PACP Committee Report

DISCIPLINE

As the previous sections describe, there were some significant breaches of policy in the outsourcing of the administration of the insurance and pension plans. The fact that there were no meaningful sanctions placed on the identified wrongdoers indicates that the system of discipline in the RCMP needs to be examined.

There is no question that several RCMP employees violated rules and allowed the mismanagement of the administration of the pension and insurance plans. Dominic Crupi, the director of the National Compensation Policy Centre (NCPC), was responsible for managing the various projects undertaken to effect this modernization, including outsourcing the pension administration. Jim Ewanovich, the Chief Human Resources Officer at the time of the problems with the plans’ administration, was ultimately responsible for the pension administration outsourcing project and the activities of the NCPC. Both Mr. Crupi and Mr. Ewanovich eventually lost their jobs as a result of the various investigations into the pension and insurance plans administration.

The internal audit into the administration of the pension plan, which was completed in October 2003, identified many of the areas of wrongdoing identified in the previous section of this report. The internal audit’s mandate was to determine whether the administrative activities of the RCMP pension plan were carried out in accordance with relevant government and RCMP policies, regulations and agreements. Though the original timeframe that the audit was to cover was from the years 2001 to 2003, the audit concluded after a review of the 2002-2003 fiscal year because the audit team concluded that it had enough evidence of serious issues that needed to be addressed by senior management as soon as possible.

As discussed in the previous section, the RCMP internal audit found that, based on the contracts the audit reviewed, the Treasury Board’s Contracting Policy was not complied with, specifically with regards to sole-source contracting and contract splitting. The results of the internal audit were shared with Commr Zaccardelli at the end of October 2003. At this time, Brian Aiken, the Director General of the Internal Audit Group, notified Commr Zaccardelli that Mr. Ewanovich, the Chief Human Resource Officer, had been dismissive of the findings of the audit.

After learning the results of the internal audit in October 2003, the Commissioner removed Mr. Ewanovich and Mr. Crupi from their positions as Chief Human Resources Officer and Director of NCPC, respectively. As Commissioner Zaccardelli told the Committee:

I did remove them immediately. I removed Mr. Ewanovich from his position. As I said, Barb George took over immediately that day in his former position. I then instructed her to remove Mr. Crupi.¹

However, as the Committee learned, neither Mr. Ewanovich nor Mr. Crupi was actually dismissed from the RCMP in November 2003. Mr. Ewanovich resigned from the RCMP in April 2004, and Mr. Crupi received various leave entitlements until he resigned from the RCMP in June 2005.²

In addition to not being dismissed from the RCMP upon learning the results of the internal audit, the Committee heard testimony that both Mr. Ewanovich and Mr. Crupi received performance pay, or bonuses, for years that they were involved in contracting irregularities. Commr Zaccardelli, when asked whether bonuses were automatically given each year, stated that there is no such thing as a bonus. He continued by stating that:

You have to earn [the performance pay]. If the government authorizes the pay of a bonus or pay at risk to be paid to the public service — the EX categories — then we, the people in the organization, make a determination on who is to be paid, based on their performance, and what amount they will get. I make that final decision.³

The Committee was appalled to learn that Commr Zaccardelli not only approved performance pay for Mr. Ewanovich and Mr. Crupi while they were engaged in unscrupulous contracting practices, but believes both had “earned” their performance pay. Deputy Commissioner Barbara George told the Committee that there is no mechanism for recouping past bonuses. She stated that:

You're always working on the past year, so if information comes to light that would have made a difference in that decision to pay it in the first place, there is no existing mechanism that I am aware of.⁴

In addition to receiving a performance bonus, the Committee learned that Mr. Crupi also received letters of recommendation from RCMP staff for a new position at the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), a highly sensitive government organization involved in monitoring foreign communications. That Mr. Crupi managed to obtain a position at CSE meant that his security clearance was in no way damaged by his actions at the RCMP. The Committee was shocked that despite the findings of wrongdoing against him, Mr. Crupi was able to receive letters of recommendation and was able to maintain his security clearance levels. The Committee believes this to be entirely inappropriate, and as such recommends that:

Recommendation 22

The Public Service Labour Relations Act and Treasury Board policies be amended to provide that a public servant dismissed for misconduct will: a) have his or her security clearance revoked; and b) be disentitled to a reference or recommendation for other employment within the public service.

The Committee was shocked to learn that two individuals who had been found to be in gross violation of Treasury Board policies were not automatically fired from their positions in the RCMP. By not dismissing those responsible for malfeasance in the administration of the pension and insurance funds, the RCMP sent a very poor message to those who risked their careers to bring the malfeasance to light. As Staff Sergeant Steve Walker told the Committee concerning the results of the Ottawa Police Service investigation,

This investigation and the outcomes are nothing short of sickening to any loyal and dedicated employee of the RCMP. My observations during this investigation and the evidence collected have led me to believe that actions or lack thereof should have resulted in the removal from management of a host of individual employees, and at the very least, quick internal sanction to ensure accountability. This should have been done to send a loud and clear message to all levels of management that corrupt conduct will be swiftly and severely dealt with in our national police service. The public expects this, and so do the employees and members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.⁵

Commissioner Zaccardelli defended his inability to fire Mr. Ewanovich and Mr. Crupi in front of the Committee by stating that:

In providing due process to people, the fact that you remove them from their jobs does not mean they are automatically off the books. People have leave, there are certain entitlements. That’s part of due process that everybody’s allowed, and that’s what Mr. Ewanovich and Mr. Crupi were given.⁶

The Committee is concerned at the conclusions that can draw from this situation. When wrongdoing has found to have been done, one expects that the wrongdoers face consequences for their actions. This does not appear to have been the case here.

Mr. Ewanovich’s and Mr. Crupi’s testimony before the Committee confirms that neither of the two actually left the RCMP when they were removed from their positions by Commissioner Zaccardelli. Mr. Ewanovich stated that, after he discussed the results of the internal audit with the Commissioner at the end of October 2003,

I agreed that I would step down from my position because of the seriousness of the audit. The next morning, I went to my colleagues on the senior executive team and I announced that I was stepping down because of the audit. I felt it had happened under my watch and that I was accountable, and the words that I used said I would be resigning. Subsequent to that, I resigned on April 2.⁷

Mr. Crupi stated that:

First of all, I wasn’t forced to leave, sir. I resigned on my own. … I knew at the time there was no way I could continue working in the RCMP. I was being continually attacked and therefore I decided to resign.⁸

That Mr. Ewanovich and Mr. Crupi were able to stay on the RCMP payroll well after they were found to be responsible for the malfeasance of the pension and insurance plans may diminish trust in the RCMP.

The current Commissioner of the RCMP, William Elliot, stated that “we should have a regime in which people who take actions — or fail to take actions — that justify dismissal should be able to be dismissed expeditiously.”⁹ The Committee wholeheartedly agrees with this assessment; however, the Committee also understands that the legislation and policies that govern the discipline of public servants and RCMP members does indeed make the process of dismissing an employee a difficult one.

Process for Dismissal

Currently, paragraph 12(1)(c) of the Financial Administration Act authorizes deputy heads in the public service to establish standards of discipline and to set penalties, including termination of employment, suspension, demotion to a position at a lower rate of pay and financial penalties, for breaches of discipline or misconduct. Section 12(3) specifies that disciplinary action may only be imposed for cause. The exercise of a deputy head’s authority to establish standards of discipline and to set penalties is subject to any directives or policies issued by the Treasury Board. The current Treasury Board policy on discipline, entitled Guidelines for Discipline, specifies that management in the public service is responsible and accountable for the imposition of discipline; however, the level of management involved should be commensurate with the severity of the disciplinary measure.¹⁰ In increasing severity, the disciplinary measures that may be imposed are: an oral reprimand; a written reprimand; suspension or a financial penalty; demotion; and termination of employment.

Under the Policy, disciplinary termination — firing a public service employee for misconduct — is considered to be the most severe of disciplinary measures. The Policy stipulates that the decision to proceed with disciplinary termination should only be taken after careful consideration and when it is determined that the employee is no longer suitable for continued employment by reason of misconduct. Disciplinary termination may be imposed after a series of acts of misconduct where a culminating incident has occurred, or for a single act of serious misconduct.

Under section 208 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA), a person who is disciplined is entitled to present an individual grievance up to and including the final level. These levels are established internally in the department or agency where the person is employed. The Public Service Labour Relations Board Regulations (PSLRBR) provide that an individual grievance process cannot be more than three levels. The employer must notify each of its employees of the names or titles of the persons whose decision on a grievance constitutes a level in individual grievances. Note that the PSLRBR prescribes time limits for the presentation of grievances under the PSLRA.

The parties can also avail themselves of an Informal Conflict Management System (ICMS), established under PSLRA. When the parties agree to use the ICMS to resolve a grievance, the time limits prescribed in the Public Service Labour Relations Board Regulations or contained in a collective agreement are suspended until either party gives notice to the other in writing to the contrary.

Under section 209 of the PSLRA, an employee may refer to adjudication a grievance that has been presented up to and including the final level in the grievance process and that has not been dealt with according to the employee’s satisfaction if, among other things, the grievance is related to a disciplinary action resulting in termination, demotion, suspension or final penalty. In such a case, one of three things will happen: (1) the parties may select an adjudicator; (2) a three-member board of adjudication may be established, upon the request of one of the parties, if the other party does not object within the time provided (composed of one member of the Public Service Labour Relations Board, who is the chairperson, and two other persons, each of whom is nominated by one of the parties); or (3) the Chairperson of the Public Service Labour Relations Board can designate an adjudicator from amongst the members of the Board.

If a grievance is heard by adjudication, the adjudicator must give the parties the opportunity to be heard. The adjudicator may, at any stage, assist the parties in resolving the difference by mediation, but only if the parties agree. If mediation is unsuccessful, the adjudicator may still continue the adjudication with respect to any matters that have not been resolved.

After considering a grievance, the adjudicator must render a decision and make the order he or she considers appropriate in the circumstances. The decision and order of an adjudicator are binding and final.

The Committee believes that the current policy on the dismissal of public servants for cause is complex and clumsy. Though the Committee understands the need for due process in the removal of an employee, it cannot understand how employees who have been found to be in gross violation of Treasury Board policies, such as Mr. Crupi and Mr. Ewanovich, were able to be given the “soft landings” they appeared to receive. In addition, the Committee recognizes that the inability to immediately dismiss a public servant for cause creates a poor picture of accountability and trust in the government by other government employees and by Canadians in general. Because the processes that need to be followed in order to dismiss an employee are so complex, and to better improve the mechanism for dismissal from the public service for cause, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 23

The Treasury Board Secretariat initiate a review of its policies on dismissing a public servant with cause so as to clearly allow for the immediate dismissal of any public servant who has engaged in misconduct; and

Recommendation 24

In order to speed up the process for dismissing a public servant for misconduct, the Public Service Labour Relations Act should be amended to provide that any grievance of the dismissal must be referred directly to adjudication within a prescribed time period.

Code of Conduct Time Limitation

In July 2005, soon after the Ottawa Police Service investigation report was provided to the RCMP, Deputy Commissioner George, the Chief Human Resources Officer, initiated a review of the report to establish who else was involved in the problems surrounding the administration of the pension and insurance plans and to determine if the RCMP’s Code of Conduct was contravened. The Code of Conduct review could not examine whether Mr. Ewanovich and Mr. Crupi had violated the Code, because by the time the review was established, they had already left the RCMP. However, the review could examine the conduct of other RCMP members and employees to determine their role in the problems surrounding the administration of the pension and insurance plans.

The internal review of Code of Conduct violations found that several members of the RCMP were in contravention of subsection 39(1) of the Code of Conduct which states that a member shall not engage in any disgraceful act or conduct that could bring discredit to the RCMP. However, as the Office of the Auditor General learned towards the completion of the audit, the RCMP was no longer considering disciplinary action against members about whom allegations of misconduct had been made. The RCMP Act requires that a formal disciplinary hearing take place within one year of an appropriate officer learning of a possible contravention of the RCMP Code of Conduct.¹¹ According to the Auditor General’s report, the Ottawa Police Service investigation report identified nine regular and civilian members who had contravened the RCMP Code. The RCMP found that disciplinary action was justified against four of the nine members; however, too much time had elapsed for any formal disciplinary measures to be taken.

The Code of Conduct states that a member of the RCMP shall promptly report any contravention of the Code. Ron Lewis and Chief Superintendent Fraser Macaulay did indeed report what they saw as violations of the Conduct to their superior officers, including the Commissioner. This occurred in May and June of 2003. It is hard to understand, then, why a Code of Conduct review was not initiated sooner than July 2005, over two years after the original complaints, and a year and a half after the RCMP’s internal audit confirmed that contracting practices were in violation of all established policies, especially given that the one year time limit set out in the RCMP Act. The RCMP told the Office of the Auditor General that it was following the practice of waiting to begin the Code of Conduct review until after the conclusion of the criminal investigation. However, the Committee heard no compelling evidence explaining why the Code of Conduct review did not begin as soon as the internal audit had been given to the Commissioner in October 2003.

The Office of the Auditor General’s report on this issue made no recommendations on the issue of the lack of disciplinary action against RCMP members. As Hugh McRoberts of the Auditor General’s office stated, while the Office did not make a recommendation on the management of internal investigations and disciplinary proceedings by the RCMP, it was “evident, however, that these need to be clarified.”¹² The Committee is willing to go further on this issue and recommend that, in order to avoid such situations in the future,

Recommendation 25

The Government of Canada amend section 43(8) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act to compel the Appropriate Officer to take action upon learning of any contravention of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Code of Conduct within one year or else be subject to sanctions.