:
Mr. Speaker, it is always a great pleasure to rise in the House. Today, we are talking about support for this important legislation and implementing the modernized Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement.
As we all know, since Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine’s territory, Canada has demonstrated an unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. Today, we have another opportunity to demonstrate support to Ukraine with the implementation of a modernized CUFTA.
When I met with people from the Ukrainian community in Richmond Centre, they shared with me their support for our government’s vision of a democratically strong nation that values the importance of international collaboration, the rule of law, and global peace and security. I also want to take a moment to convey my appreciation to Ukrainian community organizations, such as the Ukrainian Community Society of Ivan Franko in Richmond Centre, for all they do in supporting the Ukrainian community here in Canada and promoting Ukrainian arts and culture.
Canada and Ukraine share these values and, most importantly, the people-to-people ties. On December 2, 1991, Canada became the first western nation to recognize Ukraine’s independence, and today Canada will stand with Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes. When our allies need support, the Government of Canada has the responsibility to support them. I appreciate and am thankful for the Government of Canada’s support for Ukraine since the war began. Canada has provided over $8 billion toward financial, military, humanitarian, development and immigration assistance for Ukraine.
Recently, the Government of Canada announced a new investment of $650 million over three years to supply Ukraine with 50 armoured vehicles, including armoured medical evacuation vehicles, built by Canadian workers in London, Ontario. The Russian illegal invasion affects global inflation, and it affects us. It increases food prices and affects the supply chain. Global peace and security are an essential part of our global economic prosperity.
By modernizing the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement, we can provide the additional assistance that Ukraine needs with its reconstruction efforts, the cost of which the World Bank has estimated will be $411 billion U.S. These efforts will involve sectors such as infrastructure, renewable resources and financial services, which are all areas in which Canada has strengths.
Canadian firms have already indicated an interest in launching and expanding their operations in Ukraine, including with respect to reconstruction, and we would have a tool to support their involvement. I am referring to the newly added investment chapter, previously missing from the 2017 CUFTA. As you may be aware, Canada and Ukraine have an existing foreign investment promotion and protection agreement, which was signed in 1994. However, this new modernized investment chapter would not only bring this new agreement in line with Canada's model comprehensive FTAs, but would also update our investment protections to address modern investment issues and concerns.
Please allow me to briefly present this new investment chapter, which resulted from our efforts in negotiating the modernized CUFTA and which will support Canadian firms' participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. The CUFTA investment chapter modernizes the framework of protections for investors and their investments with a comprehensive set of obligations in line with Canada's most ambitious trade agreements. I am also proud to announce that this investment chapter is the first to be negotiated using Canada’s most recent model, which seeks to better ensure that investment obligations act as intended and that they provide the necessary policy flexibility for governments to act in the public interest.
As such, this new drafting for the investment chapter would allow Canada and Ukraine to maintain their right to regulate in key areas, such as environment, health, safety, indigenous rights, gender equality and cultural diversity. Additionally, this new chapter includes a modern dispute settlement mechanism, which would offer strengthened alternatives to avoid arbitration, as well as enhanced transparency of proceedings commitments. In all, these outcomes represent a significant improvement over the 1994 FIPA with Ukraine, which this chapter would replace, and would strengthen the environment within which Canadian investors can invest with more confidence in Ukraine’s reconstruction.
I am thankful for this opportunity to describe what we can achieve on investment through the modernization of the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement. I hope I have made clear why this modern and comprehensive free trade agreement would be instrumental in not only in building our long-term commercial relations with Ukraine but also supporting its forthcoming reconstruction efforts.
To this end, I urge all honourable members to support Bill and allow us to collectively move forward to implement the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement on a timely basis.
Once again, Canada will stand with Ukraine and its people as long as it takes. Slava Ukraini.
:
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise to speak to Bill . I will be sharing my time with my colleague from , who did me a favour by allowing me to go first.
Let me say from the outset that, generally speaking, we are all in favour of free trade and we are in favour of this agreement with Ukraine. We know that we are in a partnership with the Ukrainians, whom we have been supporting intensively since the beginning of the conflict. This bill is a logical continuation. The new agreement will replace the 2017 Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, which was vaguer, less restrictive and less clear. We think this is a positive change, especially when it comes to the implementation mechanisms, which have been amended to be more stringent.
This agreement sends a very clear message to the whole world, and especially to Ukrainians, that we are bound to their nation by ties of friendship and that we support them under the current circumstances. One positive element of this agreement is that it recognizes the Donbass and Crimea as being part of Ukrainian territory. This may seem symbolic, but it is important to make this kind of statement to send a clear message to the international community. I will be at the Asia Pacific Forum a few weeks from now, and I will convey the same message on behalf of everyone here.
The agreement, which was signed with the President of Ukraine during his latest visit, clarifies some technical details.
The problem we have with this kind of bill is that, once passed by Parliament, it allows for the creation of institutions or mechanisms to govern free trade agreements. However, we never get to have our say on what is actually in those agreements. We can only accept or reject them wholesale. It would be reasonable for parliamentarians to put forward proposals and analyze various texts to produce a better, more refined agreement whose every nuance has been studied in detail. The Canadian government's current system allows the executive to make all the decisions. The powers of Parliament itself are extremely limited because members cannot participate.
I will never forget what happened right after I was first elected in 2019. I had to vote in favour of ratifying the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, which forced supply-managed producers to accept yet more concessions. Although it pained us greatly, we were forced to vote in favour of the agreement knowing it would hurt people.
We do not want that to happen again. I can see that the parliamentary secretary is listening carefully. I am very honoured and very pleased that he is hearing my message. I invite all the parties to sit down together and figure out how we can change the process for adopting international agreements like this one. It is important.
Some people here agreed with Bill , which limits concessions involving supply management in future trade agreements. It was the way these agreements are currently developed that forced us to be inventive and resort to a bill to protect supply management. This issue has now been resolved. However, in other trade agreements, there will be other delicate issues, where some groups are more impacted than others, and where balance will need to be restored. That is why we need to review the current system.
Another major flaw is that, once the agreement is signed, the provinces and Quebec will be called upon to apply and implement the provisions under their jurisdiction.
However, they were not asked for their opinion beforehand. There are still some people here who wonder why we want Quebec to be independent. This is another example that shows why. We want to control what is included in our international agreements. That is one justification for independence.
Yesterday, when I asked the Minister of a question, I was pleased to receive a very clear answer. The new agreement with Ukraine is good; it will replace the one from 2017. However, the government issued a unilateral remission order last year to allow all Ukrainian products to enter Canada tariff-free. That was fine because it was a measure to help the Ukrainian economy during the conflict. No one disputed that.
However, in its haste and panic, the government threw supply-managed commodities into the mix, which is unacceptable. Yes, it is important to help, and we have always been there. The Bloc Québécois has always been in favour of measures to help Ukrainians in this terrible ongoing conflict. However, we need to be able to help others without hurting ourselves.
Why put supply management in this order? It was difficult because it was becoming politically sensitive to complain about something that favoured Ukraine. It took a long time. Supply management groups lobbied the government. The opposition worked very hard. When the order was renewed, supply-managed commodities were taken out of it. That was a good thing.
That is why I put the question to the minister yesterday. Until Bill is passed into law, there will always be a tiny possibility of further concessions.
Now the rest of the bill is mechanical. It has to do with putting structures in place. I have another complaint about the bill. In the section on investor-state mechanisms, multinational corporations are still given an equal footing with states. That is beyond reprehensible. This is very serious because states must have the right to legislate in order to regulate and ensure the collective well-being of their citizens. As things currently stand, a multinational could sue a state for damages for interfering with its business. We must find a way to stop this, because it makes no sense. A lot of things make no sense.
One of the bill's last shortcomings concerns best practices, ethical practices and environmental protection practices. The bill seems like a series of good intentions that urge people and businesses to be careful and to follow best practices, but in no way obliges them to do so.
Since I do not have much time left, I will close by saying that this agreement is important. We are partners with Ukraine, and we will remain partners. It will also be important to contribute to rebuilding Ukraine, which I hope will happen soon, as soon as this horrible war is over. I think Quebec's expertise and businesses can play a part in the reconstruction.
During my speech, I talked a lot about helping others without hurting ourselves. Every now and then, I also want to make sure that people in this country get help. I must digress for a moment. Last week, we voted on a bill to increase old age pensions starting at age 65. Some representatives from FADOQ are visiting Parliament Hill today. I invite all parliamentarians to show some respect for these important people who are working to end social isolation. More importantly, I urge them to show some respect for people aged 65 to 74 who were shut out when the government created an unjustified form of discrimination based on age. This is very serious and has been going on for months. I do not understand why this has not been resolved. Let us fix this as soon as possible.
I look forward to answering my colleagues' questions.
:
Mr. Speaker, it is always difficult to speak after my colleague from , since he is so brilliant and knowledgeable on this subject.
To begin with, I want to recall the historical context of the agreement, which Bill will implement without actually modifying. It was first negotiated under the Harper government and finally signed in 2017 by the current government. In 2023, various aspects of the 2017 Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement were improved. That is what I am going to cover in my speech.
Essentially, the 2023 agreement codifies in a treaty the idea that the territory of Ukraine also includes the Donbass and Crimea, two regions that have been invaded by Russia over almost the entire past decade. The 2023 agreement is more comprehensive than the one signed in 2017. The latest agreement was signed by President Zelenskyy on September 22, during his visit to Canada.
Bill C-57, the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement implementation act, is about 15 pages long. It is an implementation bill, not the agreement itself. It essentially contains provisions that change the names of certain references, from 2017 to 2023, for consistency. The bill authorizes the establishment, recognizes the authority, and allows for the funding of the various institutional mechanisms provided for in the agreement, including the secretariat responsible for overseeing the agreement signed on September 22, For example, it creates a secretariat responsible for the smooth running of this trade agreement.
How can anyone be against apple pie? How can any Quebecker be against poutine? Generally speaking, trade agreements are good. However, the agreement we are talking about is 1,000 pages and 30 chapters long. It is more than apple pie. It is more complicated than making a really good poutine.
This agreement covers goods and services, investments, government contracts, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and labour and environmental law. There are even provisions that favour small businesses, women and indigenous entrepreneurs. There really is a lot of complexity to this agreement, and it calls for a close look. As my colleague from Berthier—Maskinongé said, Bill should take a much deeper dive into the substance of the agreement than it does.
Not only are there questions about supply management, but we have already seen in the past that Quebec aluminum was not protected under the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, while Ontario steel was. Is that still the case? That is why we have to take the time to carefully study agreements before signing them. That is just one of many examples.
The 2023 agreement contains 11 new chapters, relative to the 2017 agreement. It addresses cross-border trade in services by specifying the rules applicable to services. Measures are being developed and administered to ensure predictability and consistency in administrative practices. That is important. Entrepreneurs often talk to us about the predictability of future events. This agreement clarifies that. The 1994 agreement on investment protection is being improved, particularly with respect to the definition of direct or indirect expropriation. The definition has been tightened up to ensure that there is no unjustified expropriation.
Then again, the current agreement opens the door to a rather serious problem by allowing investors to sue a foreign state. This is a problem, because an international agreement is an agreement between nations, and now corporations are being put on the same footing as states. This is not a good precedent to set. We can certainly discuss ways of protecting our states in committee. We are negotiating nation to nation, not investor to nation. Is there a solution? As I said, we can discuss this in committee, but the simplest solution is to bring multinationals back under the state umbrella, rather than putting them on an equal footing.
With regard to trade, this agreement completes the chapter on cross-border trade in services. I have already talked about this. It clarifies how it is to be applied in various areas, as well as the exceptions that Canada and Ukraine want to preserve. There is also a chapter on including business people and one on telecommunications. The agreement guarantees access to infrastructure, but does not affect broadcasting and cultural policies, which is great. While we may share certain similarities with various aspects of Ukrainian culture, their culture is quite different from ours. Even within Canada, we have cultures that are very different from one another and that we want to protect, particularly francophone culture and indigenous cultures.
The current agreement defines the rules applicable to financial services by immediately establishing rules that facilitate the use of financial services and the simple flow of capital in both countries. There are three chapters on the participation of SMEs, women and indigenous peoples that make it possible to implement preferential measures. Finally, the agreement codifies the regulations adopted to ensure that they are transparent and predictable. Those are two important things for both the public and business people.
The new 2023 Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement amends eight chapters of the 2017 CUFTA, including “Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures”, “Digital Trade”, “Competition Policy”, “Designated Monopolies and State-Owned Enterprises” and “Government Procurement”. The “Environment” and “Labour” chapters, which used to be statements of intent, will now be binding, so these chapters represent progress. Finally, the chapter entitled “Transparency, Anti-Corruption, and Responsible Business Conduct” is amended and improved.
In short, Bill implements an agreement that is more comprehensive than both the 2017 and 1994 agreements. However, as with every other free trade agreement, we had practically nothing to do with the content of this 1,000-page agreement, even though it will impact ordinary people, since they are the ones producing the goods and services. We, who represent the people, have almost no say in the matter, except to indicate whether the agreement should be implemented or not. Basically, that is what Bill C-57 does. We did not have much say in regard to the content of the 1,000-page agreement. This is problematic, but it does not have to be this way. The government could hold consultations with the provinces, businesses and parliamentarians.
What is more, we are rather limited in the amendments we could propose for Bill C‑57. We can amend the bill, but not the agreement. That is why we are limited in what we can amend. As I was saying, the provinces are not really involved in the process, which means the agreement can affect the constitutional jurisdictions of Quebec and the Canadian provinces, given that they were not consulted. Quebec and the Canadian provinces will essentially suffer the consequences, when it is their jurisdictions that are involved and it would be up to the provinces to manage them. That is something that needs improvement.
We will vote in favour of this bill because this free trade agreement is good not only for Canada, but also for Ukraine, essentially because it will contribute to the economic and physical rebuilding of Ukraine.
:
Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to speak on behalf of the wonderful residents of my riding of Davenport.
Today I will be speaking to Bill , an act to implement the 2023 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine, but before I begin my formal written remarks, I want to take a few minutes to make a few comments.
First, I am happy the bill has been introduced in the House. I am also grateful to the for her leadership and work. In a time of war, it is really important for us to be thinking about the Ukrainian economy, both today and tomorrow. Therefore, a huge thanks to her for this.
I am very grateful to my colleagues on the Canada-Ukraine Friendship Group for their focus and attention on this, particularly my colleague, the member for .
I also want to express how grateful I am to a number of key stakeholders who have helped to shape this agreement, including the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the Canada-Ukraine Chamber of Commerce, the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Association of Toronto, the Ukrainian Canadian Social Services of Canada and the Ukrainian Canadian Bar Association. I thank all of them.
I also want to acknowledge the context in which we are living today, one in which we are introducing this modernized trade agreement.
As we all know, something that troubles us every day are the major wars under way in the world today. In February of 2022, Russia started the unprovoked and illegal brutal war in Ukraine, which continues today. More recently, on October 7, Hamas initiated a brutal and violent war against Israel, which, unfortunately, also continues today. Both are clear illustrations of an attack on our democracies using war and terrorism.
I put out statements to my constituents constantly to update them on what is happening. In my latest update on Friday, I said the following, “We are in a struggle to defend our values, our humanity, and to stand up against these attacks on democracy. There is no simple solution to the conflict, but the work to find a humanitarian path to end the violence should be driven by one basic principle, and that is the most basic value of all, to protect and cherish human life.”
Some will ask me why I am mentioning this during a speech on the modernization of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. It is because in a time of war, when we are fighting for our values, for democracy, for the right to continue to choose the way we live, real, everyday life continues. It is important to not only support the current economy in Ukraine but also the one it is trying to build after the war it is fighting eventually ends. I am really glad Canada is there.
I have one other aside. It is my privilege to currently serve as the chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. At the international meetings where NATO parliamentarians assemble, we talk about rebuilding Ukraine after the war. We know that the work begins now. I am very proud that Canada is stepping up and very much playing its part.
It is a true honour for me to rise in the House today in support of legislation to implement the modernized Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, otherwise known as CUFTA.
As we all know, Canada and Ukraine have enjoyed very close bilateral relations since 1991, when Canada became the first western country to recognize Ukrainian independence, an issue that we are sadly still fighting for to this day. These bilateral relations are strengthened by shared values and warm people-to-people ties rooted in the Ukrainian Canadian community of nearly 1.3 million people. My family is very much part of this community.
Recently, the Canada-Ukraine bilateral relationship has been marked by Canada's steadfast support to Ukraine independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of protracted Russian aggression. Whether it was in 2014 when Russia illegally occupied Crimea or, today, following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Canada has stood steadfast beside our Ukrainian allies to support them as they fight for their independence, democracy and freedom.
As such, since the beginning of the conflict in February 2022, Canada has committed almost $9 billion in multi-faceted support to Ukraine, which includes $5 billion in financial assistance, including $4 billion in loans through the International Monetary Fund's administered account for Ukraine, as well as $500 million through a Canada-Ukraine sovereignty bond; over $2 billion in military assistance and defence, of which I know that our has recently made an additional announcement; $352 million in humanitarian assistance, a lot of which goes to the Ukrainian Women's Fund, which is for much-necessary work in the country; $147 million in development assistance; $102 million in security and stabilization assistance; and $4.8 million in cultural protection.
Additionally, Canada has established new immigration measures for Ukrainians fleeing Russia's invasion, for which we have committed $1.2 billion.
Today we have yet another opportunity to demonstrate our continued support to Ukraine through other means, means that will not only offer assistance in the short term but will extend well beyond the current unfortunate situation and will form the basis on which Canada can support the reconstruction of Ukraine for years to come. I am, of course, referring to the modernized CUFTA, which is the reason I am addressing members today.
The original CUFTA entered into force in August 2017 and immediately eliminated tariffs on 99% of imports from Ukraine. Similarly, the 2017 CUFTA immediately eliminated tariffs on 86% of Canadian exports to Ukraine, with the balance of tariff concessions to be implemented over a seven-year period, or by January 1, 2024.
While reductions in coal supplies from Canada caused a slight drop in total trade following the 2017 CUFTA's entry into force, non-coal exports grew at a rapid pace and, in 2021, total bilateral trade reached its highest point ever at $447 million before dipping to $421 million in 2022 due to Russia's invasion.
In 2022, top Canadian exports to Ukraine included armoured vehicles, fish, medicine, motor vehicles and parts, and pet food. Top imports from Ukraine included fats and oils, iron and steel, electrical machinery, and processed foods. Canadian investment in Ukraine in 2022 amounted to $112 million.
While comprehensive from a trade-in-goods perspective, the 2017 CUFTA did not include chapters on trade in services or investment. These areas were left out of the agreement due to divergent approaches at the time. Rather, the CUFTA contained a clause committing Canada and Ukraine to review the agreement within two years of its entry into force, with a view to expanding it. The review clause specifically identified services and investment as potential additions, but did not restrict the parties from exploring other areas.
Pursuant to this review clause, in a visit to Ottawa in July 2019, our and the Ukrainian president, President Zelenskyy, announced their intention to modernize the CUFTA. Our federal government then held formal public consultations on the modernization of the CUFTA in the winter of 2020. Submissions supported the initiative as a means of strengthening the bilateral relationship, building on Canada's commercial engagement with Ukraine, and further promoting an open, inclusive and rules-based trading environment for our businesses and investors.
The Government of Canada also received positive feedback from the provinces and territories, several of which were particularly supportive of the potential inclusion of new or modernized chapters on cross-border trade in services, financial services, investment, digital trade and additional commitments to support small and medium-sized enterprises. All of these areas have been successfully included in the modernized CUFTA, as well as new chapters or provisions on trade and gender, trade and indigenous peoples, digital trade, transparency, labour and environment, among many other areas.
Following these internal consultations, and delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we know there was an announcement to launch the negotiations for a modernized CUFTA in January 2022.
Unfortunately, only weeks later, on February 24, 2022, Russia began its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine. This caused another delay in progress, with Canadian trade officials relaying to their Ukrainian counterparts that they stood ready to proceed with CUFTA modernization discussions in accordance with Ukraine's capacity and willingness to do so.
Negotiations started in June 2022 and, despite compressed timelines and difficult circumstances for our negotiating partner, they were highly constructive. Both sides demonstrated an eagerness to reach an ambitious and high-standard agreement that would be on par with Canada's most comprehensive trade agreements. This was done with the aim of facilitating increased trade between our two nations long into the future.
During a visit from the Prime Minister of Ukraine on April 11, 2023, he and our announced the conclusion of negotiations for the modernized CUFTA. Each committed to undertaking their respective domestic processes to facilitate its signature and entry into force as soon as possible.
During his most recent visit to Ottawa on September 22, 2023, President Zelenskyy and our signed the final modernized CUFTA text. This was a historic milestone in the Canadian-Ukrainian bilateral relationship, and it served as another clear demonstration of Canada's unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. With the final agreement officially signed, both sides are now taking the next steps to bring the agreement into force as early as January 1, 2024. That is why we are here today.
If I may, I will say a few words about the modernized agreement and some of the benefits and opportunities it presents for Canadians and Ukrainians alike.
Substantive negotiations have resulted in a modernized CUFTA, which includes nine dedicated new chapters and upgrades to nine existing chapters from the 2017 CUFTA. I will begin with an overview of the new chapters that have been added.
First, the agreement includes a dedicated new chapter on cross-border trade in services, which puts both Ukrainian and Canadian service suppliers on a comparable footing vis-à-vis our main services trading partners. Additionally, this chapter includes provisions on the recognition of professional qualifications that would facilitate trade and professional services, which are strategically important for both parties in a knowledge-based and digital economy.
The parties have also added a new chapter on investment that would replace the Canada-Ukraine FIPA. It features modern drafting to ensure investment obligations operate as intended and provide necessary flexibility in key policy areas. The new chapter includes a modern dispute settlement mechanism that would help Canadian investors participate with more confidence during Ukraine's reconstruction and beyond.
The modernized CUFTA has a financial services chapter, which includes core obligations related to market access, national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment. It would also maintain flexibility for regulators to preserve the stability of their financial systems. The financial services chapter would support a predictable, stable and transparent investment environment for investors, and it would allow Ukraine a 10-year period to transition from its existing World Trade Organization commitments to those included in this agreement.
There is also a new chapter in telecommunications, which would promote competition and provide enhanced certainty for telecommunications service suppliers when operating in Canadian and Ukrainian markets. The chapter also includes commitments to ensure that regulators of the telecommunications sector would be independent, impartial and transparent.
The parties have also added a chapter on temporary entry for business persons, which would provide new access for Canadians and Canadian companies to do business, invest and work in highly skilled occupations on a temporary basis in Ukraine while providing Canadian employers with easier access to highly skilled Ukrainian workers.
New chapters on inclusive trade, including trade and gender, trade and small and medium-sized enterprises, and trade and indigenous peoples, seek to empower and create opportunities for these under-represented groups, increasing their participation in and expanding their benefits from the modernized CUFTA. Notably, the trade and indigenous peoples chapter is the first of its kind included by either party in a free trade agreement.
Lastly, there is a chapter on good regulatory practices. It demonstrates to current and future trading partners that Ukraine is able to take on commitments that support a regulatory environment conducive to trade.
In addition to the new chapters I have outlined, we have also agreed with Ukraine to update nine chapters from the existing agreement. This includes rules of origin and origin procedures, where Canada and Ukraine have agreed to activate an article from the 2017 CUFTA on cumulation of origin.
This would allow materials of any non-party with which both Canada and Ukraine have an existing free trade agreement, such as the European Union, to be taken into consideration by the exporter when determining whether a product qualifies as originating under CUFTA, which would make it easier for Canadian and Ukrainian businesses to participate in regional value chains. It reflects a shared desire to support trade among like-minded partners.
The new digital trade chapter aims to improve regulatory certainty for businesses seeking to engage in the digital economy in both markets, as well as those specifically looking to engage in cross-border digital trade between Canada and Ukraine. The modernized CUFTA also includes a stand-alone competition policy chapter, which would enhance both parties' objective for a fair, transparent, predictable and competitive business environment through enhanced obligations for procedural fairness, and the identification and protection of confidential information by authorities.
The monopolies and state enterprises chapter has been upgraded to include important definitions for state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies, and updated commitments on transparency and technical co-operation. In the modernized government procurement chapter, Canada and Ukraine have agreed to provisions clarifying that the parties are not prevented from undertaking policies and programs to support domestic initiatives, such as green and social procurement.
The modernized CUFTA also includes perhaps the most comprehensive and ambitious environment chapter ever achieved in a Canadian free trade agreement. The updated chapter seeks to promote robust, ambitious and transparent environmental governance, and for the first time, includes a dedicated article reaffirming the parties' commitment to addressing climate change.
There is also an updated labour chapter, which shows that Canada and Ukraine are committed to the highest labour rights standards. Fully subject to the dispute settlement mechanism of the agreement, the chapter commits Canada and Ukraine to implement, in their labour laws, the content of the core conventions of the International Labour Organization.
The transparency, anti-corruption and reasonable business conduct chapter promotes transparency and integrity among public officials, private sector and society, and it advances enforceability of anti-corruption laws. It includes a new section to encourage responsible business conduct.
These negotiated outcomes would not only position Canadian firms to better participate in the economic reconstruction of Ukraine, but also support Ukraine's trade policy interests globally. Our Ukrainian colleagues have already expressed to us the value of the modernized CUFTA as the model of a modern, comprehensive and high-standard agreement with prospective trading partners around the globe. Domestically, the modernized agreement would reinforce the regulatory framework of a more inclusive, predictable and transparent trading and investment environment, which would benefit Canadian workers, businesses and entrepreneurs.
While the war continues to hinder trade both globally and bilaterally between Canada and Ukraine, the benefits and opportunities our countries have secured through this FTA are varied and long term, and would support growth in our commercial relationship now and for years to come.
During President Zelenskyy's recent visit, he and Trudeau had the opportunity to participate in a business round table in Toronto. At this event, we heard from business leaders from across Canada about the scope of commercial trade and investment interests in Ukraine, the risks associated with doing business in Ukraine and how to overcome these risks to ensure the private sector in Canada is well-positioned to invest and support Ukrainian reconstruction. Indeed, Canadian reconstruction companies, such as Aecon, are already moving forward to form partnerships with Ukrainian companies and to aid reconstruction.
This agreement is not just about economic gains. It also represents a landmark in the Canada-Ukraine relationship and serves as another clear demonstration of Canada's unwavering support to Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. We stand with Ukraine, and this agreement is another bond between us.
To that end, I urge all hon. members to support the legislative amendments contained in Bill and support this legislation.
:
Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for .
Mr. Brad Vis: It's Canada's number one riding.
Mr. Gerald Soroka: I think it is number two.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill , a piece of legislation that would formalize the modernized Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement. This agreement offers the chance for us to look back on the opportunities that Canada had on the world stage and some of the context as to where we are now with Ukrainian trade and, more generally, European trade as whole.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe found itself in a tough spot. Almost overnight, countries had to look for new sources of energy, oil and gas. They needed to act fast. Canada was in a prime position to fill that void, to be the reliable country that Europe needed in that critical moment, but what happened? We dropped the ball. We did not seize the opportunity. Germany, for example, one of the most advanced nations on earth, had to scramble to keep houses warm in the winter when Russian natural gas was no longer an option.
In an era when we talk day and night about green energy and reducing emissions, Germany had no choice but to look toward other sources of energy to power the country. Why were we not prepared? We tied our own hands with endless red tape, long wait times and bureaucratic hurdles. Our energy industry, once a global leader, has been reduced to a shadow of its former self, unable to act when the world needed it the most.
We did not just fail Ukraine or Europe; we failed ourselves. We missed a golden opportunity to make a real, meaningful impact on the world stage, to help Ukraine in a tangible way and to quickly divert European reliance on Russia. This is not just about missed business opportunities. It is about missing the chance to do good when it was needed the most.
There is a narrative we need to correct. The idea that all oil and gas is created equal and that it all has the same environmental footprint is simply not true. Canadian liquid natural gas, known as LNG, is among the cleanest in the world. If Europe were to replace its current oil and gas imports with Canadian products, there is a good chance we would be replacing imports from countries that have lower environmental standards. Our oil and gas sector has invested heavily in technology to minimize environmental impact.
It is not just about economics; it is also about responsible energy production. Using Canadian LNG would offer European countries a cleaner alternative to what they are strongly sourcing. This is an important aspect when looking at trade with other countries. We need to make sure we are creating access to our reliable and clean energy for Ukraine and other European nations.
It is a win-win situation, one that would benefit both our economy and the global environment. When we talk about missing opportunities, we are not just talking about financial gains. We are talking about missing an opportunity to make a real, meaningful impact on global carbon emissions, something the NDP-Liberal government should care deeply about. Instead, Canada missed out on this opportunity. We could not help Ukraine with energy reliance, and we could not help the rest of Europe either.
There is another layer to this as well, an ethical one. If we do not step up, Europe has no choice but to buy oil and gas from dictatorships that do not share our values, places where human rights and environmental concerns take a back seat. We have a moral duty to offer a better alternative, and Canadian LNG is that alternative.
Ethics matter. Where we get our energy is not just a question of economics or even of environmental protection. It is a question of values. When Europe buys energy from autocratic regimes, what message does that send? What sort of behaviour does it endorse? These regimes do not think twice about suppressing their own people or destabilizing their regions.
We saw this immediately after the onset of the war in Ukraine. However, this is not an isolated situation. There are several exporting countries that fall under this umbrella of unethical or autocratic governance.
Canada stands as a beacon of democracy and human rights on the world stage. When people buy Canadian, they are not just buying a product. They are buying into a set of values, values that respect human dignity, prioritize environmental sustainability and advocate for peace. Imagine if Europe could shift its dependency from other oppressive regimes to a country that shares its core principles. It would not only send a powerful message to the world but would have a direct, positive impact on our allies such as Ukraine. By strengthening our energy infrastructure and expanding our LNG capabilities, we can offer that alternative, an alternative that aligns with the values we hold dear in both Canada and democratic societies around the world.
Last year, the hit the nail on the head when he spoke about Canada's missed opportunities in the energy sector. While Europe, including Ukraine, was scrambling for alternatives to Russian gas, we sat on the sidelines. Why? It is because we lacked the necessary infrastructure and political will. Our inability to provide Europe with a viable alternative made it turn back to less than ideal options.
The was absolutely right. We had a shot at not just benefiting our economy but also elevating our role on the global stage. We could have been the solution that Europe, including Ukraine, was desperately searching for. What stopped us was red tape and a lack of foresight from the Liberal government.
This is not just about energy. It is about seizing strategic opportunities when they present themselves. As we discuss Bill , I urge all of us to reflect on the broader implications of our international trade policies. We are always looking at the possibilities of strengthening our free trade around the world. However, we must also address missed opportunities that have significant global impacts.
This bill will likely bring up the topic of energy as it develops, a sector where Canada has failed to take the lead at crucial moments. The was clear last year about the shortcomings of the Liberal government. We need to move beyond the endless paperwork and bureaucracy that stall progress. I cannot help but stress that Canada had a chance to supply Ukraine and Europe as a whole with our natural gas, which is a cleaner, ethical option compared to what they are getting now. Instead, European countries, including Germany and Ukraine, were forced back to less desirable options because we did not have the infrastructure to support their need.
As we consider Bill , let us not just look at words on the paper. Let us think about what those words mean in the context of Canada's role on the world stage. Are we simply going to be participants or will we be leaders?
As we look to possibly expand our trade with Ukraine, let us also make sure we are positioned to make the most of similar opportunities in the future. It is not just about economics. It is about taking a stand for cleaner and ethical trade that benefits us today and sets us on the right path for future generations.
I look forward to questions.
:
Madam Speaker, the relationship between Canada and Ukraine is special. Our country is home to more than 1.3 million Canadians of Ukrainian descent. The size of the Ukrainian diaspora is matched by few others in Canada, and it only continues to grow.
As was mentioned by my colleague, the member for , our city is now home to a Ukrainian village. In the spring of 2022, I had the opportunity to hire a Ukrainian student, studying here in Canada, as an intern. The city of Mission is home to a vibrant Ukrainian Orthodox community. We have people-to-people ties that run deep and are only growing.
In fact, before I begin my speech, I would be remiss if I did not mention the multitude of service organizations, such as MCC, which have been at the forefront of welcoming Ukrainian refugees into Canadian society and integrating them into our community and civic organizations. When I think about the Canadian spirit, that is what it is all about. I thank all the organizations that continue to do this very important work today.
As Ukraine has established itself as a modern, democratic nation, Conservatives have been steadfast in our support of expanding economic ties and standing with Ukraine as it distances itself from Putin's Russia. That is why Conservatives were committed to getting a free trade deal with Ukraine done when we were in government.
Since Russian troops invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Conservatives have remained steadfast in our support of the Ukrainian people as they fight against authoritarianism and to protect their sovereignty as a modern, democratic nation. Ukraine will win this war. Canada must ensure that we are prepared to assist the Ukrainian people as they rebuild, and we must ensure that it is the aim of any trade agreement with Ukraine going forward.
On December 2, 1991, the day after Ukraine officially declared its independence from the U.S.S.R., Canada joined Poland as the first two nations to officially recognize a sovereign, independent Ukraine. As was mentioned yesterday by my colleague from , it was Canadian farmers who exported technology to Ukraine, allowing Ukraine to modernize its farming practices and turn itself into a powerhouse of agriculture that feeds many other nations.
Canada can, and should, step up to the plate again, and we could do it by giving Ukraine a hand-up through trade. That begs the question: Does this agreement allow us to do that? Can this agreement help us provide a hand-up to the Ukrainian people? Does it have the necessary tools to provide for a prosperous Ukraine after the war? These questions must be answered as we debate this bill and as it moves through the legislative process.
Let us briefly touch upon the history of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. The original agreement entered into force on August 1, 2017, and eliminated tariffs on 86% of Canada's merchandise exports to Ukraine. It was initially an asymmetrical agreement that was designed to provide more benefit to Ukraine than Canada.
Following the ratification of the original CUFTA, non-coal exports to Ukraine grew 28.5% between 2016 and 2019. In July 2019, the governments of Canada and Ukraine agreed to modernize the CUFTA. Canada-Ukraine bilateral trade reached its highest level ever in 2021. Canada's merchandise exports to Ukraine totalled $219 million, and merchandise imports from Ukraine amounted to $228 million.
Canada and Ukraine announced the launch of modernization negotiations in January 2022. However, the Russian invasion in February 2022 has obviously had a very negative effect on our overall bilateral trade and investment, leading to a 31% fall in Canada's exports to Ukraine.
In 2022, Canada's top three exports to Ukraine were motor vehicles and parts, fish and seafood, and pharmaceutical products. Canada's top imports from Ukraine were animal and vegetable fats and oils, iron and steel, and electrical machinery and equipment. Total merchandise trade with Ukraine was $420 million: $150 million in exports and $270 million in imports.
The CUFTA updates the following chapters: rules of origin, government procurement, competition policy, monopolies and state enterprises, digital trade, labour, environment, transparency and anti-corruption. For the first time in a Canadian FTA, the environment chapter includes provisions recognizing the importance of mutually supportive trade- and environment-related policies. The CUFTA has new chapters in investment, cross-border trade in services, temporary entry for business persons, development and administration of measures, financial services, telecommunications, trade and gender, trade and SMEs, trade and indigenous peoples and regulatory practices. For the first time ever, a Canadian FTA will include a chapter on trade and indigenous peoples. The CUFTA now replaces the 1994 FIPA in the investment chapter as well.
When Conservatives took office in 2006, Canada had trade agreements with just five other countries: the United States, Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica and Israel. By the time Prime Minister Harper left office in 2015, Canada had free trade agreements with an astounding 47 additional countries. I would like to thank the hon. member for for all his hard work.
The Harper government began negotiating with Ukraine all the way back in 2010. Ukraine had a weak economy at that time and, of course, it was struggling to deal with Russia. Despite this, as my hon. colleague from mentioned yesterday, Prime Minister Harper was adamant that Canada pursue free trade with Ukraine.
Building a strong economic relationship with Ukraine and giving it a leg up in establishing itself as a modern democratic nation with a strong economy remains a priority for Canada today and one that I am proud of. As we reflect on the broader implications of Canada's trade policy, we have to look to supporting a country like Ukraine. The Conservatives will continue to stand with Ukraine as it continues the fight against Putin's authoritarian regime.
Canada should be looking for ways to use our economic strength and strategic advantages to support the Ukrainian people, including by exporting Canadian LNG to break European dependence on natural gas from Russia.
I look forward to questions.
:
Madam Speaker, I begin the discussion today on Bill , which is the updated Canada-Ukraine trade agreement.
We have had some conversation already this morning on the subject of the differences between trade agreements and investor protection agreements. I would like to approach that topic again and talk about the updated Canada-Ukraine trade agreement.
I would also like to put a frame around the fact that a number of Liberal MPs said that this agreement makes an effort to name climate change and to tackle climate change in trade agreements. I wish that were so. We have a long way to go if we are going to confront the ways in which the World Trade Organization and its creation have undermined the climate agreements, and multilateral environmental agreements in general.
With that frame, I will move very quickly through some of the larger issues here because it is unusual for us to have any opportunity in this place to address the trade and investor protection agreements and how they impact climate, and they do.
Let us start by looking at the last effective multilateral environmental agreement that the world has ever seen and that was the most effective. It was negotiated in 1987 in Montreal. It is, of course, the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer.
I was honoured to participate in those negotiations as senior policy adviser to the federal minister of environment in the Mulroney government back in those days.
If we look at the success of the Montreal Protocol, it is astonishing. We have not only arrested the destruction of the ozone layer through various ozone-depleting substances but also expanded that agreement with the Kigali Amendment so that it has also been an effective treaty that has helped reduce greenhouse gases.
One of the key reasons the Montreal Protocol was so successful was that the agreement to protect the ozone layer had enforcement mechanisms. It had penalties for countries that chose to ignore their commitments to protect the ozone layer. In fact, those treaty sanctions were so effective, they never had to be used because countries abided by their commitments in the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer.
The effective sanctions were trade sanctions. It is very hard to imagine any kind of international treaty that binds nation states and that has an effective punishment system that would be other than trade agreements. It is the most logical place in which we can inflict some degree of penalty on non-compliance.
The way the Montreal Protocol worked was that if any country ignored its commitments to reduce its use and to stop the production of chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone-depleting substances, then that country would be subject to trade sanctions from any other country that was a party to the Montreal Protocol.
Since every country on earth was a party to the Montreal Protocol, that was why it was a very effective mechanism. Ten years later, in 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, when we negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, tragically, Canada changed its position 180 degrees.
Instead of being a country that championed making those agreements effective by including trade sanctions, our minister of environment headed to Kyoto saying that if trade sanctions were included in the Kyoto Protocol for climate action, Canada would not sign.
What happened? In that 10-year window, there was the creation of the World Trade Organization. The end of the Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in a more established centre for trade work globally.
All of this emanated from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had, since just after the Second World War, when it was negotiated, set aside and protected from trade sanctions those actions that were considered to be part of natural resource conservation and so on.
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade set aside, essentially, environmental protections without using that language. It certainly did not reference climate. We had the window there to protect what we did as nations, not for trade-motivated reasons or protectionist animus but for the legitimate pursuit of environmental protections. We could not be sanctioned by trade deals.
That all changed with the creation of the World Trade Organization. It created a committee called the Committee on Trade and Environment and instead of asking the useful question of whether we have trade agreements that get in the way of environmental protection, it asked a different question: Do we have environmental agreements that get in the way of trade? It spotted the Montreal Protocol and did not like that. It did not like the Basel Convention, which allows trade sanctions, or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, CITES.
We already had a number of agreements that said we were allowed to take measures to protect the environment and in those agreements, we said trade could not get in the way. The trade Hydra raised its many ugly heads and said, no, it did not want us to do that.
There was never any decision, by the way. There was no ruling. It was just a matter of, in every national capital all around the world, the powerful trade ministers at every cabinet table turning to their less powerful environment ministers and saying they could not use those tools anymore. As a result, not a single climate agreement that Canada has ever signed has had any sanctions at all. The only sanction in the Paris Agreement is essentially the annual global stock-taking of language. That is coming up at COP28. The global stock-taking is essentially a sanction based on global shaming and embarrassment as there is no sanction there at all.
We really need to deal with this. Although the window here with the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement is pretty well closed because the negotiations are done, let us take this moment to say this is wrong. Certainly, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine has been one of the most outspoken champions. The war that Putin launched illegally against Ukraine must not get in the way of climate action. President Zelenskyy knows it and champions it. This is a good time to make sure all of the climate agreements are protected from trade limitations.
This is a good time to dust off some of the decisions that have been wrongly assumed to say that we cannot pursue climate agreements without violating trade deals. For instance, there are the tuna-dolphin case and the shrimp-turtle case. Both of those cases, at the WTO appellate level, left out very clear language. It does not say that we can never protect the environment under the WTO but that we cannot do it one-on-one. We cannot say the U.S. makes its own rules and then tells Mexico what to do.
However, it did say, in the context of a multilateral agreement that is negotiated, that trade has to back off and to respect those commitments. That is the case with the Paris Agreement. Every country on earth is bound by it. It is a perfect opportunity for our government to step up and to start saying that countries cannot use trade agreements to limit action to protect climate, as has been done. There are sanctions against India for moving to renewable energy, and so on. We recently had another investor protection agreement decision that hampers climate action.
To go back, trade deals are different from investor protection agreements, but in Bill , in the existing Canada-Ukraine trade deal, there is an investor protection agreement. Those are very corrosive of democracy in that they say a foreign corporation has a right to sue a government if it does not like something that a government does that reduces its expectation of profits. Our government got rid of it in negotiating for the new CUSMA with the U.S., so what was chapter 11 of NAFTA is now gone.
We should be moving quickly to remove investor protection agreements that undermine our democracy, our environmental protections and our labour protections. Getting rid of investor protection agreements, or at least ensuring that they do not give foreign corporations more rights than domestic corporations, would be very welcome, indeed.
Bill C-57 as an improvement in modernization of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement is fine as far as it goes, but it would not do the things that many Liberal MPs have said it would. They have not been misleading the House, as they absolutely believe to be true that the Canada-Ukraine agreement as reflected in Bill C-57 would modernize and include more protections to the environment. It would not really, because unless we get at the basic conflict that trade agreements and the WTO have set themselves up to be superior to multilateral environmental agreements, like the Paris agreement, we are always at risk of trade deals and trade decisions from bodies like the World Trade Organization undermining and sabotaging global climate efforts.
:
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to contribute to the debate about changes to the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement.
I will start by stating again our full support for Ukraine in the war against Russia, which started with an illegal and unjustified invasion on Ukrainian territory in February of last year. Our support is not only in response to some of the atrocities committed by Russian forces in the region but also is a firm stance in favour of international law and a rules-based order that Ukrainians are very literally on the front line of today. It is important that when we choose our allies, we choose allies that are committed to those values and to the application of international law and that we hold them to high standards when it comes to their observance of international law in what they do.
There are many ways we can support allies. Of course, Canada has sent various kinds of aid, whether financial or military, to Ukraine, but being a helpful trading partner in times of strife is also something that is important. However, at the high level, while we are very committed as New Democrats to supporting Ukraine, details do matter, which is why there are established procedures for the House and departmental guidelines for ensuring that parliamentarians have time to do their job of proper scrutiny.
We know that sometimes, under the auspices of good causes, governments have been known to sneak a few things in, which is why the department's own policy on tabling treaties in the House of Commons requires 21 sitting days between the tabling of the text of the treaty and the tabling of enabling legislation. Given that the text of the treaty was tabled on October 17, just a few days ago, normally that would mean that we would not be seeing enabling legislation until November 22. Instead, it has come much more quickly. It has been about a week since the text of the treaty was tabled, and we find ourselves in the second day of debate. This is a contravention of the department's own guidelines on tabling treaties in Parliament, a document that, as New Democrats, we take very seriously because we take the work of this place seriously.
One of the practical consequences is that, even though we are on the second day of debate about changes to an international trade treaty, caucuses have not had the opportunity to meet since the bill was tabled, so it is a very tight turnaround. To ask parliamentarians to be speaking with authority on just a few days' turnaround to such a large document with some important implications and a lot of detail does not manifest in spirit, and in this case not even in the letter, the government's words about taking Parliament seriously as part of the trade process. I think this is an important thing for Canadians to know and understand.
Often in this place, there are debates that touch upon the role of Parliament and the seriousness with which government takes Parliament, and I think this is one of those examples. These are the times not because it is a big controversial thing but precisely because it is not. We know that the government had signed this treaty well before it was tabled in the House of Commons. There were opportunities to bring Parliament into the loop and follow the appropriate policy, but for whatever reason, the government chose to take a pass on that as it too often has in the past.
For those in government who mean it when they say that they take this place seriously, we would exhort them to talk to their colleagues in cabinet to make sure they are following, at the very least, the established procedures for conducting these kinds of debates and discussions in the House of Commons. When they get good at, at least, following through on their own commitments and their own established policies, then we can talk about how to do it better. There certainly are ways to do it better, ways that involve the legislature much earlier on in the process, and build a tighter mandate for enabling legislation when it hits the floor of the House.
There has been a lot of talk already about some of the language in this agreement. I thank the previous speaker for pointing out that flowery language in preambles and elsewhere, if not accompanied by proper enforcement mechanisms that have teeth that would catch the attention either of our own government or the governments with which we are entering into treaties, does not really amount to much.
I am going to lay out what I think is a small but symbolic test of the government's commitment, not just on its process for trade treaties but also in the context of this particular one. In some of the flowery language, there is talk about an indigenous chapter and indigenous rights. I know the government also had flowery language on that file when it came to the Canada-U.S.-Mexico agreement.
However, I moved an amendment to the enabling legislation that would be a non-derogation clause for indigenous rights. It just said that nothing in that legislation, nothing in the agreement, would impinge on the already established rights of indigenous people in Canada. When I did this, I watched the Liberals vote with Conservatives to not have such a clause, just a reminder that indigenous people do have rights in this country and that nothing the Liberal government does in the context of an international trade treaty could undermine that or take away some of those existing rights.
I was disappointed at the reticence of the government members to endorse that as a basic principle and to put it in the legislation. Now we see flowery language about indigenous rights. Let us be sure that, at a minimum, we are including that non-derogation clause in this enabling legislation. That is an important point.
I want to talk a little about one of the issues that I know certain Conservative colleagues have raised in respect of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement and, since the war began more largely, the supply of Canadian oil and gas to Ukraine. I want to point out that, regardless of whether someone supports more natural gas and oil development in Canada for export to Ukraine, when Conservatives talk about this, they are implying that we should have a greater role for government in deciding who the customers of Canadian oil and gas companies are. I do not find that particularly offensive, in principle. I think that is a conversation we should be having.
We should talk about what a reasonable level of extraction for oil and gas is, in barrels per day or barrels per year, and we should have a conversation about the best way to use those finite resources. They are finite because they are not renewable resources and because, if we are doing it right, we should have some kind of cap on how much extraction could happen in a year. This should be devised with our climate commitments in mind.
Oil and gas becomes a very precious resource indeed, as Canadians already know, with the prices they are being forced to pay. Conservatives would have us believe this is because of carbon tax, but, in fact, if we look at the record profits that oil and gas companies have been experiencing over the last number of years, price gouging is actually a much bigger concern, or should be a bigger concern, for Canadians.
Whatever government is taking in the form of a carbon tax and delivering back to Canadians in the form of a rebate is a hell of a lot less than what oil and gas companies are taking out of their pocket and sending off to international tax havens. That is costing Canadians a heck of a lot more.
It is rich for the Conservatives to get up and pretend that, somehow, they are in support of talking about how a public regulatory framework could guide export relationships and contracts for the oil and gas industry. That is not something they support. They support getting more oil and gas out of the ground faster. They support those companies selling it wherever they can make the best buck. However, for the government to get involved and actually say that we should not be buying oil and gas from these countries, that we should be exporting oil and gas to those countries, invites a lot more public involvement in the oil and gas industry than I think they have the stomach for.
This is a debate that I welcome. The best, most efficient and most prosperous use of finite oil and gas resources is something that, from many perspectives, we should be talking about. However, I do not believe this is a conversation they are serious about having. In contexts such as this, the Conservatives use it to score cheap political points, and Canadians should pay attention and not take them at their word on it.
:
Madam Speaker, it is my honour and privilege today to speak on behalf of the good people of Peace River—Westlock to Bill , the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement implementation act, 2023.
I am a free trader. I believe in free market economies. I believe that Canada is a trading country, and I think that it is incumbent upon us to pursue free trade agreements around the world. Canada is blessed to have a huge amount of natural resources, a large land mass and resilient people, who are able to produce those natural resources. We are able to outproduce our own need by multiples of hundreds, whether that is the food production that happens in this country, our forestry or the oil and gas sector.
I want to just talk a little bit about the Supreme Court decision around Bill . It is connected to this by the fact that, when Bill C-69 was brought into force, it ended the pursuit of 14 LNG projects in this country. Prior to the Liberal government coming into power, these projects were being pursued; after Bill C-69 was brought in, they were abandoned.
At the time when Bill was put on the Order Paper and we were discussing it here in this place, we said that the bill was unconstitutional and that it would have a marked effect on the pursuit of major projects in this country. We were right on both counts. We saw 14 projects just disappear. The proponents of those projects said that there was no longer the business case to do them. The business case was entirely impacted by government regulation. We also saw, after five years of that bill being in place, that the Supreme Court agreed with us, saying Bill C-69 was unconstitutional.
Why does that matter in the context of the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement? I would remind everybody that Ukraine is now in a war with Russia. Energy is the major export of Russia to the world. What is funding this war is the energy that people are buying, no matter where they are in the world.
We just heard the NDP talk about how we should pick and choose which countries we should do business with when it comes to oil and gas. I would argue that the world market for energy is the world market for energy. If we put good clean Canadian oil and gas on the world market and compete on that market, we could displace other oil and gas. When we just take our products off that market, somebody else will go in and fill that void. That might be Russia; in many cases, it is Russia.
Now we know that the Germans, for example, have come to Canada and specifically asked Canada to increase LNG production. They said that if they do not get more LNG coming to Europe, they will have to revert to coal mining. When our was asked about that, he said there was no business case. He failed to recognize, or perhaps purposefully did not say, that the business case that no longer was able to be made by LNG companies in this country was predicated entirely on the backs of the new bill, Bill . Those projects were in the works until Bill C-69 came into place and then slowly, one by one, the businesses that were pursuing LNG projects said that there was no longer a business case for them. So we have seen that go away.
Another thing that I am excited about in terms of free trade and free trade agreements is just how our Canadian technology can then move around the world. Our has often said that we will fight climate change with technology and not taxes. Our ability to then export those technologies around the world comes from when we sign free trade agreements.
I am sitting in the House here next to the member for . I know that, when he was the trade minister, he pursued an aggressive free trade agenda under the previous Harper government. He signed over 40 free trade agreements, which allowed our Canadian technology to then be transferred around the world. That made Canadian companies wealthy. That gave Canadians jobs. It also did amazing things for other countries.
Canada is a leader in agricultural techniques and technology. We often lead the way when it comes to dryland farming and those kinds of things. We are able to export not only our equipment, but also our know-how around the world.
When it comes to energy production with our small nuclear reactors, it is a flagship Canadian technology. When I was in elementary school, our social studies bragged about the CANDU reactor and how we would power the world with this Canadian technology. Free trade agreements have had a great impact on allowing our technology to pursue other markets around the world.
Also, our ability to export our LNG products also allows our clean technology products to be transferred around the world.
We export other things such as coal, which is mined in the most ethically sourced manner. In most cases, it is extremely mechanized. There are very few people involved in the actual mining of coal, mostly equipment operators. The rates of injury compared to the tonnes of coal being produced are the lowest. We have some of the best labour practices in the world when it comes to coal production.
Therefore, when our coal ends up on the world market, although we do not necessarily know what the end result of that is, we can say with confidence that our coal, our oil, our lumber and our power are the most ethically sourced. We know that our labour and environmental standards are second to none around the world. When we are exporting these products, we know we are doing good in the world, because we are displacing products that may not have those same standards being enforced.
When it comes to free trade agreements, I want to talk about competitiveness. When we enter the free market, we do not necessarily know where our products are going to end up and we do not necessarily know with whom we are going to be competing. There are price signals that impact our ability to sell our products.
Over and again, representatives from many companies come to my office to talk to me about competitiveness. They say that they have the best technology and labour laws in the world, as well as great ideas, yet they are unable to attract investment in their products because of regulatory uncertainty, high labour costs, high interest rates, these kinds of things. Therefore, more companies are saying they need to be more competitive on the world stage. The Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement would not only allow our products to go to other places, but would also allow Ukrainian investment to come in our direction, and we are very excited about that.
I know more companies are saying that their competitiveness is being undermined specifically because of things like the carbon tax. I am not sure if Ukraine has a carbon tax in place, but it could be a major challenge. If Ukraine does not and we do, we could hamstring our own companies if we enter into a free trade agreement with Ukraine or other countries around the world. Our companies would be competing with other companies that do not have a carbon tax on their products.
Let us say we want to sell LNG. Maybe another reason why there is no market plan for these LNG projects is because of the carbon tax, which came in around the same time as Bill . Companies may say that if they are being charged a carbon tax on the production work they do in Canada when an LNG project in Australia does not have that tax on it, it is an increased cost that their competitors do not have to bear. We have to be concerned about this as we enter into these free trade agreements. We need to ensure that we not only have the ability to send our products out, but we are also able to compete with those companies in those countries.
:
Madam Speaker, I am glad I am joining the debate. I was worried that perhaps I would be one of those unfortunate members of Parliament to be cut-off before being able to speak on behalf on my constituents.
I am glad to join the debate on Bill , the modernization of our free trade agreement with Ukraine. Off the top, I should first begin by mentioning that I absolutely continue, as many members on this side of the House do, to support Ukraine in its very difficult battle against the Russian Federation.
Many members know this, but I was born in Poland. My father was a hard anti-communist, and remains a hard anti-communist. He will not watch this, because he does not watch CPAC, ever. However, I come from a long line of family members who have always feared Moscow's intentions, the Kremlin's intentions in eastern Europe.
For 60-plus years, many eastern European countries were occupied by the Soviet Union, and I specifically use that term. None of those countries were able to pick their governments. Their people were not allowed to pick who was responsible for making policy decisions or government decisions in those countries. I continue to support the people of Ukraine and the government of Ukraine. This is, in fact, a battle of survival
Modernizing agreements will give them some hope. It hopefully will lead to better people-to-people connections between Ukrainians and Canadians. We have those. I count six waves of migration of Ukrainians coming to Canada. Now, under the CUAET visa, I think over 200,000 Ukrainians have fled the war and found refuge in Canada. Canada is a land of refuge. Not too far away from this building, a monument is being built that represents Canada as a place where people from all around the world have found refuge and a home. I know many of those CUAET visa holders some day will become permanent residents of Canada and I hope will become citizens of Canada.
When the original agreement was passed back in August of 2017, the goal then was the elimination of about 86% of tariffs off Canada's merchandise exports to Ukraine. It has been a good deal. We all understood that at the time the agreement was signed and ratified, it would be to the benefit of Ukraine in the short term. It was Canada's way of providing some material support to a country that is still trying to build out of that original Soviet occupation.
Ukraine did have it much worse than a lot of other eastern European country, which, nominally at least, had some level of autonomy. There were local communists in charge, who were obviously supported by the Kremlin, but Ukrainians did suffer much more deeply for longer under Soviet tutelage. Its heavy industry base is mostly based in the eastern part of Ukraine, but much of its industry, such as agriculture, was collectivized and privatized after the fall of communism in eastern Europe.
Ukraine is still building out of it. It is a long process and is not something that can be done over a couple of decades. It sometimes takes half a century to build out of a hole someone else has made. Therefore, supporting Ukraine is important. Agreements like this would tend to do that as well.
In 2022, Canada's total merchandise trade with Ukraine was about $420 million, with $150 million in exports and $270 million in imports. When the ratification of the original CUFTA happened, non-coal exports to Ukraine grew 28.5% between 2016 and 2019.
I have been going through the details of the agreement, and I want to highlight a couple of points. I have not finished reading the whole agreement. I want to ensure I read all the different parts. This was signed in September. Now, in October, we are being asked to ratify it. This is a very detailed document, so it takes quite a bit of time for parliamentarians to go through it.
As I go through it, I note the sections that drew my attention and interest, such as sections on public consultations and transparency measures, which are a good thing. They are found under article 26.7. I was reading through exactly what the expectations were of both Canada and Ukraine when we are parties to this deal.
I want to raise a section on agriculture, “National Treatment and Market Access, which is in chapter 2, section D, article 2.13, subparagraph 4 (a) to (d). There are a lot of sections to the agreement. There is a subcommittee on agriculture that was created in 2017, and this agreement would continue that deal. We of course know a lot of exports from Ukraine will be agricultural goods.
Ukraine is often called one of the breadbaskets of the world. Much of its wheat exports, barley exports and other agricultural products are shipped through the Bosporus Strait, across the Republic of Turkey, to places in northern African, the Middle East and all around the world. It is why the export of grain, wheat, barley and other products has been one of the focal points of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine. It is trying to blockade those very important agricultural shipments to try to starve Ukraine of funds and starve it of the ability to continue building support internationally. Many countries rely on Ukraine's agricultural exports, and if we can provide some measure of support in giving them a different market or the opportunity to use our market as a shuttling point to another market, we should provide that. I note that the subcommittee on agriculture will be committed to that work. I would like to see a way for our farmers and agricultural producers, but also our upgraders, processors and wholesalers, to have an opportunity to purchase Ukrainian agricultural products and then resell them on the world market.
I think we Canadians have shown ourselves to be entrepreneurial. Entrepreneurship is a highly valued set of principles. We always try to get our kids to start a business. I encourage my kids to do just that if they want to do that when they graduate, so I think it is something we hold very dear as Canadians. If there is an opportunity to help Ukrainian businesses and Ukrainian people, we should take it. I note this because it is in there and is important for people, especially in western Canada and the Prairies.
There is an entire section of the agreement that speaks specifically about country-of-origin labelling. This has been a sore spot for us with our American cousins to the south and the different agreements we negotiate with them, because they keep trying to change the terms of the agreements, or at least in how they interpret them. I was looking to find in this agreement, but have not found it yet, specific sections on how goods and services from Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson would be dealt with.
These are all the provinces of Ukraine occupied by the Russian Federation. I had expected this to be dealt with in the agreement. I am still looking for the specific sections on how goods and services would be dealt with and how they would be treated, because they are not from the territory of the Russian Federation. The four referendums held in the oblasts were illegal, unjustified and not recognized by the international community, because they were essentially just rammed through. People do not get a free vote when it is done at the pointy end of a firearm or with armoured vehicles from the Russian Federation overseeing how they vote.
I would like to know how the products and goods and services these territories produce would be dealt with. Would we have a certain measure and way to distinguish them from Russian goods? When, not if, Ukraine is able to restore its control over those provinces, I am hoping we will be able to deal with those goods and services and set them aside, perhaps giving them special treatment within our tariff system and within our country-of-origin labelling system.
There is a Yiddish proverb that I often like to use. This is not a proverb that I think is recognized, but it should be if it is not because I think it applies to the House: The late minyan has the least number of people arriving on time. At any shul, basically nothing starts on time, but we need 10 persons present at a synagogue to begin service.
I hope for that during the debate on a free trade deal. I am a free trader, I believe in free trade and our party believes in free trade, but not every agreement is exactly the same. I have noted some of the things I am looking for. I have noted that I have not been provided a briefing on the contents of the agreement itself, so all I really have to go on is what is in Bill , which makes a lot of references to the agreement and the previous agreement as well.
I hope more members will be allowed to participate, to be part of that minyan and be here to rise on behalf of their constituents to raise specific points that are of concern to them. I come from Calgary. It is a big oil and gas town but also a big agricultural town. We have a lot of major agricultural shippers, manufacturers, producers and processors that are very much interested in the eastern European market and especially the fate of Ukraine and making sure we support it.
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba are home to a huge Ukrainian diaspora, and many of them are watching this agreement and watching what the future of Ukraine will be like. An agreement like this gives them hope, but we need to look at more of the details before we pass judgment on it.
:
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to be here today to speak to something that I think is very important to all of us here in the chamber, the legislation for the modernized Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement. It is my honour to rise in the House today in support of legislation to implement, as quickly as possible, the modernized Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement, or CUFTA, as it is often referred to.
Recently, the Canada-Ukraine bilateral relationship has been marked by Canada's steadfast support for Ukrainian independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of protracted Russian aggression. Canada has stood beside our Ukrainian allies to support them as they fight for their independence, democracy and freedom. I know they are waiting for this free trade agreement to be done, with much expectation that Canada will finalize it as soon as possible so that we can open the door for further trade with Ukraine to help it in the terrible war it is dealing with. Since the beginning of this illegal full-scale invasion by Russia in February 2022, Canada has committed close to $9 billion in multi-faceted support for Ukrainians, because we know how desperately they need it, and they are eager to see this free trade agreement as well.
Today, we have yet another opportunity to demonstrate our continued support for Ukraine through other means. Bill would not only offer benefits in the near term but would extend well beyond the strengthening of the foundation on which Canadian and Ukrainian businesses can work together in the economic reconstruction of Ukraine, underpinning the long-term economic relationship between our two countries.
This is not a new deal. This is an expansion of the free trade agreement. We have been dealing with free trade with Ukraine for a very long time, so this is not new, something that has just popped up that we have not seen. We knew it was coming, and it has been worked on explicitly to make sure it is the very best that it can be.
I am referring to the modernized CUFTA, of course. The modernized CUFTA is a comprehensive high-standard agreement that, once implemented, will not only support Canadian and Ukrainian businesses but will also deepen commercial linkages, enhance co-operation, provide for increased transparency in regulatory matters, support inclusive trade and help reduce costs for businesses. That is very much what this free trade agreement is about, and it is very important that we understand it all.
One of the key outcomes of the original 2017 agreement was the market access that it gained for Canadian and Ukrainian produced and manufactured goods. If ever a Ukrainian needed help with a free trade agreement, it certainly is today.
As of January 2024, all tariff elimination schedules will be complete and over 99% of Canada's exports to Ukraine will be eligible to enter Ukraine duty-free. That is a very important aspect of this free trade agreement. This will make Canadian goods more competitive in the Ukrainian market, and vice versa, which we very much want. It will be especially valuable as we move toward reconstruction, economic renewal and longer-term prosperity for Ukraine.
Thanks to the CUFTA, Ukrainians will be able to enjoy more high-quality Canadian goods, such as frozen meats and fish, fruits and vegetables, other consumer goods, and essential services. Meanwhile, Canadians will be able to enjoy the Ukrainian goods and services that we all enjoy, to help with the cravings and needs of the many Ukrainians living in Canada.
There are a multitude of brands from Ukraine that have proved themselves to be good additions to the Canadian market over the last many years. The CUFTA helps us broaden our horizons and support the Ukrainian economy, especially in these challenging times. I know they are very excited and looking forward to this bill's passing.
Throughout negotiations, both sides demonstrated an eagerness to reach an ambitious and high-standard agreement with the aim of facilitating increased trade between our two nations, not just to meet the more immediate needs of reconstruction, which are great opportunities for Canadian companies to go to Ukraine and help in the rebuilding process, but long into the future. This eagerness is reflected in how comprehensive the modernized CUFTA is with respect not only to trade in goods but also to investment services and inclusive trade. The CUFTA helps make the reconstruction process transparent and sustainable. Also, this agreement is the first FTA addressing anti-corruption provisions.
Canada has always been there for Ukraine since its independence in 1991, and this new agreement is yet another opportunity for Canada to make itself visible in Ukraine and to lead by example. As a result, the modernized CUFTA would not only maintain the preferential market access gained in the original FTA for merchandise exports and imports, but would also support new opportunities for expanded commercial ties between Canada and Ukraine in the context of reconstruction efforts and well beyond. These benefits have led to strong support for this agreement by key stakeholders, including the Canada-Ukraine Chamber of Commerce, representatives of which were recently on the Hill and expressed their desire to see this FTA continue.
Sectors of strategic importance to Ukraine's recovery include infrastructure, renewable energy, financial services and oil and gas, which are all areas where Canada has strengths. Furthermore, Canadian companies have indicated an interest in pursuing opportunities in Ukraine in the areas of defence and security, energy, ICT and agriculture, and are positioned to engage when and where the circumstances permit.
According to the latest estimate by the Ukrainian side, since February 2022, more than 37% of the total damage in Ukraine falls on residential buildings, another 24% on infrastructure and 8% on assets of enterprises and industry. According to Ukrainian and international analysts, Ukraine will turn into the largest construction site in the world after this war ends. The modernized CUFTA would support Canadian businesses as they position themselves to respond to these interests, taking into account the scope of the market that Ukraine has. It is time to use that window of opportunities.
Prior to the negotiations, the government conducted public consultations with Canadian stakeholders on what they would like to see in a modernized FTA with Ukraine. The initiative received strong support from stakeholders, indicating that modernization of the CUFTA would enhance the competitiveness of Canadian firms in the Ukrainian market, among other benefits.
Stakeholders specifically identified pursuing stronger trade rules, increased transparency obligations, expansion of the agreement to cover services and investment, and inclusive trade as priorities. I am pleased to confirm that the modernized agreement before us reflects these aims and more.
If I may, I will now say a few words about the modernized agreement, highlighting some of the benefits and opportunities it presents for Canadians and Ukrainians with an overview of the new chapters that have been added.
First, the agreement includes a dedicated new chapter on cross-border trade in services. This includes provisions on the recognition of professional qualifications that will facilitate trade in professional services, which is strategically important for both parties in a knowledge-based and digital economy.
Ukraine is a land of world-class talents who are ready to contribute their knowledge and expertise to the common good. The new CUFTA would allow these professionals to focus on their work and what they can do best, not on the bureaucratic ping-pong that can drain the needed energy and enthusiasm from all parties involved.
The agreement also includes a new chapter on investment that would replace the Canada-Ukraine Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. Featuring updated provisions on investment protection, the new chapter also ensures that investment obligations operate as required.
:
Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to once again rise in this place to speak to the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement.
When we talk about the importance of the Canada-Ukraine relationship, we have to talk about the 1.3 million Canadians of Ukrainian origin who live here in Canada. Many of them were integral to the development of western Canada. They are an incredible and important part of the social fabric of Canada, and their contributions to Canada cannot go unnoticed. As a result of that, we have very strong people-to-people ties between Canada and Ukraine. Of course, we are strong supporters of Ukraine during the illegal invasion being prosecuted by Russia.
In addition, with respect to this agreement in particular, this modernization of the agreement would build on the 2017 agreement which updated or added 11 new chapters to the free trade agreement. The updated chapters include rules of origin and procedures, government procurement, competition policy, monopoly and state enterprises, electronic commerce, digital trade, labour, the environment, transparency, anti-corruption and responsible business conduct.
There is also a significant number of new chapters. There are 11 new chapters, to be frank. These are on investment; cross-border trade in services; temporary entry for business people; development and administration of measures; financial services; services and investment, non-conforming measures; telecommunications; trade and gender; trade and small and medium-sized enterprises; trade and indigenous peoples; and good regulatory practices. This is a substantial change from the original agreement which was signed in 2017.
In 2021 alone, Canada processed some $220 million in exports and $227 million in imports with Ukraine. Given Ukraine's GDP has dropped some 30% since Russia's invasion, trade with Canada is welcomed now more than ever. For some context, some of the larger exports from Canada to Ukraine include vehicles and parts, fish, and pharmaceuticals. When it comes to imports to Canada, it is largely cereals, iron and steel to name a few.
I want to spend the majority of my speech talking about the people and largely the people in Edmonton.
When the Ukrainian president was here in Ottawa, he reminded Canada and the world about Edmonton's close connection to his country. Soon after taking the podium right up there, he brought up my city in talking about our links to the destiny of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Canadian community. He mentioned a statue that has stood outside Edmonton City Hall since 1983. It was a proud moment for many Edmontonians, especially with his call for another monument there on victory day when Ukraine conquers and wins this Russian war against Ukraine. This was stated no more clearly than by the president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress Alberta Provincial Council, when she stated, “This is amazing. He's paying attention. He knows who we are.”
The Ukrainian Canadian Congress Alberta Provincial Council has done incredible work during this war. It is a non-profit organization that provides leadership, advocacy, coordination and connections. It officially represents the needs of Ukrainian Canadians in Alberta before the people and the Government of Alberta. It aims to promote knowledge, respect for Ukraine's history and sovereignty, and acknowledgement of the great contributions of Ukrainians within Canada. Since the war began, over 12,000 Ukrainians have already come to Edmonton.
Some of the work that Ukrainian Canadian Congress Alberta Provincial Council is doing is phenomenal, to say the least. It is providing $200,000 to support Ukrainian organizations with programming and membership for newcomers. It spent $32,000 in grocery gift cards for newcomers. It put up a website with resources and tools for newcomers. Together with the Firefighter Aid Ukraine organization, it filled the first plane to Ukraine with medical and emergency supplies.
Other of its activities include assisting with crisis needs, including emergency housing, financing the purchase of medical equipment, organizing a furniture donation warehouse, distributing furniture to thousands of newcomers, organizing free English language classes, organizing job fairs, hosting information and welcome events for newcomers, weekly rallies protesting against Russian aggression, fundraisers to support settlement, government advocacy, distributing SIM cards, distributing pallets of clothing throughout Alberta, providing laptops and computers to Ukrainians in need, coordinating mental health support and resources and, of course, welcoming Ukrainian nationals at the airport. As someone who flies a lot, being able to see those Ukrainians come to the Edmonton airport and connect with someone as they get off the plane is nothing short of heartwarming.
I want to talk about a few of the people and initiatives, particularly three Edmonton firefighters. Three Edmonton firefighters went to Ukraine to teach first responders a modified version of the NATO standard tactical combat casualty care course. They were all volunteer firefighters through the Firefighter Aid Ukraine organization. They taught 70 firefighters and police officers, who then trained other firefighters and police officers across Ukraine.
The medical course they taught focused on life-saving interventions for injuries associated with military attacks on civilian populations. They focused on critical and acute injuries, and even mental health. The president of the association stated:
Individuals who have not performed in an emergency responder role previously, have now taken on that role in Ukraine. As such, they do not have this kind of training and it is imperative for them to have it, given the situations they are dealing with in their roles.
In addition to the training, the firefighter group also brought over supplies of PPE, and specialty equipment for treating patients and saving lives. This is not new to this organization. In May 2017, it filled a shipping container with medical supplies, tools and emergency response equipment, which was then sent to Ukraine. Just last September, a group of seven firefighters and one dispatcher also went overseas to Ukraine.
Another example is of Edmonton artists who are donating their works to Ukrainian aid. A number of local artists donated to a fund created by the owners of the West End Gallery in Edmonton. The campaign raised almost $29,000. It did not have an auction. This was a call to answer by its customers. It is adamant that the full amount of the sales went directly to those who needed it the most.
The group contacted the former Alberta premier, a dear friend of mine, Ed Stelmach, whose grandparents came to the province as Ukrainian immigrants. Stelmach and his wife, Marie Stelmach, founded and have administered The Ed Stelmach Community Foundation since 2007. The foundation fosters a culture of charity and equality for all Albertans, and is overseen by a volunteer board.
The support did not stop there. Suddenly, we saw tens of thousands of Ukrainians fleeing their war-torn country, and an Edmonton mother and daughter decided to team up to help the new arrivals, who had arrived with very few belongings. The two projects they co-founded were a free store and a food kitchen. The duo launched the Free Store for Ukrainian Newcomers at a temporary site and then moved downtown to an Edmonton building provided rent-free by MacEwan University. The facility provides clothing, diapers, pillows, toys and household essentials at no charge to newcomers displaced by war.
The second project, the Ukraine Kitchen by Free Store, opened its doors in northeast Edmonton after operating temporarily out of the Cook County Saloon. Pre-ordered Ukrainian food is sold, providing wages for a team of about 14 kitchen workers, who proudly dole out plates of cabbage rolls, perogies, borscht and desserts.
Lastly, there is a furniture store. For nearly 10 months, Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Alberta Provincial Council, has been operating a furniture depot in a northwest Edmonton warehouse to supply newcomers with essentials to set up their homes. Approximately 35 families utilize the free warehouse weekly, and most need mattresses and other supplies. The whole operation is housed in the Boilermakers Lodge 146 building near the High Park industrial area.
This is not new to Edmonton. The Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Village Society was founded in 1971, and I am sure my colleague from will not mind me mentioning it. It has a number of exhibit galleries that provide a closer understanding of Ukrainian settlement in east central Alberta, which has been critical to the education of so many Albertans and Canadians.
These are just some of the reasons Canadians are watching this debate so closely. The Conservative Party is one hundred per cent behind supporting Ukraine, trade and free trade. Free trade between free nations is something we support one hundred per cent. As a member of the international trade committee, I look forward to going through this agreement and hearing debate on this agreement in the House.
:
Madam Speaker, thank you for that reminder. It was inadvertent on my part.
Around that time, the and President Zelenskyy announced plans to modernize CUFTA. Then came COVID-19, and those negotiations had to be delayed, understandably.
In early 2021 and the fall of 2021, Russia started to amass soldiers around Ukraine's borders. Understandably, the discussions in Ukraine, around the world and here in Parliament were about how we were going to support Ukraine: what we were going to do, what Russia was going to do and how we were going to respond.
I remember that in January 2022, so about a month before Russia's full-scale invasion, the minister approached me and said that she wanted to join me in a Zoom meeting because the government was going to relaunch the negotiations for the modernization of the free trade agreement. This showed, despite everything that was going on, how high a priority this was for Ukraine and for Canada. After the further invasion by Russia continued, those negotiations continued. Again, that showed what a high priority this was for Canada and for Ukraine. When President Zelenskyy was here a few weeks ago, yes he spoke in Parliament and yes he was at the Fort York Armoury to meet with Canadians, but he also signed the free trade agreement with our . This again shows how important this is to both Canada and Ukraine.
What is so great about the new modernized free trade agreement? It would maintain the preferential market access gained in the original free trade agreement with respect to all Canadian merchandise exports to Ukraine, which would be great for Canadian business people and workers. The agreement also includes dedicated new chapters on trade and services, investment, temporary entry, telecommunications, financial services and inclusive trade, and updated chapters on labour, environment, transparency and anti-corruption, among a number of other things.
It would facilitate and enhance co-operation, improve the ability to resolve trade disagreements, promote openness and inclusivity, increase transparency in regulatory matters and help reduce transaction costs for businesses, which is good for business and workers and increases trade. It would commit Canada and Ukraine to respecting and promoting internationally recognized labour rights and principles and the effective enforcement of labour and environmental laws. There would also be significant measures in place to help prevent and respond to corruption.
All in all, this is an agreement that is structured in such a way as to not only benefit Canadian businesses, Canadian employers and workers, but also make sure that the investments that Canadians are making in Ukraine, and vice versa, are protected. Therefore, it is a great economic opportunity for Canada and for Ukraine.
However, there is something else about the agreement that is really important. It is an important step in supporting Ukraine's victory and our collective victory. Let me tell members what I mean by that. As we speak, the Ukrainian people are fighting to defend themselves against Russia's genocidal war. Notwithstanding the courage and the resolve of the Ukrainian people, the situation is dire. Russia is committing genocide every day. Millions of people have become refugees inside and outside Ukraine. Hundreds of millions of people in the global south are facing food shortages and famine because of Russia's invasion and the blockades of Ukrainian food exports, and the war is a primary cause of food and energy inflation around the world. Most importantly, the war poses an existential threat to global security and Canada's security.