The House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (the committee) has studied Canada’s diplomatic capacity, holding six meetings with witnesses between 29 November 2023 and 14 February 2024.[1] In so doing, the committee built on the work of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which conducted the first in-depth review of Canada’s diplomatic machinery since the 1981 report of the Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service.[2] According to the Chair, Senator Peter M. Boehm, the Senate committee’s central finding was that Global Affairs Canada and the foreign service are fit for purpose, “but with several caveats.”[3] These are detailed in the resulting report, More than a Vocation: Canada’s Need for a 21^st Century Foreign Service, which contains 29 recommendations.[4]

During its study, this committee also had the benefit of reviewing the department’s plan for transformation, which was put forward in a June 2023 discussion paper.[5] The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mélanie Joly, outlined the context in which this document was written by conveying her assessment that Canada faces “a growing international security crisis.”[6] She warned that “the rules-based system that has kept Canadians safe for generations is cracking,” and that, to meet the associated challenges, the government’s foreign policy is being guided by two key principles: the defence of Canadian sovereignty and the pursuit of “pragmatic diplomacy.”[7] To succeed on the world stage, Minister Joly said, Canada must have eyes and ears on the ground. That is, diplomats who are “diverse, bilingual, healthy and well equipped.”[8]

The plan to transform Global Affairs Canada is based on four pillars: investing in Canada’s diplomatic workforce; increasing Canada’s diplomatic presence in key regions and multilateral institutions; enhancing Canada’s foreign policy expertise; and strengthening the department’s internal processes, including in relation to cyber security.[9] It was necessary to undertake such a frank assessment of Global Affairs Canada and outline an ambitious path forward, Minister Joly said, because the work of reforming the department had “not been done in decades.”[10] This rationale was echoed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Morrison, who remarked that Canada’s foreign service had been allowed to “atrophy” while the global security environment deteriorated.[11] Gone are the years, he said, in which Canada can operate from the position of being “blessed by geography and by globalization.”[12]

It became clear to the committee that the reference point for scrutinizing Canada’s diplomatic capacity, and determining how to strengthen it, should not be some notion of a “golden age” in Canadian foreign policy, whether that be the years following the Second World War or the end of the Cold War. The world has changed in fundamental ways. This reality was captured in the committee’s report on the implications of the return of major war to Europe, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is entitled “The Wake-up Call.”[13] Confronting this new era begins with the recognition that Canada has less room to manoeuvre and must work harder to achieve its objectives in a context where there are 193 United Nations member states, compared to the 51 that founded the organization in 1945.[14] This larger world is being shaped by the expectations of new economic powers, the pressures of regional assertiveness, the rise of authoritarianism, the tensions of strategic competition, the disruption of new technologies and state-backed threats, and the stresses of climate change.

Regardless of any specific foreign policy approaches that Canadian governments may pursue, the committee was reminded of the “paramount” importance of Canada’s relationship with the United States.[15] It was impressed on the committee that this relationship is an enduring geographic reality and will always be “preponderant” for Canada because the United States is “our partner in trade, our ally in defence and security and our co-steward in managing our shared environment.”[16] Furthermore, the committee was told, Canada’s “influence abroad hinges on our perceived access in Washington and our understanding of Americans.”[17] Decisions made in Washington also shape the broader foreign policy context given the role the United States has played in leading the West and guaranteeing the international order in which Canada has operated since the Second World War.[18] Recognizing the importance of this role is not, however, to suggest that Canada’s foreign policy is one-dimensional. Rather, Canada’s bilateral relationship with the United States, the committee heard, should be balanced “with an active multilateralism aimed at creating norms and rules.”[19]

As a member of the G7, G20, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, among other international institutions, it is the Government of Canada’s view that Canada is part of “almost every table that matters.”[20] Nevertheless, witnesses noted that Canada must navigate the new strategic landscape as a country that comprises “just under one-half of 1% of the world’s population,”[21] and that relies heavily, as a trading nation, “on a well-functioning, stable and open international order” for its prosperity.[22] The challenges are formidable because the landscape itself—the committee was told—is “less hospitable to [Canada’s] interests and values than perhaps at any time since the end of the Second World War.”[23] The world has become “messier, meaner and multi-centred,”[24] and is necessitating adaptation to “permanent turbulence.”[25]

Despite the sense of being at the beginning of a new era of international relations, whose contours are so dynamic and contested that it has not elicited an agreed upon name, the committee was reminded that the Government of Canada had fallen out of the regular practice of conducting the kind of reviews that result in a published foreign policy. Defence and development policies were delivered in 2017[26] (the former of which was updated as the committee was finalizing this report[27]), an address was given to the House of Commons on Canada’s foreign policy priorities,[28] and a dedicated strategy on the Indo-Pacific region was released in 2022.[29] However, Canada’s last comprehensive foreign policy document was the 2005 International Policy Statement.[30] Even with the pieces that have been put in place since, it has appeared to many that a foundation is missing, on which Canada’s relationships, positions, activities, spending, and regional strategies can be based.

Canada’s allies illustrate how such documents are written and released publicly. The committee learned that Japan publishes a Diplomatic Bluebook of almost 400 pages.[31] It is also aware that U.S. administrations are required[32] to publish a National Security Strategy.[33] After announcing in February 2020 that the United Kingdom would conduct the “largest review” of its foreign, defence, security, and development policy since the end of the Cold War,[34] its government published the integrated results in March 2021,[35] which have already been revised to reflect the pace of change in the international environment.[36] The general rationale for such exercises is expressed in Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. It came 14 years after Australia’s previous White Paper and summarized its own purpose in observing that, although “national interests are enduring, the international environment in which we pursue them has changed significantly, and so too has Australia.”[37] The committee heard that the written articulation of foreign policy “forces choices and it forces priorities.”[38] The results signal intentions to allies and serve as “an important communications tool.”[39] According to testimony, if conducted rigorously[40] and backed with urgency and political will,[41] such exercises need not take an excessive amount of time or follow a specific template.[42]

Overall, this study suggested that Canada’s diplomatic machinery should be guided by a foreign policy that is strategic. That is, one which balances realism about Canada’s relative size and weight in the world with the ambition to be present, well-informed, and influential. To support this policy and sustain its implementation, the committee heard that the emphasis must be on ensuring that Canada has capabilities that it can tangibly utilize.

Testimony also emphasized the importance of consistency and coherence when it comes to key principles, particularly in relation to international law, justice, and universal human rights. It was emphasized to the committee that, if Canada wants its “declared commitment to international law to result in concrete diplomatic and reputational gains on the international plane, it must both be and be seen by others to be credible.”[43] Such a status is undermined when there are perceptions of double standards in Canada’s officially adopted positions.[44] While contradictions are more of a hallmark than an aberration of international relations, it was reiterated to the committee that human rights leadership has always been expected and demanded of Canada.[45] Equally important is its application to specific cases. Testimony conveyed that the standards Canada applies to one case affects the diplomatic clout it will have when responding to others.[46]

In addition to testimony that called on the government to produce a strategic, credible, and clear-eyed approach to the world, the other main finding from the committee’s study is that Canada’s governmental machinery must keep pace with significant changes and transformation. Foreign policy objectives cannot be advanced without diplomatic capacity, the committee was told, which “relies on both hard and soft power.”[47] Such multifaceted power derives from a “robust foreign service to serve individual Canadians and Canadian interests,” but also “muscular armed forces to ensure deterrence and collective security,” alongside “well-funded development assistance to deal with global inequities and support fellow democracies.”[48]

To reach its full potential, some witnesses also suggested that Canada’s diplomatic capacity must be conceived of in the broadest terms. Yet, aspects of this capacity appear to be underutilized or underfunded. The committee’s study drew attention to the importance of Canada’s cultural, linguistic, and parliamentary diplomacy. These other channels of engagement were highlighted as having both an amplifying and a reinforcing effect.[49] Based on his postings abroad, one retired diplomat said that collaboration between Canadian missions and provincial delegations is “very important” because “it opens doors to promote our industries, our interests, and our values.”[50] Nevertheless, he also observed that despite what Canada is known to gain from cultural and public diplomacy, “the funding for these programs has been eviscerated.”[51]

In the delivery, but also the design of Canada’s foreign policy, this study underscored that Global Affairs Canada cannot be a closed shop.[52] Significant expertise is held outside the department, including at universities, think tanks and civil society. This intellectual power can be harnessed through consultations, advisory bodies, and secondments, which need to flow in multiple directions, and at different stages of careers. According to testimony, the benefits are both general and specific. Having Global Affairs Canada employees spend more time working in the intelligence community, for example, builds mutual understanding and deepens institutional linkages.[53] Grants could be another tool. One proposal would see Global Affairs Canada supporting academic research in the same manner as the Department of National Defence, in part to allow “the possibility for academics to act as consultants for the department.”[54]

Also requiring attention is the department’s internal policy capacity, beyond units that are responsible for programming, geographic relationships, and day-to-day issues management. The committee was told that a perception has taken hold among many in the research and academic community that Global Affairs Canada “has lost that policy planning edge and needs to develop much better long-term assessment of trends and their potential impacts.”[55]

In addition to having dedicated departmental machinery for policy formulation and over-the-horizon thinking, the committee heard that Canada could learn from its own record of policy “boldness.”[56] Doing so would build on the legacy of Canadian ideas that contributed in the 1990s to the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the Ottawa Treaty to ban land mines. During those same years, Canada made the human security agenda a “central part of the Security Council’s work,” including initiatives that “echo to this day: the protection of civilians; women, peace and security; children and armed conflict; and the responsibility to protect.”[57] Another perspective argued for a balanced approach in relation to what Canada chooses to promote through its foreign policy. The committee received a submission which argued that, while “the promotion of Canadian values used to be one of the three pillars of Canada’s foreign policy of the post-Cold War era (alongside the promotion of prosperity through trade and of world security),” the values pillar has “now overcome these two other pillars and has literally silenced them.” According to this argument, the overemphasis has been “counterproductive” and contributed to Canada’s “marginalization” as a global actor.[58]

When it comes to Canada’s diplomats themselves, including their recruitment and retention, this report aims to highlight the committee’s main observations, rather than to repeat the detailed work that has already been done by the Senate and Global Affairs Canada. That said, some points bear repeating to explain why systemic improvements are required. Testimony noted, for example, that Canada allowed a decade to lapse in its recruitment of foreign service officers (2009 to 2019).[59] As one witness said, “That’s when the chain came off the bicycle.”[60] Furthermore, the foreign service directives that establish the allowances and benefits to which these officers are entitled have not been reviewed since 1981.[61] In fact, many of the issues identified in the Royal Commission’s report—including spousal employment—“have never really been properly addressed.”[62]

At the same time, because of the way that different occupational groups have been staffed, the department indicates that 74% of its Canadian public service employees are not even considered part of the “foreign service.”[63] This situation appears to have created issues, including frustrations related to who is prioritized for—or given access to —assignments abroad.[64] From the perspective of a group of retired members of Canada’s foreign service, this human resources model has left Canada with both “an inadequate foreign service contingent, and a large non-rotational group that lacks satisfactory long-term career prospects.”[65]

It was noted during the committee’s study that, to be successful, Global Affairs Canada employees require training to ensure their proficiency in Canada’s official languages and to maintain their foreign language skills once acquired.[66] Regarding career progression, the committee heard that, in a few cases where there are high-profile political considerations involved, it can make sense for ambassadorships to be given to individuals from outside the department. However, when the number of such appointees grows, it has a disillusioning effect on the career civil servants who comprise Canada’s diplomatic core.[67]

More generally, the department acknowledges that some of its employees, “including foreign service officers with in-depth expertise in specific geographies and issue areas, have increasingly felt disadvantaged over time, including in promotional processes, where emphasis has been placed on management competencies, rather than geographic, linguistic or issue-area expertise.”[68] In addition to what one high-ranking former diplomat described as Global Affairs Canada’s “bureaucratization” over the last 20 years, which has seen civil servants rise “predominantly on the basis of their administrative skills rather than their foreign policy experience,” there is also the issue of resource allocation.[69] As the same witness said, the department’s headquarters in Ottawa is “too big vis-à-vis the missions.”[70] While they are supported by thousands of invaluable “locally engaged staff” (who are hired in host countries),[71] documents indicate that only 18% of the department’s public-service employees, known as “Canada-based staff,” were deployed to missions in 2022.[72]

In many cases, fixing these issues will require reforms, efficiencies, and direction from the department’s leadership. Nevertheless, the committee’s study underlined that Canada’s diplomatic capacity is also—ultimately—a function of resources. Put plainly, the committee was told that,

Global Affairs and its foreign service cannot succeed without resources commensurate with the breadth and significance of their mission. That means money to establish and maintain the presence of appropriate size, not only in capitals, but also at the busiest intersections of the multilateral world. It also means levels of development assistance that will earn us influence and credibility at the table. At present, in comparison with our key allies, we underinvest in both.[73]

Even assuming that reforms to governmental machinery are made and Canada’s foreign policy interests are better defined, another witness put forward a similar, and equally fundamental, assessment. In the absence of adequate resources for diplomacy, defence, foreign intelligence, and national security, “we are only going to be able to partially defend our interests,” he said. “There is very simply a need to invest more.”[74] The transformation of Canadian foreign policy is, therefore, both a process and an objective that can only be realized through the targeted allocation of resources.

Indeed, when France completed a comprehensive review of its foreign service in 2023, the result was a 20% increase in the foreign ministry’s budget and the decision to hire 700 additional employees over four years.[75] The committee was also reminded that the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—are seeking their own amplified voice internationally.[76] When measured according to diplomatic posts, the Global Diplomacy Index, published by the Lowy Institute, ranks Canada 14^th in the G20.[77] Furthermore, the committee was informed that Canada has a large number of “small” or “micro-missions.”[78] In terms of personnel, Canada has yet to replicate the high point it reached in 1990 when it sent 2,993 foreign service officers abroad.[79]

These figures and comparisons matter. Whether it is for the standards that will govern 6G wireless communication systems, or those responding to other societal advancements, the committee recognizes that rules for future frontiers, which will affect Canada’s prosperity and national security, are being written in diplomatic venues.[80] Consequently, it is in Canada’s interest to ensure that it has a full complement of people,[81] equipped with the right expertise and skills, at the right tables.[82]

Capacity will affect Canada’s influence in multilateral organizations overall. It may also determine whether Canada is even invited to join coalitions as they shift to more ad-hoc settings that privilege the capabilities that each actor can contribute.[83] The degree to which Canada is seen as a reliable ally, and included based on that reputation, is critically important—one witness stressed—because Canada “very rarely operates alone.”[84]

Investment in diplomatic capacity is also about ensuring that Canada can anticipate and manage crises that affect its national interests and the well-being of its globally minded and connected citizenry.[85] Consular services need to be supported. Since 2006, the emergency evacuations of Canadians from Lebanon, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Sudan, and Gaza, along with the unprecedented repatriation efforts that were made during the COVID-19 pandemic, have driven this point home.[86] Even outside of conflict zones and emergency settings, the committee was reminded that Canadians “travel the most per capita”[87] and pay for consular services directly when obtaining their passport.[88]

Today, the defining characteristic of the international system in which Canada operates is its complexity. Countless variables and forces, whether political, economic, geopolitical, or technological, are interacting and influencing the system’s trajectory. That said, this complexity becomes less overwhelming when the system is viewed, metaphorically, as a house.[89] With time and pressures, even the best structures, and ones that have served well in the past, can fall into disrepair. It is people, empowered by a supportive environment, equipped with the tools and resources they need, and guided by the objectives they are given, who prevent this erosion or undertake renewal when it must be done.