Part of the Committee’s mandate was to examine online voting. In
Canada, online voting has been used in municipal elections, including in
Markham and Peterborough, Ontario, and in Halifax and Truro and in Cape Breton,
Nova Scotia, but has yet to be tried at the provincial or federal levels.
The Committee heard a wide range of views on online voting and on
the broader topic of electronic voting (often referred to as “e-voting”). There
are three primary types of electronic voting, namely machine counting, kiosk
voting and remote online voting.
-
Machine counting refers to when a machine counts the ballots
cast.
-
Kiosk voting allows voters to cast ballots at computer kiosks
within polling stations or dispersed in other public locations such as
community centres and libraries.
-
Remote online voting allows voters to vote from personal devices
from any location (home, work, etc.).
In his opening remarks, Chief Electoral Officer Marc Mayrand
touched on the primary factors that the Committee should consider regarding
online and electronic voting:
It is undeniable that many Canadians would benefit
from the introduction of online or Internet voting. Internet voting would
remove barriers and make a vote more accessible for various groups such as
voters with mobility challenges, including seniors, those with visual
impairments, and Canadians abroad. That being said, caution is needed in moving
forward to ensure that Canadians continue to have the same high level of trust
in the integrity of their elections. In this regard we are not currently
planning to offer online voting in 2019. However, Elections Canada would
certainly welcome direction from this committee in terms of a desirable
approach in moving forward with Internet voting.
In examining this issue, the committee should
consider a number of aspects, including social acceptance and the challenges
that online voting present for the integrity and secrecy of the vote. I would
ask the committee to consider the scope of the introduction of online voting,
which may include limiting its use to particular groups of electors who would
benefit most from this option, such as those with disabilities or Canadians
living abroad.[393]
The various issues raised by the Chief Electoral Officer were
reflected in witness testimony and submissions made to the Committee. In
summary, many of those in favour of online voting suggested that it may expand
the accessibility of elections and, in turn, increase voter turnout. In
particular, online voting as well as forms of kiosk voting could make voting
easier and more accessible for voters who are blind or who have mobility
limitations. Opponents to online voting argued that if online voting was
implemented on a wide scale, accessibility to the vote could actually be
limited for voters who do not have Internet access. Others posited that there
is a ceremonial or communal value to voting in person, and that if online
voting is introduced it should be in addition to regular voting (not replace
it). Finally, the strongest arguments against online voting were technical in
nature, citing the transparency, reliability and security concerns of enabling
and protecting a secret vote to take place electronically or over the Internet.
This range of opinion was expressed by the
22,247 respondents to the Committee’s e-consultation. As noted by the results
below, respondents were generally open to the option of online voting:[394]
Canadians should be able to vote online in a federal
election
Scale: 1 (Strongly Disagree) – 5 (Strongly Agree);
NA
However, as is described in greater detail below, respondents were
also concerned about the reliability and security of online voting.
One of the primary benefits often attributed to online voting is
that it could make voting accessible and convenient for various groups, such as
voters with mobility challenges, individuals living in rural and remote areas
and those serving in the military or living abroad. Marc Mayrand noted during
his appearance before the Committee:
[I]nternet voting would remove barriers and make a
vote more accessible … if you want to make a fundamental difference in
accessibility … you need to seriously look at online voting … we have 3.5
million electors who suffer various degrees of disability in this country.
Technology would allow most of them to vote secretly and independently.[395]
This view was echoed by a number of experts. Nicole Goodman added
that remote online voting is “the only type of electronic voting reform that
represents a substantial step forward in terms of voter access and
convenience.”[396]
Diane Bergeron of the Canadian Institute for the Blind highlighted
how the current paper ballot system is not accessible to blind or visually
impaired Canadians.
She stated:
I have never once
been able to vote independently and in secret in a federal election. The
election process currently as it stands is not accessible to people who are
blind in Canada.[397]
She further noted that the Braille ballots currently offered during
federal election are not sufficient in making the voting accessible and secret
as only 3% of blind or visually impaired Canadians read Braille. Further, even
blind Canadians who can use the Braille paper ballot require assistance in
ensuring the appropriate place on the ballot was marked.
The secrecy of the ballot is a fundamental aspect of the Canadian
electoral
process that is compromised for blind and visually impaired Canadians,
according to
Ms. Bergeron.[398] By voting electronically and therefore unassisted, these electors are
afforded a greater degree of anonymity and equality when casting a ballot.
As such, Ms. Bergeron encouraged the Committee to consider electronic and
online voting insofar as it can help make the ballot more accessible:
I
encourage the [C]ommittee to
consider electronic and online voting, but to please make sure it's accessible
to everybody and to make sure that it is tested by people with adaptive
equipment to make sure that it does work and it's not just a system that
somebody says works.[399]
Carlos Sosa of the Council of
Canadians with Disabilities added that although online voting could help reduce
barriers for individuals with disabilities, it should not replace the paper
ballot. If any form of online voting were to be established in Canada, Mr. Sosa
suggested that “persons with disabilities must be involved from the ground up.”[400]
Although online voting might reduce impediments and increase voting
access for a part of the Canadian population, online voting might disadvantage others
and create social inequality as many do not have reliable access to a computer
and/or Internet. In Whitehorse, Kirk Cameron advised the Committee that:
There are many communities throughout the north
that do not have reliable communications infrastructure that would reliably
support this voting option.… Online voting may help many areas of Canada, but
do not assume that it is a good option for all regions and communities.[401]
A number of witnesses and citizens from the territories echoed this
view and noted that Internet services are not reliable there, and that ensuring
that there are accessible polling stations in remote areas should remain a
priority.
Ensuring the security of online
voting is often referred to as one of the most significant challenges of implementing
online voting. Security breaches could jeopardize the integrity of the voting
process and lead to compromised election results. A number of professionals
from the information technology (IT) industry appeared before the Committee
expressed serious concern over the implementation of online voting.
Furthermore, the vast majority of Canadians who completed the Committee’s
e-consultation noted that they are very concerned (51.1% of respondents) or
concerned (17.7% of respondents) about the reliability and security of online
voting:[402]
I am concerned about the security and reliability of online
voting
Scale: 1 (Strongly Disagree) – 5 (Strongly Agree);
NA
Barbara Simons, a leading expert on online and electronic voting,
held:
If there is even a small chance that Internet
voting might result in our elections being hacked, it doesn't matter how many
people want it. If Internet voting puts our elections at risk—and it does—we
must reject it until such time as it can be proven secure.[403]
Along with Dr. Simons, many from the IT community stressed that the
risks of online voting and electronic counting outweigh the potential benefits.
Threats of cyber-security breaches are too great, particularly concerning the
outcome of a federal election.
Brian Lack, the president of Simply Voting, noted in his brief to the Committee
that the “heightened threat level of a federal election pushed the security of Internet
voting past its limit and poses too much of a risk.”[404]
Comparisons between online voting and online banking were made
throughout the Committee’s study, as both offer individuals convenience and can
be done from any location. However, unlike online banking where records of
transactions are desirable, maintaining a record of an individual’s ballot would
compromise the secrecy of the vote.
As voters would likely have to register online and prove their identity, it is
unclear whether the secrecy of their ballot would be compromised as the
completed ballot could be traced back to individual accounts. As such, any form
on online voting must ensure voters’ complete anonymity when casting a ballot,
while ensuring that voters provide proper identification.
A related concern regarding online voting is that it lacks
transparency due to the absence of a paper trail. The paper trails produced
through traditional ballots provides a simple backup system in the event that
votes have to be recounted. Recounts with online ballots become much more
difficult, according to Dr. Simons:
When you bring in the computers, you are dependent
on the computers. You're dependent on the algorithm for counting the votes.… You can't really open up the machine and
look at it the way you can pieces of paper.[405]
Greg DePaco made a similar observation at the open-mic session in
Vancouver,:
Even if online voting could one day be made 100%
secure, it could never be visibly and demonstrably secure in the way a properly
scrutinized paper ballot can.[406]
During Dr. Simons’ appearance before the Committee, she also
advised against the use of machine counting for election results as it is not
as reliable as manual counting and could be subject to security breaches. She
stated:
If you move to a complicated form of voting, then
you're going to have to use computers, and you won't be able to see what's
going on inside the computers. You'll be dependent on the software, which could
have software bugs or it could have malware.[407]
One open mic participant, Michael Mallett, suggested that any
adoption of electronic voting technologies should use open source software, as
he argued that it is more secure:
As a software development professional, I advocate
and develop open-source software. I believe very strongly that open-source
software, such as Linux and Firefox, is more secure than closed-source
proprietary software, such as Microsoft Office or Apple iOS. One of the reasons
is that open-source software can be publicly audited and the source code can be
read by anybody with the skills necessary to do that, whereas closed-source
proprietary software is a black box and nobody knows how it works.
I would suggest that our
current paper ballot system is publicly auditable, insofar as I understand that
when I put my paper ballot in a box, at the end of the day a human being counts
those paper ballots and other people are in the room watching what they do. I
think we should look to the United States for what not to do in this regard. I
think that they have implemented a disastrous electronic voting system that
undermines their democracy. They have voting machines that are owned and
operated by for-profit businesses. Nobody knows how their black boxes work.[408]
With regard to increasing
the accessibility of the vote, Dr. Simons stated that online voting would
provide a disservice to voters with disabilities as it would be offering them a
tool that is “fundamentally insecure.” She added:
I'm reluctant to suggest having a small number of
voters vote over the Internet because … sometimes a small number of voters can
change an outcome. I'd hate to see even a small number of ballots being
vulnerable.[409]
To provide blind and visually impaired voters greater secrecy of
the ballot,
Dr. Simons suggested that voters be given the option to download a ballot at
home, fill it out using the appropriate tools, and send it in by mail.
Another benefit often attributed to online voting is that the
convenience of voting online may draw some infrequent voters into the electoral
process, and thereby increase voter turnout. As Maryantonett Flumian noted, “if
voting is more user-friendly and highly accessible, more people may be likely
to vote.”[410]
Nicole Goodman, Director of the Centre for e-Democracy and
Assistant Professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs, stated that her
research found that online voting increased turnout in Ontario municipalities
by 3%. Notably, her research also indicated that there was evidence at the
municipal level, that people who previously were eligible to vote but did not
were brought into the voting process when online voting was introduced.[411]
Harold Jansen posited that introducing online voting
would not have any appreciable impact on voter turnout:
I also am suspicious of how great the gains would
be in terms of voter turnout. I think most of the issues lie around motivation,
not opportunity. I'm suspicious of a lot of things when people say on surveys,
“Oh, I was too busy to vote”. Often, it just means, “There are other things
more important to me than voting.” Okay, citizens can make those kinds of
determinations. Voting is not that onerous, and I think Elections Canada has
done a pretty good job in the last 20 years of improving the accessibility of
the vote. There are more ways to vote than ever before.
I don't think we should
expect realistically huge gains in voter turnout. I don't think that should be
a motivation. It would be more convenient for some people, but these are people
who would likely vote anyway. What I found was that the people most likely to
say they were very likely to cast a vote in our survey were people who had
already voted. They would just switch to doing it online.[412]
Some suggest that online voting may be seen as a
particularly attractive option for young voters who are familiar and
comfortable with new technologies. However,
Ms. Goodman’s research found that online voting appeals to voters of all ages
relatively equally and that in certain countries that use online voting, those
aged 18 to 25 are
more likely to choose paper over online ballots. She observed that young people
may be opting to vote in person due to the “symbolism or ritual for the first
time participating.”
She concluded:
[W]hile older voters are likely to use online
voting and remain loyal to the voting method; young people are more likely to
try online voting once and then move back to paper ballots or back to
abstention. Older voters will use online voting, but it's not the solution to
engage young people.[413]
Finally, one of the drawbacks
often attributed to online voting is a perceived loss of interaction in public
spaces. Some witnesses and participants held that there is something
special about the ritual of voting in person that online voting cannot replace.
This view
was also expressed by 61% of the respondents of the e-consultation, who agreed
or strongly agreed that there is a public good and value associated with voting
in person.[414] Dr. Nelson Wiseman, summarized:
The Internet is convenient, but incidentally it’s
not a social activity … when you show up at the polls, you meet your
neighbours, you get in line, and you talk to other people.[415]
The Committee acknowledges that
many Canadians are open to the idea of online voting as a way of making voting
more accessible. However, both supporters and detractors of online voting agree
that the secrecy, security, and integrity of the ballot and the federal
electoral process are fundamental. The Committee heard significant testimony
(and received submissions), particularly from experts in technology, that the
secrecy and integrity of an online ballot cannot be guaranteed to a sufficient
degree to warrant widespread implementation in federal elections. The Committee
agrees.
However, the Committee recognizes that technology does have an
important and useful role to play in making elections and the voting process
more accessible for Canadians with disabilities. The Committee agrees with the
principle that any technology developed to make voting more accessible should
be of comparable security and integrity to that of the current voting process.
The Committee was particularly struck by the testimony and submissions offered
by blind Canadians, who shared their distress about not being able to cast their
ballot independently. Concerted efforts must be made by Elections Canada to
enable all voters to be able to cast their ballot in secret.
Recommendation 4
The Committee recommends that online voting not be implemented at
this time.
Recommendation 5
The
Committee recommends that Elections Canada explore, in collaboration with
relevant stakeholder groups, the use of technologies to promote greater
accessibility of the vote while ensuring the overall integrity of the voting
process.
Recommendation 6
The Committee recommends that the House of Commons refer the
question of how to improve the accessibility of voting for Canadians with
disabilities, while ensuring the overall integrity of the voting process, to
the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.