AGRI Committee Report

The following sections will focus on the federal government’s activities and how they relate to provincial/territorial food safety programs where relevant. During testimony from the various federal authorities, their roles and levels of responsibility in the context of the 2008 listeriosis outbreak were described and questioned. The federal department involved is Health Canada, while the agencies include the CFIA (an agency under the responsibility of the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-food) and the PHAC (an agency of Health Canada).

Canada consolidated its food safety system in 1997. It regrouped all risk assessment activities (the scientific evaluation of all known and potential adverse health effects resulting from foodborne hazards) within Health Canada and all risk management activities (the processes and structures put in place to effectively minimize potential adverse foodborne hazards) within the CFIA. In general terms, the CFIA is responsible for putting into effect the policies and standards established by Health Canada through regulation, inspection and enforcement. PHAC also has a role in risk management, since it is responsible for disease surveillance, including detection of outbreaks and their sources, as well as reporting and disease prevention.

Risk assessment

Food safety risk assessment consists of determining, on the basis of scientific data, whether food additives, farm inputs (pesticides, veterinary drugs, etc.) or agri-food processing procedures compromise food safety. Food consumption can never be entirely risk-free, but the threshold below which the risk is minimal must be identified, thereby determining the acceptable level of consumer protection. In Canada, this role belongs to Health Canada. Under the Food and Drugs Act, Health Canada is responsible for establishing policies and standards relating to the safety and nutritional quality of food sold in this country. The Department must, for example, determine the residual quantities of pesticides allowed in foods and the safety of new food additives.

A. Food Safety Standards

The listeriosis outbreak has shed some light on areas to improve with respect to risk assessment. Firstly, Michael McCain, President of Maple Leaf Foods, emphasized the need for ongoing science-based review of sampling and testing requirements, since the Maple Leaf Foods plant was exceeding requirements for sampling but did not detect the listeria contamination. The ongoing review of existing policies to reflect emerging food safety issues was also identified by Health Canada in its report on the lessons learned from last summer’s listeriosis crisis. Mr. James Hodges, Executive Vice-President of the American Meat Institute talked about the United States’ experience with listeria and indicated that it is a continual learning experience as each incident brings new information on how to control the organism, which further improves preventive measures. Similarly, as a result of the listeria outbreak in 2008, the Canadian government reviewed and implemented a new policy called Risk-based Verification Sampling of Ready-to-Eat (RTE) Meat and Poultry Products, which came into effect 1 April 2009.

Prior to 2005, ready-to-eat products were monitored under two sampling programs undertaken by CFIA, M-200 and M-205. The M-200 work plan required microbiological testing of ready-to-eat meat end products, with a target of 10 samples twice a year per plant. The M-205 work plan required environmental sampling of manufacturing areas (such as the ready-to-eat meat packaging area) twice a year. With the introduction of mandatory Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) program in 2005, the sampling program M-205 was eliminated. Questioned on the relevance of removing the M-205, some witnesses, including Michael McCain, have indicated that the M-205 sampling program was probably not very effective in the light of the new scientific evidence brought by the listeriosis crisis.

Despite the removal of the M-205 sampling plan, environmental testing was still identified as a best practice by Health Canada but was not mandated; this may explain why Maple Leaf Foods was still conducting environmental testing within its HACCP program. There was, however, no legal obligation to report to CFIA immediately when an environmental sample was positive. There was and still is a legal obligation for industry to report end product positive tests. In that case, industry did have obligations to conduct sanitation and to retest. Based on the policy at the time, a negative retest following sanitation was deemed to have addressed the issue. As Mr. McCain pointed out, this is not how the data collected with their environmental testing should have been used. He told the Subcommittee that “what we did not do then, and what we do do now, is sophisticated investigative and pattern recognition science to analyze test results to better determine root cause.”[1]

The measures that were introduced on 1 April 2009 include mandatory environmental testing within the HACCP plans conducted by industry, including mandatory reporting of those results, on a daily basis or upon review by CFIA. When those samples are submitted to a private accredited lab, CFIA is alerted to a positive sample by the accredited lab. Environmental testing conducted by CFIA was also reintroduced at a greater frequency than required under the M-205 plan, and there is the continuation, at a greater frequency, of end product testing both by government and by industry. It should be noted that this new policy does not only cover L. monocytogenes but also salmonella and, for some products, E. coli O157:H7. These new requirements allow for investigation and follow-up of individual trends, such as looking for patterns where pathogens can develop in the production line.

The Canadian Meat Council also indicated that the sampling requirements may vary if the company uses an antimicrobial agent, but would like some additional flexibility based on the risk if a production line uses other food safety technologies. For example, the Subcommittee heard about “cold pasteurization.” Representatives from Piller’s Fine Foods described this process, whereby the finished and packaged product is subjected to extreme pressure, in much the same way as canned foods, which kills any microorganisms that might be present. They emphasized that this process does not replace or diminish any of the good manufacturing practices of food production, but they did question the need for all of the sampling required under the new policy, since the cold pasteurization method destroys all pathogens in the end product.

Recommendation 2:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government ensure that up-to-date food safety and processing technologies as well as new scientific evidence be included in all risk assessments and that this should be achieved by establishing a process of ongoing review of food safety standards.

In this regard, the Subcommittee heard testimony about the acceptable levels of listeria in food. The current standard does allow any listeria in most ready-to-eat food but does permit 100 listeria bacteria per gram of certain ready-to-eat foods where growth is not sustained. For some witnesses, permitting any level of listeria poses a threat to vulnerable populations.[2] In other countries, including the United States and Brazil, no listeria is permitted in any ready-to-eat food.

B. Common Approach to Food Safety Standards

Health Canada is responsible for evaluating the potential health effects of food production aids and technologies. Research and development bring food safety innovations and technologies that, if safe and effective, should be available as soon as possible to food producers. For example, Health Canada issued an interim marketing authorization to permit the use of sodium diacetate (a mixture of sodium acetate and acetic acid or vinegar) as an additive in standardized and unstandardized preparations of meat, meat by-products, poultry meat, poultry meat by-products, prepared and preserved fish products. Sodium diacetate is a bactericide and fungicide; that is, it controls both mould and bacterial growth in food. As stated earlier, industry requested approval of this antimicrobial in September 2002, and it has been widely used in the United States for the past five years. According to the American Meat Institute, during that time, there have been no ready-to-eat meat recalls due to Listeria.

In the United States, irradiation of ground beef was approved in 1997. This technology destroys disease-causing bacteria in foods and serves the same function as milk pasteurization and pressure cooking of canned foods. Food irradiation is endorsed by many groups, including the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and has been approved for several decades for a handful of foods in Canada, such as potatoes to inhibit sprouting. In 1998, the Canadian Cattlemen's Association (CCA) submitted an initial petition to Health Canada to approve irradiation of fresh and frozen ground beef to minimize the risks associated with E. coli 0157:H7. Regulatory changes to allow irradiation of ground beef were published in Part 1 of the Canada Gazette on 23 November 2002 but progressed no further in the process. In 2008, a review of scientific literature showing the effectiveness of irradiation against E. coli 0157:H7 and salmonella in ground beef was submitted to Health Canada by the CCA.

New technologies that could have a direct impact on the safety of food products have to be approved, and some of the above examples show that it takes time to obtain permission to use them. Members of the Subcommittee have asked why it takes so long to approve new products and technologies and why only an emergency like the listeriosis outbreak seems to speed up the approval process. According to witnesses, all the studies and scientific data showing that these additives and antimicrobial agents pose no danger are available, but the Canadian regulatory system asks to provide information every time the industry wants to use a new one. According to the Canadian Meat Council (CMC), Health Canada does not have the same capacity to approve all antimicrobials, veterinary drugs, and pesticides that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has. As an organization, the FDA employs 10,000 people for this purpose, while the comparable Health Canada section employs approximately 800. The CMC asserted that there is little use in Canada conducting its own studies on products that the Europeans or the Americans have already approved, and that products already approved in these countries should be approved based on the same data.

The agriculture and agri-food sector has always been a strong proponent of the harmonization of pesticide, veterinary drug and other food safety regulations with those of the United States. Some would even go further and support the creation of a Canada-United States food safety authority based on the models implemented in the European Union with its European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) and in Australia and New Zealand with the Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). Those two agencies are in charge of the risk assessment and development of food safety standards; enforcing the standards remains under the supervision and responsibility of the individual countries. The European Union created the EFSA in the aftermath of the mad cow crisis, when it was realized that a continental approach would be more efficient. The CMC also indicated that the new Obama administration has announced that it is reviewing the American food safety system after the recent contamination of peanut products with salmonella. Since the Canadian economy is highly integrated with that of the United States, there is an opportunity to engage with the United States authorities on common food safety issues.

Recommendation 3:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government increase its collaborative efforts with the United States and consult with stakeholders and consumers on the possibility of developing a common approach to food safety standards.

Risk management

A. The Federal Food Safety Network

At the federal level, enforcement of the food standards is the responsibility of the CFIA. The Subcommittee was told that the CFIA is a science-based regulator with a mandate to safeguard food, animal health and plant protection and that CFIA is “part of a national network responsible for food safety, which includes Health Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada, provincial and territorial departments of health, and the public health units found in local municipalities”.[3] CFIA’s role in food safety risk management is through inspection, testing, auditing and reviewing of food production. When necessary the CFIA can take enforcement measures and issue food recalls.

Other federal agencies are involved in managing food safety risks. PHAC, which is mandated to promote and protect the health of Canadians, is responsible for preparing for, detecting, and responding to, any outbreaks that threaten human health, including outbreaks of foodborne illnesses. When an outbreak spreads beyond a jurisdiction or exceeds its capacity, PHAC takes the national lead on the human health side.

In addition to its risk assessment role, Health Canada provides assistance to CFIA and PHAC when an outbreak occurs. Health Canada carries out tests for the presence of contaminants in food and tests food samples to determine whether there is a link between a suspected outbreak and a specified food source. The department also provides scientific expertise to help CFIA respond effectively and appropriately in a given food safety circumstance. Finally, as part of its role in delivering public health services to first nations, Health Canada provides information to these communities about food recalls.

Risk management activities can be categorized in two broad areas: minimizing the risks, and managing outbreaks and emergencies when they occur. The following paragraphs focus on different risk management activities addressed during the Subcommittee hearings.

B. Minimizing Food Safety Risks

One thing that all witnesses emphasized was that safety cannot be ensured only through testing or inspections, but that preventative programs are the best way to produce safe food. The Subcommittee heard that it is virtually impossible to test all products on the shelves for contamination. Similarly, testing end products in a random fashion may not help to show the whole picture: as explained by Mr. Rick Holley, professor at the University of Manitoba, when a problem is not suspected, it is not possible to know what proportion of the products is likely to be contaminated. Since an organism like listeria occurs in foods at 0.1%, at least a thousand tests have to be conducted in order to find one positive. A similar limitation exists with environmental testing. Unless every point of contact is sampled along a production line, the source of a contaminant may be missed.

Food safety problems have to be identified and eliminated from the food production chain, so that the end products are safe to eat. This section addresses initiatives at different stages of the food supply chain that help prevent food safety hazards from developing and consequently contaminating food products.

1. At the Farm

Farmers address food safety through three broad and related systems: on-farm food safety (OFFS) programs, biosecurity programs, and traceability programs. In 2001, federal, provincial, and territorial (FPT) ministers agreed to a framework for the recognition of OFFS assurance programs based on the HACCP system. Commodity groups have been developing and administering OFFS programs since then. These programs are summarized in table 1.

Table 1: Summary of On-Farm Food Safety Programs by Commodity or Commodity Groups

Commodity	Program Name	Remarks
Chicken	Safe, Safer, Safest	83% of chicken farms already certified
Beef	Verified Beef Production	Approximately 400 producers certified or in process of being certified
Hog	CQA	Approximately 7,000 production units certified (representing over 70% of total Canadian production )
Sheep	Food-Safe Farm Practices	510 producers trained by the end of fiscal 2007-08, with 100 additional by the end of 2008
Milk	Canadian Quality Milk	All farms certified by the end of 2010 (Number of certified farms currently varies by provinces from zero to 90%)
Fruits and Vegetables	CanadaGap	Technical review by CFIA completed for most commodities; nearly 300 producers already certified
Grains/Oilseeds/Pulse	ExcelGrains Canada	Technical review by CFIA completed; implementing the certification process

OFFS programs identify such potential food safety hazards as chemical residues from animal health product use or pesticides, determines a number of procedures to eliminate those hazards, and defines the record-keeping procedures farmers have to follow to ensure that the program is correctly implemented. Most commodities have received technical recognition by CFIA for their OFFS programs, and farmers’ representatives asked for continuous support from the government to help them fully implement OFFS program and obtain recognition nationally and internationally.

Biosecurity programs are again commodity group-led initiatives to protect animals and prevent the spread of disease. They are particularly important in industries that commonly operate with confined animals. For example, the Chicken Farmers of Canada has developed, in partnership with CFIA, protocols on disease preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery, such as enhanced biosecurity provisions and an avian influenza low pathogenic surveillance program. The Canadian pork industry has also been a leader in biosecurity measures and disease control protocols. Witnesses have said that government should help commodity groups that currently lack biosecurity programs and that it must inform the general public as well as non-agricultural government organizations about biosecurity and disease prevention. The Subcommittee was told about instances where people have entered a farm site without checking to see what biosecurity protocols are in place and without the consent of the farm owner. Mr. Robert McLean, Vice‑President of Keystone Agricultural Producers, told the Subcommittee that the industry has worked with the Manitoba government to put together a workshop to train government inspectors and others frequenting farms about the importance of biosecurity and proper procedures when they do on-farm inspections. Given the current situation with the header1N1 influenza A virus, it is paramount that biosecurity measures be fully understood by the general public and government organizations.

Finally, tracking and traceability programs are intended to provide government and industry with a responsive capacity to deal with a disease outbreak when it occurs. They are not preventive programs and apply not just to farmers but to the entire food supply chain. This aspect will be discussed in the section “Managing Emergencies”.

Witnesses have indicated that there is not always a clear incentive for farmers to adopt measures or programs to improve food safety. Because they prevent diseases, biosecurity measures usually have clear economic benefits, but this is not always the case. Many producers told the Subcommittee that OFFS programs were developed with the idea of being able to market them and receive a premium. This hope never really materialized, but farm groups have indicated that some retailers will not buy from producers unless they can prove they have an OFFS program.

Mr. Rick Culbert, President of Bioniche Food Safety, also talked about the challenge with adoption of OFFS measures. His company developed the world’s first licensed vaccine against E. coli O157:H7, a bacteria strain that releases toxins that cause severe, permanent illness or even death. He told the Subcommittee that when the vaccine is given to cattle it significantly reduces E. coli colonization in the animals, by as much as 98%. This reduction in the amount of E. coli O157:H7 shed by cattle helps to reduce the risk of it being present in ground beef or surface water. As this bacteria does not make cattle sick, however, there is no incentive at the moment for cattlemen to vaccinate them. Like retailers with OFFS programs, packers might be interested to know that their risk of bringing E. coli through the packing plant door is reduced. The question remains whether they will be willing to pay a premium for it or whether they just dictate preferential supplier status and give priority to vaccinated cattle.

The Subcommittee has heard that producers are willing to prove that the food they produce is safe through these programs, but government must know that there is an economic cost to producers to doing so without being able to pass it on to the rest of the supply chain. Witnesses indicated that there is a need for cost to be offset by government on behalf of society, possibly through tax credits, incentive-based programs, or by making food safety expenses eligible for the Agri-Flex program[4] and broadening eligibility criteria for government funding to animal vaccines if they have a clear benefit for public health.

2. Processors

One of CFIA’s primary focuses is to inspect and audit food processing establishments. Inspection frequencies and types vary, depending on whether the products are imported or are from federally regulated or non-federally regulated establishments.

In addition to the requirements under the Food and Drugs Act, a number of products must comply with other statutes, namely the Canada Agricultural Products Act, the Meat Inspection Act and the Fish Inspection Act. Those commodities (dairy products, shell and processed eggs, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, honey, maple syrup, beef, pork, poultry and fish) make up 56% of the consumer’s grocery budget.[5] Regulations under these statutes provide for specific food safety regimes for the covered commodities, and each establishment has to follow strict food safety standards for their processing lines. Federally registered establishments are inspected regularly, sometimes daily, to ensure compliance with federal regulations.

The Food Safety Enhancement Program (FSEP) was developed in 1989 for the industries covered by the Canada Agricultural Products Act, the Meat Inspection Act and the Fish Inspection Act. Initially voluntary, this program became mandatory for some industries including the meat sector in 2005. Under the FESP, processors develop a HACCP program where in critical areas of the production line that may pose a food safety risk are identified and measures determined to eliminate the problem. Processors must also develop a prerequisite program to prove their transportation, storage, sanitation and other systems meet the CFIA’s criteria. With the gradual adoption of these new programs, the CFIA has replaced its traditional inspection system with a HACCP-based inspection system, under which inspectors check the validity and adequacy of the processors’ food safety procedures. The current approach to inspection, the compliance verification system (CVS), is a detailed checklist that guides inspectors, who then use defined verification tasks to assess a facility’s ability to meet the regulatory requirements by focusing on the systems the facility has put in place. According to the CFIA, the CVS assures consistency and uniformity in inspection activities and prescribes inspection frequencies.

Some witnesses suggested that the HACCP approach has become the gold standard for food safety. It is referenced by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and the World Health Organization. It is widely used in food processing industries in the United States and in the European Union and is advocated globally as the best standard, because it allows mapping known risks, documenting how risks will be managed, and then verifying whether the procedures were followed. When a problem occurs, it then provides the framework to go back and determine the origin of the contamination.

The Subcommittee heard some concerns that HACCP and CVS constitute a trend toward a deregulation of the food industry, since it gives a more prominent role to the industry in food safety procedures. According to the CFIA, HACCP and CVS do not constitute a privatization of the food inspection system, since it does not change the government’s role in establishing food safety standards and in verifying compliance with food safety requirements. In fact, controls in place under a HACCP system could not be carried out by a team of inspectors and were not all in place under the old inspection systems. In addition, the Subcommittee heard from Ms. Jennifer Fowler, inspector at the CFIA, who explained how she verifies companies’ reassessment of their HACCP programs:

What I'm doing is a verification of their written HACCP program which consists of the written HACCP plan, the actual process involved, and also their prerequisite program which has to do with the environmental factors in the plant. I look at the HACCP program. There are certain guidelines that they have to follow in writing up the HACCP program. It ranges from a form 1 that speaks about the product, to a form 10 which is their HACCP program.[…] It actually outlines the process from the time the raw product enters the plant to the time it finishes and leaves the door. […] the company is supposed to analyze, based on their system, where they will place the critical control point to make sure that the hazards that could be introduced at a certain point are being addressed and monitored. […] I go inside once I've reviewed the program to make sure that what they have on paper is exactly what's happening on the kill floor. I verify the accuracy of those plants. […] I am doing the verification in that once I'm saying that the HACCP written program is okay, the inspector is the one who implements that program. If they don't have a properly written HACCP program, the implementation will fail.[6]

Mr. James Stamatakis also described his tasks as a front line CFIA inspector in ready-to-eat meat plants:

I do work directly in the establishment and the establishments presently that I have—two establishments—are both ready-to-eat establishments. My job duties, starting from the beginning, are to perform CVS tasks. Also, my job duties are to ensure that import and export inspection is done, filing reports, answering e-mails, phone calls, and setting up schedules for the rest of the week for CVS tasks that I'm supposed to be doing [...] I am there from 7:30 in the morning until 3:30. When I do come in to perform my duties, I make sure that I release the stamps for export certification and verification to be done by the establishment under my auspices. I also might have to leave halfway through the day to go to my second establishment.[7]

Some witnesses, however, expressed some concerns about implementation of the new regime. Mr. Nelson Vessey, who worked for 40 years as an inspector with Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and the CFIA, provided an historical perspective of how food inspection programs have evolved. He told the Subcommittee that improving the system was not always the driver behind the changes and that there has been an ongoing failure to ensure that any new inspection procedures would have the desired results before putting them in place. In his opinion, the CVS has not yet been proven scientifically to work.

Mr. Bob Kingston, National President of the Agriculture Union, a part of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, indicated that the HACCP-based inspection system has drained many resources away from other useful inspection activities. He notably mentioned that traditional inspections are a good complement to HACCP and should not be overlooked. Having inspectors on-site in the plant affects the behaviour of the plant employees in a positive way so that procedures are followed more strictly and precisely, enables better communication with plant employees, and allows experienced inspectors to recognize symptoms of problems, such as excessive condensation and moisture or worn or cracked rubber belts that are very hard to sterilize. He emphasized that it does not replace the HACCP system, but traditional inspection of the plant gives the inspector real‑life experience and knowledge of the plant that can only improve his or her analysis of the plant HACCP records. Mr. James Stamatakis also confirmed that his experience with traditional inspection and the current HACCP program and CVS complement each other:

I feel that with the combination of my old experience, in the old system, along with the training at this present new system with the CFIA, with CVS tasks coming into effect, that when you marry these two disciplines together that you can do a better job. I'm happy with what I do. I feel it's effective, but like every other system, as was mentioned earlier this evening, there are going to be problems that have to be resolved.[8]

Despite the reservations described above, food inspectors, academics, and the food industry have all endorsed and supported the HACCP approach. Many even expressed a belief that in the absence of HACCP, the origin of the listeriosis issue would not have been identified. In addition, in the case of ready-to-eat products, HACCP programs allow for a greater frequency of testing by both industry and government.

The Subcommittee heard that current standards provide better protection than before. For that reason, some witnesses have asked that Canada create a single meat inspection standard. Provincially inspected (PI) meat plants that only trade within one province do not meet the same standards as federally inspected plants. Ms. Laurie Nicol, Executive Director of the Ontario Independent Meat Processors (OIMP), indicated that the Province of Ontario recently introduced stronger meat inspection regulations that require HACCP programs. Other provinces still have meat processors that are rarely inspected or do not have HACCP programs. This does not mean, however, that these plants are operating at a lower food safety standard than large federally inspected facilities.

Members have expressed concerns that a single standard could hurt PI plants that are generally smaller. Actions taken by Maple Leaf Foods for detecting the source of the listeria contamination were extensive and costly. Similarly, new prevention strategies now employed require more resources than previously. The Canadian Meat Council indicated that some federally inspected plants can be quite small, citing a company with only 15 employees, for instance. The OIMP, which represents small businesses, agrees it can be a challenge, but suggested that there may be ways other than the CFIA standards to achieve food safety. It was suggested that an “outcome-based standard” would provide identical safety and satisfy both small and large plants. Since the current national meat and poultry code, developed by CFIA and the provinces, includes those outcomes, the CFIA could, according to the OIMP, recognize provincial standards as equivalent to the federal standard. Ms. Jennifer MacTavish, Executive Director of the Canadian Sheep Federation, also supported the concept of reciprocal agreements across provinces.

Mr. James Hodges from the American Meat Institute explained that the United States also has two systems, a federal inspection system and individual state systems. Legislation was revised a few years ago to include an equivalency between state and federal standards. Currently, individual state systems must be equivalent to the federal system. Plants in states that do not have their own inspection systems (a little less than half of the states) are federally inspected.

3. Importation

Inspection of imported products is another important focus for CFIA. The 2007-08 CFIA performance report to Parliament stated that “since the creation of the agency in 1997, the imports and exports of products subject to CFIA regulation have increased 45.6%”.[9] According to Mr. Christopher Kyte, President of the Food Processors of Canada, the imported food sector represents 23% of the food consumed in Canada but 50% of the food recalls.[10] Unlike food produced in Canada, where CFIA can play an active role to implement preventative programs at the food processing level, imported foods require a different approach: equivalency and inspection of products.

With respect to meat, before a country can export products to Canada, the CFIA must assess two points in particular:

• Whether the country’s meat inspection system must be considered equivalent to Canada’s; and
• Whether the country’s status with respect to certain serious animal diseases or diseases that have serious economic consequences.

The CFIA deems another country’s meat inspection and certification system to be equivalent to Canada’s if it has demonstrated that its system can achieve the same level of protection of human and/or animal health as Canada’s system. Once the CFIA has approved a foreign country’s inspection system, it assesses it regularly to determine whether it maintains the equivalence. In addition to this, the CFIA monitors imports by checking product admissibility at points of entry and it administers an imported meat product inspection program.

One element of the meat inspection program is the pre-market label registration. Currently, an exporter of meat to Canada must submit its labels to the CFIA for registration. Mr. Robert de Valk, Executive Secretary of the Canadian Association of Regulated Importers, indicated that the government has decided to eliminate this requirement. His association, along with the Food Processors of Canada, opposes this move by the government. According to Mr. De Valk, this program is an efficient and effective means of keeping out imports that do not meet Canadian requirements. For example, a USDA inspector at a plant in the United States that exports to Canada has to interpret the Canadian regulations and ensure that the export that is being prepared there meets Canadian import requirements. Mr. De Valk asserted that “one of the most effective ways [the U.S. inspector] can assure himself that the particular export meets Canadian requirements is to have a label that is registered by the CFIA. Then he knows that someone in Canada has already looked at it and said this meets Canadian requirements.”[11]

Pre-market label registration is also mandatory in Canada.[12] The Canadian Meat Council (CMC) has been in favour of removing it for a long time and agrees with the government decision to eliminate the requirement. The CMC believes that compulsory pre−market label approval of meat products is not a food safety issue and that it delays product launch. Registration of labels does not ensure the product is safe; nor does it ensure that all ingredients are declared on the labels. The real food safety issue is ensuring that what is on the label is indeed what is in the food.

The Subcommittee also heard from Mr. Paul Caron, a CFIA inspector for 35 years, who spent a majority of his career as a CFIA border inspector and now is working as a consultant for the meat industry. He identified a number of shortcomings in the CFIA meat import inspection program. For example, imported meat shipments in Canada are not inspected at the port of entry, and exporters know between 72 hours and 30 days in advance whether or not their shipments will be inspected. He also indicated that statistics obtained through the Access to Information Act showed that “from January 1, 2000 to December 2007, 2,936 shipments that had been ordered by CFIA to be inspected were not inspected”,[13] and nothing suggests that companies were prosecuted for not complying.[14] He also asserted that “Import meat samples have not been and continue to not be sampled according to the sampling plans outlined in Chapter 10, Meat Hygiene Manual of Procedures”.[15]

Many witnesses said that imported products must meet the same standards as Canadian products. For example, Mr. Michael McCain asked that CFIA “appropriately ascertain the safety of imported ready-to-eat products by equal enforcement of its revised listeria policy at the border”.[16] Dr. Brian Evans assured members that it is very important for Canada to ensure that whatever standards apply to our domestic industry also apply to imports. He also testified that the CFIA will promote equivalency of the new listeria policy with Canada’s trading partners, with additional verifications of products imported into Canada.

4. Distribution and Consumers

While the federal government does have a less active role in the sector downstream of the processors, various stakeholders including the trucking industry and retailers play a role in minimizing and preventing food safety hazards. The Canadian Supply Chain Food Safety Coalition indicated that industry associations, using the same approach as that pioneered by the primary production sector, have developed or are in the process of developing and implementing national HACCP-based food safety programs.

Mr. Nick Jennery, President of the Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors (CCGD), notably mentioned that industry does not compete on food safety. CCGD worked with the Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers (CFIG) to develop a HACCP-based retail food safety program, which is currently being implemented across all CCGD retail members. In the fall of 2008, CCGD, along with Food & Consumer Products of Canada and the CFIG, also initiated an industry association working group to review and update the Supply Chain Food Product Recall Manual.

On the consumer side, the Subcommittee heard from the Canadian Partnership for Consumer Food Safety Education (CPCFSE). Among the 11 to 13 million annual cases of foodborne illness in Canada, the majority is caused by improper handling or cooking of the food at home. Ms. Brenda Watson, Executive Director of the CPCFSE, told the Subcommittee that research reveals that despite the fact that the majority of adults feel confident they understand and follow safe food-handling procedures, a sizeable number do not consistently follow them. The CPCFSE administers ongoing public awareness initiatives and offers consumers access to information on safe food handling at home. Technologies could also be available to consumers to help them mitigate food safety hazards. For example, the Subcommittee heard from Toxin Alert, which is developing packaging that signals bacterial contamination.

Providing information to the public on proper food handling procedures but also on food standards and risks from new technologies, contamination, or pathogens is an important factor in maintaining consumers’ confidence. Mr. Sylvain Charlebois, Associate Professor at the University of Regina, indicated that despite doing better than most industrialized countries, the Canadian food system has always been weak on risk communication, a shortcoming also identified by Health Canada in its Lessons Learned report. Mr. Charlebois suggested that the public does not have much knowledge about our food standards and food safety programs and that the government should focus on educating the public. This was also supported by the CPCFSE, which recommended that all food safety initiatives must include a focus on the consumer. The CPCFSE also recommended that communication be harmonized, integrated, and planned between industry and government and urged that ongoing investment is required to deliver food safety messaging to consumers. Indeed, campaigns aimed at changing behaviour can take 20 to 30 years to gain significant traction in the marketplace, as demonstrated by the anti-smoking campaign.

The Subcommittee also heard some testimony on communication models. The CPCFSE believes that its partnership model makes effective use of financial resources and that rather than inventing a new model, the Government of Canada should invest in the existing one that has served the Canadian consumer over the past 12 years. On the other hand, Mr. Charlebois recommended that a single Canada-US food safety agency could focus on consumer concerns alone. He testified that since communication means managing perceptions and fear, CFIA is not designed to deal with the public and that CFIA should instead look solely at regulating and developing a partnership with the industry to implement inspection programs.

Finally, the Subcommittee addressed the issue of consumer confidence in the Canadian food safety system. Witnesses representing Option consommateurs discussed the crisis of confidence that they felt followed the listeria outbreak. CFIA acknowledged that confidence may have been temporarily shaken, as is normal at a time of crisis, but denied that the outbreak brought about a real crisis of confidence.

5. Recommendations on Minimizing Risks

As mentioned throughout this report, HACCP-based food safety systems are now an integral part of Canada’s food safety approach. Although they do not and cannot prevent all problems from occurring, they are recognized by many as the most effective method for minimizing food safety hazards. It should be noted also that although HACCP programs are mandatory in many federally inspected establishments, products not covered by the Canada Agricultural Products Act, the Meat Inspection Act and the Fish Inspection Act are under a different inspection regime, and this may give the false impression that they are not inspected at all.

Recommendation 4:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government encourage the implementation of HACCP-based food safety systems certified by the appropriate food safety authority.

The Subcommittee heard from various sources that, despite having good programs in place, CFIA lacks the resources to properly implement all that it is mandated to do. Declining and inadequate training and lack of personnel were identified as problematic. On training, for example, Mr. Paul Caron, who formerly trained import inspectors, noticed a decline in the technical knowledge of those inspectors. The Canadian Meat Council also told the Subcommittee that after the new “Risk-based Verification Sampling of Ready-to-Eat (RTE) Meat and Poultry Products” was implemented on 1 April 2009, it became evident that many inspectors did not know enough about proper aseptic sampling techniques. With respect to resources, internal CFIA documents received by the Subcommittee revealed that the CFIA inspection program is experiencing workload challenges in meeting delivery requirements. Mr. Don Irons, a food processing supervisor at the CFIA, also indicated he does not have the necessary resources to properly implement the Compliance Verification System in the area for which he is responsible.

There was a fair amount of discussion on the ratio of inspectors to plants to which they are assigned. Some witnesses suggested that the ratio was too high. For example, the inspector responsible for the Maple Leaf plant was also assigned to six other establishments at the time of the crisis. However, CFIA officials indicated that they try to adjust the number of plants per inspector based on the plants’ complexity, size, and location and that there is no ideal ratio.

When asked for statistics on the number of front line inspectors, CFIA gave conflicting testimony. Union representatives offered different figures as well. Mr. Bob Kingston also questioned where the approximately 200 new inspectors announced by the government were deployed, a concern also raised by the National Farmers Union. The CFIA confirmed that 207 new inspectors had been added between March 2006 and March 2008, 133 of whom are meat inspectors. The government invested $113 million for food and product safety in budget 2008, and witnesses commended the $250 million in budget 2009 for improvement of federal laboratories. Nevertheless, many witnesses emphasized that systems can only reach their potential if they are properly resourced and implemented. As stated by Mr. Michael McCain: given the mandate that we believe is appropriate for the CFIA, for the government and regulator going forward, we would share your view that more resources are required, not less.”[17]

Recommendation 5:

The Subcommittee recommends that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, cooperatively with the union, finds the means and technology such that they can provide accurate, real-time evaluation of inspector resources.

The Subcommittee believes that the debate over CFIA resources is the responsibility of Parliament and that any assertion about the adequacy or the lack of resources should not be made lightly, as it can undermine the public’s confidence in the Canadian food safety system.

Recommendation 6:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government undertake a comprehensive review of the resources, including training, that Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) needs to properly implement, execute and enforce all food inspection activities; and that the government make that review public.

A frequent message during the Subcommittee’s hearings was that all foods sold in Canada must meet the same standards. As indicated before, the implementation of HACCP systems all along the food chain for all products, including those not covered by the Canada Agricultural Products Act, the Meat Inspection Act and the Fish Inspection Act, would partially resolve this issue. Nevertheless, many products sold in this country are not federally inspected, and although members do not want to suggest that these products are not the same, with respect to safety as those under the federal system, the Subcommittee believes Canadians should not be given the impression that there is a double food safety standard in Canada.

Recommendation 7:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government implement a system to recognize the equivalency of existing provincial inspection systems in comparison to the federal inspection system.

A safe supply of food is a public good, and in many cases farmers and processors bear the costs of implementing proactive food safety measures without being able to pass them on to the consumers. In some cases, such as the vaccination of cattle against E. coli O157:H7, the cost prevents adoption of the technology, since there is no incentive for producers. Because there is the expectation that all food sold in Canada is safe, there is no price premium paid to Canadian producers who pay the costs associated with providing safe food, yet they compete with international producers who do not always pay the same costs. Members agree that the government has a responsibility to offset some of the cost, since food safety is a public good.

Recommendation 8:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government provide funding for food safety initiatives at the different levels of the food supply chain, including the implementation of policy changes that support the development of novel approaches to foodborne pathogens.

The Subcommittee agrees with the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance[18] that E. coli should be eliminated from the food supply.

Recommendation 9:

The Subcommittee recommends that the federal government develop initiatives designed to work towards the removal of E. coli from the Canadian food chain.

Finally, as a means of increasing consumer confidence in the food safety system:

Recommendation 10:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government restore and publish the Establishment Inspection Reports and Establishment Ratings.

C. Managing Emergencies

1. National Foodborne Illnesses Surveillance System

One of PHAC’s primary functions is disease surveillance. The Subcommittee heard from Dr. David Butler-Jones, Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer, and Dr. Frank Plummer, Director of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, who provided details of PHAC’s surveillance systems for foodborne illness.

With respect to infectious diseases, PHAC maintains a database of nationally notifiable diseases, that is, diseases that must be reported within the provinces and territories, and this data is transmitted to PHAC. Diseases that are to be nationally notifiable are determined through federal/provincial/territorial negotiations.[19] Subcommittee members were told that of the top pathogens causing foodborne illnesses, all but listeria are reportable. Other pathogens include E. coli O157:H7 (verotoxigenic E. coli), salmonella, Clostridium botulinum and shigella. Richard Holley, a food safety specialist, told the Subcommittee that in addition to listeria, Staphylococcus aureus and Clostridium perfringens, which also cause significant levels of foodborne illness in Canadians every year, are also not reportable federally. Listeriosis has not been a nationally notifiable disease since 1999, and members asked whether it should be placed back on the list, given the high mortality rate associated with this pathogen in vulnerable populations, the ability of listeria to thrive in environments that are not conducive to most bacterial growth, and the long incubation period of the disease. The Chief Public Health Officer indicated that removing listeria from the list may have been premature.

The Subcommittee also heard about a multi-partner surveillance initiative funded by PHAC and Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, called C-EnterNet, which is in its pilot phase. It is meant to reduce the burden of enteric disease through sentinel site surveillance, which requires collaboration among jurisdictions, as well as the development of better food safety policies. Mr. Rick Culbert of Bioniche Food Safety urged the Subcommittee to recommend that the government fully fund C-EnterNet.

The National Enteric Surveillance Program (NESP), which is a national surveillance program designed to provide timely analysis and reporting of laboratory-confirmed enteric disease cases in Canada, was also described to the Subcommittee. The NESP has been in operation since April 1997 and provides weekly reports to stakeholders across the country. However, Mr. Holley explained that the NESP pools laboratory reports of foodborne illness and puts them all together, but that the results are easily skewed, and that it does not provide an accurate reflection of the incidence of enteric disease because only Quebec and British Columbia require that all foodborne illnesses caused by microorganisms be reported. He stated that

for reportable diseases in six of our provinces, the data are pooled together, they’re aggregated. Other provinces don’t aggregate the data. They come to Ottawa and you can’t make any sense of them. We don’t know what makes us sick and we don’t know what foods containing those unknown organisms cause greater frequencies of illnesses.[20]

Similarly, Mr. Ron Usborne testified that the collection of epidemiological data—that is, the type of pathogen, number of cases, where outbreaks occur, etc.—needs to be improved. He indicated that a program to help us evaluate how our programs are working to combat foodborne disease and allow continuous improvement had been designed at Health Canada but was never implemented. He told the Subcommittee that such a program would help evaluate the effectiveness of food safety and surveillance programs and allow for continuous improvement.[21]

Although the Subcommittee was not told about the NESP by PHAC officials, they were told that, had the outbreak occurred five years ago, the tragedy would have probably been greater. PHAC spoke about PulseNet and the Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence (CNPHI), which, PHAC testified, have greatly enhanced the ability of the Agency to detect foodborne illness outbreaks. It was not made clear to the Subcommittee whether these are meant to replace or enhance NESP and C-EnterNet.

One system that PHAC uses, PulseNet, is a virtual laboratory, which has been in existence for about 10 years but has been expanded in the past three years to include listeria. PulseNet is a decentralized system in which regional, provincial and federal laboratories across the country are certified by PHAC to work with the same equipment, the same protocols, the same training to produce genetic fingerprints, and then they compare these electronically on a central database maintained by PHAC that links all computers and databases of certified laboratories. In this way, PulseNet helps to identify outbreaks at very early stages. It is currently dedicated to tracking the DNA fingerprints of all cases of E. coli O157:H7 and salmonella, which are responsible for the vast majority of foodborne illness in Canada. In recent years PHAC has been working on adding listeria to the system. At the time of the outbreak, only the province of Quebec had chosen to be certified, as were the Health Canada lab in Ottawa and the NML. Neither CFIA nor any of the other provinces were yet certified. Since the outbreak, Ontario and Alberta have become certified, as has CFIA.

A second system, the Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence (CNPHI) allows front line workers to communicate about events in real-time. CNPHI is a secure, web-based collective of applications designed to facilitate national, integrated, real-time collection and processing of laboratory and epidemiological surveillance data, dissemination of strategic intelligence, and coordination of public health response. The goal of CNPHI is to reduce the occurrence of foodborne illness by enhancing the response capacity of public health stakeholders. CNPHI is comprised of two secure components, the CIOSC and the Response and Resource Management Centre.

CIOSC is a national system that allows for timely sharing and strategic dissemination of public health intelligence between local/regional, provincial/territorial and national public health stakeholders. Currently CIOSC includes Public Health Alerts and a FluWatch pilot site. The Public Health Alerts, which includes enteric alerts (e.g. foodborne illness) and respiratory alerts (e.g. influenza), are for receiving, posting and distributing alerts about confirmed or suspected events and outbreaks. The system allows registered users to see nationwide communicable disease event activity. The Response and Resource Management Centre contains web-based Intelligence Exchange Resources to assist public health stakeholders with the management of activities and agreed-to information-sharing between agencies of different jurisdictions.

The Subcommittee heard that these two systems, PulseNet and CNPHI, are effective at detecting outbreaks at a very early stage. PHAC officials emphasized that the listeriosis outbreak was detected with only 10 cases in a population of 30 million and a high background level of enteric disease. The Chief Public Health Officer stated that the tragedy would have undoubtedly been much worse in the absence of these two systems. The Subcommittee wonders whether PHAC has sufficient resources to expand PulseNet and CNPHI in such a way as to best serve Canadians. It notes that PHAC officials remarked on the number of years they have been developing these programs.

The Subcommittee was told that foodborne illness costs about $10 billion annually in Canada. Mr. Holley suggested that a decision has to be made as to the level of investment the government should make into effective surveillance programs. Members appreciate the enthusiasm shown by PHAC officials for the systems the agency has in place to detect foodborne outbreaks, but they question whether their effectiveness might be enhanced by including more foodborne illnesses on the list of nationally notifiable diseases, particularly listeriosis. They note that in order for the federal government to meet its obligations under the International Health Regulations, the provinces must report illnesses to PHAC.[22]

Recommendation 11:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government enhance the national foodborne illnesses surveillance system by developing programs to gather epidemiological data on foodborne illnesses in Canada and that it initiate discussions with the provinces to add relevant foodborne illnesses to the list of nationally notifiable diseases.

2. Recalls and Outbreak Management

In the event of a national foodborne illness outbreak, the CFIA is responsible for determining the exact food source of the contamination as well as managing the recall of that product. PHAC is responsible for detecting the outbreak and coordinating the national investigation and response. PHAC, directed by the Chief Public Health Officer, enters into its outbreak response mode following identification of an outbreak that either spans more than one jurisdiction in Canada or exceeds the capacity of a single jurisdiction to respond appropriately. PHAC launches an outbreak investigation in order to determine the source of an outbreak and implements control measures to reduce the public health impact and limit further spread of the disease. Unlike most disease outbreaks, where PHAC collaborates mainly with other public health figures, in a foodborne disease outbreak PHAC also works with CFIA. The identification of the source in a foodborne illness outbreak is complex, since linked cases can be geographically distant and the disease can manifest days or weeks after consumption of the food, making it difficult for patients to recall what they had consumed. PHAC’s surveillance programs PulseNet and CNPHI can address the geography issue and they can identify an outbreak at its earliest stages. The agency then determines, through the DNA fingerprinting analyses, which cases are linked. And once that has been done, it can compile the lists of consumed food from each of the linked cases and look for common items.

Once the suspected food items have been identified and tested, those testing positive are investigated by CFIA to determine where they came from. It contacts the facility that served the food to request purchasing and supply records that may provide additional information about the specific food involved. Once the source is identified, CFIA works closely with the manufacturer in order to request information on lots and batches of the foods in question, including distribution records, in order to locate and request unopened packages of these foods for testing. Confirmation of contaminated product is then relayed to the manufacturer, and CFIA initiates a recall. Several witnesses emphasized the importance of establishing certainty with respect to the affected food product. They cited instances in which authorities prematurely announced affected foods only to have to retract later, after considerable unnecessary damage had been caused to another manufacturer, an entire food industry, or even the consumers, who were forced to change consumption pattern and buy another product that was the real source of the problem. The Subcommittee heard testimony from the public health officials from Ontario that in some cases the results from open packages should be considered conclusive. They emphasized that it would be unlikely that opened packages at different locations would be contaminated with the same pathogen because of contamination of the product after it was opened.

Once CFIA, in collaboration with Health Canada, has decided that a risk is posed by a food product, it then must determine the level of risk posed in order to determine the class of food recall. There are three classes of food recall, I, II and III, in descending order of perceived risk. As in the case of the listeriosis outbreak, a class I recall involves issuance of a news release as well as a posting on CFIA’s website to notify the public.

Under the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, the CFIA has the authority to order a manufacturer to recall a product, or products. Recalls are the responsibility of CFIA’s Office of Food Safety Recall, which directs a manufacturer to carry out the recall of the affected products. The Office follows up by conducting effectiveness checks on the recall.

Some members questioned why the CFIA did not invoke a mandatory recall of affected Maple Leaf products. However, the Subcommittee was told that it is preferable that a recall be accomplished efficiently on a voluntary basis if possible. Several industry witnesses testified that the term ‘voluntary’ is misleading and that it is understood as meaning that it will become mandatory quickly if compliance is not swift. CFIA also stated that there was no need to invoke a mandatory recall, as Maple Leaf Foods was completely cooperative, and that a voluntary recall can proceed more quickly in any event. Finally, it was pointed out that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, while it gives authority to order a food recall, is meant for those situations where the company is unable or unwilling to cooperate; circumstances that did not apply in this situation. However, the Subcommittee also heard that although the use of a voluntary recall may be the most prudent, it should nevertheless be CFIA that announces, manages, and provides all public information about it; industry should not be the primary source of recall information for the public.[23]

In its follow-up report to the listeriosis outbreak, the Chief Medical Officer of Health of Ontario indicated that Toronto Public Health (TPH) inspectors were inhibited from accompanying CFIA inspectors to the Maple Leaf plant. CFIA officials indicated to members that they have no authority to prevent inspectors from entering plants. However, in their appearance at the Subcommittee, MOHLC and TPH clarified that they were not initially invited to accompany CFIA as part of the audit team and that when TPH inquired about their inclusion, they were informed that they would need to make the request in writing, which they did, and CFIA agreed. Upon arriving at the plant at the agreed-upon time and date, TPH was told by CFIA that they could only send in one of the two inspectors present. MOHLC and TPH indicated that they had had no previous knowledge of these requirements.

Testimony from Lyn Wilcott of the British Columbia Centre for Disease Control (BCCDC) suggested the same lack of collaboration between CFIA and the provinces during a recall. BCCDC indicated that for most issues, collaboration between them and the CFIA is very good. However, Mr. Wilcott testified:

Where things seem to go off the rails is during recalls where there are illnesses involved, or potential for illnesses, or potential adverse publicity, or even prior to a recall, when we as a province are doing an illness or outbreak investigation. This is the point, in those kinds of examples, where the CFIA becomes very reluctant to share information openly and freely.[24]

In addition, the concerns raised by the BCCDC reaffirmed the criticisms of the MOHLC discussed earlier with respect to its experiences during the listeriosis outbreak. Specifically, BCCDC indicated that CFIA is often reluctant to provide information to the provincial public health authorities about distribution patterns of a food in question, whether it was sold in the area in question, whether there is information on lot and batch numbers for the time in question, etc.[25]

Finally, media communication during outbreaks has been addressed. Some members voiced concerns about the amount of media time that federal officials had during the outbreak and recall process and whether their advisories and alerts to the Canadian public were carried out in the most appropriate way. Members were concerned about the need for a single person to become the face of a crisis. They indicated that in the case of the listeriosis outbreak, although the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food as well as CFIA and PHAC officials were available, Mr. McCain became the identifiable spokesperson. They suggested that one federal authority should have been more visible. Members’ concern was that in the future PHAC be more visible and that the Chief Public Health Officer be the federal spokesperson during a crisis.

Several witnesses suggested that Canada already has the capacity for effective communication, citing such incidences as the BSE crisis and the more recent header1N1 outbreak, but that there were deficiencies in communication during the listeriosis outbreak. For example, Mr. Christopher Kyte, President of the Food Processors of Canada stated;

When we had the BSE issue, the government was there in full force. You had Brian Evans out discussing it. You had the minister out. We felt really good. You got the message out to the consumers. They ate more beef. But we didn’t see that in listeria. Michael McCain ended up being the Canadian government’s spokesperson. We’re not sure that was right.[26]

A similar sentiment was expressed by Mr. Martin Michaud, Vice-President, technical services at Olymel, who testified:

During the listeriosis outbreak last summer, what our industry really needed was a voice and a face that Canadians could rely on as we had during the BSE crisis and the SARS crisis.[27]

Mr. James Laws, Executive Director of the Canadian Meat Council, also commended the Government’s handling of the BSE crisis, as well as of header1N1, and asserted that:[28]

That’s the type of response we’d like to see in the future for other food safety events like this one. We believe it should be the Public Health Agency of Canada and/or Canada’s Chief Veterinary Officer out there reassuring Canadians.

Dr. Brian Evans, Executive Vice-President of CFIA, explained that there is a federal protocol in place for outbreaks of foodborne illness. Canada’s Foodborne Illness Outbreak Response Protocol (FIORP) guides the activities of the federal government and the provincial government in the early stages of the epidemiological investigation and then transfers the lead from the province to the federal authority on the epidemiological side when the outbreak extends beyond provincial borders. The Medical Officer of Health for Toronto Public Health expressed frustration that FIORP was not being followed during the listeriosis outbreak. Dr. McKeown stated:

During the 2008 listeriosis outbreak, it did not appear to me and my colleagues that the protocol was being used to guide the investigation and response and some participants were apparently unaware of its status or its existence.[29]

He indicated that the protocol needs to be updated, and that there should be substantial training for all parties who may have to collaborate during an outbreak and suggested that Canada hold some tabletop, or simulation, exercises in order to test the foodborne illness outbreak response, including the communications component. Dr. Williams supplemented that the drafting of FIORP pre-dated the creation of PHAC, which leaves the role of the Chief Public Health Officer in question with respect to foodborne illness outbreaks.[30]

Recommendation 12:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government review with the provinces the inter-agency protocols in place during an outbreak, including the public communication and information sharing components, and conduct real-scale simulation to validate these protocols.

Recommendation 13:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government review the legislative basis for the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Chief Public Health Officer with a view to ensuring independence from government departments and ministerial influence, so as to protect and restore faith and confidence in Canada’s public health system.

It was felt that this issue must be addressed before Canada is faced with another incident. In fact, CFIA’s Lessons Learned report on the recall response focuses almost exclusively on communication and information issues. All public officials testified that these concerns were being addressed. It should be noted that unlike SARS, which was a public health issue, or BSE, which was a food supply safety issue, the listeriosis crisis affected both the food supply and public health. The fact that the response involved more than one agency may have complicated communication and increased confusion in the general public.

3. Other Initiatives in Relation to Outbreak Management

The Subcommittee heard some testimony during the course of this study with respect to the capacity of government laboratories to deal with both human and food samples. Dr. Williams of the MOHLC reiterated one the conclusions from his Report on the Management of the 2008 Listeriosis Outbreak in Ontario, that provinces should not be reliant on federal agencies for laboratory testing. This issue was addressed by PHAC officials, who described the recent efforts to decentralize laboratory testing of PulseNet as discussed above. Certification of laboratories across the country to test samples, and providing a central database for comparison of results, should help to reduce the timelines involved in identifying outbreaks. Some witnesses questioned whether laboratories will have the capacity in the event of a large outbreak. PHAC officials indicated that they have the ability to draw on personnel from other areas in that circumstance, but they suggested that both the day-to-day operations and surge capacity during outbreaks need strengthening.

The Subcommittee also heard that traceability systems, or the ability to trace back a product, are a useful component to help manage food safety emergencies. When the origin of a problem is identified and linked to a particular premise, other products delivered from that source can be followed the other way through the chain and recalled. The dairy industry is particularly advanced in terms of traceability, as explained by Mr. Richard Doyle, Executive Director of the Dairy Farmers of Canada:

When the milk is produced from the farm, on each farm we now have identification by GPS of every location, of every housing of dairy animals, so you know exactly where each of the animals is located and you know it by terms of premises. When the milk is delivered, each of the farms is also identified. Samples are being kept, and they’re tested by provincial laboratories, in most instances, once they’re received at the plant. The plants also do their own tests on receipt of the milk with regard to residue in order to decide whether they should discard the whole truck or not. Then it goes into the silo. You know where the milk is coming from, so you have a product in the end where you know the date of production, of the process of that product, and you will know exactly the lot of the milk silo it came from. You can trace the farms that have been delivering to that particular silo, and you will be able to identify back to the animals.[31]

According to witnesses, national standards for all commodities have to be developed. Mr. Doyle indicated that because of the different jurisdictions there are different traceability systems for livestock, and coordination is necessary. Even if programs can be administered by a partnership of provincial governments and commodity groups, national standards are necessary in order to avoid confusion for exporters and provide clear information about food safety programs to foreign buyers.

Recommendation 14:

The Subcommittee recommends that the government encourage the development of industry-led traceability systems for all commodities and products.

D. Final Thoughts

Finally, the Subcommittee heard that whistleblower legislation could play a role in identifying potential food safety hazards before there is a public health threat. David Hutton, Executive Director of the Federal Accountability Initiative for Reform, stressed the need for whistleblower protection. He emphasized that few employees, either of industry or government, have the protection necessary to encourage them to come forward when they see problems with food safety. He testified that the federal Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, an officer of Parliament who investigates alleged wrongdoing in the federal public service, is not sufficient protection for public servants and questioned the office’s effectiveness.