Introduction

From 18 February to 2 March 2023, a seven-member delegation^[1] of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (the committee) travelled to Stockholm, Brussels, Warsaw, and Helsinki. In these four cities, the delegation met with a range of interlocutors, including two ministers of foreign affairs, parliamentarians, Ukrainian diplomats, officials from the European Commission and European External Action Service, and representatives of the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as academics, think tanks, and civil society. The full list of meeting participants is contained in the report’s appendix. The purpose of this travel was to gain the perspectives of some of Canada’s closest allies and partners in relation to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and the war’s implications for Euro-Atlantic security and the international rules-based order. Through the insights gained from these meetings abroad, the delegation has built on the interim report the committee presented to the House on 14 February 2023.^[2]

During the trip, the war reached its one-year mark. In that time, Russia’s aggression has forced millions of people from their homes and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands. Atrocities have been committed by Russian forces, and entire towns and cities in eastern and southern Ukraine have been levelled by Russian artillery.^[3] In the weeks after the delegation returned to Ottawa, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the president’s office, for their alleged responsibility in the war crime of unlawfully deporting and transferring children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.^[4]

The date on which Russia launched its full-scale invasion – 24 February 2022 – has now become associated with two competing ideas: conquest and resistance. In Europe, the delegation was told repeatedly that the stakes of Russia’s aggression and what it represents must be properly understood. This is not a localized “conflict” over territory or a situation from which other nations – farther away from the frontlines – can consider themselves insulated or unimplicated. Echoing throughout the delegation’s meetings was the recognition that war has returned to Europe, a sobering reality that carries policy implications for democratic governments.

By launching a war against its sovereign neighbour, without provocation, Russia has sought to turn back the clock, attempting to hurl Europe back into an era when affairs were settled by the “great powers,” when policy alignments could be dictated through intimidation, and borders altered by force. At the same time, through its continued resistance, amid attacks designed purposefully to undermine the resolve of its people, Ukraine has demonstrated the strength of its statehood and its nationhood, and the determination to chart its own course.

The first half of this report outlines these stakes and examines why the war is considered to have reached an inflection point. The second half steps back and takes a wider view of the war’s implications, including the ways in which it is shaping a new global landscape. Various characterizations of this landscape have been made, with the point after 24 February 2022 described as an “epochal tectonic shift”^[5] (a Zeitenwende) or part of a “decisive decade” of strategic challenges in which the “post-Cold War era” can be declared as having definitively ended.^[6] The NATO Alliance, of which Canada is a founding member, has determined that it must prepare for a “contested and unpredictable” world.^[7] The delegation’s meetings in Europe emphasized that managing this new era of transition and disruption will require investment in comprehensive capabilities, not limited to defence.

When the committee travels abroad, there are no published transcripts of its work. Meetings are considered informal, and some are held under Chatham House rules – i.e., the points made are not for attribution to individuals. This report should, therefore, be treated as an amalgamation of key insights, made by various interlocutors, and as a summation of the impressions the delegation took away from these meetings. Where appropriate, external citations that provide context and complementary information are included. The committee expresses its sincere gratitude to everyone with whom the delegation met and to the staff of the Canadian missions who played instrumental roles facilitating its work.

The Wake-Up Call

While it is generally understood that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine poses a grave threat to the international rules-based order, the delegation’s meetings reiterated why this is so. Interlocutors drew attention to the fact that Russia is a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, a status only accorded to four other states. That body and the UN Charter which established it following the Second World War were forged in the wake of untold violence and upheaval in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”^[8] The Charter requires that all 193 members respect their sovereign equality, settle their disputes by peaceful means, and refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.^[9] While the Charter entrusts the Security Council with the maintenance of international peace and security, Russia has used its veto power to shield itself from accountability and subvert that purpose.^[10]

Russia is also one of only five recognized “nuclear-weapon states” under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Together, the United States and Russia are thought to possess almost 90% of the world’s nuclear warheads.^[11] With that status comes the highest expectation of responsible state conduct and restraint. Yet, since invading Ukraine – a non-nuclear weapon state that had returned the Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia after the Cold War ended, in exchange for security assurances – Russia’s leadership has engaged in irresponsible nuclear rhetoric. It has also made clear its belief that Russia has the freedom to act – i.e., to use its conventional military forces against a smaller state – because of the protection offered by its nuclear arsenal.

The worldview of President Putin, which emphasizes power and historical claims over law, norms and rules, has been articulated in an unabashed manner since 24 February 2022, but was already evident prior to the invasion. The delegation was reminded that, in December 2021, Russia had released what it called a draft security “treaty” with the United States and a draft security “agreement” with NATO.^[12] Together, the documents essentially demanded the dismantlement of the post-Cold War security order in Europe. They sought to impose a two-tier structure on the NATO Alliance, according to its membership and defensive deployments as of 1997,^[13] and purported to shut the Alliance’s door to any future members, from the outside. Around the same time, members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the OSCE), including Sweden and Finland, were told by Russia that they had to formally clarify their position on Russia’s conception of security.^[14] This attempt to divide Europe into two “spheres of influence,” a concept that one interlocutor characterized as belonging to the “age of empires,” was ultimately rejected.

The delegation was told that this situation should be understood as a systemic “Russia crisis,” the most violent manifestation of which is the war in Ukraine. It was noted that the regime’s antagonistic worldview can be traced back many years, including to President Putin’s 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference, in which he said that the Cold War had “left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking,” and decried the so-called “unipolar world” that he claimed was being proposed in its place.^[15] The next year, Russia invaded Georgia, and then continued to support two break-away territories within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. Less than a decade later, in 2014, Russia occupied and annexed Ukraine’s Crimea region before invading and destabilizing eastern Ukraine. As it was put to the delegation, there was no mystery to the message that was being delivered, but – at the time – the West did not want to hear it.

Some analysts, seeking to contextualize the Putin regime’s behaviour leading up to 24 February 2022, focused externally on its concerns about – and ambitions for – the geostrategic environment. Examining the regime through this lens sees Russia seeking to achieve a fundamental change in the global balance of power and to challenge U.S. leadership as well as the U.S.-led system of alliances and partnerships. Other interlocutors directed their analysis inward and highlighted the Putin regime’s own insecurities as the force behind its decision to attack Ukraine. Examined this way, and given the two countries’ historical ties, Ukraine’s – albeit imperfect – democratization and its shift toward Europe were a threat to the regime because they embodied an alternative political path and one being taken by another Slavic nation.

Whether the Putin regime saw Ukraine as the “first step” or the “crown jewel” of its revisionist agenda, it was clear from the delegation’s meetings that there can be no going back to the way things were before – when Russia had been thought of by many European states, if not those in eastern Europe, as a stable and predictable actor. While there are different views about the endurance of the highly personalist system of “Putinism,” the expanding totalitarianism within Russia and the return of war to Europe have served as a wake-up call for Canada’s partners and allies.

Perhaps nowhere has the shift in security perceptions been more evident than in Sweden and Finland, which both abandoned decades of military non-alignment with their decision to apply for NATO membership on 18 May 2022. In Finland, the delegation learned, prior to 24 February 2022, public support for joining the Alliance had never exceeded 25%. However, four days after the invasion, it had already reached 51%, and two weeks later exceeded 70%.

The rationale that led Sweden and Finland to seek NATO membership was made clear in reports issued by their governments and debates held in their parliaments. For example, Sweden’s government observed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had given rise “to a structural, long-term and significant deterioration of the security environment in Europe and globally,” and raised “questions about how Sweden can best guarantee its national security.”^[16] The report further noted that, together, Russia’s assault on its sovereign neighbour, and the measures NATO has taken in response, highlighted “the distinction between the countries that are covered by NATO’s defence guarantees and those that are not.”^[17]

In broad terms, the decision of Sweden and Finland to seek NATO membership was characterized to the delegation as a historic shift or “180-degree turn” in policy. At the time of the delegation’s visit, the only lingering questions were the timing of the final two ratifications necessary to complete the accession process^[18] – those of Hungary and Türkiye – and whether Finland would accede to the Alliance first if Türkiye continued to seek assurances in relation to Sweden’s approach to countering terrorism.^[19] On 27 March 2023, the Hungarian parliament completed the ratification process for Finland,^[20] and a few days later Türkiye’s parliament did the same,[21] enabling Finland to become the 31^st member of the NATO Alliance on 4 April 2023.[22]

Regarding the status of Sweden’s application, the delegation heard that Sweden has fulfilled its part of the 28 June 2022 trilateral memorandum that was put in place to address Türkiye’s security concerns.^[23] The delegation also heard that the Alliance has as much to gain from the membership of Finland and Sweden, two like-minded democracies that already have NATO-standard defence forces and cutting-edge industries, as the countries do themselves.

In many ways, Russia’s war against Ukraine has also triggered what was characterized to the delegation as a “strategic awakening” for the European Union (EU).^[24] Through mechanisms that include the European Peace Facility, the EU and various European governments have been providing military assistance to Ukraine, overturning years of policy restricting the provision of such assistance directly to a conflict zone. In addition to providing equipment, an EU Military Assistance Mission has been established with the intention of training 30,000 members of Ukraine’s armed forces by the end of 2023.^[25] As well, all 27 member states of the EU have agreed on 10 packages of sanctions to restrict Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine.^[26] Furthermore, the EU has become the largest source of financial assistance to Ukraine,^[27] and will provide approximately €1.5 billion per month to help Ukraine’s government pay wages and pensions, restore critical infrastructure, and maintain essential public services.^[28] Through its response to the war, the delegation heard that the EU has shown that it is prepared, in cooperation with its partners, to use the tools at its disposal in defence of the European security order.^[29]

An Inflection Point in the War

By the time of the delegation’s trip, more than three months after Ukraine’s liberation of the city of Kherson in the south, observers were debating whether the war had reached a stalemate. While intense and unrelenting combat was taking place in eastern Ukraine, including in Bakhmut and around Vuhledar, the 1,500-kilometre frontline winding through the country was largely static. The delegation was informed that Ukraine had liberated around 50% of the territory Russian forces had occupied, but that there were still up to 350,000 Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory.

There is concern that Russia is preparing for a protracted war of attrition. President Putin has publicly signalled that the war – which he persists in calling Russia’s “special military operation” – could be long.^[30] While Russia’s larger objective of controlling Ukraine is now considered to be out of reach, there is concern that Russia will be satisfied with Ukraine’s ongoing destabilization and destruction. The delegation heard that being under continuous threat makes any meaningful rebuilding effort unfeasible.

Through its mobilization of additional forces and attempt to move its economy to a war footing, Russia has not been trying to outmanoeuvre Ukrainian forces, but to overwhelm them with the sheer number of their soldiers and volume of their materiel. Nevertheless, while Russia’s offensive was yielding tactical effects on the battlefield, as of early March 2023, it was not having a strategic impact on the war’s trajectory.

Even so, there were no signs of Russian withdrawal. All indications are that Russia is preparing to sustain military operations on Ukraine’s territory. Despite the serious losses and setbacks Russia has experienced,^[31] the delegation heard that the Putin regime still does not, itself, feel defeated. While President Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion demonstrated that he overestimated Russia’s military capabilities and underestimated the effectiveness of Ukraine’s armed forces, the cohesiveness of Ukrainian society and the strength of its state, he does not appear – yet – to have miscalculated his ability to control Russia’s levers of power and repress domestic opposition. As one interlocutor put it, Putin’s external aggression and internal repression are mutually reinforcing, and Russia is now further away from democracy than at any time in the last three decades.

The delegation was reminded that political and economic pressures in Russia should not be assessed solely through a Western lens. The Putin regime is not defining success in terms of broad-based economic prosperity. In the Russian system today, which some consider “clientelist” or akin to a “mafia state,” the elites are dependent on their relationships with Putin, without which they are nothing and with whom – many apparently believe – at least some form of stability exists. The war’s hardships have not really been felt in Moscow, and the Russian countryside, from where many of Russia’s soldiers have been drawn, was already poor. As it has militarized Russian society, the regime has also, essentially, atomized the Russian people.

Western governments have been resolute in their determination to help Ukraine withstand Russia’s aggression, for as long as it takes. While the delegation was in Europe, U.S. President Joe Biden spoke in Warsaw, after visiting Kyiv, where he declared that “there should be no doubt: Our support for Ukraine will not waver, NATO will not be divided, and we will not tire.”^[32] Similar commitments were made by the nations of EU and the G7, which includes Canada.^[33]

Nevertheless, in addition to the political challenges involved with maintaining public support for billions of dollars in aid,^[34] there are practical challenges that must be addressed, particularly when it comes to military assistance. Part of the “wake-up call” the delegation heard relates to defence production and procurement. The war has seen thousands of artillery rounds fired each day, to varying extents, by both sides. Just before the delegation departed to Europe, the NATO Secretary General warned that Ukraine’s rate of ammunition expenditure was “many times higher than our current rate of production,” and characterized the situation as a “race of logistics.”^[35]

In addition to constraints on available materiel, there have been concerns since the beginning about conflict escalation. The delegation heard different views on this issue. Broadly speaking, the more cautious perspective stems from recognition of the realities of Russia’s sizeable nuclear arsenal and of the responsibility to prevent a much larger war that could engulf Europe and – potentially – regions beyond. At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that taking the steps necessary to ensure Ukraine prevails, by continuing to enhance its military capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively, will prevent further Russian escalation by arresting its aggressive push beyond its borders. This perspective, which was articulated most emphatically in Poland, recognizes that Russia tries to harness fear – of “redlines” and retaliation – as a means of statecraft and is informed by the belief that it is only through the provision of military aid without undue hesitation or delays that a visible, tangible, and undeniable Russian failure in Ukraine can be assured. In support of this view, the delegation was reminded that specific assets previously thought taboo, whether tanks or modern artillery systems, are now being provided to Ukraine and that the fundamental threshold – the decision to deliver lethal weaponry – was crossed early on.

Ukrainian forces have proven themselves on the battlefield, whether during the initial defence of Kyiv or through the liberation of significant territory around Kharkiv and Kherson that followed, and shown that they can quickly train on, and put to effective use, the NATO-standard equipment they have been given. Their operations, based on Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence,^[36] have been directed against Russian forces seeking to terrorize Ukrainian communities and occupy Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory.

Furthermore, it was clear from the delegation’s meetings that it is not in Ukraine’s interest to see the battlefield “frozen” along the current lines. The costs of this war for Ukraine are high, and not only in combat casualties. While one estimate mentioned to the delegation is that Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by around 2% in 2022, Ukraine is estimated to have lost around 30% of its economic production and now depends to a significant degree on external assistance.

The delegation was told that a frozen conflict would leave Ukraine facing constant threats and blackmail. Whether through its recent violation of the laws of war, or its flagrant disregard since 2014 of obligations to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, Russia has not shown itself to be a trustworthy actor. Russia has the power – at any time – to end the war it started by withdrawing its forces from Ukraine, which it has refused to do, even though 141 member states of the United Nations have demanded it.^[37] A ceasefire, along the current frontlines, was therefore characterized to the delegation as a false peace. It would cement Russia’s occupation, achieved through invasion, and give Russia time to reconstitute its battered forces and prepare to launch further attacks, at the point of its choosing. Throughout its meetings, the delegation heard that the objective must be a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, which – it is believed – will only be possible when the aggressor knows it can make no gains through force. Put simply, it was emphasized to the delegation throughout that there will be no peace without Ukraine’s success on the battlefield.

Given these pressures and the realities of Russia’s intentions, Ukraine does not want to be forced to manage the frontlines as they are, but equipped to go on the offensive and liberate its territory. Overcoming entrenched Russian positions and repelling hundreds of thousands of forces could come at a steep cost. Even so, the willingness to bear it, and to persevere, reflects the democratic will of the Ukrainian people. The delegation was told that Ukrainians have signalled clearly to the country’s elected leadership that there is no appetite to relinquish their rightful territory or to see the perpetuation of a Russian military presence on their land. For Ukraine, restoration means all of the state’s internationally recognized territory as of 1991 – i.e., including the Donbas and Crimea.

Ukraine has expressed its gratitude for the military assistance received from its partners, including anti-tank weapons, drones, advanced artillery, and air defence systems, which have made a clear difference on the ground. The impact of this materiel – the result of some €65 billion in commitments from NATO Allies^[38] – is being amplified by training programs delivered by various Western militaries at locations in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland. Nevertheless, successfully assembling and delivering this equipment, providing this training, and forming and preparing new Ukrainian units takes coordination and time.

Even though the military aid committed to Ukraine has reached proportions that might have been unthinkable a year ago, scale and speed remain essential. In addition to capabilities that range from advanced infantry fighting vehicles to basic artillery shells, Ukraine’s partners, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have been working to provide Ukraine with refurbished Soviet-type tanks and more than 150 of their own main battle tanks.^[39] It was noted during the delegation’s meetings, however, that the decision to begin sending these modern tanks was not taken until late January 2023.^[40] Ukraine needs these tanks and other equipment to arrive as soon as possible and has indicated that it wants many more tanks than have been promised so far.^[41] It also wants fighter jets and longer-range artillery systems. There is a clear objective informing these deliveries and Ukraine’s additional requests: seizing the window of opportunity to carry out a major counter-offensive in 2023. While Ukraine believes that victory is a matter of time, the delegation was warned that insufficient capabilities could lessen Ukraine’s momentum and increase its losses. Overall, then, Ukraine’s partners are being asked to show strategic patience as the war endures and to act with decisiveness so that it will end.

In this context, the delegation was reminded that the amount of support being allocated for Ukraine and the seriousness of the war’s larger implications should both be kept in perspective. On the first point, it was noted that the tens of billions of dollars allocated so far represent but a fraction of the overall military and civilian budgets of Ukraine’s main partners. Furthermore, it is Ukrainians who are doing all the fighting and enduring all the attacks. On the second point, the delegation was told that the strategic consequences of allowing Russia to benefit from its aggression would far exceed the monetary costs associated with supporting Ukraine. The alternative would be a return to darker times, and an acquiescence to the dismantlement of the rules-based order that was painstakingly built after the Second World War. Some interlocutors drew the delegation’s attention to the war’s stakes beyond eastern Europe, noting that other authoritarian powers, including China, are closely watching what Russia does and how the West responds.

It is widely agreed that one of the Putin regime’s greatest miscalculations leading up to 24 February 2022 was to underestimate the strengths of the world’s democracies. The regime appears to have assumed that their combined response to Russia’s aggression would be slow, fractured, and relatively short-lived. Instead, support for Ukraine was not only immediate and coordinated, but has been sustained.^[42] During more than a year of announcements made in lockstep, individual moments of leadership – including Poland’s public decision to provide tanks to Ukraine and its call on other governments to do the same – have also encouraged Ukraine’s partners to keep moving forward and to act based on agreed principles, rather than fears.

Rebuilding, Reinforcing and Reimagining Capabilities

Set against the war in Ukraine, the delegation’s meetings in Europe underlined the importance of allied and Canadian investments in defence, but also international assistance and diplomatic capacity. The combined significance of these three pillars is considered next.

Deterrence and Defence

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has accelerated NATO’s return in focus to its original mission of deterrence and collective defence. As was noted during the delegation’s meetings, this shift began in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. It also followed the period, after the Cold War, during which the Alliance had engaged in a range of crisis management activities and conducted out-of-area operations, most notably through its almost 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.

The NATO Secretary General has characterized the steps taken since 2014 as “the largest reinforcement of [the Alliance’s] collective defence in a generation.”^[43] Those steps assumed greater purpose and urgency after 24 February 2022. More than 40,000 troops, along with air and naval assets, are now under direct NATO command. Furthermore, the number of multinational battlegroups has been doubled from the original four (in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) to eight (with the addition of those in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia), the Alliance’s defence plans have been upgraded, more forces have been put at a state of high readiness, and more equipment and supplies have been prepositioned in the eastern part of the Alliance’s territory.^[44]

Credible deterrence has allowed NATO members – including some of the smallest states, on the Alliance’s eastern flank – to transfer significant amounts of their own military kit to Ukraine, on an individual basis. This support has been coordinated, separately, through what is known as the “Rammstein process” (the Ukraine Defense Contact Group), which has brought together more than 50 nations, including Canada.

In 2014, the NATO Allies endorsed the “Defence Investment Pledge” through which they agreed that those among them not already spending 2% of their GDP on defence would move towards that guideline by 2024.^[45] In light of the threats the Alliance has identified, and the requirements associated with the decisions that have been taken to address them, the 2% guideline is now increasingly seen within NATO as a floor rather than a ceiling. It was noted to the delegation that, having certain members not contribute to a mission beyond NATO’s area of responsibility affects the success of the mission in question, but failure to deliver on core commitments poses risks to the Alliance itself. That is because commitments are ultimately converted into capabilities and deployments, or the means necessary to ensure that “every inch” of Alliance territory is defended.

Some Alliance members already have ambitious plans in place. With defence spending at 2.42% of its GDP, Poland is one of the seven Allies who were estimated to have been meeting the NATO guideline in 2022.^[46] Poland now aims to spend 4% in 2023^[47] and to double the size of its 150,000-strong army by 2035.^[48] The Alliance’s newest member, Finland, already spends 1.96% of its GDP on defence.^[49] While not yet a member, the delegation was told that Sweden aims to be spending 2% by 2026. It is expected that the NATO Allies will decide on the future parameters of the Defence Investment Pledge at the July 2023 Summit in Vilnius.

Canada has one of the higher overall defence budgets in the Alliance and has made important contributions to NATO structures and missions. Nevertheless, at 1.29%, Canada was 25^th out of 29 Allies when defence expenditure is measured as a proportion of GDP.^[50] Canada was also one of only four Allies in 2022 who were not meeting the NATO guideline of devoting 20% of defence expenditure to equipment.^[51] As the leader of NATO’s multinational battlegroup in Latvia, Canada must now – at the same time as it has provided significant materiel from its own stockpiles to Ukraine – ensure that it can contribute its share of surging the battlegroup (of some 1,300 personnel) to brigade size (some 3,500–5,000 personnel), when needed, as agreed at the 2022 Madrid Summit.^[52] Such an expansion also requires key enablers for the battlegroup, including air defence systems.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drawn attention to the consequences of lengthy defence procurement processes and reiterated the importance of logistics and sustainment. The delegation was told, for example, that the war has demonstrated the limitations of peacetime models of stockpiling and “just-in-time” manufacturing strategies, while also underlining that the defence industry wants clear, long-term demand signals from governments so that they can invest in the appropriate production capacity.^[53] Going forward, there is also a need to operate at what was characterized to the delegation as the “speed of relevance” – that is, adjusting the speed of defence investment to the speed of innovation. The delegation heard that, ensuring the Alliance has the most cutting-edge capabilities at its disposal, when they are needed, will inevitably require the balancing of risks between ensuring the integrity of procurement processes and the timeliness of deliveries.

The combat in Ukraine has been waged in trenches and street-to-street and has seen both massive exchanges of artillery fires across open terrain as well as ambushes in forests and along narrow roads. While these classical elements of warfare – some of which are reminiscent of the First World War – have received the most attention, they do not tell the whole story. New technology is also being adopted, adapted, and combined for military use, from networked drones of all sizes to software that harnesses artificial intelligence. The battlefield has also extended to the information space, which has seen the unprecedented public disclosure of intelligence about Russia’s military build-up and operations, and to cyberspace. The delegation heard that efforts to move Ukrainian government functions to the cloud played an important role in the war’s opening stage when Russia, alongside its military operations, sought to cripple Ukraine’s government by shutting down its networks. Since that time, Starlink’s vast network of commercial satellites in low-earth orbit have kept many Ukrainians connected to the Internet.

Resilience is not only important for states that are grappling with active security threats on their territory. It was impressed on the delegation that resilience, at the societal level, is a form of deterrence. Such resilience is fostered by investments, whether in cyber security, media literacy, or education, and is upheld by fundamental freedoms. However, those investments, which can enhance social cohesion in the face of major crises and weaken the impact of hybrid tactics like state-backed disinformation campaigns, take time and require trust in institutions.

After being invaded – twice – by the Soviet Union in the 1940s, Finland has worked to reinforce its culture of readiness and resilience. The commitment to do so recognizes that Finland’s survival as an independent state – of only 5.5 million people – in a difficult geopolitical environment necessitates a defensive orientation, which has tangible manifestations. Finland’s system of conscription and military service has produced a reserve strength of some 900,000 citizens, a latent capacity that could be translated into a wartime strength of 280,000 soldiers.

In Finland, actors beyond governmental authorities, including businesses, civil society, and the citizenry, are involved purposively and collaboratively in the maintenance of functions vital to society.^[54] One example is the extensive bunker system that was developed to ensure the population can withstand major emergencies. Institutionally, the “comprehensive” approach to security is reflected in the composition of the 24‑member Security Committee, a permanent body that is tasked with “proactive contingency planning.”^[55] In addition to officials drawn from across Finland’s government and security agencies, the chairs of the National Emergency Supply Council and the Finnish Red Cross, are also members.^[56]

International Assistance

While debates about military equipment have recently dominated media reporting, the war in Ukraine has implications beyond the battlefield. Within the country, millions of civilians have suffered hardships and, beyond, the needs of vulnerable populations have been heightened by the disruptions and price increases Russia’s tactics have caused.

In Ukraine itself, 17.6 million people need some form of humanitarian assistance, including the 6.9 million people who have remained in their homes during the war, the 6.3 million people who are internally displaced, and the 4.4 million returnees.^[57] As the delegation heard, the country’s needs are massive, but they also vary considerably based on the degree to which different areas have been subjected to Russian bombardment or occupation, and the point at which populations may have been liberated or evacuated. In areas of the Donbas that have been subjected to unrelenting combat, some towns and villages are becoming largely depopulated. Many of those who have chosen to stay in their homes amid insecure conditions or who are unable to leave are elderly or have physical limitations to their mobility.^[58]

In addition to those displaced internally, more than 8.1 million refugees from Ukraine had been recorded across Europe as of 11 April 2023. Some 5 million of those refugees are registered for EU or similar national protection measures.^[59] With men of fighting age having to stay behind for possible military service, most of the refugees are women, often accompanied by young children.

While donors like Canada have financed support that is being channelled through the multilateral system, the delegation recognizes that Ukraine’s neighbours have done the heavy-lifting welcoming refugees. In Poland, where more than 10.7 million border crossings from Ukraine have been recorded, approximately 1.58 million refugees from Ukraine have registered for temporary protection.^[60] Poland has created a safe harbour for them by essentially opening its social welfare and healthcare systems, as well as its labour market, to Ukrainians, on the same basis as Polish citizens. They also opened their homes. It has been estimated that a considerable proportion of Polish society – 70% according to survey respondent declarations – helped Ukrainian refugees in some way during the first three months of the war.^[61] These steps have been taken, and sustained, even as Polish citizens have had to manage the impact of high inflation, among other pressures.

The delegation witnessed, first-hand, the generosity of Ukraine’s partners and the resilience of its people at a childcare and educational centre and a residential facility in Warsaw. It also heard some of the heartbreaking stories of women who have been forced to flee the war and the destruction of their communities.

Governments, civil society, and international partners are already focusing on ensuring that Ukrainians will have a viable and prosperous country to which they can return and rebuild. The challenges are considerable. A joint assessment published in March 2023 by Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission, and the United Nations estimates that the first year of Russia’s war against Ukraine resulted in more than US$135 billion in direct damage. The most affected regions are Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kyiv.

Looking ahead, the joint assessment estimates that the full cost of recovery and reconstruction in Ukraine, over a 10-year time horizon, will be US$411 billion. This figure integrates what the report considers to be “critical steps” on Ukraine’s path to becoming “a modern, low-carbon, disaster- and climate-resilient country that has aligned with European Union policies and standards in view of being ready to join the European Union,” and to ensuring “the population’s vulnerabilities are addressed and people live in prosperity.”^[62] To put the total cost in perspective, it is approximately 2.6 times the value of Ukraine’s entire GDP for 2022.^[63]

The report estimates that US$14 billion will be needed in the coming year, including for the restoration of basic services, a figure that encompasses government-implemented and financed priorities, as well as support for the financing of state-owned enterprises and mechanisms that can “sustain and de-risk private investment.”^[64] Determining when the full extent of recovery and reconstruction needs can be met will depend on many factors, including the trajectory of the war. While damage assessments typically focus on infrastructure and the built environment, there are important human dimensions. The report estimates that the war has pushed 7.1 million people into poverty and reversed 15 years of development progress in Ukraine.^[65] The delegation was also reminded of the immense stresses and trauma caused by the war, and the resulting need for psychosocial support services.

Given the estimated costs of reconstruction, the range of actors who are implicated, and the timeline that is likely to be involved, the delegation heard that donor coordination will be essential throughout the process. To that end, in December 2022, the G7 leaders established a “multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform,”^[66] which will be co-chaired by the EU, Ukraine, and the United States, and supported by a secretariat, with one office hosted in Brussels and the other in Kyiv.^[67] At the same time, civil society organizations emphasized that reconstruction should not be overly donor-based and should instead reflect the priorities of Ukrainian people, aim to support local capacity, and ensure democratic oversight of the process. Given long-standing concerns about corruption and institutional reform in Ukraine, clear benchmarks and monitoring mechanisms will be required.

Inclusiveness will also be core to the realization of a just and fair reconstruction process. In general, it was emphasized to the delegation that broader principles and commitments should not be neglected in the response to the war, even if decisions are often having to be made under crisis conditions. Participation is one of the pillars of the women, peace and security agenda, which applies to all situations of armed conflict and has been endorsed through multiple UN Security Council resolutions and championed by Canada and other NATO Allies. That extends to the design and delivery of humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. The women, peace and security agenda recognizes such participation as integral to the building of a positive and durable peace. It also underlines the importance of gender perspectives and analysis, which the delegation heard could – in the context of Ukraine’s reconstruction – be advanced through the meaningful use of gender budgeting, among other measures.

Notwithstanding the scale of humanitarian needs in Ukraine, and the cost and complexity of the country’s reconstruction, the delegation was told repeatedly that Ukraine cannot be the singular focus of Western governments. Despite record-high funding from donors in 2022, information provided to the delegation showed that the requirements of all international humanitarian appeals increased by 461% between 2012 and 2022.^[68] Dire needs exist in many countries, from Afghanistan to Yemen. Indeed, the delegation was told that the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance would – if grouped together – constitute the third most populous country in the world.

While waging its war, Russia has been trying to create fissures in global solidarity for Ukraine by pushing narratives of abandonment and double standards in the countries of the Global South. A sense has taken hold, in some, that the West’s considerable focus on this European war is diverting attention and resources from efforts to address the climate crisis and extreme poverty. The conflict is also sometimes framed as one that is not substantively different from other territorial disputes or easily distinguished from past interventions involving the major powers.

In addition to emphasizing that core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake, and encouraging Ukraine’s own diplomatic outreach in the Global South to deliver that message, the delegation was told that these narratives can be countered by signalling that support for Ukraine will not come at the expense of the international development agenda or humanitarian system. Efforts that have maintained the flow of grain exports from Ukraine and contributed to global food security were highlighted for their importance in this regard. Nevertheless, the message does not appear to be getting across clearly or consistently. Despite the narratives outlined above, the delegation was informed that the EU has supported Ukraine through additional resources, and that Finland has also not – so far – diverted its existing aid programs, although the country was heading into an election. Further emphasis on public diplomacy in relation to aid policy may, therefore, be required.

On the concern about the realization of international development objectives, in Sweden, the government formed in October 2022 has declared that it will focus on Sweden’s neighbourhood and “primarily pursue a Swedish and European foreign policy – with Swedish interests and democratic values at its core.”^[69] Ukraine “is expected to become the largest recipient of Swedish bilateral development assistance.”^[70] Globally, the Swedish government is also “linking aid policy and trade policy.”^[71] At the same time, it intends to redirect core support from multilateral organizations to civil society and expand climate aid, while also continuing to support gender equality and initiatives related to sexual and reproductive health and rights.

There are budgetary implications to the Swedish government’s “ambition to make aid more focused, relevant, effective and transparent” and to establish objectives “in terms of quality and results.”^[72] Sweden’s aid will no longer be pegged to the country’s gross national income, and will instead be a set amount, which is expected to see spending fall from around 1% to 0.88% of GDP.^[73] That would, however, still rank the country as a leading donor and likely far above Canada’s aid spending, which was an estimated 0.37% in 2022.^[74] While Finland has committed to meeting the UN’s aid spending target of 0.7%, it did not establish a clear path to get there – from around 0.4%-0.5% – by 2030, the point at which the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals are meant to be attained.

Diplomacy

In addition to defence and development, the issues raised during the delegation’s meetings also underlined the importance of diplomatic capacity. The term encompasses intellectual and institutional elements, as well as resources.

Crafting a policy response to the next stage of Russia’s war against Ukraine provides a case in point. Given Russia’s refusal to withdraw from Ukraine’s territory, the delegation heard that conditions were not conducive to a negotiated resolution of the war that would be acceptable to Ukraine or that would adhere to the fundamental principles of international order. While the task, at present, is to give Ukraine the support it needs to defend itself and advance on the battlefield, at some point, there will be a shift to diplomacy. Nevertheless, it was noted to the delegation that Western governments do not yet have a common understanding of what the “end game” should be, beyond Ukraine’s victory on its own terms. Ukraine’s partners have emphasized that broad principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity must be upheld, rather than insisting upon the liberation of specific – named – territory.

Ukraine has put forward elements, characterized as a 10-point formula, for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. In addition to the principles mentioned above, which can only be achieved through the full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine’s territory, the formula calls for accountability in relation to the aggression that has occurred and the damages that have been caused. The formula also outlines specific concerns that need to be addressed, including prevention of the repetition of aggression against Ukraine,^[75] as well as restoration of nuclear safety and food, energy, and ecological security.^[76] Ukraine is asking Canada – and other partners – to lead the implementation of elements of this 10-point formula. The urgency of lending support to President Zelenskyy’s vision may now be even greater in light of other proposals that are being made, including China’s position on what it calls the “Ukraine crisis.” That document mentions the cessation of hostilities and the need for a political settlement to be reached as soon as possible, without recognizing the aggression that has occurred or calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops.^[77]

The delegation also heard that the “end game” must be sustainable and, therefore, linked to Ukraine’s larger aspirations, modernization, and democratic consolidation. Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in June 2022, but a long process is likely involved, including because of the strict policy, legal and institutional conditions that any candidate state must meet. While the EU and NATO function differently and for distinct purposes, a lesson could be drawn from 2008 and events thereafter. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the Allies declared that Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO members, but without putting in place a timeline or a clear pathway.^[78] One view is that this approach essentially left them exposed.

While the realization of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine is the paramount concern, there are additional complexities that must be navigated. These include determining the most appropriate mechanism for prosecuting the Russian leadership’s crime of aggression; establishing the conditions under which frozen assets – belonging, separately, to state entities and sanctioned Russian oligarchs – could be seized and used for Ukraine’s reconstruction;^[79] and, exploring the means by which young Russians – who appear to be less supportive of the Putin regime’s policies – and other remaining democratic elements of Russian society can be supported. To craft effective policy, Russia’s power must also be properly understood. While that includes the assessment of conditions on the battlefield, it also extends to having robust analysis of the sources of Russia’s power, from its defence industrial capacity and ability to mobilize military resources, to the nature of its relationships with China and Iran.

Sanctions are the primary tool that Western governments have to limit Russia’s ability to maintain this capacity and harness these resources for a long-term war against Ukraine. Although sanctions have now been expanded and layered to the point of becoming comprehensive, the delegation heard that further work must be done to bolster the implementation and enforcement of these measures. That includes ensuring there is a commensurate expansion in the personnel, expertise, and reporting and monitoring mechanisms needed to realize the intended impact of the measures that have been announced.

While the problem of sanctions circumvention^[80] requires further study, the role of third countries was highlighted by several interlocutors. Sanctions are generally considered to be more effective when imposed and enforced by as a broad a coalition of states as possible. On this point, concerns were raised with the delegation about Russia’s elevated trade with some nearby countries, including Georgia, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, other key global economies are not participating in the sanctions that have been imposed by the G7 nations and the EU, including Brazil, China, and India.

The delegation’s work largely focused on these and other issues connected to the war. Nevertheless, it was constantly reminded of the many issues on the international agenda that could impact or concern Canada. In Stockholm, for example, the delegation discussed Sweden’s leadership in multilateral processes aiming to advance nuclear non‑proliferation and disarmament, which the country’s new government has said will continue. By the time the delegation reached Brussels, however, President Putin announced that Russia was suspending its participation in the only nuclear arms control treaty it has left with the United States, the New START treaty.^[81]

Yet, the challenges do not stop with a revisionist Russia, or even an increasingly assertive and powerful China. In addition to the war in Ukraine, in Brussels, the delegation’s meetings touched on the status of Iran’s nuclear program, the struggles Venezuela has endured trying to move beyond authoritarianism, the complexities involved with delivering aid in a destitute but Taliban-run Afghanistan, and the needs generated by the devastating earthquakes that struck Türkiye and Syria. In Warsaw, the delegation discussed the renaissance in bilateral relations and the significance of the shift in Europe’s centre of gravity eastward, at the same time as concerns around Poland’s rule of law and respect for women’s rights were raised. By the time of the delegation’s final stop, in Helsinki, Arctic security was a recurrent theme. Throughout the delegation’s trip, Canada’s existing and potential roles were considered, including as a partner that can help Europe achieve and sustain full energy independence from Russia while advancing its green transition.

Managing these challenges and seizing these opportunities will not only take diplomatic skill, but a fully resourced network calibrated for the emerging international landscape. Throughout its work, and in the conversations had with Canada’s expert diplomats, the delegation was reminded that nothing replaces insights from people on the ground.

At the same time, not all expertise has to come from within government ministries. Indeed, in Sweden, Finland, and to a lesser extent, Poland, the delegation was told that research collaboration and movement between ministries and external institutes, or think tanks, is common practice. Sweden’s ministries, for example, are relatively small^[82] and there is a tradition of leaning on external research for insights and policy options. Often this research is funded by the government and conducted by government officials on leaves of absence. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs is one example, with some of its senior leadership and researchers coming and going from various ministries over the course of their careers. Another, slightly different example, is the Expert Group for Aid Studies, a small organization that operates within the government, independently evaluating and analyzing “the direction, governance and implementation of Sweden’s official development assistance, with a specific focus on results and efficiency.”^[83] The group’s main task has been characterized as providing an “evidence base” for the management of Sweden’s aid,[84] and the group has already analyzed considerations for the financing and organization of Ukraine’s reconstruction.[85]

In Finland, as a part of its policy planning and research activities, the ministry for foreign affairs carries out research projects in cooperation with Finnish and foreign partners that are then published on the ministry’s website.^[86] In addition, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, established in 2006 by an Act of Parliament, receives basic funding from the Finnish government for its research activities, which are autonomous.^[87] In Poland, a government-affiliated think tank, the Polish Institute of International Affairs, publishes extensively on foreign policy and security issues while providing advice to the Polish government.^[88] A recent report, which researchers from the Institute provided to the delegation, explores the ways Canada and Poland can further bolster their strategic partnership.^[89]

As a group of parliamentarians, the delegation would be remiss in concluding this section, which has focused on diplomatic capacity, without highlighting the importance of parliamentary accountability. In Sweden, the delegation arrived just after the Foreign Affairs Minister, Tobias Billström, had presented the government’s Statement on Foreign Policy. The statement, presented annually in February, outlines the government’s priorities for the coming year and initiates a larger foreign policy debate in the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament).^[90] It is one part of a consensus-building model on foreign affairs in the Riksdag that is perhaps best exemplified by the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, a body chaired by the King of Sweden that consists of the Speaker and nine members of the Riksdag. Under Sweden’s Instrument of Government – one of the four Fundamental Laws that make up Sweden’s constitution – the Swedish government is obligated to “keep the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs continuously informed of those matters relating to foreign relations which may be of significance for the Realm.”^[91] In all foreign policy matters of major significance, the delegation learned, the government confers with the Council, if possible, before a decision is taken.^[92]

In Finland, too, there is a robust model of parliamentary engagement in the development of foreign affairs and security policy. Part of that model involves frequent ministerial appearances at parliamentary committees, but it also extends to engagement with civil society. There is an established practice, for example, before sessions of the UN Human Rights Council, of the foreign affairs minister meeting with a broad range of civil society actors to hear their views.^[93] In addition, once a parliamentary term, the Finnish government submits its Foreign and Security Policy Report to parliament, which “assesses Finland’s foreign and security policy operating environment and defines the goals and priorities for Finland’s actions within the next few years.”[94] These reports, and the comments given by parliament in response, “define Finland’s foreign and security policy.”^[95]

Conclusion

During the delegation’s trip, there were constant reminders of the lessons of history. In Poland’s parliament, the Sejm, there is a large plaque on a marble wall, which commemorates the Deputies of Poland’s Second Republic who were victims of the Second World War. The list of names is staggering in its length. It has the effect of stopping onlookers in place and forcing them to reflect on recorded history and what it reveals that aggression can unleash.

Various moments in history are being invoked to help conceptualize what is transpiring in Ukraine, determine the actions needed in response, and consider their possible consequences. While grappling with these complex issues of war and peace, a timeless parable, mentioned to the delegation, is worth recalling. It is the story of two wolves who are born and then struggle against each other, one embodying the world’s ills and the other its opposite. The point of the story is to ask the listener which grows stronger. And the answer is equally simple: it’s the one you feed.

In addition to the notion that the West was given a “wake-up call” on 24 February 2022, there were other recurrent themes to the delegation’s work. One was the importance of realism in assessing intentions and threats, and preparing on that basis, even if it means taking steps today in anticipation of scenarios that may only unfold years later. Another was that the world is not static. Adversaries adapt, political and economic pressures evolve, and technology does not stand still. Third was recognition of the democratic world’s strength when it acts together, decisively. Finally, there was the understanding that this strength is amplified by investment, in relationships, values, and ideas, and in the capabilities needed to back them up.