Introduction

Animal disease outbreaks can have important consequences for animal and human health, food security, and international trade. The World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) explains that increased volumes of people and goods travelling across borders, as well as shifting animal migratory patterns due in part to climate change, have created new pathways for animal health risks to spread more widely. The ability of governments to anticipate and respond to animal health emergencies is therefore a worldwide concern.

To better understand Canada’s capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to animal biosecurity challenges, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food (the Committee) adopted the following motion on 17 April 2023:

That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee undertake a study regarding the preparedness and safeguards in place from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and industry in the case of biosecurity threats to agriculture such as the avian flu, African swine fever, Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease and other potential threats to food security; that this study include components such as the vaccine bank, veterinary needs, and reciprocity of standards at our borders; that the committee hold a minimum of three meetings to hear witnesses on this study; and that the committee report its findings and recommendations to the House[.]

The Committee held three meetings on this topic between 3 May and 23 October 2023 during which it heard from 16 witnesses. Between 28 September and 16 October 2023, the Committee also received testimony related to biosecurity practices on farms as part of its three-meeting study of Bill C-275, An Act to amend the Health of Animals Act (biosecurity on farms), a private member’s bill that seeks to amend the Health of Animals Act to make it a criminal offence to trespass in an animal enclosure. This report draws on information presented to the Committee during both studies.

Legislative Framework

At the federal level, Canada’s legislative framework for dealing with issues related to animal diseases and biosecurity consists primarily of the Health of Animals Act and its regulations, notably the Reportable Diseases Regulations. Section 5(1) of the Act requires any person in the possession, care, or control of an animal who becomes aware of the presence of a reportable disease in that animal to notify relevant authorities immediately. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) enforces biosecurity-related provisions of the Health of Animals Act and the Safe Food for Canadians Act and their regulations.

The CFIA, in cooperation with its provincial and territorial counterparts, animal health experts, and industry groups, has developed eight sector-specific biosecurity standards. Dr. Mary Jane Ireland, Executive Director Animal Health Directorate, Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, explained that the Agency does not monitor or mandate compliance with these standards; sectoral groups are free to implement them as they see fit to meet their specific risks and needs. Several producer groups have tailored these standards to create mandatory on-farm programs for their sectors. The Canadian Pork Council, for example, has developed the Canadian Pork Excellence platform, which implements the guidelines established in the National Biosecurity Standard for swine. Pork producers must comply with the Platform’s rules – which also include requirements related to traceability and animal welfare – to ship their hogs to federally regulated slaughterhouses, a precondition to export their products.

Some witnesses expressed their opinion that these voluntary guidelines are not an effective method to ensure proper biosecurity practices and called for more stringent regulatory requirements for the livestock sector.^[1] Dr. Toolika Rastogi, Senior Manager, Policy and Research, Humane Canada, expressed her view that the “intensity and scale” of Canadian animal production increase the risk of animals becoming susceptible to and transmitting animal diseases. Dr. Rastogi encouraged the adoption of the “One Health and One Welfare” approach to food production, which emphasizes environmental sustainability and high animal welfare standards.

Others disagreed with this approach, noting that producers already have strong professional and economic incentives to prevent animal diseases from entering or spreading on their farms.^[2] Ms. Tara Terpatra, Vice-Chair of the Board of Directors, Ontario Pork stressed the need for biosecurity requirements and programs to allow for flexibility in compliance to ensure that industry competitiveness is not compromised.

Dr. Jean-Pierre Vaillancourt, Full Professor, Université de Montréal, explained that farm employees and visitors do not always fully comply with biosecurity protocols, such as requirements to wash hands or change clothing, because of human error. Dr. Vaillancourt reported that new technologies, such as sensors that monitor compliance with cleaning procedures, and new training methods, can help to ensure compliance.

Biosecurity Threats to Canadian Agriculture

The Reportable Diseases Regulations currently list 33 reportable animal diseases, each of which affects different species and production types. The following sections highlight diseases witnesses mentioned as posing the greatest threat to their sectors and explain issues related to their early detection, prevention, and response.

African Swine Fever

African Swine Fever (ASF) is a highly contagious viral disease that affects wild and domestic pigs but does not pose a threat to human health. ASF can be easily transmitted through pigs interacting with infected pigs, consuming infected meat and other pig by-products, or contacting contaminated clothing or equipment brought between farms. While health authorities have not documented any ASF cases in North America, the disease has made incursions in several regions – including the Caribbean – and has led to outbreaks that have wiped out large swine herds.^[3]

Witnesses, particularly those representing the pork sector, expressed concern over the prospect of ASF entering Canada. As Mr. John de Bruyn, Chair of the Board of Directors, Ontario Pork, explained, a reported case of ASF would lead to a immediate suspension of all Canadian international trade in live pigs and pork products. Such a response, Mr. de Bruyn cautioned, would have considerable consequences for Canada’s pork industry, which exports as much as two-thirds of its domestic production, making it inherently vulnerable to such shocks.

Witnesses from the federal government testified that their agencies and departments have made considerable investments to help the pork sector and provincial governments address the ASF threat. Mr. Tom Rosser, Assistant Deputy Minister, Market and Industry Services Branch, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food, explained that his department has created an African Swine Fever Executive Management Board under the aegis of Animal Health Canada to help coordinate industry and government prevention and response plans. Dr. Ireland mentioned that the federal government has provided funding to increase Canadian laboratory capacity and to support the pork industry’s efforts to develop prevention and emergency response strategies.

Pork sector representatives explained that one way it is implementing these prevention and response plans is PigTRACE, a digital tool that collects detailed and timely data on animal movements to allow for a rapid response to a disease outbreak.^[4] Beyond these measures, witnesses also urged the federal government to maintain its vigilance at points of entry, where travellers and importers may bring in inadmissible or undeclared food or animal items that could carry ASF or pose other biosecurity risks.^[5]

Mr. René Roy, Chair, Canadian Pork Council, stressed the important role the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) plays to secure the country against unauthorized entries of inadmissible goods that may pose a biosecurity threat. Mr. Roy encouraged the CBSA to increase its use of detection dogs trained to identify meat products that may carry ASF. Mr. Shawn Hoag, Director General, Commercial Program, Canada Border Services Agency, agreed that detector dogs are one of the CBSA’s best tools for detecting inadmissible or undeclared food, plant, and animal items. Mr. Hoag explained that the Agency had a five-year plan, beginning in 2019, to acquire and train 24 new detector dogs at points of entry and that a growing number of them have been deployed in recent years.[6]

Further underlining the importance of border control, Mr. Matt Bowman, Co‑Chair Animal Health and Care Committee, Canadian Cattle Association, encouraged the federal government to adopt a “zero tolerance” approach to undeclared items and to increase its monetary penalties for travellers who import inadmissible products or otherwise jeopardize animal biosecurity.

Witnesses also raised concerns relating to wild pigs, an invasive species primarily found in the Prairie provinces. Mr. Roy explained that wild pig populations can become animal disease vectors that transmit diseases to pigs on farms. He further noted that the issue is a difficult one to tackle as it requires action from several overlapping jurisdictions, including provincial governments, Parks Canada, and Indigenous communities. He called on the federal government to take a leadership role on this issue and provide these entities with a framework to collectively control the wild pig population.

Avian Influenza

Avian influenza is a highly contagious viral disease that primarily affects domestic and wild birds. Strains of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) can spread rapidly through bird flocks, causing severe illness and high mortality rates. Birds are infected either through interaction with infected poultry or waterfowl or contact with infected surfaces.^[7]

In December 2021, Canada experienced its first documented outbreak of the H5N1 strain of HPAI, which has devastated bird populations worldwide. The virus has subsequently been detected in each province and territory. As of 28 September 2023, the CFIA has documented 336 infected premises affecting an estimated 7.7 million birds.[8]

Dr. Ireland noted that the likely transmission route of HPAI is the direct exposure of farmed birds to migrating wild birds. She further explained that this type of unpredictable transmission requires poultry producers to develop and enforce enhanced biosecurity measures on farms to decrease the possible exposure of birds to external pathogens. She also underlined the importance of producers and public health authorities rapidly detecting, reporting, and responding to HPAI outbreaks. When the CFIA confirms a case of HPAI on a farm or other premises, Dr. Ireland explained that the Agency aims to take rapid action to quarantine the infected location and euthanize Infected flocks, as well as flocks in the vicinity of the premises that may have been in contact with infected birds.

Witnesses underlined that HPAI outbreaks place considerable strain on producers, who have sometimes faced delays in receiving government assistance. Several witnesses raised the outbreak that occurred in British Columbia’s Fraser Valley region in autumn 2022 in which HPAI spread widely and rapidly throughout the area, which has a large agricultural population, placing considerable demand on provincial and CFIA resources.

Mr. Philippe Morel, Vice-President, Operations, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, testified that, at certain points, up to 10% of the CFIA’s nationwide resources were devoted to responding to HPAI cases in British Columbia and that it had to triage its response based on the severity of a farm’s outbreak and the overall health status of the flock. Mr. Morel reported that at least “two or three” operations had to wait up to 10 days for their infected flocks to be euthanized, which he acknowledged is “not ideal.”

Some farmers also called for alternatives to the CFIA’s current euthanasia methods. Ms. Cammy Lockwood, Co-Owner and Operator, Lockwood Farms, noted that mobile shock trucks can be an effective alternative, particularly when supplies of carbon dioxide, the chemical compound typically deployed to euthanize poultry, are low. Ms. Lockwood also encouraged CFIA officials, particularly case managers responding to reportable diseases, to adopt better relationships with farmers to allow for more effective communication of biosecurity practices and emergency response protocols.

Witnesses also noted that, while the CFIA covers costs related to euthanizing animals with reportable diseases and compensates farmers based on the market value of those animals, the Agency does not cover costs related to the cleaning and disinfection of barns and other farm facilities following an outbreak. These witnesses recommended the Agency cover these costs to help farmers return to normal operation as soon as possible.^[9]

Ms. Lockwood noted that part of the reason HPAI was able to spread so widely in the Fraser Valley is that many households have backyard chicken flocks for personal use located close to poultry farms. Dr. Vaillancourt explained that backyard flocks are unlikely to infect large commercial flocks with HPAI unless there is an epidemiological link between them, such as individual working with an infected backyard flock and then immediately working on a commercial farm. He nevertheless suggested that backyard flock owners register their flocks with local authorities to allow for improved monitoring. He also called for greater planning and regulation of barn types and distances between farms to help prevent the rapid spread of animal diseases between operations.

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”) is a fatal disease that affects the central nervous system of cattle. BSE is believed to spread through infected cattle tissue (sometimes referred to as Specified Risk Material or SRM) that contains prions, the abnormal proteins that cause BSE. The spread of BSE through Western Europe and North America in the late 1990s and early 2000s had significant consequences for the global cattle industry. Following decades of strict import controls and biosecurity protocols, the WOAH reports that the disease’s global prevalence is negligible and approaching zero.^[10]

Since 1997, Canada has enforced an Enhanced Feed Ban that prohibits manufacturers from using SRM in animal feed, pet food, and fertilizers to prevent the spread of BSE on farms. In May 2003, Canada identified its first BSE case in a cow imported from the United Kingdom, resulting in many countries closing their borders to Canadian beef and live cattle imports. In response, Canada adopted new regulations for the handling of cattle and the removal and disposal of SRM in slaughterhouses.

Between 2007 and 2021, WOAH classified Canada as being a “controlled” risk country for BSE. While Canada demonstrated compliance with the WOAH’s standards for controlling BSE, the detection of BSE in another cow in 2015 impeded its efforts to regain full international market access.^[11] In 2021, WOAH granted Canada “negligible” risk status, the lowest risk status available.^[12] Despite this change, however, some in the cattle sector note that Canada’s BSE-era SRM regulations remain in effect, limiting the value they can obtain from a head of cattle compared to their international counterparts, notably ranchers in the United States.

Dr. Ireland explained that Canada’s negligible risk status is contingent on it enforcing its current BSE program, including the enhanced feed ban and the SRM regulations. If it wishes to change these regulations it would have to consult with the WOAH to ensure the country remains at low risk for a BSE outbreak. Mr. Bowman stated that, in his opinion, the Canadian cattle sector will never return to where it was before the emergence of BSE but is in a better position to deal with any future outbreak. He added that the Canadian cattle sector is seeking opportunities to better harmonize its approach to SRM with the United States and other large trading partners.

Foot-and-Mouth Disease

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease that causes blister-like sores in the mouths and hooves of cattle, swine, and other cloven-hoofed ruminants. While many affected animals recover, the disease can cause permanent damage, leaving them weakened and debilitated. Outbreaks can result in severe production losses and blocked access to export markets; the federal government estimates that an outbreak of FMD in Canada would cost the national economy anywhere between $19.4 and $65.2 billion.^[13]

While WOAH recognizes Canada as FMD-free, it cautions that the disease can occur sporadically in a typically free area.^[14] FMD is present in animal secretions, contaminated surfaces, clothing and equipment, and infected aerosols. To prevent the disease from entering Canada, the federal government maintains strict controls prohibiting imports of animals and animal products from countries and zones not recognized as free of FMD.

Unique among the diseases in this study, a vaccine is available for FMD. Dr. Ireland explained that, in the event of a large FMD outbreak, rapidly vaccinating infected animals would allow Canadian livestock operations to return to normal more quickly. Since 1982, Canada has participated in the North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB), which it maintains jointly with Mexico and the United States.  In its 2023 budget, the federal government announced $57.5 million over five years and $5.6 million ongoing for the CFIA to establish a Canadian FMD vaccine bank to complement its participation in the NAFMDVB.

Vaccines and other animal health products are important tools for securing Canada’s animal population against disease incursions. Some witnesses expressed concern, however, that Canada’s regulatory process for developing and registering animal health products is too expensive and cumbersome, leading pharmaceutical manufacturers to register their products in larger markets with speedier processes instead.^[15] Mr. Yvan Fréchette encouraged Canadian authorities to grant animal vaccines approved in peer countries, such as the European Union and the United States, expedited approval to ensure livestock producers have access to the latest developments in animal health products.

Witnesses from the beef and pork production sectors welcomed the announcement of a Canadian FMD vaccine bank but stressed that vaccines were designed to respond to, rather than prevent, an FMD incursion. They stressed the need to develop and implement biosecurity plans for FMD, including surveillance and early detection, and greater animal traceability to track movements and limit outbreaks.^[16]

In 2023, the CFIA held a public consultation on its proposed amendments to Part XV of the Health of Animals Regulations which would expand the species of animals subject to these requirements and mandate more timely and detailed electronic reports on animal movements and locations. In her testimony to the committee, Dr. Leigh Rosengren, Chief Veterinary Officer, Canadian Cattle Association, explained that while the Canadian beef industry was broadly supportive of increased animal traceability, it had concerns over the feasibility of implementing the proposed regulations and the overall cost benefit to producers.

Veterinarian Shortage

Witnesses expressed concern over a shortage of qualified Canadian veterinarians, who Dr. Trevor Lawson, President-Elect, Canadian Veterinary Medical Association, noted play “an integral role” in helping livestock producers in all sectors and regions detect and manage animal diseases. While the number of companion and food animals in Canada has grown considerably in recent decades, the number of Canadian veterinary school graduates has not risen accordingly. Some veterinarians have left the profession in recent years, Dr. Lawson reports, because of increasingly large workloads and subsequent burnout.

Dr. Lawson acknowledged that provincial governments had a role to play in expanding the number of spaces in Canadian veterinary schools, but also called on the federal government to increase immigration pathways for overseas veterinarians. Dr. Ireland also reported that veterinarian shortages exist in both private practice and in public health units and that the federal government would continue to monitor the issue.

Conclusion

Over the course of this study the Committee heard from primary producers and others involved in the Canadian livestock chain on the biosecurity challenges confronting their sector and their readiness to face animal disease outbreaks. While they described extensive efforts undertaken at the farm and industry-wide levels to prepare for such outbreaks, they nonetheless encouraged continued vigilance from the federal government in this area. The Committee also heard from representatives of veterinarians and animal vaccine developers who outlined difficulties their sectors face in helping producers and others ensure they can care for their animals effectively. The federal government has significant roles to play in helping to address the nationwide shortage of veterinarians, notably by helping new Canadians with foreign credentials enter practice quickly. The federal government should also ensure veterinarians have a full arsenal of vaccines and other health products available to treat animal disease outbreaks, notably by making the regulatory approval process for these products more efficient.

Observations and Recommendations

The House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food recommends that the Government of Canada, in accordance with provincial and territorial jurisdiction:

Recommendation 1

Improve Canadian biosecurity preparedness by:

• working closely with international partners to share best practices and coordinate efforts in enhancing biosecurity measures, especially considering the ease with which diseases can cross borders in a globalized world;
• increasing funding for the development and implementation of innovative biosecurity technologies and practices, such as sensor technologies, automated disinfection systems, and improved animal traceability systems; and
• conducting annual reviews of biosecurity protocols in collaboration with industry stakeholders to ensure that the measures are up-to-date and effective.

Recommendation 2

Develop a national awareness campaign on the importance of biosecurity measures and high animal welfare standards in preventing the spread of animal diseases. This campaign should target both industry stakeholders and the general public.

Recommendation 3

Improve Canada’s ability to protect animal health and respond to animal disease outbreaks by:

• engaging in public-private partnerships to develop new vaccines, treatments for animal diseases, and best management practices for the health of live animals;
• encouraging the standardization and harmonization of requirements for animal medications with trusted jurisdictions to ensure long-term accessibility to these products, and;
• developing and maintaining vaccine banks, as the government has proposed to do for Foot and Mouth Disease in Budget 2023, to allow for a rapid response in the event of an outbreak.

Recommendation 4

Prioritize signing protocol agreements with its trading partners for diseases such as African Swine Fever.

Recommendation 5

Review the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s compensation policy, when the destruction of animals is ordered, to include all cleaning and disinfection costs.

Recommendation 6

Ensure Canadian border and inspection services:

• have the necessary resources to verify compliance with import requirements that address biosecurity threats to Canadian livestock – including adequate training in agricultural and agri-food matters –  while facilitating international trade by keeping Canadian border crossings and points of entry operating efficiently and safely;
• enforce penalties to encourage compliance with the Health of Animals Act’s requirements for imports of food and animal goods and consider increasing penalties for offenders; and
• enforce the reciprocity of standards between countries.

Recommendation 7

Review its regulatory requirements for the disposal of Specified Risk Material to allow Canadian beef producers to compete more effectively in international markets and to increase regional beef slaughtering capacity, while ensuring that any changes it makes neither jeopardize biosecurity nor compromise Canada’s negligible risk status for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.