PROC Committee Report

REVIEW OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST CODE

SUPPLEMENTARY OPINIONS OF THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION

We are pleased to support this report on the Procedure and House Affairs Committee’s review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons which reflects a consensus of its members.  That said, we want to take this opportunity to add a couple reflections.

We should have heard more evidence about the new “parliamentary functions” definition

We believe some of our colleagues on the Committee may have acted too quickly in accepting the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner’s “technical” proposal to incorporate into the Code the definition of “parliamentary functions” used in Board of Internal Economy’s Members By-law.

The Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel’s comments in respect of the proposal to link the Board’s definition of immediate family to that found in the Code—which the Committee considered persuasive in declining the Commissioner’s recommendation—are equally instructive here, we believe:

I think it’s important to look at the purpose and the impact of the definition.  The Board of Internal Economy’s by-law for members is dealing with different things, the same as the Conflict of Interest Act is in dealing with ministers….

A broad definition like that would have different impacts and broader impacts.[1]

Indeed, one of those potential impacts might be visible already through the Commissioner’s 2019 Vandenbeld Report, which relied upon the definition found in the Members By-law, in concluding that an MP endorsing a candidate for another elected office would be unethical:

[129] As noted earlier in the Concerns and Process section of this report, the Members By-law specifically prohibits the use of parliamentary resources for non-parliamentary functions, which include “activities designed, in the context of a federal, provincial, or municipal election, or any other local election, to support or oppose a political party or an individual candidate.”

[130] If it is improper to use parliamentary resources for the purpose of endorsing or supporting a political party or individual candidate, the logical conclusion to be drawn in my view is that using one’s position as a Member of Parliament for that purpose is also improper.

[131] In my view, the Code does not encroach in any way on Members’ participation in election campaigns as long as they do so without using their position as Members.  As such, they may endorse candidates, but only in their private or partisan capacity.[2]

Anchoring into the Code the notion that any activity which an MP cannot spend his or her office budget on is automatically unethical would be, in our view, absurd.  There are many things done by—and expected of—elected officials which are not eligible for office reimbursements and nor should they be.

While it is absolutely right that our taxpayer-funded budgets should not be available for partisan campaigning, our constituents often expect their politicians to have views and take positions on the major discussions in their community, including provincial and municipal elections.  To expect our constituents to understand that that their MP can speak about politics, yet not “as an MP”, beggars belief; and to explain that there is a distinction probably would actually diminish the view that audience would hold of politicians and political institutions.  Picturing the scenario calls to mind the metaphor “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?”

In the circumstances, we believe the Committee’s decision to decline the Commissioner’s recommendation to include specific reference to municipal and school council membership among interests which could be furthered should be instructive to the Commissioner with respect to the views and interpretations of our Committee when it comes to MPs’ engagement in political campaigns in our communities.  To do otherwise would be equally confusing and unexpected for both Members and our constituents.

Just slapping the label “technical” on the Commissioner’s proposal does not necessarily mean its implications could not be far-reaching and consequential and that inquiry may be waived.  In our opinion, this proposal and its implications should have been probed with greater depth before a decision was taken.

Any further study would be better done by the full Committee

As we acknowledge in the foregoing comments, there are matters related to the Code which do require further reflection and study.

We are concerned, however, by the Committee’s suggestion to hive off this work to a panel of just five MPs, acting as a subcommittee of the Committee.  Two factors motivate our point of view.

Firstly, the ethical rules which bind all Members of Parliament are an important part of our life and work as parliamentarians.  At a minimum, continued studied should be entertained by a full committee of the House.

Secondly, so long as hybrid proceedings are in place for the House, there would be serious resource implications for the work of the House’s committees.  Effectively, for every new meeting added—which would include any for a subcommittee—requires another meeting to be cancelled.  The Committee’s recommendation is a clever, indirect vehicle for the government to throw a wet blanket on other committees when they are busy holding it accountable over one problem or another.

In light of those considerations, we believe that any further review of the Conflict of Interest Code ought to be conducted by the full Procedure and House Affairs Committee.

That said, we have hesitations about the interest in shifting toward a “values-based code”, which the Committee’s recommendation mentions, and which Liberal members urged in questioning witnesses during this study.[3]  While we are open to considering ideas which would raise and strengthen ethics in Parliament, we also do not want to see the adoption of a mindset and rules whereby unethical conduct can be excused so long as “your heart is in the right place”.

This report reflects the strength of consensus deliberations

Finally, in passing, we want to acknowledge that this report reflects the strength of the Committee proceeding on a consensus basis when it comes to reviewing the rules which govern and guide the House, its Members and our work.

Conservatives have long insisted that changes to our internal rules ought to be adopted on a consensus basis.  With this report, the Committee has accomplished just that—and demonstrated that it is not too hard to achieve.  To that end, we want to acknowledge the role our Chair played in forging a consensus among the members of the Committee as we worked through several engaging, productive conversations.

The natural inclination she demonstrated building a consensus on this report leads us to speculate that, back in 2017, when she, as Government House Leader, rejected Conservative calls to handle her discussion paper on procedural reforms with a consensus-driven approach that she was perhaps, in all reality, simply acting under the directions of a Prime Minister’s Office which has, time and again, proven its commitment to wedging and dividing parliamentarians and all Canadians.