important. It has been used responsibly. It's important to give that discretionary power to the chief firearms officer.
Again, I think that allowing the less-than-18-year-old to be able to hunt and trap in order to sustain himself or herself or his or her family is important in certain circumstances.
I don't agree with R-001.
Mr. Ramsay: There's no question that individuals under 18 years of age ought to have consideration to possess a firearm to hunt or trap, but this is an exemption. So we ask again, if an individual, because of his behaviour or his record, is deemed to be of the type that may be dangerous where possession of a firearm is concerned, why would there be an exemption? Why would this person be made eligible under this particular clause if the purpose of this bill is to ensure that only those who are credible and for whom it is safe to have firearms can actually have them? There seems to be an inconsistency here, and this is what this amendment would address.
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The Chair: Mr. MacLellan.
Mr. MacLellan: It's not something that would be given lightly. I agree with Mr. Ramsay that it's not the sort of thing you give as a matter of course. But if a person is under the age of 18 and is married, is at home, and the family - parents or other relatives - are depending on him or on her for sustenance, it's awfully hard to deny this young person that right. I don't think it would be right in those circumstances. Mind you, the young person has to prove to be responsible and competent in the use of firearms. I think that would go without saying. But I think in the more remote areas, where circumstances such as these can arise, this is a matter of life and death.
Mr. Ramsay: I have just one final comment. It seems there is an exemption for people in this situation, for those who use firearms to obtain food and sustenance. I therefore wonder what the prohibition or ineligibility clauses are meant to do in those kinds of cases.
So what are we going to have? Are we going to have people whose records indicate they may be dangerous or are in fact dangerous, and who would be prevented from having a firearm if they did not require it for sustenance, yet at the same time we're going to entrust them with a firearm when it may in fact be dangerous not only to themselves but to others? It seems to be an inconsistency. That's all I have to say.
Mr. MacLellan: Mr. Ramsay may be mixing clause 5 and clause 7. We're only talking here about an exemption from the safety course, and frankly, in that light I think paragraphs 7(4)(a) and (b) are quite realistic.
Amendment negatived
The Chair: Amendment G-6 was also stood. This mentions crossbows, so I presume that's why it was stood.
Mr. MacLellan.
Mr. MacLellan: Yes, it's a matter of crossbows and the licence to acquire crossbows:
- (e) is a non-resident who is eighteen years old or older and by or on behalf of whom an
application is made for a sixty-day licence authorizing the non-resident to possess firearms that
are neither prohibited firearms nor restricted firearms.
- I think it's fairly straightforward.
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
Clause 7 as amended agreed to on division
On clause 8 - Minors
The Chair: Clause 8 was stood because of LP-4 from Ms Phinney, which dealt with crossbows. So LP-4 is withdrawn or not put.
Amendment withdrawn
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Clause 8 agreed to
On clause 10 - Carriers
The Chair: Clause 10 was stood. There were no amendments to that clause. It had to deal with transport carriers.
Mr. Lee, maybe you had asked that to be stood because you wanted to deal with transport carriers at a later time. At that point you had an amendment later on.
Mr. Lee: Yes, there was an amendment, which we dealt with about an hour and a half ago. In any event, I would withdraw. It was simply stood because another amendment was to be provided.
Amendment withdrawn
Clause 10 agreed to on division
On clause 12 - Prohibited firearms - individuals
The Chair: Clause 12 had been stood. There were two amendments by Mr. Wappel that were stood and there's a new amendment by the Reform Party. They didn't have a draft at that point. Amendments LW-1 and LW-2 of Mr. Wappel were stood.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, LW-1 dealt with total length as opposed to barrel length and that's been decided by the committee. LW-2 dealt with the national sporting competitions as well as international shooting union competitions and that's been dealt with. So I'm withdrawing them, with permission.
Amendments withdrawn
The Chair: All right. Now we have new amendment R-002 by Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Ramsay: I will not be moving this amendment.
Clause 12 as amended agreed to on division
On clause 21 - Mental disorder, etc.
The Chair: Clause 21 says:
- 21. A person may transfer or lend a firearm to an individual only if the person has no reason
to believe that the individual
- (a) has a mental illness...
- (b) is impaired by alcohol or a drug.
Mr. Lee.
Mr. Lee: I'm think Mr. Ramsay was going to put an amendment there and had requested that it be stood.
Mr. Ramsay: What clause is that, 21?
The Chair: It's clause 21. No amendments were received in advance.
Mr. Ramsay: No, there is no amendment for clause 21.
Clause 21 agreed to on division
On clause 22 - Authorization to transfer firearms
The Chair: We stood clause 22 at the request of Mr. Wappel, who had an amendment, LW-3.
Mr. Wappel: The officials were to take a look and see if they could come up with some better wording as to how they could ensure that the vendor.... How will I put this? We had a lengthy discussion on just how much we would force vendors to do and how much they would be required to do.
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The officials were to get back to us with what they proposed after having examined that clause and I think clause 23 later on.
Mr. MacLellan: We did, and came forward with G-14.1, which has been circulated.
The Chair: That's clause 22.1. That's not clause 22. I'm dealing with clause 22.
Mr. MacLellan: It's G-14.1.
The Chair: Then my agenda is wrong. There's a new clause 22.1, and G-14.1 is marked with respect to that clause, not clause 22. I don't know if it's right or not.
Mr. MacLellan: It's clause 22.
The Chair: I'm told that under clause 22 this does apply. So there are four amendments that apply. There's LW-3, which was stood; there's R-003 and R-004, which are new; and there's G-14.1, which is new.
Mr. Wappel, you asked if the government would come up with something and it has. It's G-14.1. Would you explain this one, Mr. MacLellan?
Mr. MacLellan: We're talking about the underlined portions of paragraphs (a) and (b) and mainly (a), where ``the transferee produces to the person a document that purports to be a licence''. It doesn't necessarily have to be a long-term licence, but it must purport to be a licence. In paragraph (b), the person ``has no reason to believe that the transferee is not authorized by the document to acquire and possess that kind of firearm''.
I think it would address Mr. Wappel's concerns, as I understand the discussion that took place on LW-3.
Mr. Wappel: The purpose of LW-3 was to clarify what the vendors had to do. I think G-14.1 clarifies my LW-3, so I would withdraw it.
Amendment withdrawn
Mr. Wappel: I do have an additional question on clause 22.
The Chair: Let's dispose first of G-14.1. Are there any further questions?
Ms Meredith: On a point of order, that's moving on to clause 22.1, is it not?
The Chair: No, I was told that's a mistake. I'll correct that again. Under clause 22 we have LW-3, R-003, R-004, and G-14.1. They should have been under clause 22 and not under clause 22.1.
Mr. Wappel has withdrawn LW-3, and G-14.1 has just been explained. Are there any further questions with respect to G-14.1?
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Now we have two new amendments by the Reform Party, R-003 and R-004.
Mr. Ramsay: As a result of G-14.1, it may not be necessary for me to go forward with this. This amendment would change ``person'' to ``individual''. The reason for that is ``person'' means a business as well as an individual. So we wanted that clarified in both cases.
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To respond to Mr. Wappel's concern about a vendor, R-004, as you see, clearly sets out the regulations required of a business selling firearms. Like a liquor store or any other business that's selling commodities that are somehow restricted, all they have to do is ensure that the person in this case is eligible to purchase a firearm. They're in the business. They don't have to approve that each time an individual comes forward to purchase a firearm.
But I don't know whether that is necessary in light of the passage of G-14.1. I don't think it is, so I will not be moving these amendments.
Mr. Wappel: I have a question on clause 22 as amended.
You'll recall, Mr. Chair - and I hope the officials do - that we had a bit of a technical discussion about the meaning of the word ``transfer'', which is defined in clause 20. It means sell, barter or give - all of which involve, in law, certain acts and none of which can occur until the final act, which is the transfer of the property.
Clause 22 requires these things to be done at the time of the transfer, which if you look at it very strictly, I would argue, would be at the time of the actual handing over of the firearm. In reality, it would be the first step to be taken in the transfer process. In other words, even before the firearm can be handed over, the person comes to the counter and produces his licence, and then the Canadian Tire store, or whatever the case may be, will do it.
I ask if the officials would consider coming up with something instead of the words ``at the time of the transfer'', such as, for example, ``prior to the transfer'' or something to that effect. Otherwise, the way the clause is written now, the things that are required to be done are required to be done for the first time when the gun is handed over, which clearly is not the intent.
Mr. MacLellan: I would be pleased to give Mr. Wappel an undertaking that we will look at it.
Mr. Wappel: What does that mean, for report stage?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes, for report stage.
I know what Mr. Wappel means, but we're talking about a transaction time and a transaction period as opposed to a specific sequence of events. I guess we have to ask if any change we make removes it from that particular time to a prior sequence of events rather than the actual time when the customer, for instance, is at the counter and shows the proof and then takes possession of the firearm.
So what we'll do is look at it and get back to Mr. Wappel. If we feel some change would be helpful, or an improvement, we'll bring it forward at report stage.
Mr. Wappel: Thank you.
Clause 22 as amended agreed to on division
The Chair: We now have new clause 22.1. Amendment BQ-6, which is the new clause, was stood.
I can't recall why you asked to stand it.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: I can tell you why. It was because at the time, the government had told us the very good intentions it had for that clause and that it was somewhat reluctant towards the offences created by BQ-6 but that they were quite at ease with the idea of a mandatory of safe locking system sold with a firearm.
I therefore present it again and ask the government if they still support it.
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[English]
Mr. MacLellan: We appreciate what Madame Venne is saying, but we feel it would be more appropriate under the regulations than in the act.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: You could have mentioned that when I first presented the amendment. We would not have had to go back to it.
The Chair: What are your intentions?
Mrs. Venne: Well, we'll just vote on BQ-6.
The Chair: Very well.
Mr. Langlois: Right. I was going to ask to take a vote on that question.
[English]
The Chair: You have before you amendment BQ-6, which would bring into force a new clause, 22.1. Are there any further questions or comments?
Amendment negatived
On clause 23 - Authorization to transfer prohibited weapons, devices and ammunition
The Chair: Next we have clause 23. We had LW-4, which was Mr. Wappel's amendment. It was stood. We have two new amendments. One is by the government, G-14.2. Mr. Wappel, I don't know if this is another one where you asked the government to come up with something better. I don't know whether it is or not. Also we have R-005.
Perhaps we could look at G-14.2 first.
Mr. MacLellan: Here it's the same situation as G-14.1 as applied to LW-3.
Mr. Wappel: Clause 23 deals with businesses, clause 22 was more particular to persons, and clause 23 deals with prohibited weapons. The same concerns were expressed. It would appear as if the government has addressed them, and I therefore withdraw LW-4.
Amendment withdrawn
The Chair: Are there any further questions with respect to G-14.2?
Mr. Wappel: Did anybody move G-14.2?
The Chair: No.
Mr. Wappel: I'll move G-14.2.
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Then we have amendment R-005.
Mr. Ramsay: This deals with clause 23, and it has now been amended by G-14.2. But our concern was the addition of qualified individual after those areas in clause 23 that refer to a business. In other words, in subclause 23(1) it would read, ``prohibited device or prohibited ammunition only to a business,'' and we added ``or qualified person.'' We believe that would allow those individuals who have been grandfathered to acquire additional restricted or prohibited firearms.
The Chair: Are there any questions or comments to Mr. Ramsay? Mr. MacLellan, have you any response to this?
Mr. MacLellan: No, the prohibited weapons would be grandfathered and would only be able to be transferred to people with like firearms.
Mr. Ramsay: Of course that is exactly what we're saying when we include ``or qualified person.'' They would qualify to possess those types of firearms.
Mr. MacLellan: On this amendment R-005, what Mr. Ramsay is saying would change the bill considerably. This clause only relates to prohibited firearms.
.0020
Amendment negatived
Clause 23 as amended agreed to on division.
On clause 26 - Chief firearms officer
The Chair: Clause 26 was stood. One amendment was carried. We have 2 amendments outstanding, G-14.3, which is a new amendment, and also R-006. We'll take G-14.3 first.
Somebody move this. Mr. Lee.
Mr. MacLellan, would you explain G-14.3, the amendment to clause 26.
Mr. MacLellan: This is consequential to clause 22, regarding proposed transfer of a firearm, and also to clause 23.
The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments?
Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings]
The Chair: Now we have amendment R-006.
Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Ramsay: When we went over this first, this clause would have anyone who wished to purchase ammunition get authority to do so first from a chief firearms officer who would have to verify their credentials to do so. The government indicated that this was perhaps an onerous burden upon anyone who wanted to buy a box of .22 shells. I don't see that that has been addressed. If it has been addressed in G-14.3 I haven't seen it.
What my amendment would do is simply delete the reference to ammunition as per the argument put forward before on this subject.
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan.
Mr. MacLellan: I think G-14.3 does deal with it. What R-006 does is take ammunition out of the two changes. Amendment G-14.3 deals with, under clause 22, the transfer of a firearm, the proposed transfer of a firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, ammunition or prohibited ammunition to a business under clause 23. I feel that it is covered.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, do I understand correctly that clause 22 doesn't deal with ammunition, and subclause 23(2) deals with ammunition, and G-14.3 would say that the chief firearms officer must be involved when either prohibited ammunition or ammunition is being sold to a business, not by a business to an individual -
Mr. MacLellan: That's right.
Mr. Wappel: - which I think Mr. Ramsay was worried about. Indeed, you would have dealt with his concern in G-14.3.
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
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The Chair: Are there any further questions or comments?
Amendment negatived
Clause 26 as amended agreed to on division
The Chair: Amendment R-007 will have to be presented at the report stage, because we had carried clause 27.
On clause 39 - Authorization for individuals who hold a licence to import firearms
The Chair: Clause 39 was stood.
Ms Phinney: Are the government amendments we got today all the new amendments there are? There's one, G-32, for clause 32. It's in the bundle we were given today.
The Chair: I leave it to you people when we come to a clause. If it was carried, then it is too late. You have to do it at the report stage.
Ms Phinney: If it does belong to clause 32, then I'm just wondering why there's also a G-32 at clause 63.
The Chair: Clause 32 had been carried.
Ms Phinney: In clause 32?
The Chair: Clause 32 had been carried when we originally dealt with it, so although G-19.1 is down there, we couldn't deal with it because it wasn't stood. Maybe the government had prepared G-19.1, but if it was a proposed amendment to clause 32, then it came too late.
In any case, we're on clause 39, which was stood. We have amendment R-008.
Mr. Ramsay: I will not move this, because it was subject to the passage of clause 12.
Clause 39 agreed to
On clause 43 - Authorization to export
The Chair: Clause 43 had been stood. One amendment had been carried. That was Mr. Lee's famous amendment. Then Mr. Lee's LL-3 was stood, and G-23 was stood.
First is LL-3.
Mr. Lee: My recollection is that LL-3 dealt with the requirement for the applicant for an export licence to have the certificates of registration for all the firearms. I had questioned the appropriateness of that when you had a manufacturer making 20,000 or 40,000 units of a firearm. However, as I understand it after discussion, the department has convinced those who would be subject to this clause that they will be relying not on paper and plastic cards but it is their intention to rely on electronic documentation.
My goal of reducing a very repetitive, costly paper burden is not there. Consequently, if my amendment has been stood, then I ask to be allowed to withdraw it.
Amendment withdrawn
.0030
The Chair: Then we have G-23, which was stood. Maybe it was stood because Mr. Lee's amendment was stood. They both dealt with transit through Canada. It's regarding licences to transport goods through Canada. I think you stood this one because Mr. Lee asked that LL-3 be stood. They dealt with the same subject-matter.
Mr. MacLellan: There is a requirement to possess a licence, except where those goods are to be exported after being imported, shipped and transited through Canada by a business that does not carry on business in Canada. It's an exemption from having a licence.
The Chair: I see. It's where goods are just transshipped through Canada.
Are there any questions or comments with respect to this?
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
On clause 52 - Applications
The Chair: Clause 52 was stood, and we have an amendment by the Reform Party, R-009.
Mr. Ramsay: I won't be moving that. Thank you.
Clause 52 as amended agreed to on division
On clause 56 - Conditions
The Chair: Clause 56 was stood, and we have amendment R-0010.
Mr. Ramsay: I'm not moving this amendment.
Clause 56 as amended agreed to on division
On clause 58 - Issuance of registration certificate
The Chair: Clause 58 was stood. Mr. Lee's amendment LL-5 was stood. There's a new government amendment, G-28.4. Let me look at G-28.4.
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Mr. MacLellan, could you explain this amendment?
Mr. MacLellan: We have ``may'' in the bill, but the French says licences are given by the firearms officer, and we've brought the English version to correspond with the French version.
The Chair: Before I ask you to move it, let's have amendment LL-5, which was stood. That's Mr. Lee's LL-5.
Mr. Wappel: Mr. Chairman, my notes indicate there was a G-29.3 and we stood that. Now, G-28.4 appears to be identical to it. Is that right?
Mr. MacLellan: Yes.
The Chair: I don't think the G-29.3 or whatever was distributed.
Mr. Wappel: Okay, fine.
Mr. Lee: With respect to LL-5, Mr. Chairman, I don't actually recall why it was stood, but I do know what it was about. For some reason we did not dispose of it. It was the hope that the matter might have been addressed somewhere down the line.
What it purported to do was to effectively exempt from having registration certificates those firearms that were manufactured on a business's premises - that is, a business licensed to manufacture firearms in Canada. Secondly, where a firearm described in this clause is exported from Canada, the firearm does not need a registration certificate.
The Chair: I notice that the government's amendment 28.4 strikes out lines 31 to 36. Yours strikes out line 31, so there's some overlapping there. You have in yours ``The registrar may'' and they have ``The registrar is responsible''. Then you have other amendments, Mr. Lee, that follow after line 36 but that have nothing to do with the - The (b) part of your amendment does not touch on the same territory, whereas your part (a) does touch on the same territory as amendment 28.4.
Mr. Lee: Mr. Chairman, it would clearly be simpler if I withdrew my amendment. I think I'll do that on the basis that the registration certificates referred to in here, as mentioned earlier, will be dealt with electronically.
The businesses that do export are going to have to obtain export authorizations through the same electronic means that would already exist for the certificates. So if we move to the electronic means there certainly won't be as much paperwork as I and others had originally thought there might be. So I will withdraw my amendment LL-5.
Amendment withdrawn
The Chair: All right. So we have G-28.4. Are there any further questions, explanations, or comments?
Mrs. Barnes: Has it been moved?
The Chair: No, I don't think it has.
Mrs. Barnes: I'll move it.
.0040
Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings]
Clause 58 as amended agreed to on division
On clause 59 - Form
The Chair: Clause 59 was stood, and we have a Reform amendment, R-0011.
Mr. Ramsay: Yes, it's the crossbow item again, Mr. Chairman, so I'll not be moving that.
The Chair: All right.
Clause 59 agreed to on division
The Chair: Clause 60 had carried on division. Clause 61, I can't understand what's....
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: Agreed to.
[English]
The Chair: Okay, it carried. Clauses 62 to 66 carried on division, and clause 67 carried.
Mr. MacLellan: Sixty-seven was stood.
The Chair: No, I have it carried here. Yes, Ms Torsney.
Ms Torsney: There are three Reform amendments on 66, 67 and 68 even though the clauses are carried.
The Chair: If the clause carries we can't consider them. The only way they can be put is at report stage.
Ms Torsney: Okay. I just want it noticed on the record.
The Chair: Okay.
Ms Meredith: I have 67 on my agenda number three as having been stood as well, and I have 68 and 69 as carried.
The Chair: Just one minute. I'll look at my record here. Yes, I have 67 as having been stood.
On clause 67 - Registration certificates
The Chair: We're on amendment number R-0013.
Mr. Ramsay: R-0013 and 0014 will not be moved.
Mr. Ramsay: Now I'm going home.
Clause 67 agreed to
On clause 93 - Agreements with provinces
The Chair: Clause 93 was stood and BQ-7.1 was stood as well. Madame Venne.
[Translation]
Mrs. Venne: I remember very well that clause that changes at clause 93, page 40, the verb peut (may) by doit (must or shall). The French version should now read: Le ministre fédéral doit conclure des accords avec les gouvernements provinciaux prévoyant le paiement de compensations.
The amendment was brought for the plain reason that the prime minister had confused things, about two weeks ago, when he declared that the cost of registering firearms should be born by the provinces. The next day or the day after, seeing the reaction across the country, the prime minister went back on his statement and said that there would be an agreement between the provinces and the federal government. But it was a bit late and that planted doubt in our mind.
.0045
This is why we are now asking that the famous peut, ``may'', become doit ``shall'', so that the prime minister will not be able to procrastinate anymore. This is why we are proposing this amendment, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. MacLellan, what response do you have to this?
Mr. MacLellan: The Prime Minister of course wouldn't recant, Mr. Chair.
Also, there have been conversations between the Minister of Justice federally and the Minister of Justice in the province of Quebec on this question. I think they've agreed that this wording is satisfactory. So to change it now, after there has been an understanding, would be rather risky. For that reason, we would not be supporting amendment BQ-7, although we understand what Madame Venne is proposing.
Mr. Ramsay: I support this motion. The federal-provincial agreements made some time ago have not been renewed. I've talked to officials in at least two areas, and they tell us that they are thousands of dollars over in their expenditures on the enforcement of the present gun control registration system, the FAC system, and that they are getting nowhere with the federal government in coming to some agreement on the new federal-provincial financial arrangement.
If we leave it as ``may'', then that's what it will stay as. We have to ensure that the federal government, if it's going to impose this type of regulation system upon the provinces, will pay for it. The justice minister from the Yukon Territory felt that any cost that is incurred through this system must be incurred totally by the federal government. So I support this.
It wouldn't be so bad if they weren't in a state now where they're fighting with the federal government to get the money that's owed to them, and no new federal-provincial agreements are being made.
So when I hear them talk about consultation and talking to the provinces, I'd like to see these federal-provincial financial agreements put into place. I wonder why it isn't in place.
Leaving these agreements hanging doesn't show much goodwill on the part of the federal government.
So I support the amendment.
Mr. Thompson: When I hear the parliamentary secretary talking about the federal minister engaging in conversation with the justice minister of Quebec about the wording being satisfactory - To your knowledge, has the minister consulted with any other ministers in other provinces, and if so, could you relate that to us?
Mr. MacLellan: I assume that the federal justice minister has contacted all the ministers of justice and attorneys general provincially. In fact, there has been agreement in principle with eight of the twelve provinces and territories with regard to the expenses and costs of the registration system. So I think considerable progress is being made, and I think even more progress will be made.
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Amendment negatived
Clause 93 agreed to on division
The Chair: I am told that was the last stood clause, with the exception of clause 1.
Clause 1 agreed to on division
The Chair: Shall the title carry?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Shall the bill as amended carry?
Mr. Ramsay: I would like a recorded vote.
Bill C-68 as amended agreed to: yeas 10; nays 3
The Chair: Shall the bill as amended be reprinted as a working copy for the use of the House of Commons at report stage?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Shall I report the bill with amendments to the House of Commons as the eighth report of the committee?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: I want to thank the members of the committee. This has not been an easy task. You all deserve a lot of credit.
As a matter of fact, the committee carried on in a positive way with very little partisanship. There was a difference of opinion on amendments and on clauses, but everything was carried on in a very - I think - polite, civilized way. I thank you all.
I want to thank Mr. Mosley, Mr. Roy, Ms Weiser and our two legislative counsel, who were very helpful, Mr. Bartlett, who was very helpful, and our two clerks.
I also advise you that I have consulted with the clerk, and because we have had so many amendments it's not likely that I will be able to report the bill tomorrow. It is scheduled to be reported on Wednesday when we report bills, which is just after the Question Period.
I am telling you that because if you want to prepare amendments at the report stage you will need the reported bill, because some of the clauses will be renumbered. I suggest that those of you who want to submit amendments should keep your eye open on Wednesday afternoon so you can get a copy of the new bill and get your amendments in as quickly as you may wish, without delay.
The committee adjourns until tomorrow at 10:30 a.m., when we will deal with Bill C-72, extreme drunkenness as a defence. I'm going out to test that tonight.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
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Mrs. Barnes: Mr. Chair, can you please advise the committee before you go and get drunk tonight what other justice meetings we may have later this week?
The Chair: This week we have meetings on Bill C-72, tomorrow morning and afternoon, and Wednesday afternoon. That's all because there's an election in Ontario on Thursday. We have three meetings this week, tomorrow morning, tomorrow afternoon and Wednesday afternoon. That's all for this week.
The meeting is adjourned.