moved that Bill , be read the second time and referred to a committee.
She said: Mr. Speaker, I rise in the House today in support of Bill , an act to implement the 2023 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine. This is not the first time I have stood in this House to introduce a new trade agreement, but this trade agreement is special. I rise today to enter into the record the story behind this agreement, because all members in the House, all Canadians and, especially, the 1.3 million members of the Ukrainian Canadian community, should know how it came about.
The story of this agreement begins with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's first visit to Canada back in 2019. During that visit, President Zelenskyy and the announced a mutual intention to modernize the existing Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. Following that announcement, public servants in both countries went about doing their respective homework to prepare for renewed negotiations.
That homework often takes many months. It is just part of the routine for our respective civil servants and trade negotiators. However, there was nothing routine about the way these negotiations unfolded.
First came the pandemic, which stalled progress for over a year. Then, when we were finally ready to launch negotiations, Russian troops were massing along the Ukrainian border.
On January 27, 2022, I held a virtual event with Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine's deputy prime minister and minister of economy, to announce the start of negotiations on this agreement. Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine at that time, but it was already clear that the situation was reaching a precipice. The world was seeing that an invasion was imminent, and there was a lot of uncertainty.
A short time before that announcement, I asked my Ukrainian counterpart if she and her government were still willing and able to move forward with negotiations. Her answer was candid and unequivocal: She told me that her government was determined to move ahead, and she told me how much it mattered that Canada was showing confidence in Ukraine at a time when many were beginning to question its resolve.
Ukraine knew then which path it wanted to take for its future. Ukraine had chosen the values of democracy, openness and transparency, as well as a rules-based international order. A sovereign Ukraine was seeking to modernize its infrastructure, its economy and its laws. A comprehensive and progressive free trade agreement would be an important step toward modernization for Ukraine, and Canada would be its gateway.
One month after that announcement, on February 24, 2022, Russia moved in with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and it invaded for all the reasons I just listed: Ukrainian territorial and economic sovereignty, values of openness and democracy, and a rules-based international order. Vladimir Putin despises all these things, and he could not stand to see Ukraine embrace them, uphold them and blossom into a great modern nation. That is why he invaded Ukraine.
On that day, I knew, the knew and the government knew what we had to do. As long as the government of Ukraine stood, we would stand with it. Since the war began, Canada has committed $9 billion in military, humanitarian, financial and development assistance to Ukraine. We also understood that standing with Ukraine meant that we would see these trade negotiations through to the end.
At the outset, it was not easy. The war made travel dangerous and even routine calls impossible for our Ukrainian counterparts. Negotiations had barely begun; suddenly, they came to a standstill. They stayed at a standstill for four months, until I travelled for meetings at the OECD in Paris. That is where I met Ukraine's chief negotiator, Taras Kachka.
It is important to understand that we did not plan a formal meeting that day. He and I, along with Canada's chief negotiator, simply sat in the cafeteria of the OECD building and talked. Mr. Kachka recounted the first 120 days of the war and the challenges he had to overcome just to make that one trip to the OECD. I again asked if Ukraine was able and willing to begin negotiations. Mr. Kachka said yes and I said yes, and negotiations began in earnest.
A few weeks later, at the G7 summit in Germany, I finally met Deputy Prime Minister Svyrydenko face to face. We revisited our earlier conversations and talked of how our earlier hope of avoiding the conflict had been so savagely dispelled. We reiterated our mutual intention to reach an agreement, and then we hugged.
The private conversations I had with my Ukrainian counterparts moved me in ways that are hard to describe. If they had told me that they were not yet ready to begin trade talks, of course we would have waited. Canada would have given Ukraine as much time as it needed.
Ukraine's quiet resolve to move forward was unmistakable and unbreakable. These negotiations were driven by the very values of openness and self-determination that Ukrainian soldiers were and are fighting and dying for. I can tell the House today that, even in the midst of an all-consuming war effort, Ukraine's commitment to those values never wavered and neither did Canada's.
[Translation]
I am proud to say that this agreement was achieved in record time, a mere 12 months from start to finish. That shows the resolve that Canada and Ukraine share on this crucial matter. This process reached its conclusion just a few weeks ago, when our and President Zelenskyy signed this agreement as part of President Zelenskyy's second visit to Canada. It is my true honour to speak to it in this House.
It is not just that we reached a deal in 12 months; it is that we reached an exceptional deal. In trade circles, it is known as a “high-quality agreement”. It includes provisions for trade in services and investments, a binding dispute settlement mechanism to ensure fair treatment, and labour protections. It recognizes the importance of small- and medium-sized businesses, women-owned businesses and indigenous-owned businesses, and it includes environmental protections that are the strongest of those in any of Canada's trade agreements currently on record.
In terms of its contents, it is on par with best practice agreements such as CUSMA, the CPTPP and CETA. With this agreement, Canada becomes the first country to sign a comprehensive trade agreement with Ukraine.
Ukraine has told us that this trade deal would serve as a model for further agreements with other prospective partners. That is one of the reasons I said this agreement is special.
Above all, this agreement is special because Canadians support Ukraine's fight against Putin's barbaric invasion. They demonstrate their support through their government with military, humanitarian and financial aid. However, support for Ukraine is not limited to government alone. Here in Canada, many individuals and organizations are helping by welcoming Ukrainian families fleeing the war. Many more Canadian organizations and businesses want to join that effort, both here at home and in the Ukrainian heartland.
This agreement opens up new avenues for Canadians to support Ukraine. It establishes the rules by which Canadian companies could invest in Ukraine's reconstruction, modernize its infrastructure and create jobs in Ukraine, as well as here in Canada. There are Canadian companies already active in Ukraine, and more are joining as we speak. The Canadian construction firm of Aecon is now forming partnerships in Ukraine under a memorandum of collaboration for the construction of a hydro power plant in Ukraine.
The presence of Canadian companies will help Ukraine persevere amid the strife of war. Thanks to this agreement, more can and will join them. Through all these activities, Canada and a victorious Ukraine will strengthen our shared values in our pursuit of peace, mutual success and prosperity. At the end of the day, trade is not just about business; it is about shared values.
Ukrainians and Canadians both want a free, modern and democratic Ukraine. This trade agreement is a manifestation of those shared values. I am truly proud to have been a part of it.
Today, I urge the House to reaffirm its commitment to those values and its support for Ukraine by ensuring the swiftest possible passage of this bill. Slava Ukraini.
:
Mr. Speaker, Conservatives have a very long, storied and proud tradition of supporting free trade. We only have to look back to the negotiations of the original Canada-United States free trade agreement, which was, of course, something Conservatives were in favour of and that Liberals campaigned very hard against. I was a young lad back then, but I remember a commercial from the Liberal Party on this, talking about free trade. It said that there was only one more line that we had to remove, and then it erased the border between Canada and the United States. That was a long time ago, but I just want to talk briefly about how strongly Conservatives support free trade. We believe in free trade between free nations as an integral part of improving the prosperity of all people.
We were also the people who started the negotiations on CETA. The CETA deal is a Conservative deal that was started by Prime Minister Harper as part of our aggressive trade expansion. The same thing with the CPTPP, which was a Conservative initiative. Conservatives are very supportive of free trade.
This original free trade agreement between Canada and Ukraine was originated by a Conservative government under Prime Minister Harper. The member for , from the Conservative Party, was the lead negotiator on that. He will speak to this, and we will have some wonderful insights on this agreement.
When we talk about the importance of the Canada-Ukraine relationship, we have to talk about the 1.3 million Canadians of Ukrainian origin who live here in Canada. Many of them were integral in the development of western Canada. They are an incredible and important part of the social fabric of Canada, and their contributions to Canada cannot go unnoticed. As a result of that, in part, we have very strong people-to-people ties between Canada and Ukraine. Of course, we are strong supporters of Ukraine during the illegal invasion being prosecuted by Russia.
With respect to this agreement in particular, this modernization would build on the 2017 agreement, which updated or added 11 new chapters to the free trade agreement. The updated chapters included rules of origin and procedures, government procurement, competition policy, monopolies and state enterprises, electronic commerce, digital trade, labour, the environment, transparency, anti-corruption and responsible business conduct.
There is also a significant number of new chapters, 11 new chapters, in this trade agreement, and I will talk a little more about that later in my remarks. However, these are on investment; cross-border trade and services; temporary entry for business people; development and administration of measures; financial services; services and investment, non-conforming measures; telecommunications; trade and gender; trade and small and medium-sized enterprises; trade and indigenous peoples; and good regulatory practices. This is a substantial change from the original agreement that was signed in 2017.
On that, I would echo some of the comments made by the NDP, which is that this agreement is actually substantial. It is a very large trade agreement. Of course, we have to take our time to make sure we study free trade agreements in detail and thoroughly. However, it does seem as though the government is trying to rush this forward, and I am not sure that is necessarily the way Parliament should look at things. We should do our jobs as parliamentarians.
I would like to talk about the original trade agreement. In 2022, Canada's total merchandise trade with Ukraine was $420 million, $150 million in exports and $270 million in imports. The way the original agreement was designed, as it was negotiated by the Conservative government, was that this would be, in a sense, a bit of an asymmetrical agreement.
It was set up such that Ukraine would have a little more advantage in the early stages of the agreement, with the anticipation that there would be a final agreement in which more things would be added. Originally, this was primarily a merchandise agreement. We can see now that a lot of chapters have been added on the services side. I suspect that as a result of that, we will see the trade balance perhaps narrow between Canada and Ukraine, but in general increase the trade between the two countries.
After the ratification of the original agreement, exports to Ukraine, other than coal, grew about 28% between 2016 and 2019, which reinforces the view that trade, especially free trade, is good for both countries. We saw a significant increase in the two-way trade between two countries as a result of the free trade agreements, which goes back to why Conservatives absolutely and unequivocally support free trade agreements.
Interestingly enough, the top three exports to Ukraine were motor vehicles and parts, fish and seafood, and pharmaceutical products. The top imports from Ukraine were animal and vegetable fats, oils, iron and steel, and electrical machinery and equipment. Canadian businesses certainly have an opportunity to expand their trade with Ukraine.
I have undertaken to consult with industry with respect to this. I have spoken with agricultural companies, agricultural industries, etc. The challenge of course is the very condensed time frame, and I should explain this.
What we have before Parliament is the enabling legislation to implement the free trade agreement, but that is probably not what we are debating today. We are not actually going to look at and debate whether “subsection 42.1(1.1) of the act is amended by adding the following paragraph after (a).” I suspect that is not what we will debate here today.
The implementation legislation is how we implement the changes to relevant statutes and other things to implement the actual free trade agreement. This implementation bill's enabling legislation does not seem to have much in it that any of us will spend a lot of time debating in this chamber, although I could be wrong, as some members do enjoy debating those kinds of things.
The member for might enjoy going through and deciding whether “paragraphs (b) and (c) of the definition Ukraine in subsection 2(1) of the act are replaced by the following” is a good or significant change, but that is not what I will talk about today.
What we can talk about are the general principles of supporting free trade and the free trade agreement itself. In that is some of the difficulty that was expressed by the NDP member. He said he had not had the time to discuss this legislation with his caucus and colleagues, which takes me back to discussions with stakeholders.
As part of looking at whether this will be a trade agreement that benefits Canada, we want to talk to stakeholders to see whether they view some of the changes to this free trade agreement as being good or bad. In particular, in the agricultural sector, we are going to be talk about things like sanitary and phytosanitary measures. We are going to look at whether the quotas that will be allowed, the products that are coming in without tariff, are appropriate. This could be in the beef sector, the pork sector or in a whole bunch of agricultural sectors.
Those consultations are ongoing right now. I have reached out to the industries that would be affected by that to find out where they stand on it.
When I attended law school, we had professors very clearly say that the devil was often in the details. I am not 100% sure that Parliament should just pass things without any scrutiny whatsoever. We have learned that when other trade agreements were put forward by the Liberal government and passed rapidly, we ended up with some challenges.
If we look at, for example, free trade with the European Union, we have all kinds of challenges now with the sanitary and phytosanitary measures surrounding beef and pork. It is a particular issue right now in our negotiations with the U.K. It is almost impossible for Canadian beef or pork producers to export into the United Kingdom. They also have great difficulty exporting into the European Union. Why? It is because there are sanitary and phytosanitary measures preventing those exports from taking place. We would think that after this amount of time that these things would be resolved. However, for both things, there are very complicated dispute resolution procedures in place to try to resolve issues of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are important. They are put in place to ensure the health of people consuming the products. They are also protections put in place to protect biodiversity, to ensure things are not contained within certain products that could harm biodiversity. These measures are important, but sometimes these sanitary and phytosanitary measures are used as non-tariff barriers, or NTBs. NTBs have become sort of the new way to frustrate free trade. As we look around the world, we see that NTBs are growing in number and there are challenges in resolving those free trade agreements.
I took the time to look at the section in this free trade agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. I am pleased to see that this section sets out that they will be resolved within the rules set out by the World Trade Organization. That is quite a difference from the measures that have been put in place for the resolution of sanitary and phytosanitary measures within CETA, which the U.K. benefits from in the transitional agreement. Trying to resolve those issues through that process has proven to be, if not incredibly complicated, almost impossible. It is good to see that is in this agreement.
If we look at the opportunities for Canada, one of the things I raised in my question to the was that the agreement talked about the phase-out of coal. However, in Europe, we have seen the rise in the use of coal by a number of countries as a result of them trying to stop buying Russian gas. As we all know, the purchase of Russian gas is providing revenues and profits to Russia so it can use those monies to fund its illegal war in Ukraine.
Many European countries have asked Canada to export more LNG, and the United States has actually taken that up. It has built a number of LNG export facilities over the last number of years to take advantage of the demand for LNG, including that demand in Europe. Unfortunately, Canada has not taken advantage of that and, in fact, has lost all kinds of opportunities.
However, when talk about transition, we do not transition from coal to a solar panel. Those kinds of transitions generally do not work. We do not transition from coal to a wind turbine and solar. Those things do not work. Both of these things provide intermittent power. Intermittent power makes maintenance of the electric grid more expensive and it is unreliable when there are surges in demand. We need a strong baseload of electricity generation.
I hope that when I have the time to go through this agreement in full, I will see this addresses a great area of potential opportunity for Canada and Ukraine with respect to electricity generation. We have amazing expertise in the production of nuclear reactors, as does Ukraine. Canada has all kinds of uranium that it can export. I really hope there will be some things in the agreement that talk about furthering this kind of development and partnership. It would be both good for Ukraine and good for Canada.
However, transitioning from coal would be beneficial to the world. When we look at energy transitions, we know they do not happen rapidly. In fact, they take a long time. All we have to do is think about how coal was discovered 200 to 250 years ago. We have had gas, natural gas and nuclear for a much shorter period of time, but they have not completely displaced coal even though the power density for both gas and nuclear is far more dense than for coal. Therefore, it makes sense to transition to these things.
This is the challenge in suggesting we transition from coal to solar or wind, because the actual energy density is so much smaller. An electricity plant that would use LNG or nuclear would take up 20 acres, but to get a similar amount of energy from wind or solar, we would be looking at 10 to 100 times that amount of land. The suggestion that we can make those transitions quickly from coal to wind and solar is not feasible and it does not make sense. We should be exploring the opportunities that Canada has with LNG and nuclear.
The Conservative Party is 100% behind supporting Ukraine, supporting trade and free trade. Free trade between free nations is something we support 100%. I look forward to going through this agreement and to the debate on this agreement in the House.
:
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in the House to speak to Bill , which seeks to modernize the 2017 Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, or CUFTA. I rise as the Bloc Québécois international trade critic, and I am pleased to speak on behalf of my political party today.
I just want to remind the House that our party is continuing a tradition, because Quebec's independence movement has been advocating for free trade since the 1980s with a view to exiting the Canadian economic framework, which is too narrow. It has been a quite a deal for our SMEs, whose expertise is as valuable as it is diverse. I should note, however, that our position is not categorical: A trade agreement may be bad, and it is what it contains that determines whether or not we support it. If an agreement is going to be harmful to our key sectors, commodify our public services to an unreasonable degree, give multinationals the upper hand or hurt the environment or workers' rights, we would not support it merely because we believe in the virtues of international trade.
In the present case, I will say right now that we will be voting in favour of the principle of the modernized 2023 agreement, since we are still at the principle stage. However, we have a major concern about something that I will talk about a bit later, something that we will be urging the government to commit to changing.
Let us first look at the context. We are talking about modernizing an agreement that dates back to 2017, but we could basically call it a new agreement. The 2017 CUFTA, which was essentially negotiated by Stephen Harper's Conservative government, was mostly about extending a hand of friendship to Ukraine, a symbolic stance, since trade with Ukraine was rather marginal at the time. The negotiations ended in the summer of 2015, just before the election, but the agreement was signed by the current government during the Ukrainian Prime Minister's visit to Ottawa in 2016 and it took effect in 2017. The Bloc Québécois supported that agreement. Given that we wanted to move forward quickly since Ukraine was looking for international support, the 2017 CUFTA was pretty bare-bones. More work could have been done, particularly with regard to the implementation mechanisms that were meant to ensure compliance with the agreement. They were rather weak.
What we have before us today is a real trade agreement. Bill is 15 pages long and merely amends Canadian legislation to align it with the agreement's requirements so that the government can go ahead and ratify it. Bill C‑57's clauses are largely technical, as most of them change references to the 2017 CUFTA or other agreements, replacing them with references to the modernized 2023 agreement for consistency. It also authorizes the establishment, recognizes the authority and allows for the funding of the various institutional mechanisms provided for in the agreement, including the secretariat responsible for overseeing the agreement and the various dispute settlement bodies.
The modernized 2023 agreement is a comprehensive agreement. We are talking about 1,000 pages. It contains 30 chapters covering trade in goods and services—including special provisions in a number of areas—as well as investment, government procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labour law and environmental law. It also includes provisions to favour SMEs or businesses owned and operated by women and indigenous people. It casts the net wide.
For starters, we were pleased to see that the content of the June 2022 order was not included in this agreement. Countries in difficulty or at war are often exempted from Canadian tariffs, but this was the first time supply management was included. Ukraine became totally, or almost totally, exempt from supply management in relation to Canada and its borders. Chicken farmers were very concerned, and for a year, they suffered the ill effects of that access. It was unacceptable. There was no reason for this to happen, especially given the rather ridiculous reasoning behind it. For example, it was alleged, on the basis of studies from several years ago, that there is no bird flu in Ukraine. However, we know that viruses can mutate and that one of the main sources of bird flu in Europe is Poland, which is right next door. Until proven otherwise, birds, such as chickens, do not respect borders. They are not screened at the border. If there were a major outbreak in Poland, it would be surprising if there were no cases, contrary to what was being said in Ukraine.
In short, this agreement covers the components of trade and various related sectors likely to impact trade. Among its 30 chapters, 11 are new since the 2017 CUFTA. The “Cross-Border Trade in Services” chapter sets out the rules applicable to services. The chapter entitled “Development and Administration of Measures” ensures that administrative practices are predictable and consistent. The “Investment” chapter protects investments and replaces the 1994 bilateral agreement for the protection of investments.
The annexes on services and investment non-conforming measures complement the chapter on cross-border trade in services. They clarify its application in specific areas and list the exceptions that both countries wish to retain.
The “Temporary Entry for Business Persons” chapter is a necessary provision for business to occur between the two countries. It did not appear in the 2017 CUFTA.
Although the “Telecommunications” chapter does not completely open up access to the telecommunications market, it guarantees access to the telecommunications infrastructure. It does not cover broadcasting and therefore has no impact on cultural policy. Fortunately, the cultural exemption, as we call it, remains intact, and a good thing too, because we certainly would have fought this provision if it violated the cultural exemption.
The “Financial Services” chapter, which complements the chapter on cross-border trade in services, sets out the rules applicable to financial services without completely opening up the market. The Canadian banking market remains essentially protected. This chapter sets out the rules that facilitate the use of financial services in the other country and the simple flow of capital.
Three chapters are being added to the 2017 CUFTA concerning the participation of certain groups in trade, specifically SMEs, women and indigenous people. This allows preferential measures to be put in place.
There is also the chapter entitled “Good Regulatory Practices”, which codifies the manner in which regulations are adopted to ensure transparency and predictability.
Eight of the chapters in the 2017 CUFTA are being amended. The chapter entitled “Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures” relaxes the rules of origin for products containing materials that come from a country with which a free trade agreement has been concluded. The chapter entitled “Digital Trade” clarifies the rules that apply to electronically transmitted data to ensure more efficient flow. The chapter entitled “Competition Policy” clarifies the competition rules that could hinder trade, particularly in the case of Ukraine, where mass privatization occurred after the fall of the U.S.S.R. State monopolies were replaced by private quasi-monopolies that were difficult to break into. The agreement will help address that. The chapter entitled “Designated Monopolies and State-Owned Enterprises” includes the provisions of the 2017 CUFTA, but in a separate chapter to facilitate its implementation.
The chapter entitled “Government Procurement” was in the 2017 CUFTA, but in the form of a statement of intent only. The new agreement includes provisions from the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, which takes it away from the WTO's dispute settlement bodies, which have been paralyzed for years, and gives it instead to the panels under the Canada-Ukraine agreement. This chapter is very important, considering the huge contracts that will be awarded for rebuilding Ukraine, presumably in the near future, as soon as the war is over, which we hope is not too long from now.
The chapters on the environment and labour, which were also statements of intent in the 2017 CUFTA, will now be binding.
Now let us talk about the chapter entitled “Transparency, Anti-Corruption, and Responsible Business Conduct”. The 2017 CUFTA contained anti-corruption measures. The 2023 agreement adds provisions on responsible business conduct. We know that the government is boasting about this chapter. This section encourages businesses to adopt internationally recognized guidelines and principles of responsible business conduct and corporate social responsibility, but these codes are purely voluntary. It is merely a fine principle. It is completely empty. There is nothing in it but encouragement to follow lofty principles. There is no body to oversee or verify compliance with this chapter.
In other words, we should disregard the siren songs of the Liberals, who are bragging that this chapter will do even more to help in the fight against corruption in Ukraine. That concludes the overview of the new and amended chapters.
Now, there are some potentially predictable effects that would encourage us to support the principle of this agreement. Even though trade between Canada and Ukraine is up by one-third since the 2017 agreement was signed, Ukraine remains a small trading partner for Canada. In 2022, the value of Canada's merchandise exports to Ukraine was $150.2 million, or 0.02% of the $760 billion in goods Canada exported last year, even in the context of a country at war. The top three exports to Ukraine were motor vehicles and parts, fish and seafood, and pharmaceutical products. Again in 2022, imports from Ukraine were valued at $271.2 million, or 0.04% of the $780 billion in Canadian imports. Canada's top imports from Ukraine were animal and vegetable fats and oils, iron and steel, and electrical machinery and equipment.
The trade impact of this new agreement will therefore be marginal, especially given that most of the goods and services are already subject to free trade, because, until proven otherwise, like Ukraine, we are still part of the World Trade Organization. However, this agreement will bring greater predictability than the previous 2017 agreement, which should make things easier.
I will point out that the 2023 agreement provides one extra year of guaranteed access to the Ukrainian market for 20,000 metric tonnes of Canadian pork, a major production sector for Quebec. These provisions should please pork producers. The chapter on government procurement could also become very important during Ukraine's post-war reconstruction, especially for Quebec engineering firms, some of which are very successful internationally. They could be enlisted to help rebuild the country's infrastructure. Dam building, for instance, is an area where our expertise is internationally recognized.
I will now address the concerns we have. As usual, the main one is transparency. Parliament's ability to amend Bill , the subject of today's debate, is fairly limited. Amendments must relate only to the bill and cannot affect the agreement itself. This limitation of parliamentary powers is not exclusive to the Canada-Ukraine agreement; indeed, the people's elected representatives in this House, the issue of a monarchical culture, have very little involvement in international treaties. Their power is limited to saying yes or no to whatever the government has signed. We have this agreement before us and there is very little we can do. We cannot say that one item or another needs to be improved or that we are opposed to certain aspects. It is just not possible. We cannot influence the contents of these agreements in any way. By the same token, while provinces are responsible for implementing the parts of the treaty that pertain to their jurisdictions, they are not involved in the negotiations, as opposed to what is done in Europe, for instance, where member states play an integral part. Even if the treaty is with the European Union, negotiations happen with the parliaments of member states.
Again, these democratic shortcomings are not exclusive to the Canada-Ukraine agreement. The entire Canadian approach to signing treaties has to be reviewed. Regardless of the issue or political stripe, governments do not really appreciate it when their opponents look too closely at what they do. When it comes to trade agreements, secrecy is in order. Canada, with its deep-seated monarchical traditions, keeps the treaties it signs in the dark, afraid that they might turn to ashes like vampires if they see the light of day. As a member of Parliament, I have had the unfortunate opportunity to experience that first-hand. In November and December 2020, at the Standing Committee on International Trade, we were forced to examine the Canada-United Kingdom free trade agreement without seeing the text of the agreement. During that sad bit of absurd theatre, we had witnesses, experts and groups telling us about an agreement about which they knew as much as we did as elected representatives, which is nothing at all.
When Canada's foreign affairs department was created in 1909, the minister was supposed to table before Parliament an annual report on the department's operations. This report would logically include an overview of Canada's international discussions and commitments.
In 1995, when globalization was in full swing, the legislation governing the department was amended to give the minister a freer hand by granting him jurisdiction over international trade to the detriment of the institution of Parliament. The requirement to submit an annual report was abolished. A Parliament worthy of its name should have procedures to increase democratic control over agreements. The Bloc Québécois tabled seven bills on this between 1999 and 2004.
The other irritants in this agreement are the investor-state dispute settlement provisions. They are in there. This mechanism allows foreign multinationals, foreign investors to sue a state if a policy hampers their ability to turn a profit. This is extremely serious. These types of dispute settlement mechanisms found their way into each and every agreement when signing such agreements was all the rage during the aggressive, triumphant neoliberal years, but it is very serious that Canada is continuing to persistently accept, negotiate and encourage these kinds of agreements.
There are a few things we need to remember about this. These are clauses that have enabled multinationals to sue governments over increases in minimum wage, environmental measures, taxes on soft drinks to counter obesity epidemics in certain countries and moratoriums on drilling. These are protection clauses, a legal tool available to foreign investors to undermine the government's ability to act by leaving the perpetual threat of legal recourse from foreign companies dangling overhead. It is a threat to national sovereignty. It makes it increasingly difficult for governments to legislate on issues such as social justice, the environment, working conditions and public health if a transnational company believes its right to profit has been infringed. This is censorship of the democratic will.
According to a 2013 UN report, states won these suits 42% of the time and corporations, 31% of the time. The remaining disputes were settled out of court. This means that plaintiffs were able to override the political will of states in 58% of cases either in part, through agreements, or in whole, by winning their case. This quantitative figure, however, overlooks one important factor, namely, the pressure put on states by investor protection clauses. States give up on certain policies early in the discussion and decision-making process to avoid being sued. They self-censor for fear of ending up in court.
In 2014, a report by the European Union's Directorate-General for External Policies stated that these investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms were indeed a public policy roadblock. I remind members that this is the Bloc Québécois's fight. In 2021, I presented a motion that led my committee to undertake a study on the impact of these mechanisms. At our last convention, opposing these mechanisms became part of our platform.
After a health crisis, there is no reason for Canada to stubbornly continue to support such provisions, especially since they were removed from the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA. They were included in NAFTA, but removed from CUSMA. Why continue to defend the sovereignty of multinationals and the right to profit, rather than democratic rights and the sovereignty of states?
In the specific case of Ukraine, let me first point out that it will be a rather fragile post-war state. Even though there are opportunities for Quebec and Canadian companies, do we want to colonize that country with a mechanism that could be embarrassing for Ukraine and could incite it to adopt certain measures, because it would be afraid of the backlash from Canadian and Quebec companies looking to make a profit?
At the same time, allowing a company to sue a foreign country directly without obtaining the consent of its home country could have consequences for us. In the case of Ukraine, we know that it has sanctioned several of its own citizens for collaborating with Russia. These sanctions could go as far as seizing their assets. If these Ukrainian citizens who collaborated with Russia also have investments here, and Ottawa decides to mimic the Ukrainian government and seize their assets here, the federal government could be sued for discriminatory expropriation under the agreement.
I will close by urging the government to move forward with an exchange of letters if this agreement is adopted in order to remove this dangerous and unique provision.
:
Mr. Speaker, I am proud to rise today to speak to Bill , the new Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement. This bill would update the agreement made in 2017. Much has happened in the past six years, as we all know.
First, I would like to speak a bit about the original agreement, as it forms the core of the present one, then cover some of the changes outlined in Bill . I will wrap up with some comments about how free trade agreements are presented to Parliament for the debate that they deserve.
The NDP is very much in favour of free trade agreements. We hear catcalls from both sides every time we debate free trade agreements here, saying that the NDP is always against them. We are not. We have voted for free trade agreements in the past and we voted for the Ukraine free trade agreement when it was presented. Our main caveat for these agreements is that they be designed to protect and create Canadian jobs, protect the ability of Canadian governments at all levels to care for our environment, and promote the well-being of our citizens. The measure of success of free trade deals must not be just the profits made by Canadian companies. It must also include measures of good labour agreements, both here and in the countries we are making deals with, and measures of good environmental and human rights laws on both sides as well.
These agreements must be beneficial to the people of both countries involved. I have to say that this new agreement with Ukraine and the bill before us that would implement that agreement seem to do a good job in that direction. The Canada-Ukraine friendship is very special. In fact, when Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Canada was the first western country to recognize that act. Today, there are more than 1.3 million Canadians of Ukrainian heritage. They are very proud of that heritage and their cultural traditions.
Canada has consistently supported Ukraine's development and reform efforts, providing over $460 million in international assistance between 2014 and 2021. Of course, Canada and Canadians have been strong supporters of Ukraine since the illegal invasion by Russia in February 2022. Since then, Canada has committed over $8.9 billion in assistance, including financial, development, humanitarian, military security, stabilization and immigration aid.
With respect to trade, Canada issued remission orders to temporarily open up trade with Ukraine, allowing supply managed products, such as poultry, to enter Canada. We have heard some concerns about these remission orders in the international trade and agriculture committees, but I think it is fair to say that Canadians are happy to help Ukraine in any way during these horrific times in their struggles.
I would like to step back a bit in time and spend some time talking about the original agreement. I would like to thank Tracey Ramsey, who is the former member for Essex, the NDP international trade critic when the first Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement was debated and came into effect. Tracey was and remains a passionate defender of Canadian workers, and she took her role very seriously. She recommended that the NDP support the original Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement because it upheld those basic principles I mentioned previously.
The Canada-Ukraine trade relationship is relatively small. Ukraine represents less than 1% of the total Canadian global exports. Following the signature of the original trade agreement, Canada's non-coal exports to Ukraine grew by 28.5% between 2016 and 2019. Total merchandise trade reached an all-time high of $447 million in 2021, although that of course declined in 2022 because of the illegal invasion.
The original free trade agreement eliminated most of the tariffs on Canadian imports to Ukraine and Ukrainian imports to Canada. Canadian exporters have largely welcomed the deal. Canadian products that benefit from the free trade agreement include iron and steel, industrial machinery, pulses, canola oil, and fish and seafood.
While the original free trade agreement includes a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism, it did not include the investor-state dispute settlement system, ISDS provisions. It is important to note that these provisions actually existed before the free trade agreement came into place because in 1995, Canada and Ukraine signed a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, which included these investor-state provisions.
The NDP, in general, does not like ISDS provisions because they allow foreign corporations to literally tell Canadian governments at all levels how they should be protecting their environment or protecting their people. We believe that is an infringement on our sovereignty and we think that ISDS provisions do not have a place in any foreign free trade agreement. We are happy to see that the new Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement did not include them. They were in both the Canada-Europe trade agreement and the CPTPP. We believe that foreign investors should be obligated to go through domestic courts before being granted access to a special court where they can sue our governments, and that should be done at the state-to-state level.
New Democrats analyze trade deals as a whole. As I say, we have supported trade deals in the past, including the Ukraine agreement and the South Korea deal.
The original Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement entered into force in 2017. It has a review clause that it be reviewed within two years of entry into force with a regard to expanding it and that was done. In 2019, Canada and Ukraine agreed to modernize the free trade agreement with expanded sections. There were public consultations held in the winter of 2020, but those consultations did not seem to include the Parliament of Canada. I will talk more about that later.
Canadian and Ukrainian officials conducted negotiations from May 2022 to April 2023. The new agreement includes more chapters on a broader array of services and business. It covers professional services like engineering, legal, computer services and telecommunications. It covers investment. It covers temporary entry for business persons. There are other sections that promote more broad interactions around trade and commerce. These are chapters that are included in other free trade agreements that Canada has with other countries and we welcome them here.
The agreement also has an updated environment chapter, which is subject to dispute settlement, aiming to ensure parties do not lower the levels of environmental protection to attract trade or investment. Again, that is obviously an important part of trade agreements. Trade agreements should raise the level of the standard of living of people in both countries in commercial and financial terms, but also in terms of their environment, human rights and labour dealings.
This bill has an updated labour chapter, which is again subject to dispute settlement provisions. It aims to improve labour standards and working conditions in both countries.
As I say, the NDP in general supports this kind of free trade agreement. Whether we support this bill or not, I would like to say here that, unfortunately, this bill was tabled only last Tuesday and I have not had time to bring it before the NDP caucus for discussion, which happens on Wednesdays, as we all know. This is a big, complex agreement and the NDP caucus likes to discuss all legislation before we decide whether we will support it.
We think it is important to allow Parliament to have input into trade negotiations before they begin. It is also important to allow ample notice once the treaties are signed for debate in this place before they are ratified. When the first Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement was tabled, the government followed that policy. It tabled the enabling legislation along with an explanatory memorandum and a final environmental assessment more than 21 sitting days after tabling the treaty. However, the government did not follow any of these standard procedures when introducing CETA, the Canada-Europe trade agreement. We were happy when it followed those procedures in the previous first version of the Canada-Ukraine agreement, but it seems that the government has forgotten those policies with this new agreement.
When the government negotiated CETA and CPTPP, Canadians were kept in the dark about what was being negotiated. When we finally learned what was on the table, the deal was already finalized, and the government said that there was absolutely no way to change anything at that point. It is not too much to ask for input on these important policies. The United States Congress has the right and ability to debate what the priorities of their country will be before entering into free trade negotiations.
The member for wrote a letter, in December 2019, to the Minister of International Trade, who is now the , regarding increased transparency around the negotiations for the new Canada-U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement. In response to that letter, the minister agreed, on February 19, 2020, to change the policy on tabling treaties in Parliament. Those changes:
To require that a notice of intent to enter into negotiations towards a new free trade agreement be tabled in the House of Commons at least 90 calendar days prior to the commencement of negotiations. Under normal parliamentary procedures, the notice of intent would be referred to the [committee on international trade].
To require objectives for negotiations towards a new free trade agreement to be tabled in the House of Commons at least 30 calendar days prior to the commencement of negotiations. Under normal parliamentary procedures, those objectives would be referred to the [committee on international trade].
As I mentioned previously, there were discussions with some stakeholders about the scope of changes to this free trade agreement in the winter of 2020, but as far as I can tell, and we have done some research on this, the matter was never referred to the international trade committee or tabled in the House.
The government also seems to have broken standard policies on introducing implementation legislation for free trade agreements and other treaties. There should be 21 sitting days between the tabling of treaties and tabling of legislation, and that did not happen with this agreement. On top of that, as I mentioned, the minister tabled this legislation last Tuesday and here we are debating it on Monday. This is a big, complicated bill. There was no opportunity for opposition parties to discuss this in caucus last Wednesday.
To conclude, the NDP is very much in favour of free trade. We supported the original version of this agreement with Ukraine and we will be discussing this new legislation in caucus on Wednesday. I urge the minister and her government to follow the standard policies on how to introduce treaties and implement legislation before Parliament. These are not minor details; these are important points on how Canadians expect us here in this place to hold the government to account.
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Mr. Speaker, I would basically like to follow up on the last question and answer it because I think that is something that needs to be taken into consideration. The overriding thing has got to be the issue of trade agreements in principle and how it is that Canada has been a major benefactor through world trade.
We are very much a trading nation. For us to be able to hit the potential that Canada has in the future, we are very much dependant on international trade. All one needs to do is to take a look at any province, territory or community and the impact that international trade has had on every one of us in Canada. It affects us all. When we talk about good-quality, middle-class jobs, these are the ways in which we are going to be able to get many of those middle-class jobs.
This government has been focused on that virtually from day one, the importance of the middle class and those aspiring to be a part of it. That has been a priority of this government. How can one make it a priority and not deal with the issue of trade? That is the reason, and I put this forward in the form of a question earlier, there is no government in the history of Canada that has signed more trade agreements than the current and the government.
Contrary to how the member tried to respond in his question, one cannot change history. That is the reality. The reason why we have recognized the value of international trade and how that helps all of us is that we have seen the results of it, the growth in the economy. Prepandemic, we had already exceeded over a million additional jobs. That was prepandemic, based on the type of economic polices that were being developed and implemented here in Canada. It was having a positive impact.
The original Ukraine agreement was one of the first ones that was signed off on. I believe it was the and the who went to Ukraine and signed off on it. A few years later, President Zelenskyy and the Prime Minister met and had a discussion about how important it was that we modernize that particular agreement. There were a number of things they felt could be done to improve the agreement.
There were sound negotiations, which I made reference to earlier. We are very fortunate because of the number of trade agreements and memoranda of understanding we have been able to put into place. We have an incredible team of negotiators who negotiate on Canada's behalf. I would ultimately argue that they are second to no other team in the world. They have been at it, and we have accomplished so many agreements.
Members ask about this or that region, what is taking place in this or that region or how we feel as the House of Commons. I suspect that, whether or not it is in debates after previous agreements, the experiences and the discussions that take place with the many different stakeholders, whether municipalities, provinces, indigenous people or many other stakeholders, leading into the negotiations, give a very good sense of what would work well for us as a nation.
Ultimately, one could say that the proof is in the pudding. Look at the number of agreements that Canada now has with other countries. No other country has the same sort of access as Canada does around the world, even the United States, with those formal agreements. We have been aggressive in recognizing the importance of achieving these agreements because all of us benefit through them.
I define the benefits as raising the standard of living for Canadians and creating thousands of good-quality middle-class jobs, which provide the type of revenue that supports the government in bringing forward good government programs. This is where the focus of the government has been.
We look at the agreement being debated today, and I am sensitive to what is being said with respect to the input before signing. Why are we now being asked to either agree or not agree with it by way of a question?
I think it is important to recognize the process by which the negotiations take place. The cannot take a document, sit down with the President of Ukraine and say that this is the agreement per our negotiators and the feedback we have received from literally hundreds if not thousands of stakeholders, who are now signing off on it, much like we would not expect the Ukrainian Parliament to try to change the agreement itself. That is how it has worked for a while now, and it has been very successful.
Members have made reference to wanting to see a bit of a change. Let us put that in a different perspective. I could be wrong on this, but if memory serves me correctly, this could be the first time in modern history where a trade agreement is being achieved when one of the countries is at war. Ukraine has a lot of things on its plate right now, yet as a country, it recognizes just how important it is to look at securing the modernization of a trade agreement.
It says a lot when a country at war is looking to Canada, which has been a dear friend to Ukraine, saying how important it is that we have a modern trade agreement. That was a president to a prime minister. It was signed off last month, in September. Given all the other issues we are facing, how often do I stand in the chamber to talk about the impacts of inflation, how it is hurting Canadians, the issue of interest rates and so many other issues? As a government, we recognize how important it is that we continue to push on the file between Canada and Ukraine in a tangible way. If we put it in the perspective of Ukraine being at war, given our previous negotiations and achievements through trade agreements, in particular the Ukraine trade agreement, I think there is a valid argument to be made that there is absolutely nothing wrong with allowing this legislation to, at the very least, go to committee.
I realize this is day one of the debate, but what concerns me is that the Conservatives' critic, in particular, has indicated that they want to have a more thorough debate, but there was no indication as to how long they would like to debate it. I am hoping that they, in particular, will not use House and procedural tactics to filibuster this legislation.
The stakeholders, whether in Ukraine or Canada, see the benefit of having this type of legislation pass. Personally, I would like to see it go to the Senate before Christmas because it still has to pass at the Senate, which is very much doable.
I want to emphasize this: We all talk about what is happening in Ukraine today, with the illegal invasion of Russia into its sovereign territory. Here we have an opportunity to make a very powerful statement by believing in our negotiators. Members have a copy of the agreement.
Even New Democrats voted in favour of the original Ukraine trade agreement. Collectively, as a House, we can send a very strong message to Europe and to Ukraine by saying that Canada is going to be there for Ukraine in a very real and tangible way. This trade agreement would empower more economic commerce between the two nations. It would enable a wider spectrum of services and goods. It would put into place dispute mechanisms.
Ukraine will prevail over Russia. When that happens, it is going to need and want to see its allied countries come to the table. Canada will be there. This is one of the ways we can be there in a real way. That is why I would suggest that we should deal with this legislation in the same format as we did for the first piece and allow it to pass relatively quickly.