:
Good afternoon, colleagues.
I would like to welcome the witnesses, as well as Ms. Lewis, who is replacing Mr. Kram today.
I've just been informed that the sound checks have been done. It's all good. So we're ready to begin.
In the first hour of the meeting, we have three witnesses. As individuals, we have Hugues Chenet, associate professor at the IESEG School of Management, and Bryce C. Tingle, K.C., N. Murray Edwards chair in business law at the University of Calgary Faculty of Law. From Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, we have Rosemary McGuire, vice-president.
Each of the witnesses will have five minutes for their presentation. Afterwards, we will proceed with the question and answer period.
We'll start with Professor Chenet.
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, by way of introduction, I would first like to say a few words about the journey that led me to make this presentation today.
First of all, my background is in geoscience. I started out as a geophysicist, but I became a financial consultant after that, just before the 2007 financial crisis. I began wearing two hats, one with a quantitative aspect, since it involves market risk modelling, and the other relating to environmental or climate risks in finance. At the time, those risks were not taken into account, but we'll come back to that.
In 2012, I co-founded a finance and climate think tank, which has had some influence on regulatory mechanisms in France and then in Europe, particularly in the lead-up to COP21.
Finally, for the past eight years or so, I've been completely focused on the academic side of things. I'm a transdisciplinary researcher in management science, economics, finance, a bit of accounting, as well as geoscience and environmental sciences.
I want to start with a positive to frame some of the things I want to talk about with you today. In terms of climate issues and, more recently, biodiversity, finance has more broadly made a lot of progress, because it started from a very long way away, which is a little less positive. I think it's worth revisiting that a bit.
When I started working in finance some 15 years ago, the major financing and investment banks, particularly those that were a little further ahead on environmental issues, were very proud to communicate their response to global warming. One of the biggest things they did was change the light bulbs in their offices. It's a bit disappointing when you get into the financial sector and find that out. In the end, there was virtually no connection between their vocation or their real mission, which is to finance the economy and industry, and climate. So not much was happening and very little was being shared.
What about fossil fuels and renewable energy? There was no comment. Basically, the big answer to the questions we could ask them at the time was that they were just bankers or investors and that people should look to their clients instead. So they had no real sense of responsibility for activities that may have an impact on climate change.
Today, obviously, that has changed a lot. You know the situation as well as I do; we can come back to it. In spite of everything, it's been a resounding success. They have made a lot of progress, but perhaps we need to qualify this positive point. If we look at the economy in its current state and the progress made on climate and the emissions trajectory, we can see that finance—if you'll pardon the expression—is not delivering the goods. We don't have what we should expect to have, which is portfolios that are decarbonizing. Portfolios fund the real economy—at least they're supposed to—but the real economy is still just as carbon intensive. We're still emitting as much carbon and greenhouse gases from year to year. Yes, we've stopped emissions from increasing, but we're still emitting and we've yet to hit the peak.
In short, finance hasn't been able to do this on its own. That may be the problem, meaning that it may not be up to finance to do the work. That could be worth discussing. It's exactly the same thing for biodiversity. In a way, finance may not be designed to decarbonize the economy.
I often quote a well-known financial mathematics professor in France, Nicolas Bouleau, who has written in a number of publications that financial markets were not designed to manage the planet. It's very important to remember that. That's not at all what they were designed for. So if we expect them to do something other than what they were designed for, their ability to do it may be called into question.
In addition, the conditions don't seem to be right for finance to spontaneously take on this decarbonization effort. Typically, if an activity remains legal and, in addition, it's profitable, even very profitable, it's virtually impossible for the vast majority of financial institutions to abandon that type of activity. Most of the time, they themselves feel that stopping that type of activity would be like pulling the rug out from under themselves.
In my opinion, then, either we have to change the tool, or we have to change the rules for using the tool. In other words, either we don't rely, or rely much less, on finance to decarbonize the economy, and instead look to industrial policy to shift demand—financing is very likely, I think, to adapt—or we change the fundamental rules of finance so that it can be effective and really play a leadership role in this decarbonization operation.
However, something else has happened instead. People were mainly banking on the fact that, by taking on significant financial risk related to climate change, or even systemic risk in the more or less distant future, the financial world would steer clear of those risks through its investment and funding decisions. We relied essentially on transparency and disclosure of financial risk that isn't considered material enough right now. There's not much going on.
:
Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the committee.
My name is Bryce Tingle. I'm the N. Murray Edwards chair in business law at the University of Calgary's faculty of law. My research and writing are largely in the area of corporate governance. I'm a member of the Alberta Securities Commission and of the national special advisory board to the RCMP's integrated market enforcement teams, which investigate financial crimes. I sit on numerous boards and I've spent my career advising boards, investors and managers on issues relating to corporate governance.
All opinions are my own and should not be attributed to any institution that I'm part of.
I'm appearing before you as someone who has spent his professional life working in and studying corporate governance and corporate finance.
For the record, I accept the consensus about the science of global warming contained in the most recent reports from the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
The bottom line from all my research is that there are thousands of empirical studies, and these studies generally show that corporate governance interventions of the sort produced by the financial markets do not produce their intended outcomes. This includes the long-time goals of corporate governance of producing better financial returns for investors and reducing executive pay.
The failures of corporate governance as a channel for producing desired outcomes are a function of, first, the fact that corporations are generally embedded in competitive markets and that these markets constrain the range of behaviours a corporation can undertake if it wishes to remain solvent. The average company doesn't make much over its total expenses.
Second, markets produce incentive structures for managers and shareholders, and these systems of incentives militate against certain desired non-financial outcomes.
Third, corporations, their people, strategies, research programs, opportunities, business partners and competitive situations all vary so much that one-size-fits-all interventions affect them in different and unexpected ways and occasionally in counterproductive ways.
Fourth, the most prominent tools used by corporate governance reformers—disclosure requirements and investor pressure—are not suited to the task, for various reasons.
Given the limited amount of time I have, I'll talk about three examples of governance failures that are relevant to ESG.
The first is disclosure. Most investors do not have the knowledge or the incentives to read or accurately process most of the disclosure we provide, and this is particularly true of rather complex environmental disclosure. As a result, investors tend to rely on third parties to produce ESG ratings or rankings. There are over a dozen empirical studies that find these ratings are invalid.
Different ESG companies rate the same company in very different ways. The disagreements among these companies about the environmental merits of companies appear to be increasing over time. There are several studies that show that ESG ratings are very poor predictors of future environmental or social performance.
Studies also show that disclosure discourages innovation, since it provides competitors with the ability to replicate successful initiatives and avoid failures. As a result, companies stop innovating. They will wait for others in a version of the free rider problem. Disclosure requirements also cause companies to behave defensively in an area. ESG activities, if required to be disclosed, can become less ambitious in order to avoid lawsuits or subsequent criticisms for failures.
A second example is financial divestment, which doesn't work. The value of a company's shares is a function of the company's future cash flows. For this reason, divestment does not affect share value. We know this from multiple studies. Several studies find no evidence of the cost of capital increasing for bad ESG performers. There's also no sign, at least in public markets, of lower costs of capital for good ESG companies.
Another problem is that divestment is too crude. A recent study found that the majority of environmental progressive green patents are produced by low-ESG-rated companies. Usually these are old-economy energy companies. This is particularly true of blockbuster environmental patents that are cited by many other patents. The researchers note that this research and development is being performed by companies that are actually excluded from ESG portfolios.
The third example I'll give is about the nature of investors. They don't focus on ESG. Investor behaviour is produced by strong financial incentives to keep their costs low and to maximize fund returns. ESG investors in companies with ESG profiles are generally no better off than non-ESG investors. Some studies find that ESG-branded funds hold worse-performing companies. Studies that look at what happens when an ESG fund buys a stake in a company find no sign of improvement in that company's environmental or social performance.
My time is up.
I will answer any of your questions when the time comes.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
I am Rosemary McGuire, vice-president of member experience at Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, known as CPA Canada. I oversee the research team focused on emerging issues in the accounting profession and capital markets. A key area of focus for us is the growing need to account for environmental impacts and for increased transparency around climate-related risks and opportunities.
CPA Canada is one of the most influential accounting organizations in the world. CPA Canada also supports the independent structure of accounting, assurance and sustainability standard-setting in Canada. We have been actively involved in the challenges of climate change for more than three decades, and we are currently an active member of the IFRS Foundation's partnership for capacity building, helping to develop resources to implement international sustainability disclosure standards in Canada and globally.
In my brief remarks, I will address three main points: the evolving expectations around sustainability issues, the importance of standards and third party assurance, and the need for a harmonized approach and policy certainty.
Sustainability is becoming increasingly important for investors and providers of capital. A report by the Bank of Canada and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions noted that the transition to a low-carbon economy will create opportunities for innovation, investment and potential green growth, but this transition may also lead to economic dislocation and a reassessment of the value of various financial assets.
Confidence in the quality of information is crucial for the integrity of our financial system and efficient capital markets. This need extends beyond financial information to include ESG factors, yet this demand for more transparency is leading to a trust deficit. PwC's 2023 global investor survey found that three-quarters of investors and analysts consider how sustainability is managed to be important to their investment decisions, yet 94% believe that sustainability reporting includes unsupported claims.
That brings me to my second point: the importance of sustainability standards and third party assurance.
We are seeing a push toward a global system for sustainability-related reporting. This began with the creation of the International Sustainability Standards Board, or the ISSB, which aims to develop a global baseline of sustainability disclosure standards for capital markets. The ISSB released its inaugural standards last year, covering general sustainability disclosure requirements and climate-related disclosures. The Canadian Sustainability Standards Board was created shortly thereafter and is expected to finalize standards before the end of the year, tailoring them for the Canadian marketplace.
These new standards aim for better disclosure, not just more of it. The climate disclosure standard will require companies to report on their targets and net-zero commitments, along with information on the anticipated financial impacts.
Materiality is a critical concept in these standards. It recognizes that different sustainability issues affect various industries in unique ways.
Another important concept is proportionality, which allows for adjustments based on the capabilities and circumstances of different companies, and this is vital for the Canadian market, given the large proportion of small and medium-sized entities.
Assurance plays a vital role in enhancing the reliability of ESG and climate-related information. The processes involved are similar to the audits that professional accountants have been conducting for decades.
Sustainability regulation in Canada is evolving rapidly, but concerns have been raised about multiple similar proposals being introduced at the same time. These include securities regulation, the Competition Bureau's new anti-greenwashing legislation, OSFI's guideline on climate risk management, the proposed sustainable finance taxonomy and new federal initiatives.
This may lead to a potentially unnecessary regulatory burden for Canadian companies facing oversight by multiple regulators. There is a need for a harmonized approach.
Education and capacity building are also essential. Standards and regulations that aren't well understood or properly applied won't be very effective.
I have only just skimmed the surface of this very complex and evolving subject, but I would be pleased to elaborate and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
:
That's not a problem. I can hear the echo as well, for what it's worth.
Okay, that's better, if it works for everyone else.
We have this growing reluctance of companies to go public. In practice, that means Canadian companies choose to sell themselves as a way of generating liquidity for their investors. In many important industries, like technology and pharmaceuticals, selling themselves means selling themselves to a foreign company, usually an American company.
Our public markets are generally where companies have scaled up, so I've been very concerned about why companies are refusing to go public. I think the increasing regulation we impose on companies when they go public is the most likely explanation.
:
There are two possible explanations for the financial market's poor performance on ESG.
One explanation is that they're just not being given accurate information by the companies. Certainly, there are lots of incentives for companies to put the best face on their ESG performance. I tend to think fraud is not common, but there's a lot of spin in ESG reporting.
The other reason the financial market has done a poor job is that the incentives of fund managers are to generate strong relative returns in their funds. Doing that is where they invest most of their time and energy. It's not in reading lengthy and complex ESG disclosure, much of which is inadequate because, in order to evaluate a company's ESG performance, you have to understand the alternatives strategically, in their markets, to decide whether or not they're taking the right path for the company. We don't see that level of engagement in any topic in corporate governance, including straightforward topics like executive compensation or maximizing financial returns. Corporate governance generally gets ignored by investors, aside from rhetoric.
:
Thanks a lot for your question.
Well, it depends on whether we are talking about regulation in general, which is now very much pushed at the European level, or about things that are much more oriented to the financial markets.
What is very interesting in what happened in France—the story may be overly simplistic—is that because France was organizing COP21 in Paris, the idea was that it would be nice to show some things before setting it up. As the one very crucial ingredient for the climate diplomacy discussion was the finance part, there was a kind of a push behind the scenes before COP21 was held to have something happen. At the end of the day, six months or three months before COP21, we had a law in France, for the first time ever, asking financial stakeholders in the investment community to communicate about their climate action. There were a lot of different items.
That was just before COP21, and I think that promoting something was very positive for France as a regulator and also for the Paris Agreement, which was reached at the end of the day. As you know, one of the three main overarching goals in the agreement is about finance. There may be a kind of chicken-and-egg issue there, but it was clearly good. I think that having this incentive under the spotlight was probably a good thing.
Also, then, what is very important, I think, is that this would never have happened if some investors, not necessarily the biggest or the most well known, and the banks, public and private—public in terms of government or private on the markets—had not pushed for it as well. There was a kind of an agreement for that—
It's true that I have been able to observe various financial ecosystems. For the moment, it's not the one in North America that I'm most familiar with. As far as Canadian banks are concerned, I don't have a very specific opinion.
What's very visible from the outside is Canada's industrial activity, particularly in the area of energy production and fossil fuel resources. I would imagine that Canadian banks are involved in providing financial support for the Canadian economy. Necessarily, there's quite a strong connection to be made there, and that's the case in most countries. Even though finance is international and these companies finance themselves on international markets, there's still a very strong local connection in financing.
I don't know if that answers your question.
Even though I've been working in finance for 15 years, I tend to say that it's not so much financial matters, but industrial matters, that are discussed. To tackle the problem of fossil fuel resources, we must first have a clear understanding of how these industries work and really be motivated to get them off fossil fuels. The banks will follow suit, in a way.
In Europe today, it's really central to all discussions. The principle of double materiality is being imposed in the progress reports of businesses, starting with the big ones and, little by little, the smaller ones. As you said, it's about analyzing the impact of activities on climate and the impact of climate on activities, and therefore on the financial performance of businesses and portfolios.
In my opinion, this is really a key issue, because the double materiality principle is precisely what will help companies look beyond their solely financial view of performance so that they can say that, of course, activities must perform well financially to be continued, but they must be carried out within the limits of feasibility. In other words, financial performance must be consistent with the prerequisite, a functioning biosphere. Otherwise, companies can turn out products and add value, but that serves no purpose if life is no longer possible in 10, 20 or 200 years. This raises the question of the ability to operate within planetary boundaries, to use that framework. Personally, I think that prerequisite must be established.
Obviously, if you're the first to jump in the pool when the water is cold, you look a little silly and you will probably want to get out. That's more or less what's happening today. Europe is starting to want to backpedal, because it's very complicated when it comes to competitiveness. However, we have to be able to say that we're not talking about five years, but a century and potentially more. It may hurt and there may be a price to pay in the short term, but if we don't do it, we're sure to pay a much heavier price in the long term. Until we accept that, it will be virtually impossible. As a result, today, those who can afford to make somewhat more radical decisions about their economy are those who think long term and don't necessarily have to use market incentives and look at their effects on stock market performance every quarter.
:
Thank you very much, Ms. Collins, for this question. It's actually, for me, the tipping point.
Today we have financial institutions everywhere on earth in the global financial markets committing to net zero. It's easy to find and easy to flag but almost impossible to do it. When financial institutions realize they have signed something that is probably too difficult for them, either they resign so that they are again compliant with their engagements, or they really have to take strong decisions.
As of today, as I was mentioning, it's very difficult for global financial institutions to see a very profitable market—for instance, oil and gas—and then decide not to go there. This is very difficult. What is almost impossible for them if they're already there is to say they quit, and have to close down the branch working on that and fire the employees or organize them differently. This is not a win-win situation.
We are at a situation that is very interesting, because stakeholders are no longer looking for a win-win option. I think we are entering a win-lose option, and we know there will be a cost. We know that there will be something that will be closed, so we have to organize this.
Finally, for me, it's much more a societal, policy and political issue than a pure financial thing. When you have really motivated banks—and I work with some of them—that are very committed to trying to go to this net zero, when they realize what it means for them, then behind the scenes they say that they will never succeed if the economy is not in alignment to do that. Then it's not a financial stake anymore; it's first and foremost an industrial policy thing.
Take the car industry in Europe, for instance. The internal combustion engines are expected to be forbidden in 2035. It's in the law, but it can always go back and forth. It's easy for a financial decision-maker to say that they won't go to a particular company but to another because they are going electric. However, if there is not such a regulation, they will not stop financing car producers that make cheap internal combustion cars. It would be stupid.
For me, the industrial policy has to be first and foremost, and then the financial industry has to follow and implement.
:
The short answer is that it cannot.
The slightly more complicated answer is that a company must determine its carbon budget based on a hypothetical global scenario where emissions and the global carbon budget are distributed in a certain way among countries and companies. Then, it needs to establish a very concrete strategy to determine how it's going to spend that carbon budget over the next few years, what it's going to invest in, the activities it's going to undertake and the activities it's going to stop. Then it has to ask itself how it will optimize its processes and what new technologies it will use or stop using, for example.
At that point, we're heading toward something precise, but that implies that we have scaled up a sensible carbon budget. If all the companies in the world do this but don't agree, we can have only carbon-neutral companies, but reach a four-degree Celsius increase, because the carbon budget won't have been used globally.
:
Thanks so much, Mr. Chenet.
I feel like the financial institutions, but also governments, are looking at time horizons that are too short when it comes to the impacts of the climate crisis.
One other thing that concerns me is that we've heard that there is quite a bit of overlap between the boards of these financial organizations or institutions and the boards of the largest fossil fuel companies in Canada.
These oil and gas companies are also under-reporting their emissions drastically. While a number of those companies are also investing in emissions reduction technologies, they're also growing oil and gas and their mining and exploration and increasing their emissions.
Do you think there are ways that we can address the issue of the under-reporting of emissions through some of the climate-aligned financial regulations that we've been talking about?
:
Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to our witnesses for being here.
We've spent much of our time and effort litigating the virtues of ESG investing. For those watching, those are the environmental, social and governance standards big companies claim in order to attract attention and investment.
Unfortunately, we're missing the point a bit. The politicization of ESG investing in the United States led to a very polarizing series of headlines. I'll read one from The New York Times: “How Environmentally Conscious Investing Became a Target of Conservatives: The business world has been pulled into partisan politics, with Republicans bringing their battle against socially conscious investing to Congress”.
For over two years, there was a conversation in the United States as to whether or not ESG investing is worthwhile. It was my hope that we could avoid this here on the committee, mostly because this study isn't supposed to be on whether or not ESG standards are worthwhile; rather, it's about to what degree companies need to be honest and truthful if they say they have renewed commitments to environmentally sound practices or a new governance practice that ought to be seen as more ethical. That's what disclosure is going to report on.
Monsieur Chenet, am I mistaken? Are sustainable finance disclosure and taxonomy about honesty, or more about litigating whether or not companies ought to be sustainable?
I will say that I appreciate the kind words of Mr. van Koeverden regarding my birthday, but I wish we could have reserved this topic for committee business. It's always pointed out to us that it's a more appropriate time. Unfortunately, we are going to lose the officials who travelled all the way across the river to get here. I think it is deeply unfortunate to see that sort of hypocrisy.
I think this is all very confusing, and not only as to what amendment we're voting on. This committee has so many things on its plate right now, and juggling....
Obviously, Mr. Chair, you worked tirelessly for years to bring forward a very robust water study, on which I'm sure the analysts have been working very diligently. I know there were a lot of witnesses and testimony to bring together, so I'm sure there's a lot of work there. I suspect you would like that study to see the light of day in a published format, but with rumours of a possible prorogation and potential early carbon tax election, I would hate to see that report not make it across the finish line and published.
Of course, this isn't the only thing we have. I appreciate the possible date of December 4, I believe, for to appear, in order to help us conclude the Jasper fire investigation. I hope he's spending a lot of time in Jasper talking to folks there and finding out—as we studied—the factors that led to the fire that devastated that community and left 2,000 people homeless. I think we also need to try to ensure we finalize that particular topic.
We have ongoing letters that need to be sent out regarding the appearance of five oil and gas CEOs before our committee, and I think we have another study or two awaiting circulation for us to review. Then, of course, there's the net-zero accelerator fund challenges we are having. My understanding is that we haven't returned to that issue—
:
Okay, but what I think, though, is that the 18th is already spoken for. The 20th is spoken for. The committee has agreed that on the 18th we'll do the net-zero accelerator. On the 20th we have the commissioner.
What's the meeting after the 20th...?
I would suggest that we should finish this one hour that's left on the finance study. We should do that on the 25th. Maybe we can do an hour of committee business after that, on the 25th. Scheduling a subcommittee meeting basically kills a committee meeting. We have to use the same time slot, essentially.
What I would suggest, which I think would respond to your wishes, is that on the 25th we have the officials back, if they're available, from ECCC and finance, for the hour that they can't do today. In the second hour of that meeting, we can do committee business in camera.
:
Just a second, Ms. Collins.
Basically, Ms. Collins was saying to go ahead with one hour of the finance study on Wednesday, followed by the on Bill , and then we would hold a subcommittee meeting to discuss the timing of Ms. Collins' study.
What I'm saying is that if we do that, I think the issue of Wednesday is settled. We're all in agreement, so I don't know why we're debating Wednesday. I think what we're debating now is whether we have a subcommittee meeting in lieu of one of our regular meetings, and then that subcommittee meeting would not be able to be held until November 25, because we've already agreed on what we're doing on the 18th and the 20th.
Therefore, what I'm suggesting is that on the 25th, we could finish that one hour we have left on the finance study with the witnesses that we had to just let go, and we could then go in camera for the second hour, do committee business and talk about Ms. Collins' study.
If you want to make that a two-hour committee business meeting, then we can do that as well, but that takes us up to two o'clock on a Monday. We could do that, and we may get committee business done in half an hour, so it may all be moot in the end.
That's the issue we're talking about. It's whether we have a subcommittee meeting on, say, November 25, or whether we have our witnesses back for one hour and then do one hour of future business, in camera, on the 25th. That's where we are.
Ms. Collins, what are you suggesting?
:
In general, I want to highlight.... Maybe I'll just start by realizing that my subamendment has the typo from the original amendment. We need to edit “meetings” and put it as the singular.
With regard to the amendment itself and the importance of doing a prestudy on Bill , it is a really important bill that we want to tackle and it is important when we're thinking about biodiversity and accountability. We want to make sure that we have the come this Wednesday, which everyone's in agreement with.
As this is clearly a conversation that's going to take a little while, normally we would schedule another study from the list of studies that we need to do at a subcommittee meeting so that we wouldn't take up witness time. This is a way for us to make sure that this conversation can happen.
My big priority is to make sure that we honour the wishes of the nations that have asked Parliament to look at the contamination in Fort Chipewyan. I want to make sure that the remaining meetings of this prestudy don't displace that and allow the current government to avoid accountability on the contamination and the lack of transparency and communication to those nations in Fort Chipewyan.
I also want to make sure that we get to this prestudy on Bill . It is critical. I'm hoping that this is a way that we can have the whole committee come together, pass this motion today and then move on with the business at hand.
I think it is a reasonable amendment from my colleague. I hope we can find a solution to further amending it to deal with, as I mentioned earlier, the many issues that are pressing to this committee and the work that has been undertaken so that we do not have this study push back our agenda until, more or less, the spring.
We may risk losing all of the reports and all of the work. I even forgot earlier about the caribou study and the letter that we'll be sending there. We have a lot of things on the table. In order to try to help clean that up.... As well, you outlined some of the more recent news that we've received about the tentative schedule for the meeting with the environment commissioner and an apparent appearance from . I would like to clarify that we do have Minister Boissonnault coming here.
I'd like to subamend the subamendment by adding after—
:
This is complex stuff. I'm trying to wrap my head around where the amendment is at this point.
All of that said, as I outlined previously, we have many things we need to accomplish. I think a subcommittee, frankly, is a good idea, and having that included in the amended version by Ms. Collins. Obviously, we have many things to sort out in a forward-looking calendar, for the rest of this year, and with the possible inclusion of this prestudy, well into next year.
Having all of those reports delayed would be quite unfortunate, particularly due to the devastating nature of the wildfire in Jasper National Park, the rebuild and cleanup necessary there and the work has been tapped to do by the . I hope he is looking into the many factors that led up to that devastating fire and the risk that still remains in Jasper. I think it's very timely for the people of the region and the province—