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PACP Committee Report

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INTRODUCTION

According to the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG), National Defence “operates the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) as a federally funded institution to educate and train Officer Cadets and commissioned officers for effective military service.”[1] In addition to its mandate to provide “a complete education in all branches of military tactics, fortification, engineering, and general scientific knowledge in subjects connected with and necessary to a thorough knowledge of the military profession,” since 2001, its purpose also includes “objectives to prepare and motivate Officer Cadets for effective service as commissioned officers and to improve the education of commissioned officers.”[2]

The Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) is RMC’s principal and largest program; upon completion, Officer Cadets are “awarded a university degree, receive a commission, and become junior officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.”[3]

In the fall of 2017, the OAG released a performance audit whose objective was to determine, “whether [RMC] produced the quality of officers that the Canadian Armed Forces needed at a reasonable cost.”[4]

On 1 March 2018, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts (the Committee) held a hearing on this audit.[5] From the OAG were Michael Ferguson, Auditor General of Canada (AG) and Gordon Stock, Principal; from National Defence were Jody Thomas, Deputy Minister, and RAdm Luc Cassivi, Commander, Canadian Defence Academy.[6]

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Academic Education and Military Training

As part of its audit, the OAG examined the following reports about RMC’s Officer Cadet training and education:

  • Report of the Officer Development Review Board (Morton Report), 1995;
  • Balanced Excellence: Leading Canada’s Armed Forces in the New Millennium report (Withers Report), 1998;
  • Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development System Study Final Report, 2014; and
  • Special Staff Assistance Visit [SSAV] Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and [ROTP] Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada–Kingston, 2017.[7]

These reports all concluded that RMC needed to place additional emphasis on military training.[8] More specifically, the OAG noted that the SSAV report found the following:

  • “a complex and unclear chain of authority resulted in confusion as to whether military or academic objectives should take precedence;
  • there was limited input from the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces on the standards and curriculum for military training;
  • Officer Cadets did not see professional military training as practical or connected to lessons learned in academic courses, particularly core courses in leadership and ethics; and
  • Officer Cadets emphasized academic studies over military training because of academic program demands.”[9]

Overall, the OAG found that “RMC did not sufficiently balance and integrate military training and academic education. As a result, military training at RMC was secondary to the culture and demands of the academic program. During the summer, Officer Cadets at RMC and those in other officer entry plans receive leadership and occupational training elsewhere within the Canadian Armed Forces, including at operational units. Although [the OAG] did not include this summer training in the audit, National Defence observed that the training was not always practical or relevant.”[10]

Additionally, the OAG found that even though the RMC is an academic military institution, “many faculty members were civilian employees who were not required to help instill military attributes while educating Officer Cadets;” as such, “the academic environment did not consistently support teaching military discipline and Canadian Armed Forces’ values.”[11]

Therefore, the OAG recommended that “National Defence should clearly define and strengthen its military training of Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada so that the training is relevant and practical, and provides value to operational units. The Royal Military College of Canada should then integrate the improved military training with the academic education of Officer Cadets.”[12]

In its Detailed Action Plan, National Defence stated that it agreed with the recommendation and committed to a “review of the entire complement of military training activities, including leadership and ethics, delivered to [Naval/Officer Cadets] throughout the academic year and summer training period will be undertaken with the aim of increasing the types and number of training activities that are relevant, practical and provides value to operational units, ensuring a reasonable balance between academic and military training.”[13] This is to be fully completed by August 2019 with an interim report to be completed by September 2018.[14]

Furthermore, Jody Thomas, Deputy Minister, National Defence, stated in her testimony before the Committee that by “undertaking this review, we will ensure that officer cadets' academic studies and military training are better integrated.”[15]

Therefore, to help ensure the success of this process, the Committee recommends

Recommendation 1 – Regarding the integration of military training and academic education

That, by September 2018, National Defence provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report detailing what progress has been achieved with regard to 1) clearly defining and strengthening military training of Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada so that it is relevant, practical, and provides value to operational units; and 2) integrating this improved military training with the academic education of Officer Cadets. A final report must also be submitted by 31 August 2019.

B. Operating in a Cost-effective Manner

Overall, the OAG found that “although RMC offered a good-quality academic education to Officer Cadets, the operating cost per student to provide the education was twice the average cost of other small universities. Several factors increased the education cost per student, including the number of programs offered, the salaries of military staff in non‑academic roles, and the very low student-to-faculty ratio.”[16]

According to the OAG, “RMC is a small university that offers a large number of programs. There are 22 undergraduate arts, science, and engineering degree programs, and 13 graduate degree programs;” the school also has several specialized non-degree programs.[17] Furthermore, during the 2014–2015 academic year, RMC had 1,312 full-time students and 1,248 part-time students, the majority of whom (approximately 1,000 Officer Cadets) were enrolled within the ROTP.[18]

With regard to the quality of academic programs offered at RMC, the OAG reported that all degree programs “are reviewed internally and externally on a cyclical basis in accordance with the requirements of the Ontario Universities Council on Quality Assurance. According to these reviews, the overall quality of RMC programs examined was good. However, reviewers noted that some programs offered a limited number of courses and had limited library and faculty resources.”[19]

Additionally, the OAG’s “analysis of scholarly publications showed that faculty at RMC published as much as faculty of comparable programs at other universities of a similar size. Publication in peer-reviewed and other journals is an indicator of research quality at Canadian universities.”[20] The OAG also found that, “in particular, the civil engineering and history faculties had their work published and cited more often than the same faculties at similar universities used for comparison.”[21]

Lastly, regarding RMC’s operating costs, the OAG found that the school’s “expenditures were approximately $91.9 million in the 2014–2015 fiscal year,” which amounts to approximately “$55,000 per full-time-equivalent student and is the highest per-student cost in the country.”[22] This is twice the average cost per student at comparable universities, and per the OAG, “the number of degree programs offered and the low student-to-faculty ratio are major factors that contributed to this high cost.”[23]

Thus, the OAG recommended that “National Defence should explore ways to reduce the Royal Military College of Canada’s operating cost per student and consider reducing the number of programs offered.”[24]

In its Detailed Action Plan, the Department agreed with this recommendation and committed to conducting a “review and analysis to confirm whether the cost per student of operating RMC is reasonable, compared to similar Allied military institutions.” [25] It also committed to developing “a cost model that enables RMC to be compared with other Canadian academic institutions of similar size, adjusted for scope.”[26]

When asked about these costs, the Deputy Minister replied as follows:

Reducing the number of programs offered will help reduce the cost. The two programs you cite with a 5:1 and a 7:1 [student-to-professor] ratio are very specific science and engineering courses that we're offering in French at RMC. It is anticipated that, in the future, le Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean will offer those programs, so that we will have programs in French with bigger classes at CMR and programs in English with bigger classes at RMC. Again, that will increase the student ratio—not to anything unreasonable—and at a lower cost.
Yes, 7:1 is a very low student-to-professor ratio. We don't have an objective standard of what is reasonable. Certainly 200 is too high and we won't ever be at that point, but we take the point that we need to reduce the number of courses, so that there are more students in any one course. We have to look at the number of non-academic staff hired by the college and we have to look at the military staff.[27]

In light of these considerations, the Committee recommends

Recommendation 2 – Regarding Cost Effectiveness

That, by 31 December 2018, National Defence provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report outlining the progress that has been achieved regarding cost effectiveness as presented in the Department’s Detailed Action Plan that was tabled on 21 November 2017. A final report must also be submitted by 31 July 2019.

Recommendation 3 – Regarding Cost Comparisons

That, by 31 December 2018, National Defence provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report that A) explains the Department’s rationale for comparing the operating costs of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) to those of Allied military institutions, given that the scope of the audit was to compare RMC’s costs to other Canadian officer development plans; B) compares RMC’s education operating cost per student to Canadian academic institutions of similar size; and, C) compares the cost of officers recruited and developed through other means such as the Regular Officer Training Plan and the Direct Entry Officer Plan.

C. Cost per Student and Military Performance after Graduation

According to the OAG, in addition to the ROTP, “National Defence funds and operates other officer entry plans. These include the ROTP-civilian plan and the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan–Air Environmental Affiliated Degree at Seneca College, which graduates pilots for the Royal Canadian Air Force. Civilian candidates with a suitable degree from a Canadian or foreign university may also enrol as an officer through the Direct Entry Officer Plan.”[28]

The OAG found that annual costs to subsidize the education officers varied depending on their entry plan.[29] For example, the cost to educate an Officer Cadet at RMC included the annual operating cost per full-time-equivalent student ($55,000) plus salary and benefits, less fees for room and board.[30] The cost for the ROTP-civilian plan and the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan–Air Environmental Affiliated Degree included tuition, books, and other expenses, as well as salaries and benefits.[31] In contrast, almost “half of new officers enter the Canadian Armed Forces through the Direct Entry Officer Plan” – in which case candidates already have a degree–so there is no cost to National Defence for their education.[32]

Consequently, the OAG concluded that “RMC was the most costly way to educate future military officers–about $40,000 more per year than sending an Officer Cadet to a civilian university through the ROTP-civilian plan.[33] Given that the Canadian Forces currently face a shortage of officers,[34] “National Defence has an opportunity to increase the overall number of officers at a lower cost by increasing enrolment in the ROTP-civilian plan or recruitment through the Direct Entry Officer Plan.”[35]

Additionally, the OAG found that “RMC’s academic curriculum, language training, and physical fitness performance standards at graduation exceeded the Canadian Armed Forces’ requirements for Officer Cadets graduating from other entry plans,” which “contributed to the higher education costs for Officer Cadets at RMC. The Special Staff Assistance Visit report recognized that these higher standards were not tied to clear policy requirements.”[36]

Lastly, the OAG noted that “National Defence’s analysis of career progression among officers found that there was no significant difference between Officer Cadets who graduated from RMC and officers who entered the Canadian Armed Forces through other plans. On average, ROTP-RMC graduates were not promoted faster. The analysis also found a less than 10 [%] difference among retention rates for RMC graduates compared with officers from other entry plans.”[37]

Hence, the OAG recommended that “National Defence should demonstrate and ensure that the higher standards of the [ROTP] at the Royal Military College of Canada are required, that they result in better qualified officers, and that the cost is reasonable.”[38]

Case Study 1

Despite higher standards and higher costs, National Defence could not demonstrate that RMC produced more effective officers than other officer entry plans. The Canadian Armed Forces has a professional development system to progressively develop officers throughout their careers. After graduation, or enrolment through direct entry, all junior officers attend training for their occupations. At the end of this training, all are equally qualified to be effective officers. A 2014 Canadian Armed Forces professional development system study observed that there was “no discernible difference” in officers produced from the various entry plans at the end of this occupational training. The study also observed that there was no evidence to show that RMC graduates had a stronger grasp of military leadership or proper conduct.

Source: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Royal Military College of Canada—National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.55.

National Defence agreed with this recommendation, and in its Detailed Action Plan committed to conducting “a detailed analysis on Military College graduation and career development to demonstrate the value of the [ROTP] at RMC. This analysis will emphasize the comparison of costs between RMC and our Allies’ Service Academies,” and is to be completed by 15 July 2019.[39]

Regarding this matter, the Deputy Minister provided the Committee with the following:

[The] audit findings raise some key questions that we need to address to ensure that RMC produces high-quality officer cadets at a reasonable cost. What exactly do we expect from RMC and its graduates? How should RMC be similar to other academic institutions? More importantly, how does it need to be different to accomplish what we expect? What is the appropriate cost for that difference? The studies we have planned will help us answer those questions and more effectively implement the Auditor General's recommendations.[40]

To ensure that RMC addresses these concerns, the Committee recommends

Recommendation 4 – Regarding the purpose, cost, and value of Royal Military College of Canada’s higher standards

That, by 30 July 2019, National Defence provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report detailing what progress has been achieved with regard to demonstrating and ensuring that the higher standards of the Regular Officer Training Plan at the Royal Military College of Canada are required, that they result in better qualified officers, and that the cost is reasonable, compared to other officer development plans.

D. Royal Military College of Canada Governance

Overall, the OAG found that “RMC’s governance structure was ineffective, and that the institution did not integrate military and academic objectives.”[41]

According to the OAG, “RMC’s governance structure is different from a typical university because it operates as a military unit and as a federally funded university,” and that the Queen’s Regulations and Orders designate the Minister of National Defence as both its Chancellor and President.[42]

The school’s executive head is the Commandant, under whom is the Principal, who “leads academic instruction, coordinates research activities, and serves as the link between academic studies and military culture.”[43] RMC also has a “Board of Governors, to make recommendations to the Minister on all RMC matters.”[44]

The OAG reported that past reviews of RMC found there to be discord between the military leadership and the academic leaders, especially regarding confusion and conflict between military and academic visions.[45]

Furthermore, the OAG noted that a “contributing factor to this confusion is that academic staff are appointed to permanent positions, whereas military training staff, including the Commandant, normally rotate into and out of RMC every two to three years. This rotation among military staff does not support long-term development of a consistent military training program. It also makes it difficult to coordinate planning to achieve both military and academic program objectives.”[46]

Lastly, the OAG (and the SSAV report) “found that although the Board of Governors had the authority to review and approve academic programs on behalf of the Minister, it was not performing these functions.”[47]

Consequently, the OAG recommended that “National Defence should clearly define the role of the Commandant as the executive authority for day-to-day operations and long‑term planning of all aspects of the Royal Military College of Canada’s operations, particularly the ability to oversee and integrate military training and academic programs.”[48]

According to its Detailed Action Plan, Nation Defence agreed with this recommendation and has explained how the Chief of Defence Staff has directed that the length of command tour for the Commandant will be three years, commencing with the current Commandant, in order to allow strategic continuity and management of the leadership and programmes within the unique and complex nature of the Canadian Military Colleges.[49] Additionally, the Department will also conduct a detailed analysis of the governance framework.[50]

Additionally, with regard to this recommendation, the Deputy Minister explained the following:

The Auditor General recommended that we more clearly define the role of the Commandant as the authority for the day-to-day business of the college and we are doing that. And per the SSAV Report we've already extended the length of the Commandant's command tour to three years. That will allow for longer term planning and ensure better continuity for each cohort of students.[51]

Notwithstanding these developments, the Committee recommends

Recommendation 5 – Regarding the role of the Commandant

That, by 31 December 2018, National Defence provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report detailing its progress regarding better defining the role of the Commandant as the executive authority for day-to-day operations and long-term planning of all aspects of the Royal Military College of Canada’s operations, particularly the ability to oversee and integrate military training and academic programs.

E. Military Leadership and Proper Conduct

Case Study 2

National Defence requires that members report for duty unless absences are approved. This means that Officer Cadets are required to attend all academic classes. Failure to do so without authorization means that they are absent without leave, which is considered military misconduct. [The OAG] reviewed cases in which Officer Cadets did not attend classes but asked other students to forge their signatures on the attendance record [and] also noted a case of a military training staff member who was told to leave a class by the academic instructor when the military training staff member attempted to identify absent Officer Cadets.

Source: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Royal Military College of Canada—National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.23.

According to the OAG, the conduct of Officer Cadets at RMC “is governed by the Cadet Wing Instructions as well as National Defence legislation, regulations, and orders, and the military’s Code of Service Discipline. Leadership training in the Canadian Armed Forces is expected to instill proper conduct, including responsibilities to obey the law, enforce military discipline, and uphold professional and ethical standards of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage.”[52]

As RMC is considered a training environment, “minor incidents of improper military conduct, such as deficiencies in dress and deportment, are addressed by military training staff and third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets in leadership positions. They may provide counselling, mentoring, or corrective training, and administer sanctions, such as dress requirements and leave restrictions, to other Officer Cadets.”[53]

In contrast, incidents of “military misconduct, such as drunkenness and insubordination, may be investigated by RMC commanders. More serious incidents, such as assault, are referred to the Military Police. The Military Police may refer cases back to RMC for further action, such as administering sanctions or disciplinary proceedings. Cases of sexual assault or sudden death are referred to the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service, a specialized crime unit. Civilian law enforcement agencies may also respond to and investigate incidents involving Officer Cadets.”[54]

The OAG found that “RMC did not provide effective military leadership training, guidance, and mentoring to Officer Cadets. [According to the OAG], this may have contributed to the large percentage of incidents of improper conduct among senior Officer Cadets.”[55]

In addition, the OAG noted that the SSAV report found the following:

  • “Officer Cadets and some military staff felt that there were too many rules, and that they were unevenly applied.”[56]
  • “some Officer Cadets were cynical about RMC rules and practices. This resulted in chronic rule-breaking and banding together to protect their colleagues when someone was caught breaking the rules.”[57]
  • “Officer Cadets spent most of their time engaged in academic studies with academic instructors, and that many Officer Cadets saw these instructors as role models. However, faculty members were mostly civilian employees, who were not expected to instill military attributes.” (Also findings of the OAG.)[58]
  • “except for some key positions, there was no process to ensure that RMC’s military training staff had the skills or experience needed to instruct and guide Officer Cadets. The SSAV report also found that some military training staff were not providing sufficient guidance and instruction to Officer Cadets.”[59]
  • “some Officer Cadets in leadership positions abused their authority by selectively enforcing rules, causing stress among other Officer Cadets.”[60]

Lastly, the OAG concluded that “the expectation that third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets would consistently demonstrate proper conduct, enforce military discipline, and instill Canadian military values in first- and second-year Officer Cadets was not well founded.”[61]

Therefore, the OAG recommended that RMC “should ensure that before senior Officer Cadets are appointed to leadership positions, they demonstrate high standards of conduct and ethical behaviour.”[62]

National Defence agreed with this recommendation and in its Detailed Action Plan stated that the “process for selecting officer cadets for senior leadership positions” had already been revised” as of September 2017; and that “[personnel] resource investments have been made to provide experienced leaders and mentors at RMC. These include the Director of Cadets and Training Wing staff. Each bar/leadership position and each position of responsibility has a dedicated mentor who is a member of the CAF/Department of National Defence;” this new system was to be fully completed by 31 January 2018.[63]

When questioned about this situation, RAdm. Luc Cassivi, Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, explained the challenges involved in such a selection process, as well as some of the changes that have been implemented:

[Some] positions have been granted based on merit in the past. That's the predominant method. However, we must also challenge our cadets. They must all be in command positions so that we can evaluate their behaviour, guide them and mentor them during this time. Otherwise, they will not have the experience and learning needed so that we can assess their leadership abilities at the end of the program. It's a balance.
Students who are assigned to a command post will have a record of good behaviour. That is one of the criteria we established since the report was published.
We made these changes … in order to ensure that these situations will not reoccur.
Each session, when senior [officer cadets] are replaced, we will see whether there were mistakes. We will learn from these mistakes and correct the process as we were asked to do.[64]

Given the seriousness of ensuring both discipline and moral leadership amongst RMC’s Officer Cadets, the Committee recommends

Recommendation 6 – Regarding standards of conduct amongst Officer Cadets

That, by 31 December 2018, National Defence provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report detailing what progress has been made with regard to ensuring that before senior Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada are appointed to command positions, they demonstrate high standards of conduct and ethical behaviour.

F. Mentoring of Officer Cadets

According to the OAG, military “training staff and senior Officer Cadets are expected to act as mentors to others. Mentoring is a skill used to develop judgment and leadership traits in others. It involves exercising guidance and sharing wisdom so that the less experienced person develops professionally.”[65]

However, the OAG found that “military training staff required a specific set of skills and leadership qualities to effectively mentor Officer Cadets” and that “there were no formal requirements for military training staff to receive training in mentoring Officer Cadets.”[66]

Hence, the OAG recommended that the “Royal Military College of Canada should ensure that military training staff have the proper skills and training they need to develop leadership skills among Officer Cadets.”[67]

National Defence agreed with this recommendation and stated the following in its Detailed Action Plan:

  • “Personnel resource investments have been made to provide additional leaders and mentors at RMC. These include personnel posted into the positions of Director of Cadets and Training Wing Sergeant-Major who are at higher ranks and with more experience, compared to their predecessors.”
  • “[A]n additional 15 Divisional and Squadron Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) positions at higher ranks and with more experience will be phased in over the next three years as current incumbents are posted out.”
  • “[R]evised Terms of Reference have been developed for Divisional and Squadron Commanders, as well as for Training senior NCMs.”[68]
  • New selection criteria for Cadet Wing Training staff [have] been established.

The first three changes are to be fully implemented by 31 August 2020, while the fourth was changed November 2017.

Further to this recommendation, the Deputy Minister provided the following:

Following a similar recommendation from the SSAV report, we have made sure that the military staff who are posted to RMC have the suitable rank and leadership experience to support the officer cadets. We are increasing staff orientation and training to ensure that they are well equipped for the tasks we require of them.[69]

To help ensure the success of this process, the Committee recommends

Recommendation 7 – Regarding Mentoring of Officer Cadets

That, by 31 December 2018, National Defence provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report detailing what progress has been made with regard to ensuring that military training staff have the proper skills and training they need to develop leadership skills among Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

It should be noted that as regards serious incidents, the OAG found that “RMC provided support and took disciplinary action when serious incidents were reported.”[70] As such, it made no recommendations in this area.[71]

CONCLUSION

The Committee concludes that the Royal Military College of Canada did not demonstrate that it produced officers at a reasonable cost, especially given that the OAG found that there was no significant difference in the career progression of its graduates when compared to other officer recruitment and development plans. Furthermore, RMC demonstrated weaknesses in military training and integrating this training with academic training.

The Committee also concludes that although RMC “took action when serious incidents were reported, the number of investigations and incidents of misconduct involving senior Officer Cadets showed that it needed to improve military training,” especially with regard to leadership skills.

To address these concerns, the Committee has included seven recommendations to help RMC achieve its mandate of developing future leaders of the Canadian Armed Forces.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED ACTIONS AND ASSOCIATED DEADLINES

Table 1 – Summary of Recommended Actions and Associated Deadlines

Recommendation

Recommended Action

Deadline

Recommendation 1

National Defence should provide the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts with a report detailing what progress has been achieved with regard to 1) clearly defining and strengthening military training of Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) so that it is relevant, practical, and provides value to operational units; and 2) integrating this improved military training with the academic education of Officer Cadets. A final report must also be submitted.

September 2018 and 31 August 2019

Recommendation 2

National Defence should provide the Committee with a report outlining the progress that has been achieved regarding cost effectiveness as presented in the Department’s Detailed Action Plan that was tabled on 21 November 2017. A final report must also be submitted.

31 December 2018 and 31 July 2019

Recommendation 3

National Defence should provide the Committee with a report that A) explains the Department’s rationale for comparing the operating costs of RMC to those of Allied military institutions, given that the scope of the audit was to compare RMC’s costs to other Canadian officer development plans; B) compares RMC’s education operating cost per student to Canadian academic institutions of similar size; and, C) compares the cost of officers recruited and developed through other means such as the Regular Officer Training Plan and the Direct Entry Officer Plan.

31 December 2018

Recommendation 4

National Defence should provide the Committee with a report detailing what progress has been achieved with regard to demonstrating and ensuring that the higher standards of the Regular Officer Training Plan at RMC are required, that they result in better qualified officers, and that the cost is reasonable, compared to other officer development plans.

30 July 2019

Recommendation 5

National Defence should provide the Committee with a report detailing its progress regarding better defining the role of the Commandant as the executive authority for day-to-day operations and long-term planning of all aspects of RMC’s operations, particularly the ability to oversee and integrate military training and academic programs.

31 December 2018

Recommendation 6

National Defence should provide the Committee with a report detailing what progress has been made with regard to ensuring that before senior Officer Cadets at RMC are appointed to command positions, they demonstrate high standards of conduct and ethical behaviour.

31 December 2018

Recommendation 7

National Defence should provide the Committee with a report detailing what progress has been made with regard to ensuring that military training staff have the proper skills and training they need to develop leadership skills among Officer Cadets at RMC.

31 December 2018


[1]              Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG), Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.1.

[2]              Ibid., para. 6.2.

[3]              Ibid., para. 6.3.

[4]              Ibid., para. 6.5.

[5]              House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 March 2018, Meeting No. 88.

[6]              Ibid.

[7]              OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.15.

[8]              Ibid.

[9]              Ibid., para. 6.19.

[10]            Ibid., para. 6.21.

[11]            Ibid., para. 6.23.

[12]            Ibid., para. 6.25.

[13]            National Defence, Detailed Action Plan, p. 1.

[14]            Ibid.

[15]            House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 March 2018, Meeting No. 88, 1540.

[16]            OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.30.

[17]            Ibid., para. 6.35.

[18]            Ibid.

[19]            Ibid., para. 6.39.

[20]            Ibid., para. 6.40.

[21]            Ibid.

[22]            Ibid., para. 6.42.

[23]            Ibid.

[24]            Ibid., para. 6.44.

[25]            National Defence, Detailed Action Plan, p. 2.

[26]            Ibid.

[27]            House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 March 2018, Meeting No. 88, 1630.

[28]            OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.50.

[29]            Ibid., para. 6.51.

[30]            Ibid.

[31]            Ibid.

[32]            Ibid.

[33]            Ibid., para. 6.52.

[34]            For further information pertaining to this situation, please refer to OAG, Canadian Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention–National Defence, Report 5 of the 2016 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada.

[35]            OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.52.

[36]            Ibid., para. 6.54.

[37]            Ibid., para. 6.57.

[38]            Ibid., para. 6.59.

[39]            National Defence, Detailed Action Plan, p. 3.

[40]            House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 March 2018, Meeting No. 88, 1540.

[41]            OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.60.

[42]            Ibid., para. 6.65.

[43]            Ibid., para. 6.66.

[44]            Ibid., para. 6.67.

[45]            Ibid., para. 6.68.

[46]            Ibid., para. 6.69.

[47]            Ibid., para. 6.70.

[48]            Ibid., para. 6.72.

[49]            National Defence, Detailed Action Plan, pp. 3-4.

[50]            Ibid.

[51]            House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 March 2018, Meeting No. 88, 1540.

[52]            OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.75.

[53]            Ibid., para. 6.77.

[54]            Ibid., para. 6.78.

[55]            Ibid., para. 6.79.

[56]            Ibid., para. 6.85.

[57]            Ibid.

[58]            Ibid., para. 6.86.

[59]            Ibid., para. 6.88.

[60]            Ibid., para. 6.90.

[61]            Ibid., para. 6.89.

[62]            Ibid., para. 6.92.

[63]            National Defence, Detailed Action Plan, pp. 5-6.

[64]            House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 March 2018, Meeting No. 88, 1630.

[65]            OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.93.

[66]            Ibid., para. 6.94.

[67]            Ibid., para. 6.95.

[68]            National Defence, Detailed Action Plan, pp. 6-7.

[69]            House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 1 March 2018, Meeting No. 88, 1540.

[70]            OAG, Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence, Report 6 of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, para. 6.96.

[71]            Ibid., para. 6.99.