[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Wednesday, October 23, 1996
[English]
The Chair: We'll come to order, and again we're dealing with Bill C-41.
From the Barreau du Québec we have Maître Miriam Grassby, Maître Dominique Goubeau, and Maître Suzanne Vadeboncoeur.
Let me say that you're welcome and that we were very grateful to the Barreau du Québec for hosting us at a reception when we were in Montreal a few weeks ago and for participating in the Young Offenders Act legislation. We're glad to have you here today as well.
I know you have a brief and we will be happy to hear from you, and then we will have questions.
[Translation]
Ms Suzanne Vadeboncoeur (Secretary, Standing Committee on Family Law, Director, Research and Legislation, Quebec Bar): Good morning, Madam Chair, honourable members. First of all, I would like to thank the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs for giving the Quebec Bar the opportunity to express its views on Bill C-41 and the guidelines released by the Justice Department last June.
We weren't expecting to appear before the committee until November. Since the dates of the presentations were moved up, we hastily examined the bill last Monday and this is why, unfortunately, we do not have a written submission for you. We appreciate the fact that committee members are allowing us to make an oral presentation. We will be happy to submit a written brief in the days or weeks to come.
I would also like to point out to you at this time that Ms Grassby, the chair of the Quebec Bar Standing Committee on Family Law, is also here to answer some of the more practical questions. I am the Director of Legislation for the Quebec Bar and I have not actually practice law for several years. Ms Dominique Goubeau, a law professor at Laval University, has written several works on family law; it is a field with which she is very familiar. We wanted to have someone with us who practises family law should any questions about this area arise.
Having dispensed with these preliminary remarks, before I get to the crux of the matter, let me just say that Bill C-41 and the child support payment scales came about as a result of the realization in the 1980s that child support payments across Canada were clearly inadequate on the one hand and very unequal and therefore totally unpredictable on the other hand.
This initiative represents an attempt to establish a consistent national standard of child support across the country and to make payments somewhat more predictable. Support payments have since increased, at least in Quebec. Perhaps this initiative has nudged the courts into increasing the amount of support payments. This being said, the Bar feels it is important that the scales or tables included in the revised legislation are not viewed as a ceiling, but rather as a minimum level for child support payments.
The interests of the child must remain the court's priority and the support payments eventually established in light of these tables should continue to be viewed as minimum amounts.
As I stated earlier, the legislation seeks to strike a balance between consistency and predictability with respect to child support and to ensure enough flexibility so that support takes into account the special circumstances of regions and of families across the country.
The department has drafted a number of consultation papers in the past five or more years and the Quebec Bar has been consulted at each stage of the process. These papers are a reflection of the improvements that have been made to legislative initiatives over the years. A certain balance has been achieved between predictability and consistency and the exercise of judicial discretion allowing for a certain amount of flexibility.
However, we feel the guidelines, which serve as a blueprint for implementing Bill C-41, create certain loopholes or certain opportunities to circumvent the enforcement of the payment scales.
On reading the section in the guidelines on undue hardship, we note that unfortunately, the loopholes are too often available to the parent who pays support, to the detriment of the custodial parent and the child. We will get back to this later, but perhaps it would be a good idea to balance out the rights of the two parties a little more, so that it is clear the guidelines apply and the loopholes are available equally to either party.
Our comments will relate to both the content and the form of Bill C-41. We will begin with some observations as to the substance of the bill.
First of all, subsections 15.1(5) and 17(6.2), newly included by clause 2 and subclause 5(2) of the bill, constitute, in our view, provide a means of circumventing the enforcement of the application of the guidelines. The scope of the guidelines is, therefore, greatly diluted.
These provisions, which extend far too much discretion to the courts, represent, in our opinion, a lifeline which support payers will grab hold of in order to circumvent the enforcement of the payments scale.
Providing support payers with a golden opportunity like this runs counter to the spirit behind the reform. We are convinced that it will lead to serious, lengthy discussions between the parties and this too is inconsistent with one of the objectives set out in the guidelines.
For example, we have as you know in Quebec special legislation respecting the division of family property in the event of marriage breakdown. In cases where the division favoured the custodial parent, the discussions will be reopened in several years' time on the grounds that the amount awarded over and above half of the value of the family property will have benefited the children either directly or indirectly.
Similarly, when the guidelines and Bill C-41 take effect, payers will be tempted to try and have their payments lowered, arguing that the support order issued several years earlier was unfair to them or gave a direct or indirect advantage to the children. The courts could be flooded with applications of this nature.
In the opinion of the Bar, non-custodial parents would still be at liberty to plead undue hardship in an effort to have their child support payments lowered.
Consequently, in the interests of justice and the sound administration of justice, to avoid a major bottleneck in the courts on May 1 and 2, 1997, the Bar recommends that subsections 15.1(5) and 17(6.2) of the Divorce Act, newly added by clause 2 and subclause 5(2), be stricken from the bill.
However, if the legislator were to decide to maintain these provisions, orders issued under the previous legislation should, at the very least, be excluded from the application of these subsections.
As for section 15.3, a provision of great importance which has been added to the Divorce Act by clause 2, it gives children priority in the awarding of support.
Section 15.3(2) rightly stipulates that any subsequent reduction or termination of child support constitutes a change of circumstances for the purposes of an application for a variation order in respect of the spousal support order.
The Bar fully supports this position. However, it feels that this situation, namely the reduction or termination of child support, should also constitute a change of circumstances for the custodial parent in respect of whom no spousal support order was issued by the court, because the court awarded priority to the child and because of the limited financial resources of the parent paying support.
Therefore, the hypothetical situation of the total absence of an initial spousal support order should also be covered by subsection 15.3(2) and be viewed as constituting a change of circumstances for the parties resulting in a spousal support order.
Unless section 17 of the guidelines... I apologize for skipping ahead to the guidelines but they are what lawyers will be contending with every day in court. The Divorce Act refers to guidelines which essentially are regulations which will be used to enforce the new reform. We cannot review the legislation without turning our attention to the guidelines.
Therefore, unless section 17 of the guidelines is expanded, subsection 17(4) of the Divorce Act will be far less inclusive than subsection (4.1) which has to do with the spousal support order, since it makes no reference to resources or to the interpretation of the courts, limiting itself instead to income as defined in the guidelines and, in certain cases, to the possible imputing of income, as covered in the guidelines.
For example, paragraph (e) of section 17 of the guidelines reads as follows:
- e) the spouse's assets are not reasonably utilized to generate income;
- Under the circumstances, the court could impute income in cases where the spouse's assets are
not reasonably utilized to generate income.
It is simply not enough, in our opinion, that these assets are taken into account when one of the parties pleads undue hardship. For this reason, the Bar proposes that the application of section 17 of the guidelines be expanded so that there is not too great a difference between the application of spousal support and the application of child support. We will get back to this point when we discuss the guidelines.
Section 25.1 of the Divorce Act provides for an administrative review of child support orders. Paragraph (b) raises a number of concerns.
The Bar is of the opinion that it is not the role of an administrative agency or of an official, even if the decision can be reviewed and amended by a judge pursuant to subsection 4, to review a judicial decision or to assess the validity of applications for increased support or applications for reduced payment on the grounds of undue hardship. We believe that this kind of discretion should only be exercised by the courts, that is by an arbitrator acting independently of the executive branch of government.
Our concern stems from the fact that this new provision, namely section 25.1, is still in the developmental stage. Will there be a hearing? Will the parties be able to make recommendations before a new amount is established? Can the parties depend on a minimum number of procedural guarantees? We don't have the answers to these questions.
For several years now, support payments in Quebec have been indexed annually. Therefore, unless the administrative review process is further clarified and the concerns raised addressed, the Bar recommends that this mechanism not be used under the circumstances so as not to compromise the rights of those under the court's jurisdiction.
This concludes my comments on the substance of Bill C-41. We referred earlier to transition measures and to the fact that these should be excluded from the application of subsections 15.1(5) and 17(6.2). Therefore, I will say nothing further about this point.
As for the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, I have only one comment to make. The problem I wish to address is not new, but since we are looking at this legislation, perhaps it might be a good idea to try and iron it out.
The new section 79 of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act reproduces the existing section 62, albeit with the addition of paragraph (c), which refers to the administration of the new Part III of the act.
The problem, which I repeat is not new, stems from the broad wording of paragraph (a) which, unlike paragraphs(b) and (c), which establish a necessary link between the information sought and parts II or III of the act, authorizes the release of all information contained in the information bank referred to in section 16. Pursuant to a new amendment, the information banks controlled by the Department of National Revenue have been added to existing information banks.
At first glance, we find it somewhat excessive to allow the information contained in the banks mentioned in section 16 to be searched. We feel that information that could be searched should be further contained and used solely for the stated purpose of the legislation, that is to find the support debtor and ensure the execution of the support orders.
I would now like to comment on the form of Bill C-41. First of all, we wonder why, in subsections 15.1(4) and 19(10) of the Divorce Act, the word ``appropriées'' was replaced by the word ``indiquées''. The word ``indiquées'' raises some questions such as ``indiquées par qui?''. I think it would be wiser to keep the word ``appropriées'' in the French version.
As for subsection 15.1(5), we recommended earlier that it be stricken from the bill. However, should the legislator decide to keep it in the legislation, we wish to bring to your attention a difference that we have noted between the French and English versions.
In the English version, paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 15.1(5) appear to be cumulative conditions, because of the presence of the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (a). In the French version, the word ``et'' does not appear at the end of paragraph a), which tends to indicate that in the French version, these are two alternate, not cumulative conditions. There is a real problem with consistency between the English and French versions. We feel that the English version is the preferable one. Therefore, the word ``et'' should be added at the end of section 15.1(5)(a) of the French version.
Furthermore, because of the addition of special provisions respecting child support orders, the numbering of the subsections in section 15.2 was amended, so that the current subsections (5), (6) and (7) of section 15 now become subsections (4), (5) and (6) of the new section 15.2. This could result in some errors and confusion when attorneys cite these provisions or when judges refer to them in their rulings. Maintaining the same numbering of the subsections would eliminate this stumbling block.
I have one final comment about the form of the bill, although I would image that everyone is aware of what I am about to say. As of May 30, 1996, the date on which Bill C-41 was tabled in the House of Commons, section 15 of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act was amended by the Act to establish the Department of Human Resources Development and to amend or repeal certain other acts, chapter 11, 1996 statutes. This amendment came into effect on July 12 last by Order 1996-1140. This fact should be taken into account when the final version of the bill is drafted and the wording of section 15 should be amended accordingly.
I don't know how much time I have left, but I would like to add something further. Although your mandate is not to specifically examine the guidelines, I think the Quebec Bar has a duty to make some observations about them.
While the Bar favours the idea of setting out the objectives in the guidelines, it does have some reservations about how realistic these objectives are. Some of the amendments to the Divorce Act as a result of Bill C-41, in particular the subsections which I spoke of earlier, namely 15.1(5) and 17(6.2), will tend to increase, not reduce, tensions between the spouses or former spouses.
Moreover, given the nature of the examples presented in the section on undue hardship, there seems to be some reluctance to give custodial parents a great deal of latitude when the proposed support amount appears inadequate. Therefore, the first stated objective might be difficult to achieve.
With respect to the application of the guidelines as set out in subsection 2(3), the Bar agrees with the provision as described, bearing in mind the concerns it raised earlier with respect to section 25.1 of the Divorce Act, which calls for an administrative review by an agency or official further to an agreement reached between the federal government and the provinces.
Regarding section 4 of the guidelines which pertains to special or extraordinary expenses, we think that far too much latitude has been awarded to the court in the first subsection. In the opinion of the Bar, once the court takes into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the best interest of the child and the reasonableness of the expense having regard to the means of the spouses, it must add to the amount of the order an amount deemed appropriate for these expenses.
The use of the word ``special'' to qualify expenses associated with child care costs seems questionable, because while these expenses vary from one family to another, all families having at least one child in fact incur expenses of this nature. Perhaps a more appropriate term should be found.
Furthermore, we have a number of problems with the word ``extraordinary'' in view of its subjective nature. The subjectiveness arises from the standard of living of the family, from the perception of the judge hearing the case and from his own experience and values.
In our opinion, the establishment of a minimum amount, 200 $ per year per child for example, would be clearer, more objective and more consistent with the objectives of the guidelines, namely to reduce conflict and tension between spouses. A minimum amount could also be established in the case of paragraphs (b) and (c) which relate to medical or health related expenses, expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any educational programs that meet the child's particular needs. Provision for such expenses was made in the consultation paper released by the department in November 1995.
With respect to paragraph (e) which pertains to extraordinary expenses for extra-curricular activities, not only do we have a problem with the word ``extraordinary'', as we stated earlier, but a further problem arises, namely the far more restrictive meaning of the word ``parascolaire'', in French, compared to its English equivalent ``extra-curricular''. In French, the word means that the activities must be associated with the school or organized by the school. The Bar prefers by far the much broader meaning of the English word ``extra-curricular''.
Concerning these extra-curricular activities, the Bar feels that the word ``extraordinary'' should be replaced by a description. We are not necessarily talking about setting a $200 ceiling per year per child, something which would be difficult to enforce. In so far as expenses for extra-curricular activities are concerned, we believe that these should be such expenses associated with educational, cultural or sporting activities which help children develop a skill or interest.
Finally, we feel it is vitally important that summer camps be included in this last category in paragraph (e), something which is not obvious at first glance. Moreover, this specific example, namely summer camps, was included in the guidelines drafted in November 1995. There is no mention of summer camps in the new guidelines.
With respect to section 5 which deals with undue hardship, we feel that subsection 5 is unequivocal when it comes to the possibility of either increasing or reducing the amount of support. Thus, either the payer or the custodial parent can plead undue hardship in his case or in the case of the child. It is important that the child be considered.
The examples given in subsection 2 are not as obvious. As I stated in my introduction, they seem to favour the support payer and a lowering of the amount of support. Perhaps these examples should be adjusted accordingly, with the addition in paragraph(b), as a circumstance leading to undue hardship, a situation in which charges could be incurred as a result of the failure to exercise visitation rights. Provision was made for this in the November 1995 guidelines and unfortunately, there is no mention of this in the new draft.
As for the examples given in the guidelines, it should also be pointed out that undue hardship can be experienced not only by either one of the spouses, but by the child as well. It might be a good idea to include examples that reflect this reality or hypothetical situation.
For instance, the application of the guidelines may not meet the needs of children. Major disparities could also exist between the standards of living of the two families once the guidelines have been applied. Situations such as these were covered in the 1995 document.
One might argue that basically, this is nothing more than a veiled attempt to secure support for the custodial parent. Historically, especially in Quebec, the courts have awarded, when differences in standards of living exist, additional money not to the custodial parent, but to the children. A number of legal decisions confirm this.
With respect to the application of subsection (5) concerning undue hardship, the Bar believes it is important that the court set a time limit for repayment of the debts, otherwise the situation of indebtedness could drag on indefinitely, thus preventing the awarding of a just and appropriate support. Thus, the words ``may establish'', should be replaced by ``shall establish''. The court should be required to establish a period of time for the repayment of the debts.
With regard to section 6 concerning split custody, the French text leaves one with the impression that there must be two applications for a support order, one from each parent who has custody of a child. However, the English version says something different. It states that compensation is awarded as if there were two support orders. I think that the French version should be clear and consistent with the English version and not absolutely require the existence of two support orders.
Often in the case of shared custody, the parties believe that no support should be paid because the children spend equal amounts of time with each parent. Some feel that expenses are more or less the same for each party and that there is no need to pay support.
As you know, support payments are determined on the basis of need and ability to pay. In cases where there is an income disparity between spouses, we believe that one spouse should continue to pay support. The problem with this is that parent who is owed support and who cannot afford to go to court to seek redress will simply not take any action. Therefore, in our opinion, it is important to apply the same rules in both shared and split custody cases. In each instance, you calculate the support payment that would normally be established according to the tables and you order the amount paid. It's exactly the same thing in the case of split custody. What this would mean is that in all deserving cases, support would be paid to the parent who is not as well-off financially.
Sections 10 and 12 pertain to arrangements between spouses. Regarding the initial support order and the variation order, the Bar suggests that the court should have the useful and relevant financial information in hand in order to truly assess the reasonableness of these arrangements. It should have in its possession a statement of income as well as a summary description of each spouse's assets and liabilities. There is no provision for this in the current guidelines.
Regarding section 14 pertaining to the determination of income and adjustments, the Bar is of the opinion that a paragraph (g) should be added so that expenses incurred to earn this income are deducted from the income, except where these expenses provided an advantage or personal benefit. The classic example is the automobile which provides a tax deduction, but which personally benefits the person claiming the deduction and his family. The income should then be recalculated and no deduction should be allowed for the portion of the expenses incurred for personal benefit.
Pursuant to section 17 respecting the imputing of income, the court may impute income to the spouse as it deems appropriate in the circumstances, which it goes on to list. I stated earlier that the circumstances listed in this section seem to imply that the spouse in question has behaved rather badly or has acted in bad faith. Perhaps these should not be the only circumstances listed. Mention should also be made in this section of the possibility of imputing income in cases where the standard of living of the spouse is inconsistent with his reported financial situation.
Moreover, since the taxation system applicable to the spouse's income is extremely important in establishing payment scales, it might be appropriate to consider the circumstances when all or most of the spouse's income is comprised of dividends or capital gains which are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income. Therefore, a second provision should address circumstances where the spouse receives a significant portion of his income in the form of dividends or capital gains.
With respect to the obligation on the part of the applicant as well as the recipient of the support order to supply documents providing financial information, we feel that in order to help the court properly assess the situation of the spouses, section 19 of the guidelines should also require parties to submit a full report on their assets in order for the court to have an overall picture of their financial situation.
In cases of failure to comply as set out in sections 20 to 22 of the guidelines, it is our understanding that the sanctions provided, which are quite interesting by the way, will apply notwithstanding the existence of provincial rules on the disclosure of information.
Regarding this matter, subsection 19(5) of the guidelines stipulates the following:
- (5) Nothing in this section precludes the making of rules by a competent authority, within the
meaning of section 25 of the Act, respecting the disclosure of information that is considered
necessary for the purposes of the determination of an application for a child support order or a
variation order in respect of a child support order.
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We want assurances that the application of provincial rules will not preclude the application of sanctions associated with the failure to disclose information.
I think it is important to point out one final minor difference between the English and French versions of the guidelines. Pursuant to paragraph 22(d) and subsection 23 (4), the court may award costs in favour of the other spouse up to an amount that fully compensates the other spouse for all costs and disbursements incurred in the proceedings.
In French, the word ``coûts'' encompasses just about everything that could be considered in the way of disbursements and extra judicial fees. The fees and expenses relate more to what is known in legal jargon as bills of costs, that is law stamps, expert costs, service costs and so forth. In other words, in the French version, this sanction targets all disbursements and all professional fees, that is all expenses associated with the proceedings.
The English version of the guidelines, on the other hand, refers only to ``costs and disbursements'', which are much more limited. What exactly does this refer to? To costs and disbursements only, or to all fees?
The Bar would be happy to see the English version expanded to include fees, as is the case in the French version, given that this provision imposes a penalty for failure on the debtor's part to comply with the legislation.
In conclusion, I would once again like to thank you and to stress one point. As you most likely know already, the Quebec government is currently in the process of drafting its own guidelines. We appeared before a parliamentary commission in Quebec last August to discuss this matter. I must admit that the federal system seems to be based solely on the payer's income. I say that this appears to be the case because I know that the income of the custodial parent is also taken into account in the calculations and in the model. However, judging from the tables and in the opinion of those who have not done a thorough examination of the model, the federal system appears to be based solely on the payer's income, whereas the Quebec system - I don't know if other provinces have similarly systems - would clearly be based on a contribution from both parents, based on each spouse's income.
In order to sell the system - pardon the expression - , the Government of Canada will have to undertake a very serious and effective information campaign to wipe out the impression that those subject to the jurisdiction of Quebec's courts may have that the federal system is perhaps ``unfair'' compared to the Quebec system. I hasten to add that this is not the case, but in light of what I have told you, this impression might continue to prevail. Therefore, the public information campaigns must be very effective.
Thank you again. We are now ready to answer your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Mr. Ramsay, you have 10 minutes.
Mr. Ramsay (Crowfoot): Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'd like to thank our witnesses. I won't be very long. I have about three or four questions I'd like to ask.
First of all, were you consulted on this bill? Did you have input into this bill?
[Translation]
Ms Vadeboncoeur: May I answer the question in French?
[English]
The Chair: Use whichever language you're comfortable with.
[Translation]
Ms Vadeboncoeur: The Quebec Bar has been consulted throughout the process, that is from the very beginning in 1990. It has commented on each phase of the process of drawing up these guidelines, but not really on the bill itself which amends the Divorce Act, because as we stated earlier, the guidelines will provide the legal framework to which the lawyers will be primarily referring in court. Therefore, to answer your question specifically, we were not really consulted on the bill as such, but we were consulted throughout the process of drafting the guidelines.
[English]
Mr. Ramsay: Thank you.
Would you support this bill unamended?
[Translation]
Ms Vadeboncoeur: Some of the provisions in the bill which I referred to earlier could threaten certain rights of people under the jurisdiction of the court. I am referring to the rather questionable administrative review and to sections 15 and 17 which could lead to a debate being re-opened. Basically, it's not so much Bill C-41 that is important as it is the guidelines. Of course, we would prefer it if the bill were amended as we have suggested.
[English]
Mr. Ramsay: If those amendments aren't forthcoming, how would you feel about this bill?
[Translation]
Ms Vadeboncoeur: I believe I have already answered that question sir.
[English]
Mr. Ramsay: Okay.
Do you believe this bill will reduce the number of delinquent parents under court order to make child support payments?
[Translation]
Ms Vadeboncoeur: Again, it's not so much the bill itself, but the guidelines that are important. Enforcing the guidelines will help considerably to reduce the number of delinquent parents. Perhaps my colleague, who is in court all week long and who confronts delinquent payers, could say something further in answer to your question.
[English]
Ms Miriam Grassby (President, Barreau du Québec): The fact that we're going to have much more consistent guidelines and payer spouses who believe they're being treated equitably across the board certainly will affect their view of paying child support.
Whereas before someone could say they were paying $500 and someone else at the same income level was paying $100, you'll have a system that will be much better understood and will be seen as much more equitable and certainly very child-oriented. In that respect, I think it will help payment.
In addition, there are all the additional questions of execution, which will be very favourable in convincing someone to pay rather than not to pay.
Mr. Ramsay: So you feel the fairness that is contained within this document will help the overall picture in terms of parents responding to court orders to pay child support. Is that what I gather from your answer?
Ms Grassby: Yes.
Mr. Ramsay: Okay.
There are enforcement provisions within the bill. How do you feel about those, in particular the suspension of drivers' licences, passports and those kinds of things? Do you feel this will aid and abet the payment by parents under court order?
[Translation]
Ms Dominique Goubeau (Member of the Standing Committee on Family Law of the Quebec Bar, Professor, Law Faculty, Laval University): Essentially, the Bar sees this as an added extra to the existing system. In Quebec, a new law respecting support orders has recently been adopted. This legislation has teeth and it is now administered by the Department of Revenue rather than by the Department of Justice. We believe the amendments which provide for licence suspensions are welcomed additions.
[English]
Mr. Ramsay: Thank you very much. I'll look forward to your written submission.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Thank you.
Perhaps I can assist you. It would be tough for me to do it off the top of my head verbatim, but some of the amendments you have proposed in fact are now being considered by government members. That's just to give you some measure of comfort.
Mr. Maloney.
Mr. Maloney (Erie): Getting back to the reinforcement provisions, is there anything else you think would be useful in attempting to get at absconding payers of support? Is there anything else we've missed that we could perhaps practically utilize?
Ms Grassby: I have a favourite one, but I don't think I would mention it here.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Maloney: We've heard everything. You probably won't surprise us.
The Chair: You won't believe the stuff we've heard.
Ms Grassby: It has to do with golf.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Ms Grassby: I won't mention it.
Ms Vadeboncoeur: Speak for yourself. Go ahead.
Ms Grassby: No, I'm not mentioning it. There are too many golfers, perhaps, in this room. We're talking about memberships.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
[Translation]
Ms Vadeboncoeur: Given the brief amount of time available, the Bar did not stop to consider other scenarios. I think the ones that have been suggested to us are satisfactory. If others are suggested, we will look at them, but I think that at this stage of the process, we have nothing further to add as far as these sanctions are concerned.
The Chair: Mr. DeVillers.
Mr. DeVillers (Simcoe-North): First of all, I would like to thank the witnesses. It is obvious that you have done a thorough job and we thank you. Is this bill saleable?
Ms Vadeboncoeur: Yes, it is. Of course, in Quebec, the vast majority of support orders will be subject to provincial guidelines and to provincial government tables, but nevertheless... I have no idea of the exact number, but each time the payer spouse leaves the province, and this will happen fairly frequently in border regions, the federal guidelines will apply.
I'm thinking here about the Ottawa-Hull region or about the Gaspé region where many people can move to New Brunswick. I'm also thinking about the regions along the U.S. border. This situation could occur quite frequently. When the bar proceeds to train its lawyers and members, it will certainly have to inform them about the two systems. I think that lawyers can understand the difference between the two systems, even if it may not be obvious that the income of the custodial parent is being taken into account.
If this is not obvious to the lawyers, you can imagine that it is even less obvious to the people under the court's jurisdiction, particularly to those who will be ordered to pay support. They will look at the tables and say: They are only taking my income into account; what about my spouse's income?'' The provisions will have to be explained to them... But yes, the bill is saleable.
Ms Goubeau: I believe your concern is justified. We met with Minister Allan Rock in Quebec City - I come from Quebec City - and we assembled for this occasion some forty lawyers who specialize in family law. Everyone in attendance proceeded to read the bill - not Bill C-41, but the guidelines, the most important document - and many of those present failed to grasp the philosophy behind the system.
Imagine then how the person under the jurisdiction of the court feels. Lawyers specializing in family law, even after reading through the bill, failed to understand that fundamentally, it is based on the assumption, one that is challenged at times, that the woman who, in the majority of cases, has custody of the children, will use this income appropriately for the child. Some payer spouses challenge this assumption and this can lead to problems. Therefore, it will not be easy to sell this idea to people who are not knowledgeable about these matters.
Mr. DeVillers: There is still work to be done.
Ms Goubeau: Yes.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Ramsay, did you have any other questions?
Mr. Ramsay: No, that's fine.
The Chair: Are there any other questions?
Thank you so much for your assistance. We're going to clause-by-clause tomorrow night, so that's when the amendments will be discussed. If you're interested, I'm sure the clerk could talk to you about it if you wanted to see just briefly what we have. We've turned them in to the clerk now.
Thank you very much again.
Madame Grassby, I understand we're going to see you tomorrow with the Canadian Bar Association in any event.
Ms Grassby: Yes.
The Chair: We'll look forward to that.
Thank you very much.
Ms Grassby: Thank you.
The Chair: We are adjourned until 9:30 tomorrow morning.