Dissenting Opinion of the Official Opposition to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence Report on Canada and the Defence of North America: NORAD and Aerial Readiness

Introduction:

The Official Opposition (Conservative) committee members do not recognize the report on Canada and the Defence of North America: NORAD and Aerial Readiness as legitimate for several reasons.

Firstly, in the opinion of the Official Opposition, the committee’s majority report is not legitimate because of the procedures and practices implemented by the members of the Liberal party throughout the course of this study. No opposition members were present for the final stages of drafting. Some members of the committee, with the tyranny of the majority, rushed through the final stages of the draft report, which included making recommendations and established the short deadline for the dissenting opinions for opposition members.

Furthermore, the committee, passed a motion forcing members of the opposition parties to submit a dissenting report less than three days after the last meeting. Members of the Official Opposition were not afforded an opportunity to see the final version of the report before the deadline for submission of dissenting reports. Therefore, the Conservative Party’s dissenting report was written in the dark, without seeing the final version of the committee’s majority report.

Additionally, the motion that was passed by the committee forces opposition members to submit their dissenting reports in both official languages in less than 72 hours. This is an unreasonable demand, seeing as translation services typically allows for three days to complete a translation, especially on longer documents such as dissenting reports.

It is the opinion of the Official Opposition that the members of the governing party took advantage of their majority status throughout the study to draft a report that suits their political needs, rather than the shared opinion of all committee members. Members of the Official Opposition, were not consulted on the motion and timing to submit a dissenting report and their consent was not given.

Furthermore, the Minister of National Defence said that he would use the committee’s findings in shaping the government’s defence policy, which is currently under review. The Official Opposition is of the opinion that the committee’s majority report is not reflective of all members of the committee, but only of those of the governing party. The behaviour of the Liberal members of the committee, throughout the course of the study, is evidence that the government is using its majority status to predetermine the outcome of not only the committee’s report, but the government’s defence policy review as well.

Additionally, this report only addresses one aspect of the Canadian Armed Forces, - the Royal Canadian Air Force - and does not fully reflect all aspects of the military and Canada’s defence policy.  For the above reasons, the Official Opposition committee members do not accept the committee’s majority report and respectfully request that the Minister of National Defence consider all dissenting opinions in the government’s review of Canada’s National Defence policy.

Question on breach of Parliamentary privilege:

The Official Opposition members believe that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable John McKay, breached the committee’s Parliamentary privilege.

On Tuesday, June 7, 2016, the Parliamentary Secretary appeared on a televised broadcast on CPAC on a program titled Prime Time Politics. During an on-air discussion with host Peter Van Duesen, James Bezan (Member of Parliament for Selkirk— Interlake— Eastman) and Randall Garrison (Member of Parliament for Esquimalt — Saanich — Sooke), the Parliamentary Secretary made reference to recommendation #3 of the  report that was submitted to the clerk of the committee for consideration in drafting the committee’s report. In a discussion concerning the replacement of Canada’s CF-18 fighter jets Mr.McKay said “You need a plane… Even James, in his representations to committee has said the government needs to make a decision within 12 months, and I agree”. At no point during the course of the study did Mr. Bezan or any other member of the committee make reference to a suggestion that the government make a decision regarding the replacement of Canada’s CF-18s within a 12 month period. However, in providing suggested recommendations to the clerk of the committee, Mr. Bezan, on behalf of the Official Opposition Members of the committee, wrote “That the Government of Canada decide on the replacement of the current fleet of CF-18’s within the next 12 months”.  The Official Opposition’s recommendations were submitted confidentially directly to the clerk of the committee, through Mr. Bezan’s office. In accordance with committee procedures, the clerk then shared all submitted recommendations with the committee members, clearly indicating that the information was strictly confidential and not to be shared with anyone who is not a member of the committee. The e-mail distributed by the clerk on May 30^th, 2016 says:

Any disclosure of information contained in this draft report and document could be considered a potential breach of parliamentary privilege (House of Commons Procedure and Practice, Second Edition, 2009, p. 1077-1078). This list is CONFIDENTIAL AND REMAINS SO even after the final version of the report is presented in the House of Commons.

It is important to note here that Mr. McKay, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, is NOT a member of the Standing Committee on National Defence, and therefore should not have had access to this confidential information. Therefore, this incident indicates at least two breaches of the committee’s Parliamentary privilege. Firstly, Mr. McKay should not have had access to this confidential information, a member of the committee must have shared it with him, despite clear instructions from the clerk. Secondly, as an experienced Parliamentarian, Mr. McKay should be well aware that any confidential information that is provided to the committee cannot be shared outside of committee, nonetheless on national television.

Furthermore, the involvement of the Parliamentary Secretary in the business of committee is in violation of a campaign promise made by the Prime Minister. During the last federal election campaign, the Prime Minster promised “We will change the rules so that Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries may not be, or stand in for, voting members on committees”. Clearly, their effort to distance members of the Government from the work of committees has failed.

The working relationship among members of the committee began to deteriorate when Mr. Bezan attempted to address this potential breach of privilege.

Threats to Canada and North America:

Ensuring the defence of Canada has always been the top priority of the Canadian Armed Forces. In an ever-changing world, new threats to Canada and its citizens are bound to emerge. Canada prides itself on being the True North Strong and Free. The CAF is the means by which our freedom and sovereignty are protected.

A basic understanding of history shows that the global security environment is fluid, always changing and evolving. This idea was reaffirmed by military and government officials on a number of occasions throughout the course of the study. On multiple occasions, the Official Opposition members heard about the continuous challenge of staying ahead of the development and modernization of new threats. As Lieutenant-General Pierre St-Amand, Deputy Commander, NORAD noted “we're observing threat streams that force us to adjust our aperture and pay attention to other domains”.[1] 

The safety and security of Canadians is at risk from threats that can stem from either beyond or within our borders. Extremist groups from around the world have proven more than capable of launching attacks on the West. Ensuring that our domestic agencies have the tools they need to stop an attack on Canadian soil is paramount. In addition, responding to a terrorist attack with the proper force and effectiveness is necessary for ensuring a safe and secure Canada. Setting the framework so that the CAF, RCMP, and local assets have the ability to work in tandem during a crisis must be a priority for any Canadian government.

The threats from non-state actors have been on the rise. Examples of these threats range from drug traffickers, to radicalized individuals, often referred to as ‘lone wolves’, to organized terrorist groups that have declared war upon Canadian values. In an uncertain world, filled with newly emerging threats, it is paramount that the government remains vigilant in protecting Canada and Canadians.

The rapid modernization of the threats facing Canada is perhaps best illustrated through the examples of non-state actors. They are often difficult to predict and can be carried out with weapons ranging from commercial aircrafts, to hand held knives, to cyber technologies and everything in between. Despite these difficulties, Dave Perry believes that Canada has developed an expertise in defending against and preventing these types of attacks, “For more than two decades, the focus of North American defence and security has been largely on non-state threats, on things like narcotics trafficking and terrorism. I'd argue that Canada is currently quite well positioned to defend itself against those types of threats[2]” he said.

An emerging threat, stemming more and more from non-state actors, has been cyberattacks.  Cyber technologies can be used for variety of purposes including but not limited to disabling a power grid, distributing government services, or conducting theft of information or resources. Cyberattacks are now a reality that government must face on a daily basis, and from a wide array of actors. As the Chief of the Communications Security Establishment, noted our reliance on new technologies has made us more susceptible to cyberattacks, “More and more of the world's and Canada's government operations, our business, our military systems, and citizens' lives are conducted online. This increased prevalence of digital information and electronic systems represents tremendous opportunity for Canada, but it also presents risks and threats to our government systems, to Canadian industry, and ultimately to Canadians”[3].

Recommendation: 1. That the Government of Canada ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to detect, deter, and prevent conventional and asymmetric attacks on Canada and Canadians, including but not limited to cyber-attacks, missile threats and terrorism, by foreign governments and non-state actors.

Surveying the North and Protecting our Sovereignty:

One of the key areas of concern when addressing potential threats to Canada’s sovereignty is the Artic. From population to geographical makeup, the barren landscape that is Canada’s northern border poses a number of security concerns. It can best be described by Lieutenant General Stephen Bowes who said “Canada's Arctic region is immense. It comprises some 40% of Canada's overall land mass, and 75% of its coastline. Its size, combined with its austere climate and conditions, present a complex environment in which the Canadian Armed Forces must be prepared to operate at any time.”[4]

Surveying Canada’s North is imperative to the sovereignty of Canada. The vast expansion that is Canada’s Northern border is shared with a number of countries, and not all are allies. This is done through a network of surveillance equipment such as the North Warning System and UAVs that safeguards Canada’s domain awareness.  To ensure our borders are secure and sovereignty protected, Canada must ensure its surveillance equipment is effective, modern, and interoperable.

At this current time Canada’s northern surveillance does not meet the requirements for a full grasp of domain awareness[5]. As threats in the north become more prevalent in terms of intent and technology, Canada must be able to ensure that sovereignty is protected. Before a nation can respond, it must first be aware. An overwhelming number of experts and military personnel stated that there are gaps in our surveillance systems that must be filled.

Canada is not alone in this task, and our partnership in NORAD has a large role to play in ensuring North American surveillance and sovereignty. This is echoed by Rear Admiral Scott Bishop who stated “NORAD also plays an important role in ensuring Canadian sovereignty and security, serving as a deterrent against potential attacks, and providing crucial surveillance capability for North America's approaches.”[6] Through NORAD’s tri-structure command the Arctic is a shared responsibility between Canada and the United States. This allows for the sharing of resources and intelligence in order to maximize the defence of North America.

With this said, a number of witnesses told Conservative members that Canada must be vigilant that the North Warring System as well as other surveillance equipment are becoming outdated. According to Andrea Charron of the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, “One of the immediate material concerns for NORAD is the modernization of the North Warning System, which is vital to NORAD's ability to detect, assess, and track airborne activity emanating from the north.”[7] This sentiment was echoed by a three other witnesses at the committee. The lone exception was academic Michael Byers who said Canada is “good on surveillance in the Artic right now and [will] be for the next 20 years.”[8] An overwhelming majority of witnesses support an upgrade of our northern surveillance system that was built between 1986 and 1992. Since that time technology and threats have evolved, and our surveillance systems must adapt as well.

In terms of monitoring the north, Canada must not be reactive, but forward thinking. With the advancement of Russia’s stealth fighter jet program and other advanced weapons Canada must remain ahead of the technological curve. This point was also made by Lieutenant-General Pierre St-Amand who said that’s NORAD’s system was in place to survey threats “perceived in the late 1970’s” and that is why, “from a capability point of view, we have to look at something else.”[9]

The lifecycle of the North Warning System has started near its end. According to Lieutenant-General St-Amand “We expect the system to last until around 2025, at which point we will be looking for modern solutions to replace its capabilities.”[10] At this time DND is in the planning process of replacing the North Warning System, but what the future makeup of the system will be is uncertain. Canada has the option to invest in a number of surveillance equipment such as satellites, UAV’s, radar systems, and patrol aircraft. How Canada chooses to invest its money in surveillance equipment will show how serious it considers its northern sovereignty.

Conservative members also heard multiple testimonies that northern surveillance should not only be upgraded, but expanded as well. Conservative members were told that whatever system were to replace the North Warning system must cover more of the Arctic territory. This was echoed by Lieutenant General Pierre St-Amand who said that the system that replaces the North Warning System must cover the far north, as the system currently in place cannot[11].  Ensuring that Canada is aware of activities in the North is intertwined with the concept of sovereignty.

In terms of surveillance, interoperability is a must. With our commitments to NORAD, Canada must ensure that the equipment purchased for surveillance and response must work alongside our American partners. Rear Admiral Scott Bishop agreed with this point when he said, “the other benefit of remaining interoperable with the United States is that the United States sets the bar for any military operation of significance around the world. By ensuring that we are very interoperable with the United States, Canada can operate in pretty much any foreign military operation and not only operate but also assume a leadership role, which we have done several times.”[12] The equipment must also work in conjunction with allies outside the scope of NORAD and be relevant for decades to come. This point was solidified when Lieutenant General Michael Hood said, “I think in making the choice of aircraft for Canada, that has to be one of the factors that keeps in mind our interoperability today but also 20 and 30 years into the future.”[13] Canada shares the vast Arctic expansion with a number of NATO allies, which must work together to ensure a shared security.   

Recommendations: 2. That the Government of Canada ensures that proper surveillance safeguards, operational capabilities and deterrent measures are in place to protect Canada against any potential threats.

3.That the Government of Canada maintain its current support and involvement in both NORAD and NATO.

4. That the Government of Canada consider a plan to replace and upgrade the North Warning System by extending the infrastructure’s operational life cycle, adapting new technology, and expanding the system to cover Canada’s Arctic Archipelago.

5. That the Government of Canada acquire and employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the surveillance and defence of Canadian Arctic territory.

6.That the Government of Canada, both independently and through its NORAD partnership, continue to strengthen its domain awareness and surveillance operations of any threats to Canada and North America, specializing in the Arctic and maritime domains.

7. That the Government of Canada commit to deploying the remaining RadarSat Constellation and expanding the number of satellites to guarantee the surveillance of Canada's Arctic on a continuous basis.

8. That the Government of Canada ensure the RCAF has sufficient assets and resources to protect Canadian sovereignty both at home and abroad, and defend our values internationally when deemed appropriate and necessary.

Submarine Defence:

Having a dominant  stance in the marine domain defence of Canada is paramount. This covers both above and below water vessels. It was stated by Adam Lajeunesse that “the Russians have also been rebuilding their submarine capability. Now, these boats are intended largely for use in the Arctic. The Russians have historically had a very strong under-ice presence through most of the last decades of the Cold War.”[14] Submarines are important in the context of North American security due to their ability to launch cruise missiles. It was expressed by Dr. Robert Huebert that “submarine factors are already coming into context. To pretend that these types of technologies are not being developed with countries that have very different interests from Canada is just simply sticking our head in the snow, to be honest.”[15] Tracking and defending against below water vessels will become critically important due to the potential cargo traffic that will exist within the Artic sphere of influence.

Recommendation: 9. That the Government of Canada recognize the proliferation of submarines as a threat to Canadian sovereignty and ensure we enhance the RCAF and RCN surveillance and deterrent capabilities against such threats.

The right equipment to get the job done

Following the 2015 federal election, the government announced its plan to hold an “open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft, focusing on options that match Canada’s needs.”[16] While the Liberals have indicated that they do not plan on launching the competition process until the defence policy review is complete, we have concluded that such a decision will jeopardize the possibility of securing a functional fleet by 2025. After hearing statements from several witness who have indicated that “the competition needs to proceed expeditiously,” it is the opinion of the Conservative Party that the Liberals must propose a statement of requirements as soon as possible, so that the competition process can begin.

In Question Period on June 15^th, 2016 the Minister of National Defence informed the House that “26 aircraft have been extended,” and that the Liberals “are trying to extend all the aircraft up to 2025.”[17] Based on this update, it can be concluded that the condition of Canada’s current CF-18s will not pose a capability gap to the RCAF, assuming the Liberal Party selects a replacement aircraft within the next 12 months.

According to the testimony given by Dr. Michael Byers’ on May 10^th, 2016, purchasing 65 of Lockheed Martin’s  F-35 aircraft is unaffordable. He references the limited nature of the government’s budget for securing a replacement for the current fleet of CF-18s, and indicates that the cost of the F-35 would be too great for the government to be able to afford the minimum number of jets required to service the RCAF.[18] However, Denmark’s recent report detailing the competitive procurement process that they held to select a new fighter aircraft, directly contradicts Dr. Byers’ suggestion that the F-35 is unaffordable in comparison to other aircraft being considered.[19] In an article discussing Denmark’s competition process, Defense News states that “the Danish government pegged the overall procurement cost to buy 28 F-35s at $2.33 billion, or $83 million a piece,” while the overall cost to buy the same number of Super Hornets amounts to $4.65 billion ($122 million per unit).[20]

Given the changing nature of both conventional and asymmetric threats in the current global security environment, and the consequential security demands that must be met by the CAF, Canada must be equipped with the appropriate resources. This in mind, the Conservative Party considers it an obligation of the Liberal Party to secure a replacement for the CF-18s, using a process that guarantees the aircraft best suited for the RCAF. This in mind, the only way to ensure that the RCAF is properly resourced, is to have the Liberal Party conduct an open and transparent procurement process to replace the CF-18 Hornet.  By pursuing a competitive tendering process, we will be able to determine which aircraft best meets the needs of the RCAF, as well as secure a contract that offers competitive pricing and a suitable timeline.

Recommendation: 10. That the Government of Canada conduct an open and fair competition to replace Canada’s outgoing fleet of CF-18 fighter jets.

Following the replacement of Canada’s CF-18 fighter jets, there should be an evaluation of: the existing military infrastructure in place, the compatibility of the infrastructure with the replacement aircraft, and the projected lifespan of the existing infrastructure. Due to the age and limited capabilities of the CC-150 Polaris currently in use by the RCAF, DND has indicated its intention to purchase new multi-role tankers between 2021 and 2025, with completion expected to take place between 2026 and 2030. However, this timeline will prove problematic should the aircraft chosen to replace Canada’s CF-18s not be compatible with the CC-150 Polaris. According to Lieutenant-General Hood, “once a decision is made on the next fighter aircraft, the next decision is the tanker replacement.”[21] He also said that “we will replace the tanker aircraft with whatever our front-line fighter is at the time. That's been our plan for quite some time.”[22] Lieutenant-General Hood, along with several other witnesses, were insistent on reminding the committee of the need to secure a replacement air tanker fleet as soon as possible, and of the critical nature of the air tanker to Canada’s participation in the NORAD mission.[23]

Recommendation: 11. That the Government of Canada begin the process of replacing the Polaris refuelling tankers immediately following the selection of the next RCAF fighter jet.

As Canada initiates the process of replacing its current fleet of CF-18s, it is crucial that we consider the interoperability capacities of all potential aircraft options presented. As a member of NORAD, in partnership with the United States, Canada is responsible for protecting one of the largest airspaces in the world. Our obligations as a NATO member to fulfill various international defence commitments, as well as our efforts to protect our sovereign territory in the Arctic, are ones that necessitate constant communication and cooperation with our allies. The interoperability made possible through the coordination of aircraft acquisition has the potential to greatly benefit all cooperative missions in the future, through shared investments in personnel, equipment, readiness, and infrastructure. In his testimony, Lieutenant-General Hood stated the following:

With the complexity of the signals environment, the way aerial warfare is evolving, interoperability today and into the future will be a very important factor. Your ability to receive information from space-based assets, from AWACS aircraft, from ground-based sensors, from other aircraft, requires a level of interoperability that not every aircraft has the capability to meet... I think in making the choice of aircraft for Canada, that has to be one of the factors that keeps in mind our interoperability today but also 20 and 30 years into the future.[24]

Recommendation: 12. That the Government of Canada consider interoperability with our allies, and in particular the United States, as a key component for the replacement of Canada’s CF-18s.

It is the Conservative Party’s firm belief that where the safety of Canadian soldiers is concerned, operational effectiveness and efficiency of the CAF should be a paramount priority. The Liberal Party’s decision to postpone $3.7 billion worth of military spending deprives the CAF of the resources necessary to defend Canada in today’s global security environment, and maintain aerial readiness. This decision will result in the suspension of 62 projects commissioned by Department of National Defence that were initiated to improve the capabilities of the CAF, as they work to protect Canada’s security, sovereignty, and freedoms. The delays imposed on military procurement and infrastructure investment by the Liberals threaten to limit Canada’s ability to respond to threats in the future – not improve it.

Recommendation: 13. That the Government of Canada reverse its decision to delay major capital projects for the CAF.

The Official Opposition’s Recommendations:

1. That the Government of Canada ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to detect, deter, and prevent conventional and asymmetric attacks on Canada and Canadians, including but not limited to cyber-attacks, missile threats and terrorism, by foreign governments and non-state actors.

2. That the Government of Canada ensures that proper surveillance safeguards, operational capabilities and deterrent measures are in place to protect Canada against any potential threats.

3. That the Government of Canada maintain its current support and involvement in both NORAD and NATO.

4. That the Government of Canada consider a plan to replace and upgrade the North Warning System by extending the infrastructure’s operational life cycle, adapting new technology, and expanding the system to cover Canada’s Arctic Archipelago.

5. That the Government of Canada acquire and employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the surveillance and defence of Canadian Arctic territory.

6. That the Government of Canada, both independently and through its NORAD partnership, continue to strengthen its domain awareness and surveillance operations of any threats to Canada and North America, specializing in the Arctic and maritime domains.

7. That the Government of Canada commit to deploying the remaining RadarSat Constellation and expanding the number of satellites to guarantee the surveillance of Canada's Arctic on a continuous basis.

8. That the Government of Canada ensure the RCAF has sufficient assets and resources to protect Canadian sovereignty both at home and abroad, and defend our values internationally when deemed appropriate and necessary.

 9. That the Government of Canada recognize the proliferation of submarines as a threat to Canadian sovereignty and ensure we enhance the RCAF and RCN surveillance and deterrent capabilities against such threats.

10. That the Government of Canada conduct an open and fair competition to replace Canada’s outgoing fleet of CF-18 fighter jets.

11. That the Government of Canada begin the process of replacing the Polaris refuelling tankers immediately following the selection of the next RCAF fighter jet.

12. That the Government of Canada consider interoperability with our allies, and in particular the United States, as a key component for the replacement of Canada’s CF-18s.

13. That the Government of Canada reverse its decision to delay major capital projects for the CAF.