PACP Committee Report

GOVERNANCE

The Committee heard testimony over the 15 meetings on the RCMP pension and insurance issue that dealt with a wide variety of problems in the internal management of the RCMP. The Committee was shocked to hear about, among other things, the treatment of whistleblowers, the lack of discipline meted out to wrongdoers, the disregard for contracting rules and the lack of attention paid to adhering to the Access to Information Act. The testimony heard by the Committee seemed to indicate that the RCMP has a poor grasp on internal departmental management. The Committee believes that without good management, there cannot be good accountability.

The governance structure of the RCMP concentrates considerable authority in the hands of the RCMP Commissioner. This may have contributed to, or at least exacerbated, the problems surrounding the administration of the pension and insurance plans. David Brown, author of the report from the Office of the Independent Investigator into RCMP Pension and Insurance Matters, points out that

the powers vested in the Commissioner of the RCMP make the holder of that office much more powerful than any corporate CEO. Accordingly, the attitudes and demeanour of the Commissioner pervade the RCMP more fundamentally than would be the case in most corporate environments.¹

Part of the reason for the concentration of authority in the hands in the Commissioner is that the current governance model at the RCMP is a paramilitary one that relies on a chain of command and orders that must be followed. The Commissioner has total authority in the RCMP. Additionally, the principle of police independence, whereby the police are separated from political direction over operational matters, has meant that the RCMP Commissioner does not receive much direction or oversight into administrative matters. Mr. Brown writes that “the prerogative of the Commissioner to direct the operation of the policing function is subject to virtually no oversight”.²

Mr. Brown points out in his report that the current RCMP paramilitary governance model

is not a governance model that investors in a $3 billion business would accept… [because a] sophisticated business organization of this size cannot provide appropriate transparency and accountability within a command and control structure.³

As an alternative, Mr. Brown notes that Crown corporations have independent boards of directors that are accountable to the government. The Chief Executive Officers of these boards are appointed by the Governor in Council, but are nonetheless accountable to both the board of directors and to the government. Mr. Brown suggests that implementing such a governance structure on the RCMP would not compromise the command and control structure that typifies effective policing.

As a board of directors is more appropriate to the corporate environment than to a government organization that must function within the framework of ministerial responsibility, the Committee believes that a police accountability board would be a better model for the RCMP. This sort of board could act as a buffer between the Public Safety Minister and the Commissioner in the sense that the Commissioner of the RCMP would report to the police accountability board, which would then would review the performance of the RCMP and recommend appropriate actions to the minister.

Many other provinces and municipalities have police boards that are responsible for oversight of the administration of their police forces. The Toronto Police Services Board, for example, has specific legislated responsibilities to determine objectives and priorities, establish policies for the effective management of the police service, establish guidelines for the administration of the public complaints system, and approve capital and operating budgets. This Police Services Board is accountable to both the community and to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS).⁴

British Columbia has a province-wide police board that sets the priorities, goals and objectives of its police department and develops the annual police department’s budget. The police board is responsible for service and policy complaints related to its police department. It also receives complaints against the Chief and Deputy Chief Constables. According to the provincial government, the board strives for a fair and responsive interaction between police and the community.⁵

The Committee believes that the type of governance oversight model typified by some provinces’ and municipalities’ police services boards could well serve the situation of federal policing. Having an accountability board to which the Commissioner of the RCMP would report could provide greater oversight to the substantial powers that currently reside with the RCMP Commissioner. If such a board was required to report publicly on the performance of the RCMP, its senior executive and its membership at large, there would be more of an onus on the Commissioner of the RCMP to act in such a way as befitted the RCMP. The composition of such a federal police accountability board is open to discussion, but given that a large part of the RCMP’s work focuses on contract policing to the provinces, the Committee would expect that the accountability board would include provincial representation.

Given the current need to improve accountability and oversight in the RCMP, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 31

The Government of Canada establish a Police Accountability Board that will provide third-party oversight of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Commissioner of the RCMP would continue to report to the Minister, but would also report to the Board, which, in turn, would report to the Minister and publish a public annual report on the performance of the RCMP, which would be tabled in Parliament.