Introduction

Between 3 February 2022 and 3 March 2022, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (the Committee) undertook a “comprehensive review of nuclear waste governance in Canada and its impacts on the environment, including the issues raised by the import of these wastes and the trade in medical technologies.”^[1]

There are environmental, economic and social benefits to society from nuclear power and medical isotopes, but the waste generated requires robust control and management. This report does not focus on the merits of nuclear technology but rather on the governance of radioactive waste in Canada.

The report first provides general background about radioactive waste in Canada, including waste classifications, locations and quantities. It then explains the governance structure for radioactive waste, including the entities with decision-making and management responsibilities for Canada’s radioactive waste, and addresses the importance of independent and transparent review. The report lays out the need for long-term storage solutions and discusses the proposed near surface disposal facility at Chalk River for low-level radioactive waste and the proposed deep geological repository for high-level radioactive waste. An overview of the safety record of the Canadian nuclear industry is provided, along with a debate on the risks and benefits of transforming existing radioactive waste, such as through reprocessing. After comparing Canadian radioactive waste governance to international standards and discussing the importance of Indigenous consultation and community engagement when siting radioactive waste repositories, the report presents the need for improved public engagement on radioactive waste matters.

The Committee met with federal officials who regulate radioactive waste, Indigenous leaders, concerned citizen groups, those who manage Canada’s historic radioactive waste, representatives from the nuclear industry, and academics, among others. The Committee thanks the 28 witnesses who provided testimony as well as the groups and individuals who sent in briefs^[2] on the topic.

What is Radioactive Waste?

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) defines radioactive waste as “any material (liquid, gaseous or solid) that contains a radioactive nuclear substance for which no further use is foreseen.”^[3] It may also contain hazardous substances that are not radioactive. If not managed safely, radioactive waste poses a danger to human health and the environment.

Exposure to the ionizing radiation emitted by radioactive waste can cause harmful effects. The severity of the effect is dependent on the radiation dose and dose rate experienced (i.e., cumulative over many years or acute). High radiation doses kill cells and may result in death. Examples of high radiation doses are those experienced by the workers and firefighters who responded to the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant accident: 800 to 16,000 millisieverts (mSv).^[4] Lower radiation doses may damage DNA and increase the risk of cancer later in life. According to the CNSC:

Studies have shown that radiation will increase the frequency of some cancers that already occur naturally and that this increase is proportionate to the radiation dose—i.e., the greater the dose, the greater the risk of cancer. However, studies to date have not been able to show any excess cancers or other diseases in people chronically exposed to radiation at doses lower than about 100 mSv.^[5]

If isotopes from radioactive waste get into groundwater or rivers, they may enter food chains. While such indirect exposure, if it occurred, would produce a much smaller dose than a direct exposure, a much larger population could be exposed.^[6]

The CNSC recognizes four classes of radioactive waste:

• 1)      uranium mine and mill waste;^[7]
• 2)      low-level radioactive waste (LLW);
• 3)      intermediate-level radioactive waste (ILW); and
• 4)      high-level radioactive waste (HLW).^[8]

A CSA (Canadian Standards Association) Standard for radioactive waste, compiled by government and industry stakeholders, came into force in March 2019.^[9] Figure 1 provides a summary of the source, description, interim storage, monitoring and respective radioactive lifetimes for the four categories of radioactive waste^[10] in Canada.

Figure 1: Source, Description, Storage, Monitoring and Radioactive Lifetimes for the Four Categories of Radioactive Waste in Canada

Source:  Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, What is Radioactive Waste?

Radioactive waste becomes less radioactive over time. HLW remains radioactive for many thousands of years. ILW and LLW are radioactive for shorter periods of time. For example, Jason Van Wart, Vice-President of Nuclear Sustainability Services at Ontario Power Generation (OPG), described preliminary readings on the reduction in radioactivity observed in LLW from the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station: “On average, it's approximately 10% of the radioactivity that was originally there when we stored the waste. Over the period of 30 to 40 years, the waste has significantly decayed in terms of radioactivity.”^[11] However, one witness mentioned that accurately measuring some types of radioactivity is a challenge.^[12]

Radioactive Waste in Canada

Radioactive waste in Canada is generated by activities including:

• the nuclear fuel cycle, which includes uranium mining, nuclear fuel fabrication, the operation of nuclear power generating stations, and the eventual decommissioning of nuclear facilities; and
• the generation and use of radioactive isotopes in medical procedures.^[13]

Waste from Nuclear Power Generation

Canadian-developed CANDU (or Canada Deuterium Uranium) reactors use the heat created by nuclear fission to create electricity: The nuclear fuel creates heat as its atoms split. This heat converts water into steam. The steam turns a turbine that spins a magnet, which makes electricity flow to the power grid. The spent nuclear fuel is HLW, as described in Figure 1. CANDU reactors are currently active in Ontario and New Brunswick.^[14]

In 2019, nuclear power plants generated approximately 15% of the electricity produced across Canada. Nuclear power represented approximately 58% of the electricity generated in Ontario and 38% of the electricity generated in New Brunswick.^[15] Jason Van Wart credited the reliability of nuclear power in Ontario with making it possible for that province to stop coal-fired electricity generation—and the associated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—in 2014.^[16]

John Gorman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Nuclear Association, pointed out that for Canada to meet its GHG emissions reduction targets, “all the tools at our disposal, all non-emitting and clean energy technologies, including nuclear, are needed to play a role in dramatically reducing emissions.”^[17] Some witnesses felt that nuclear power is needed in order for Canada to reach its net-zero targets and meet the increased energy demand created by electrification^[18] but not all agreed.[19]

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are a developing technology which could be used to supply power to small electrical grids or rural and remote areas. SMRs are usually smaller than traditional nuclear power plants^[20] and can be used in heavy industry and mining operations for electricity, heat, and to produce hydrogen.^[21] Some witnesses believed SMRs are a way to move forward towards net-zero goals despite the fact that the technology is not yet fully developed.^[22] The term SMR encompasses a variety of reactor designs that produce “radioactive wastes that vary in characteristics such as chemical composition, physical form and uranium enrichment.”^[23]

Medical Isotope Production and Waste

Medical isotopes play a critically important role in medical diagnosis and cancer treatment, as well as to sterilize medical equipment and personal protective equipment.^[24] Jason Van Wart stated, “medical isotopes produced in nuclear power plants are helping to save millions of lives every year.”^[25] For example, cobalt‑60, used for sterilization and radiation therapy, has been produced at the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station for 50 years.^[26] Molybdenum‑99, a precursor to an isotope used in diagnostic imaging, was produced at Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) and will soon be produced at the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station.^[27] James Scongack, Chief Development Officer and Executive Vice President of Operations at Bruce Power felt that Canada could become a world leader in producing medical isotopes such as cobalt‑60.^[28] Gilles Provost, retired journalist and spokesperson for Ralliement contre la pollution radioactive, explained that, after Canada’s exports of cobalt‑60 are used in other countries, Canada repatriates the waste.^[29] Gilles Provost felt that each country should manage its cobalt‑60 waste itself rather than having Canada bear that burden.^[30]

Volume and Location of Radioactive Waste in Canada

Canada’s latest inventory of its radioactive waste was conducted in 2019 and published in 2021. Table 1 presents the inventory of radioactive waste in Canada as of 2019. HLW accounts for approximately 95% of the radioactivity of all radioactive waste but accounts for less than 1% of the volume of radioactive waste. Almost all the radioactive waste in Canada by volume is LLW.

Table 1: Inventory of Radioactive Waste in Canada in 2019

Waste Category	Waste Inventory at the End of 2019	Waste Inventory Projected to 2022	Waste Inventory Projected to 2050	Waste Inventory Projected to 2100
Waste from uranium mines and mills	385,000,000 tonnes	No projectiona	No projectiona	No projectiona
Low-level radioactive waste	2,524,670 m3 (1,010 Olympic-sized pools)b	2,616,087 m3	3,082,690 m3	3,410,478 m3
Intermediate- level radioactive waste	15,681 m3 (6 Olympic-sized pools)b	18,361 m3	30,087 m3	32,324 m3
High-level radioactive waste	12,718 m3 (5 Olympic-sized pools)b	13,577 m3	21,012 m3	22,853 m3

Notes:    a. No projection is available for uranium mine and mill waste, as inventory depends on production levels, which are affected by market price fluctuations for uranium.

b. An Olympic-sized swimming pool is the equivalent of 2,500 m³.

Source: Prepared by the Committee using data obtained from Natural Resources Canada, Inventory of Radioactive Waste in Canada 2019, 2021, p. 13.

All LLW, ILW and HLW in Canada is currently stored in interim storage.^[31] This interim storage is licensed, temporary storage to be used until final disposal facilities become available. LLW is stored above ground in bins and bags. ILW is stored in shielded above-ground or in-ground storage silos. HLW is stored in pools for seven to ten years before being transferred to dry storage in concrete canisters or silos.^[32] Figure 2 shows the location of these storage facilities in Canada.

Figure 2: Temporary Storage Locations for Low-level Radioactive Waste, Intermediate-level Radioactive Waste and High-level Radioactive Waste in Canada

Note:      “Low-level waste from past practices” refers to historic low-level waste (LLW) which originated from past handling, transportation and use of uranium ore. It is mainly in the form of soil contaminated with uranium and radium. Between the 1930s and 1960s, uranium ore was mined at Port Radium in the Northwest Territories and shipped to be refined at a facility in Port Hope, Ontario. The majority (>98%) of the historic LLW in Canada is in the Port Hope area. Other sites in the greater Toronto area have small amounts of historic LLW from radium dial painting operations in the 1930s. The federal government has accepted responsibility for historic waste, whereas LLW resulting from ongoing operations are the responsibility of the waste owners and producers. (See: Natural Resources Canada, Inventory of Radioactive Waste in Canada 2019, 2021, pp. 30-31; and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Historic nuclear waste.)

Source: Map prepared by the Library of Parliament, Ottawa, 2022, using data from Natural Resources Canada, Inventory of Radioactive Waste in Canada 2019, 2021; the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Radioactive waste, January 2022 and Uranium mines and mills waste, November 2021; and Natural Resources Canada, Administrative Boundaries in Canada—CanVec Series—Administrative Features, 2019. The following software was used: Esri, ArcGIS Pro, version 2.9.2. Contains information licensed under Open Government Licence—Canada.

Many witnesses believed that the current storage is safe for the time being, but is not a permanent solution.^[33] As explained by Jason Van Wart, while interim storage “is safe in the short and medium term, it's not a plan for the long term. Interim storage cannot be maintained in perpetuity for thousands of years. Buildings and packages [storing radioactive waste] degrade over time and need to be continually maintained. What is needed is permanent disposal.”^[34] The CNSC defines “disposal” as “the placement of radioactive waste without the intention of retrieval.”^[35]

The CNSC and Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) report that Canada’s interim storage facilities “are safe, secure and environmentally sound” and “are continually monitored by the licensees and the CNSC to ensure fitness for service.”^[36] However, they add that “Canada recognizes that enhanced, long-term management approaches will be required for all its spent fuel and radioactive wastes.”^[37]

Governance Structure for Radioactive Waste in Canada

The federal government holds primary responsibility for the nuclear sector in Canada. It is responsible for the regulation of nuclear energy and materials, including radioactive waste, and for policy, research and development.^[39] Because provinces have jurisdiction over their electricity needs, the decision to pursue nuclear energy—and generate the resultant radioactive waste—rests with the provinces.^[40] In February 2020, the Government of Canada announced it would review and modernize Canada’s Radioactive Waste Policy Framework, which has been in place since 1996. A new draft policy is being developed and is expected to be completed by the end of 2022.

Two federal statutes govern most issues related to radioactive waste management in Canada. First, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and its regulations form the regulatory framework for nuclear energy in Canada. Under the Act, the CNSC is the independent federal agency responsible for regulating, licensing and overseeing nuclear activities and facilities in Canada; it regulates all steps in the management of radioactive waste.^[41]

Second, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act provides the federal government with a framework for making decisions on the management of nuclear fuel waste in Canada. The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) was created under the Act in 2002 to develop and implement a long-term management plan for nuclear fuel waste, which is HLW.^[42]

Other federal statutes relevant to management of radioactive waste include:

• the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act;
• the Impact Assessment Act;
• the Canadian Environmental Protection Act; and
• the Fisheries Act.

NRCan is the department responsible for federal radioactive waste policy matters. Other main entities involved in the governance of radioactive waste management are described below.

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

The CNSC is an “independent, quasi-judicial tribunal with the authority to regulate all nuclear facilities and activities in Canada, including radioactive wastes.”^[43] The CNSC’s decisions are to be “based on the best available science and an understanding of the risks involved” and can only be reviewed by a federal court.^[44] The CNSC does not report to a minister but rather reports to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources.^[45]

Under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA 2012), the CNSC was responsible for the environmental assessment of proposed radioactive waste storage projects that, if approved, it would subsequently regulate. The Impact Assessment Act (IAA), which came into force in 2019, provides separation between the entity that decides if a proposed radioactive waste storage project can proceed from the impact assessment phase to the regulatory phase (the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada [IAAC]), and the regulator that licenses the project (the CNSC). Projects whose reviews had already started under CEAA 2012 may continue under that Act.

Nuclear Waste Management Organization

The NWMO is a not-for-profit organization fully funded by Canada’s nuclear electricity producers—Hydro-Québec, New Brunswick Power Corporation, and OPG.^[46] The NWMO is responsible for the long-term management of used nuclear fuel, which is generally considered HLW. The NWMO recently reaffirmed its commitment to manage only nuclear fuel waste generated in Canada, and to “not import, manage or store used nuclear fuel from other countries”.^[47] Gordon Edwards, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, pointed out that the NWMO’s commitment has no basis in law.^[48] Some witnesses believed a law or regulation banning the importation of nuclear fuel waste would be necessary.^[49]

Impact Assessment Agency of Canada

The IAAC administers the IAA and is accountable to the Minister of Environment and Climate Change. An impact assessment under the IAA may be required for projects that manage or generate radioactive waste. An impact assessment should help “project proponents, the public, Indigenous groups and decision-makers understand the possible impacts of proposed projects before they are allowed to proceed. Assessments identify ways to avoid or reduce a project's potential negative impacts while increasing the potential positive effects.”^[50] Since the IAA came into force in 2019, no projects managing or generating radioactive waste have been subject to an impact assessment.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) was established in 1951 as a federal Crown corporation with a mandate including “driving nuclear innovation for Canada and cleaning up federal nuclear legacy waste.”^[51] AECL is responsible for managing the Government of Canada’s radioactive waste and decommissioning liabilities. This includes legacy liabilities that are a result of past activities at AECL’s sites for nuclear science and technology, and historic waste liabilities for LLW for which the Government of Canada has accepted responsibility.^[52] AECL fulfils its mandate through a government-owned contractor-operated (GoCo) model with Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL). Under the GoCo model, AECL “owns the sites, facilities, assets, intellectual property and responsibility for environmental remediation and radioactive waste management. CNL is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the sites.”^[53] As part of government restructuring, the assets of AECL’s CANDU Reactor Division were sold in 2011 to Candu Energy Inc., a division of SNC‑Lavalin. CNL was launched in 2014, and in 2015, all its shares were transferred to a private-sector consortium, Canadian National Energy Alliance (CNEA), which now operates it. The consortium is made up of the companies SNC-Lavalin, Fluor and Jacobs.

Joseph McBrearty, President and Chief Executive Officer of CNL, believed the GoCo model was a beneficial one because it

offers one of the best potential contracting mechanisms that Canada can employ. There is not very much decommissioning in nuclear waste management experience that exists in Canada today. The vast majority of that experience exists in the United States and the United Kingdom. The ability to bring in high-quality engineering firms, to actually bring that talent to Canada and have it rapidly and expeditiously available, is a significant benefit and allows Canada to be at the same level as the other major nuclear tier-one nations.^[54]

Figure 3 shows the organizations responsible for the long-term management of radioactive waste in Canada.

Figure 3: Organizations Responsible for the Long-Term Management of Four Types of Radioactive Waste in Canada

Note:      Acronyms used in the figure are: NWMO—Nuclear Waste Management Organization; OPG—Ontario Power Generation; HQ—Hydro Québec; AECL—Atomic Energy of Canada Limited; and CNL—Canadian Nuclear Laboratories.

Source: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Radioactive waste.

Independence and Oversight of Radioactive Waste Governance in Canada

There was much discussion among witnesses as to whether the existing governance reporting structure provided enough oversight and independence and avoided conflicts of interest—or the appearance of them. Dr. Gordon Edwards believed that “the people who speak most highly of the CNSC are the people they're supposed to be regulating” and stated:

I think it would be useful if the CNSC—the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission—reported directly to Parliament on a regular basis. Parliament could summon people who have dealt with the commission and have been unhappy with their findings so that some light can be shone on this matter.^[55]

As illustrated in Figure 4, CNSC and AECL do not report to the Minister of Natural Resources but rather to Parliament, through the Minister. Because only ministers of the Crown or parliamentary secretaries acting on their behalf can table documents in the House of Commons,^[56] the Minister of Natural Resources tables documents (such as annual reports) on behalf of CNSC and AECL in Parliament.

Figure 4: Canada’s Current Governance Reporting Structure for Nuclear Energy and Radioactive Waste, as Depicted by the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note:      The dashed line indicates that CNSC and AECL report to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources to Parliament, as opposed to reporting to the Minister. The solid line indicates that Natural Resources Canada reports to the Minister.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, Country Nuclear Power Profiles, “Canada”, 2018.

Some witnesses stated that the CNSC and AECL both reporting through the Minister of Natural Resources on matters of radioactive waste could create a real or perceived conflict of interest since the Minister of Natural Resources is also responsible for promoting and regulating the nuclear industry. These witnesses generally suggested that the Minister of Environment and Climate Change Canada would be a more appropriate Minister to handle matters of radioactive waste management while the Minister of Natural Resources could retain the responsibility for the nuclear industry.^[57]

In its brief, the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) suggested that the agencies and departments that promote the development and use of nuclear power (AECL and NRCan) should report to and through a separate minister of the Crown from the one to which the nuclear safety regulator (the CNSC) reports.^[58] It argued this would bring Canada into alignment with guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In fact, as specified by CELA, having the CNSC and the AECL report to the same Minister contravenes the IAEA’s Convention on Nuclear Safety, which states that “Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.”^[59] CELA quoted from the response from then-Minister of Natural Resources Seamus O’Regan to a petition filed through the Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development on the matter, which stated that the Governor in Council has authority to designate a minister other than the Minister of Natural Resources for the purposes of the Nuclear Safety Control Act, thereby changing who is responsible to Parliament for the CNSC.^[60] In his response, then-Minister O’Regan noted that a corresponding change would be needed under the Financial Administration Act and that this decision would be made by the Prime Minister of Canada as per the Privy Council Office’s guide for Ministers, Open and Accountable Government.^[61]

In a brief, Barry Stemshorn, Honorary Senior Fellow at the University of Ottawa and former Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for administration of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, concurred with the CELA brief that the CNSC and AECL should report to separate ministers in order to provide more separation between CNSC and the promoters of the nuclear industry. He recommended that a parliamentary review or an audit, possibly by the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, be conducted to ensure that CNSC’s legislative framework aligns with the IAEA. Mr. Stemshorn presented the opinion that the CNSC should not be independent from government but that “elected representatives should have the final word on decisions that require value-laden choices, often between economic benefits on the one hand and risks to environmental and/or public health on the other.”^[62] He believed the CNSC’s decisions should be “ratified by elected members of cabinet who are accountable to Canadians” as opposed to its current quasi-judicial state.^[63]

Rumina Velshi, President and Chief Executive Officer of the CNSC, addressed the concern raised about the optics of having the regulator (the CNSC) reporting to NRCan. She noted that the reporting structure is strictly to allow for the tabling of the CNSC’s reports in Parliament and that there was “no political interference in our decision-making.”^[64] She noted that whichever minister CNSC reports through is a decision for the Governor in Council and that she couldn’t “see it making any difference in how we carry out our mandate”.^[65] Although Thomas Isaacs, private consultant, did not wish to advise on the parliamentary reporting structure, he offered the opinion, shared by other witnesses, that radioactive waste management should have independent oversight which is monitored by Parliament,^[66] and that it should be done in a way that is “perceived as being competent and free of conflicts of interest.”^[67]

In his written correspondence to the Committee, Dr. M.V. Ramana, Professor at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia, weighed in on the issue of governance, stating:

The current structure naturally induces suspicion. The problem is that Natural Resources Canada has the responsibility to develop and promote nuclear energy. Because the CNSC is responsible for the protection of “health, safety, security and the environment”, its ideal role can, on occasion, be at odds with the promotion of nuclear energy. Conversely, when regulating a technology that is being promoted by the Ministry, the regulator might be motivated to adopt practices that prioritize the potential for rapid deployment rather than ensuring a higher degree of safety and precaution.^[68]

The Committee does not suggest that there is a conflict of interest in having the CNSC report to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources. However, the Committee sees benefits to improving public trust and confidence in Canada’s radioactive waste management by eliminating a perceived conflict of interest. Greater social acceptance of potential future nuclear development may be one such benefit.

Recommendation 1

The Committee recommends that the Auditor General of Canada conduct a public audit of Canada’s radioactive waste governance.

Long-Term Storage of Radioactive Waste

There is a moral imperative to store the radioactive waste resulting from nuclear energy generation permanently and safely and not to pass on the responsibility to future generations.^[70] Chief Duncan Malcolm Michano of the Biigtigong Nishnaabeg believed radioactive waste should stop being produced because it would be “poisonous to our descendants for hundreds of thousands of years”.[71] He raised the issue of the amount of waste that could be produced in 100 or 500 years compared to the waste created over the last 60 years for which long‑term plans do not yet exist.^[72]

Witnesses spoke of how the polluter pays principle applies to nuclear energy, and that the nuclear industry tracks and pays for all its waste.^[73] Laurie Swami, President and Chief Executive Officer of the NWMO, explained that the long-term disposal of HLW is prefunded by the nuclear energy industry for all existing used fuel bundles. The money is held in trust funds that the NWMO will be able to access once it obtains its construction licence for the deep geological repository (DGR).^[74] Ole Hendrickson, Researcher at the Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, raised questions about the availability of funds for radioactive waste management, noting that discounted and undiscounted federal liabilities for federally owned nuclear sites was approximately $23.4 billion. This exceeds the $7.1 billion in federal liabilities for 2,500 contaminated sites. In the 2021–2022 Main Estimates, $808 million was directed towards AECL’s nuclear decommissioning and radioactive waste management expenses.^[75]

Dr. Gordon Edwards agreed that applying the polluter pays principle to radioactive waste is important. However, he felt that the polluters should not determine the extent of waste management and, therefore, the extent of how much polluters must pay. Instead, he felt that those with “only the health and welfare of the Canadian citizens and the Canadian environment” should be in charge of waste management.^[76]

Chief Reg Niganobe, Grand Council Chief of the Anishinabek Nation, Chiefs of Ontario, outlined the five principles on radioactive waste agreed upon by the Anishinabek Nation and the Iroquois Caucus, adopted by the leadership of 133 First Nations communities in Ontario:

First, there should be no abandonment but rather a policy of perpetual stewardship. Climate change has made weather events unpredictable; therefore, human-made storage must be resilient to ensure that radioactive materials stay out of the food we eat, the water we drink, the air we breathe and the land we live on.

Second, the best possible containment must be used with adaptable packaging to align with changing environmental conditions.

Third, it should be monitored and retrievable in a relationship of continuous guardianship. Information and resources must be passed from one generation to the next to ensure that any signs of leakage are able to be addressed.

The fourth principle declares that nuclear waste should be away from major water bodies. When we poison our waterways, we poison ourselves. Rivers and lakes are the blood and lungs of mother earth.

Finally, exports and imports of waste should be forbidden except in truly exceptional cases after full consultation with all those whose lands and waters are being put at risk.^[77]

William Turner, AECL retiree and resident of Deep River, noted in his brief that the term “abandon” is used in the Nuclear Safety and Control Act to refer to the final phase in the life cycle of a nuclear substance or nuclear facility.^[78] Section 26 (e) of the Act states: “Subject to the regulations, no person shall, except in accordance with a licence, prepare a site for, construct, operate, modify, decommission or abandon a nuclear facility.”^[79] The CNSC defines “abandon” as “remove[d] from regulatory control.”^[80] William Turner noted that many of Canada’s CANDU power reactors are entering the decommissioning phase of their life cycles, and that “abandonment” is the next (and final) phase after decommissioning. However, he observed that the CNSC does not have guidance for licensees on abandonment and has been removing the term from their guidance documents in recent years. William Turner was concerned for the governance of nuclear waste in Canada if “neither the nuclear industry nor the regulator appears willing to address the radioactive waste abandonment issue.”^[81]

While William Turner saw abandonment as an inevitable phase of the nuclear facility life cycle, for which CNSC should be proactively providing guidance to the licensees, Gordon Edwards, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, did not accept that abandonment must or should occur. Dr. Edwards stated that “rolling stewardship is an alternative to abandonment and should be seriously considered by Parliament. Abandonment is irresponsible; three final repositories have experienced failure so far.”^[82] Dr. Edwards described the concept of rolling stewardship as “an intergenerational waste management concept whereby each successive generation passes on the knowledge and provides the necessary resources to the next generation, so that nuclear wastes are never placed beyond human control and are never left unattended.”^[83] The concept of rolling stewardship of radioactive waste, as opposed to abandonment, was supported by several briefs and witnesses^[84] such as Ole Hendrickson, who stated that, in the case of a facility with waste remaining radioactive for thousands to hundreds of thousands of years,

it would essentially never be possible to abandon or unlicense a facility that's above ground and that still has significant quantities of radioactive and non-radioactive hazards in it. You essentially need a perpetual licence. This would represent a perpetual liability for the people of Canada and for our governments and taxpayers.^[85]

Potential long-term storage options discussed by witnesses included a near surface disposal facility (NSDF) in Chalk River, Ontario for LLW and a DGR, also in Ontario, for HLW. There are no plans to address the long-term storage needs for ILW in Canada. In November 2020, the Minister of Natural Resources asked the NWMO to lead the development of an integrated radioactive waste management strategy for LLW and ILW as part of the review of the Radioactive Waste Policy.^[86]

Near Surface Disposal Facility

Joseph McBrearty described the history of CRL, which is in the area of Chalk River, Ontario, including over 70 years of “groundbreaking research” including two Nobel Prizes and the invention of the CANDU reactor.^[87] Since 2015, CNL has managed the legacy waste liabilities at CRL, which include contaminated soil, and old buildings.^[88]

The clean-up of the Chalk River site involves managing low-, intermediate- and high-level wastes. All radioactive waste is expected to be disposed of by 2070.^[89] ILW will be processed to reduce its volume and stored at a new facility until a national determination has been made for its disposition. Nuclear fuel waste (HLW) will be transported off-site to the DGR (discussed in the next section).

CNL has proposed a NSDF as the “the best approach to isolate and contain [LLW], to reduce risk and to protect the surrounding environment.”^[90] The NSDF would be “a mound, built at near-surface level, consisting of disposal cells with a base liner and cover as well as systems to collect leachate, detect leaks and monitor the environment”.^[91] The NSDF proposed at CRL would have a licence or regulatory oversight for 300 years while the structure would last over 550 years.^[92] The CNSC held public hearings in February and May 2022 to hear from intervenors before making a final decision on the facility.^[93] A timeline of significant events in the history of Chalk River Laboratories is included in Table 2.

Table 2: Timeline of Significant Events in the History of Chalk River Laboratories in Chalk River, Ontario

Year	Event
1944	Building of Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) begins in Chalk River, Ontario. It is operated by the National Research Council of Canada.
1951	Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) is established as a federal Crown corporation. It operates CRL.
1940s, 1950s, 1960s	Temporary radioactive waste storage areas and facilities are created at CRL, leading to the contamination of the surrounding soil.
2011	As part of government restructuring of AECL, the assets of its CANDU Reactor Division are sold to Candu Energy Inc., a subsidiary of SNC‑Lavalin.
2014	Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) is launched.
2015	As part of government restructuring of AECL, the shares of CNL are transferred to a private-sector contractor, as part of a government owned contractor operated model for the management and operations of AECL’s sites. The private-sector contractor is a consortium, Canadian National Energy Alliance (CNEA), which begins to operate CNL.
2015	Clean-up by CNL begins at the CRL site.
2016	Environmental assessment process begins for the Chalk River near surface disposal facility (NSDF) under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, overseen by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC).
February and May 2022	CNSC commission hearings for CNL’s request to amend CRL site licence to authorize the construction of the NSDF.
September 2022	Environmental assessment and licence decision.
Approximately 2500	End of NSDF lifespan, if approved.

Note:      Only low-level waste is proposed to be stored at the near surface disposal facility. There are no current plans in Canada for the long-term storage of intermediate-level waste. High-level waste would be transported off-site to a deep geological repository.

Sources:    Prepared by the Committee based on data from Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL), 1944–2019 AECL Historical Timeline; AECL, Environmental Stewardship: Near Surface Disposal Facility; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Regulatory review status for the Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF); and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories, Near Surface Disposal Facility.

While some witnesses believed the NSDF was a good way forward for the long-term storage of LLW;^[94] others did not.^[95] The CNSC is concluding its environmental assessment of the proposed NSDF, which started in 2016 under CEAA 2012.^[96] Because the environmental assessment process under CEAA 2012 is different from the new impact assessment process under the IAA, some witnesses expressed disappointment that the NSDF environmental assessment process was proceeding under CEAA 2012.^[97]

It was initially proposed that the NSDF would store small amounts of ILW. Public concern led to the project being revised to only store LLW. Meggan Vickerd, General Manager of Waste Services at CNL said this was “a great example” of public input during the environmental assessment process.^[98] According to Joseph McBrearty, the approach to the NSDF project had gone through several changes because of input from Indigenous communities.^[99]

In June 2020, the CNSC adopted a regulatory document on the management of radioactive waste.[100] It provides descriptions of LLW, ILW, HLW and uranium mine and mill tailings. Ole Hendrickson was concerned that ILW was being inappropriately reclassified as LLW so that it could still be stored in the NSDF at Chalk River.^[101] A brief from the Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area questioned why, between 2016 and 2019, the ILW inventory at Chalk River was reduced by 90%, from 19,468 m³ to 1,382 m³, among other irregularities. The group called for AECL to provide a full inventory, including radioactivity and specific radionuclides, that resolves the differences between the 2016 and 2019 inventories of current and projected wastes.^[102] Gilles Provost and Ginette Charbonneau, physicist and spokesperson for Ralliement contre la pollution nucléaire, argued that ILW was still going to be stored at the NSDF because of inappropriate categorization of cobalt‑60.^[103] CNL’s Waste Acceptance Criteria for the NSDF was initially issued for review and comment on 30 April 2019. It has since been revised five times to incorporate CNSC comments and other changes, most recently in November 2020. The document’s revision history shows that the revision released in September 2020, “replaced “Reference Inventory” with the “Licensed Inventory” that has lower total activity limits for Iodine 129 and Plutonium‑239/240.”^[104]

The proposed site for the NSDF is close to the Ottawa River. Dr. Gordon Edwards expressed concern about the proximity of the NSDF to the river and the possibility of climate change-impacted flooding and precipitation resulting in leaching of wastes into the Ottawa River.^[105] Mr. Hendrickson added that “the IAEA says that siting is an extremely critical part of radioactive waste management”^[106] to address concerns for leaching into waterways. Some witnesses spoke in favour of taking a regional approach to an impact assessment along the Ottawa River, given that there are several other nuclear facilities located in the Ottawa Valley.^[107] In 2021, the City of Ottawa requested a regional assessment under the Impact Assessment Act that was turned down by the Minister of the Environment.^[108]

Joseph McBrearty explained that the proposed site was identified as the best site from a geological standpoint as well as a hydrogeological standpoint “to ensure that the Ottawa River watershed is protected at all costs.”^[109] He added that the proposed site was chosen so that the NSDF would not be affected by human-made or natural events—including major weather events such as flooding caused by climate change and dam failures.^[110] Meggan Vickerd explained that CNL has a “very robust environmental monitoring program that includes groundwater sampling, surface water sampling and soil and air sampling, not only on the Chalk River site but off the site as well.” She added that CNL has been working with Indigenous groups to include traditional knowledge in the environmental monitoring program and potentially have them conduct the environmental monitoring.^[111]

CNL witnesses told the Committee that the risk currently presented by radioactive waste on the Chalk River Laboratories campus was low but that it would be even lower after the waste is stored in the NSDF. Joseph McBrearty emphasized that a large portion of the waste at Chalk River site is exposed to the elements—including about 500,000 cubic metres of contaminated soil and World War II-era buildings.^[112] Since cleanup began at the Chalk River site in 2015, 110 out of nearly 200 structures have been safely remediated in a way that minimized material needing to be sent for final disposal.^[113]

Deep Geological Repository

The challenge of developing a long-term storage plan for spent nuclear fuel or HLW in Canada is not new. In 1978, the governments of Canada and Ontario directed AECL to develop the concept of a DGR for spent nuclear fuel and, in 1988 a federal public review of the concept (and a range of nuclear fuel waste management issues) was initiated.^[115] After extensive public consultation and scientific review, the environmental assessment review panel, chaired by Blair Seaborn (“the Seaborn Panel”), published its report in 1998. The Seaborn Panel examined “the criteria by which the safety and acceptability of any concept for long-term waste management should be evaluated,” coming up with the following key conclusions:

• Broad public support is necessary in Canada to ensure the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes.
• Safety is a key part, but only one part, of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from two complementary perspectives: technical and social.^[116]

On this basis, the Seaborn Panel defined the safety and acceptability criteria as follows:

• To be considered acceptable, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must:
  • have broad public support;
  • be safe from both a technical and a social perspective;
  • have been developed within a sound ethical and social assessment framework;
  • have the support of Aboriginal people;
  • be selected after comparison with the risks, costs and benefits of other options; and
  • be advanced by a stable and trustworthy proponent and overseen by a trustworthy regulator.
• To be considered safe, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must be judged, on balance, to:
  • demonstrate robustness in meeting appropriate regulatory requirements;
  • be based on thorough and participatory scenario analyses;
  • use realistic data, modelling and natural analogues;
  • incorporate sound science and good practices;
  • demonstrate flexibility;
  • demonstrate that implementation is feasible; and
  • integrate peer review and international expertise.^[117]

The Nuclear Fuel Waste Act of 2002 created the NWMO and “set the stage for the NWMO to develop a solution for all of Canada.”^[118] Some witnesses stated that the NWMO is sufficiently independent from industry to be objective and trustworthy.^[119] Other witnesses felt the creation of the NWMO did not follow the recommendations the Seaborn Panel to form an entity independent from industry to manage nuclear fuel waste in Canada.^[120]

Chief Duncan Malcolm Michano believed the federal government was delegating the governance and policy-making for radioactive waste to industry and likened it to “putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop”.^[121] Other witnesses also expressed concerns that the NWMO governance model, i.e., being owned and operated strictly by radioactive waste generators and having only industry members on the board, could create at least the appearance of a conflict of interest.^[122] Many briefs and witnesses suggested that an independent body should manage waste.^[123]

In 2007, the Government of Canada selected adaptive phased management (APM) as the long-term plan for nuclear fuel waste. The APM calls for “centralized containment and isolation of Canada's used fuel in a deep geological repository in an area with suitable geology and an informed and willing host”.^[124] A DGR is a network of tunnels and a placement room built at a depth of between 500 m and 800 m beneath the surface depending on the rock characteristics at the site. Both engineering systems and the rock itself would provide protection to people and the environment (as shown in Figure 5).^[125] According to Mollie Johnson, Assistant Deputy Minister of the Low Carbon Energy Sector at NRCan, DGRs have been identified as a best practice across international standards.^[126] At the time of the study, Sweden had recently approved a site for its DGR, and Finland had applied for an operating licence for its DGR, which is under construction.^[127]

Figure 5: Stages in the Multiple-Barrier System for the Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel in a Deep Geological Repository

Sources:    Figure prepared by the Library of Parliament using data obtained from Canadian Nuclear Association, The Canadian Nuclear Factbook 2019, p. 50; and Nuclear Waste Management Organization, Ensuring Safety: Multiple-Barrier System, Backgrounder, 2015. In: Xavier Deschênes-Philion and Sophie Leduc, Library of Parliament, Nuclear Energy and Radioactive Waste Management in Canada, 2020.

The Committee heard that a DGR has consistently been recognized as the safest way to permanently store nuclear waste. Laurie Swami stated that

[t]he need for a permanent solution for Canada's used nuclear fuel has been studied and discussed for more than 50 years. The overwhelming result of this work—and work done over the same period internationally—was that over the long term, used nuclear fuel should be managed in a deep geological repository and in a location that is socially acceptable.^[128]

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency issued a report on the management and disposal of HLW, which confirmed that DGRs are the best approach.^[129] Additionally, the International Energy Agency's review of Canada's energy policy recommended that the Canadian government support NWMO's mandate in selecting a site for a DGR.

The Committee heard from witnesses who supported the process to develop a DGR[130] as well as those who opposed it.^[131] The NWMO began the process to find a willing host community for the DGR in 2010. Down from an initial group of 22 communities in Saskatchewan and Ontario that had voluntarily entered into the selection process, two communities are currently being considered to host the DGR: the Township of Ignace in northwestern Ontario and the Municipality of South Bruce in southern Ontario.^[132] A site selection is expected by the end of 2023.^[133] The Committee noted the importance of the informed consent of the community that will host the DGR.

The Committee received some briefs about the DGR project in South Bruce.^[134] Rita Groen’s correspondence, which describes exchanges with the Saugeen Ojibway Nation about work conducted by the NWMO, reveals concerns related to the alleged lack of independence: “The multi-year funding agreement between South Bruce and NWMO also mentions communications with media must be NWMO approved. NWMO is in the driver’s seat and has all the control.”^[135]

Storing radioactive waste in stable rock would keep it “safe from earthquakes, hurricanes, warmongers and glaciers.”^[136] Glaciations occur every several tens of thousands of years and cover Canada with glaciers up to four kilometres thick, destroying everything on the surface and spreading the debris across the continent. Since radioactive waste will be radioactive for several glaciation cycles, it is important to store this waste below the surface away from future glaciers.^[137] Chief Duncan Malcolm Michano extended the timescale even further, noting that all rock formations eventually move, and this movement would allow the radioactive waste to leach from the DGR into the environment.^[138]

Dr. M.V. Ramana explained that the radioactive waste produced by some SMRs might not currently be suitable for long-term storage in DGRs without a lot of pre-processing.^[139] He gave the example of the waste from molten salt reactors which could “be in chemical forms that are not known to occur in nature and thus unsuitable for geological disposal.”^[140] Dr. Jeremy Whitlock, Section Head of Concepts and Approaches at the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA, agreed there would be “technical challenges that one will have to address before the spent fuel from the SMRs can be put into a [DGR]” but believed scientists and engineers would be able to develop the appropriate pre-processing technologies in order to do so.^[141] Dr. Ramana noted that the cost of this pre-processing is unknown because the necessary technology and methods have not yet been perfected.^[142]

Recommendation 2

The Committee recommends that any research and development work related to small modular reactor (SMR) technology rigorously document and categorize in their analyses the radioactive waste that will be generated, and that a plan be developed to manage this waste as part of Canada’s Policy for Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning.

The proposed DGR is currently included in the waste management plans of some nuclear facilities—HLW from both CRL and the decommissioned Gentilly‑2 nuclear reactor in Quebec will be transferred to the DGR once it is approved and constructed.^[143] In fact, Gentilly‑2’s deferred decommissioning approach, which includes a storage-with-surveillance period of about 35 years, was chosen based on the availability of the NWMO’s permanent site for spent fuel disposal by 2048. This approach also allows more time for the radioactive material to decay and reduces storage costs until the permanent facility become available.^[144]

As previously mentioned, several witnesses and authors of briefs were concerned about the “abandonment” phase of managing nuclear substances and facilities, which occurs after radioactive waste has been removed from regulatory control, requiring no further action, including monitoring.^[145] Instead of abandonment, these individuals preferred the concept of “rolling” or “perpetual” stewardship and monitoring of waste by this and future generations.^[146] Such an approach would require that waste packages be accessible, so they could be repackaged if leaks were detected, storage could be adapted to unforeseen changing climatic conditions affecting the integrity of the waste storage, or changes could be implemented based on evolving scientific knowledge.^[147]

Safety Record of the Canadian Nuclear Industry

Witnesses emphasized the safety record of the Canadian nuclear industry.^[148] Jason Van Wart noted that all radioactive waste is “well regulated in Canada by the CNSC and managed safely by owners, with an excellent safety record… across Canada.”^[149] Professor Jason Donev, Senior Instructor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at the University of Calgary, concurred, stating that “[t]he Canadian nuclear industry has an extraordinary record of safety, safe practice, and compliance [with regulations].”^[150] Dr. Jeremy Whitlock characterized the risk of accidents to spent nuclear fuel as “low.”^[151]

Recommendation 3

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada prioritize the building of a deep geological repository (DGR) and acknowledge that it is the safest way to store high level radioactive waste.

Dr. Gordon Edwards agreed that the nuclear industry is operating reactors in a safe manner, however he differentiated this safety record from the future management of radioactive waste in a safe manner over multiple generations.^[152]

Rumina Velshi, added that “the transportation [of radioactive waste] has an impeccable record in over 60 years of transportation. … There has not been an incident that has impacted the environment or the safety of individuals.”^[153] Over one million packages of nuclear substances are transported per year in Canada.^[154] Laurie Swami explained that used nuclear fuel will need to be transported from its existing storage facilities at the nuclear power facilities in New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario, to an eventual long-term storage site. She acknowledged that

We will be implementing programs with knowing where our trucks are at all times, understanding the areas they're driving through, and we will probably have escort cars and things like that for protection of the used fuel and do this in a very safe manner.^[155]

Dr. Jeremy Whitlock agreed that Canadians needed to learn about the safety of the transportation of radioactive waste because “it’s going to be going through their communities all along the path”. He added that seeing the rigorous safety tests through which transport vehicles and containers are put through would assuage concerns about the safety of the transportation of radioactive waste.^[156]

Recommendation 4

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada use all existing science on radioactive waste management and storage as the foundational component in decision making for future waste management projects.

Transforming Current Waste

In some cases, radioactive waste can be transformed to become less hazardous, or even used for other purposes. James Scongack outlined the importance of reducing, reusing or recycling, or disposing of radioactive waste, in that order.^[157]

Jason Van Wart mentioned OPG initiatives to minimize LLW, including opening a “clean energy sorting and recycling centre” with McMaster University. LLW—some of which has been in storage for decades—is brought to the centre, sorted, decontaminated, cleaned and, where radioisotopes have sufficiently decayed, free released for recycling of materials such as metals. The remaining low-level waste is compacted to reduce the environmental footprint and the number of storage buildings required for continued storage.^[158]

In the case of HLW, a chemical process called reprocessing separates the “uranium and plutonium from the other radioactive fission products that are produced in a nuclear reactor”.^[159] Canada does not currently reprocess its HLW but did do so in the 1950s.^[160] Dr. M.V. Ramana expressed concerns that some SMR designs envision the reprocessing of spent fuel, since separating uranium and plutonium from other radioactive compounds “makes little difference to long-term management of nuclear wastes, while making nuclear weapons proliferation easier”.^[161] The separated uranium and plutonium can be used as the fissile material in nuclear weapons. Acquiring fissile material is the main obstacle in the development of nuclear weapons.^[162]

In her brief, Dr. Susan O’Donnell raised concerns regarding the federal government’s $50.5 million grant to Moltex Energy to use pyroprocessing to extract plutonium from HLW stored at Point Lepreau, New Brunswick.^[163] Dr. O’Donnell worried that NRCan’s new draft radioactive waste management policy, which “allows for reprocessing high-level waste,” “moves our national policy in a dangerous direction”.^[164] Dr. Ramana provided a brief to the Committee that had been submitted to the New Brunswick Minister of Natural Resources and Energy Development regarding the proposed SMRs in New Brunswick, by Moltex and ARC.^[165] This brief took issue with a proposal by ARC to import used nuclear fuel or weapons-grade fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads from the United States, and predicted that the “liquid sodium coolant from the proposed ARC design will become a new category of liquid radioactive waste, posing special problems that promise to be very expensive.”^[166]

Substances and elements found in radioactive waste from nuclear reactors can have other uses or themselves be sources of useful substances and elements. For example, tritium is used in emergency lighting, as a biomedical tracer, and in international research on fusion power. A by-product of tritium, helium‑3, is used in quantum computing, border security, neutron research and medical imaging.^[167]

Recommendation 5

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada invest in research in reducing, reusing, and recycling nuclear waste.

Comparison of Canadian Radioactive Waste Governance with International Practices

Some witnesses told the Committee that Canada is well regarded around the world when it comes to the management and governance of its radioactive waste.^[168] Others said that Canada is doing things that are against international standards.^[169]

John Gorman stated that, in terms of nuclear energy, Canada is “a tier one, globally respected nation in terms of our assets, our facilities and our regulator.”^[170] James Scongack specified that the CNSC “internationally is a tremendously respected independent regulator.”^[171]

A number of witnesses expressed concern that plans to bury some nuclear reactors onsite when they reach the end of their lifespan in Canada go against the standards of the IAEA.^[172] One of these reactors is in Pinawa, Manitoba, on the Winnipeg River, while the other is near the town of Rolphton, Ontario, on the Ottawa River.^[173] Ginette Charbonneau expressed reservations with the plan to bury the Rolphton reactor in place, since it goes against the safety standards of the IAEA, which do not recognize in situ decommissioning or entombment as appropriate management methods.^[174] Ginette Charbonneau felt that the lack of planning in Canada for ILW has led to the proposal to bury it in place, as there is no permanent storage solution elsewhere for the Rolphton waste if the reactor is dismantled.^[175] Gordon Edwards was apprehensive about CNL’s plans to “bury the dangerous radioactive carcasses of two defunct reactors right beside major rivers instead of dismantling them, as was originally proposed and approved by the CNSC.”^[176]

Ole Hendrickson expressed concern that the process to develop the new CNSC regulatory document on decommissioning had not been fully transparent and seemed to give more weight to industry comments compared to comments from public intervenors.^[177] He believed that the new regulatory document could be interpreted as allowing for the disposal in place of SMRs.^[178]

Recommendation 6

The Committee recommends that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Natural Resources Canada, which directed the Nuclear Waste Management Organization to lead consultations on a long-term storage plan for intermediate-level radioactive waste, follow the International Atomic Energy Agency standards in their policies and practices, and provide clear rationale to Parliament and Canadians for any deviations from these standards that are deemed unavoidable.

The Committee asked witnesses about the governance framework under the IAEA's Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Rumina Velshi informed the Committee that, as a party to the convention, Canada is required to report every three years to an international body of peers on Canada’s used fuel and radioactive waste management, adding that

It is an opportunity for peers to review the entire management system for waste management in Canada. We get feedback from them. We get questions from them. Areas for improvement are identified. In the spirit of transparency, it is presented to the commission as a public hearing meeting.^[179]

Where areas for improvement are identified at one triennial meeting, Canada is “legally bound to respond to these at the next meeting” to ensure that issues identified are adequately addressed.^[180]

Recommendation 7

The Committee recommends that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission:

• follow the International Atomic Energy Agency standards in its policies and practices;
• implement recommendations that were made by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service Audit that was conducted in 2019; and
• provide clear rationale to Parliament and Canadians for any deviations from these standards that are deemed unavoidable (e.g., waste classification, in situ decommissioning), and that these justifications be documented and made publicly available within 30 days of sending to Parliament.

Waste Classification and Record Keeping

Ole Hendrickson believed that Canada’s national radioactive waste inventory lacks consistent classification standards with detailed data on individual radionuclides that would be required to conform to Canada’s reporting obligations under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.^[181] Currently, the inventory reports on the volume of waste of different classes but not radioactivity or specific radionuclides present in the waste. This lack of information has already led to unpredictable clean-up costs at the CRL in Ontario. As Fred Dermarkar, President and Chief Executive Officer of AECL, explained, incomplete recordkeeping related to activities at the site in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s means that total remediation costs could increase as CNL starts “digging into the ground to better understand what’s there”.^[182]

The Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area’s briefs called for NRCan to “add information on activity and specific radionuclides to its radioactive waste inventory” as “required under article 32(2) of the Joint Convention.”^[183] Ralliement contre la pollution radioactive’s brief also requested that owners of radioactive waste be required to provide a detailed inventory with descriptions of their radioactivity.[184]

Dr. Jeremy Whitlock believed that radioactive waste management and decommissioning policies should require waste owners to document waste according to agreed-upon record keeping standards to ensure that the information needed to manage waste safely is available in an accessible format even as technology evolves.^[185] The importance of transmitting key information to future generations about radioactive waste sites was also expressed by other witnesses.^[186] Dr. Gordon Edwards believed Canada’s record keeping policies do not align with those of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.^[187]

Recommendation 8

The Committee recommends that Natural Resources Canada and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission be required to provide additional detail in Canada’s inventory of radioactive waste, such as source and level of radioactivity, and that this information be provided and made publicly available as soon as possible.

Recommendation 9

The Committee recommends that Natural Resources Canada and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission work with Library and Archives Canada to ensure that the preservation of records reflects reports from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency’s Radioactive Waste Management Committee, such that they are maintained up-to-date and preserved for the hazardous lifespan of the waste itself.

Public and Indigenous Consultation and Consent

Public consultation surrounding nuclear projects is important. This section covers the public consultation that occurred for the federal radioactive waste policy, the NSDF at Chalk River, and the DGR.

Between November 2020 and May 2021, NRCan consulted with and received feedback from Indigenous peoples, public interest groups, waste producers and owners, other levels of government and other interested Canadians on how they would like to see Canada’s radioactive waste policy modernized.^[188] The draft radioactive waste management and decommissioning policy was published on 1 February 2022 after the consideration of the feedback received. It was possible to provide written feedback on the draft policy until 2 April 2022. The policy is intended to be finalized by the end of 2022.^[189] The goal is to inform a “modernized radioactive waste policy that continues to meet international standards based on best available science and that reflects the values and principles of Canadians, including… [I]ndigenous peoples.”^[190] Mollie Johnson described the variety of viewpoints submitted on the draft policy: “If you read all the reports that are on our website right now, they show two sides, a spectrum of perspectives, when you look at the issue. I think that demonstrates that there is no monolithic or no single view on these matters.”^[191]

Thomas Isaacs mentioned that the main recommendation of the Blue-Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future was that a consent-based approach should be used to select a radioactive waste storage site. He felt that this principle is reflected in the approach taken by the NWMO.^[192] Laurie Swami stated that a “very important part of our work is that we must have a willing and informed community, and communities, where we will deploy our project.”^[193] The NWMO communicates to potential host communities the opportunities, risks, benefits and financial benefit that are associated with becoming a host community.^[194]

Witnesses had differing viewpoints on how well informed the members of potential host communities are. Dr. Jeremy Whitlock believed that the NWMO had done a good job of providing the available information to members of potential host communities, leading to some very well-informed members, but worried that uninformed members of potential host communities could be “as vocal or more vocal” than those who were “fully informed” and “for it.”^[195] Sandy Greer disagreed with the characterization of community members in opposition to the proposal as “uninformed.”^[196]

Some witnesses provided their negative impressions of NWMO consultations.[197] Chief Reg Niganobe, Chief Duncan Malcolm Michano, and Dr. M.V. Ramana spoke of the potential economic benefits of hosting radioactive waste being used to convince community members to accept the risk of the radioactive waste.^[198] Chief Duncan Malcolm Michano and Dr. Gordon Edwards spoke of the NWMO providing a one-sided “sales pitch” during community consultations about hosting radioactive waste, which they felt was not balanced with information about the potential risks.^[199]

Witnesses mentioned the different consultation requirements under CEAA 2012 and the IAA, notably the more stringent requirements for consultation, particularly with Indigenous groups, under the IAA.^[200] Joseph McBrearty believed that the Chalk River NSDF consultation process, grandfathered under the CEAA 2012 regime, included consultations meaningful enough that they would fulfil even the more rigorous IAA consultation requirements.^[201] According to him, CNL and AECL engaged frequently and early with Indigenous communities.^[202] Fred Dermarkar relayed that AECL and CNL are pursuing “substance in relationships” with Indigenous groups rather than focussing on the process.^[203]

Chief Reg Niganobe described the perspective from which First Nations communities in Ontario enter consultations regarding radioactive waste storage:

Since time immemorial, each of the 133 [F]irst [N]ation communities in Ontario have endeavoured to fulfill our traditional legal responsibilities by ensuring that our decisions are made with the best interests of the next seven generations. We must be collective in decisions about the land, think only of future generations, and allow this inherent responsibility to determine our decisions.^[204]

Chief Reg Niganobe and Chief Duncan Malcolm Michano relayed that many Indigenous communities did not find consultation processes for radioactive waste storage proposals welcoming or accessible.^[205] Chief Niganobe recalled a patronizing experience:

My community was part of this NWMO process at one point and one of the panellists who the NWMO had sent on their behalf remarked to our community that, “We could explain it to you, but you wouldn't understand it anyway. We'll give you all the information and you wouldn't understand it.”^[206]

Chief Reg Niganobe emphasized that no decisions concerning nuclear waste storage, transportation, or decommissioning can be made without the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples as set out in article 29.2 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.^[207] With regards to current consultation practices, he said that “transparency and full disclosure are essential, but not a substitute for full engagement”.^[208] He suggested that the government could start work on creating an effective and broad consultation policy co-developed with Indigenous communities.^[209]

When speaking about the NSDF process, Rumina Velshi explained that the CNSC is always learning how to improve the consultation process and added that “Certainly around reconciliation, it's a journey. I know the next time around we will maybe start a lot earlier, engage much further and just be better partners in this and have stronger relationships than have been established. All I can say is that we're constantly improving.”^[210] The Committee emphasizes the need for free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous communities to host radioactive waste.

Recommendation 10

The Committee recommends that Government of Canada work with Indigenous communities to co-develop a consultation framework that upholds the right of Indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent as set out in article 29.2 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Public Information and Education

Rumina Velshi described the public’s perception around radioactive waste management as sometimes tainted with “genuine, real fear,” in part due to how radioactive waste is portrayed in the media. She added that the risks and how well radioactive waste is managed could be better explained.^[212] Dr. Jeremy Whitlock explained that one of the reasons these conversations with Canadians are difficult is that the lifespan of radioactive waste—hundreds or millions of years—is beyond “the normal horizon of people’s imaginations.”^[213]

James Scongack believed that there is a lot of work remaining to effectively communicate the facts about the nuclear industry, its safety, and its waste management.^[214] Professor Jason Donev was concerned about the amount of misinformation about nuclear energy and waste, and would like to see public education on nuclear energy issues.^[215] He introduced the Committee to the acronym FEAR, or “False Evidence Appearing Real,” something which he believed happens with the nuclear industry and radioactive waste. He hoped to see the nuclear industry “work with the government to have more of these conversations about what people's fears are so we can separate out the false evidence appearing real from legitimate concerns and legitimate hazards.”^[216]

Concerned citizen groups cited difficulties accessing information they sought from industry and regulators, or insufficient information provided.^[217] The Committee noted that, although much of Canada’s radioactive waste regulatory information is available online (e.g., CSNC decisions and supporting documents), websites are not always user friendly. This may make finding specific documents and information difficult. Moreover, regulatory environmental monitoring data may be available but not put into context for the average Canadian.

Recommendation 11

The Committee recommends that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Natural Resources Canada, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (and its contractor, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories), and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization review their communications and websites to ensure

• documentation and information on Canada’s radioactive waste are divulged in full transparency and easy to find; and
• relevant technical documents are summarized for the layperson.

Recommendation 12

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada invest in scientific-based public education initiatives on nuclear energy and nuclear waste storage.

Conclusion

The Committee’s attention to this study was timely because the issue raised is of proven political and regulatory relevance. During 2022, NRCan is revising its Radioactive Waste Management Policy for Canada, the NWMO will publish its Radioactive Waste Management Strategy, and the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (through the Auditor General of Canada) will publish a report specifically on the issue.

As the CNSC moves closer to licencing CNL for the Chalk River NSDF project, it seems clear that the work done by the Committee could provide positive guidance to the government and organizations involved.

As Canada seeks to decarbonize its energy grid and achieve net zero emissions by 2050, nuclear power will be part of the energy mix and issues of waste management must be addressed. Rigorous consideration is needed to deal appropriately with radioactive waste since decisions made in the near future will have repercussions decades, centuries and even millennia from now.

An approach based on transparency and rigour in characterizing substances is crucial. Citizen involvement is a pillar of democracy and a consultative approach that demonstrates respect for the people is vital. Solutions to the challenges of storing radioactive waste for the long term are needed. The Government of Canada must make careful choices about how to oversee the nuclear industry and the radioactive waste it generates, as these choices have the potential to affect human and environmental health, safety and public trust in the nuclear industry.