NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

¹

1535

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.))

Lieutenant General M.K. Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence)

¹

1540

¹

1545

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance)

¹

1550

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¹

1555

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Bachand (Saint-Jean)

º

1600

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Bachand

Major-General . E.S. Fitch (Project Manager, Land Force Reserve Restructure, Department of National Defence)

Mr. Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

º

1605

The Chair

Mr. Wood

Mr. Wood

º

1610

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Wood

The Chair

Mr. Wood

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Wood

The Chair

Mr. Wood

The Chair

Mr. Wood

LGen M.K. Jeffery

º

1615

MGen E.S. Fitch

The Chair

Mrs. Wayne

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Wayne

º

1620

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mrs. Wayne

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Wayne

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Wayne

The Chair

MGen E.S. Fitch

º

1625

The Chair

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

º

1630

The Chair

Mr. Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Brigadier General Herbert Michael Petras (Director General, Land Reserve, Department of National Defence)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

º

1635

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

MGen E.S. Fitch

º

1640

Mr. David Price

MGen E.S. Fitch

The Chair

Mrs. Wayne

LGen M.K. Jeffery

BGen Herbert Petras

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

º

1645

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay--Atikokan, Lib.)

Mr. Dromisky

º

1650

LGen M.K. Jeffrey

MGen E.S. Fitch

Mr. Dromisky

The Chair

Mr. Dromisky

LGen M.K. Jeffery

º

1655

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

»

1700

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Anders

LGen M.K. Jeffery

BGen Herbert Petras

Mr. Anders

BGen Herbert Petras

The Chair

Mr. Peric

»

1705

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Peric

The Chair

Mr. Peric

LGen M.K. Jeffery

»

1710

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

»

1715

The Chair

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. David Price

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

---

NUMBER 048

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1535)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

    We are again very pleased to have before us today Lieutenant General Jeffery, as well as Major General Fitch, and Brigadier General Petras is here to speak to us on the reserves.

    On behalf of all of the members of the Standing Committee, Generals, I'd like to welcome you here today. We're very interested in getting your comments with respect to the issue of the reserves and how it relates to our study of the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. Without any further delay, we'll go to you.

    Before I do so, I should make a note of the fact that, members, we do have some issues we would like to deal with in camera at the end of this meeting. They are issues relating to budgets and personnel. Perhaps we could stick around for a few minutes at the end of this. Maybe we could end this meeting around 5:20 or so, and then deal with the remaining issues.

    It's 5:15 for the bells. Perhaps, as we don't have far to go, maybe we could end the meeting at 5:15. It might be the best approach. Then we'll deal with the issues accordingly.

    Again, without any further delay, General Jeffery, you have the floor. We're very interested in getting your comments.

    Lieutenant General M.K. Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it really seems like yesterday that I appeared in front of you, speaking primarily on the state of readiness and the capability of the army. Today, as I understand it, you wish me to focus primarily on the army reserve. I am pleased to do so.

    Today, as you said, Mr. Chairman, I am accompanied by Major General Ed Fitch, who is the project manager for the Land Force Reserve Restructure Project, and Major General Herb Petras, the Director General of Land Reserves and my principal reserve adviser. You should note that General Fitch is a regular force officer. General Petras is a reservist.

    I'm going to take about ten minutes, if I may, to establish what I think is a context for what I believe are mostly the questions you wish to ask, such that I and my colleagues can answer those questions. You will see there have been some slides handed out. They do not relate to my opening remarks. They are there as a matter of reference should we wish, or should you wish, to get into any details. They might form an easy reference in dealing with issues of some complexity.

    The history of the army reserve, or, perhaps more accurately, the militia, in Canada is in many ways, I believe, the history of the country. From the time of Montcalm in New France, through the British colonial period, to Confederation and since, the depth of defence here in Canada has been provided by the citizen soldier.

    We've had a resident professional army, first French, then British, now Canadian, but the militia has been enduring. In both world wars, Canada immobilized the nation. It was the militia that was the principal base for army expansion. In each case, the regular force, while important in its own way, was too small a base to build on.

    I remind you of this history only to emphasize my belief, or indeed I believe in the fact, that the militia is part of the Canadian culture and psyche. As a consequence, we as a nation have long considered we do not need to have large standing forces. At times of crisis, it will be the reserves that answer the call.

    The difficulty with that perspective is it has its limits. We, in particular the military leadership, have faced major differences of views on this very important issue. General Guy Simmons once said:

Of all the traditions Canada has inherited in the military field, none is more persistent than public neglect of and indifference to national defence until face to face with an emergency.... ...when an emergency does come, the general public believes that the citizen recruited off the street can be turned into an effective fighting man at the wave of a wand. The public mind seems incapable of grasping the fact that the military business is a highly skilled profession.

    The question, in my mind, is not if we have reserves, but what the reserves can do and what the balance must be, as a nation, between the resources we put to our regular force and those to the reserves.

[Translation]

    Throughout our history, the Reserves have largely been organized along parallel lines to the Regulars, with the principal role of adding depth to the army. That is to say that they have the same general capabilities, but were maintained at a lower level of readiness, requiring additional training and of course the complement of equipment to reinforce or replace the regular units.

[English]

    The degree of depth has varied with the perceived threat and the dominant defence thinking of the day. During the Cold War this dominant thinking led, in the fifties and sixties, to a reduction in the size of the reserves based on the assessment that any war would be, in the vernacular of the age, “come as you are”, since the nation would not have the time to mobilize.

    The reserves were therefore focused on national survival after nuclear attack. This period in our history, referred to in uncomplimentary terms as “snakes and ladders”, is not remembered fondly by the reserves as it saw a lowering of war-fighting training and a move away from what the reserves saw as real soldiering.

    While the national survival focus was replaced with a more traditional role in the late sixties, the need for highly responsive forces resulted in a loss of focus on what the reserves should be. In my view, the reserves have never fully recovered from that period, and attempts by generations of military leaders to reform the reserves have been fraught with significant difficulty.

    There have been a number of major studies or reports, both within the department and by government, but in reality these have resulted in few substantive changes. This has been due to a number of factors, but I believe the principal hurdle to achieving consensus on what the reserves should look like was the conflicting views as to the requirement for, and ultimately the place of, the reserves in Canada.

    The regular force, primarily a product of the Cold War, saw the reserves principally as a manpower base for augmentation to the regular force, to meet the force expansion requirements should any significant conflict occur, while the reservists and the communities from which they flowed, founded in the history and the culture of the militia, saw their role in far more fundamental terms as defence of the nation and a mobilization base in times of conflict.

    The inability to achieve consensus, combined with increasing resource limitation, resulted in an erosion of the reserves as an institution. The latest round of attempts to bring focus to this matter of reform of the reserves started in 1990. After several years of major effort to restructure the reserves, attempts to reach agreement broke down and the Minister of National Defence asked the Hon. John Fraser to review the situation and provide him advice on how to resolve the impasse.

    In early May of 2000, prior to the submission of Mr. Fraser's final report, the CDS appointed me to develop a strategic plan, in line with Mr. Fraser's report, for implementation of change within the reserves. On May 19, 2000, Mr. Fraser submitted his report, titled In Service of the Nation, to the minister, and on October 6 the minister announced his policy on reserve restructure and released the LFRR strategic plan.

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[Translation]

    The policy statement, amongst other things, indicated an intention to increase the Land Force reserves to at least 18,500 and confirmed the three roles of the reserves as the provision of a mobilization base, its footprint in the community, and to act as augmentation of the Regular Force.

    The Strategic Plan outlined a broad framework for reform that saw an initial three-year phase during which the focus would be the re-establishment of the health of the Reserves and a rebuilding of trust between the Regular and Reserve components of the army. The second phase would then see reform of the reserves, in a manner to be determined, and its ultimate growth to 18,500.

[English]

    During the summer of 2001, Major General Fitch was appointed as the project manager for LFRR.

    The army reserve today in Canada is the product of much of that history. In structural terms, the army reserve consists of 138 units, divided into 10 brigades, still very much based on the post-World War II organization. These units are still located in many towns and communities across the nation, again, largely based on the post-World War II footprint.

    However, the authorized army reserve strength for this coming fiscal year, FY 02-03, will be 15,500, against which we actually have approximately 15,000 positions filled with class A and class B reserve soldiers.

    So when we talk of 138 units, none of them would equate to full operational units. Rather, each is effectively a training organization with a responsibility, based on historic manning levels and available resources, to produce a specific level of capability. So we could see a reserve infantry battalion with a manning level of 280 tasked to produce, in time of crisis, an infantry company of 126, or a battalion of 155 tasked to produce a platoon of 36.

    All of these soldiers would have their full complement of uniforms and personal equipment, and we are in the process of bringing these units up to regular force scales for basic individual weapons and equipment. However, none of these units would have the full suite of equipment one would expect to find in a regular force operational unit. Rather, they would hold sufficient equipment to undertake individual and some low-level collective training and they would depend on the regular force for equipment to conduct higher levels of that collective training.

    The reserves have many challenges today, key of which is the attraction, training, and retention of young Canadians. The Canadian Forces and the army are addressing this matter with vigour, but real progress will take time. We also face resource constraints, and this translates into some limitations on the type and the amount of reserve training that can be undertaken.

    The reserves are successful, and the difficulties notwithstanding, our reservists continue to contribute significantly to everything we do.

    Historically, we rely on our reserves to support all types of domestic operations. I believe you are all well aware of the Canadian Forces' efforts to assist during such natural disasters as the ice storm and the floods in the Saguenay and the Red River. Often lost in the activity is the understanding of the magnitude of the reserves' support and contribution for those and many other less visible domestic operations.

    The reserves are also contributing significantly to our international operations. As we speak, we have approximately 242 army reservists deployed outside of Canada on operations and another 225 currently undergoing training to deploy overseas, on Rotation 10, in April. I know that some of the committee members have already had the opportunity to visit some of those units, and I hope more will as well.

    I expect to maintain and even increase these numbers, but more significantly to deploy formed reserve capabilities rather than rely on individual augmentees.

    In that context, we currently have six reserve infantry sections with the third battalion, le Royal 22e Régiment, which is in Bosnia. During the next rotation in April, the second battalion of the 22e Régiment will deploy with at least one full infantry platoon, and the following rotation with 1PPCLI will go in with a full reserve infantry company.

    In addition, you should know that reservists fill a large number of the day-to-day taskings that the army is required to undertake. In January of this year, as an example, there were approximately 2,800 army reservists on full-time service.

    Indeed, ladies and gentlemen, the army could not operate today without its reserve component.

    What about the way ahead? First of all, we continue to progress phase I of LFRR. This is Brigadier General Petras' main focus as he oversees the army reserve of today. I believe we've moved significantly in the right direction, and both the health of the reserves and the trust between the two components are much improved. However, we continue to face challenges, and it will take time before I can say that we've created the conditions for real change.

¹  (1545)  

    On my behalf, Major General Fitch is leading the planning and consultation on LFRR phase II. In this regard, he's conducting the analysis and will be developing the options to help guide the LFRR process forward. However, the real progress in this phase will require clarity in resource and policy terms.

    As you are aware, the Minister of National Defence has indicated the intent to undertake a defence review, and I believe this will provide an opportunity to validate the policy on the reserves. In addition, the current budget does not have the resources to achieve LFRR phase II objectives, and this will similarly need to be resolved during this review cycle.

    Over and above the policy and resource issue, there is much work to do to restructure and reform the army reserve generally.

    In that context, I would like to leave you with two thoughts. First, whatever the future, the reserves, like the army, must be reformed if they are to remain a vital part of the nation's defence. What that means will be the focus of much of the analysis throughout the review, but we need to have the collective will to see this matter through. In my view, the status quo is not acceptable to the army, reserve or regular, and I don't think it should be acceptable to the Canadian people.

    Secondly, such reform is a collective responsibility and cannot be left to any one group. It means that reservists and regulars must work together to produce a solution that makes sense to both. Ultimately the solution must be one that meets the needs of the nation.

    In summary, I believe the army reserve in Canada is and always has been vital to the defence of the nation. The army leadership and I are committed to rebuilding and reforming this very important national institution. It will take time, money, and, above all else, commitment to this most difficult of tasks, but in the interest of the nation, I'm committed that we must succeed.

    That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues and I are now prepared to respond to your questions.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, General Jeffery.

    We're into our seven-minute round. Mr. Anders, you have the floor.

    Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    To the best of your knowledge, is the U.S. army employing anti-personnel landmines in any capacity in Afghanistan?

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    LGen M.K. Jeffery: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, no.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Interesting. Okay.

    The U.S. Army doesn't permit women in its infantry, armoured combat, engineer, or artillery units. How many women are serving in the infantry and armoured elements of the PPCLI battle group?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: First of all, Mr. Chairman, I believe the statement is incorrect. All the classifications within the army, indeed all the classifications within the Canadian Forces, are now open to women. The most recent, of course, being decisions on submarines, is outside of my purview, but that's the one remaining area that is under transition.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Sorry, maybe I didn't make that clear. My understanding was that that was the U.S. Army. I'm asking, with regard to the PPCLI, how many do we have?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: My apologies.

    There are, I believe, three female soldiers in the Kandahar region as part of the battle group. I believe none of them are in an infantry role. All those are in support classifications. There is at least one female in the armoured reconnaissance squadron.

    But I would make a point, Mr. Chairman, that we don't track such issues. I think that's an important issue. We deal with soldiers, soldiers who can do the job, irrespective of what gender they be.

    Mr. Rob Anders: What types of capabilities that you do not today possess would you most like to see added to the capability of the army?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: At this stage, the highest priorities I have for improvement of overall military capability are in the information operations and what we refer to as the ISTAR domain--that is, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance. We have plans to undergo both restructuring and capital equipment procurement in that domain. That, by far, is the top priority.

     The second major area of capability improvement is in the whole area of firepower, both direct and indirect firepower. Most of the issues are related to capital procurement, either procurement or upgrading.

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    Mr. Rob Anders: Do you think the army should maintain a main battle tank capability?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The army at present does not have, in modern terms, a main battle tank. The Leopard C1, what we refer to as the Leopard C2, recently upgraded with improved protection and surveillance capability, is a first generation tank upgraded. At best, it would be considered to be a medium tank in today's context.

    Such a weapon system, in my view, is the minimum requirement for direct fire support in any real mechanized type of operation where fighting is going on. It still doesn't permit our forces realistically to be in the front line, if you will, in the most demanding part of the task.

    My belief is that such a weapon system will need to be replaced. I do not necessarily see it being replaced by a main battle tank, or indeed not necessarily even a tank as we know it. I believe I addressed this issue in part last time I appeared in front of the committee. I talked at some length as to the kinds of new future combat systems we would see ultimately replacing this, once technology permits us to do it.

    Mr. Rob Anders: My understanding is the Dutch, Norwegians, Danes, Spanish, Australians, and Italians all have main battle tanks, and you're saying we don't. Is that right?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: We're into an issue of terminology. Many of those nations actually have exactly the same tank we do, the Leopard C1. Ours has been upgraded even more to a better capability than some of those.

    In the early part of the 21st century, you were dealing with tanks like the Abrams Mark 2 that is clearly in a league by itself. When we look at a battlefield with that tank and other comparable tanks, the Leopard C2 is not in the same league and could not engage in a comparable battle in the same sense. It is not what I would call a modern main battle tank.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Okay. Do you think we should have that capability?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: One has to be realistic in terms of what a nation can provide and what one requires. My view is, and indeed my vision for this army is, it is an army that is focused on a medium-weight capability. It will have a capability comparable to, or even superior to, our current weight of fire in terms of the current tank we have. As technology allows us to move forward, we will actually be able to improve it significantly, and perhaps even achieve comparable main battle tank capability, in the long term, using technology.

    The difficulty here is that one has to recognize the change in technology and what is acceptable risk. Frankly, if I had the money, I wouldn't necessarily go out and buy a main battle tank tomorrow even if I could afford it. The harsh reality is that increasingly there are few places in the world where one needs to use it. Some people have some difficulty recognizing that we're not likely to be engaged in major tank battles on the central European front. Most of the operations are now conducted by forces that are more strategically mobile but can still arrive there with a punch.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Would you spend it on heavy transport helicopters then?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I could go down a list from the Sears Christmas wish book. I'm not sure it would be helpful.

    I can spend some time talking about more globally where this army needs to go, if you wish me to spend the time.

    The Chair: Actually, General, Mr. Anders is out of time at this point. We will have to move on to the next question.

    Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ) Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'd like to welcome General Jeffery and at the same time, congratulate him. I read in theMaple Leaf that he was appointed commander of [Editor's note: inaudible]. While this will not be a lucrative appointment, it is nonetheless testimony to the trust placed in him by the people of North and South America. I just wanted to state this for the record.

    For starters, General Jeffery, could you explain the difference between yourself and Rear Admiral Zuliani who recently explained to us his role and relationship as an adviser to the Canadian Forces? During his presentation, he explained to us that the Land, Air Force and Naval Reserves each had their respective commanders in charge. What then is the nature of his role as an adviser? Does he work with you first, or does he directly advise Admiral Maddison with the information then being passed on to you? Could you explain to us briefly the relationship between yourself and Rear Admiral Zuliani in so far as the Land Force Reserve is concerned?

º  (1600)  

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The Chief of Reserves and Cadets is the principal adviser to the Chief of the Defence Staff on all reserve and cadet issues. He has the mandate to provide oversight of all reserve activities, ensure that the overall department's and Canadian Forces' objectives are being attained, report that to the CDS, and provide appropriate advice.

    However, each of the environments and the reservists within those environments are the responsibility of the environmental commander. In my case, I am responsible for the army reserve, that is the Canadian army militia, in all respects. I report to the CDS, as part of those responsibilities.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you.

    Mention is made of transparency and responsibility in the Fraser Report. The report notes that a project office has been established to oversee the revitalization of the Land Force Reserve. Mention is made of Major General Fitch - by the way, congratulations on your appointment. However, the report also states that a project charter has not yet been approved. Could you tell me what the status of the project charter is at this time? Since the completion of the Fraser Report, has a project charter been drafted? We're told that it's the responsibility of the VCDS - which, as I finally discovered, stands for the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff - that is Admiral Maddison, to issue the action directive. Can the Major General give us a status report and update us on the latest developments?

     Major-General . E.S. Fitch (Project Manager, Land Force Reserve Restructure, Department of National Defence): It would be my pleasure, Mr. Chairman.

    The document you're talking about is the Project Charter, a draft of which was drawn up several months ago. It's gone to staffing in the VCDS's office. As far as the delays are concerned, I would imagine this is less of a priority than other matters handled by this office. However, I can assure you that there have been no undue delays because of the fact the Charter has yet to be approved.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I also read in the Fraser Report that a new policy, needs-based training, seems to have taken hold. I'm curious as to whether this is compatible, not only with the White Paper, but...As I understand - and you can confirm this for me - your goal is for at least 20 per cent of the Land Force to be comprised of reserves. I'd like to know if you see any contradictions between this policy and the need to increase the number of militia officers in the Land Force. Needs-based training implies that in peacetime, the number of reservists is allowed to dwindle, whereas in times of conflict, when forces members are sent into theatres of operation, more reservists would be hired.

    Could you explain this particular policy to me in further detail?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, the whole matter of training for the whole of the Canadian army has been under review for some time. We're in the process of fundamentally transforming how we train both regular and reserve components.

    There are two major dimensions here. One, the tempo of activities we have to undertake, not only for operations but indeed for training, has increasingly put a tremendous strain on our people and the army at large. In simple terms, the training demand exceeds the capacity. Part of the problem here is that we're dealing with an institution that is increasingly complex and we have to find new ways of organizing it and running it on a simpler basis. I cannot allow that training to get out of control. I have to maintain a control whereby we can actually do the necessary training and keep the force coherent.

    We are restructuring the army and restructuring the very way in which we train the army to ensure it remains efficient. As part of that, the same is necessary for the reserves. Indeed, it is even more important with our reservists because they are, by and large, part-time soldiers. There has been a tendency over history, certainly in the last 20 to 30 years, to gradually load more and more on our reserve soldiers in terms of our expectations of them vis-à-vis training, in a sense to try to make them almost regular soldiers, albeit on a part-time basis.

    It's not achievable. We cannot achieve those standards, so we must ensure a much more pragmatic and achievable training regime that will ensure we can maintain essential levels of training amongst our reservists, know where they are. Then when we need to use them, whatever those operations be, we can rapidly bring them to the requisite level of standards and capability for either domestic operations or international operations.

    Indeed, we're doing that. As has been stated, Mr. Chairman, upwards of 20% of our people deployed in real operations are reservists, and they are performing extremely well. By and large, we give them some special preparatory training before they go, in some cases as much as a year, to ensure they meet the necessary standards. That training is being effective and those reservists are being effective.

º  (1605)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General Jeffery.

    Mr. Wood.

    Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General Jeffery, there's something that just bugs me, and I want your opinion on it. Lately, every time I pick up a newspaper, there's a photo of a Canadian soldier involved in an assault against a terrorist in Afghanistan. This photo names the soldier and provides his hometown. In this particular case, it was Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta.

    Putting a soldier and his family in peril for no reason at all by putting his home number or name or where he comes from.... This man is risking his life to fight the al-Qaeda, and somehow the press is putting his name and address on the front page. I guess this is out of the Globe on the weekend. There's a story about what we're doing there, and it names a master corporal from Edmonton, Sergeant So-and-So from Edmonton, another master corporal from Edmonton, a guy from Thunder Bay, somebody from Peterborough, somebody from Duck Lake, Saskatchewan, and Francis McCann of Langley, B.C.

    These terrorists, sir, are a new sort of enemy, as you know, who will stop short of nothing to advance their causes and seek revenge. I can't believe this sort of stuff is going on. To my knowledge, I don't think the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Army does this. I could be wrong, but I don't think they do. I've talked to a retired brigadier general, and he agrees with me.

    We're in a war against terrorists, sir. How safe do you think these families feel? Do we think there are no terrorist cells operating in Canada? Are we that naive? Of course there are people wandering around Canada somewhere who probably have some terrorist ties.

     I want to know why, if everything is so quiet on the JTF-2, there's not a word said of who's involved in any of those things and it's a secret mission, yet we send the Princess Pats and a lot of other people from Edmonton there and we think nothing of giving their name and their home address. These people can be tracked down; their families can be tracked down. In my mind, we have some responsibility to those people, and I don't think we're giving it to them.

º  (1610)  

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, it certainly is an issue that very much resonates with me, as it would with any soldier. I am concerned about the whole issue of operational security and force protection where our soldiers are concerned. Understandably, we do apply a reasonable operational security, particularly in terms of specific operations, to ensure that the particular nature of operations in the short term is kept sufficiently classified and that, where appropriate, our people are protected.

    But as a soldier, I'm paid, as are all the soldiers in the army, to defend freedom, and one of those freedoms is to live in a relatively open society. I think we have to recognize that there's a balance there. If indeed I seriously believed that our soldiers, sailors, and airmen and airwomen, who are actually also serving in this theatre, were under threat by their fellow citizens or people in Canadian society, then I would be the first to be saying we shouldn't be doing that. But I have no evidence that there are real threats to our soldiers. Indeed, I think there is a counterbalancing morale issue here. We have soldiers in combat doing extremely good work, and at this stage, at least, I am not concerned that it is an unnecessary operational risk.

    Mr. Bob Wood: I can't believe that. I can't believe you wouldn't protect your people. This is a war. This is not Bosnia; we're not in a peacekeeping situation, General, we're in a war. People are getting shot; we're shooting people. These people have to be protected.

    The Chair: Mr. Wood, can I ask you to direct your comments through the chair?

    Mr. Bob Wood: Sorry, Mr. Chairman.

    I just can't believe it.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, this country has been at war before. I certainly wasn't in uniform. In fact I wasn't even around during the last big one; many of us perhaps were not. While yes, we were concerned about operational security even in that environment, the fact that we had people off on foreign shores fighting was not any sort of secret; it was well known. There were concerns about operational security, about what was coming back from the theatre, and that's why there was some level of review of mail and the like back in that era, but no one was concerned that would happen here.

    I appreciate we're in a much different age, but from a moral, values point of view, has something really changed that much? I don't think so.

    Mr. Bob Wood: I have one more question on this. This is not a conventional war. This is not a conventional situation. This is a terrorist situation, a totally different situation, and, as I said, these guys stop at nothing to address their causes and seek revenge. We've seen that happen. That's all.

    The Chair: Anything further, Mr. Wood?

    Mr. Bob Wood: Do I have any time? I want to get to the reserves, but this was really bugging me.

    The Chair: You have one minute.

    Mr. Bob Wood: I wrote a couple of things down here. On the phase II reserves, the restructuring, we're going to have to figure out really how to fund this. You said nothing was done on that. It's not funded in the long term. Do you have any idea how much we're going to need, how much we're going to have to come up with, and are you looking for help?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I do have some general idea of how much it costs, and those figures are in the Land Force Reserve restructure strategic plan. I'll ask General Fitch to talk to the issue, but before he does, I'll just make one point.

     These estimates are based on our initial forecasting of how much growth is required. They do not account for major changes in orientation of the reserves. If the government decides it wants the reserves to do specific kinds of things, those would be incremental. These figures actually talk about the growth principally in people.

º  (1615)  

    MGen E.S. Fitch: Thank you, sir.

    Mr. Chair, if the members would like to refer to page 6 of the handout, the two slides on that page show our current staff estimate for the costs of the program. Just to quickly explain the diagram, the big green block represents the $497 million that is our baseline of spending on reserves when reserve strength was around 14,000. That figure was arrived at by normal departmental accounting practices that ascribe costs.

    As you move to the right, you'll see that there's growth in those different categories of capital, ammunition, full-time support, operations and maintenance, and so on. That's tied to the growth in the number of people, which you can see is the output strength at the bottom of the diagram.

    So we entered this program at about 14,500. As you can see, by the end of this fiscal year, indeed by the end of this month, we were to have reached 15,000. That figure has been reached. By next year we are to reach 15,500. That brings us to the end of phase I. Then in phase II, resources permitting, we would continue growth to the planned critical mass of 18,500 by the end of fiscal year 2005-2006.

    Does that answer the question, Mr. Chair?

    The Chair: Very comprehensively, General.

    Mr. Wood is out of time at this point, so I'll go to Mrs. Wayne for seven minutes.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): I'm going to continue along the lines of what Bob was discussing. I know we're all aware that the John Fraser report was brought down in May 2000. It's my understanding that on October 6, 2000, as you have said, Lieutenant General, the Minister of National Defence agreed with the report that we have to bring our reserves to 18,500 by the year 2005-2006. My understanding is that the money you require to be set aside for that increase from 15,500 to 18,500 isn't there now. That is a major concern. With the minister stating he agrees with the report that we must continue in that direction, does National Defence headquarters agree with this, or is it that you need to have more money injected into your budget to allow it to take place?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chair, when the minister's policy statement was delivered, it was made very clear, including by the minister, that he understood that given the strains on the department, the goal for phase II of LLFR to achieve the full 18,500 would require additional resources. There was no indication where those resources would come from, but it is certainly my understanding that they came either from new money that would come to the department--clearly, that's an issue the government has to decide upon--or as a result of reprioritization within the department. There are no other sources of revenue. Either of the two would be the sort of issue that would be addressed in the event of a defence review.

    But as I've declared in front of this committee before, we are already facing significant resource pressures, and, frankly, from the army point of view, I cannot take any more money out of the regular force to put into the reserves. I'm already walking a tightrope.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chair, I had the father of one of our men who is in Afghanistan come to see me this past week. The father was really concerned. He wanted to know if I could explain to him why, when his son was in Bosnia, he received a certain amount of pay. Now that he's in Afghanistan he's receiving less than he received in Bosnia, and he wanted to know why there would be a difference.

    Lieutenant General, I told him I'd get back to him, that I didn't know if there was some sort of policy on this. He said he had just had a little note from his son, and the note had this in it, and he wanted to get an explanation, if he could, as to why this was happening.

º  (1620)  

    The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, further details might be necessary in connection with that particular soldier's issues, but if the general feels he can respond....

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I honestly can't, Mr. Chair. I find it incomprehensible that this would be the case. We do have, as I think the committee is well aware, a very structured set of guidelines in terms of how we remunerate our soldiers, and it's a combination of conditions and risks. I can't think of any place in recent memory that has worse conditions or higher risks than what our troops there are currently facing.

    The Chair: So, Mrs. Wayne, if you would like to provide further details on that, and if you'd like to go through the chair, as a matter of fact, perhaps we could provide an answer to all the members of the committee.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I will, Mr. Chair, as long as I'm assured by the Lieutenant General that he's not going to be penalized. He wrote to his dad and his dad came to me. I don't want to be political with this. This is a question that his parents would like to have an answer to, and rightfully so, but I don't want him to be penalized, that's for certain. Perhaps I can have that assurance.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Perhaps I may address that issue, Mr. Chairman.

    I think it's an unfortunate outcome of rhetoric in the public forum that somehow the leadership of the military is trying to keep its soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen locked up and incommunicado. I think nothing could be further from the truth.

    Secondly, somehow the preservation of information or the chain of command is more important than the care and attention of our people in uniform. That's not my view. It's not the collective army leadership view. We care about our soldiers, and, frankly, it doesn't matter to me at all where that information comes from as long as we look after them properly.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I will say this, Mr. Chair. My staff have been looking into this, and the information they've been receiving basically says this has been taking place, not only with this gentleman but with others.

    So I will get that to you, because I think it's something that needs to be straightened out.

    Also, in the executive summary of the Minister of National Defence's monitoring committee on the “Land Force Reserve Restructure, Progress Report 2000/2001”, there is a statement that suggests, Mr. Chair, that there is still no long-term commitment of resources for the expansion of the reserves. This is why, and you were saying so yourself, we need to have more resources.

    Has the Lieutenant General looked at exactly what the figure is? Has he looked at what increase you need in order to be able to accommodate all of the recommendations in that executive summary?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe, Mr. Chair, General Fitch already addressed that issue in his response in terms of that slide on those figures.

    The Chair: That's on page 6, Mrs. Wayne.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: That is the baseline increase. Whereas we're currently within the department overall spending $497 million in all dimensions on the reserves, in order to grow to the 18,500, that would have to increase to $639 million.

    As I implied, if there are additional issues, major re-equipment, new types of capability that are not factored in here, that would be an additional increase too.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: In a letter to General Fitch from Reserve 2000, it stated that no reorganization should take place until a mobilization plan is prepared.

    General Fitch, what is your view with regard to this statement, sir?

    The Chair: General Fitch, could I ask you to be very brief. Mrs. Wayne is a little over her time at this point.

    MGen E.S. Fitch: Of course, sir.

    The Land Force Reserve restructure strategic plan planned for the restructuring of the land force reserve in two phases. It's written right in the plan that phase I is a period of rebuilding trust, of testing out some ideas on building consensus. That's the phase I we're in now for another year yet, and it is not a time to be making changes in structure, and so on.

     I'm working with the concerned community stakeholders, and I've had many responses. We're building that consensus, and I'm confident that through the defence review process and the consultations we'll be ready, at the start of phase II, with a consensus for what changes should take place.

    So we fully agree. That's the deal; that's the way it's laid out right now.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

º  (1625)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General Fitch.

    Mr. Anders.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'd like to give our witnesses a compliment today on the briefing they've given. On page 7, in your top graphic, you indicate not only land forces, navy, and air force, but satellites. Bravo. I think that's part of the future.

    My question, though, is different. At the Conference of Defence Associations meeting here in Ottawa, Lieutenant General Jeffery, you mentioned we are “deficit financing”. Can you elaborate and inform the committee of what kind of budget problem you are facing this year?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I'd like to make sure the full quote is quoted. I think its context is important. I said that given the resource challenges we face and the tempo of operations and activities we are undergoing, we're living beyond our means. We're deficit financing on the backs of our soldiers.

    I believe that to be true. We're effectively doing more as a force--and I won't restrict that to the army; I think it's true of the other services as well--than we can sustain in the long term. The impact is being felt in many dimensions of the institution, but most importantly on our people. It must be addressed, and I hope it will be addressed as part of a defence review.

    Mr. Rob Anders: How long has the army been deficit financing?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The army identified a significant shortfall in its annual operating budget in 1997. My predecessor at the time identified that, with the help of the department, and quantified that in some considerable detail. A lot of work was done, through the period 1997-2000, to look at options on how to deal with it.

    So it's been since 1997, but in the absence of solutions, the longer you live with that sort of gap, the greater the impact becomes. So we're running toward five years now, in this particular situation.

    Mr. Rob Anders: You also said “We have too much army for the budget”, and that “We can't go on like this much longer”. How much longer can you continue before you're looking at serious cutbacks?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: In a sense, we've been making cutbacks all through that period. To put this in a domestic context, if you and I and our families found we were living beyond our means and outlay was less than income, we'd start to look for places to whittle back. We'd reduce our insurance, get rid of the second car, and so on.

    We've been doing that for five years. So to suggest that those impacts are only now going to be felt, or serious impacts are only now going to be felt, is misleading. They are already there.

    Perhaps the question really implies, how long before things start to seriously break? I can't answer that question, and I don't know if there's any way. I can only tell you the risks are continuing to increase. We manage the mitigation of those risks very well. We ensure that first and foremost we do not put soldiers into operations improperly prepared and unable to do their jobs, or that those resource demands do not put them unnecessarily in harm's way in operations.

     But we certainly take a considerable amount of risk at home in terms of the infrastructure of the military and, increasingly, the quality of life of our soldiers. It is demanded that they go to many, many places, not just on operations but on other training tasks here in Canada as well, and this takes them away from home for long periods of time.

    So those risks are growing. I don't believe we will wake up one day and find the army coming to a halt. I'm not suggesting this for a minute. But you will see, over time, things really starting to break down.

º  (1630)  

    The Chair: Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Anders.

    Monsieur Bachand, you have five minutes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Continuing in the same vein, you're probably going to tell me that my question is budget related, but as you know, I had the privilege of training last summer with the Royal 22nd Regiment in Valcartier. Not only was this an opportunity to see firsthand just how intensive the training is - at times, you wonder if you'll be able to hang in until the end - but it also gave me a chance to chat a great deal with soldiers. Many of these soldiers, who were both regulars and reservists, feel that there is a problem with training. They feel that they should receive training on a more regular basis. I trained with platoons and sections. Apparently, the level of training becomes more intensive when deployment on a mission is imminent. Forces members told me that they felt they should receive training on a much more regular basis.

    Speaking of training, I'd also like to know if reservists receive the same training as regulars. They did at Valcartier because they were all scheduled to be deployed together to Bosnia. As a rule, however, do platoons of reservists and regulars train together? Has the Army given any thought in the past to integrating them to boost their esprit de corps?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, there really are three questions here, and I'm going to try to address two of them. I'll ask General Petras to address the specifics of some of the reserve training.

    One of the challenges we have in terms of maintaining adequate training again goes back to resources and tempo: the money to do the training and the time to get the soldiers out to do it. Over a period of about a decade, we've gotten ourselves into a training regime that is very much focused on the next mission. You're seeing the consequence of that focus.

    Now, I actually addressed this issue in part last time I appeared in front of the committee. I suggested that the lack of a regular collective training regime, while an acceptable risk over much of the last decade, is no longer acceptable. We must, and we will, address this.

    We're in the process of changing the training regime so that all operational units within the army will go through the proper, full combat type of training that the member suggests the soldiers are talking about. This is an important part of the dynamic. With this foundation, soldiers can be prepared for the specific types of missions they need to undergo in minimal time. This is not the current regime; it has to be the regime for the future.

    I'll let General Petras address the issue of reserve training because it's based on a different context, and then I'd like to come back and talk about the two working together.

    Brigadier General Herbert Michael Petras (Director General, Land Reserve, Department of National Defence): Right, thank you, sir.

    Mr. Chairman, the commander pointed out very well that the biggest problem with reserve training is time available. As you stated earlier, when we deploy on operations we certainly do train together, and when we go out the door we're at the same standard.

    As reservists, we have to rely on weekends or vacation time during the training year in which to book training. The typical reservist will train one weekend a month. In the summertime, often brigades will go away on a one- or two-week concentration. Most of the time, unless the regular component is off on an operation, they train with us.

    We do exactly the same type of training in terms of the standard, except that with the reserves, again because of the time constraints, we focus on essential skills.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Finally, in terms of the pooling of resources and working the two together, I think there really are two dimensions to it. The first is that in the restructured managed readiness approach to training, as I refer to it, we will see, as a matter of course, more and more reservists training with regulars in that context. But where it counts most of all perhaps is in preparation for real operations.

    As I said in my opening remarks, we are already training and committing a significant number of reservists to real operations now. We have approximately 250 for every rotation, and increasingly those will be formed reserve units. By Rotation 11, a year from now, we will have a full reserve infantry company in operations in Bosnia. Those people are being identified now and will train over the next year to reach that standard.

    I think we are already well along the way to ensuring the two components, regulars and reserves, are both training and working together.

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, General, for being here.

    I guess you just answered one of my questions about a full infantry company going in. That's one I had on the list. Are there others on the line that you're looking at? I'll go on with a couple of questions and then maybe you can pick that up after.

    First, if I look at right after the LFRR came out, there was a lot of panic going around in reserve units about re-roling and talking about ending up being postal clerks. I think that's kind of gone by now, but we still see them in the reserve units kind of wondering what they're going to end up doing. There's not a very clear picture there of what their roles are going to be.

    I did spend six years in the reserves. That was back in the sixties, when we were looking at nuclear aftermath and we were training for that and how we were going to handle that. I'm wondering, with the way things have been developing as of late, why the reserves are not looking a lot more at NBC roles.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I'm going to ask General Fitch to respond to this, but I'd like to say two things first.

    In terms of formed reserve capability in parallel with the reserve infantry company, I've asked my commanders to look very carefully at what reserves in their respective areas can do. Where it makes sense to have engineer sections, artillery detachments, armoured reconnaissance sections, and whatever else the reservists can provide, we should do that as well. It's not restricted to infantry; it's whatever capability we can achieve.

    Indeed, in a sense, I have provided that challenge to the reservists overall. You tell me what you can do as reservists, and I'll do everything I can to make it a reality, but you have to be able to do it first.

    The issue of re-roling--and General Fitch is doing a lot of work here--very much comes down to the issue of the changing world, the changing security environment, and the changing requirements of this profession. Part of that has to be addressed in the context of the defence review. Part of it talks about the evolution of military capability.

    I'm prepared to go into that at some length, Mr. Chairman, if you want. I suspect you do not because I did address it last time, but there are many of them. We don't have all those answers. I think in this new age we're going to see reservists able to do more and more of those new kinds of roles, but there's not one big blueprint that suddenly I'm going to drop on the reserves. We're going to develop that over time, and it's the work General Fitch is doing that will lead us there.

    MGen E.S. Fitch: Thank you, sir.

    There are three activities that have been going on for some time now, to respond to that. The first is that mobilization planning to include stage three of mobilization has been ongoing since about a year ago. It's a separate staff group from the one I'm in, but we expect them to deliver product at the end of this month. Early indications are that most of the units will be required in their current roles.

    Having said that, another activity in my office is understanding the requirement and developing statements of requirement for new capabilities that could be added to the kind of work reservists do.

     All this is being dealt with in a round of consultation that we started last fall and is coming to fruition next month in achieving a consensus for a fresh statement of what the roles, missions, and tasks for the reserve forces are. None of this is cast in concrete. All of these things will be subject to review as our defence policy evolves and changes, as the threat evolves and changes, and as technology evolves and changes.

º  (1640)  

    Mr. David Price: I just want to get a little clearer picture, though. I mentioned NBC because I look at that particular role, and the reserve is our footprint across the country. They're in the local communities. Quite often our reservists, probably 20% to 30% of them, are volunteer firefighters, who have that extra capacity. So why are we not looking closer at this particular role? In the context of today it fits so well.

    MGen E.S. Fitch: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We certainly are looking closer at it. You would be aware that for something like nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological incidents, the first response is the civil authority. It's police, it's fire, it's ambulance. So the municipalities are preparing themselves for that.

    At the national level, there's work going on to build a national capacity, based at Canadian Forces Base Trenton, which is very central across the country. That will be regular force and available 24/7.

    We've only just started talking about a middle capacity that could be embodied in the reserves as a new capability. In principle, locations could be selected across the country where the threat was deemed to be the highest. These people would not have the same extensive training as the full-time group, but they would have some, and some equipment.

    Indeed, in the emerging concept, they may carry a pager like the volunteer firemen that the member mentioned. So when a call came, the first responders would already be on site. The reserves would get the call, would go back to the armory and get their equipment and vehicles, and could then do what they do, and by then, we would expect the national asset to be close on their heels and on the scene. So we are working on this concept for a graduated response that does have a role for reservists across the country.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price. Shall I put you down for another round?

    Mr. David Price: Yes.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Thank you, General.

    Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chair, I would like to know if the Lieutenant General could provide us with a brief overview of the pay rates for class C reservists who remain in service at home in Canada. It is my understanding that their pay is or is in the process of being reduced. Is this accurate, sir?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am not in a position to provide an overview of class C pay rates, but I can certainly provide them to the committee. They are readily available.

    I am going to ask General Petras to talk to the specific issue. One starts to get into a level of technicality here in terms of some of the specific dimensions to it.

    The change, however, that's ongoing here and why there's a change is that, as we use our reservists more and more, we need to make sure that our reservists are treated in a comparable manner to the regular force when they're doing comparable work. The difficulty, of course, is because reservists come with less than full liability--a regular has unlimited liability, a reservist may not--part of the dynamic within the remuneration is unlimited liability or not. What we have been working on is to try to find a new frame that ensures that everyone is treated fairly for what they do and for the liability they hold. That's the objective. The specifics, of course, in terms of getting from here to there, are much more of a challenge.

    BGen Herbert Petras: And it has been an interesting challenge, Mr. Chair. This activity is a DND and CF activity. It isn't just the army, although it does impact on us.

    But if I can use an example, class C was originally intended to pay soldiers who are doing the same jobs as regulars. If they're deployed on operations in a place like Bosnia, for example, they will receive the full pay and allowances that the regulars get.

     What was starting to happen in Ottawa was that a number of regular positions that weren't filled were being backfilled and were being given class C contracts and class C pay. We had a whole bunch of other folks who were working at army headquarters and National Defence headquarters who were on what is called class B pay, which is at 85% of the regular component. So there was a lot of dissatisfaction from people sitting at the table where you may have two reservists in the same office, side by side, and one is making 85% and the other is making the full amount.

    So there is a program or a process in place to take a look at how we can equalize that and make it fair. The commander pointed out very well that where it is at this particular stage now is that it's going to be up to each of the environmental commanders to define what operations mean, but class C pay is going to be paid for people who are on operations.

    So, for example, the navy is outside our purview, but they've made a decision that the reservists who work on the MCDVs, the coastal defence vessels, will get class C pay. The army pays class C for soldiers who are deployed in Bosnia and so on. But, as I say, it's being handled at the CF level, so it's not our decision. The only thing we wanted to accomplish with this thing was to come out with fairness, ultimately.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: On that, why hasn't the special duty pension order been amended for personnel in Afghanistan? Could someone enlighten us on that?

º  (1645)  

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chair, that's not an issue that--

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That you're aware of.

    LGen M.K. Jeffrey: --I or I believe my colleagues are particularly familiar with. But certainly, if you're going to have ADM HR Mil General Couture back here, he could answer it, or we could certainly get an answer for it, but I'm afraid that's out of our depth.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have one last question.

    There was some controversy recently in the United Kingdom when the defence secretary suggested that reservists should play a greater role in homeland defence.

    Do you believe there would be a morale problem if Canadian reserves were assigned only to homeland defence duties and could not participate in combat or peacekeeping operations?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I think there would be, depending on how it's handled. That's one of the reasons I specifically talked about the history throughout the 1950s and 1960s during the period of, what we termed then, national survival, when the reserves were primarily assigned to that role and it took on the rather uncomplimentary term of snakes and ladders, because that's the somewhat derogatory view the reservists-at-large had.

    Having said that, I think we have to recognize that homeland defence, homeland security, and the military role in that is likely to increase, and given the size of our regular force, the reservists are going to take a significant role in that indeed, maybe even a dominant role. That doesn't mean they can't or should not also have a role of preparing for combat operations outside of the country and continue their role of augmenting the regular force. But I think it will mean, potentially, as has already been suggested, other capabilities and other skills that may very well see them have a lead role in this area.

    That's conjecture. It's a personal view on my part, but I think what we want the reserves to do is the kind of issue we have to address in the context of a defence review.

    But to answer the specific question, is it a morale issue or could it be, yes, but any time you require an institution to change, certainly one as conservative and slow to change as the military, you're going to have those problems. And as I said in my closing remarks, we don't have a choice. We have to move this institution forward and reform it, and it's incumbent upon the leadership to provide this positive leadership forward to wherever we have to go.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. Dromisky.

    Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay--Atikokan, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I'm really pleased to hear some of the statements you made, General. In fact, in your last one, about how slowly the military really moves in changing policies and so forth, your statements pertaining to your outlook, and your hopes and your dreams for the reserves and military in the future, are very encouraging.

    I used to be on a subcommittee investigating the relationship between the active and the reserve, and it wasn't a very positive report we made based on that relationship.

    Your comments indicate to me that you are looking at the reserve as being a much more significant partner in this relationship than ever before.

     In your statement you are reassuring us that the reserve community will continue to have a voice, a key role, in the restructuring process. It's a nice statement

    Will we have proof that this is actually happening? Has it really started? Is it one of your objectives for the future? If possible, can you give us some idea of how you're going to carry this out?

    I have other questions for follow-up.

º  (1650)  

    LGen M.K. Jeffrey: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask General Fitch, in a minute, to talk about some of the specific processes, if you will, and consultation that go on in the specific reserve restructure domain.

    I will tell you, following on from the development of the LLFR strategic plan that I did in consultation with senior reservists, both serving and retired, across the nation, we are moving this army to a much more all-inclusive approach.

    When I meet with my commanders, they are regulars and reservists. When I pull the army leadership together, it's regulars and reservists. When we chart the course for the future for the army, not just the army reserves, it's regulars and reservists working together.

    No one should believe that, in some cases, decades of animosity and friction between the two components is going to be done away with overnight. This is something that requires constant care and attention. You should take it as a given that the current senior leadership in the army is committed to this approach. In my view, it's key to achieving the level of integration that ultimately the army needs to achieve between the two components.

    MGen E.S. Fitch: Thank you, sir. The question dealt with change, modernization, and specifically improving relations with the regular force. We've now been, since 1992 in Bosnia, at an operational tempo unseen before since the Korean War. It has had a subtle but very beneficial effect on the army. In most of the operations, reservists have been present in very significant numbers.

    Two things come out of it. First of all, you have a reserve force that has a lot more operational experience amongst it. There are still young new ones, but many have real operational experience. The complementary effect is that the opinion of the reserves among the regular force has been going up steadily. They've been in operations together. The regular force know what the reservists can do. They're now meeting very highly trained and experienced reservists.

    I don't know when you were on that committee. We've been noticing, very distinctly in the last few years, tremendous improvement because of the operational experience that's getting into the reserves.

    It is propelling us forward with Lieutenant General Jeffery's vision of one army. Indeed, in the future vision, we may be able to make less distinction between regular and reserve forces. Even some of the nomenclatures of class A, B, and C pay rates may no longer be applicable. As we look forward to a spectrum of service and employment options, we expect the boundary between the two components will be more permeable.

    Mr. Stan Dromisky: Okay. I'm going to give you a hypothetical situation. It's really not that hypothetical, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: Could you be very brief, Mr. Dromisky?

    Mr. Stan Dromisky: I will be very brief.

    Let's say an officer wishes to lodge a complaint or a concern pertaining to the acquisition of supplies. In his area, he has been assigned 25 new troop carriers. They never get to him, yet they are in his annual budget. It's allocated as an expense toward a group of reservists. The documents will always consistently show the allocation was for him and his group, but the equipment really went someplace else. In other words, the active component took the equipment and are using it.

    In your future plans, is there any avenue available for any officer or member of the militia, whether they be active or reserve, to go through some channels to voice their concerns without the fear of a demotion or a court martial?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: First of all, Mr. Chairman, the issue--the example used, and it's not a unique one--is the perception that no matter what we buy, it's for the regular force. The reserves just get whatever is left over, and even though we may buy stuff for the reserves, it is really going to be taken by the regular force.

    There are some cases, some examples, where one could draw that conclusion. Indeed, the member may very well be referring to a situation in the late 1980s where we purchased a vehicle called the Bison, which was purchased as a reserve trainer. That was purchased in the late 1980s following the 1987 white paper, when the vision for what the army was going to be was much different from what we find today. It was going to be a much bigger army with manyfold more regular, many, manyfold more reservists, major training centres across the nation, and so on.

    Well, much water has gone under the military bridge since then, and as a result of those changes, those maybe somewhat idealistic plans are just not achievable. That equipment has been re-roled and changed and is in a number of other areas.

    That is not to suggest that those reservists do not have such equipment or even other equipment, and as I said in my opening remarks, we have pushed significant amounts of equipment to the reserves. Indeed, one of my concerns is that we have pushed too much to them and that they can't sustain it.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: General, I'm going to have to cut you off right there because Mr. Dromisky is well over his time, and I want to go to Mr. Anders.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, may I answer at least very briefly the last part, because it really gets to a very important issue of trust in this institution?

    I said it already: we don't shoot people for talking. I would invite you, Mr. Chairman, and your committee to go into the army website, the LFRR web page, and go into the chat room. In that chat room you will find reservists and regulars from across this army, every rank in the army, debating the issues of the reserves and where they're going. We don't go out and shoot those people, we encourage them, because this is professional debate, which is good and healthy.

    I really am concerned about this prevailing view that somehow we are still living in the 17th century.

    The Chair: Thank you for that additional information.

    Mr. Anders.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Lieutenant General Jeffery, you commented about the army's personnel crisis, and you noted that the army is short about 1,200 effective soldiers. You said the problem is getting worse, specifically at a meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations here in Ottawa, where you said “we are living on borrowed time” and we are “driving our personnel into the ground” due to continuous rotations overseas. What resources should Parliament be providing that are not being provided now to address this problem?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, the difficulty with those quotations is getting the context around them right, not that they are not accurate; they are.

    First and foremost, the major problem we have in the short term is getting to the required level of trained, effective strength. The immediate personnel problems are recognized and have been recognized by the department for quite some time. Thus, as you're probably well aware and as has been publicly stated, significant growth in recruiting has happened. At least the majority of our major recruiting targets are being achieved. There are some exceptions I could talk to, but the major ones have been achieved.

    The difficulty is that it takes time to get a trained soldier out at the end of that. Depending on what trade classification and rank you're talking about, it can be anything from two to five years to get a trained, effective soldier. As a result of that change, you are going to see at least the maintenance of a deficit or even in this case a growth of that deficit, and by our calculation it will get somewhat worse before it gets better. The statement is an accurate one; we're about 1,200 under strength in terms of trained, effective strength, and that'll go to about 1,700 before the summer.

     Over the next year and a half to two years, that will be resolved, and the current recruiting drive will bring us up, so by 2004 or 2005 at the latest we should be up to full strength, based on what we're required to have right now.

    The other dimension and those other comments are related to my earlier issue of living beyond our means. If you're going to take an institution like this and demand we do all we are required to do with limited respite, then you are deficit financing. You are driving it into the ground. Something will have to be done.

    It's not only a resource issue. Part of it is doing less. We have a gap, and it's really up to others, not us, to decide how to close that gap, but closed it must be.

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Rob Anders: Do you believe the size of the army should be increased?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: At the end of the day, that's a decision the people of the country and the government of the country have to answer.

    Given what we face as a nation, the security risks of the nation, and what the nation clearly seems to want, in terms of what we're demanding of our military, if you want all of that and want to mitigate those risks, you're going to have to do something about increasing size. If you're not prepared to pay that bill and you're prepared to take those risks, what we have now, or even less, may very well be acceptable. But that's not an issue the military alone must decide.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Was the money that was provided in the December budget sufficient?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The short answer is no. The gap still exists. We're living beyond our means.

    Mr. Rob Anders: We'll let that sink in.

    On the militia units, what is the average strength of the 51 infantry battalions?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe I addressed much of that in my preparatory remarks. I'm going to ask General Petras to talk about that, in terms of where we are right now.

    You must bear in mind, as I said in my opening remarks, these are largely training units and are not fully operational, so an infantry battalion, for example, would be required to be able to produce either a company or maybe only a platoon, in operational terms. So the numbers have to be taken in that context.

    BGen Herbert Petras: Just to clarify, you asked about the average strength of our infantry battalions. The 51 battalions we have are really structured in two different ways. The battalions we call single-mission elements are currently maximized out at 155. The two-mission element units that have two companies are at 280. We currently have about 9,200 reservists across the country, spread into those 51 mission elements. So the average strength varies around the country, but if we take 9,200 infanteers and divide them into the 51 battalions, that's approximately what the average is.

    Mr. Rob Anders: What's the smallest number of soldiers we have in a militia infantry battalion today?

    BGen Herbert Petras: It varies across the country, but I estimate that the smallest would be approximately 60 personnel.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Peric.

    Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Lieutenant General, since September 11 a lot of things have changed. Do you think we should change the plan and the whole technique for training our reservists for duties within Canada, or should we just prepare them for God knows where and when and for what abroad?

»  (1705)  

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I take the question in the context of post-September 11 and the perceived increase in risk and security of the nation.

    The first thing I will say is that the kinds of issues we're dealing with here are very much the purview, as General Fitch said earlier, of what we refer to as first responders. In many of these issues in the domestic first line of defence, it's police, firemen, ambulance services, and the like that provide the immediate response in any community. The military, both regular and reserve components, are available, as they always are, to provide additional support if and when the need arises.

    As we look at this issue, the question is whether we need to do more to allow the military to be able to respond more quickly and to better focus them on the kinds of tasks and skills one would require in that environment, and we are clearly looking at those issues now.

    But to have the military, even just the reserve, focused solely on that kind of effort would probably be shortsighted, given not only the size of our military but clearly the need for us to be able to contribute to security on a world scale. In that context, I believe that overall our training should be focused on military operations in a combat sense, with special skills included to meet the domestic requirements where we've identified them.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Do I still have some time, Mr. Chair?

    The Chair: You have two minutes, Mr. Peric.

    Mr. Janko Peric: I agree with my colleague Mr. Wood. I'm not too pleased to see the names of our soldiers in the newspapers at home, especially when we're dealing with international terrorists. I'm talking from my personal point of view, because I have somebody who is out there--I don't know where right now--and I wouldn't appreciate seeing his name in a newspaper. I would feel insecure for myself and my family and especially for him. Would you have it within your power to prevent their names and pictures from appearing in national newspapers? How would you feel if one of your sons, daughters, nephews, or close relatives were involved today in Afghanistan and their photo, name, and address appeared in a newspaper?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I believe I have many sons and daughters in Afghanistan right now. No one should for a minute believe that I take lightly the security and safety of our soldiers in operations. Nothing could be further from the truth. I responded to this question earlier by saying I am very concerned about the operational security and their safety. But at the end of the day, one cannot hide from fear or from the risks around the world.

    I remember a period in the not-too-distant past when we actually had men and women in uniform who were, I have to admit, ashamed to wear their uniform in public. I find that really hard to understand, but that was the reality of it.

     Part of what we do as an institution is provide confidence, not only because of what we do but also because of who we are and our presence on the world stage. I don't think my soldiers for a minute are shy about being on the front page. They're proud of what they do. They're taking more risks on a day-to-day basis than any number of feared terrorists could incur.

    There's a balance to be struck here. It is, at the end of the day, not my decision; the nation must make a decision about what's important and how we preserve the freedom we have. But as far as this citizen is concerned, every time we have men and women in uniform who are afraid to be seen, we have another problem.

»  (1710)  

    The Chair: Thank you General.

    Mr. Janko Peric: Here's my last question.

    The Chair: Actually, you're well over your time, Mr. Peric. I have to go to Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to congratulate my colleagues who are members of the Liberal reserves. I see that they are obliged to come to the rescue of the great Liberal army. Congratulations.

    Getting back to your table on page 6, I have some questions about phases I and II. As I understood it, the objective of phase I, which extends until 2003, was to revitalize the reserves. Phase II, from 2003 to 2006, focuses on the army of the future.

    On looking at the amounts being requested year after year, I calculated the following: in 2002, the government is requesting $13 million more to revitalize the reserves. An additional $16 million is being requested in 2003. Do you think you'll ever initiate phase II? The amount requested seems to grow in leaps and bounds: first $43 million, then $21 million and then $29 million. I have some serious doubts about phase II. I think you can manage to carry out phase I, but once the reserves have been revitalized, I don't think they can be associated with the army of the future. Or, is my assumption incorrect?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: No, Mr. Chairman, there was no mistake. We can achieve phase I. It will be a challenge, but I believe we can do it. We will achieve, barring any unforeseen difficulties, the overall numbers. I believe we are well along the way in terms of restoring the overall bonds of trust and restoring the health.

    As I think I've said to the committee already, we're not going to get any further than this without some changes. If the dollars aren't there, the resources do not exist to achieve anything beyond that. I would be misleading the committee to suggest otherwise.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I'd now like to ask you three quick questions. You probably won't have time to answer them, but I would appreciate your sending me your responses in writing, as these are truly topics of some interest.

    First of all, on the subject of delays, I see that you have a new 10-point plan. Often, we hear reservists complaining that when they go to a recruiting centre, it takes forever for them to get a uniform or to be fully hired. Can you tell me how you plan to address this issue which comes up often?

    The second issue is the rather hefty bonuses that the regular forces have paid out to many of their members. I would imagine that the reserves have trades persons similar to those serving in the regular forces. The fact that someone enlisting in the forces can receive a bonus while a reserve member cannot must cause problems. Could you give me your take on bonuses for reservists?

    Another proposal calls for job protection measures in the event of a crisis. I realize employers are obligated to release reservists when they are called up for duty, but unfortunately, they are under no obligation to take them back. In your opinion, would a legislative provision requiring employers to rehire reservists boost forces recruitment and hiring efforts?

[English]

    The Chair: General, you have a minute and a half.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: There's no way I could possible address the first question on recruiting in the time, Mr. Chairman. This is quite a complex issue and I have to tell you also a very emotive issue within the overall army.

    There is both truth and fiction in the issues. Part of this is management of expectations. Some want to be able to immediately put a uniform on people who walk through the recruiting door. We can't do this. There are many issues we have to look at, liability and risk issues. But we're working very hard to solve the problem.

     As for military bonuses, we don't have control over them even for regular force soldiers in classifications. Treasury Board has approval of them, where the business case warrants it, on a case-by-case basis. I have difficulty understanding where you might get a business case that would allow us to do this in the reserves, although I wouldn't totally dismiss it, but I don't think it's going to happen in the short term.

    As for the issue of employment protection, I think the members are probably well aware of what is in Bill C-42 in this regard. This is as far as we've gone in the short term. But given the potential for using reservists more and more, it does seem logical that the department would probably be looking for additional legislative changes over the long term.

»  (1715)  

    The Chair: Okay, thank you, General.

    We have time for about two minutes of questioning from you, Mr. Price, and then we're going to have to deal with the motions before committee.

    Mr. David Price: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll continue with employment.

    I'll give you an example of a particular case that happened just a couple of weeks ago. A group of reservists went down to Fort Hood. We had trouble with the airbus coming back, so they were back about four days late. This ended up creating problems for them with their employers.

    Now, this is not like a deployment overseas where they're actually taking a long period away. They'd already taken a week of vacation off to do this particular exercise and they were called back. An airbus breaks down. It can happen with any piece of equipment. I find no fault there.

    My problem relates to the situation with the employers. What are we doing to work with these employers to try to solve this problem? These situations leave a rather sour taste in the mouths of employers and reservists then have a hard time getting other time off to do their regular training.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I think this is clearly a reflection of, dare I say, a reality.

    The committee will be aware, I believe, of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council, which does tremendously good work of creating a network of employers. We work very closely with them, not only at this level but across the whole of the armed forces, to try to establish a network of employers who understand how important the job their employees who are reservists are doing for the nation. It tries to generate a level of support and understanding for what male and female reservists in uniform face.

    Even if we had legislative tools to address the sort of problem you've raised, realistically, I'm not sure we'd want to use a hammer such as that every time there was a problem. Doing that becomes self-defeating.

    I don't think I can answer the question any better than this. This is one of those difficult issues for which there is no easy solution. We try to provide, where we can, if not compensation, then at least some mitigating support for these people, but that's about as far as we can go.

    Mr. David Price: I certainly wasn't looking for anything legislative on that, General. I was thinking more of the PR we do with those employers. That's where we have to aim. Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Price.

    Generals, on behalf of the committee, I'd like to thank you for being here today, Major General Fitch, Lieutenant General Jeffery, and Brigadier General Petras. It was very good of you to be here and to answer all of our questions.

    As I mentioned earlier at the start of the meeting, we have some motions we have to deal with in camera. We are going to try to get those done within the next 10 minutes or so.

    Again, on behalf of the committee, I'd like to extend a sincere thank you for your responses here today.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: It's been my pleasure, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    [Editor's Note: Proceedings continue in camera]