:
Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to get up here today and speak to the statutory review of the Conflict of Interest Act.
Statutory reviews are quite important. They are put into the statute for an annual review so that every five years members of Parliament can review the conflict of interest legislation through their committee and make meaningful recommendations. In this case, we are talking about the five-year review of the Conflict of Interest Act. The whole idea is that a committee of members from all parties of the House will listen to a number of witnesses and make some meaningful recommendations.
In this case, the report that has been presented here today is a complete farce, because the eight or nine recommendations that we see at the end of this report do not even resemble the text of the report itself.
I will highlight that. The text of this report was well put together by our committee, by our analysts, and by those in the Library of Parliament. The committee listened to a lot of the recommendations that came from a number of different witnesses. We held a number of meetings on this subject with witnesses from different universities, Democracy Watch, the Privy Council, York University, the Canadian Bar Association, the office of the lobbying commissioner, and different conflict of interest commissioners from across the country, including our own conflict of interest commissioner, and that is where I will start with trying to compare why this report is such a farce.
Our own conflict of interest commissioner made some 75 recommendations through her experience with the Conflict of Interest Act. Some of them were quite technical, and others were quite in depth in nature. She made some really good recommendations through her testimony. One only needs to read the body of the report to realize some of the recommendations that our commissioner put forward.
However, they did not make their way into the recommendations at all, except for one or two. That is sad, because after we listened to all of the testimony she gave, we could not come up with even some of her recommendations.
The body of the report is very well put together. It talks about the commissioner coming before the committee and making some 75 different recommendations, such as inserting new chapters into the act, definitions, rules of conduct, compliance measures, post-employment roles, and administration and enforcement. According to the commissioner herself, they are quite broad. She stated:
Some are quite broad in scope, some target specific provisions of the Act, and others are largely technical in nature.
It did not even include some of the technical amendments that she was recommending from her experience with the act, nor did it include her general themes and priorities, such as increasing transparency around gifts and other advantages, strengthening the act's post-employment provisions, narrowing the overall broad prohibition on engaging in outside activities, narrowing the overall broad prohibition on holding controlled assets, introducing some disclosure and reporting obligations for non-reporting public office holders, addressing misinformation regarding her investigative work, adding administrative monetary penalties for breach of the act, and harmonizing the Conflict of Interest Act and the members' code, most of which were very practical in nature.
Other witnesses also came forward and made similar recommendations. There were some that varied a bit. As a committee, we heard from a lot of good witnesses and a lot of good individuals who spoke to the different areas of the act that needed to be changed.
Members should keep in mind that some of the recommendations that we looked at came from the Oliphant commission, which was one of the predecessors to this bill being brought forward to Parliament. There were some leftover recommendations from the Oliphant commission that we did not even entertain at all.
One of the things in the act that was talked about was post-employment and cooling-off periods for members of Parliament, particularly members of cabinet and parliamentary secretaries, and how some of the rules around that needed to be tightened up and adjusted. However, we did not see any of that make it into the recommendations of this report.
The Canadian Bar Association came forward, and Mr. Guy Giorno, a Conservative himself, made some good recommendations around changes to the act on the different assets people have and disclose, and how these changes needed to be made as well.
Both the Canadian Bar Association and the commissioner recommended giving the commissioner the ability to impose administrative monetary penalities in the act. Right now the commissioner cannot impose any fines or administer any penalty if someone contravenes the act.
We heard a lot of this during the testimony, and we could have taken the opportunity to incorporate some of these things and make a meaningful document. My recommendation to the people who write legislation for the government is to dive into this report, see what was recommended, and see what people actually put forward as concrete suggestions in trying to modernize and update our conflict of interest legislation.
As I mentioned, this was a statutory review. It only comes around every five years, so when it comes, we have to look at some meaningful recommendations. I would not expect the government to take all the recommendations; I get that, but at least when making recommendations, the government should come back to what we heard and to some of the suggestions that were made.
It is disappointing that this report does not reflect the hard work of the committee. As I said, some of the witnesses had some very good suggestions, but they were completely ignored.
I do not think that this report has done Parliament any good. It has not managed to strengthen our conflict of interest legislation at all.
I wanted to make those few comments on this report. I and the Liberal Party will present a minority report in which we outline what I have spoken about here today.
:
Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for .
I am pleased to congratulate the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics for its report on the statutory review of the Conflict of Interest Act. The Conflict of Interest Act was brought in as part of the Federal Accountability Act in 2007. With the tabling of this report, the standing committee has fulfilled the legal requirement that the act be reviewed within five years of its coming into effect.
This was a thorough examination and I think we have heard that from previous speakers. The review took place over several months, between January and June of 2013. In the process, the committee heard evidence from stakeholders, including public servants, subject matter experts, university professors, interest groups and the Commissioner of Lobbying. It also heard from the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner who spoke at the start and at the very end of the review.
The committee's work represents a diligent and comprehensive effort to fine-tune the Conflict of Interest Act in this country and the government thanks the committee for undertaking it. We are pleased with the result. We welcome and support the 16 recommendations outlined in the report. I would like to thank the committee for a job well done. In fact, I think all parliamentarians should be proud of both the actual work that went into the review and its broader significance for our democratic institutions.
The committee's review and the resulting report honour both Canadian values and Canadian democracy. Across our land, it is Canadians' cherished belief in fairness, merit and equality that has made us who we are today and what we stand for in the world.
This report's recommendations are squarely in line with one of the abiding principles of Canadian democracy: the idea that those in positions of power must be accountable to the people they serve. Ultimately, that is what the review of this act and the act itself are all about: increasing the accountability and transparency of those who hold public office. Accountability is the bedrock value of democratic and good government, and it has been a pillar of our democracy since Canada achieved responsible government over a century and a half ago.
The report is also in line with our government's approach to accountability and to protecting Canadians' hard-earned tax dollars. We came into office in 2006 on the promise of protecting taxpayers' money and Canadian democracy. We understood that Canada's public institutions need to be accountable and transparent because that is what would continue to make us a great nation in the future.
That is why we implemented the Federal Accountability Act and its companion action plan in 2006. When this legislation received royal assent on December 12, 2006, one of the first things we did was move to reduce the influence of money in elections. We introduced a law banning contributions to political parties by corporations, unions and organizations and lowering the limit on individuals' political contributions.
The Federal Accountability Act also designated deputy ministers as accounting officers who are accountable before Parliament for the management of their departments.
We also cleaned up the procurement of government contracts by enshrining in law a commitment to fairness, transparency and openness in the procurement process. We appointed an independent procurement ombudsman to provide additional oversight of the procurement process.
We also implemented measures to give Canadians broader and better access to more information from public organizations than ever before.
Specifically, we extended the Access to Information Act to cover the Canadian Wheat Board, five foundations and five agents of Parliament, and most crown corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries.
We acted to strengthen ethical conduct in government. We conducted open and extensive consultations with lobbyists and Canadians about a new Lobbying Act to ensure lobbying and government advocacy was done fairly and openly.
The result, as we know, was stricter rules for lobbying activity and enhanced powers to investigate and enforce them, and there were serious penalities for breaking the rules. The penalties for lobbyists found guilty of breaching the requirements of the Lobbying Act were increased to a maximum of $200,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.
We also brought into force the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act. This act created an environment in which public service employees, and all Canadians, could honestly and openly report government wrongdoing without fear of reprisal.
We also created an independent Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and the position of an independent Public Sector Integrity Commissioner. We brought in the Conflict of Interest Act and named a Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. By doing so, we have ensured that Canadians have the opportunity to voice their concerns about unethical behaviour in government and to hold violators accountable.
That is not all. To give these measures teeth, we introduced new criminal penalties and sanctions for anyone committing fraud against the crown. This offence carries a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment for fraud of $5,000 or less, and a maximum penalty of 14 years for fraud over $5,000.
These are just a few of the steps we have taken to meet Canadians' needs for stronger and more accountable and transparent public institutions.
The measures we took at that time reflected the will of Canadians to do the right thing, and I see the same spirit in the work of the standing committee. The standing committee's report is consistent with our focus on accountability, transparency, and protecting taxpayer dollars. It reflects Canadians' sense of honesty and hard work. That is why we welcome and support its recommendations and will consider how best to implement these improvement, in a manner that would further the purposes of the Conflict of Interest Act. Doing so would help us build on the many achievements of the Federal Accountability Act, and it would help to ensure that our public institutions continue to reflect Canadian values and common sense.
:
Mr. Speaker, it is an honour and a pleasure to stand in this place to speak to the government's response to the report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics on the statutory review of the Conflict of Interest Act.
At the outset, I would like to thank the committee for undertaking a review of this important piece of legislation. I sat on the committee for most of that.
The government welcomes and supports the 16 recommendations outlined in the committee's report. The committee's recommendations were wide-ranging, and call on government to amend the Conflict of Interest Act and any other necessary acts of Parliament in a variety of ways.
The committee recommended tightening up the definition of public office holder to ensure that all appropriate people are covered, and to align the definition of reporting public office holder with that under the Lobbying Act.
The recommendations take action to prevent vague and arbitrary rulings, to better define what is meant by preferential treatment, and to clarify conflict of interest in the context of expected duties of public office holders. There needs to be a relationship.
Measures would also give the commissioner the clear authority to permit certain activities by public office holders, such as participating in or volunteering for charitable organizations and events.
The committee calls on the government to make amendments to the Conflict of Interest Act in order to enhance fairness and protect the rights of those public office holders who may be the subject of a request before the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. For instance, it includes that the examination of a complaint remain private until a formal report is made public by the commissioner; that the complaint filing and examination process be standardized; that a section be added to the Conflict of Interest Act that specifies the rights of the individual public office holder who is subject to a request; and that the act be amended so that any order or decision of the commissioner is subject to judicial review where there is an error in law.
We live in a world where some people seem motivated to make requests that could only be called frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith. It is recommended that where the commissioner determines that such a request has been made, the commissioner be obligated to publicly disclose the identity of the member of the Senate or House of Commons who made the request. One should not be able to hide behind anonymous and frivolous requests.
It is also recommended that complaints filed by members or senators which the commissioner does not see fit to investigate be publicly disclosed, along with the complainant's name.
Finally, a number of recommendations suggest that the government take action to ensure there is more consistency between the Conflict of Interest Act, and other acts of Parliament, conflict of interest codes, and codes of ethics. It only makes sense to standardize some of those measures.
In carrying out its study, the committee heard testimony from the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, academics, subject matter experts, and other interested stakeholders. The committee is to be commended for hearing from a diverse group of witnesses and for considering a variety of perspectives.
It is clear that government and the committee both agree that the Conflict of Interest Act plays a vital role in ensuring Canadians that their elected representatives and public office holders make decisions in the public interest, without any consideration of personal gain. In fact, this principle is so important that it is incumbent on governments, at all levels, to take necessary measures to achieve this objective. That is exactly what our government has been doing by giving Canadians the information they need to judge for themselves.
We have all heard the saying that information is power. By making information accessible, we increase transparency and empower Canadians to hold their government to account. In fact, Canada is a leader in providing accessible information to citizens.
We were one of the first countries to enact access to information legislation almost three decades ago. That is why since coming to office, our government has been working hard to throw open the doors and windows of government and to make information available, not only to parliamentarians but to all Canadians.
For example, in 2006, the government introduced the most extensive amendments to the Access to Information Act since that act came into force in 1983. Most importantly, we broadened the reach of the Access to Information Act to more public institutions. Effective April 1, 2007, the Canadian Wheat Board, five foundations, and five agents of Parliament came under the act's provisions. It was about time.
All told, the Federal Accountability Act added 69 additional public institutions to the list of those covered by the legislation.
As a result, there are now some 250 public organizations that are subject to the access to information law. The services that these institutions provide are wide-ranging and far-reaching and involve many activities and services that are important to Canadians.
Ensuring greater transparency and accountability goes beyond just expanding the coverage of the act to more institutions.
We have also been working hard to improve the flow of information through the access to information system. For example, in April 2013 we introduced a pilot project to receive access to information requests and payments online from three participating departments, a number that has since grown to 21, which represent 80% of all ATIP requests.
The project provides better service to Canadians by making the process of requesting government records simpler and more convenient. Instead of printing, scanning, and mailing forms to the participating departments, individuals can now simply submit their requests online. Requesters can also securely pay the application fee for their access to information and privacy requests online using a credit card, further simplifying the process.
We also made it a requirement for all departments and agencies that are subject to the Access to Information Act to post summaries of their completed access to information requests. Each summary includes a request number, a summary of the completed request, and the number of pages disclosed, and I am pleased to say that the departments, agencies, and crown corporations are complying with this new requirement. These summaries can now be searched online from a single location: data.gc.ca.
Over 100 organizations are already posting summaries of completed access to information requests, and a full list of these organizations is also available at data.gc.ca. Indeed, this year we provided Canadians with more access to government information, over six million pages, than ever before.
Our efforts do not end there. We are also opening the records of the Government of Canada. We have taken measures to post online three million pages of archived government records that were previously restricted. Our objective is to put more and more information about government activities into the hands of the public and parliamentarians, who can use it to hold the government to account.
I am proud to say that our government is meeting that objective. For example, last year the unveiled the expenditure database, a new searchable online database that, for the first time ever, consolidates all information on government spending in one place. We are talking about everything from spending on government programs to operational spending on things like personnel and equipment.
What this means for Canadians is that they now have a more complete picture of how taxpayer money is spent, and we as parliamentarians are now better equipped to do our jobs, which is to analyze, assess, and consider government expenditures. We all know how difficult and time-consuming it can be to go through numerous complex financial documents to try to get a whole-of-government picture of what is being spent and where. Now, with a few simple clicks, users can find out in one place what every department and agency is spending on items such as transfer payments to provinces.
Clearly, our government has taken historic action to promote accountability in government and to ensure that the powers entrusted in all of us by our citizens are being exercised in the public interest.
We welcome and support the 16 recommendations outlined in the committee's report to further strengthen the Conflict of Interest Act. The committee's work is vital to ensuring that the act is providing the clarity, fairness, and accountability Canadians rightly seek, and its members are to be commended for their efforts.
:
Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise to speak to the ethics committee's report.
The bottom line is that this report, as we have heard in the speeches so far, clearly represents one of the more egregious, but unfortunately not uncommon, examples of a complete hijacking of the legislative process, in this case of the legislative committee process, by the executive.
There is absolutely no explanation for what happened in this committee and what has happened with this report other than that the 's office and the government in general intervened not only to direct but to control what came out of that committee.
It is not at all surprising that the government's three-paragraph response to the majority report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics says simply, “The Government welcomes and supports the sixteen recommendations outlined in the Committee’s report and agrees with the intended improvements to the COIA”. Well, pas de miracle, it is not surprising. The committee majority clearly worked in lockstep with the government to produce these 16 recommendations.
When I say worked in lockstep, that is a generous categorization of what the committee members probably did. Given everything we know about the testimony that was heard and how well it was digested by the officials in the first part of the report, which was not at all reflected in the recommendations, it rather seems to me that these committee members from the government side, the Conservative Party members of the committee, either did not have minds of their own or were literally directed as to what to do and what to put in that report.
If we had a functioning parliamentary system, this committee would have done its work unimpeded by the executive branch. It would have issued its recommendations and then the government would have decided which recommendations it was comfortable with and which ones it was not. It would have had to have stepped up to the plate to say “this is what we are prepared to do”, rather than creating a complete and utter travesty of the fusion of the executive and the legislature by saying, “Oh, we like the 16 recommendations that came out from the committee; we accept them”. It is no surprise, because the books were cooked by the executive. This whole process was a waste of time for the witnesses and for the members of the committee who actually tried to make the committee work.
The dissenting report by my colleagues, led by the member for , makes very clear how little listening there was on the part of the Conservative members of the committee, or as I have already described, the government sitting at the shoulders of or behind those members.
The ethics commissioner indicated in her own report of 2013-2014 in respect of Conflict of Interest Act that she suggested 75 different recommendations. On page 34 of her “2013-2014 Annual Report”, she said, “I was pleased to see in the Committee’s report that it agreed with a few of my own recommendations”. She is biting her tongue. “In Recommendation 6, the Committee suggests...” and she described it. “In Recommendation 14, the Committee suggests...” and then she described it.
Out of 16 recommendations, the ethics commissioner isolated two recommendations that had come from her 75 recommendations. Of the 16 recommendations the majority of the committee put forward in its report, 11 of the 16, as the NDP's dissenting report itemized, were not reflected in the evidence in terms of either written or oral testimony.
Let us look at recommendation number one, which has rightly caused such outrage, and should. It says, in the majority report:
That the definition of “public office holder” be changed to include:
Members of organizations that collectively bargain with the Government of Canada;
Frankly, this is an out-of-the-blue, gratuitous, ideological attack on the very idea of unionized civil servants, quite apart from what I am about to get to, which is the complete unworkability of this.
Contrast it with how the majority somehow manages to avoid those in a contractual relationship with the government who are not subject to collective bargaining agreements. Somehow they are not included in the regime. Certain kinds of civil servants are, and other kinds of folks who work for the federal government are not. It is a pure attack on unionization, and it is a bloody ridiculous one as well.
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, in her own report, says at page 31:
...the Committee proposes a very broad amendment to the definition of “public office holder”. It recommends that all members of organizations that collectively bargain with the Government of Canada be included. The implementation of this recommendation would essentially bring all employees of the Public Service of Canada (some 260,000 public servants are members of the various public sector unions) under the Act as non-reporting public office holders. These employees are already covered by the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector, which sets out its own requirements for the disclosure and reporting of interests, and is administered within federal departments.
She basically says “Wow” in very diplomatic under-speak, but it is clear that she is concerned and it is clear that she cannot figure out why the government would do something so unjustifiable and brazen. On June 10, 2014, in the ethics committee, my colleague from had the chance to question the commissioner, and basically asked about this very inclusion of, as she already told us, 260,000 additional people. He asked:
One of the recommendations that the government brought forward on the conflict of interest review was to put all civil servants under the public office holders' rules.
Have you examined how that would actually be enforced and who it would include?
Her answer:
Yes. I found that a very surprising recommendation. I certainly read the minority report, which suggested that there would be something like 260,000 additional people whom my office would have to administer. That obviously says to me that it wouldn't be the same office. I found that a very surprising recommendation.
No wonder; it came from nowhere other than the ideological mess that passes for the 's Office.
Then my colleague asked:
Would you be able to operate if you had to keep tabs on an extra 260,000 people?
This goes to the workability. Her answer:
No, I think it would have to be a rule-making body. It would be a totally different system, and somebody else would be administering it. Two-hundred sixty-thousand is a lot of people.
Clearly the commissioner is an expert at understatement, but she has made very clear what a travesty this recommendation is.
At this point I would like to quickly touch on some of the many recommendations from her and from other witnesses that were not acted upon, as also noted in the NDP's dissenting report.
Nothing was done on the front of penalties, for example. The NDP recommended increasing the penalties on the finding of a contravention to include suspension for a specified period, a suspension of a member's right to vote for a specified period, imposition of a fine not exceeding $5,000, and reimbursement of the value of any gift, hospitality or benefit. None of these make an appearance in the recommendations.
It is very important, speaking now as the critic for democratic reform and parliamentary reform that we have also asked that the act be amended to include guidelines that can then be interpreted and acted upon by the commissioner on fundraising and dealing with lobbyists.
Ministers, Ministers of State and Parliamentary Secretaries—
I will now call them the ministry.
—should not seek to have departmental stakeholders included on fundraising or campaign teams or on the boards of electoral district associations....
[The ministry] should ensure that government facilities and equipment, including ministerial or departmental letterhead, are not used for or in connection with fundraising activities....
[The ministry] should not discuss departmental business at any fundraising event, and should refer any person who wishes to discuss departmental business to make an appointment with the [appropriate person].
Finally, it says that the ministry should ensure:
...that fundraising communications issued on their behalf do not suggest any connection between fundraising and official government business.
Indeed, the commissioner added her own suggestion before the committee on June 10. She said:
I have suggested in my five-year review document that the government consider making ministers and parliamentary secretaries not do any fundraising at all....
That certainly does not appear in the recommendations.
With that, I end my remarks, except to say that I would like to make a motion.
I move:
That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following:
The First Report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy, and Ethics, presented to the House on Wednesday, February 5, 2014, and related to its statutory review of the Conflict of Interest Act, be not now concurred in but that it be referred back to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics with instruction that it amend the same by removing recommendation number one and amending the other recommendations with a view to: (a) give the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner the power to administer financial and administrative penalties; (b) enshrine the Conflict of Interest Code into law; (c) allow members of the public to make complaints to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner; and (d) make part-time or non-remunerated ministerial advisers subject to the ethics code.
:
Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the .
I am very pleased to add to this discussion on the report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics on the statutory review of the Conflict of Interest Act. Before I do that, however, I would like to thank the committee for undertaking such a thorough review of this act. This process provided an important opportunity to examine the act to ensure that it is providing the clarity, fairness and accountability that Canadians rightly seek.
As the committee noted in its report, the act is working well in accordance with its objectives, but before this act existed, the situation was far from satisfactory. There was much concern, and with good reason. The government touches on all sectors of the economy. It does this in a multitude of ways, through regulatory agencies, legislation, tariffs and tax policies, to name but a few. Canadians need to have the confidence that public office holders are impartial and act with integrity, and this government took real action.
Our first piece of legislation, the Federal Accountability Act, included the Conflict of Interest Act, which gave Canada for the first time a regime to govern the ethical conduct of public office holders, both during and after employment. These changes represented a major improvement to Canada's accountability regime, and the government welcomes the 16 recommendations outlined in the committee's report and agrees with the intent and improvements to the Conflict of Interest Act. Canada now has one of the most accountable and transparent systems of governance in the world, and the committee's recommendations can help us make that even better.
We know that a high degree of transparency makes government more accountable and is vital to the effective participation of citizens and organizations in the decision-making process. However, accountability and transparency in public institutions is something we can never take for granted. That is why we have been working hard to make more and more information available to Canadians.
By proactively making government information available, it becomes accessible to anyone who may be interested. In that same spirit, the recently took steps to ensure that information disclosed about public service contracts is accessible and easy to understand.
The new measures ensure that more detailed information is published on contracts for services such as professional services and management consultant contracts. For example, rather than simply providing a generic description of the awarded contract, a more detailed explanation of the type of work and context is now required. It is all part of the government's effort to provide our citizens with information previously stored within the government's vault, so to speak.
In fact, we are opening the lid on a vast store of valuable information that has until very recently been diligently collected and just stored away. The Government of Canada produces and acquires vast amounts of data. This data supports service delivery in the areas such as health, environment, agriculture and natural resources. Through our open data efforts, we are now releasing information in machine-readable formats by way of portals, meta data and search tools for reuse by governments, citizens, voluntary organizations and the private sector in new and unanticipated ways. The door is now being thrown open and the possibilities are truly exciting.
The open data portal at data.gc.ca is a one-stop shop for federal government data that can be downloaded free of charge by Canadian citizens, researchers, voluntary organizations and private sector businesses. It is a collaborative effort among Government of Canada departments and agencies to provide access to data managed by the government that can be leveraged by citizens, businesses and communities for their very own purposes.
These datasets, which now number around 200,000, include everything from building permits and wait times for non-emergency surgeries, to pollution emissions and lineup times at the border. Statistics Canada, for example, has made its community level health profiles available as well as 2001, 2006 and 2011 census data and socio-economic geographic data. Environment Canada has put out information about fish stocks and freshwater quality indicator data from the Canadian environmental sustainability—
:
Mr. Speaker, over the last year, the member for has spent a lot of time working on this at committee. The vice-chair of the committee, the member for , has been working on this committee for a long time and has truly become an expert on many of the things that have come before committee. Her input has been invaluable in helping to pursue some of the avenues that we are now attacking with respect to accountability in government since we were elected in 2006.
I would like to thank the member for . He rightfully highlighted the fact that this government was elected in 2006 mainly on a promise of increasing accountability. It came after a time when Canadians were somewhat disappointed by the activities that they had seen from the Liberal Party beforehand with respect to the sponsorship scandal. Canadians work very hard day in and day out. They always want to make sure that the funds they send to us, that they entrust to their elected officials, are used wisely. They were rightfully outraged when information came out at the Gomery commission to show that was not the case.
In 2006, we ran on a platform of not only restoring Canada's economy and opening up new markets for our manufacturers, creating jobs and cutting taxes, but also on restoring balance in our justice system. A big part of that platform was about restoring people's trust and faith in the government and the institutions that support government. That is what brought the Federal Accountability Act forward.
The Federal Accountability Act was the first piece of legislation this government introduced after being elected. It was obviously very important. Members may recall at that time the conflict of interest commissioner, who I believe was appointed by Prime Minister Chrétien, reported only to the prime minister. He was not subject to Parliament and did not report to Parliament. He only reported to the prime minister. The prime minister at the time, I suppose, would accept reports and pass judgment on what he heard. We knew Canadians would not be confident with that mechanism.
As a result of the sponsorship scandal, we saw it was not working and that was why we passed the legislation in 2006, which subjected the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to Parliament. Ms. Dawson, who is the commissioner right now, reports to Parliament. There was a provision in the act stating that it would have to be reviewed. It goes without saying that is something we would expect. As circumstances change, as our lives change as parliamentarians, and the tools that we use change, all pieces of legislation have to be updated. In this instance, all parliamentarians would agree that such an important act which highlights how government works in an accountable fashion, how it addresses accountability, needs to be reviewed. These things are top of mind to all Canadians. That review process is an important one.
The committee started its work in January 2013. I was not serving on the committee at that time. It took six months for the review and it finalized a report by June of that year. That report came back to committee in the fall of 2013.
The committee listened to hundreds of hours of testimony. It received recommendations from a number of individuals. By and large, we heard that people were happy with the act, but it contained some elements that needed to be addressed, some rules that needed to be clarified, and others that needed to be brought forward.
This would ensure that not just parliamentarians but the government as a whole and those who work within government, those who were entrusted to undertake the things that we have passed here in Parliament, would have that same level of accountability, because what we hear when we go back into our ridings, especially coming out of the sponsorship scandal, is that although parliamentarians are ultimately responsible for the decisions they make, what we saw in the sponsorship scandal was that parliamentarians enabled people down the line, people who work within the public service, to make decisions on their behalf, which then caused a lot of the trouble, as we saw in the sponsorship scandal.
We heard a lot of this through our consultations within our ridings and consultations at the committee. We heard that certain rules had to be tightened up and that certain people had to be brought within the scope of the Conflict of Interest Act. That is what we acted upon.
However, we also wanted to make sure that any changes reflected the fact that Canadians by and large, as well as those working under this act, could be confident that it was actually doing what it was designed to do: provide a set of rules for those of us who are elected, those of us who are ministers or parliamentary secretaries or ministers of state, to govern the way we act, the way we do our business, and to make sure that those activities are done in an honourable and ethical fashion.
I think what we have seen is that by and large, it is working. That does not mean that every single provision and every single thing that we have done with respect to improving accountability is perfect. Obviously that is why the five-year review was put in place: to ensure that we can improve on all of the things that we do.
One of the things that was highlighted, something that I think really underscores the differences between this act and what came before it, is the independence of the commissioner herself.
As I highlighted earlier in my discussion, the previous commissioner reported only to the . Under this act, the commissioner reports to Parliament. The commissioner can make investigations; those investigations are made public and are reported to Parliament. Parliamentarians can learn from the unfortunate mistakes that some of our colleagues might make. We can know what they did wrong or what they may have made a mistake with, and we, the rest of us, can learn from those mistakes.
Previously, that was not how it worked in this place, so that is a huge benefit over the previous system.
As I said, I reviewed a lot of the testimony, and what we heard from a lot of the testimony was very clear: we had to continue to do all we could to ensure that ethical practices were followed, that the act itself was working properly, and that this was not the time to throw out an act that was working well and completely start all over. However, some areas needed to be modified.
Recommendations came through the committee after almost a year of debate in committee. The report was finalized, if I am not mistaken, toward the end of October or early November. My colleague from can probably correct me if I am wrong on that. After almost a year of consideration, we came out with a report.
Obviously the opposition did not appreciate all of the recommendations that came through the majority of the committee members, but the process also allowed them to make a comment, and there was, of course, a minority report that was attached. It also becomes part of the public record for debate.
By and large, the committee actually did what it was supposed to do, what it was tasked to do. It looked at an act, an act that is a good act and that has fundamentally changed how public office holders work within government. It is transparent, it is open, and it gives clear indication to the Canadian people that their politicians, those they elect, are acting in an ethical manner, but it also says that as time moves on, we will make sure that we improve on it, and that is what we did. The committee worked in a very good fashion on this task. It took the time it needed, it listened to the witnesses that it needed to, and, after almost a year of study, it came up with these recommendations.
I think they are good recommendations. I commend the committee members, especially the member for and the vice-chair, the member for , who did extraordinary work.
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Mr. Speaker, I am honoured to rise in this House, as always, to speak on behalf of the people of Timmins—James Bay.
I am not pleased that Parliament is looking at this report as it stands now. I believe that this report has made a mockery of the work of Parliament and the parliamentary committees and has undermined, in a very egregious manner, the objective of the Conflict of Interest Act and the promise that was made in 2006, when the present came into town promising accountability.
When we go back to 2006, after the endemic corruption that had beset Ottawa under years and years of a Liberal government, there were numerous problems identified. There was the revolving door around the 's office; the easy access of the lobbyists to keep people in positions; the lack of accountability mechanisms for the people in the civil service at the very high levels, who were making the procurement decisions; and the inability to devise clear walls between the political operatives of the government and the senior civil service to ensure accountability to the Canadian people.
In 2006, the New Democratic Party worked in good faith with the incoming Conservative government, because we believe in the issue of transparency and accountability, regardless of which party is in power. The Canadian people expect this.
At the time, there were some obvious major failings in the efforts of the accountability act. We had pushed to have the Senate under the same code as the House of Commons so that Canadians could trust that even though the House is elected and the Senate is not elected, and I am not going to get into that issue tonight, there was a standard for ethical behaviour. The Canadian public will certainly agree that if the Senate had agreed to come under the Conflict of Interest Act and to have an empowered ethics commissioner and a lobbying commissioner a number of its members might not be facing fraud or be under investigation the way they are tonight.
That does not mean that the act itself, the way it was administered in Parliament, did not have problems. That was the reason for the five-year statutory review. The reason was that we needed to see what worked and what did not. Certainly over the period of five years, a number of problems came forward that the original enshriners of the act, the Conservative government at the time, working with the New Democrat opposition, may not have envisioned.
One of the problems was the interpretation of the Conflict of Interest Act. Present Commissioner Mary Dawson is very literal. There is no deviation on the issue of apparent conflict of interest.
Yet members will know that in dealing with lobbying or people looking to get access, the issue of apparent conflict of interest is as crucial as conflict of interest, because it is very difficult to prove an exact conflict of interest unless the actual body is lying on the ground, with a gun in the hand, and the ethics commissioner is jumping in the door as it is all happening.
The issue of apparent conflict of interest would have been a reasonable amendment to clarify the role of the ethics commissioner.
We needed to clarify the roles of the lobbying commissioner and the ethics commissioner, because we have had the bizarre situation where the lobbying commissioner has found that lobbyists have acted inappropriately, yet the same ministers who were under investigation through the ethics commissioner for the same act of lobbying were found to have done nothing wrong. There is obviously a problem if the lobbyist did something wrong but the ministers or senior civil servants did not. We had to clarify that. It would have been a good result of the act to clarify that, which would come down to the issue of the apparent conflict of interest role.
There are certainly issues in terms of clarifying the roles of financial remuneration, particularly for the top parliamentary secretaries and ministers of the crown, because these are the people who can be influenced.
Right now the reading of the act is very narrow. There has to be a personal benefit. A personal benefit is not necessarily money paid to a riding association, yet clearly there is a benefit to a lobbyist who is going to give money to a riding association.
This is not to be draconian on this. I am sure we could have worked it out.
If a senior minister has someone donate to him or her, one does not necessarily have the ability to check everybody who is donating, so that person is not necessarily in a conflict of interest. However, if that person is in his or her office and lobbyists are going to the office and the individual is saying he or she is doing a fundraiser, the person is potentially in a conflict of interest. However, if the word “apparent” is not being used, that issue is not being clarified. These were issues that needed to be addressed.
Certainly Canadians were wondering how it was possible that the most senior inside advisor to the could write a secret cheque for $90,000. Is that a conflict of interest, a breach of the act? These were things that needed to be clarified, so we all understood the rules. Unfortunately, that did not happen.
Let us talk about the administration of the act, the people who are under the act, and about how this whole process was undermined.
In terms of the administration of the role of the access to information, privacy and ethics committee, these are officers of Parliament who are some of the finest civil servants I have had the honour to meet. There is extreme professionalism traditionally, by the Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, Elections Canada, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, and the Lobbying Commissioner. They all play the role of ensuring that parliamentarians in government are accountable to the Canadian people.
However, we saw the full-on attack against the credibility of the head of Elections Canada, insinuating that he was somehow partisan. That undermined his office and his ability to do the work. We saw the attack on the former parliamentary budget officer, Kevin Page, which was relentless and completely out of line. The government was trying to undermine the work of an independent officer who was bringing forward the information that parliamentarians need.
The recent appointment of the Privacy Commissioner has caused a great deal of uncertainty in terms of his role. I hope he can fulfill his role with credibility, despite what has happened under the current government. Then we have the issue of the Conflict of Interest Act and how Mary Dawson is going to apply that act. We know she has proven herself to be very literal when she reads the act, so who is it that Mary Dawson or a future ethics commissioner should be overseeing? This was a big issue in terms of what we debated. We heard from expert after expert, right across the political spectrum. The key issue was who it is that the ethics commissioner should be overseeing. It is clearly people who hold power and who have the ability to make decisions.
If a backbencher writes a letter of support for a local business, because that is what backbenchers do, that is considered part of the job. However, someone sitting at the cabinet table is not supposed to do that because that person has the power to influence in a way that a backbencher does not. Therefore, there is a gradation, in terms of the roles of responsibility and accountability.
Elected members of Parliament have certain ethical standards that they have to meet, but the act is meant for key people who are able to influence power. Cabinet ministers, parliamentary secretaries, and key advisors around the , would be considered part of that. These are the office holders who can be influenced and who can influence. Who are the lobbyists attempting to influence? Who are they taking out to supper? Who are they buying gifts for? Who are they taking on trips? These are the kinds of questions that the ethics commissioner needs to deal with.
In the 2006 platform of the Conservative Party, there were a number of recommendations about empowering an ethics commissioner. One of the recommendations was that members of the public should be able to make complaints. It does not mean that the ethics commissioner is going to be burdened with all manner of spurious complaints. In fact, if the ethics commissioner believes a complaint is spurious, she can write it off. However, members of the public should have the right to ask for investigations, and the ethics commissioner could decide whether to apply it.
The issue of administrative monetary penalties was a fundamental principle in the 2006 Conservative platform. Administrative monetary penalties mean that the ethics commissioner as well as the Lobbying Commissioner have the power to enforce the act so that they can hold people to account.
We are being told it is simply enough that they have moral weight or that they ask people to stay after school or write an essay saying that they promise they will not do it again.
If someone is dealing with contracts that may be worth hundreds of millions of dollars and is seen as doing something inappropriate, the lobbying and ethics commissioners should have the ability to bring forward administrative monetary penalties, yet the government is against that. It does not want these independent officers to have teeth.
We have talked about the people who hold the power, the people who make the decisions, the people who get lobbied and the people who do the lobbying, the people who decide on procurement, the people who are appointed to key government boards and the big public boards that people are brought forward on. These are all the people we heard again and again should be under the act, to what extent they should be under the act, and what rules should apply to them.
That was the main oversight of our committee, yet all of that evidence was completely ignored. At the last minute, the deus ex machina recommendation dropped in from the Prime Minister's Office, right in the middle of the recommendation. Of all of the recommendations that we heard from the law societies and the experts, recommendation number one, which was rolled down right into our report as though it had actually been presented as evidence, although it had not, came down from the Prime Minister's Office and said that from now on, anybody who has a union card and works in the civil service is going to be treated the same as ministers of the crown.
Poor Mary Dawson was somewhat gobsmacked by that recommendation. We asked her how many people would come under the act and how many people she would now have to administer. It would be like telling Mary Dawson that in addition to making sure that the parliamentary secretary for finance is not being unduly lobbied and in addition to making sure that key ministers are not hanging out and going on weekend trips with key lobbyists, she will now have to look after more people than live in the city of Saskatoon or Longueuil. The number is double the population of Barrie.
Now she is going to have to administer that act herself. What that means in a very simple and cynical fashion is that the Conservatives have watered down the act to make her job functionally impossible. We asked her how she would handle this recommendation. She said that she simply would not be able to do it. The government would have to get some other body to it. What the government has done is it has decided that its number one recommendation, without any evidence or witnesses coming forward, is to make her office unable to do its job, which is keeping the key power brokers in the Conservative government accountable.
The other thing the Conservative government is pushing for is secrecy. This is the government that tells us how much it believes in openness and transparency. What it believes in is total transparency against its enemies and total secrecy for its friends. It wants to make it so that any investigation of any of its ministers or friends who are guilty of wrongdoing has to be kept secret.
The government members do not talk about that here tonight when we hear them talk about transparency, openness and datasets. It was talking about radio waves and fish stocks earlier, but it was not telling the Canadian public that one of the key recommendations they are bringing forward is to make the investigation process secret. How does that help the Canadian public? It does not, but it will certainly help the Conservative Party when it is about protecting Conservatives and hiding the information about whether or not any wrongdoing has been done.
We have enormous respect for these institutions, and we believe that when recommendations or questions for investigations are brought forward, the spurious ones will be looked at and thrown out, but the Canadian public has a right to know that an investigation is under way. They have a right to know that the ethics commissioner has the right, and should have the right, to be able to say, “Yes, I have launched an investigation”, and the person who is bringing it should be able to say it. She should also have the right to say, “I looked at it and I found that it was an absolutely ridiculous request for an investigation. No, I am not doing it.” That should be the power of an independent officer, which the government is taking away, but it has not said that.
There was a number of recommendations that the government ignored. What we are seeing here is a sham. This is not based on what we heard.
The Conservatives completely ignored the 70-some recommendations from the ethics commissioner. They ignored the recommendations that came from the law societies and the people who deal with the administration of government who look at these issues. They ignored all of those recommendations and basically brought in a whitewash that will undermine this act.
We believe that the power to bring in administrative monetary penalties is a key power that the ethics commissioner needs as well as the Commissioner of Lobbying. That should include the ability to suspend for a specified period, a suspension of a member's right to vote if they refuse to be compliant for a period of time, and require reimbursement for the value of the gift.
We spent hours and hours talking about the value of gifts and whether it should $30, $50, or whether there should be any limit at all. Personally, I think it absurd to think that somebody would be influenced by a gift of $30, a snow globe or a photo book of Saskatoon in the spring. What will influence someone is being flown around the country or flown around Europe and given tens of thousands of dollars in free gifts. That is an issue.
We spent hours arguing about gifts, which was fundamentally irrelevant because it treats the ethics abilities of the civil servants and key ministers and it makes it ridiculous. However, on the issue of gifts, at a certain point we have to set a reasonable fee.
We have to deal with the issue of fundraising and lobbyists, first, so that it is fair, but second, so that it is clear. However, none of that is in there.
Ministers, Ministers of State and Parliamentary Secretaries should ensure that government facilities and equipment, including ministerial or departmental letterhead, are not used for or in connection with fundraising activities.
These are the straightforward, straight-up responsibilities that should be in the act.
The ministerial code of conduct that the himself brought in should be made part of the act. It is absolutely useless to have a code of conduct that is optional. How can we have a code of conduct for ethics that is optional? The had established what the rules were for ministers of the crown. We should put it in the act, and that should be the standard that people apply to.
Again, on the issue of bringing complaints, it should be fair. If the public believes a complaint should be brought, the Commissioner of Lobbying and the ethics commissioner should have the ability and power to decide whether it is reasonable or not.
Also, there is the extended definition of ministerial staff to include those working within the minister's office on contract work. This is not to say that if one is in a member's office and a student from one's hometown comes by that they should not be part of the act. That would be absurd. However, if one is dealing with a ministerial office and coming in to do contract work, while in the minister's office, one is part of the overall decision-making and under that period of time it would be a reasonable thing. Again, it would not be reasonable to apply that to every single person who comes in to volunteer at the office of a member of Parliament or even over in the Senate, if we imagine it ever did become accountable.
These are the lines that we have to start defining between what is a reasonable request and what is an unreasonable request, and what is doable and what is not.
We believe that we could reduce the gifts. As I said earlier, there was talk about $30 and $500. Right now it is $200, but we believe a $100 gift is fair.
If a member goes out to lunch with someone, the member's doors will not busted down if a member paid for someone's lunch at $100. I mean, I would love a Saskatchewan Roughriders jacket, but nobody has ever given me one. However, if it was under $100, that would be perfectly fine, but not if it was over $100. These are reasonable things.
Also, make automatic divestment rules for reporting public office holders with significant decision-making power and access to privileged information, including but not limited to ministers, ministers of state, parliamentary secretaries, chiefs of staff, deputy ministers, ministerial staff and employees in a minister's office. Keep those rules in place, but extending that to 260,000 civil servants across the country will make this act unenforceable. It will dilute the role of the ethics commissioner and it will make a mockery of the work of our committee.