NDDN Committee Report

Preamble

Our predecessor committee’s report from 2002 entitled “Facing our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces” was truly influential and its Chair, the Honourable David Pratt, P.C. eventually went on to become the Liberal Minister of Defence. As such he was able to implement some of the recommendations. This report on the state of military readiness was to have been an update on that report. Regrettably the Conservative majority report is long on description, short on analysis and devoid of any useful recommendations. Any report which deletes or minimizes any reference to military procurement, smart defence, our relationship with NATO or General Leslie’s elegant report entitled “Report on Transformation 2011” is of questionable utility.

Introduction: Our Role as a Nation

There is an active and animated discussion in Canadian society about our role as a nation in international conflicts. Some argue that we should return to our Pearsonian roots of blue helmeted peacekeepers. Others argue that we are a warrior nation and point to our roles in World War One, World War Two and lately in Afghanistan and Libya. The truth is somewhere in between, and changes according to circumstances. Sometimes we are a warrior nation, and sometimes we are peacekeepers, but in all instances, we should act as a nation that strives to minimize, if not eliminate conflict and violence.

As we consider our military’s future role and its state of readiness, it is important to reflect on the consequences that taking on that role will have on our armed forces. In recent years we have emphasized our military’s involvement in conflict missions such as Afghanistan and Libya. The brave actions of our military in these missions have been rightly lauded and the Liberal Party is proud of the courageous sacrifices that our men and women in uniform have made.

Regrettably however, we have lost some of our capacity to intervene at earlier stages of conflict. If we had a more robust capacity to provide peacekeeping — peacemaking, possibly our thinking would have been changed about pre and post Afghanistan and Libya. “Winning the war” may actually be easier than winning the “peace”.

Of course peacekeeping missions are not always the best course of action to address an emerging conflict, but when they can be considered and when they address an emerging issue rather than a burgeoning one, often they are the far less costly option. As our allies deal with the realities of fiscal restraint, preventing conflict should be an essential aspect of any country’s defence policy. Lieutenant General Peter Devolin appeared before the committee and assured Members that the Canadian Army trains its soldiers to be able to "move from combat through stability to peacekeeping with ease”.[1] A careful balance between maintaining a capability for peacekeeping missions as well as combat missions should remain a core focus.

As such, the Liberal Party recommends that:

1) Continuing a balance in training, education and preparedness for both peacekeeping missions as well as combat missions should remain a core focus.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Will to Intervene (WTI)

The most significant development in the last decade in foreign affairs and defence policy has been the R2P and its corollary the WTI doctrines. It is a certainty that there will never be an absence of conflict in the future so the real question becomes, how, and when it is appropriate to intervene. Our present century will most likely resemble previous ones. There “will be wars and rumors of wars, warfare will be both regular and irregular, regional and international order will be fragile, challenged, unstable and liable to collapse. We can all hope that for a future when we discard violence as an instrument of political communication,” but prudence remains the supreme virtue in statecraft and teaches that we be prepared for the least pleasant.[2]

“When Canada signed on to the Responsibility to Protect protocols some argued that there is a corollary to that: the ability to protect. You need the ability to move resources if you’re going to have influence. The strategic center was perhaps undeveloped at the time, so we didn’t have the necessary forms of heavy lift; we didn’t have good secure strategic command and the control architecture we have now. Those are really valuable improvements.”[3]

We need to understand that the way we think about our “national self-interest” needs to change. It has been said that nations don’t have values, they only have interests, and Canada is no different. There are very few conflicts, disasters, or pandemics in which Canada doesn’t have a direct or indirect interest in.

Therefore the Liberal Party recommends that:

2) The government commit explicitly to the doctrine of Right to and uses it as a touchstone to guide decisions on interventions and readiness.

3) The government create a national focal point for intervention in mass atrocities and other abuses of human rights.

Defence and Foreign Policy

Sir David Richard, the Chief of Defence Staff for Great Britain said at a CDI conference in Ottawa, “It’s a bold man who plans for military idleness”.  Indeed it’s a bold nation that plans for military idleness, and so a report on readiness should be welcome. The problem with a standalone “military” report on readiness is that it doesn’t recognize that “military readiness” is necessarily driven by and depends upon “foreign policy readiness”. The two are inextricably linked. However, the Conservative government has chosen not to release a foreign policy strategy, and as a result the military has been left to structure its state of readiness around a wish list. Absent an overarching foreign policy, the nation is left with a document like the Canadian First Defence Strategy which is nothing more than a glorified shopping list of military procurements, which has since been discredited as too expensive and unrealistic. Briefing notes prepared for the Associate Minister of Defence state “the funding reductions from Budget 2010 and the reduced funding line going forward will make the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) unaffordable”, yet for some reason the committee continues to reference the CFDS.

The Conservative Government lost its bid for the U.N. Security Council seat. Not only did we lose, we didn’t even try to win. We are abdicating our role at the U.N. with serious defence consequences. It is no great insight to say that the U.N. is dysfunctional; however, it is the only international body that can authorize a military intervention.

Therefore the recommendation of the Liberal Party is that:

4) The Government forthwith release a White Paper outlining its vision of Canada’s Foreign Policy and that contemporaneously updates the unrealistic Canada First Defence Strategy;

5) The Government table with Parliament a bi-annual strategic review outlining its assessment of potential threats to Canadian national interest that may need to be addressed;

6) The bi-annual strategic review be referred to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence which will report to Government, within six months, on its assessment of the review;

7) The Conservative Government re-engage at the United Nations so that when an intervention is contemplated Canada will be able to make its voice heard.

Cyber Intelligence

It has been said that surprise is one of the dominant characteristics of readiness and that cutting down on the number of surprises would be most helpful. It therefore follows that “cyber intelligence” is one of the most important assets of “readiness”.

During his testimony to the committee, General Vance said that “over time our cyber capacity will need to increase, commensurate with the rest of the world’s cyber capacity.” While Canada has a good cyber capacity, we will need to continue to develop and invest in it.[4] Professor David Skillicorn, from Queen’s University’s School of Computing, made a similar observation. He also went on to suggest that if we are going to be effective in combating cyber threats we will need to have analysts with an education that can incorporate both the social sciences and data analysis. It has been the tradition to rely on analysts trained primarily in the social sciences. Given the technical skills required in today’s cyber world, we require analysts who can bridge the gap between social science training and data analysis. Professor Skillicorn also noted that there are major synergies between “the things you have to think about to do cyber security and the things you have to think about to do signals intelligence.” As a result, he concluded that the “Communications Security Establishment is the right place to put cyber security and all of its related issues.”[5]

The committee report spent very little time on the issues surrounding the gathering and application of military intelligence. Regrettably the report is also limited in its discussion on cyber intelligence. The committee heard some witnesses who testified on the threat and the recommendations contained in the committee report are good as far as they go. However, military doctrine is both defence and offence. We did not pursue the offensive capabilities of cyber intelligence and what role Canada could play, if any, in the use of cyber intelligence for offensive or pre-emptive purposes.

Subsequent to our hearings on readiness, the Auditor General released his Fall 2012 Report. In it he describes a major gap in our co-ordinating network.

“… the CCIRC (Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre) cannot fully monitor Canada’s cyber threat environment, which hinders the Centre’s ability to provide timely advice on defending against new cyber threats. Furthermore, the Centre is still not operating on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week basis, as originally intended. This restriction on operating hours can delay the detection of emerging threats and the sharing of related information among stakeholders.”[6]

What is even more disturbing is the government’s response to the Auditor General’s report, as if going from 8am-5pm business hours to 15 hours per day is sufficient.

“As CCIRC is not operating around the clock, there is a risk that there will be a delay in the sharing of critical information linked to newly discovered vulnerabilities or active cyber events reported to CCIRC after operating hours. A restriction on operating hours means that CCIRC is not able to monitor the cyber threat environment 24 hours a day, as envisioned in its mandate. Public Safety Canada officials told us that the Department is now working to extend CCIRC’s coverage to 7 days a week, from 6:00am until 9:00pm (Ottawa time), although there are no plans to go to a 24-hour-a-day operation. Based on our discussions with officials, it is our opinion that operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week is important for the timely detection and notification of cyber threats, and for communicating with the computer emergency response teams of Canada’s foreign allies, which operate in different time zones.”[7]

All cyber intelligence is inter-related. For example, information gathered by Public Safety may or may not be relevant to the Department of National Defence (DND), but if DND doesn’t know about it in a timely fashion, then its utility can never be determined. One is left to wonder whether the Government of Canada even understands the full magnitude of this security threat let alone able to act upon it. There is a school of thought that argues that cyber warfare is the new total warfare. All persons and all systems would be affected and rendered dysfunctional with catastrophic consequences for the loser.

As such, the Liberal Party recommends that:

8) The Department of National Defence reviews its cyber security infrastructure in light of the Auditor General’s report and report to Parliament on any steps that it has taken to remedy any deficiencies, if any.

9) The communications and security establishment be the lead agency responsible for coordinating and managing Canada’s efforts in combating cyber terrorism and cyber warfare.

Recruitment

Canada is home to every ethnic group known to mankind. Many of these people have military and foreign affairs intelligence which could be of enormous value to our state of readiness.

We did receive repeated assurances from senior military personnel about the cultural and linguistic sensitivities in recruitment. Hopefully those sensitivities can be turned into intelligence — particularly military and foreign affairs intelligence. It’s not obvious that the transition has fully occurred.

Therefore the Liberal Party recommends that:

10) The Canadian Forces actively recruit in diaspora communities people with specific linguistic and intelligence capabilities.

Education and Research

The importance of investment in education, research and development cannot be understated. When visiting the Toronto facilities of Defence Research and Development Canada, members of our Committee were very impressed with the work being done. What we saw and heard left us convinced that DRDC projects provided a significant contribution to the effectiveness and welfare of our military. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Walter Natynczyk, himself recently praised the work of the DRDC by stating that, “You’ve saved lives. You’ve saved countless lives and for that I’m truly indebted.”[8]

However, as a result of funding reductions certain important programs may be cut. DRDC is stopping work on a bomb detection project at its Suffield facility in Alberta and the Counter Terrorism Technology Centre, which “conducts research into chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive incidents.”[9] The research done at Suffield and other sites is designed to protect front line soldiers and enhance their effectiveness. Given the kinds of combat environments our troops are likely to find themselves in one can only wonder whether the budget cuts imposed on CDRC are in fact wise.

Similarly, the recent cuts to RMC should also be reconsidered. The school has been told “to cut $1 million from its budget in the coming year, noting the following year, then $3.5 million for 2014-2015.” This could lead to the loss of as many as 32 academic staff and up to 160 fewer courses for cadets to choose from. As well, the program that brings experienced non-commissioned officers to RMC to earn degrees will also be eliminated.[10] Once lost, intellectual capital is not easily recouped.

As such, the liberal Party recommends that:

11) The budget cuts made to Defence Research Canada be restored.

12) Funding be restored to the Royal Military College and other staff colleges to the level before the recent budget cuts.

Procurement

In an era of fiscal restraint, the margins for procurement are razor thin. We agree with the Minister of Public Works who recently said “Frankly, when it comes to procurement, I’m a little tired of being told why something can’t be done. I’m also tired of being told I can only get partial buy-in for new ideas because people would rather see things fail first. And I’ve become tired of all of the duplication and competing agendas. I am fully aware of all of the internal obstacles to change, but I realize we won’t be able to transform the procurement system overnight.”

The fiascos surrounding procurement under this government have been well documented. Virtually without exception individual procurements are either over budget, behind schedule or festooned with announcements but no deliveries. It would be generous to describe Canadian military procurement as a mess. Examples of this include Fixed Wing Search and Rescue planes, military truck’s, close combat vehicles and the F-35’s.

The fondness of this government for procurement announcements and re-announcements reached a zenith of silliness with the Ministers’ $47,000 F-35 press conference for a plane we may never purchase.

Over the last decade many arguments in favour of reforming the process have been made. These have included the Auditor General of Canada (AG), Parliamentary Committees and internal and independent studies sponsored by the government itself. Some have argued that “there is a lack of competitive bidding and a shortage of industrial and regional benefits for Canadian industry, and some have criticized the high costs associated with certain projects.” Needless to say, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program has attracted considerable parliamentary, media and public attention in this regard. While both DND and Public Words and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) have implemented a variety of “initiatives aimed at streamlining the defence procurement process and reducing acquisition cycle times, in recent years,” problems with the process continue to be raised. Many have therefore suggested that what is needed is more far reaching reforms of the defence procurement process. One remedy that is often offered up is that defence procurement needs to be centralized under a single government department agency. The present system, critics argue, is too bureaucratic, too slow to respond and results in inefficiencies and duplication of work. A simpler system with a clear line of ministerial responsibility could be achieved with a single organization in charge of defence procurement.[11]

In 2008 the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, in its study on defence procurement, noted that while it believed “that the current system of splitting the procurement process and function between departments has many excellent qualities, including acting as a check and balance between departments, there are strong arguments to the contrary, including a clearer line of ministerial accountability, and a simpler process.” The Committee went on to recommend that the “government investigate ways of changing Department of National Defence procurement processes with the aim of substantially reducing procurement wait times for major defence capital projects” and that “this re-evaluation should include investigating an ‘in-house’ departmental procurement process (i.e. a Defence Department Procurement Agency).”[12]

The recent “turmoil” over the acquisition of the F-35 fighter jets, can only lead us to conclude that there is still something seriously wrong with the procurement process. The Liberal Party believes that the concerns over the manner in which defence equipment is procured have existed for far too long and that fundamental changes to the process need to be made.

As such, the Liberal Party recommends that:

13) The Government establish an independent Commission, consisting of one to three Commissioners, with appropriate staff support, to investigate the inefficiencies in the procurement process of military equipment and that it report its finding on appropriate measures for improvement to Government within one year.

14) That the findings of the Commission on procurement reform be referred to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence for consideration, once tabled with the government.

Transformation

Unfortunately the committee did not have the benefit of hearing from General Leslie, who spent a year analyzing transformation and sustainment. His report titled “Report on Transformation 2011” is a must read for those wishing to study and understand transformation a “sine qua non” of readiness. It is one of the most comprehensive reviews of military readiness since the beginning of the Afghan conflict. The Committee is without the views of the Minister on General Leslie’s observations about lapsed funding, administrative incoherence, ever escalating growth of contractors and non-combat personnel or his recommendation on the redress between “tooth” and “tail”. Regrettably, the government has yet to table a formal response to General Leslie’s observations. There is therefore no benchmark against which to measure the military’s transformation. Without a benchmark there can be neither success nor failure — only muddle.

Therefore the Liberal Party recommends that:

15) The government immediately table with Parliament its formal response to General Leslie’s report;

16) The Department of National Defence report to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence on an annual basis as to the developments in the transformation process. Reports should include detailed and transparent information on staff reductions, effects on the reserves including staffing numbers, training time, progress made on job protection and employer support; time lines for equipment acquisition; and so on.