[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Monday, October 16, 1995
.1934 
[English]
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): I call this session of the Special Joint Committee on a Code of Conduct to order on this Monday evening, October 16.
I extend a very warm welcome to our special presenter this evening: Mr. Duff Conacher, from Democracy Watch.
.1935
Mr. Conacher, in the briefing notes I noticed that Democracy Watch was formed in 1993 and has some 250 supporters from across Canada.
Of importance to us, however, is that you have three campaigns under way, one on bank accountability, one on lobbying, and one on government ethics. Some of your studies seem very appropriate to the things we're studying.
I understand you have an opening statement and you're prepared to answer questions afterwards.
Yes, Senator Gauthier.
Senator Gauthier (Ontario): Before we move to the witness, Mr. Chair, I want to give notice that I wish to raise a question at the next meeting of this committee regarding the naming of the committee.
On September 23, I raised the question as to whether the phrase ``code of conduct'' is the correct expression for the name of this committee, especially when stated in French. That's code d'éthique, which is a completely different concept. I raised it and I've made my points. I think I've scored somewhere. I don't know. But I'd like to see some results now.
I think a code of deontology would be much better, because in English ``code of conduct'' is the understatement of the year. Is it good conduct or bad conduct? What is it? What kind of conduct are we talking about here?
So I'd like to have a discussion at the next meeting. I won't take the time of the witness tonight, but at the next meeting maybe we could get into this and probably rectify our targets.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): I know, Senator, that some of the clerks have done some research on the issue you raised. Maybe we can circulate the research papers to everyone on the expression in French, the expression in English and the meaning of both. That will help the debate, which we can have at the next meeting. I quite agree with your suggestion.
Senator Gauthier: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra): I have another point of order. The point made by the hon. senator is well taken but it affects all ongoing hearings of the committee. I take it that ``code of conduct'' in English was intended to carry on the convention of Wickham College, that ``manners maketh man''. It refers to objective ascertainable conduct rather than to internal moral conceptions of right and wrong, and if one is lecturing on the one in French and on the other in English, we are two paths that may not meet except by chance in a meandering way.
So I think the point is very well taken and probably deserves immediate adjudication rather than postponement to the indefinite future.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): There's nothing indefinite.
Mr. McWhinney: In this committee, or in Parliament, everything is....
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Conacher, without further ado, please, the floor is yours.
Mr. McWhinney: Are you not ruling on this point?
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): We are going to bring it up at the next meeting.
Mr. McWhinney: It may be too late.
Mr. Duff Conacher (Coordinator, Democracy Watch): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I hope the committee will be able to resolve that contentious issue as well as many others so that the six efforts in the past ten years to get a code of conduct for members of Parliament will not end with a seventh that still has no code of conduct.
I'm sure the joint committee is aware that the context in which its deliberations are taking place is a context in which Canadians are showing quite clearly their lack of trust in political institutions and in politicians.
We have submitted to the clerk a brief entitled Restoring Integrity to Government and I've been assured by the clerk that you will all receive a copy upon translation.
You will see in the first section of that brief that we consider this a new opportunity to address an old subject, but in the current context the committee should be aware that recent polls have shown a very high level of distrust of government and politicians.
An in-depth, two-part, government-sponsored survey of 2,400 Canadians conducted by Ekos Research Associates Inc. in February and November 1994 concluded that 83% of Canadians feel politicians and business leaders have taken care of themselves and their friends while average Canadians have suffered badly. Seventy-three per cent believe governments have lost sight of the needs of average Canadians. Sixty-nine per cent feel the ethical standards of the federal government have slipped badly in the past decade and 44% of Canadians have lost all confidence in our current system of government.
.1940
Another reflection of this feeling is that in this poll of 2,400 Canadians, only 33% of Canadians would be proud if their child grew up to be a politician.
As the president of the polling company that conducted the poll stated, if the Prime Minister thinks people are now saying, ``Oh, good, we trust government again. Carry on'', then he's absolutely wrong. People's resentment of and hostility toward government haven't really cooled down. I don't see any fundamental difference in trust and confidence.
There are also many examples over the past year that have shown that conflict of interest rules are either incomplete or unclear. With this context and its mandate in mind, the special joint committee has a new opportunity to review this old subject and, hopefully, to resolve it in a satisfactory manner at the federal level.
The special joint committee also has some promises to keep. The government promised in its campaign document Creating Opportunity that if government is to play a positive role in society, as it must, then honesty and integrity in our political institutions must be restored.
One of the main promises was to enact a code of conduct for public officials. Unfortunately, the committee now has to draft this code in the context of an existing code, which was revised in June of 1994. I think this causes a very large problem for the committee, because it means that there has to be an interaction with an existing code rather than the drafting of a code for all members.
The special joint committee of 1992 recommended that all rules be consolidated into amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act. As Senator Oliver was a member of that committee, I know that he is well aware of the recommendations made.
At Democracy Watch we think that this is the best approach, and generally we endorse the report of the 1992 special joint committee and we call on this committee to follow its recommendations generally.
However, we feel that in certain areas the recommendations of that report need to be improved, and I will focus on those in the remaining part of my opening statement.
An area I will return to is the promises the Liberal government made in respect of appointing an independent ethics counsellor with strong investigative powers. This is an essential area and I will return to this in more detail, but there are very significant promises and you will see all of them detailed on pages 5 and 6 of our brief. The committee should definitely keep those promises in mind in its deliberations.
There are at least five reasons for undertaking the drafting of an effective ethics code and an effective enforcement system, and we set these out in our brief.
An overarching reason is to restore the trust of the public in government institutions.
How do you do that? The first reason and the first method of doing this is to avoid conflicts of interest as much as possible in government decision-making.
Again, because of the existence of a code and our parliamentary system, a major issue for the committee to consider is what government decision-making is. We feel that it is not adequate to say that because only ministers and secretaries of state introduce legislation and programs into Parliament and the government can reject proposals made by any other member of Parliament, therefore other public officials do not need to be subject to conflict of interest rules.
.1945
Indeed, currently there are rules for ministerial staff and public servants who in some cases do not participate as directly in government decision-making as members of Parliament do.
New rules were introduced in February 1994 for parliamentary committees that create new methods of drafting and amending legislation. Senate committees have shown that they can influence legislation through review and delay; for example, the electoral boundaries bill.
This committee itself is an example of the decision-making power of members of the House of Commons and the Senate.
As a result of the many different means of influencing government decision-making, attempting to draw lines between those public officials who have constitutional decision-making power and those who don't would only lead to an unwieldy and unworkable set of conflict of interest rules. One set of clear rules, with variations for only certain specific circumstances, will work much better. Using this approach, all members of Parliament will be subject to the same disclosure rules; however, those with greater decision-making power will be held to a higher ethical standard simply because the rules will apply to them in more situations.
As a result, we endorse the recommendation of the 1992 special joint committee report that conflict of interest rules for all members of Parliament should not differ significantly, especially in the area of disclosure.
We also endorse the recommendations of that committee report concerning amending the Parliament of Canada Act and amending the Criminal Code to ensure that public officials and ministers are covered by those Criminal Code provisions.
In specific areas there will be differences between various members, and we also differ from the 1992 special joint committee report.
First, regarding rules concerning nepotism, we feel that, as in every province and territory except Prince Edward Island, members of Parliament should be required to disclose the interests, assets, and liabilities of their spouse and dependants.
We also feel that instead of the recommendation that members should be prohibited from furthering a private interest of only the member's immediate family, members should be prohibited from furthering private interests of the extended family of any member.
In the area of rules concerning financial interests, the 1992 special joint committee report set a threshold of $10,000 for disclosure of financial interests, assets, liabilities, and sources of income. If it was less than $10,000, then it would not have to be disclosed. We feel that this threshold is too high. As in British Columbia, Quebec, and the Yukon, there should be full disclosure of all the financial interests of all members. We see no reason to have a lower standard at the federal level.
Although the 1992 special joint committee heard many witnesses debate the merits of full disclosure as opposed to full divestment as compared to blind trusts, we feel that full divestment should be favoured, especially for ministers, secretaries of state, parliamentary secretaries, and others who hold key decision-making decisions. We feel that this is in the public interest.
In the area of rules concerning outside activities, we agree with the special joint committee of 1992, which quite correctly made it clear that the right to carry on outside activities should be subject to the responsibility to avoid conflicts of interest. Therefore we believe that any member of Parliament should be able to engage in employment or practice of a profession, carrying on a business, etc., only to the extent that they are still able to fulfil their obligations concerning conflict of interest.
.1950
We also believe that, as in several provinces, members should be prohibited from being a party to a government contract. Further, we believe that all members should be prohibited from negotiating, or being involved in negotiations on, a government contract. This is to avoid the situation we saw last spring, in 1994, when Senator Mario Beaulieu bid with his company on a government contract and he did not resign from the Senate until after his company received the contract. There should be a clear prohibition, because no amount of disclosure will assure the public there is no undue influence on the part of a member over a contract bidding process.
We believe the only exceptions should be to contracts that existed before the member became a member, or contracts made in an emergency. But the prohibition should apply to an extension of an existing contract and to a contract that is offered through public tender.
In the area of rules concerning gifts, hospitality, and other benefits, currently the definition of ``gift, hospitality or other benefit'' is too vague. The threshold of disclosure are too high. We favour limits on gift-giving, as opposed to simple disclosure. As a result, we call on this committee to enact a rule that expands the definition of ``gift'', especially to include transportation and travel, and we call for a prohibition on any member accepting a gift with an individual or aggregate value of more than $50 in a calendar year.
There's no reason why gift-giving should be used in any manner. The only exception we see is if it is a matter of protocol. Otherwise we call for a clear prohibition on gift-giving.
We also call on the committee to consider carefully the implications of donations in cash or in kind to members and to political parties between elections and during election campaigns. Using donations as a means of influence should not be permitted to violate the intent of gift-giving restrictions, which is to eliminate the influence of money in government decision-making. If those with money are able to use those means, it means our standard of democracy in Canada is lowered.
If the special joint committee disagrees with this prohibition on gift-giving, it should at the very least define ``gift'' to include transportation and travel, lower the disclosure threshold to $50, and apply the prohibition on accepting gifts from anyone who is or should be registered under the Lobbyists Registration Act, since lobbyists are the people most likely to use gift-giving as a means of undue influence.
In the area of rules on post-employment, Democracy Watch feels the post-employment compliance measures in the current conflict of interest code should be extended to all members of Parliament, with the change that the limitation in the period on post-employment should be increased from two years to five years for ministers and for members of Parliament it should be two years.
The second major reason for putting in place strong rules and an effective enforcement regime is to prevent participation by public officials in decision-making processes when a conflict of interest exists. The proposals set out above are aimed at defining what interests pose conflicts for a member, in order to help members avoid potential conflicts. The proposal in this area is aimed at defining when a member must recognize that a conflict is real and withdraw from participation in the decision-making process. As the 1992 special joint committee stated:
- We decided that the public interest in ensuring that all decisions are reached without
consideration of a Member's private interest outweighed the public interest in having the full
benefit of all available experience in every decision before Cabinet and Parliament.
However, the 1992 report exempted votes or participating in decisions if it was a matter of general public application or affected a broad class of the public. This approach is currently embodied in rules of the Senate and House of Commons.
We disagree with it because it allows members to participate in decision-making even when they have a clear conflict of interest. Therefore we call on the committee to make it clear that no member shall participate in making any decision in his or her capacity as a member, even decisions of general public application, if the member knows that it will further, directly or indirectly, the private interests of the member or the member's extended family.
Some might argue that this prohibition will prevent members from serving on committees or voting in Parliament to a far greater extent than is necessary. The answer to this argument is that, as the special joint committee in 1992 said, it is in the public interest.
Any member with expertise in an area can simply be called as a witness before a committee. They do not have to sit on a committee.
In addition, members already have ample opportunity to share their expertise, as I'm sure you all know, with colleagues in caucus and informally through letters and conversations.
Again, in this area, as in others, the attempt to draw a distinction between levels of decision-makers and types of decisions will only lead to an incoherent and ineffective ethics regime.
A third reason to enact strict rules and an effective enforcement regime is to inform the public so they can judge whether public office holders are making decisions based upon merit.
Currently there are two fundamental problems with the system concerning government decision-making and conflict of interest rules: applicable rules and relevant information are spread out in a disjointed series of documents, and the rules and information are available only from relatively obscure government offices for a cost, or not at all.
I repeat our recommendation that all existing and future codes should be consolidated into a new part of the Parliament of Canada Act as a means of ensuring an accessible and coherent ethics regime.
Also, we recommend that the committee call on the government to make the provisions concerning conflict of interest that are in the currently secret document entitled ``Guidance to Ministers'' public so that the public will know the rules under which those with the greatest political and legal powers in Canada exercise them.
We also call on the committee to recommend that the federal government ensure that details about every government decision-making process, the status of public officials concerning conflict of interest, lobbyists, and political finance are made available to the public in a very accessible manner; specifically, on computer networks for free and on computer disks for use in public libraries across the country.
All of the information that is collected currently about lobbyists and conflict of interest should be put onto the computer networks so that, for each decision the government makes, Canadians will be able to judge how the government weighed the arguments of citizens, citizen groups, business associations, and lobbyists, whether the government made the decision on its merits, and whether the government kept its campaign promise that it would listen to the people.
A fourth reason for a coherent and effective regime is to give clear guidance to public officials. This approach of consolidating all rules would benefit not only the public, who would be able very easily to learn the rules under which memberships undertake their responsibilities, but also members, who would be able easily to understand their responsibilities.
Second - a major area - an independent ethics officer not only would reassure the public but also would reassure members that when they are on the government or the opposition side of the House or the Senate, if they face charges of conflict of interest they will be treated fairly, in a non-partisan manner, and the matter will be objectively resolved rather than hanging over them for the rest of their lives.
.2000
In this area, the fifth and very important reason for an effective and coherent regime is to ensure the integrity of the system of government decision-making. Primarily in this area the position of ethics counsellor must be reformed.
The current position in no way adheres to the government's campaign promises as set out in Creating Opportunity. As well, the position is fatally flawed by conflicts of interest. The ethics counsellor is the administrator of the current code but is also the investigator, although with very limited powers.
The Prime Minister, not Parliament, as was promised in Creating Opportunity, is given the ultimate power to resolve disputes between the ethics counsellor and public office holders. Also, the Prime Minister rather than the ethics counsellor decides which conflicts of interest are investigated, even if those conflicts involve an official other than a minister, an excuse that has been used by some members of the government, saying that the Prime Minister is quite properly responsible for ministers.
The current code applies also to political staff, not just ministers, and so the only way to resolve these problems is to appoint an independent ethics counsellor.
The current positions of the government and the ethics counsellor are also hypocritical, because under the Lobbyists Registration Act, the ethics counsellor will enforce the lobbyists code of conduct and has the power to investigate and hold inquiries.
By having this current structure, the government has created a more stringent ethics investigation and enforcement regime for lobbyists, who can only try to influence government decisions, than it has for cabinet ministers, who make government decisions, and public servants, who develop policy and therefore can greatly influence government decisions.
The current position also creates a serious problem for the ethics counsellor. If a lobbyist violates the lobbyists code of conduct by influencing a minister in an unethical manner, and the minister violates the code by granting the requested favour to the lobbyist, the ethics counsellor will be in a conflict of interest himself because he will be required to investigate the lobbyist and report publicly to Parliament while at the same time reporting privately to the Prime Minister about the cabinet minister's conduct.
It's an untenable position and it raises the question of who will guard the guard. We need an independent ethics counsellor in order to answer this question satisfactorily.
The conflict of interest commissioner of Ontario, whom you will hear from on Wednesday, has stated publicly: ``If people at the provincial level need an independent ethics commissioner then I think the federal level needs it too''.
Also, then Liberal MP Paul Martin testified before the special joint committee in 1992 and called for the creation of the position of the ethics commissioner, who should report to Parliament and have the ability to investigate.
The commission should have full powers to investigate compliance of all the codes in the Lobbyists Registration Act, to hold inquiries, to report publicly the conclusions of inquiries and to recommend sanctions to Parliament or refer matters to the RCMP for potential prosecution.
Democracy Watch also agrees with members of the 1992 special joint committee, in particular Don Boudria, who expressed concern. He stated:
- I have some difficulty with this proposition of the conflict of interest commissioner, from
whom one can seek advice, but then that person is also investigating. ...that it is like having the
police and judge combined, but it's actually worse than that; it's like having your lawyer acting
against you in the same case he acts for you.
.2005
We also feel there should be an ethics commission, as was recommended in Bill C-43 in 1991. A multi-person ethics commission will much more easily avoid the conflicts of interest one person can fall into. Although the 1992 special joint committee cited the desire to avoid an extensive bureaucratic machine, this committee should take into account the costs that two officers will be able to save. They will be more effective and will be able to stop government spending that should not be taking place because of conflict of interest. They will also be able to save the cost of the public not trusting government.
Finally, to deal with a few other areas of the ethics officer's position, if the committee feels there should not be an ethics commission, it should at least hold up the standard in provinces of having an independent office with strong investigative powers. The current code should be amended so that an ethics adviser, and not the Prime Minister, has the power to approve conflict of interest compliance arrangements; and so that only an ethics officer or investigator, and not the Prime Minister, can approve reductions in the limitation period on post-employment. This officer should be the final arbiter if a public official agrees with the advice of an ethics adviser. In the area of public servants, the ethics commission should have the same powers.
On the subject of additional enforcement mechanisms, Democracy Watch disagrees with the 1992 special joint committee, which stated that an ethics officer would not be required to conduct an inquiry in certain circumstances, and would only be required to do so if there was a resolution from either House of Parliament. The 1992 report also recommended that the ethics officer not be required to report publicly if the inquiry was requested by the Prime Minister.
We agree with Paul Martin, who, in his testimony before the 1992 special joint committee, recommended that the public be allowed to file a complaint with the ethics officer - as in Alberta and Nova Scotia - and that the ethics officer be required to investigate all complaints and report publicly in every case. Public reporting is an essential component, and Paul Martin agreed with this in his 1992 testimony.
Finally, there should also be protection provided to whistle-blowers - as is currently given to Ontario's public servants - so that any individual who gives information leading to the conviction of a person in violation of the conflict of interest rules would be protected. If there were fines imposed, that individual should receive 50% of the fine if they are not also in violation of the rules. We think this will encourage and reward high ethical standards for public officials.
That concludes our opening statement, and I look forward to your questions. If you have further questions or are interested in further information from Democracy Watch, we have the brief that we have submitted. Also, in May 1994 we released a report entitled Spring Cleaning: A Model Lobbying Disclosure and Ethics Package for Those Hard to Reach Places in the Federal Government. In June 1995 we released our report Reinventing Integrity: First Annual Report Card on the Federal Government's Ethics Package. Spring Cleaning is on file at the Library of Parliament, as is our report, Reinventing Integrity. In those reports, we have much more detail and background on the recommendations we have made today.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Thank you very much, Mr. Conacher.
.2010
When you were giving your evidence, you kept saying ``we'' throughout. As I understand it, your organization was established in 1993 and has 250 supporters. Do you have an office? What do you do? What goes into the principles that you say ``we'' have worked upon? Who is this? Who's behind your organization?
Mr. McWhinney: Who is this ``we''?
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Yes, who is this ``we''? That's my first question.
My second question is as follows: A number of people have come before this committee and have said that one of the things it should consider for a code of conduct is to first arrive at a series or set of principles and, from that, work out individual things it wants to cover, like trips, gifts, and so on. I would like to know what you think of that.
My third question deals with the fact that you said ``we'' feel that, in your view, gifts should be limited to $50 unless there's a protocol reason for doing otherwise. If a lobbyist were to take a member of Parliament out to sit down and talk about a piece of legislation and the bill came to $101 for lunch, would that have to be disclosed under your plan?
Those are my three questions.
Mr. Conacher: First of all, in regard to who we are, we are currently the only advocacy group scheduled to appear before the committee that represents the citizens' perspective. We do not claim to represent all Canadians, but we try to think about what somebody in Moose Jaw, Burnaby or Toronto would want to see in a conflict of interest code. As a result, we draft our recommendations with the citizens' perspective in mind while, as you would see if you looked at our report Spring Cleaning, comparing rules across every single jurisdiction in North America.
We have a small board of three people at Democracy Watch, an advisory committee of three people, and 250 supporters across the country - at least one in every jurisdiction. As you have mentioned, we started up in 1993 with the proceeds of a book called Canada First, which I co-authored with Ralph Nader. Now, like every other group, we are trying to survive in a time of cuts in government funding. We have a policy of not receiving any government grants or donations from corporations; we take only citizens' donations. We are essentially the only group currently tracking these issues from a citizens' perspective in Canada.
I have a suggestion for you if you would like a more broadly based, larger group sitting before you: recommend to the government that in the next budget it should announce that a box will be added to the bottom of every tax return form sent out to taxpayers. The box will contain a statement that says ``Please check this box if you wish to add to your taxes $10 that will be directed to a national taxpayers' association with the mandate to monitor the ethical standards of government and government spending and to educate people on the uses of their tax dollars''. We estimate this form would go to 18 million Canadians. If 3% joined, you would have a group with 540,000 members and a budget of $5 million. With that, you would have a much more representative, well-resourced organization sitting before you today and lobbying you for a strong, coherent, and effective ethics enforcement régime.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): And on the other two points?
Mr. Conacher: With regard to principles, we have argued that it is at least unclear that the principles in the current conflict of interest code for public office holders apply to every person in this room. This is because ``public office holder'' in part I of that code is not defined in any restrictive manner.
We recognize that there are ongoing struggles with the courts to define ``public office'', ``public official'', and ``public office holder'' on a case-by-case basis. We feel, however, that those ten principles are very good and are a great place to start. This would be a preamble to part I, as it is in the current code.
.2015
Again, we feel all of this should be legislative, as opposed to the nebulous status of the current code. It's not really enforceable in any way. No one can complain to the ethics counsellor. It's completely at the discretion of the Prime Minister. No one can appeal to a court or any independent body. So the current code has very questionable status, and that's why we recommend that all the rules be consolidated in the Parliament of Canada Act...and put the ten principles up front as the first section of a part.
Your third question was on the $50 prohibition. We simply feel there should be a clear prohibition. There is no reason why anyone should be able to use this means of influence. If you have only disclosure, it means a lobbyist who can afford to can take a member of Parliament out for lunch every single day. That's unequal access, because not every citizen can afford to take a member out for lunch every single day. So a clear prohibition, a cap of $50 per year from any one person, is what we recommend.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Thank you very much.
Mrs. Catterall.
Mrs. Catterall (Ottawa West): This may seem like a facetious question. Believe me, it's not. Do you know any member of Parliament personally? Have you ever worked with a member of Parliament? Do you have any idea what their daily working life and week are like?
Mr. Conacher: When I finished law school I articled with the policy development division of the attorney general's office in the province of Ontario. I have also worked quite closely with a number of the members of the industry committee over the past year in our bank accountability campaign.
My grandfather was a Liberal MP under Louis Saint-Laurent. Over the past several years I have also had ongoing contact with members of Parliament, including Patrick Boyer. Mr. Milliken may be aware of a paper we submitted to him on citizen access to decision-making, one that called for initiative referendum recall.
Mrs. Catterall: Let me tell one of the reasons why I ask, because I am interested. You didn't define a dividing line between the kind of code that might govern ministers, who directly make decisions; parliamentary secretaries, who have access to confidential information and to influencing decisions; and other members of Parliament, who don't have that decision-making ability. Frankly, it seemed to confuse me a bit when you said they should be prohibited from participating in a committee because they have other ways of influencing decisions. Frankly, to me being on a committee is the least effective way to influence a decision a minister of a department is about to make. Those other ways of influencing decisions are far more important when there might be a situation of your personal interests being involved.
Mr. Conacher: Under the new rules introduced in February 1994, committees have been greatly empowered. For example, Bill C-43, the Lobbyists Registration Act, was referred to committee after first reading. The committee amended that bill significantly and the bill as amended passed through Parliament intact, except for one further amendment, introduced by your colleague Mr. Epp. That's legislative decision-making power.
Mrs. Catterall: But that's not the ability to expend public money. Only Parliament has that and only ministers have that. Committees don't. But a member privately approaching a minister or an official can influence those kinds of decisions. So I'm wondering why you drew the line at participating in committees or in votes but not at those other subtler but more effective ways of influencing.
Mr. Conacher: Because the other ways are influence, as opposed to participating in the decision-making process.
.2020
Mrs. Catterall: But if one's decisions have no effect....
Mr. Conacher: But they do. The code that you will draft here will have effect. The subcommittee that examined Bill C-43 amended the legislation.
Mrs. Catterall: But it's not going to affect the spending of public money or the giving of public favours.
Mr. Conacher: No, but it can still affect interests.
Mrs. Catterall: That's why I asked the question: because, frankly, I think that displays a lack of understanding of the access that members of Parliament have to those who make the decisions. It's not through committees and it's not through your vote in the House.
Mr. Conacher: I understand that, but those are where you are taking part in decision-making processes. So the idea of a regime is, as the 1992 special joint committee summarized so clearly, to ensure that a member withdraws from a decision-making process when they face a real, potential, or apparent conflict of interest.
Mrs. Catterall: That is precisely my point. The decision-making is the minister's or an official's, not a committee's. To me, that is where the member should also withdraw: from any private approaches to anyone who is in a position to influence their well-being.
Mr. Conacher: If you were saying ``also withdraw'', then I would agree with you.
Mrs. Catterall: If I were going to choose one or the other, then I'd say you chose the wrong one if you understand the situation.
Let me go to another question. You suggested that somebody should be able to designate $10 to support the kinds of activities that you and your organization undertake. Would you suggest also a buffet style of tax return where I could be informed that 9% of my dollar goes to defence and 40% of it goes to health care and social services and I could choose for which ones I want to pay my taxes?
Mr. Conacher: No.
Mrs. Catterall: Then why would you suggest $10 going to a taxpayers organization?
Mr. Conacher: Because it is very difficult for the citizen voice to organize and band together. The business interests can very easily shift profits that they make from selling services and goods to consumers to support their lobbying activities. For example, the Canadian Bankers Association is funded indirectly by consumers.
So why not have as easy a method for citizens to band together?
Mrs. Catterall: Why did you say ``taxpayers'' instead of ``citizens''?
Mr. Conacher: You could call it whatever you want. You could call it the National Citizens' Association for Government Ethics and have it simply be a monitor of ethics.
Mrs. Catterall: I want to make one more point and ask one more question, because you suggested that there shouldn't be any provision for a commonality of interest. You might know that that's part of the municipal conflict of interest legislation, that where a member shares an interest in common with the community they represent, they may vote notwithstanding an interest in the matter. You chose to set that side.
Are you aware of why that's in the municipal conflict of interest legislation?
Mr. Conacher: Do you mean in Toronto?
Mrs. Catterall: An interest in common with the community.
Mr. Conacher: We allow that a member could request a ruling from an independent ethics officer. It has to be an independent ethics officer, though, not the current system. If it was in the public interest to do so, then the independent ethics officer could rule that the member can participate.
Again, if that occurs, then it should be registered and it should be made available on computer networks that that ruling has been made. Or if a member withdraws, then that should also be registered, and the reason why, and that should all be available to the public so it can track the status of members who are participating in decision-making.
Mrs. Catterall: Finally, can you give us your definition of ``extended family''?
Mr. Conacher: That's a difficult area. We believe simply that it should go beyond spouse and dependants.
Mrs. Catterall: How far beyond?
Mr. Conacher: I believe the committee in 1992 included parents and siblings of the member as well. I think that would be satisfactory.
Mrs. Catterall: Thank you.
.2025
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Senator Gauthier. Then we will hear from Senator Spivak and Mr. Epp.
Senator Gauthier: Mr. Chair, I have a couple of quick questions for our witness, Mr. Conacher.
You told us this was the sixth or seventh try at getting a kind of code of deontology going here. You also gave us a pretty good overview of the 1992 report, which you seemed to have endorsed for the majority of the recommendations, except for a few things. Why do you think the 1992 report didn't become government policy or that Parliament didn't adopt this policy proposal?
Mr. Conacher: Democracy Watch was set up in 1993.
Senator Gauthier: No. I'm asking you why did the government not do -
Mr. Conacher: Sir, I wasn't there. But in everything that I've read, the special joint committee in 1992 felt that Bill C-43, which it was considering, was hastily drafted and therefore amended it in many significant ways and recommended a coherent set of rules.
I can only note that when an amended bill came back to that committee as Bill C-116 in 1993, the committee held hearings very briefly, and expressed deep frustration throughout that most of their recommendations had been ignored. I'm not sure whether Mr. Oliver could give more details on that, but essentially it went back into the hopper with government officials and public servants and came out not looking very much the same. The committee had to look at it again and they rejected Bill C-116.
Senator Gauthier: So you're telling me -
Mr. Conacher: I think that current.... Still, as has been seen in June 1994, a code for public office holders was introduced. So there is obviously the intent of this government, as it was for the previous one, to draw these lines, which I think is a mistake.
The difference in terms of the standards should be in the application. You have very similar rules for everyone. Paul Martin endorsed this in 1992 when he appeared before the special joint committee. Where you see the distinction is in the application because, of course, ministers are going to have to follow the rules in more instances than will other members because of their responsibilities and decision-making powers.
Senator Gauthier: If I were to say that the politicians and the parliamentarians in great majority were in support of the 1992 report.... But as you just told me, when it went back to the bureaucracy it was digested by some people and returned as unacceptable. Is that what you just told me? That's also the way I understand it.
Mr. Conacher: Yes, that's what -
Senator Gauthier: What makes you believe it will be different this time?
Mr. Conacher: Well, the promises of this government are clearer, I hope.
Senator Gauthier: I'm not talking about the parliamentarians. I've got good intentions. I've been here for 23 years. I've never been objected to. I've never been suspected. I've never been the object of any gift of any kind. And as for all you've told us about politicians having lack of trust in politics and politicians are a bunch of crooks, I don't buy that nonsense.
Nevertheless, we're trying hard here to come up with a code of conduct. What makes you believe that even though I'm well-intentioned and this committee is well-intentioned we'll be able to succeed unless we get the support of people like you?
Mr. Conacher: That's why I'm here. That's why if you come out with a good code, we will do a news conference the same day congratulating the committee, and if you had a national citizens' association you would have the support of many hundreds of thousands of Canadians pushing for this -
Senator Gauthier: But you've heard of the national coalition.
Mr. Conacher: I've heard of the national -
Senator Gauthier: There's someone who doesn't seem to have a lack of money. He seems to be getting all kinds of money.
Mr. Conacher: Yes.
Senator Gauthier: Why don't you do the same thing?
Mr. Conacher: Why don't we do the same thing? Well, he started with a bit more of an endowment than we did.
As I mentioned, it started with the proceeds from Canada First, which was a best-seller in 1993 in Canada. But a best-seller in Canada does not mean hundreds of thousands of dollars, as any of you who have authored anything are -
Senator Gauthier: You made a statement about the Parliament of Canada Act. You said, and I'm trying to quote you here, that the Criminal Code provisions need to be amended:
- to ensure that federal, provincial and territorial Cabinet Ministers and Secretaries of State are
explicitly covered...
Mr. Conacher: Well, the 1992 special joint committee recognized that the courts have been struggling in a few areas.
.2030
Senator Gauthier: We have amended the act since. The Parliament of Canada Act has been amended.
Mr. Conacher: Yes, but the Criminal Code itself. It has been struggling.
Senator Gauthier: I'm not a lawyer. You are a lawyer. Tell me where I should be looking. What am I supposed to be paying attention to in the code?
Mr. Conacher: Sections 118, 119, 121 and 122 are used. Section 118 defines an official in a way that makes it unclear that all federal and provincial cabinet ministers and provincial and territorial members of legislative assemblies are included. Section 119 is unclear as to whether cabinet ministers and secretaries of state are explicitly covered.
Senator Gauthier: And section 121.
Mr. Conacher: Sections 121 and 122 are affected by the definition in 118.
Senator Gauthier: An official covers a parliamentarian as an official, in your definition?
Mr. Conacher: Well, the courts have -
Senator Gauthier: No, in your mind. I know what the courts have said.
Mr. Conacher: Yes. There is a huge difficulty. For some reason every time something is drafted a different term is used. So we have the code of conduct, conflict of interest and employment code for public office holders, but if you look in the Interpretation Act, they use the term ``public officer''. Then if you look in the Criminal Code they use the term ``official''.
I took a course in legislative drafting when I was at law school. I think the legislative counsellor to the province of Ontario who taught that course would have concluded that this was vague, generally incoherent and ambiguous and not very good drafting. So make it coherent.
Senator Gauthier: I may agree with that. I don't have any further questions at this time.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Senator Spivak, please.
Senator Spivak (Manitoba): I would like to ask you a couple of questions, one with regard to donations.
You mentioned that very briefly. It seems to me that if there's a lack of public trust in politicians, a lot of that has to do with the way the party system operates and not with transgressions that individual members of Parliament may or may not have made.
It has to do with the fact that it costs millions of dollars to run a party, that donations have to be sought constantly and it is in human nature to not be impartial when that sort of system exists. The question I would like to ask you on the subject of donations is, do you see that there needs to be alterations with donations for political parties, any sorts of alterations in that system? Or do we need a radical systemic change? What's your view on donations to political parties and how they influence the code of conduct of members of Parliament?
Mr. Conacher: We have not looked closely at this area to date. In Creating Opportunity, the Liberal Party promised to amend the election finance rules to eliminate the influence of special interests, and there are a few systems out there.
Quebec has a system, which the Bloc follows, whereby there are no corporate or organizational donations allowed and individuals are limited to $5,000. Another proposal that has been made, which would be a much greater change, is that $1 would be added to every taxpayer's amount of taxes. That would create a pool of $18 million, which would then be divided amongst the parties according to the popular vote they obtained in the last election and the number of seats they hold in the House.
We think we have a better system than the United States currently in that we have caps on how much can be spent. But as has been revealed in the media with certain industries - such as the financial services industry, which gave about $1.2 million to the Liberal Party last year - it is hard to see that as not being used as a means of influence unless they are giving the same amount to every party.
.2035
We haven't looked at it closely, but hopefully the Liberal government will take this up before the next election, as they promised to do. At that time we will take a closer look at it.
Senator Spivak: Turning to the question of lobbying, do you think there ought to be any further regulations to govern lobbyists? The growth of lobbyists in Canada has been quite phenomenal compared to ten or fifteen years ago.
Lobbying firms generally protect themselves by having within their ranks members of all parties who have served in government or who have been close to the Prime Minister's office. Do you think we need further rules and regulations that touch upon the issue we're addressing here in terms of lobbyists?
Mr. Conacher: Yes, very much so. We submitted a brief to the subcommittee studying Bill C-43. Some of our recommendations were adopted. Some key ones weren't. Essentially the system that has been put in place makes more information available, but not key information.
We feel lobbyists should be required to disclose all past paid and volunteer work with any government or political party. We feel lobbyists should not be able to hold senior positions in political parties, such as a campaign manager or treasurer. We also feel lobbyists should have to disclose their expenditures on any lobbying undertaking. Also, if a lobbyist is simply providing information rather than directly contacting officials to influence, if they're providing information that is not readily accessible to the public, then they should have to register as well.
So we definitely still have problems with the Lobbyists Registration Act as it stands, and we hope these problems will be addressed in the lobbyists code of conduct. We very much expect that there will be a provision in the lobbyists code of conduct that will say a lobbyist or lobbying firm shall not lobby a department at the same time as doing work for that department.
This was seen last year with the Earnscliffe Strategy Group, which was providing communications advice to the Department of Finance and at the same time representing clients who were lobbying the Department of Finance. It's untenable.
Senator Spivak: So you don't think we need specific regulations that prevent someone who has been in close contact with the highest decision-making powers in government from joining a lobbyist firm for a certain period of time.
Mr. Conacher: Oh, yes. The revolving door we think should be shut much more tightly.
Senator Spivak: Do you have any specific recommendations at this point?
Mr. Conacher: We haven't made them in this brief because we feel it's more within the realm of the lobbyists code of conduct that these provisions should be made, but we think if you are in a senior position in a political party, you should be prohibited from then lobbying, because you can gain just as much inside access and influence through your ties as you could if you worked in government, sometimes more.
Senator Spivak: You've given us all the reasons you think there ought to be a code of conduct. Some people who have appeared before us have said there shouldn't be a code of conduct, and we should just leave it alone.
In my own view a code of conduct is necessary, but there are other areas, such as the party system and lobbyists, where there is far more influence and far more reason for public distrust than with the conduct of ordinary members of Parliament, who generally speaking are not a dishonest lot. I just wonder how you view that.
You began with the issue of public trust, and I'm not sure that the public trust issue is as simple as it's made out to be in those polls. There's a range of things that go into that public trust. I'm not sure that just changing the code of conduct will do anything to alter the public feeling that they don't have trust in government.
.2040
There are many reasons, like the party system and the lobbyists. There's also the general feeling that people, once they get in the government, reward their friends.
What are your comments on that?
Mr. Conacher: I feel this committee can take a significant step forward if it generally follows the 1992 special committee report.
I would just like to quote Paul Martin from when he appeared before the committee. He offered an example in which he had an interest in a company while being a cabinet minister. Of course, he wasn't one at that time. He stated:
- To go back to the Oceanex example that I gave, if I have been in cabinet - heaven
forbid - and I'm not allowed to be involved in the management of the company, I don't know
what is going on, and suddenly I'm asked a question about something, how in heaven's name
will the public be satisfied that this was all done in a fair and legitimate way if an independent
officer of Parliament is not able to ascertain the facts?
Mr. Epp (Elk Island): Mr. Conacher, I really enjoyed your presentation. I have 23 points that I wrote down from it. I'm looking forward so much to receiving a copy of your report when finally we get it.
Mr. Conacher: Actually, you will see in our report that the title of the second section is ``Five Reasons to Take 25 Steps to an Effective System''. There are a couple more.
Mr. Epp: I missed a few.
I am really curious with respect to your wish to really distance parliamentarians from business, from making money, and so on. I concur with this as an ideal, but I wonder how practical it is.
We have had a few examples here already. Should we expect a farmer who runs for Parliament and is elected to divest himself of his farm? Or, on the other hand, should he not ever speak or vote on the things that affect his community the most, although he was elected in the farming community? How do you reconcile something like that?
Mr. Conacher: In terms of activities, we feel that there can of course be an exception for family-run businesses. For example, it is very difficult to divest.
So when I say that we favour full divestment, it's especially for ministers and secretaries of state, who are in the key decision-making positions. But in other areas, placing things in a blind trust or simple disclosure can satisfy it. Essentially, again, an independent ethics officer is needed to rule on these situations, and just make the ruling public so that at least everybody knows.
Mr. Epp: The fact of the matter is that every farmer who is elected, especially if he comes from a farming community, can hardly divest himself from it.
You indicated you would like to see this apply not only to the member but the member's spouse, the member's children, the children's wives or husbands, parents, and so on.
Mr. Conacher: Not divestment, though. For the member's family it would be disclosure.
Mr. Epp: Okay.
Mr. Conacher: It's divestment on the part of the member, when possible.
Mr. Epp: I somehow feel that our best experts in a lot of those areas are people who have worked in those fields. When I think of banking and business, I really appreciate the input that business people have into those kinds of discussions.
.2045
Talking about influencing, I'm in a party in which there's only one lawyer. My apologies to you. We have 51 other members, the majority of whom are business people. They almost all took a cut in salary to become members of Parliament, by the way. Consequently, you're asking them now to even further take financial losses. Do you think that might have any ramifications on who might possibly run in the next election?
Mr. Conacher: There's one problem you're raising, which is that it's difficult to consider a code without considering pension plan, compensation, post-employment rules, and the whole context of sacrifices.
Some people say that good people will be discouraged from running from Parliament. We believe that the phrase ``good people'' is a euphemism for ``elite people''. Most Canadians would not take a cut in pay, but would have a huge raise in pay if they became a member of Parliament. So ``good people'' will not be afraid to run for public office if there is a high level of disclosure and ethics enforcement; bad people will be afraid of that, which is fine.
What should be left behind? We're not saying that members should live in a vacuum. What we're saying is that you can bring your expertise to your office, but leave the ties behind. That means that if you maintain any of the ties, then you don't participate in decision-making processes. That's because you have an interest in what the decision will be.
If your colleagues want your expertise, then they can call you as a witness before the committee. You can give your expertise to your colleagues in caucus before the committee, in public and in private. Have dinner with them, and the expertise can be shared. But if you have a tie and an interest in a decision, then the words ``conflict of interest'' mean that you withdraw from that decision-making process. Any other definition of conflict of interest is simply fudging.
Mr. Epp: I don't want to enlarge or dwell on this too long, but I really do think that we would cut out an awful lot of good people, by even that requirement, because of their success.
I'm thinking of a person who is very knowledgeable in the transportation industry. He's an excellent businessman. He would make an excellent member of Parliament. He's a good manager. He has an excellent ability to analyse what needs to be done, and then how to do it.
This is something that I think is lacking in the government. It seems like we spend months and years discussing, debating, and ``committeeing''. In the end, we write some sort of a namby-pamby report that results in no action.
I'd like to see more people like him as members of Parliament, but I don't think we're going to get them.
Mr. Conacher: Nothing in our recommendations would discourage that person from running. He would just not be able to sit on the committee that would deal with the - -
Mr. Epp: And he wouldn't ever be able to be a cabinet minister, because he would have to divest all his business interests.
Mr. Conacher: In terms of the compensation that cabinet ministers receive, I think most Canadians would consider that to be more than adequate. It would double or triple what most Canadians earn in a year.
Mr. Epp: Okay. I want to use my time to go onto another topic, which is the financing of political campaigns. I'm very happy that in my own campaign I had no large donations at all. I had many hundreds of people give donations of between $20 and $100, which was certainly the best way to go.
One of options you suggested was that instead of individuals financing political campaigns, perhaps it could be done by adding a dollar to an income tax return and using that money to fund these campaigns. The distribution would be based on the number of seats won in the previous election.
Mr. Conacher: And the popular vote.
Mr. Epp: But then how would you ever expect a new party to get started? I'm speaking from recent experience here.
.2050
Mr. Conacher: I'm not saying we agree with that system. It is one possibility that has been proposed. The person who proposed it was also trying to break through in the last election - Mel Hurtig of the National Party. He included a one-time exemption for a new party, which of course would have applied to his party since it received a $4 million donation from one individual. That's possibly how that system could work. If it was enacted, for one election a new party could receive as much as it wanted, but if it didn't succeed in that election, that would be it.
Mr. Epp: Are you aware of any instances where people who donated heavily to a political campaign got political favours or contract favours from the government when their boy got elected? It would probably be wise for you not to give any specific examples, but I would like to have some feel for how many there are. How widespread is this?
Mr. Conacher: We recommend that this sort of information, such as the registry of lobbyists and other information, be put on computer networks, because currently it is very difficult to research campaign finance information. For some reason, Elections Canada does not require the parties to file their lists of donations on computer disks. Instead they ask for hard copies, make copies of those copies, and send them to libraries across the country. You have to essentially flip through hundreds and hundreds of pages to even try to make the case.
There was an investigation of Alcan making a donation to the Conservative Party. The reason it was investigated was because the Conservative Party then exempted Kemano II from review under the federal environmental assessment laws. That's the only case I've heard of, and the investigation was dropped.
So can you make the clear connection? No, but I think we can improve our campaign finance system so parties will be encouraged to connect with citizens more - after all, that's who elects them - and so the principle we uphold on election day of one person, one vote will also apply between elections. Why is it that one day every four or five years everyone in Canada has the same influence over a government - they get one vote each - but between elections we allow people with more money or more access or their own lobbyists to have more influence? That's a fairly low democratic standard, I think, and it should be raised.
Mr. Epp: I'd like to go to topic number three for me. Is that okay?
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Before you ask your question, would you mind very much if the co-chair, Mr. Milliken, asked a couple of his questions and then I'll come back to you?
Mr. Epp: That will be fine.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): I want to discuss some of the points in the answer you gave to the chair in respect of my co-chair, Senator Oliver, about the organization you're representing. You indicated that you had a board of directors. Is Democracy Watch incorporated?
Mr. Conacher: Yes.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Under what law?
Mr. Conacher: The Canada Business Corporations Act.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): As a non-profit corporation?
Mr. Conacher: Yes.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): So you have a board of directors of three. How are they selected?
Mr. Conacher: It's a founding board. We do not have enough members or resources currently to have an election of board members or a nomination process at this point.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Are you not required to have an annual meeting of your members?
Mr. Conacher: Yes, but we have supporters. We don't have members currently.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): So the three directors are the three members.
Mr. Conacher: Exactly.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): So they are perpetually re-electing themselves, in effect.
Mr. Conacher: Well, not perpetually. If we are able to obtain the necessary resources, then we will hold elections.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): But you have to get members before you hold elections.
Mr. Conacher: Exactly, which is why we advocate a box with a a check-off on a tax return. We think there should be a group to represent a much greater percentage of Canadians than any organization in Canada currently does. We will also have the resources through the system, since the funds will cost absolutely nothing to raise. We'll have enormous resources to hold elections and have delegates and a board elected across the country.
.2055
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Are there any employees of the corporation?
Mr. Conacher: No, I'm on contract.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): You're on contract to the corporation full-time?
Mr. Conacher: Yes.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Are you a director?
Mr. Conacher: I am a director, yes.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Who are the other two directors?
Mr. Conacher: Aaron Freeman and Craig Forcese.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Is either of them on contract?
Mr. Conacher: No.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Do you have an office?
Mr. Conacher: Yes.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Where's that?
Mr. Conacher: It is located at 1 Nicholas Street. You will see our address, in full, on our brief.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): I suspect that's true. I've seen it on some of the other documents you mentioned earlier that have been made available to us.
Do you run the office?
Mr. Conacher: Yes, and I try to effectively delegate to myself as well.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): You mean in preparation of these documents and materials. Thank you.
The corporation has been incorporated since 1993?
Mr. Conacher: Yes, 1993.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Are you practising law on the side? You indicated you are a lawyer.
Mr. Conacher: No, I cannot afford it. Many people are in the same situation because of the insurance fees. It's another ethical scandal that is currently being investigated.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): In your response to my co-chair you also mentioned that the principles in the current code of conduct governing public office holders are principles that you think should be enshrined in any code of conduct we come up with.
You didn't appear to draw any connection between those principles and what ought to be the guidelines that govern conduct in terms of specific rules. Is there some reason why you don't think looking at principles first might be important, or do you think it is? If so, in considering your remarks and suggestions tonight, did you have recourse to those principles in formulating the ideas you have for what ought to be disclosed and what ought to be allowed and disallowed?
Mr. Conacher: Do you mean recourse to those principles in the current code?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Yes.
Mr. Conacher: Yes, we've looked quite closely at the current code's principles, mainly in the context of situations such as the Dupuy affair and the trip that was taken to Cuba by members of Parliament. I mention these because in our minds it is at least unclear whether those principles apply to all members of Parliament currently, in any case.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): There isn't any question; they don't. The principles are in the code governing public office holders.
Mr. Conacher: Yes, but public office holder is defined in part II and part III of that code, but is not defined in any way in part I.
As I mentioned, this ongoing issue of the Interpretation Act saying ``public officer'', the Criminal Code saying ``official'' and the code itself saying ``public office holder'' means that the courts have had to struggle; the special joint committee in 1992 struggled, and we think it should be clarified.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): It does say, if I may recite it, in part I:
- The object of this Code is to enhance public confidence in the integrity of public office holders
and the decision-making process in government...
Mr. Conacher: The definition in part II says:
- For the purposes of this Part and the Schedule, ``public office holder'' means
- and then it lists certain people.
.2100
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): I'm not arguing that it shouldn't be clarified. But I don't think it was ever suggested that it applied to all members of Parliament.
Mr. Conacher: Well, it was a bit confusing, I must say, because in Creating Opportunity the government promised that:
- ...we will develop a Code of Conduct for Public Officials to guide Cabinet ministers, members
of Parliament, senators, political staff, and public servants in their dealings with lobbyists.
Mr. Conacher: This committee is developing a code of conduct to guide cabinet ministers?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): No, one for members of Parliament and senators, etc.
Mr. Conacher: That's why I say it was confusing, because in Creating Opportunity it said a code - singular - of conduct for everyone that followed. But now we're going to have more than one code for different people.
Again, we would endorse the approach taken by the 1992 special joint committee, consolidated in a legislative instrument.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Okay, but you haven't answered my question. I asked, if you look at the principles set out there, which you said were the principles you thought were appropriate for members of Parliament, did you in considering your remarks tonight, in your suggestions for guidelines and for dos and don'ts, consider those principles and formulate your guidelines based on those principles?
Mr. Conacher: That's our starting point, yes.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): The principles were your starting point?
Mr. Conacher: Yes, sure.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Oh, so you agree with those completely?
Mr. Conacher: Yes.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): You weren't adding any others to the list?
Mr. Conacher: No, those ten are fine. I think the addition of the principle in June 1994, that public office holders shall consider only the merits of the case in making decisions, was a great addition.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Okay.
Mr. Conacher: So those ten are great, but they're only a start.
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Thank you.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Epp, the last question to you.
Mr. Epp: Actually I have two, but they're quite short.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Okay.
Mr. Epp: The next one has to do with gifts. You indicated that you thought there should be limits to receiving gifts, probably. I wrote down the word ``prohibition'' for gifts, and ``total disclosure''.
How do you propose to monitor and enforce something like that? I'm just an MP from a third-string party, and I find that even in my position I have people say ``Hey, I want to talk to you about something. Can we do lunch?'' These are people in my constituency; I don't usually invite people in as lobbyists. Well, I say ``Fine'', we go over and we do lunch, and then they insist on picking up the tab. Now, I can make a big argument, and sometimes I do, but they say ``No, no, it's covered''.
I had a couple of farmers not long ago in my constituency do that. They wanted to talk to me about dairying and all these different things that are going on now with NAFTA and that type of thing. These guys just accepted that as good hospitality: we asked you over, we want to have lunch with you, bend your ear, get information, and we're picking up the tab. It's just a gentlemanly thing to do. I think that meal probably cost $7 or $8, but they do add up.
Should I keep track of that?
The Joint Chairman (Mr. Milliken): Sure.
Mr. Epp: Do you?
Mr. Conacher: Our prohibition is not accepting a gift with an individual or aggregate value of more than $50 from any one person or entity in a calendar year.
Mr. Epp: But he may likely gain, and if I don't keep track of it, I won't know when I have crossed that threshold.
Mr. Conacher: You do have to keep track of it if a $200 threshold for disclosure is in place. I hope that at the very least, under whatever code is drafted, there's going to be a threshold, and you will have to keep track of it to ensure that whenever you cross that threshold you disclose to the registry.
Mr. Epp: I certainly agree with the principle of it. I just am wondering about the administrative details of it.
Mr. Conacher: Well, I think if you have an independent ethics officer and a whistle-blower provision, and you allow any member of the public to file a complaint with the independent ethics officer, then you have a system of enforcement that will encourage you to self-regulate, because if you don't, you could be facing a complaint from somebody who discovers you have violated a rule.
.2105
Mr. Epp: Again, as a neophyte here, I got quite a quick education. I had no idea MPs were so desirable to have as speakers and so on. I've had a number of occasions - I'm sure the rest of you have too - where you're invited to come and speak and then at the end the guy says ``Here's an envelope for you''. And I took the first one. I thought it would be a nice thank you note, which I would expect. I got home and it had a $100 cheque in it. So I had to send it back. I declined it. I'm just not into that type of thing.
That has happened to me several times since then, but now I ask them what's in the envelope and I just say I will not accept it. But there's that type of thing going on a lot. It's more than just lobbying, because they have very little to gain from me at this stage. Maybe they think I'm going to be a cabinet minister next time, but at this stage I'm not.
Mr. Conacher: Yes, well, just generally our principle is one person, one vote on election day. Why shouldn't all the other rules in between elections maintain that principle?
Mr. Epp: I agree with that.
Mr. Conacher: How do we call ourselves a democracy?
Mr. Epp: But of course at the same time, when an MP has 100,000 constituents, there's no way he or she is going to be able to give them all equal treatment between elections.
Mr. Conacher: No, but at least you won't allow money to be used by a few to get unequal treatment.
Mr. Epp: No, that's true.
My last point for you has to do with sanctions. Obviously a law or a set of guidelines is not useful unless there is some consequence when it is violated. You didn't really mention anything about sanctions or steps to be taken if members of Parliament or senators break the rules laid out in this code of conduct. Have you contemplated that at all? What are your ideas on it?
Mr. Conacher: Again, we agree with what the special joint committee states in terms of sanctions, and we agree generally with the report.
Mr. Epp: Are you talking about the 1992 report?
Mr. Conacher: Yes. In our brief, where we don't specifically set out a variation from the 1992 report, it means we endorse the 1992 report.
The important part of sanctions is that again there's an independent ethics officer who can investigate, hold an inquiry and recommend the sanction to Parliament. The sanctions that were listed in the 1992 report are: a reprimand; restitution or paying compensation; a suspension from the House, with or without pay, for a specific period; or that the member's seat be declared vacant or the member be disqualified from holding a seat in the Senate.
Those four levels seem to me to be adequate to allow for many different combinations and variations in penalties. We endorse those.
Mr. Epp: Okay, good. Thank you.
In conclusion, I'd like to tell you that I certainly agree in principle with most of the things you've said. I'm just looking at it from the practical point of view of how we implement, monitor and make sure people are abiding by these things. In particular, I don't know who thought of it first, you or me, but your idea of the independence of the ethics counsellor is of paramount importance.
Mr. Conacher: Well, Paul Martin didn't think of it first. It was recommended in Bill C-43. He endorsed it as an opposition member and now he is a federal cabinet minister but seems to tolerate the fact that there is not an independent ethics counsellor. That promise was very clear in Creating Opportunity and it should be kept.
Mr. Epp: The only partisan job I'll give is that this government has steadfastly withstood all of our pleas for the independence of the ethics counsellor, but we'll keep pushing.
Mr. Conacher: Well, if it's good enough for lobbyists, then it's good enough for members of Parliament.
Mrs. Catterall: Mr. Milliken was asking about your membership and so on. It appears you have a group of supporters but in fact a very limited membership, who are also the executive. Did I understand that correctly?
Mr. Conacher: That's right.
Mrs. Catterall: How many women do you have among your members or your supporters?
.2110
Mr. Conacher: Among our members, none. We have two on our advisory committee - Marilou McPhedran and Lyse Blanchard, who is most recently the executive director of CUSO - and amongst our members, I actually haven't done a breakdown by gender.
Mrs. Catterall: Okay. I just wanted to know what makes you think that I, or any member of Parliament, would pay more attention to somebody who took up two hours of my time insisting on meeting at lunch than to somebody I met in my office or in their living-room for an hour.
Mr. Conacher: I don't think anything I've said tonight states that we believe that.
Mrs. Catterall: Then why do you want to know who takes me to lunch as opposed to who I have an appointment with?
Mr. Conacher: What we want is the use of money removed.
Mrs. Catterall: You're suggesting that the fact that somebody happens to buy lunch for me, because that's a convenient time for them to meet, somehow influences my opinions more than the hour I spend with a constituent in my office or in their home?
Mr. Conacher: No. Our gift-giving prohibition is not just for going to lunch. It's for those who can afford to give you a $1,000 gift being prohibited from doing so.
Mrs. Catterall: No, you said $50.
Mr. Conacher: Yes. There would be a prohibition on receiving any gift of greater value than $50 from any one person in a calendar year.
Mrs. Catterall: But you're suggesting that because I meet with somebody at lunch, I'm more influenced by their opinion than if I meet with them at another time?
Mr. Conacher: No. I'm suggesting that somebody who might buy lunch for you once a week for a year would have more influence than somebody who can only afford to take you out for lunch once.
Mrs. Catterall: Or than somebody I can meet with once a week for a year? Are you suggesting there's a difference in quality? I mean, frankly, that the most valuable thing I have is my time.
Mr. Conacher: There is a difference in quality. It may not be for you, and I'm happy to hear that. But if a member makes it directly or indirectly clear that they appreciate very much being taken out for lunch once a week, and that the person taking them out for lunch, if they pay consistently, will continue to get that access, that's the situation we're trying to prevent.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Ms Catterall, can I ask a supplementary to your question?
Mrs. Catterall: Yes, because to me this again goes back to my earlier question. Does this gentleman really understand how a member of Parliament's days and weeks operate? Frankly, the most precious commodity I have is time, not money in my wallet.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Conacher, let us say Ms Catterall was out seeing constituents and she knocked on a door around suppertime. And they say they are anxious to talk to her about a number of issues of public policy, so please come in, and they are just sitting down to dinner and ask her to have dinner with them. She has dinner with them, and they serve steak. Under your proposal, would she have to somehow have that costed and include that in the $50 limit?
Mr. Conacher: Yes.
Mrs. Catterall: And you really believe that influences my opinion, the fact that I happen to be at their home at dinnertime rather than at another time?
Mr. Conacher: No, not if it only happens once. What we're trying to prevent is those with money to spend having more influence than those without money to spend.
Mrs. Catterall: What makes you think they have more influence? That's what I'm trying to understand.
Mr. Conacher: There is certainly the possibility, a much greater possibility, that if somebody can spend $10,000 on you in a year they would have more influence than somebody who can only spend $25 on you.
Mrs. Catterall: Would that be true of you? Would somebody be able to bribe your opinion?
Mr. Conacher: I'm not saying this is particular to any one member, but rules are meant to prevent situations where undue -
Mrs. Catterall: But it is based on an assumption that I'm challenging, I guess, and I'm not sure where that assumption comes from....
Mr. Conacher: It's not my assumption.
Ekos Research surveyed 2,400 Canadians in February and November 1994: 69% of Canadians feel that the ethical standards of the federal government have slipped badly in the past decade; 44% of Canadians have lost all confidence in our current system of government; 33% of Canadians would be proud if their child grew up to be a politician; 59% of Canadians disagree with the statement that Canadian politicians are held up to an unrealistically high standard that is almost impossible to meet.
.2115
Mrs. Catterall: None of this goes to the points you have made, though.
Mr. Conacher: As to financial gain, 77% of Canadians agreed with the statement that too many people who seek public office do so for financial gain.
I'm not sitting here saying I represent Canadians, but this is a poll of 2,400 Canadians, sponsored by the government. If you're not going to listen to a government poll and you don't want to listen to me because you feel I'm not representative of Canadians, then I urge you to do two things. One, urge the finance minister to include a box on the next tax return so that a broad-based, democratically structured representative group can be organized to monitor ethics in government spending. Two, commission a poll in your own riding to determine whether your constituents feel as Ekos Research found most Canadians feel.
Mrs. Catterall: I'm not questioning that the poll is accurate, but frankly I meet with dozens of constituents every week, I meet with thousands in a year, so I think I pretty well know what my constituents think. But I'm questioning the effectiveness of the remedies you are proposing.
Mr. Conacher: That's always subject to debate. I guess we favour a clear prohibition, but as you will see in our brief, if you disagree with this, at least lower the disclosure level and put the prohibition in place for lobbyists, who are most likely to use money for influence. Also, ensure that the registry of gifts is made available to the public on computer networks and on computer disks in public libraries across the country.
Mrs. Catterall: In other words, make this available to people who can afford to access it in that way?
Mr. Conacher: No, I also said to have it in public libraries across the country. Usually at public libraries the services, except for photocopying, are free. This is why we recommend that public libraries across the country should be the depository for this information, as has been recommended by the Lobbyists Registration Branch with regard to the lobbyist registry. They have a draft regulation on this issue.
The Joint Chairman (Senator Oliver): Mr. Conacher, on behalf of the committee, I'd like to thank you very much. You've certainly challenged the committee, and we will give serious consideration to your brief when it's circulated and we have a chance to read it.
I'd like to remind the committee that the next meeting is Wednesday, October 18, at 4:30 p.m., in this room. I'd also like to remind the committee that next Monday the meeting will start at 3:30 p.m. and not at 7:30 p.m. A notice to that effect will go out to everyone.
Thanks very much. The meeting is adjourned.