Introduction

On 15 August 2021, the government and security forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed, and panic took hold in the streets of the last territory that had been under its control: the capital, Kabul. Returning to power–via military force–was the Taliban, a group whose repressive rule had horrified the world in the late 1990s and who had harboured the Al Qaida terrorists that carried out the attacks of 11 September 2001. The republic’s collapse unleashed shockwaves within Afghanistan and around the world. It signified the abrupt end of a nearly 20-year effort, which had seen hundreds of thousands of international coalition troops serve–with thousands fallen or wounded–as well as billions of dollars spent on security force training, reconstruction and development.[1] As the situation on the ground unravelled, a multinational air bridge was formed. Many were rescued amid volatile and dangerous conditions. However, when the final evacuation flight departed Kabul at the end of August 2021, left behind were people who had tried–with the coalition’s encouragement–to advance security, freedom, opportunity and dignity in their country. Within Afghanistan, there is now a tableau of vulnerability; millions of people trying to avoid hunger, destitution, or retaliation.

Afghanistan is not only one of the many crises in distant parts of the world; Canada has a legacy there. Consequently, the Taliban’s takeover has deep emotional significance for Canadians, as well as implications for Canadian public policy. At the peak of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, “approximately 2,950 Canadian soldiers and over 120 civilian personnel were deployed to Afghanistan.”[2] Cumulatively, more than 40,000 members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) served in Afghanistan between December 2001 and March 2014, as part of operations–at different times and with different mandates–in Kabul and Kandahar. Taken together, the counterterrorism, stabilization, combat, support, and training missions undertaken by Canada were its largest military deployment since the Second World War, with 158 members of the CAF and one Canadian diplomat losing their lives in service.[3] Furthermore, Canada has provided $3.8 billion in international assistance to Afghanistan since 2001.[4]

Over almost 20 years of international partnership with Afghanistan, many Afghans experienced improved access to healthcare and education. They were also able to participate in efforts–however flawed and incomplete–to build a democracy that was connected to the world. It is these gains that are now at risk.

To learn lessons from what transpired and to determine how Canada can help Afghan people who worked alongside the thousands of Canadian Armed Forces, diplomatic and development personnel who served in the country, the House of Commons created a Special Committee on Afghanistan (the Special Committee). It was mandated,

…to conduct hearings to examine and review the events related to the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, including, but not limited to, the government’s contingency planning for that event and the subsequent efforts to evacuate, or otherwise authorize entry to Canada of, Canadian citizens, and interpreters, contractors and other Afghans who had assisted the Canadian Armed Forces or other Canadian organizations, and that the special committee conduct its work with the primary objective of assessing the humanitarian assistance to be put in place by Canada to assist the Afghan people […].[5]

The Special Committee was instructed to present a final report within six months of its creation on 8 December 2021.

To accomplish this task, the Special Committee has received testimony and briefs from a range of individuals and organizations, including those that are trying to meet humanitarian needs in Afghanistan. It has heard moving stories and appeals from people with family and colleagues who have been unable to leave Afghanistan or are in precarious situations in neighbouring countries, and those who are trying to help them. The Special Committee was also briefed on the government’s response by Global Affairs Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces.

The report that follows is structured in two parts. The first is retrospective, examining the August 2021 evacuation from Kabul and the events that led up to it, including the assessments and decisions that were made. The second part is forward-looking. It details the humanitarian situation inside Afghanistan, and the efforts to bring Afghan nationals who are at risk to safety, as well as the impediments that are being encountered. The dedicated focus on this one country, at a time of great instability in the world, reflects the obligations that stem from Canada’s years of military, development and diplomatic involvement in Afghanistan and the enormity of needs and vulnerabilities that exist.

Part I: Looking Back

The Fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban

On 14 April 2021, President Joe Biden announced that the United States (U.S.) would begin the final withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan on 1 May 2021, in keeping with the 29 February 2020 agreement his country–under the administration of President Donald Trump–had reached with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar.[6] The rationale for intervening in Afghanistan in October 2001 had been “to ensure Afghanistan would not be used as a base from which to attack [the U.S.] homeland again,” an objective that President Biden said had been “accomplished.” The United States could not, he remarked, “continue the cycle of extending or expanding our military presence in Afghanistan, hoping to create ideal conditions for the withdrawal, and expecting a different result.” Following consultations within his administration and with allies and partners, President Biden concluded that it was “time to end America’s longest war.”[7]

After declaring that “there is no military solution to the challenges Afghanistan faces,” the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies announced on the same day that they too would begin the withdrawal of Resolute Support Mission forces by 1 May 2021. The NATO withdrawal was to be completed “within a few months.”[8]

Even though the involvement of foreign troops was coming to an end, the hope was that an intra-Afghan peace process would result in a settlement. The Taliban had committed, through the Doha Agreement, to start such negotiations, which had been intended to see discussion of a ceasefire, as well as a political roadmap for the country. Nevertheless, negotiations between representatives of the Afghan republic and the Taliban–which commenced in September 2020–did not result in meaningful progress.[9]

In May 2021, the Taliban intensified its military offensive against the Afghan government and began to increase the territory under its control. By mid‑July 2021, the Taliban reportedly “controlled about half the districts in Afghanistan, at least six international border crossings with their revenue-generating customs posts, and long stretches of highways throughout the country.”[10]

The first provincial capital to fall to the Taliban, on 6 August 2021, was Zaranj in Nimroz province, on Afghanistan’s western border with Iran.[11] The next day, the Taliban captured its first capital in northern Afghanistan, the capital of Jowzjan province. By 12–13 August 2021, the country’s second- and third-largest cities–Kandahar and Herat–fell under Taliban control, along with Lashkar Gah in Helmand province. Then, with the capture of Mazar-e Sharif, the Taliban completed their takeover of northern Afghanistan.[12] On 15 August 2021, Afghanistan’s President, Ashraf Ghani, fled by helicopter to Uzbekistan, before relocating to the United Arab Emirates.[13] Taliban forces entered Kabul, assuming control of government buildings and the presidential palace. In all, therefore, the Taliban captured 33 of 34 provincial capitals within 10 days.[14]

President Biden maintained the 31 August 2021 deadline for ending the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, which he had announced on 8 July 2021, saying that he was not prepared to extend “a forever exit.” The decision to end the military airlift operation by that deadline, the president indicated, reflected a “unanimous recommendation” of his civilian and military advisors.[15] On 26 August 2021, a member of the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a terrorist group that competes with the Taliban for power and influence in Afghanistan, had detonated a suicide vest at one of the entrances to the Hamid Karzai International Airport (the Kabul airport), killing 13 U.S. troops and an estimated 150 Afghan civilians.[16] It was understood that the Taliban’s tacit cooperation with coalition forces around the security perimeter of the airport would end on 1 September 2021. In all, during the 18‑day period of the multinational “air bridge” it facilitated and defended, the United States flew 387 military sorties and enabled 391 non-U.S. military sorties to evacuate 124,334 people.[17]

Canada’s Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation

When the need for an evacuation became clear, Canada was in a different position than some of its allies because there had been no Canadian military mission in Afghanistan since 2014. Canada did not, therefore, have military assets on the ground.[18] The CAF was approved to support the evacuation on 30 July 2021.[19] In essence, this complex mission involved, in the words of General Wayne D. Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff, projecting combat power “from Canada into a contested environment on the other side of the world where we had not had a military presence for seven years.”[20] Canada was able to do so because of its strategic airlift and communications capabilities, as well as its network of partners and allies and embedded staff around the world.[21] The people the CAF were tasked with evacuating included Canadians and Canadian-entitled persons, as well as interpreters who had worked with the Canadian Armed Forces and Afghans who had worked for the Canadian embassy over the years.[22] Military and civilian chartered flights began on 4 August 2021 but were subsequently disrupted when Kabul fell to the Taliban.[23]

On 15 August 2021, the Government of Canada announced the decision to “temporarily suspend” Canada’s diplomatic operations in Kabul. The rapidly evolving situation was posing “serious challenges” to Canada’s ability to ensure the safety and security of its diplomatic mission. Canadians still in Afghanistan were instructed to “leave immediately while commercial flights [were] available.”[24]

CAF flights resumed from the Kabul airport on 19 August 2021 as part of the U.S.-led “air bridge,” with the last flight departing on 26 August 2021. Canada and other allies needed to repatriate their personnel and aircraft first so that the United States could complete its own withdrawal and, finally, cease defending the airport. The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence, told the Special Committee that Canadian personnel “stayed as long as possible at great personal risk.”[25] The conditions in Kabul were described by the CAF as having been “tenuous, chaotic and desperate.”[26] In all, Canada transported and facilitated the transport of approximately 3,700 evacuees.[27] Those evacuees “include Canadian citizens and permanent residents, their family members, citizens of allied countries, persons with a lasting connection to Canada and [A]fghan nationals at risk accepted for resettlement in Canada or by [Canada’s] allies.”[28]

The Government of Canada’s travel advisory for Afghanistan now indicates that travelling throughout Afghanistan “is extremely dangerous, including in Kabul.” There are, according to the advisory, “checkpoints on all roads and throughout cities.” What is more, “[s]ome borders are closed or may close without notice. Border crossing is risky.”[29]

Contingency Planning and Signs of Collapse

The Special Committee received conflicting information regarding whether the fall of Kabul–and, thus, Afghanistan–to the Taliban was the culmination of a political and security situation that was clearly unravelling, or a surprise.

Reid Sirrs, former Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan, told the Special Committee that the “complete collapse of the Afghan forces and the Taliban’s rapid takeover of Afghanistan came as a surprise to everyone.”[30] Jennifer Loten, Director General of International Crime and Terrorism at Global Affairs Canada (GAC), similarly conveyed that the speed at which the U.S. departure from Afghanistan converted into the Taliban’s control of the country surprised the world. She said: “I don’t think any of us would have predicted an August [2021] fall of Kabul.”[31]

Owing to Canada’s limited presence on the ground in Afghanistan, Canada relied on allies for “a lot” of its intelligence, according to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Eyre.[32] There was a deterioration in the country, he said, from the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal. In the words of General Eyre, as of 1 April 2021, “our intelligence assessed that the Afghan government was facing a likely defeat, and as time progressed, the timeline for that defeat reduced as well.”[33] In subsequent remarks, General Eyre expanded on the nature of the expected defeat, namely that, “should western forces withdraw, the Taliban would likely decisively defeat the [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces], capture most major urban areas and re-establish Taliban control over most of Afghanistan.”[34] By 8 July 2021, the CAF assessed that a “maximum” of six months remained before that eventuality. At the same time, General Eyre stressed that intelligence assessments reflect probabilities and not absolute certainties.[35]

The Special Committee was given a general sense of how the government’s contingency planning evolved. The Honourable Harjit Sajjan, speaking about his former role as Minister of National Defence (2015–2021), indicated that Global Affairs Canada had submitted a request for assistance from the CAF to ensure the security of embassy personnel in Afghanistan. That request, which was necessary for any troops to be deployed, was “authorized in early April [2021].”[36] The CAF’s strategic advisory team was in place as of 24 April 2021 with instructions to provide warning and advice to Canada’s head of mission–i.e., Ambassador–regarding embassy security.[37] Minister Sajjan said that, later, because conditions in the country were “drastically deteriorating,” the CAF team–which was expanded–“changed its system of support toward the evacuation of as many people as possible at that time.”[38] In reply to another question about timing, Minister Sajjan remarked that Canada’s “evacuation started as soon as we felt the situation was deteriorating.”[39]

Ambassador Sirrs provided further details about the government’s contingency planning and the core assessments that were informing decision-making at the time. He said:

Up until a few days before the decision to temporarily suspend embassy operations, Canada and the international community were expecting difficult times in August and September, but not a complete takeover of the capital. In fact, we expected the Afghan military to defend the city until the onset of winter, allowing time for negotiations to continue.

With this in mind, we were considering options to maintain a skeletal presence throughout the fall so we could continue essential programming as well as support possible evacuation efforts. With the support of [the] special advisory team from the Canadian Armed Forces we were able to continually update our concepts of operation for maintaining a presence in the country to a temporary suspension of operations and implementation of a non-combatant evacuation operation. This team was also instrumental in securing space in the air bridge that became an essential bridge for getting so many people out of the capital.[40]

Commenting on the extent and pace of evacuation efforts that Canada had carried out prior to the collapse of the Afghan republic, Ambassador Sirrs indicated that planning for a special immigration measures policy “went back into March [2021].”[41] He also commented that the republic’s authorities had “started barring people who did not have passports or their Afghan tazkiras—national identity cards—on the planes.”[42] Those constraints reflected a larger political context, according to Ambassador Sirrs, wherein the president of the Afghan republic “did not want Afghans leaving because he felt that there would be a brain drain, and we retorted that we needed to have part of the brain come with us so that they could come back and build the country later on.”[43] Minister Anand echoed this point, noting that the “former Afghan government was concerned that a mass exodus of people would signal a lack of confidence among its citizens.”[44]

Looking back on these events, testimony and information provided by other witnesses suggested that signs may have been missed and time to evacuate people, when more options were available, may have been lost.

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) was asked about the contingency planning it was doing for Afghanistan and the region, which was completed in December 2020 and shared with governments–including the Government of Canada–in early 2021.[45] The document noted that the situation in Afghanistan, “including a complex peace process and the withdrawal of international forces and a volatile security environment has given rise to an unpredictable trajectory.” The UNHCR was preparing for two possible scenarios. The first was increased internal displacement caused by escalating conflict, political instability, and a stalled peace process. The second scenario was heightened conflict and a breakdown of the peace process, which would saturate the absorption capacity of communities, “resulting in exponential internal displacement and outflows of Afghans seeking international protection in neighbouring countries.”[46]

When asked whether action should have been taken earlier, Stephen Peddle–who retired from the Canadian Armed Forces as a senior intelligence officer with the rank of major–replied:

The moment that President Donald Trump announced to the world that America was leaving Afghanistan, I think anyone who was in Afghanistan knew the writing was on the wall as to what was going to happen. The question was when, and then President Biden gave a date.

There were lots of opportunities long before July or August 2021 to bring all the Afghans who helped us, who we had records of, over to Canada. There is no excuse whatsoever for us to have waited until August 2021, when we knew that Afghanistan was folding. There’s no excuse whatsoever for waiting that long.[47]

Wazhma Frogh, founder of the Women & Peace Studies Organization–Afghanistan, told the Special Committee that the collapse of the Afghan republic and the fall of Kabul to the Taliban “didn’t just happen overnight.” In her view, the 2020 agreement between the United States and the Taliban, and not 15 August 2021, was “the start of Afghanistan’s political surrender.” With the Doha agreement, she said, legitimacy was given to the Taliban, while representatives from the Afghan republic were not included as signatories. That was, she said, “when things started getting much worse in local communities.”[48]

Major-General (retired) David Fraser referenced a letter that he and others sent in early July 2021 “to the implicated ministers asking them to create a pipeline to evacuate vulnerable Afghans.”[49] In his view, “[i]f three retired generals without access to intelligence saw this coming in July, there could have been a lot more people evacuated out of Afghanistan before Kandahar fell and before Kabul fell.”[50]

That was not the only letter that was sent or appeal that was made. Wendy Long, Director of Afghan-Canadian Interpreters, had started writing letters in November 2018 to Canada’s then Minister of Immigration, Ahmed Hussen. She told the Special Committee:

As the Doha peace talks progressed, the pleas for an immigration process mounted and concerns started coming in from veterans worried about those left behind. Some veterans had spent thousands of dollars in attempts to get interpreters here, without results, adding to their mental anguish.[51]

After compiling files on Afghans who had been part of the Canadian mission, Wendy Long’s organization and 15 other international advocacy groups sent an open letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on 1 June 2021, as well as to then Minister of Immigration Marco Mendicino, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau, then Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan, and other NATO leaders.[52] The letter warned that time was “running out to protect NATO’s local Afghan allies.”[53] Furthermore, the signatories suggested that,

Without a coordinated effort to guarantee the protection of the Afghan local staff that supported its partner nations, NATO risks betraying its own promise that the “drawdown will be orderly, coordinated, and deliberate.”[54]

In addition to the people who had played a direct role supporting military and diplomatic missions, there was also growing concern for people who were associated with the larger project of building democracy and advancing women’s rights in Afghanistan. These concerns were reflected in a letter that was written to Minister Mendicino on behalf of the Afghan Women’s Organization Refugee & Immigrants Services. Asma Faizi, the organization’s president, explained that they had been approached “by women parliamentarians and activists from inside Afghanistan” concerning “the dire situation they were in.”[55] Dated 26 July 2021, the letter urged the Canadian government to “take immediate action to protect Afghan women and girls” since the situation had taken “a dark turn with the withdrawal of US and NATO military forces.” Furthermore, the letter communicated the organization’s understanding that the Taliban had “reoccupied more than half of Afghanistan and the gains that have been made in the past 20 years, particularly by women, are now at dire risk.”[56]

Evacuating Canada’s Afghan Allies and the Process Involved

During a meeting in June 2021 with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Wendy Long’s organization,

stressed that we needed a fast and effective means to get people assessed initially and then more completely processed in either Canada or elsewhere. We stressed that there was no time or money for passports if people didn’t already have them, and we recommended a refugee-type approach. Most applicants had no access to laptops or printers, and any process would have had to be cellphone-based, since any other method would expose the applicant to identity theft, fraud or death.[57]

Nevertheless, testimony suggested that the process that unfolded was administratively and logistically complex. The special program to resettle Afghan nationals who have an enduring connection to the Government of Canada was announced on 23 July 2021.[58] Corey Shelson, who served in the Canadian Armed Forces from 2002 until 2015, including as a combat engineer troop commander, characterized the application process as “bureaucratic.” From his perspective,

providing forms that could be opened only in Adobe Acrobat Pro DC and requiring that they be signed, scanned and returned, demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the situation on the ground and placed affected individuals at undue risk.[59]

The initial communications the Government of Canada sent, without being translated into Pashto or Dari, showed–in Mr. Shelson’s view–a further “lack of sensitivity,” as did the reliance on email.[60]

This perspective was supported by Stephen Peddle, who made the following observation about the risks involved as people were trying to escape a war zone:

These folks, who didn’t have Internet access, were in provinces outside of Kabul. To get Internet access, they were going to Internet cafés—which at that point, no doubt, had Taliban or sympathizers—to fill out paperwork articulating how they helped Canada join the war against the Taliban, so that they could eventually get their immigration approved and get on those planes.[61]

Even when people made it through the paperwork, there was confusion about next steps. Describing the experience of the family members of his former interpreter, Stephen Peddle said:

When, eventually, they got through that screening process and were making their way on their own to Kabul for evacuation, they had little or no detail as to what was going to happen next, when the planes were leaving and how to get on those planes.[62]

The family was “trying to navigate through Taliban checkpoints to get to Kabul.” However, according to Mr. Peddle, once they arrived, there were no clear directions for “how to get on those planes.”[63]

Corey Shelson also described the challenges generated by the “chaotic” conditions that had taken hold around Kabul’s airport.[64] The seeming lack of a direct communication channel at the airport gates between those seeking to flee and the Canadian government personnel and armed forces who were deployed there did not, according to his testimony, help. Mr. Shelson asked Members of the Special Committee to envision themselves in the following situation:

You have a few young kids, your wife, a two-year-old, a three-year-old and a four-year-old, and you get a call at four o’clock in the morning to pack up your family and get to the airport because your plane to Canada is coming. You grab your kids, throw them in a taxi and get all the way to the airport, and you wait, and you wait and you wait.[65]

Wendy Long characterized Canada’s special program for Afghan interpreters and others who had supported Canada’s mission in Afghanistan as “the most generous and all-encompassing of any NATO member country.”[66] Ultimately, however, “for so many, Canada had left too little time to do the job right,” she said. Once Afghanistan had fallen to the Taliban on 15 August 2021, “[a]ny hope for a swift but orderly evacuation went out the window, effectively leaving thousands behind again.”[67]

Oliver Thorne, Executive Director of the Veterans Transition Network, was even more candid. He suggested that the Government of Canada “was not prepared for the collapse of the Afghan government and the resulting humanitarian crisis.” In Mr. Thorne’s view, the “result was a hasty announcement of an immigration program that IRCC was not sufficiently prepared for or staffed to execute.”[68]

Roles and Responsibilities During the Evacuation

GAC confirmed to the Special Committee that it is the lead department “for international consular situations and emergencies” like the one that unfolded in Afghanistan. That lead is “established under Canadian law.”[69] IRCC has the “mandate in terms of responsibilities for immigration” into Canada.[70] National Defence and the CAF supported the evacuation operation from Kabul pursuant to a request for their assistance that GAC and IRCC had made on 27 July 2021.[71]

In reference to the actual evacuation period, Cindy Termorshuizen, GAC’s Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, characterized the collaboration between National Defence, IRCC, and GAC as having been “excellent.”[72] Embedded in GAC’s emergency watch and response centre were officials from National Defence and the CAF, as well as IRCC. She said that then Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau was briefed “on a daily basis.”[73] General Eyre also mentioned daily interdepartmental task force meetings that were held at the level of assistant deputy ministers during that time, as well as meetings of deputy ministers and the Chief of the Defence Staff that took place approximately every second day.[74]

Even so, what happened in Afghanistan was not a typical consular emergency. There were unique challenges posed by this case, which necessitated the evacuation of thousands of vulnerable non-Canadians from a landlocked country that was in situation of active conflict and on the verge of being taken over by a hostile actor–the Taliban. Speaking generally about the challenges involved with Afghanistan, the Honourable Sean Fraser, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, acknowledged that he does not think “that permanent, ordinary refugee resettlement programs are particularly well designed to respond to crises as they occur in real time.”[75]

Testimony from some witnesses suggested that the number of Canadian government entities involved in responding to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, and the gaps between their distinct responsibilities, may have exacerbated the difficulties that were encountered in what was an already extremely challenging environment. Wendy Long stated: “There was no effective partnership.” In her view, the CAF, IRCC and GAC “were not looking at it as a mission that all three entities should have been taking part in for the end goal of getting our people to Canada.”[76]

Corey Shelson detailed his understanding of interdepartmental roles and responsibilities during the evacuation as follows:

IRCC was the department that applications would go through, and they were the ones who were calling people to the airport by email. The Canadian Forces were, in my understanding, manning the gates, and GAC had to approve the people who would get inside. So you had three different departments that weren’t all talking to each other. We had folks getting called to the airport, but when they got there, their visa had the names of only some of the people, therefore GAC wouldn’t let them in. You had IRCC not talking to GAC; CAF being told—and I spoke with several MPs, including Mr. Mendicino, who told me that the Canadian Armed Forces on the ground would have discretion at the gate. That never occurred. If your name wasn’t on a GAC list, you did not get through the gate.[77]

When asked if Canada had evacuated any Afghans who managed to make it through any of the airport gates, but who were not on a GAC or IRCC list, General Eyre replied in the affirmative. He said that CAF personnel on the ground “made decisions at times to take Afghans who weren’t on the list because they were part of a vulnerable community or there was sufficient evidence to believe that, yes, there was some link with Canada.”[78] Yet despite this, there were many reports of families being separated. Some did not manage to get on the evacuation flights because their spouse and/or some of their children were not on the list.  

Explaining why the decision was made to close Canada’s embassy on 15 August 2021, Ambassador Sirrs referenced information he had received on 12 August 2021, which led him “to believe that the security of the embassy and all the people who worked within its compound was at risk of attack from the Taliban.”[79] A “special consular team” was deployed to the Kabul airport a few days after the embassy closed to assist with the broader evacuation efforts.[80] Nevertheless, Ambassador Sirrs acknowledged that the pressure on the airport–by that time the only exit point from the country–was so high that Canada could not “sustain any more volume to go through.”[81] As he described the operation of the U.S.-led air bridge, “Canada only had so many time slots to get planes in, load them and get people out.”[82] The Special Committee was informed that Canada was given one slot per day.[83]

A more critical perspective of the embassy’s role was put forward by David Lavery, a retired non-commissioned officer of the CAF who had gone on to serve with the UN Department of Safety and Security and then entered the private sector. Mr. Lavery was in Kabul working on behalf of several of the veteran and volunteer-based organizations that testified before the Special Committee, after those organizations had approached him in early July 2021. Lavery’s team offered to provide support and updates to GAC, IRCC and the CAF, but that elicited “little to no response or interest.” Furthermore, Mr. Lavery suggested that the “ambassador and his team’s non-presence had a significant impact on getting out our Canadian Afghan applicants and families.”[84]

That point was echoed by Major‑General (retired) Dean Milner, who was Canada’s final commander in Kandahar and the commander when Canada’s overall military mission in Afghanistan ended in 2014. In his opinion, “moving the embassy out was embarrassingly way too fast.”[85] Speaking more broadly, Major-General (retired) Milner believes that the absence of “clear leadership” within government and “a clear plan” to guide its efforts resulted in an outcome where “we only managed to pull out maybe about 15% to 17% of those critical interpreters who soldiered alongside us.”[86]

Major-General (retired) David Fraser also emphasized the importance of clear lines of decision-making and coordination. During the evacuation, and after, he and his colleagues urged the government “to create an interdepartmental task force with one leader.” There is a need, according to Major-General (retired) Fraser, for there to be “one minister” who has “the pre‑eminent authority and responsibility” to manage across the departments that are involved in getting people to safety.[87]

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

Even if the exact point at which the Taliban’s ascendancy became inevitable could not have been predicted with certainty, the Special Committee believes that greater prudence–and, therefore, a more proactive approach–was warranted in response to Afghanistan’s clearly worsening trajectory. Testimony underscored the peril facing those who were associated with the international coalition. Given the Taliban’s history and the long campaign it fought against coalition forces and the Afghan republic, the risks were known. The Special Committee acknowledges the complexities and danger involved with the operation of the air bridge from Kabul, and it commends those who made it possible. At the same time, it believes that, long before 15 August 2021, the risks associated with the Taliban should have compelled greater urgency and a more systematic policy and planning effort across the Canadian government to help people reach safety before it became much harder to do so.

When it comes to Canada’s machinery of government, this study has shown that Canada has the capacity to act and systems to coordinate efforts once a situation reaches the level of a full-fledged crisis. However, what was less clear is if the government is equipped, structured, and instructed to act in the same cohesive and timely manner in response to situations that require foresight and action over longer time horizons, before a worst-case scenario has taken hold. Such an approach, as was called for with Afghanistan, requires not only the exchange of information between departments and the harnessing of institutional memory, but clear leadership and decision-making to guide all aspects of Canada’s response. In the words of Warda Meighen, Partner, Landings LLP, “We have to be prepared before the moment requires it.”[88]

Some departments have conducted an internal lessons-learned exercise or after-action review.[89] However, the results of those exercises were not communicated to the Special Committee, and it was not clear that a formal, comprehensive, and whole-of-government review has been completed.[90] As noted, Afghanistan was Canada’s largest military deployment since the Second World War. The country is also arguably where Canada made its most significant direct contribution to a state-building and development effort in a fragile state. Given this involvement and the anguish that the Taliban’s return to power has caused for so many, the Special Committee believes that what transpired in Afghanistan requires full review and putting in place best practices for the future to be shared with Canadians. It should be treated with the highest scrutiny by the Government of Canada and the greatest possible candor.

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada re-examine its whole-of-government review of lessons learned from Afghanistan to ensure the review addresses all aspects of the government’s performance in Afghanistan from February 2020 onwards, including in relation to its contingency planning and the information and assessments that informed those plans and decisions, and incorporates all departmental “after-action” analysis that has been completed, as well as the findings and recommendations from this study. Furthermore, that the Government of Canada, while protecting any security clearance requirements, share the full outcome of its review with all relevant departments and agencies, and summarize the review’s main findings in its response to this Special Committee’s report.

Recommendation 2

That, when signs point to an emerging crisis in another country that implicates Canada’s interests, the Government of Canada quickly establish a structure of interdepartmental coordination, communication, and planning, as well as streamlined leadership and decision‑making authority across departments, with one person responsible, to ensure a coherent and timely response. That, to facilitate such crisis management efforts in the future, the Government of Canada confirm the roles and responsibilities of each department and minister, as well as the way in which allied and partner governments and non-governmental actors are to be engaged. Unless otherwise directed by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Global Affairs Canada are the lead minister and department for evacuation operations.

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada creates an emergency mechanism ready to be deployed in the event of future humanitarian crises, which would allow the Minister to activate quickly, and according to need, various measures such as the lifting of biometric data requirements, the introduction of special visas, the establishment of refugee sponsorship programs, and the establishment of air gateways.

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada ensure it has the ability to surge resources to relevant embassies and departments, and to reallocate personnel within those departments, as necessary, when conditions in another country that implicates Canada’s interests are deteriorating.

Part II: Looking Forward

Humanitarian Needs in Afghanistan

While needs in Afghanistan have intensified significantly since August 2021, Afghanistan’s people were facing hardships and vulnerabilities even before the internationally supported government collapsed. This context was framed by Asma Faizi, who said:

Afghans find themselves at the intersection of four decades of war imposed on them, political and economic instability, corruption, widespread human rights abuses, a global pandemic, back-to-back droughts in the past four years and a harsh winter.[91]

Within that overall picture, women and children are “at the front line and are disproportionally affected.”[92]

The collapse of the government triggered the suspension of international assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors and development banks.[93] The Afghan state and economy were heavily dependent on those flows. The World Bank had assessed that Afghanistan’s economy was “shaped by fragility and aid dependence.”[94] Grants were financing some 75% of total public expenditure and were responsible for around 45% of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product in 2020.[95] With the abrupt return to power of the Taliban, Afghanistan–whose currency reserves held abroad were frozen[96]–experienced a significant fiscal contraction at the same time as it essentially became cut-off from the international banking and payments systems. That occurred because the Taliban have long been subject to sanctions in relation to terrorism.

The overall result for the country has been “near economic and institutional collapse, including an inability to provide most basic services and pay civil servant salaries.”[97] The net effect for the Afghan people is that prices have increased, livelihoods have disappeared, and household resources have been exhausted.[98] This crisis, in the words of Asma Faizi, has been “fuelled by both a lack of response on the part of the international community and the Taliban’s inability to be an inclusive and representative government for all its people.”[99]

When the Special Committee began its study, the World Food Programme (WFP) indicated that approximately half of Afghanistan’s population–some 23 million people–were facing acute food insecurity.[100] That was being seen “across all 34 provinces.” What is more, urban residents were “suffering from food insecurity at similar rates to rural communities” for the first time.[101] For the March–May 2022 period, it was estimated that 19.7 million people in Afghanistan were still facing high levels of acute food insecurity. The reduction from previous months was mainly driven by the significant scale-up of humanitarian food assistance to the country.[102]

To encapsulate the enormity of this situation, John Aylieff, Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific at the WFP, said: “Today, millions of people in Afghanistan—young children, families and communities—stand at the precipice of inhumane hunger and destitution.”[103] Of the 23 million people who required food assistance, nearly 9 million were “one step away from famine,” while some 1 million children were “at risk of perishing this year from acute malnutrition.”[104]

In addition to severe food insecurity, Afghanistan’s healthcare system is under strain. Dr. George Varughese, Principal Adviser for Humanitarian and Development Assistance with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, described “severe shortages of medical supplies, fuel to heat hospitals and food and money for staff.” Those shortages have emerged while Afghanistan’s health care system “is confronting five outbreaks: acute watery diarrhea, measles, polio, malaria and COVID-19.”[105]

Dr. Jason Nickerson, Humanitarian Representative to Canada for Doctors Without Borders, discussed those shortages and strains in concrete terms. He highlighted the case of a doctor, who had not received a salary for five months, working at a public hospital in Afghanistan where a Caesarean section had to be performed with the light from a mobile phone because “the hospital could not pay for fuel for the generator anymore.”[106] In the view of Dr. Nickerson: “Recent funding announcements still leave the health system with far fewer funds than before, and will not improve a health system that was already failing.”[107]

Gender inequality is another long-standing challenge in Afghanistan. In 2020, prior to the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan ranked 169th out of 189 countries on the UN Development Programme’s Gender Inequality Index. As one sign of that inequality, “Afghan women were more likely to be severely food insecure than Afghan men, especially if they were from female-headed households (71.5% v 61.2%).”[108]

The vulnerabilities facing women and girls are intensifying. Dr. Varughese expressed concern that “gender inequality continues to shape the humanitarian crisis.”[109] Other testimony supported that concern. Of the 3.4 million people who are displaced within Afghanistan, some 80% are women and children.[110] Another indicator of heightened vulnerabilities is that “nearly 100% of female-headed household[s] reported facing insufficient food consumption” in February 2022.[111] Furthermore, it is estimated that 60% of the 4 million Afghan children who are out of school are girls. In addition to lost education, such children face protection risks, including child marriage, child labour and–potentially–trafficking.[112]

Many people in Afghanistan are also living with some level of disability, with barriers “amplified for women and girls.”[113] Mines Action Canada observed that, for persons with disabilities “who fear for their lives, the challenging routes out of the country are impassible without assistance.” Furthermore, persons with disabilities, who were already more likely to be living in poverty, lost their monthly government pensions.[114]

Amid an economy that has been deprived of “oxygen,”[115] some people are confronting impossible–and terrible–decisions. That includes reported instances of “families selling their daughters for future marriage in return for payment.”[116] Dr. Sima Samar, former Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, asked the Special Committee to imagine “the level of desperation needed to sell your children or your organs to feed the rest of the family.”[117]

Prioritizing and Reaching the Most Vulnerable

The United Nations (UN) system, with its partners, launched an appeal that aims to reach 22.1 million of the 24.4 million people in Afghanistan who are expected to need assistance this year. According to the UN’s humanitarian response plan, doing so will require US$4.44 billion from donors. That figure represents the largest appeal for a single country the UN system has ever made.[118] Some US$2.4 billion was pledged at a high-level donors’ conference.[119] As of 23 May 2022, the appeal had received actual funding for around 30% (or US$1.34 billion) of its identified requirements.[120]

The Government of Canada provided $47.1 million in humanitarian disbursements for Afghanistan and neighbouring countries in 2021 and an additional $94.2 million as of March 2022.[121] The Honourable Harjit Sajjan, Minister of International Development, told the Special Committee that Canada’s “humanitarian response since August [2021] is the largest it has ever been for Afghanistan.”[122] More than half of Canada’s humanitarian assistance has gone to the WFP, while Canada has also supported programs being delivered by the United Nations Children’s Fund, the International Organization for Migration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The international organizations appearing before the Special Committee emphasized that humanitarian assistance is being directed to the benefit of the Afghan people. John Aylieff said that the WFP has “insisted from day one on full independence of [its] actions.” He added that assistance “is based on an independent assessment of needs” and is only distributed by the WFP’s implementing partners. There are monitors present, Mr. Aylieff noted, “at every single distribution.” Operating in this manner allows the WFP to maintain its “operational independence,” in keeping with humanitarian principles.[123]

Accountability measures were also addressed by Patrick Hamilton, Head of Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). His organization is supporting 28 provincial-level hospitals in Afghanistan for “everything from the payment of salaries through to the running costs and medical provisions.”[124] According to Mr. Hamilton, the ICRC signed a memorandum of understanding with Afghanistan’s new health authorities to clarify that funding will not be channelled through the health ministry itself but will be used to pay the salaries of hospital staff directly. The ICRC has its own monitoring mechanisms, but also “engaged a German-Dutch third party monitoring company” to ensure that the program’s funding “is delivered directly to the intended recipients.”[125] While the ICRC is “very conscious of the need to avoid trespassing over the various sets of counter-terror legislation” that exist, Mr. Hamilton observed that, under the present circumstances, they must engage with the de facto (Taliban) authorities to ensure access to the people the ICRC is seeking to assist and protect.[126]

Responding to a humanitarian crisis with significant human rights dimensions, according to Dr. Lauryn Oates, Executive Director of Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, will “require observing the fine balance of delivering meaningful assistance on the ground while not recognizing a regime that is not legitimate and is based on an ideology of violence and nihilism.” She believes that “Canada must at every turn vocally demand that the rights of women be upheld.”[127]

Complementary to that view, Khalidha Nasiri, Executive Director of the Afghan Youth Engagement and Development Initiative, recommended that Canada increase its investment “in humanitarian aid groups that are focused on helping women and girls.” In a situation where mass impoverishment is being forecasted, she said, the people who are “most at risk” must be prioritized.[128] Barbara Grantham, President and Chief Executive Officer of CARE Canada, emphasized that “local women’s leadership is critical to delivering humanitarian aid, especially in marginalized communities, and it must be prioritized in the response efforts.”[129]

According to testimony, as of early 2022, international humanitarian organizations were able to operate throughout Afghanistan. The WFP reported having “unhindered access” to Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.[130] Martine Flokstra, Operations Manager for Doctors Without Borders, characterized the situation as being “very fluid,” but indicated that security conditions were allowing her organization to continue activities “at times more easily than before the transition of power.”[131] Manuel Fontaine, Director of the Office of Emergency Programmes for the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), similarly conveyed that, while there were some variations at the regional level, UNICEF personnel were finding it easier to “move around and assess needs and see the reality of the needs on the ground.”[132] Nevertheless, he cautioned that the situation “could deteriorate quickly.”[133]

While the WFP’s female staff were “back at work without conditions,” some were required to have “a male escort in certain areas,” but that was also the case before the Taliban’s takeover.[134] About 95% of the UNHCR’s female staff were also “back in the office as part and parcel of colleagues who visit the field, do field assessments and approach communities to look at their needs.”[135] However, speaking to the conditions facing women-led non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan, Barbara Grantham said: “While it’s possible in some provinces, the full participation of women humanitarian staff remains limited, which risks marginalizing women and girls even further.”[136]

Humanitarian assistance is supposed to reach the population on the basis of need. However, Dr. Sima Samar mentioned a report that some Hazara districts were “receiving very little” of the relief program because “the Hazara-headed NGOs were not included in the distribution.”[137]

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

After considering the vulnerabilities outlined above, the Special Committee notes that 10 Canadian humanitarian organizations are calling for Canada to ensure that “increased commitments in 2022 reflect the drastically escalating needs” in Afghanistan.[138] Furthermore, the Special Committee is cognizant that, notwithstanding the relocation and resettlement efforts it believes must remain a priority, there are–in the words of Khalil Shariff, Chief Executive Officer of the Aga Khan Foundation Canada–“tens of millions of Afghans who will continue to remain in the country indefinitely.”[139]

The Special Committee is also aware that humanitarian assistance is designed to provide basic protection and relief from suffering; it cannot take the place of a functioning economy. In this regard, the Special Committee is mindful of Patrick Hamilton’s assessment that the centre of the “catastrophe” facing the Afghan population is “the situation of economic paralysis and the total absence of liquidity today in the Afghan market.”[140] Nevertheless, and however unsatisfying a conclusion this may be, it does not appear that the complex factors contributing to Afghanistan’s economic paralysis will be quickly or easily resolved. A designated terrorist entity’s control of an entire state apparatus–and one that had previously been supported by extensive international assistance–is an unprecedented situation. While those complexities are being navigated by the international community, basic needs can be met, and humanitarian principles upheld.

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada instruct Global Affairs Canada to allocate–at minimum–Canada’s fair share of funding toward the United Nations humanitarian appeals for Afghanistan, with funding being increased should needs increase markedly.

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada ensure, as part of its response to the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, that Global Affairs Canada supports trusted organizations whose primary focus is vulnerable populations, while also ensuring that its humanitarian assistance is reaching the most vulnerable populations in Afghanistan–of all ages, abilities, genders, ethnicities and religions–on the basis of need.

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada ensure that Global Affairs Canada continues to monitor the humanitarian environment in Afghanistan, and that it take action with its partners in response to any credible reports that humanitarian assistance is being impeded or that the de facto authorities are limiting the roles of women humanitarian actors or the services and support they deliver.

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada work with its allies and the international financial institutions in support of Afghanistan’s economic stability through an approach that is focused on helping the Afghan people.

The Impact of Sanctions on Aid Delivery

Canadian humanitarian organizations who testified to the Special Committee urgently called for the Government of Canada to provide clarity and assurances in relation to Canada’s sanctions and anti-terrorism financing law and regulations. Otherwise, they cannot operate in Afghanistan.

The UN Security Council has, for years, maintained sanctions–asset freezes and travel bans–on individuals and entities associated with the Taliban.[141] After 15 August 2021, there was significant uncertainty regarding the transactions, interactions and activities connected with Afghanistan that would be permissible.[142]

On 22 December 2021, the UN Security Council decided through Resolution 2615–the drafting of which was spearheaded by the United States–that “humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan” do not violate the Council’s sanctions regime.[143] The Council also specified that “the processing and payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources, and the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of such assistance or to support such activities are permitted.”[144] Notwithstanding this humanitarian carve-out, the Council also strongly encouraged relevant actors “to use reasonable efforts to minimize the accrual of any benefits,” whether directly or through diversion, to individuals and entities that have been designated for sanctions.[145]

John Aylieff of the WFP told the Special Committee that,

The sanctions carve-out by the UN Security Council has helped immensely to give us the space to operate, and that’s all we really needed: the space to operate in a context of where even paying the utility bill of our offices, just to give an example, would otherwise have been at risk of breaching sanctions.[146]

Put succinctly, the carve-out has been “critical.”[147]

Nevertheless, Michael Messenger, President and Chief Executive Officer of World Vision Canada, characterized Canada as being “out of step.”[148] Canada’s Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Taliban, ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida were last amended in 2020 and, therefore, have not been adjusted following the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2615.[149]

The regulations prohibit a person from knowingly providing any property or financial services to–or for the benefit of–any person or entity associated with the Taliban.[150] The Canadian Red Cross observed that the regulations were “written at a point when the Taliban were a nonstate armed group, not as the effective government ruling Afghanistan, as is the case now.”[151] There is a provision in the regulations for an exemption certificate to be issued;[152] such a certificate must be issued if the UN Security Council did not intend for the activity in question to be prohibited.[153] Nevertheless, the Canadian Red Cross submitted that the exemption provision does not “specifically concern humanitarian action,” and that “the application process can be lengthy and may not be successful.”[154] Furthermore, the provision “does not mitigate the risk under other legal requirements, such as Canadian charities law and the Canadian Criminal Code.”[155]

The Taliban and the affiliated Haqqani Network were listed as terrorist entities under Canada’s Criminal Code in 2013.[156] Witnesses appearing before the Special Committee have drawn attention to the restrictions stemming from subsection 83.03(b) of the Criminal Code, which makes a person guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for up to 10 years if they, directly or indirectly, collect property, provide or invite a person to provide, or make available property or financial or other related services “knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group.”[157]

According to the 10 Canadian humanitarian organizations that submitted a joint brief to the Special Committee,

The initial interpretations provided by Global Affairs Canada indicated that Canadian organizations are thus arguably prohibited from using any Canadian funding (governmental or non-governmental) to directly or indirectly pay ordinary and incidental taxes linked to humanitarian work, including taxes on rent, salaries, vendors or imports in Afghanistan as the Taliban is perceived to be equivalent [to] the de facto government.[158]

This view seems to have been confirmed by the Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs. She indicated that the way in which the relevant sections of the Criminal Code had been drafted–in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001–and are now being interpreted, has created a situation where organizations cannot provide any form of indirect aid to the Taliban.[159]

The 10 Canadian humanitarian organizations emphasize, with respect to operations in Afghanistan, that not paying taxes “would increase organizational risk, impede the ability to operate and carry out programs, and access required work permits, visas and documentation.”[160] To the knowledge of these 10 organizations, “there are no exemptions from the Canadian government that would entirely eliminate risk for Canadian organizations to authorize the prohibited activities.”[161]

The situation was detailed in the testimony of Barbara Grantham of CARE Canada, who told the Special Committee that,

The current framing of the Criminal Code, as interpreted by the government, is that the risk of prosecution under the code would be entirely borne by humanitarian organizations like CARE if we were to proceed without an exemption or some form of workaround, or a change to the legislation as the current Criminal Code sits. All of those are options. We have been working actively with counterparts inside the Government of Canada to endeavour to bring those options to bear, but the reality is that the timeline here does not jive with the timeline you have heard … in terms of the short-term acute nature of this crisis.

… Canada is the only significant donor/funder, sovereign funder, to Afghanistan that has not provided some form of exemption or change to its Criminal Code framework that enables the humanitarian organizations from those countries to operate.[162]

Speaking from the perspective of UNICEF, which is part of the UN system and thus enjoys distinct privileges and immunities, Manuel Fontaine observed that Canada’s legislative restrictions are still affecting UN agencies because Canadian funding “can only be used for expenses outside of Afghanistan.” Consequently, according to Mr. Fontaine, if a UN agency tries “to work with NGOs or civil society locally, you cannot do it with Canadian funding, and that's a problem.”[163]

In their joint submission, the 10 Canadian humanitarian organizations noted that other donors “have recently made exemptions and/or guidelines in order to get aid into Afghanistan, or have adopted a more pragmatic and flexible approach.”[164] Barbara Grantham and Michael Messenger emphasized that theirs were the only national chapters–of the CARE and World Vision networks, respectively–whose operations in Afghanistan have not resumed.[165] World Vision Canada, for example, had two containers “full of packets of ready-to-use therapeutic food … to treat children facing the severest forms of malnutrition… [that] can literally bring children back from the brink of death by starvation.” The organization could not ship them to Afghanistan, despite the pleas from their team on the ground. Each container can help more than 900 children.[166] Programs for which Canadian organizations are the sole external funder will likely be forced to close.[167]

Barbara Grantham was asked how CARE’s non-Canadian implementing partners ensure that funding reaches women and girls in need, and not the Taliban. In reply, she cited the organization’s presence in Afghanistan since 1961, its “deep historical trusted relationships with partners and leaders,” and its “extensive monitoring systems.” Ms. Grantham also noted the establishment of an Afghan women advisory group, which she said is advising CARE’s humanitarian country team on its engagement with the Taliban. That provides, in her words, an “interlocutor” between themselves “as civil society organizations and the Taliban to ensure that the intent of what we’re there to achieve and the monitoring systems in place are working to our satisfaction and in a way that fulfills the commitments we have made to the people of Afghanistan.”[168]

The Special Committee was informed that the Government of Canada is providing funding for Afghanistan through “a small number of very trusted partners” that have “established measures in place to minimize the risks of misappropriation or diversion of humanitarian assistance and to make sure these emergency relief items go to the people they are intended for.”[169] As noted previously, those partners comprise UN humanitarian agencies and the ICRC. Global Affairs Canada recognizes that Canadian law currently “precludes Canadian NGOs from being active.”[170]

When asked how other countries have been able to facilitate broader humanitarian action in Afghanistan,[171] Christopher MacLennan, Deputy Minister of International Development, indicated that “some countries have put in special measures that allow them to permit things such as a licencing scheme or a way of permitting certain activities that otherwise would be deemed to be a contravention of the code.”[172] Canada’s legislative framework does not contain such a mechanism.[173] While Minister Sajjan said he could not provide a timeline for resolving this issue, he assured the Special Committee that Global Affairs Canada “is working with Justice and Public Safety to figure out the best step to move forward.”[174]

According to Amy Avis, General Counsel for the Canadian Red Cross, what would be most helpful “is some sort of expressed permissibility with regard to the ability to take humanitarian action.”[175] To get there, the Canadian Red Cross has suggested that action could be taken in the immediate term through the issuance of “a Ministerial statement and/or interpretative bulletin” that would outline Canada’s implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2615.[176] Furthermore, the sanctions regulations could be revised to include a non-applicability clause for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Regarding the Criminal Code, the organization suggests that “clarity” could be provided to the humanitarian sector “on permissible action.”[177] In the longer term, if it was determined to be necessary as part of ensuring that the relevant sections of the Criminal Code are tailored and specific “to the types of activities and context that constitute support of terrorist entities,” an express carve-out could be inserted for legitimate humanitarian action.[178]

Michael Messenger of World Vision indicated that,

Based on external legal advice, our understanding is that the Minister of Public Safety could provide an exemption to the restrictive provisions through section 83.09 of the Criminal Code. In fact, we believe he and his department have an urgent obligation to do so.[179]

Doctors Without Borders is advocating for a solution that is not limited to the case of Afghanistan. They suggest that the Government of Canada should provide,

clear reference and written guidance to all concerned parties (including financial institutions, law enforcement, and others) that counterterrorism and sanctions measures are not intended to have adverse effects on the civilian population, and that they comply with protections afforded to impartial humanitarian organizations and their personnel, and civilians, under international humanitarian law (IHL).[180]

The organization is also calling for “permanent and well-framed humanitarian exemptions” to be included in the relevant sections of the Criminal Code, United Nations Act and Special Economic Measures Act, in compliance with international humanitarian law.[181]

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

The Special Committee recognizes that there must be strong prohibitions in place against terrorist entities. The Taliban should not be supported by Canadian actors, whether they be governmental or non-governmental. At the same time, given that Canada’s objective is to provide relief to the most vulnerable Afghan people, the ability to do so should not be impeded, either directly or indirectly. The United Nations Security Council, through Resolution 2615, has provided clear parameters for humanitarian assistance to be delivered in Afghanistan, a decision that is being implemented by Canada’s allies. In response to Minister Joly’s openness to consider solutions emanating from this study,[182] the Special Committee wants to communicate that it does not believe that Canada taking its own policy, regulatory and legislative steps to facilitate legitimate humanitarian action would equate to legitimization of the Taliban. The Special Committee, as noted, appreciates the complexity of this situation. However, it is concerned that many months have passed since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, while the needs of the population are known to be dire. As Barbara Grantham stated: “The unfortunate thing is that the sense of urgency that we feel is not aligned with the timeline the government seems to feel is possible. We're running against a clock of weather, famine and malnutrition.”[183]

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada act immediately to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 2615.

Recommendation 10

That the Government of Canada act immediately to ensure that registered Canadian organizations have the clarity and assurances needed–such as carve-outs or exemptions–to deliver humanitarian assistance and meet basic needs in Afghanistan without fear of prosecution for violating Canada’s anti-terrorism laws.

Recommendation 11

That the Government of Canada review the anti-terrorism financing provisions under the Criminal Code and urgently take any legislative steps necessary to ensure those provisions do not unduly restrict legitimate humanitarian action that complies with international humanitarian principles and law.

Broader Forms of Engagement

After the events of August 2021, Western governments emphasized that the Taliban would be judged by their actions and not by their words promising amnesty for those the Taliban fought against. The goal–ultimately–remains an Afghanistan that is part of the international community. Nevertheless, testimony suggested that the reality of the Taliban’s rule is entrenching Afghanistan’s international isolation.

From the perspective of journalist Sally Armstrong, who has covered the situation in Afghanistan since the 1990s, it has become clear that the Taliban “have not moderated.” Making this point, she noted that, as the Taliban took control of villages, they “demanded a list of all the girls over the age of 14 and all the widows under the age of 44 to give to their soldiers because, according to them, they’re allowed four each that God told them they had the right to have.”[184]

Alison MacLean, a documentary filmmaker who completed “four combat camera embeds with six NATO countries” in Afghanistan, described the peril that women who served in the Afghan republic’s security forces now face.[185] That includes “a former policewoman, who was eight months pregnant, [and] was dragged out of her home and executed in front of her children and neighbours.”[186] Friba Rezayee, Founder and Executive Director, Women Leaders of Tomorrow, said that members of Afghanistan’s female sports teams “have been threatened by the Taliban with a punishment of 110 lashings in public or the death penalty.”[187]

Heather Barr, Associate Women’s Rights Director at Human Rights Watch, indicated that the human rights situation in Afghanistan has gone from “extremely bad to even worse, with new signs of this every day, including extrajudicial killings and abductions, censorship and intimidation of the media, and violations of women’s rights.”[188] Summarizing all the restrictions that have been imposed on women and girls, from classrooms to workplaces and civic spaces, Ms. Barr conveyed that the Taliban are “systemically violating women’s rights to work, study, protest, speak, travel, access health care, live free from violence and have a political voice.” In her assessment: “There’s no reason to think there aren’t more crackdowns coming.”[189]

The Government of Canada’s assessment of the human rights situation in Afghanistan is equally negative. Minister Joly underlined her concern about the “backsliding” that has been observed in relation to the rights of Afghan women and girls.[190] In general, she said, reports are pointing to a climate of growing violence and rights abuses, with civilians, journalists, human rights defenders, and former members of the Afghan republic’s government and security forces being targeted.[191] Even though the Taliban had promised an amnesty for people who had served the republic, the situation has, in fact, deteriorated since August 2021.[192]

On 23 March 2022, the Taliban reneged on their commitment to allow all girls to attend secondary schools (i.e., education above the sixth grade). Minister Joly, along with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the High Representative of the European Union, noted that the decision was taken despite “months of work by the international community to support teacher stipends based on an expectation that schools would be open for all, with the higher interest of Afghan students and teachers in mind.” The foreign ministers declared that the decision “will have an inevitable impact on the Taliban’s prospects of gaining political support and legitimacy either at home or abroad.”[193]

Minister Sajjan, who had described an “appalling regression” in the gains made in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover,[194] told the Special Committee that Canada is “strongly advocating with our like-minded partners to make sure that there is no restriction of girls going to school.” He emphasized that, “[e]ven going up to grade 12 is not acceptable to us; it has to be unconditional.”[195] Minister Sajjan also indicated that, if the authorities allow unconditional access to education, “that will make it better for them in terms of what further steps we as an international community can take for Afghanistan.”[196]

According to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, on 7 May 2022, the de facto Taliban authorities announced that “all women must cover their faces in public, that women should only leave their homes in cases of necessity, and that violations of this directive will lead to the punishment of their male relatives.”[197] The G7 foreign ministers expressed their “strongest opposition” to this directive. With the Taliban imposing “increasingly restrictive measures that severely limit half the population’s ability to fully, equally and meaningfully participate in society,” the G7 ministers underlined that the “Taliban are further isolating themselves from the international community.”[198]

Addressing the post-August 2021 situation in Afghanistan in broad terms, some witnesses emphasized that normalization of the Taliban should be resisted. Dr. William Maley, Emeritus Professor at Australian National University, and Representative for Canadian Hazara Humanitarian Services, told the Special Committee that the Taliban “tick every box that you need to tick in defining a group as a terrorist group.” In his view, it is “very important that diplomacy not be conducted in a way that normalizes their participation in international society.”[199] Dr. Lauryn Oates had raised this concern, noting the signal that normalization could send to other groups that are watching how the world is responding to the Taliban.[200]

To avoid normalization, but to reckon with the current reality of the Taliban’s de facto governance of millions of people, other testimony advised engagement that is carefully calibrated. After describing her work with women who remain in Afghanistan, Wazhma Frogh told the Special Committee that it is her “continued advocacy that we need to engage with the Taliban, but that does not mean recognition.” There is, she insisted, “a need for tight criteria attached to our engagement.” That involves “public diplomacy and putting pressure.” In Ms. Frogh’s view, it “should also mean supporting national and international organizations.”[201]

From the perspective of Asma Faizi, political pressure should be focused on achieving “an inclusive and representative government that respects human rights and allows the people to define what they want for the future of Afghanistan.”[202]

The testimony of Dr. Sima Samar also advised a firm stance in relation to human rights. She insisted that, if the “Taliban wants to be recognized by the international community, they have obligations and they have to accept human rights.” In her view, “[t]here should not be a negotiation on human rights with the Taliban. It should be clear.”[203]

Heather Barr argued that Canada, France, Germany, and Sweden have a “special responsibility to Afghan women and girls” because they are the four countries that contributed troops to the international coalition in Afghanistan after 2001, and they are also the countries that have adopted a feminist foreign policy.[204] From Ms. Barr’s perspective,

The crisis happening in Afghanistan right now is the most serious women’s rights crisis in the world. It’s the most serious women's rights crisis the world has faced since 1996, when the Taliban took over the last time. If feminist foreign policy doesn’t mean standing with Afghan women right now, in this crisis, it begs the question of what feminist foreign policy means, and risks the conclusion, “Not much.”[205]

Dr. Oates raised similar questions and concerns in relation to Canada’s significant past involvement in Afghanistan and the application of its current foreign policy lens. At the time of her testimony, it was “not coming across that Afghanistan is a priority foreign policy issue for Canada.” She said: “A Canadian moral stance is missing.”[206] Khalidha Nasiri also felt that Canada must “take on a much bigger and vocal role in the response to the crisis.”[207]

Heather Barr outlined four steps toward a coordinated, global approach to Afghanistan, and one in which Canada could assume a leadership role. The first step is to “deny the Taliban legitimacy,” including by ending the UN Security Council exemption on the travel ban for their leaders, avoiding meetings with them outside Afghanistan, and sending gender-balanced delegations to meet with them. The second is to do everything possible–including speaking out quickly and firmly–when human rights defenders in Afghanistan are abused, abducted, or detained. The third is to ensure that funding decisions do not perpetuate discriminatory policies, including in the educational sector. Fourth, is to avoid punishing the Afghan people for the Taliban’s decisions. Ms. Barr believes that humanitarian needs can be met while pressure is maintained on the Taliban in relation to human rights.[208]

To organize, direct and amplify the Government of Canada’s efforts, some witnesses called for the appointment of a special envoy[209] or ambassador-at-large for Afghanistan.[210] Wazhma Frogh called for the envoy to be a woman. In her view, that would enable focused engagement with the authorities, along the lines outlined above, as well as support for the women’s organizations that remain active in the country.[211]

Minister Joly subsequently informed the Special Committee that David Sproule, who had been announced as the department’s senior official for Afghanistan,[212] is now permanently in a special envoy role.[213] As is the case with Canada’s allies, Mr. Sproule is operating out of Doha, Qatar, where such representatives have been engaging with the Taliban’s de facto foreign minister. Operating in that manner, according to Minister Joly, allows Canada “to engage without recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban government.” Recognition, she insisted, is a “red line” that Canada does not want to cross.[214]

In addition to ensuring that it is engaging without legitimizing the Taliban, testimony also suggested that Canada’s foreign policy will need to consider the fluid security context within Afghanistan and the regional dimensions at play.[215] Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill, Professor of Political Science at Concordia University, told the Special Committee that, for issues ranging from refugee assistance to counterterrorism, “[a]ll of it depends on Pakistan.”[216]

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

To date, the evidence suggests that the Taliban have not transitioned in any meaningful way from being an ideologically rigid and violent movement to a political body that intends to govern in a way that fulfills core international expectations. The Special Committee agrees that the Government of Canada should not recognize or legitimize Taliban governance. Nevertheless, and while the situation is fraught with complexity and emotion, the Special Committee does not believe that Canada’s approach to Afghanistan can be limited exclusively to humanitarian concerns. It is the Special Committee’s view that, anchored by its feminist foreign policy and guided by the red lines it has established, the Government of Canada can engage actively with its partners and allies on Afghanistan policy, including at the regional level, while also finding ways to support the voices of tolerance, justice and moderation that remain within Afghanistan.

Recommendation 12

That the Government of Canada advocate for the end of the United Nations Security Council exemption on the travel ban for Taliban leaders.

Recommendation 13

That the Government of Canada continue to insist that girls and women throughout Afghanistan have permanent access to all levels of education.

Recommendation 14

That, as a condition of Canada’s ongoing engagement with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities, the Government of Canada’s special envoy insist on being able to communicate with Afghan civil society organizations and women leaders who are in Afghanistan, without them facing any risk of reprisals. Furthermore, that the Government of Canada, in its response to this report, detail how it is monitoring, supporting, and advocating for the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan.

Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Effort

The Government of Canada has committed to welcoming 40,000 Afghans by 2024.[217] According to Minister Fraser, on a per capita basis, Canada’s commitment is “the most substantial refugee resettlement effort from Afghanistan globally right now.”[218]

Nevertheless, as the Special Committee finalized its report, Canada was less than half-way toward meeting its objective. As of 1 June 2022, 14,645 people had arrived in Canada since August 2021 under all programs.[219] That number comprises 6,735 people who assisted the Government of Canada (from the 14,910 applications that had been received), as well as 7,910 Afghan nationals who arrived through a separate humanitarian program.

As a concrete example of the work yet to be done, the Special Committee was informed that National Defence and the CAF had received some 7,500 inquiries from Afghans wanting to participate in Canada’s special immigration measures, about 3,800 of whom were validated as having an enduring relationship with the CAF. Of those, 900 individuals have been accepted by IRCC, plus family members who met the criteria. For GAC, the department assessed more than 5,500 individuals, resulting in the positive referral of more than 3,600.[220] According to National Defence and GAC, their role ends once the validation is completed and the file is forwarded to IRCC.[221]

At the time of the writing of this report, IRCC has yet to provide a response to the Special Committee on the status of the rest of the 2,900 applications. Meanwhile, applicants with confirmation emails from National Defence that referrals have been made to IRCC have yet to receive any response. The same applies to the GAC-referred cases. Furthermore, the Special Committee has yet to receive responses from the departmental officials of GAC, National Defence, and IRCC to 10 undertakings requested by members. (Appendix A contains a list of the undertakings to which there has been no response from officials.) Not only is the lack of response disrespectful to the work of Special Committee Members, but it inhibits the ability of the Members to do their work, as directed by the House of Commons.

Immigration Programs for Afghan Nationals Launched in 2021

Before exploring the challenges and impediments that are affecting Canada’s ability to meet its target, this section of the report first describes the new policy measures that the Government of Canada has initiated.

Three special programs were launched in 2021. The first program, referred to as the special immigration measures (SIM), focuses on Afghans who assisted the Government of Canada.[222] The second one is a humanitarian program for other specified groups of Afghans who are facing risks under the Taliban.[223] The third program is a family reunification pathway for the extended family members of former Afghan interpreters.[224]

The SIM program was announced on 23 July 2021. It is designed for interpreters who worked with the Canadian Armed Forces, cooks, drivers, cleaners, construction workers, security guards and locally engaged staff employed at the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan, as well as their family members.[225] The SIM defines a family member as: a spouse, a dependant child (unmarried and less than 22 years of age) and a grandchild. The definition also includes “de facto dependants,” specified as individuals who need financial or emotional support or are living with the family as a member of the household.

For the SIM, Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence are used as referral agencies. Applicants are then processed by IRCC, which indicated early on that those benefitting from the SIM would be treated like government-assisted refugees. The first individuals to benefit from this program arrived in Canada on 4 August 2021.[226] Minister Fraser told the Special Committee that approximately 18,000 individuals will come to Canada under this program.[227]

Launched on 13 August 2021, the humanitarian program is focused on Afghan women leaders, human rights defenders, persecuted religious or ethnic minorities, journalists and individuals who helped Canadian journalists, and LGBTI individuals in need of resettlement.[228] To be eligible for this program, Afghan nationals must be outside Afghanistan. Under the program, privately sponsored refugees are referred to IRCC by a sponsorship agreement holder or an organization or a “group of five.”[229] Government-assisted refugees need to be referred to IRCC by referral organizations with which the Government of Canada has agreements, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Front Line Defenders and ProtectDefenders. Minister Fraser explained to the Special Committee that such referral organizations have experience in assessing vulnerability in situations of mass displacement.[230] The minister also mentioned that IRCC is using the Employment Mobility Pathway Pilot wherein referral partners help Canada select refugees based on their skills and work experience.[231]

Finally, in December 2021, IRCC created a new family reunification program for extended family members of former interpreters and staff who supported Canada’s combat mission in Kandahar,[232] and who came to Canada as permanent residents under the 2009 and 2012 public policies for Afghan interpreters.[233] Eligible family members include parents and grandparents, as well as siblings and half-siblings and their spouses and children.[234] As is the case with the two other special programs, the family reunification program requires that applicants must have been in Afghanistan as of 22 July 2021.

Obstacles on the Path to Safety

Witnesses described the challenges and fears Afghans are facing, both as they live in hiding in Afghanistan, waiting for a moment to flee, and as they reside in a third country, waiting for their applications to be processed. Witnesses also highlighted problems that were common to the three special programs, including poor communication from IRCC, the requirement for biometrics and a perceived lack of resources at IRCC to handle the volume of cases. In addition, witnesses described problems specific to each individual program.

The biggest obstacle to reaching Canada is that it is now difficult to leave Afghanistan. Minister Fraser informed the Special Committee that some 10,000 people “have already been through the eligibility approval process and are still in the country now.”[235]

While waiting to find a way out, many Afghans live in hiding and in fear.[236] Djawid Taheri, Lawyer, told the Special Committee that “targeted individuals” are “still inside the country and moving from safe house to safe house to save their lives and evade the Taliban.”[237] Safiullah Mohammed Zadeh, a former interpreter with the Canadian Armed Forces, indicated that a colleague had lost 11 family members since the Taliban takeover and he described his own family situation:

I have four brothers, and two of them went missing when the Taliban took over…. Their children and the rest of their families and my family are on the move from one house to another, from one city to another, from one province to another. It has been seven months, and we have moved to four or five provinces. It's been six or seven weeks since I have spoken to them.[238]

For those who do attempt the journey out of Afghanistan, the path is perilous. Katherine Moloney, Representative for Afghan Families, Tenth Church, told the Special Committee that,

There is risk both to get to the border and at the border. It’s a harrowing journey for people to make, knowing that they are on hit lists, that they are being hunted and that if they are identified they can be killed. It’s an incredibly difficult journey, but one that many families choose to make in the hope that they can be resettled.[239]

Other challenges relate to documentation. Each neighbouring country sets its own entry and exit requirements, which may shift over time and may include a valid Afghan passport and a visa. However, some Afghans have had no other choice than to destroy their identity documents to avoid Taliban reprisals. In many cases, obtaining a passport, which is usually necessary to acquire a visa, is not a realistic option. This point was made by Brian Macdonald, Executive Director of Aman Lara, who indicated that two-thirds of the people his organization is trying to help do not have passports. He added:

To get a passport, Afghans are effectively telling the Taliban that they want to get away from them. Imagine: You’re trying to flee the Taliban, but to do so you need to travel to an office that’s controlled by the Taliban and give your name, the names of your family members, your address and all the fingerprints and photos of your family to the Taliban. Doing this exposes our people to great danger. As well, getting a visa to a third country is another obstacle. It exposes these families to another level of risk, and it can be expensive and time-consuming.[240]

In addition to the difficulties of obtaining a visa, the options for which have been narrowed by the limited number of embassies operational in in Kabul, Wazhma Frogh noted that the Taliban have “stopped women from travelling as well.” Consequently, she said: “We don’t have any hope of getting to the third countries.”[241]

People cannot apply to Canada’s humanitarian program directly. To be eligible, individuals must make it outside Afghanistan and then register with the UNHCR and be referred by a partner agency or by the UNHCR. However, because people who are notionally eligible under the humanitarian program “cannot get out of Afghanistan,” they are “stuck in an unimaginable catch-22,” according to Eleanor Taylor, Deputy Executive Director of Aman Lara.[242]

Minister Joly and officials from Global Affairs Canada emphasized that they have been engaging diplomatically with Canadian allies and regional governments on these issues. Pakistan is key in this regard because it is the primary land route for people fleeing Afghanistan. Pakistan had been admitting undocumented refugees until November 2021, after which its requirements changed. Paul Thoppil, Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia Pacific, Global Affairs Canada, indicated that Canada’s mission in Islamabad is engaging “constantly” with Pakistan’s government in pursuit of a “sustainable protocol” for the Torkham gate border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The objective is to ensure that single travel documents issued to Afghans by the Government of Canada will be accepted.[243] However, Mr. Thoppil reminded the Special Committee that Pakistan had already been hosting millions of Afghan refugees prior to 15 August 2021 and that they are concerned about having to manage a significant outflow of people.[244]

In terms of travel options from within Afghanistan, Mr. Thoppil indicated that evacuation charter flights from Kabul were not a viable option at this time because the Taliban want the airport “to resume normally scheduled commercial airline traffic.”[245] In addition to engaging with Pakistan about single journey travel documents, Ghulam Faizi, a former Interpreter for the Canadian Armed Forces, wants Canada to engage “with the Qatari government about securing chartered flights from Kabul airport to Doha or [the United Arab Emirates],” because–he said–“Qatar controls airports in Afghanistan currently.”[246]

Even if people manage to cross the border, making it out of Afghanistan does not guarantee safety or relief. Heather Barr told the Special Committee that, in Pakistan, people who have valid visas must renew them every 60 days. Afghans without a valid visa cannot rent a place to live and cannot work, nor can they send their children to school. Undocumented migrants cannot get an exit visa from Pakistan. Heather Barr further commented that,

[M]any Afghans are going back to Afghanistan because they're running out of money and they can't feed themselves. At least if they go back to Afghanistan, they'll hopefully have family members who will take them in.[247]

Ali Mirzad, Senior Government Affairs and Relations Advisor, Canadian Hazara Humanitarian Services, said that being registered as an asylum claimant did not give a person legal status in Pakistan, and “they run the risk of being arrested at any time and deported to Afghanistan.”[248] From the perspective of Djawid Taheri, it is inevitable at some point that the third country will not renew the visa and Afghans will be deported.[249]

Certain population groups may also be at heightened risk in third countries. According to Rainbow Railroad,

LGBTQI+ refugees who fled Afghanistan face unique, imminent, and severe risks to their lives and safety in neighbouring countries due to laws restricting diverse sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC); vigilante violence; and state-sponsored persecution.[250]

The organization underlines that “LGBTQI+ Afghan refugees require exceptionally urgent and expedited resettlement assistance given that local integration and voluntary repatriation are not viable or durable solutions.” While many “are relegated to safe houses,” others “cannot leave Afghanistan without a clear path to a safer third country.”[251] Rainbow Railroad has a list of 300 Afghans waiting in neighbouring countries for safe passage to Canada.[252]

The collection of biometrics is the final obstacle that was highlighted by many witnesses. The Government of Canada’s special programs all require applicants to provide photographs and fingerprints to confirm their identity and background. Currently, there are no biometrics collection sites in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan there is one visa application centre in Islamabad. However, Oliver Thorne reminded the Special Committee of the following:

Without the ability to deliver biometrics in country, which we cannot do without a Canadian consular presence, they have to go to a third country before they can come to Canada. That means we have to deal with all the paperwork requirements to get them into that third country. Remember, most of the individuals we're talking to do not have passports. Without a passport they can't get a visa and without a visa they can't go into the country.[253] 

He indicated that, “The ideal solution would be … to bring people to Canada without biometric verification and do the verification in Canada.”[254] This was echoed by Sally Armstrong, who felt that Afghans should be able to get to safety, in Canada or in a lily-pad country, and “sort out the biometrics later.”[255]

Some witnesses suggested that biometrics could be collected either in Afghanistan by a private company, using secure technology,[256] or by having discussions with third countries and issuing the necessary documents to allow individuals to transit there for these procedures to take place. Brian Macdonald suggested that finding a way of confirming identity inside Afghanistan would allow the passport and visa requirements involved in reaching a third country, which are out of Canada’s control, to be bypassed. According to him, “With those obstacles removed, Aman Lara could move a quarter of its list almost immediately.”[257]

The Special Committee heard from Cindy Termorshuizen, Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, about security concerns obtaining biometrics in Afghanistan. She said:

I think it's fair to say that we probably have conversations about biometrics on a weekly basis. As the minister said, the issue of biometric collection, particularly inside Afghanistan, is a real challenge. We can collect biometrics in other countries, which we're doing in Pakistan, but the inside-Afghanistan piece is really difficult. None of our allies has cracked this nut because, as the minister said, the ability to collect biometrics in Afghanistan securely, given the security situation some of your colleagues have noted, is challenging.[258]

Minister Fraser told the Special Committee that he was following the advice of Canada’s security experts in maintaining a requirement for biometrics. He further indicated that most persons found inadmissible to Canada were a result of biometric screening.[259] In the minister’s view, carrying out biometrics in Canada would not be advisable as Canada has an obligation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and international law not to return an individual where they may be tortured (i.e., non-refoulement).[260] However, Stephen Peddle suggested that, “We bring them to Canada and put them in a secure place where they're under watch until they're properly vetted. … If they don't check out, we have other mechanisms in place to send them back.”[261] Mr. Peddle also indicated that this would not be the first time Canada has done this, citing the Kosovo refugees as an example.

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

Testimony highlighted a clear need both to help people reach safety and to ensure that they are not languishing in uncertain and precarious situations once they are able to leave Afghanistan. The Special Committee believes that Canada’s response must be nimble, flexible, and innovative. It must involve the arms of Canada’s diplomacy and its immigration and refugee efforts, working in concert. With a system that is fully resourced and with streamlined processes, as will be discussed next, the Special Committee believes that Canada can bring more Afghans to safety, faster, without compromising Canada’s security.

Recommendation 15

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada issues single journey travel documents to Afghan nationals who are eligible for Canada’s special programs, and that it assure third countries that those Afghan nationals will have safe passage to Canada.

Recommendation 16

That the Government of Canada engage with countries that neighbour Afghanistan to ensure that Afghan nationals who are eligible for Canada’s special programs have safe passage.

Recommendation 17

That, in consultation with the Government of Canada’s national security agencies, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada waive biometric and other documentation requirements, in the minimum for Department of National Defence-referred applications and extended family members of former interpreters and collaborators, while simultaneously enhancing access to biometric collection sites in third countries, including those that neighbour Afghanistan.

Recommendation 18

That the Government of Canada instruct Global Affairs Canada to assemble a whole-of-government team, including the Department of National Defence, to help bring Afghans to safety.

Recommendation 19

That the Government of Canada work with allied countries and non-governmental organizations, like Aman Lara, which can operate in Afghanistan, to help confirm identity in Afghanistan and help bring Afghans to safety.

Recommendation 20

That the Government of Canada, through Global Affairs Canada, continue funding organizations like Aman Lara, and that it expand the use of those funds to include temporary accommodations for Afghans.

Systemic Issues

Several witnesses raised concerns about communications issues with IRCC and the department’s apparent lack of resources to manage the significant caseload it has been given. In particular, witnesses expressed frustration regarding the nature and frequency of IRCC’s communication with its clients. Wadood Dilsoz, Director, Afghan Community Vancouver, said that Afghans who need to get to safety have received only “an automated confirmation.” Put another way, they have not received an actual response.[262] Wazma Frogh explained that her parents waited seven months with no information from IRCC regarding the status of their case.[263]

Ghulam Faizi said: “We haven't received any [Unique Client Identifier, UCI] or G numbers after the application arrived at the IRCC office” as of 10 January 2022.[264] The importance of these numbers was explained by Ahmad Shoaib, another former interpreter for the Canadian Armed Forces, who remarked: “If we do not get UCI and G numbers, that means we are not in the system, so we cannot go further than that.”[265] Eleanor Taylor said that 52% of the 10,000 Afghans in Aman Lara’s system had not yet had their applications acknowledged.[266] Mohammed Zarif Mayar, a former interpreter for the CAF who recently arrived in Canada, said that IRCC had still not communicated with interpreters’ families of as of May 2022.[267]

Shajjan & Associates, the Afghan law firm that had been retained by Canada’s embassy in Afghanistan since March 2013, submitted employment confirmation for each of its employees who could be eligible for the SIM program, as well as two letters of recommendation from Canadian officials and the firm’s retainer agreement with the Government of Canada. While Saeeq Shajjan, the firm’s Founder and former Managing Partner, managed to make it to Canada, his colleagues had not received “any response from the Canadian authorities other than autogenerated responses.” A Canadian law firm–Cassels, Brock and Blackwell LLP–became involved on a pro bono basis. However, despite the “hundreds of calls” that were made to the newly established IRCC hotline, the “overwhelming response from these calls was that no information could be found about any of these Target Individuals.” According to Shajjan & Associates, the “IRCC agents working at the hotline could not look up any details of the Target Individuals’ initial referral requests.”[268]

Some witnesses suggested that IRCC has not been sufficiently resourced in Canada and abroad to effectively administer Canada’s special programs for Afghanistan. Alison MacLean told the Special Committee: “We are not able to get families, who have been in flight for seven months in third countries, access to Canadian embassies, because the staff are overwhelmed.”[269] Kaylee Perez, Chair, Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Agreement Holders Association, also suggested IRCC needed more resources to hire staff in light of the department’s existing caseload, which she said is at a historic high.[270]

For Dr. Wendy Cukier, Founder, Lifeline Afghanistan and Professor, Ryerson University, Ted Rogers School of Management, “business process re-engineering is essential.” She commented that, “[d]oing things the way we’ve always done them and throwing money at them is, in my view, not efficient.”[271]

Corey Shelson suggested that the problem lies with the system, software and databases used to process applications. He observed that IRCC personnel, on the front lines, are dealing with incredibly difficult situations where people are contacting them and essentially saying “Save me. I’m going to die.” Many of the people fielding calls and emails in relation to Afghanistan had transferred to IRCC from Service Canada and the Canada Revenue Agency “because they wanted to help.” They were, according to Mr. Shelson, “trying tirelessly, with a completely broken processing system, to process the applications we submitted.”[272]

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

Testimony and briefs suggested that IRCC needs to communicate promptly, more regularly and in a more individualized manner so that applicants are not left in situations of significant uncertainty. The Special Committee also recognizes the magnitude of the task IRCC staff face in responding not only to the situation in Afghanistan, but other crises in the world, and is mindful of comments indicating that they are overwhelmed.

Recommendation 21

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada is promptly acknowledging the receipt of applications, by sending emails containing unique client identifiers for those accepted to the program and rejection emails to those who do not qualify, while also ensuring prompt responses to queries and follow-up requests.

Recommendation 22

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada dedicates more staff and hires new staff to process applications for Canada’s special programs for Afghan nationals.

Issues Specific to the Humanitarian Program

Overall, witnesses raised two main issues about the humanitarian program for vulnerable Afghans. Some witnesses want to see the definition of at-risk individuals or groups broadened. Second, many witnesses urged the Government of Canada to recognize Afghan nationals as prima facie refugees, that is, people who are automatically considered refugees and do not require an individual assessment from the UNHCR.[273]

The Special Committee heard devastating testimony about the persecution of women and vulnerable people in Afghanistan. For example, Alison MacLean spoke about Afghan policewomen being hunted down and executed.[274] However, while the eligibility criteria for Canada’s humanitarian program includes women leaders, it does not include all women facing gender-based persecution.[275] To overcome what they viewed as the unjust exclusion of certain individuals and groups from the humanitarian program, several witnesses suggested different ways in which its definition of “at risk” individuals should be expanded. For instance, Friba Rezayee argued that women athletes should fall within the definition of women leaders.[276] For her part, Dr. Lauren Oates reminded the Special Committee that safe passage was also needed for Afghan colleagues who had worked to deliver programming based on Canada’s feminist international assistance policy.[277] The Canadian Association of University Teachers, the Canadian Labour Congress, and the Canadian Teacher’s Federation in their joint brief recommended that academics, teachers, and trade unionists be eligible for the humanitarian program.[278]

The other, recurrent, issue in the testimony was the requirement for Afghan nationals to have their refugee status determined, individually, by the UNHCR as part of private sponsorship under the humanitarian program. For private sponsors and groups of five, an individual must have a UNHCR refugee determination to be sponsored. That is not the case for sponsorship agreement holders.[279]

The Special Committee heard that the UNHCR had increased its resettlement capacity in Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries in the first quarter of 2022.[280] Nevertheless, witnesses told the Special Committee that problems persist. For instance, Djawid Taheri suggested that, although people applying under the humanitarian program require acceptance and a referral from the UNHCR, “in none of the countries bordering Afghanistan is the UNHCR actually doing that.”[281] Asma Faizi communicated her understanding that, while “the UN is operating in some of these third countries, they have a huge backlog, and they’re not processing, so it’s a huge barrier for a lot of people.”[282]

Several witnesses pointed out that, in 2015, the Government of Canada had designated Syrians as prima facie refugees, which significantly facilitated resettlement efforts.[283] Multiple witnesses called for the UNHCR requirement to be waived in the case of Afghanistan.

In their brief, Journalists for Human Rights proposed a “referral network” approach, which they believe could harness the NGOs and veterans that have been involved in the Afghanistan response and are well-informed about the applicant populations.[284] Aman Lara argued that a “referral mechanism” would “ensure faster, better informed and more precise referral of refugees under the [special humanitarian program] who reflect Canadian priorities.”[285] However, such work and the work of safely identifying pathways out of Afghanistan–as Journalists for Human Rights and Aman Lara have done–requires funding.[286] In the case of Rainbow Railroad, Dr. Kimahli Powell, the organization’s Executive Director, told the Special Committee that many people had assumed they would be a referral organization for LGBTQI+ Afghans.[287] The organization believes that being designated as a direct referral partner would allow it “to pursue targeted responses for the most vulnerable cases of LGBTQI+ persons of Afghanistan, Ukraine and beyond for resettlement.”[288]

More broadly, the Special Committee heard that Sponsorship Agreement Holders are an integral partner in IRCC’s resettlement efforts. Kaylee Perez argued that IRCC should “develop a framework for immigration and refugee responses to emergencies that sets objective criteria.” Doing so, she argued, “would allow all of the actors involved to be well prepared to act quickly, and would help maintain transparency and equity in the strategic use of resettlement.” Ms. Perez also called on IRCC to invest in its infrastructure to ensure it can meet demands when an emergency arises.[289] Wendy Cukier, on the other hand, felt that private sponsors, such as group of five sponsors, are better able to handle spikes and high volumes in refugee resettlement.[290]

While most testimony addressed how to facilitate safe passage for Afghan nationals to Canada, some noted the displacement crisis that has built up in the region over years of conflict and hardship. According to the UNHCR, Iran and Pakistan “have continued to host over 2.2 million registered Afghan refugees and over four million other Afghans for over four decades.”[291] While UNHCR is working to help stabilize the situation in host communities and emphasized the importance of the UN’s regional refugee response plan, Indrika Ratwatte acknowledged that “resettlement will remain a critical protection and solutions tool for individuals with acute protection needs, preserved as a life-saving mechanism for those with heightened vulnerabilities.”[292] Maria Toorpakai Wazir, President and Founder, Maria Toorpakai Foundation believes that “you cannot bring everybody to Canada or to Europe.” She added: “We can help them right there.”[293]

Issues Specific to the Family Reunification Pathway for Former Interpreters

Canada intends to welcome 5,000 Afghan nationals through the family reunification pathway for former interpreters. Katherine Moloney noted that “Afghan families typically live together as multi-generational households,” and explained why she believes it is so important for extended family members to be included as part of Canada’s resettlement efforts:

The Afghan definition of “family” matters because the Taliban target family members. The Taliban hold an entire family responsible for the actions of one family member and operate under a revenge model, which requires the life of a family member in place of a person who has evaded capture. Thus, whole families face deferred risk for the actions of one family member, including a Canadian-based family member.[294]

The Special Committee heard from several former interpreters who have been meeting regularly with IRCC on the specific pathway that was established for their family members. Each highlighted a different aspect of the challenges they have faced, ranging from the terror of their families being in hiding and on the run from the Taliban to the frustration of IRCC requesting additional forms to be completed. They have all had numerous meetings with IRCC, but there has been little discernible progress.[295]

Ghulam Faizi described what his family members are facing as follows:

This is what our families are going through in Afghanistan. For example, the Taliban raided the house of one of our former interpreters. His brother burned all the documents, and he was only able to send one of his brothers to Pakistan. He tells me he cannot afford all of his family members travelling to Pakistan at the same time and arranging for them to live there. His family is still living in Afghanistan, and they do not know what will happen to them tomorrow. They constantly change their location.[296]

Hameed Khan, another former interpreter for the Canadian Armed Forces, told the Special Committee that,

The Taliban have done multiple killings of anyone considered a traitor. This knot is now getting tighter, as they enter and search houses of suspected family members of those who worked with NATO or [International Security Assistance Force] forces. Many have burned the paperwork that connects our families to Canada.[297]

Yet, according to former interpreter Ahmad Shoaib, 65% of the extended family members of Canada’s former interpreters were still waiting to receive UCI and G numbers. Nevertheless, he said, “the IRCC is pushing us to get passports.” As Mr. Shoaib pointed out, doing so would mean disclosing their identity and past activities to the Taliban.[298] Former interpreter Safiullah Mohammad Zahed commented that this effort “was supposed to be an emergency evacuation, but instead it’s being treated as a family sponsorship program in which we have to pay for everything.” After noting that former interpreters have been asked “to file hundreds of forms,” he said: “I think they’re just making excuses.”[299] Minister Fraser explained that forms are sometimes designed to replace an interview when these were not feasible in person.[300]

Ghulam Faizi also wanted to know why resettlement assistance (RAP) or other income programs were available only to Afghan nationals coming to Canada under the SIM and not to those relying on the family reunification pathway. Without such support, the interpreters are worried about how to pay for rent for their extended families.[301]

Retired members of the Canadian Armed Forces who testified to the Special Committee emphasized the invaluable role that Afghan interpreters and cultural advisers had played during Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. According to Major-General (retired) David Fraser, “Afghanistan was one of the most complex missions Canada has ever engaged in. Nowhere were we more dependent on interpreters and cultural advisers than we were in Afghanistan.”[302] After noting that “these individuals worked alongside Canadian Forces personnel, in the same vehicles, wearing the same uniforms,” Oliver Thorne reminded the Special Committee that “in many cases, their local information and knowledge helped save Canadian lives.”[303] Interpreters have been reaching out directly to CAF members. Consequently, Mr. Thorne said that it has been “incredibly detrimental to the mental health of Canada’s veterans to not be able to help them and to see them still waiting to come here when the veterans are getting messages daily talking about how dangerous it is.”[304]

Corey Shelson framed the situation in terms of Canada’s “post-military campaign responsibilities.” He observed: “When Canada deploys troops, we must understand that our mission does not end with their return.”[305]

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

The rationale underpinning the creation of special programs for Afghan nationals must not be forgotten: these individuals worked with Canadians, under dangerous conditions. They came to embody the ideals that Canada and its allies sought to advance in Afghanistan and are now at risk from a regime that fought a bloody insurgency against those same ideals. In this regard, the Special Committee draws attention to Minister Fraser’s statement that,

If we want to bring any 40,000 Afghan refugees who are already in third countries, I don't question that we would be able to deliver on that commitment more quickly. However—and this is an important element of this effort to me—we made a commitment to certain individuals and their families on the basis of their work with Canada. We don’t plan to waver on that commitment, even if it means doing the harder thing, which is to continue to pursue all avenues to get them to Canada, despite the fact that they might still be in Afghanistan.[306]

The Special Committee agrees that Canada cannot waiver on its commitment, no matter the obstacles that must be overcome. As such, it believes that it is incumbent on the Government of Canada to show the utmost adaptability, respect, and urgency in achieving that objective.

Recommendation 23

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada does whatever is necessary to ensure that applications under the special immigration measures (SIM) for Afghan nationals with an enduring connection to Canada are being processed immediately.

Recommendation 24

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada expands the categories of individuals who are deemed vulnerable, such as women fearing gender-based persecution, to ensure that its humanitarian program for Afghan nationals is as inclusive as possible.

Recommendation 25

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada broadens the range of referral partners it is using to resettle Afghan nationals to include trusted non-governmental organizations that are active in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries and that have knowledge of the applicant populations.

Recommendation 26

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada waives the requirement for a UNHCR refugee status determination for Afghan nationals, as it has done in other situations of mass displacement, including Syria, to ensure that Canadian civil society can sponsor vulnerable Afghans in groups of five or in community groups.

Recommendation 27

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada waives the requirement for Afghans to be in a third country to be eligible for the special immigration measures.

Recommendation 28

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada processes immediately the applications submitted for extended family members of Canada’s former Afghan interpreters.

Recommendation 29

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada expands the extended family reunification stream to other Afghans.

Recommendation 30

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada reduces the paperwork required from Afghan nationals with an enduring and significant tie to Canada, and their families, and waives requirements for certain documents that are not possible to obtain from Afghan authorities, such as marriage certificates and birth certificates, only after reviewing the risk of human trafficking of children.

Recommendation 31

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada removes the caps on Sponsorship Agreement Holders for Afghan refugees.

Recommendation 32

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada provides the Resettlement Assistance Program and other year-long income programs for SIM applicants to the extended family reunification stream for former interpreters.

Recommendation 33

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada provides evacuation flights for Afghans in third countries, except for Iran.

Recommendation 34

That the Government of Canada instruct Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to ensure that the family members of former interpreters are provided support for their accommodation in third countries.

Recommendation 35

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada conducts an internal review of its response to refugee crises including processing times, workforce capabilities, and communications with applicants, refugee sponsors, and other organizations such as non-governmental organizations and refugee referral partners. While protecting national security, the review should be shared with relevant departments and agencies including Global Affairs Canada, National Defence, and the Canadian Armed Forces. The main findings should be communicated in writing to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration.

Recommendation 36

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada exercises its authority under section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to create a special immigration measure to urgently resettle at least 300 pre-identified LGBTQI+ Afghan refugees as Government Assisted Refugees and that this be in addition to the quota for the resettlement of 40,000 Afghans.

Existing Immigration Programs Adapted to the Afghan Crisis

Effective 23 August 2021, IRCC issued operational instructions to its officers to support persons affected by the crisis in Afghanistan by offering them “priority processing.”[307] Priority processing applies to:

• Afghan nationals who are immediate family members[308] of a Canadian citizen, a status Indian or a permanent resident who have filed either an application for family reunification or a temporary residence application such as a visitor visa. Complete applications are to be processed first.
• Protected persons in Canada (such as successful refugee claimants) who apply for permanent residence and whose spouse or partner, and any children, currently reside outside of Canada.
• Dependants of resettled refugees currently residing outside of Canada.[309]

The Special Committee did not hear much about these measures. However, the Canadian Bar Association submitted in writing that “there are no indications that the Facilitative Measures have been effective in prioritizing case processing.”[310]

Warda Meighen suggested that IRCC should issue temporary residence visas.[311] Friba Rezayee wants IRCC to issue study permits, especially to students who have full scholarships.[312] Women Leaders of Tomorrow “has helped many Afghan women to obtain full-ride scholarships to Canadian universities, but their study permits and student visas have been denied by the IRCC on the grounds that they are unlikely to return to Afghanistan.”[313] Wendy Cukier also spoke about a post-graduate student in Afghanistan who was denied a study permit because IRCC felt she would not return home after the end of her stay.[314]

For some, discussion of such visas and permits invoked a comparison to the measures that have been offered to the six million Ukrainians who have been forced to flee from the invasion Russia launched against their country on 24 February 2022.[315] IRCC created the Canada-Ukraine authorization for emergency travel (CUAET),[316] which provides Ukrainians temporary resident status for up to three years, and makes them eligible for a free open work permit or study permit.[317] In addition to the 34 locations in the region where Canada already had visa application centres and biometrics kits,[318] IRCC opened new, temporary centres in Warsaw, Poland and Berlin, Germany to allow for greater access to biometrics collection sites.[319]

Wadood Dilsoz told the Special Committee that work permits and study permits should be made available to Afghan nationals just as they have been offered to refugees from Ukraine.[320] More broadly, Wendy Cukier would like to see the Government of Canada do “what it has done in a matter of weeks for Ukrainian refugees.”[321] Djawid Taheri said to the Special Committee:

[W]hen we look at the government and how the government is utilizing simple and expeditious measures to facilitate the resettlement of Ukrainians to Canada, one starts to wonder: Why isn't this possible for Afghan refugees?[322]

Katherine Moloney offered one possible explanation for the differential treatment: “[T]he reason why Canada is not issuing temporary visas for Afghans where they are for Ukrainians is that there is a … fear that Afghans fleeing the Taliban may in fact be Taliban, and while that is not substantiated, I think that’s the fear.”[323]

Minister Fraser framed the department’s response to the two situations in terms of the different circumstances and realities involved. In the case of Ukraine, he said, many people are expected to return when it is safe to do so. Afghan nationals, on the other hand, “need to have a permanent resettlement program.”[324]

The Special Committee’s Observations and Recommendations

The Special Committee is cognizant of the circumstances that have enabled Canada to mount a swift and generous response to the displacement crisis generated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the presence of allied governments on Ukraine’s borders and in other locations nearby. At the same time, it recognizes the concerns about equity that were brought to its attention. The Special Committee believes that all avenues that could help young Afghans contribute to Canadian society and–one day–to the rebuilding of Afghanistan should be explored.

Recommendation 37

That the Government of Canada ensure that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada allows Afghans to access study permits, including individuals who have obtained full scholarships or are continuing their studies, as well as economic mobility pathway pilots and economic immigration streams, without assessing the intention of returning to their country of origin.

Settlement Services

The Special Committee heard that a new framework for collaboration among RAP providers and settlement organizations was created in a matter of days to assist with the resettlement of Afghan nationals to Canada under the special programs. Umashanie Reddy, National Director, Government-Assisted Refugee Resettlement and the National Afghan Refugee Resettlement Programs, Calgary Catholic Immigration Society, told the Special Committee that her organization had eight days to plan for the arrival of their first Afghan refugees. In that time, they put together “a fully fledged strategic governance structure that spoke notably to roles and responsibilities: one that was nationally coordinated and locally implemented, one that was equitable, one that was socially just and one that every single RAP service provider could take part in.”[325] They met weekly and communications with IRCC went well.

Umashanie Reddy also spoke of the 34 resettlement agencies across the country that are supporting the government-assisted refugees who fled Afghanistan. She explained that government-assisted refugees have access to the RAP income support and other services, including needs assessments (education, housing, financial literacy, health, etc.) and language assessments.[326] However, Umashanie Reddy went on to say that because a lot of the people she meets “are very well educated” they can be overqualified for some of the jobs they are offered.[327]

Dr. Kelly Ernst, Vice President, Vulnerable Populations, Centre for Newcomers, pointed to the challenges–or “barriers”–arising from the different support services that are available to Afghans based on how they come to Canada (i.e., their immigration type). Depending on whether somebody is a government-assisted refugee, privately sponsored, or a refugee or asylum claimant, they receive “different types of services based on their status.” In the view of Dr. Ernst, the distinctions between such categories are “very false” and need to be addressed.[328]