| M-102 — November 6, 2023 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize: |
| (i) the damage done to democracy around the world, including to Canadian political stability, by the disinformation orchestrated by some foreign regimes, |
| (ii) the need to work to strengthen the Canadian fight against the disinformation inside and outside of the country, acknowledging the technical and intellectual capacity Canada has in that field, and the need for cooperation with partners; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should: |
| (i) put more effort into the security of social media accounts and web pages of Cabinet members, members of Parliament, and other political figures who suffer from the deliberate cyberattacks, |
| (ii) consult the relevant researchers and analysts in the field from Canada and abroad regarding the possible outcomes in case of continued cyber interference in the Canadian domestic political scene, |
| (iii) join efforts with the relevant parties to prevent any possible cyber interference in the Canadian political environment, |
| (iv) promote additional research about the intricacies in ownership tendencies among the leading social media platforms to detect any potential vulnerabilities for their further use in Canada and urgently develop a constructive strategy with further steps on how to proceed regarding these tendencies, |
| (v) take into consideration the circumstances of the ongoing conflicts around the world and their impact on the disinformation on a global level, especially the Russian digital propaganda in the context of the Russian unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, |
| (vi) cooperate with the well-established Ukrainian and European-wide NGOs with a robust history of countering the disinformation regarding the cases of disinformation materials spread by Russia where Canada is mentioned, |
| (vii) examine the examples of Canada being misused by Russia in its disinformation campaigns and work together with the Ukrainian fact-checkers and disinformation specialists on ways of damage control and prevention of further escalation of disinformation against Canada and its assistance efforts in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine, |
| (viii) consider other ongoing conflicts around the world that are reshaping the modern informational landscape and examine the coping strategy for each individual case, |
| (ix) work together with vulnerable communities directly affected by the disinformation campaigns in the conflict-affected areas, such as minority groups, survivors of sexual violence, refugees, children, locals at the temporarily occupied territories, etc., |
| (x) raise awareness about the importance of media literacy in the circumstances mentioned above and promote fair practices to ensure a prominent level of “informational hygiene” in cooperation with the relevant specialists, |
| (xi) support the media literacy initiatives in other countries by any means, especially those targeted towards the conflict-affected communities, i.e., in Ukraine. |
| M-86 — June 12, 2023 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) representative democracy is a fundamental part of Canadian society, |
| (ii) in Canada’s current electoral system, the majority of voters cast ballots for a candidate who does not get elected, and many voters feel that election results do not accurately reflect their views, |
| (iii) a Leger poll conducted in September 2020 showed that 80% of Canadians support the idea of striking a non-partisan, independent citizens’ assembly on electoral reform, |
| (iv) many Canadians are concerned with the health of Canada’s democracy, including voter distrust and disengagement, low voter turnout, and the polarization of politics, |
| (v) all politicians, and all parties, are widely perceived by the public to have a vested interest in the design of the electoral system, |
| (vi) citizens' assemblies have considerable legitimacy and public trust because they are independent, non-partisan, representative bodies of citizens, |
| (vii) citizens’ assemblies have been used successfully in Canada, Australia, Belgium, France, Ireland, Scotland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom to tackle difficult issues through nuanced public deliberation, |
| (viii) a citizens' assembly on electoral reform would give citizens a leadership role in building consensus on a specific model for electoral reform for Canada; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should create a Canadian citizens’ assembly on electoral reform, which would, |
| (i) consist of citizens selected by sortition, an impartial selection process to ensure the assembly’s independence and non-partisanship, |
| (ii) reflect the diversity of the Canadian population, including a representation and meaningful participation of age groups, genders, ethnicities, languages, socioeconomic backgrounds, and geographic regions including from First Nations, Inuit and Metis peoples, |
| (iii) determine if electoral reform is recommended for Canada, and, if so, recommend specific measures that would foster a healthier democracy. |
| Pursuant to Standing Order 86(3), jointly seconded by: |
| and — June 13, 2023 |
| — June 14, 2023 |
| — July 12, 2023 |
| — August 2, 2023 |
| — August 3, 2023 |
| — September 26, 2023 |
| — September 29, 2023 |
| — October 11, 2023 |
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| — October 16, 2023 |
| — October 18, 2023 |
| and — October 19, 2023 |
| and — October 20, 2023 |
| — October 23, 2023 |
| — October 24, 2023 |
| — October 27, 2023 |
| — November 2, 2023 |