FINA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES FINANCES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, April 28, 1999

• 1907

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Maurizio Bevilacqua (Vaughan—King—Aurora, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order. As everyone knows, in accordance with the order of reference of the House of Commons of Tuesday, April 20, 1999, the committee continues the study of Bill C-71, an act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 16, 1999.

This evening we have the pleasure to have with us as witnesses, from the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, Mr. Steve Hindle, president, and Robert McIntosh, policy adviser.

Welcome. As you know, you have approximately ten to fifteen minutes to make your presentation. Thereafter we'll engage in a question and answer session, beginning with Mr. Harris.

Mr. Steve Hindle (President, Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here with the committee once again. As president of the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, I'm here to represent the 29,000 of our members whose working lives are affected by the Public Service Staff Relations Act.

Through Bill C-71, the Budget Implementation Act, the current government is asking you to amend this act, the Public Service Staff Relations Act, to deny the binding arbitration dispute resolution method to federal public sector employees. In the face of it, this amendment appears rather insignificant in comparison with more ambitious labour relations legislative initiatives, such as the Public Service Reform Act of 1992. I have some comments to make about that act a little bit later on in the brief.

However, I assure you this amendment is not innocuous. It lays bare the hypocrisy of a government claiming in one breath to promote participative democracy and the rule of law to its citizens, while in another it undoes its public expressions through its actions as an employer. I ask you to carefully consider the facts and commentary in our brief, keeping in mind both the short-term and long-term effects of the proposed legislative action.

• 1910

Part 3, subclause 19(1) of the Budget Implementation Act 1999 suspends the operation of sections 64 to 75.1 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act until June 20, 2001. Now under the Public Service Staff Relations Act there are two dispute resolution options: conciliation board/strike, and compulsory binding arbitration.

When the staff relations act was first enacted in 1967, it was viewed as establishing an innovative labour relations system in the public service because much thought had been put into balancing the needs of its citizens for delivery of public services and the rights of federal employees to be treated fairly, both individually and collectively, in their employment relationship with their employer, the federal government.

While collective bargaining had been part of the Canadian private sector since the early 1900s, it was not until the mid-1960s that it started to appear in the public sector. Moving from the categorical statement that “the Queen does not negotiate with her subjects”, the focus evolved on ensuring that the public interest was protected by limiting the collective bargaining rights of public sector employees.

The PSSRA, unlike legislation applying to private sector employers and employees, made a wide array of tools available to the federal government in its role of employer to limit collective bargaining rights.

If I could highlight the four major tools, the first one was a process to designate employees in certain work, and in so doing prevent them from striking where the work is considered to affect the safety and security of Canadians; the second was directing arbitration boards to consider four specified factors in making awards on compensation and other conditions of employment; the third major tool was allowing the employer to keep sole control of staffing and termination rules and how work would be organized and valued; and the fourth one, which is far more recent, from 1992, was the federal government can ask cabinet to have a minister order a vote on its last offer to the bargaining agent.

All in all, that's an impressive arsenal to protect the delivery of public services to Canadians.

Why then must the arbitration route be denied to federal government employees? Does the employer prefer strikes? Are there other motivations or explanations? I'd like to take the opportunity to examine the evidence. I won't go through all the words in the charts that are contained in the brief, but what we've done is tried to contrast what was said with what actually was done by the government.

The first one was that on the return to collective bargaining, after six years of having no negotiations through legislation, the then Clerk of the Privy Council talked about an improved labour relations environment and talked about how Treasury Board will work with the unions. And what was the actual experience at that time? On March 7, 1996, during tabling of the main estimates, access to binding arbitration to resolve disputes was suspended until June 1998. This helped Treasury Board in its desire to seek risk-free bargaining upon a return after six years of no bargaining.

So what's the employer afraid of? Within a workforce of more than 200,000 in the late 1980s, only a handful of bargaining units sought the use of a binding third party to resolve outstanding bargaining issues. As a matter of fact, that represented only 2% of the employees who actually accessed that method of resolving a dispute.

The 1999 budget has been characterized as a health budget. Ironically for health care professionals in the federal public service, the 1999 budget means they are denied any opportunity to resolve issues if the negotiations process is no longer effective. You might wonder how that's so. The employer has sought the designation of between 85% and 130% of the current population in the new health services group. The distinction among the various percentages is this new group is composed of professionals in the fields of nursing, dentistry, medicine, nutrition and dietetics, psychology, social work, pharmacy, occupational and physical therapy and veterinary medicine. And they have different percentages for each of what are the current bargaining units. Consequently, the conciliation board and strike resolution route has no meaning for the health services group.

• 1915

The professional institute happens to concur with one of the authors of the staff relations act, Jacob Finkleman, who observed in 1983 that the court's 1982—and in this case it was the Supreme Court—ruling on designations in effect declared that the right to strike under the PSSRA is not necessarily a right in practice. If a large number of employees are designated, as we've indicated for the health care group, the capacity of a bargaining agent is destroyed, since the bargaining agent would be deprived of any effective method in law for resolving an impasse in negotiations. Access to binding arbitration is therefore of utmost importance.

The health services group is also the only PIPSC female-dominated group working for the Treasury Board. Let us be direct: by suspending arbitration to the year 2001, Parliament is setting aside the rights of healthcare professionals to fair treatment. How does this legislative action protect the public interests of Canadians?

Now, looking at the staff relations act and the collective bargaining framework for public sector employees, we could perhaps think that this is an anomaly. But if we go back in history, back to the 1975-78 period, to the anti-inflation act, the purpose being to control inflation, they put constraints on public service bargaining. From 1982 to 1985, with the Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, commonly and more popularly referred to as six and five, they again put restraints on public service bargaining. And the comment at the time was that government said “We do not like singling out government employees whose pay increases have not been noticeably out of line, but leadership must begin at home”.

Then we move on to the Public Sector Compensation Act of 1991, another “set an example” piece of legislation where they were trying to get private sector employers, apparently, to control their wage settlements. That's the beginning of the imposition of what is commonly called the wage freeze in the early 1990s, of 0% followed by 3%, which was extended by the Government Expenditures Restraint Act, 1993 to 1995, and then again extended by the Budget Implementation Act of 1994 for two more years. So it was a period of six years in which public service employees had imposed on them contract settlements of 3% in one year and 0% in the other five years.

Then there was the Budget Implementation Act of 1996, which we referred to, where salary increments were frozen. So all in all, it was a very heavy-handed approach by the government in dealing with its own employees.

So the record, to us anyway, is very clear. In the twenty years between 1982 and projecting into the year 2001, the federal government will have altered, or has altered, the collective bargaining rules seven times, covering a period of 16 years. For that record there is no respected economic institution in Canada that has affirmed the federal government's actions have effectively contributed to its economic goals by limiting the collective bargaining rights of its employees. So we would have to wonder why the government keeps doing it.

In addition, the United Nations via the International Labour Organization, the ILO, has rebuked Canadian governments 33 times between 1980 and 1998. And five times it reprimanded the federal government over its restrictions on collective bargaining where the public interest could not be demonstrated.

The provinces of Newfoundland in 1984, Quebec in 1990, and Ontario as recently as 1996 have been specifically counselled to amend legislation to provide for independent arbitration of employees who have been designated.

So we come back to the question: Where is the public interest? How are federal government employees expected to respect the rule of law when their employer is so quick to assume its other role as legislator and change the rules to its advantage?

• 1920

With this track record, I think it's entirely fair to conclude that this employer, unlike the vast majority in this country, has no incentive to seriously conduct labour relations. Over time, the federal government has sought to use more blunt and more punitive instruments on its employees, while exhorting them to work more productively and sensitively to the needs of Canadian citizens.

More recently, the employer has shown its intolerance for those employees who actually exercise their legal right to strike under the staff relations act. In anticipation of the correctional officers being in a legal strike position on March 26, 1999, the government proposed back-to-work legislation, Bill C-76, on March 22. The CXs were ordered back to work on March 30, 1999.

Now, strikes in the federal public sector are rare, and even with the employer's right to determine which services cannot be withdrawn, legislated returns to work still happen. The Canadian tradition in such situations is to send outstanding bargaining issues to a binding tribunal. In the case of the correctional officers, the employer had legislation drafted that not only ordered the CX employees back to work, but unilaterally determined the unresolved wage and benefit items.

This same legislation was used to threaten the 14,000 blue-collar workers into signing a collective agreement or have lesser wages and working conditions imposed. The 1999 round of negotiations promises to be a rocky one. With neither binding arbitration nor legal strike a real option, is this collective bargaining?

I have a quote here from the then Clerk of the Privy Council, Jocelyn Bourgon: “With all the power and authority in the world, one cannot `command and control' creativity and innovation”.

One cannot order new results to emerge. A new approach to management is called for. This approach requires a climate of trust, encourages collaboration, and favours inclusiveness. It recognizes the importance of sharing power in exchange for having everyone gain a great sense of collective responsibility.

Clearly, the era of command and control has been drawing to a close for some time. In 1992, via the Public Service Reform Act, the Public Service Staff Relations Act was reviewed and amended. At that time no alarm bells were sounded about the insufficiency of the PSSRA to protect the public interest. Both the arbitration and the conciliation/strike routes were confirmed as part of the collective bargaining rules of engagement. It is time to respect those rules, if the rule of law is to have any meaning to federal government employees.

In conclusion, we have but one recommendation for this legislation, and that is to delete subclause 19(1) of the Budget Implementation Act and reject penalizing those federal employees for whom the arbitration route is the only effective recourse option. Suspension of arbitration can only increase dissension in the public service and the likelihood of confrontation. Recent events in Newfoundland and Saskatchewan confirm this reality. At a time when cooperation and partnership are essential, this amendment will not contribute to constructive labour relations in the federal public sector.

I'm open to questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Hindle and Mr. McIntosh.

We'll now proceed to the question and answer session. As I said earlier, we'll begin with Mr. Harris.

Mr. Richard M. Harris (Prince George—Bulkley Valley, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your presentation, Mr. Hindle.

I've never had much of an appetite for strikes or labour strife, so I've always been a big fan of what I think they call final-offer arbitration, or I call it baseball arbitration: each side makes their best pitch, and an agreed-upon arbitrator picks the one that, in their judgment, is the most palatable offer, the most compromised offer. How do you feel about that type of arbitration?

• 1925

Mr. Steve Hindle: It's not a type of arbitration that's been offered to us. We have limited experience with it in the province of Manitoba. I think if the government were to propose it we'd be willing to engage them in discussions as to how it would work, what the process would be, and how it would be determined what could make up a final offer. We're always willing to sit down and discuss other options. As you said, we don't like being in a position where the only action possible to resolve a dispute is strike. It's particularly important in those areas where we represent people who do not have the legal right to withdraw their services that another option be available.

Mr. Richard Harris: I think the formula is fairly simple. The employers and the employees agree that they want to enter into this type of solution to any future problems, so you collectively agree on an impartial arbitrator. When the contracts come up for renewal, or if there's a dispute somewhere along the way, both sides sit down separately, figure out the very best offer they think they can make that will not scare off the arbitrator to the other side, and the other side does the same thing.

They pick the one that appears to be the most reasonable and fitting offer, and both sides have got a pre-agreement that they will live by the decision of the arbitrator. I know it works in many industries. Many companies that people I know run use that strictly, and they have had nothing but labour-employer harmony for years using that type of solution.

I guess the question is if the government would agree to it—and I don't know if they will—do you think it's something you could sell to your members as a solution to future problems?

Mr. Steve Hindle: Technically it's an option that's already available through the alternative dispute resolution provisions in the staff relations act, which is section 61. So if the government were to propose that, and they could have proposed it for the highly designated groups, we'd be willing to entertain that.

I'm sure we could convince our members this is a valid alternative. But it's interesting to note that during this period when we had no arbitration—and this is an experience of our union as well as other unions that have highly designated bargaining units—we did make approaches to the Treasury Board to look at other ways of resolving disputes, to use section 61. The Treasury Board was not interested in entering into serious discussions about what other alternatives would be available, so they themselves haven't considered that final-offer selection would be available.

Mr. Richard Harris: Did you ever specifically request that maybe this is a way we can get along?

Mr. Steve Hindle: No, we did not suggest this as a method of resolving a dispute, but it does point out the need for a binding mechanism to resolve it. If the Treasury Board were to offer it, we'd be willing to entertain it.

Mr. Richard Harris: If it was available, as you say, as one of the options, and you recognize there could be some value, both immediate and future, in it, why wouldn't you have said to the government, listen, the other options don't seem to be working here and we've got a problem—why don't we consider this type of arbitration? Then you would have laid the ball in the court of the government and they would have been able to consider it and respond.

Mr. Steve Hindle: It's a valid point, and it's one we will consider in our next approach to the Treasury Board. I would anticipate what their answer would be.

• 1930

Mr. Richard Harris: But I'm sure you would.... It's recognized, as I understand, as a very effective tool for settling labour disputes, or disputes between employer and employees, and quite frankly I'm surprised it isn't used far more extensively than it is, because it seems, from personal observation, very fair to me—a fair and logical way to resolve it.

It eliminates the constant head-bashing, which nobody wins and nobody wants. And considering the size of the public service and the obligation of the government to serve the Canadian people in the best way possible, and I know your members want to do your jobs in the best way possible, I would think that one would just jump out at you and and you would say let's give it a try. I would hope it would jump out at the government and they would say let's give it a try as well. Maybe we can all live together after all.

Mr. Steve Hindle: Perhaps we can.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Harris.

[Translation]

Mr. Desrochers.

Mr. Odina Desrochers (Lotbinière, BQ): Mr. Hindle, in your report of these historical events, you seem to suggest that you are losing more and more of your leverage vis-à-vis the government when you negociate. Could you give us a description of the climate which prevails when the time comes to negociate? Is it a win-win approach? Is it a confrontational approach? How far do you think that could go if the provisions of bill C-71 were enacted?

[English]

Mr. Steve Hindle: There is no incentive on the part of the government to truly engage in collective bargaining when they know they can fall back on legislative means to achieve their goals. That leads to a very frustrating process for the unions, and more importantly for the members we represent. They get very frustrated in trying to sit with their employer and work out arrangements that will be beneficial to them as employees and as individuals, and that will also allow the government to achieve some of the goals they have, legitimate goals as an employer.

It has been found, certainly over the return to collective bargaining after six years of imposed wages through legislation, that it's been very difficult to engage in a real dialogue, because not only were we unable to bargain wages during that six-year period, but we had little if any opportunity to negotiate any of the other terms and conditions that aren't direct wages.

Federal public service employees have been kept away from the table for six years. It's easy to understand that the return was not easy, and it wasn't helped by a downsizing exercise that saw the loss of over 50,000 positions in the federal public service. There was a lot of built-up anger, a lot of resentment for the employer and for what was going on, and there was less and less incentive for people to want to stay in the public service.

So it hasn't been win-win at the bargaining table. It's been the employer coming and saying this is what we have, this is what you're going to get, this is what you're going to take, and by the way, when you go back to your job, we expect you to do it better and with fewer resources and to be happy about it. Well, they're not happy about it. It hasn't been easy.

[Translation]

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Now, can you see the light at the end of the tunnel? You don't seem very optimistic about the next negociations. You referred to the two special legislations that have been recently adopted by the House of Commons. You have lost much of your leverage. What should we do in order to improve the staff relations climate between your union and the federal government?

[English]

Mr. Steve Hindle: The first thing that would help is to restore access to arbitration, to give those people who aren't really interested in engaging in strike activity and disrupting the workplace an opportunity to have an impasse, if there is one, resolved through binding arbitration.

• 1935

Most employees and most unions wouldn't end up in front of a third party. The whole idea of having the binding arbitration there is that in case there is a dispute, they can go to a third party. That provides incentive for both the union and the employer to be reasonable in their approach to collective bargaining. And if it comes to a situation where they have to go to a third party, they have to take a reasonable approach in front of a third party. Outrageous demands are not going to get either side much of a hearing in front of an impartial arbitrator.

So the best thing that could be done would be to restore the law to the way it was in 1967, when it was first enacted, to truly put a balance back into the collective bargaining relationship between the employees and the employer. For all the talk of balance coming from government officials and members of the government in the House of Commons, there is no balance in there that is worthy of the name “balance”. It's truly lopsided in trying to deal with this employer in this climate.

[Translation]

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Thank you very much.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Brison.

Mr. Scott Brison (Kings—Hants, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for spending some time with us today.

Particularly in a post-deficit or a surplus environment, why do you feel the government continues to delay on restoring binding arbitration as a vehicle for labour negotiation?

Mr. Steve Hindle: The first reason is that when we returned to collective bargaining after six years away from the table, they were concerned about arbitrators playing catch-up, producing awards that would take into account the fact that for five of the previous six years public service employees had received zero, and that the one year they did receive a raise, it was 3%. They're now saying that they can't afford a situation where an arbitrator renders a decision that is not in keeping with the implementation of the universal classification standard.

If you go back to the first one, that in itself—being afraid of catch-up—is a recognition from the government that what they did to public service employees for those six years was unfair, and that it did keep them away from the level at which they should be. During that six-year period, 3% was the increase for public service wages. Inflation ran over 12% for that year. So there was a real decline in earning power and disposable income for people in the public service. And it was reasonable, on their part, to expect that an arbitrator would make some allowance for that in the final award.

But our experience with arbitrators has been that they do not produce awards that are out of line with what's going on in the economy of the country as a whole. They can't do that. They have constraints on them in the legislation. I think the current thinking that they can't afford a settlement that's not in keeping with the universal classification standard is a bit of a smoke screen. We've already bargained one contract for this round—what you'd call the second round—for the auditing group, who are in the process of trying to ratify it in anticipation of moving to the revenue agency. There was no talk about the universal classification standard. The Treasury Board's not prepared in this round for the implementation of the UCS.

Mr. Scott Brison: You mentioned the Revenue Canada agency. One of the reasons the government says it needs to create this new agency and effectively split off, I believe, 40% of the—

Mr. Steve Hindle: About 25%.

Mr. Scott Brison: —25% of the public service into a new agency is that it does not feel it can do within the public service many of the efficiencies that need to be gained. Why is the government saying that? In terms of human resource management, I would like to believe the government has a leadership role to play in facilitating better human resource management, and in fact in trying to achieve better results and better services through human resource management. But the government's effectively saying that's not possible, and is splitting off almost a quarter of the public service to a new.... What is the real reason the government is saying it can't effect change and improve services and cost-effectiveness of the public service? Why aren't we starting to try to improve, as opposed to just splitting off?

• 1940

Mr. Steve Hindle: I would have to agree that moving 40,000 public service employees outside to an agency—roughly a quarter of the public service—is an admission that there is a problem within the public service as a whole, a fundamental problem with the way the public service is organized and the rules of the legislation under which it has to operate.

Why are they doing it? Because there is either no political will or no method that they can see to actually reform the rules and regulations for the whole of the public service. So they're going to do it piecemeal, by moving things like Revenue Canada and Parks Canada to become agencies. There's also the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and the selling off of the air navigation system and creation of a private sector, not-for-profit corporation called NAV CANADA.

In other words, to address the problems within the public service, they have to move these things outside the public service and then try to address them outside. I will tell you they have been less than overly successful with the new agencies, and the creation of independence for them has not actually brought us to the point where we can resolve those problems. We're still working on it with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. We're about to embark on it with Parks Canada. But it has been less than successful as an experiment.

Mr. Scott Brison: Would you suggest that public servants, or the union, if you will, would be more amenable now to constructive discussion, potentially even addressing some of these issues in a cooperative way with the government, than they may have been 20 years ago? Might there be the potential for a more cooperative approach to joint challenges and goals than there was 20 years ago? Perhaps the government is dealing with the union with the same sort of approach that it would have under a different era.

Mr. Steve Hindle: You could well be right. We've always been interested in finding creative ways to deal with the issues. The professional institute pre-dates collective bargaining in the federal public service. We've been around since 1920 to try to deal with issues of professional public service employees. We have always been willing to sit down and take a creative approach to discussing what the real issues are and trying to come to some understanding about how they could be addressed. But it's been frustrating when we've done it.

Mr. Scott Brison: Even in the corporate sector, the boards of companies like Chrysler Canada have union representation. There is a cooperative effort, even in the corporate world. It just seems odd to me that we're not trying more actively to develop a cooperative effort in the public sense. To a certain extent, and maybe part of it has been the political side of it, there's been a demonization of the public service. The public servants are a lot like politicians: we both get a bad rap. Bankers are another group.

Mr. Steve Hindle: So are union presidents.

Mr. Scott Brison: So are union presidents. The morale issue does concern me. We're dealing with productivity at this committee, and one of the issues I would really like to address is productivity within the public service, because I think we would find that the levels of moral have been deleterious to the levels of productivity in the public service. That can't help but affect it.

Mr. Steve Hindle: To answer the specific question, life in the public service was better 20 years ago. You probably would have found us a lot more interested in cooperating with Treasury Board as the employer. It is through issues such as the introduction of legislation restraining wages, removing rights that were in the legislation at the outset, and other such things that have led to low morale. It has led to a less cooperative approach, certainly less willingness on the part of the unions to be cooperative, because when we do cooperate, we still end up with regressive legislation. So it's been a very unfortunate 20 years.

Mr. Scott Brison: Thank you very much.

Mr. Steve Hindle: You're welcome.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions? I see a question from Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hindle, I want to thank you for your submissions here today.

I've been listening intently to your description of this dynamic that exists in the public service, and certainly federal public servants have to be acknowledged for what they've been able to contribute over the last number of years in what were generally described as difficult times financially. They've played a big role in enabling the government finances to achieve some stability and balance.

• 1945

I know that you and some of your colleagues are skeptical about the provisions of this bill that would remove third party arbitration from the collective bargaining process for another couple of years, and certainly one has to ask why. You've suggested reasons why here, and I want to ask you whether you think it is fair for the government, on behalf of all Canadians, to want to manage very strictly the rollout of public finances, following the achievement of Canadians in balancing the federal expenditures. Do you think it's reasonable for the government to want to have a very firm hand on what followed that important event?

Mr. Steve Hindle: It's a loaded question and seems to imply they weren't doing that when free collective bargaining was in existence. I think they did a very good job of managing the finances with regard to public service wages during the period when we had access to binding arbitration and there were no fetters on collective bargaining.

Mr. Derek Lee: Fair enough. I'll suggest to you, though, it did take some public will on the part of the government, some willpower, to see the need to impose a regime, following the six dry years. Everyone admits they were pretty dry for the public service and the private sector. The whole country went through a difficult period.

The government, I suggest to you, in the period that followed the six years, in wanting to maintain a very firm handle on public finances, would want to have a smooth landing in dealing with financing of public service labour costs, and would not want to allow a subcontracting out to a third party arbitrator of huge economic decisions involved, when arbitrators in the public sector might not have the right goalposts, the right markers, because of the six dry years. Who knows what a good public servant should be paid. Do you think it's fair for the government to want to impose a smooth landing?

Mr. Steve Hindle: No.

Mr. Derek Lee: You don't.

Mr. Steve Hindle: No. That presupposes that what they did prior to that was fair, and it wasn't. The six years was not fair. Now the Treasury Board, as employer, has an obligation and the government has ample tools available, through the legislation as it's currently written, to ensure that arbitration boards do not unfairly treat public service employees, to make up for that lost time, as it were.

When you get right down to it, ultimately Parliament has the final word. Parliament has done this in the past. They have the right. They've done it to introduce legislation that overturns or changes arbitral awards. They did it in 1991, when they introduced legislation to end the public service strikes being engaged in by the Public Service Alliance and the Professional Institute of the Public Service. They also suspended the application of two arbitral awards, one for dockyard workers on the east coast and one for the law group we represent.

So Parliament always had the final say if the employer—the Treasury Board on behalf of the government as employer—was unable to get what Parliament thought was a reasonable settlement through whatever process was available to them. So I think it was somewhat premature of the members of the government to think they needed to remove access to arbitration before anything had actually happened that was untoward.

Mr. Derek Lee: In your answer, you suggest that the solution to an arbitration award that is way outside the envelope is for Parliament to roll it back. I suggest that parliaments don't like doing that.

• 1950

I feel better simply removing the third party arbitration for a couple of years, as a smooth-landing mechanism to ensure that labour collective bargaining across the country assumes a stable platform, and public servants and the government will have a better idea. Instead of taking orders from the minister, perhaps those who do the collective bargaining can look around the marketplace, look around government, and freely collectively bargain, without the risk of having to subcontract it to an arbitrator.

Mr. Robert McIntosh (Policy Adviser, Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada): May I just add to this? Having been a veteran before arbitration boards a number of times, the way the legislation is framed under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, the parties will present their cases. Therefore the Treasury Board, delegated by Parliament as employer for the government, has a responsibility to present the employer's arguments, whatever they may be, and the unions have the same responsibility on behalf of our membership.

Surely, in the interests of good labour relations, it makes sense to have the right and opportunity to present these arguments and have an independent third party make a decision. What is the concern with that? That's all we have asked for here. Again, this is the original legislation that was put forward and passed and we've lived with for a number of years. Bringing in these legislated, prescribed solutions is a recipe for the mess we're in now, in terms of the morale of the public service.

Mr. Derek Lee: There's another way of looking at it. As one Canadian, I might possibly want to say to my government, “Look, no subcontracting. You deal with the public service. You cut a deal with the public service. Don't ship it out to a third party. You deal with it, Mr. Government.”

I understand the desire of public servants to have access to the other route of binding arbitration. I just look at it a little differently. I hear what you're saying. In two years, most of what we're saying will probably be moot, if this bill does pass, and you'll have all the bells and whistles in the collective bargaining process.

Mr. Steve Hindle: With all due respect, that's what we heard three years ago, when they suspended arbitration for three years. During the election of 1993, the Liberal Party campaigned and said they would return to collective bargaining. What they failed to tell us and other Canadians was it was only after two more years of zero.

So I don't put a lot of faith in two years from now this will be moot. This is not two years from now; this is now. This is not fair to public service employees. It is especially not fair to those public service employees who would normally have a method of trying to resolve a dispute to use their leverage at the bargaining table, which is the right to withdraw their services.

We represent a large number of people who do not have that right. They have no legitimate method of resolving a dispute if they get into one at the bargaining table. We are saying give them back that method. Give them an opportunity to have some assurance that the result of collective bargaining will be an agreement that's based on the arguments put forth by both sides, and not the presumption of one side as to what's right.

Mr. Derek Lee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Lee.

Are there any further questions?

On behalf of the committee, Mr. Hindle and Mr. McIntosh, I'd like to thank you very much for helping us out with the bill. Thanks.

Mr. Steve Hindle: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm looking forward, at some point in the future, to coming in front of this committee and praising the government for what it's doing in labour relations. Unfortunately, it appears that will be a while yet; but if it happens, I'll be the first one here to say congratulations to the government. Thank you for your time, members.

The Chairman: I look forward to that day, Mr. Hindle.

If all the members can stay seated, we have some housekeeping items here to deal with, which I'm sure we'll deal with very quickly.

A voice: Do you want to move in camera for this?

The Chairman: We will move in camera for this. Is everybody agreed?

A voice: Where's the camera?

[Proceedings continue in camera]

• 1954

• 1958

[Public proceedings resume]

The Chairman: As you all know, we're here to do clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-71. You've all done this before. I'm just going to ask permission to deal with some of the clauses in groups.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Everybody agreed. Wonderful.

An hon. member: What?

The Chairman: I'll repeat it. I'd like to deal with clauses in groups.

Mr. Desrochers' assistant says yes. I guess then we all agree. Okay. We'll put this to the test right away.

(Clauses 2 to 21 inclusive agreed to)

(On clause 22)

The Chairman: Now, I understand the government has approximately four amendments for clause 22.

Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee: Colleagues will see that the amendments I'm moving here go right back into the sections dealing with the Governor in Council in tandem with the minister. The minister has already been described in the legislation. All the amendments I'm going to be moving are for the purpose of writing into the legislation an appropriate role in borrowing and related transactions for the Governor in Council, which of course in other statutes is authorized by Parliament to borrow and deal on behalf of the taxpayer.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

• 2000

Mr. Richard Harris: Everything will be on division.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Yes, everything on this side.

Mr. Scott Brison: I prefer to think of them individually. I won't say no just because the government proposed it. But it's on division for this one.

The Chairman: On division, then.

Mr. Scott Brison: We try to be more reasonable.

The Chairman: Okay. Everybody has a copy of the amendments, right?

Mr. Derek Lee: The amendment G-1 has been adopted.

The Chairman: It's been adopted, that's right, Mr. Lee. Now we're on amendment G-2.

Mr. Derek Lee: This has the effect of allowing the Governor in Council, in addition to the minister, to impose terms on the financial transactions that will be borrowing or borrowing-related.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chairman: Mr. Lee, I understand you have another amendment.

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes, amendment G-3. This is a clean-up clause that allows the movement of paragraph 46(b) of the FAA up into the new 45.1.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lee.

Mr. Scott Brison: What is the impact of this change, Mr. Lee?

Mr. Derek Lee: We have already, by the previous amendment, moved paragraph 46(b) up into another section, and we're now deleting....

Mr. Scott Brison: But what's the—

Mr. Derek Lee: This one deletes—

Mr. Scott Brison: No, but you must have a reason for this change. Could you explain the rationale behind the amendment? That's what I'm interested in. You, as a parliamentarian, are seeking to amend the budget implementation act, and as a parliamentarian I'm interested to note your rationale for that before we—

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes, I just explained that the balance of the sections are unnecessary because they're redundant and paragraph 46(b) has already been moved. The sections we're deleting are not needed any more.

Mr. Scott Brison: Okay, but why did you delete them? I guess that's the question.

Mr. Derek Lee: I just wanted them deleted.

Mr. Scott Brison: Yes, but why? Was it just arbitrary, or did you just pick some—

Mr. Derek Lee: No, because they're already contained in the other section.

Mr. Scott Brison: Okay. I was just curious as to your rationale behind these—

Mr. Richard Harris: Scott, he just got the amendments handed to him an hour ago. You don't expect him to understand them already.

Mr. Derek Lee: I'm quite willing, Mr. Chairman, to walk the member through the movement. Would you like that, Mr. Brison?

The Chairman: Can we have some order here?

Mr. Lee obviously has made these amendments because he feels they're necessary.

Mr. Scott Brison: I'm satisfied at this point.

The Chairman: You're satisfied?

Mr. Derek Lee: No, I think I'm going to walk Mr. Brison through it. I think it would be useful.

The Chairman: Do you have to walk us through as well?

Mr. Derek Lee: Do you want to pose your question again, Mr. Brison?

Mr. Scott Brison: I think I'm perfectly satisfied that you spent a lot of time developing your rationale for this—

Mr. Derek Lee: Have you got your bill opened on page 13, Mr. Brison?

Mr. Scott Brison: Mr. Lee, I'm satisfied.

Mr. Derek Lee: I was wondering if you had your bill open to page 13.

Mr. Scott Brison: No.

Mr. Derek Lee: You're not following.

Mr. Scott Brison: I wasn't amending.

Mr. Derek Lee: Mr. Brison is not following, for the record.

The Chairman: Mr. Lee, I think we're ready.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

The Chairman: What about amendment G-4? Mr. Lee, do you have the explanation for this one, for Mr. Brison and the rest of us?

Mr. Derek Lee: I hope Mr. Brison can follow this. We are adding—

Mr. Scott Brison: Go slowly, go slowly.

Mr. Derek Lee: We are adding the words “Governor in Council”. Consistent with my earlier explanation that the purpose of these amendments is to write in the Governor in Council, we are actually, in proposed clause 46.1, adding the words “Governor in Council”.

Mr. Scott Brison: That's a good idea, as long as you're consistent on this.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 22 as amended agreed to)

Mr. Richard Harris: Mr. Chairman, this is just a small point, but I don't think the wording flows, if you look at it closely.

The Chairman: Is this the part we just carried?

Mr. Richard Harris: Proposed clause 46.1.

The Chairman: Do you want to reopen the clause?

Mr. Richard Harris: It was pretty fast.

The Chairman: Was it fast?

Mr. Richard Harris: I wanted to make a point here.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Richard Harris: The way I read it, it will then read....

• 2005

Mr. Derek Lee: Would you like me to read it through?

The Chairman: No, I've got it. We're going to need to reopen this clause.

Mr. Derek Lee: Is it perfect, or is it perfect?

Mr. Richard Harris: I have it open. I'm following.

The Chairman: Just to recap, clause 22 carried as amended, and now we are on clause 23. I understand there is an amendment from the government, G-5.

(On clause 23)

Mr. Derek Lee: I move amendment G-5. This amendment restructures section 49 to replace a chunk of it because the sections are redundant to other sections because of other amendments we're making.

The portions that are being deleted in this amendment from the existing section 23 will now be contained in sections 54 and 55, recalling that we have added (d) to section 55.

(Amendment agreed to) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 23 as amended agreed to on division)

The Chairman: Now we have another amendment by the government, G-6. Mr. Lee, will you be doing this one?

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes, I move amendment G-6. Again, this new subsection (2) adds back in the Governor in Council as the effecter of the operation, reads them back into the loop and specifies or states that the Governor in Council can authorize for a period the financial transactions that are specified in the section.

I'm sorry, there was the additional add-on section, if members are interested. This is the movement of the paragraph (d) to section 55. This will authorize the Governor in Council and the minister to remunerate people who engage in these new types of financial transactions. There is an arguable doubt in the existing legislation as to how and when these people could be paid for the work they do in dealing with these transactions.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Richard Harris: I don't have section 55.

Mr. Derek Lee: We're on page 14 of the bill and then we're adding in new clause 23.1.

(Amendment agreed to on division) [See Minutes of Proceedings]

(On clause 24)

The Chairman: I understand there's a government amendment, G-7.

Mr. Derek Lee: I move amendment G-7. Because at any given time there are financial transactions at play out in the real world, there will come a day when this bill is going to be proclaimed in force. The trick for the government is picking a day that won't leave ongoing financial transactions in a hiatus, in a gap. So what the government proposes to do is clauses 20 to 24 will be proclaimed in force on the appropriate day when all of the financial transactions are set up for the change.

This statute makes changes in procedures and this allows the government to put them into play on a date when all of those transactions are lined up properly. All of the lawyers and all of the agents are ready for the change in procedure.

Amendment agreed to on division) See Minutes of Proceedings]

(Clause 24 agreed to on division)

• 2010

The Chairman: Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee: Mr. Chairman, because of all the amendments we've just adopted, it makes clauses 25, 26, 27, and 28 redundant. It makes them unnecessary, or in conflict or redundant. I am going to recommend that clause 25 not be carried and that it be negatived.

The Chairman: Is it the same with clauses 26, 27, and 28?

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes.

(Clauses 25 to 28 inclusive negatived on division)

(Clauses 29 to 54 inclusive agreed to on division)

(Clause 1 agreed to on division)

The Chairman: Shall the title carry?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Shall the bill carry?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Shall the committee order a reprint for use at report stage?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Shall the chairman report the bill with amendment to the House?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. That was very productive.

Before we leave, as always, we must be mindful of the fact that there are many people who work to make this happen. You know who you are—the officials from the department, the clerks and everyone here. I sincerely want to tell you that we truly appreciate all your work. It would not be possible without the excellent service you provide to this committee. Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.