:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 110 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.
Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill , an act respecting countering foreign interference.
Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.
Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. Only use a black, approved earpiece. The former, grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you for your consideration.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.
I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.
Regarding specific comments on Bill , as indicated in the memo that was sent out on May 31, I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.
I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first panel today.
We have Mr. Charles Burton, senior fellow, Sinopsis. We also have Mr. Michael Kempa, associate professor of criminology at the University of Ottawa.
Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you for joining us today.
I now invite Mr. Burton to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.
My area of expertise is Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy. I was educated in China, and I've worked in the CSE, in the Canadian diplomatic service and as an academic. I have published several articles and reports on Chinese influence operations in Canada.
I will focus my remarks on part 4 of Bill , the foreign influence transparency and accountability act part, as it impinges on the activities of agents of the Chinese Ministry of State Security targeting politicians, civil servants and others involved with shaping Canada's relations with the People's Republic of China regime.
Justice Hogue's report earlier this month noted that her mandate is to investigate potential foreign interference with “Executive decision-making by Cabinet and its ministers in relation to their departments, including indirect foreign interference with ministerial decisions when such decisions are based on information originating at a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state (or its proxy, agent, etc.).”
I'm not sure why Justice Hogue's mandate is limited to “a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state”. In the previous meeting of this committee, Mr. Genuis raised the possibility of a future Attorney General of Canada being in a conflict of interest because he or she had benefited from foreign interference in his or her riding. My knowledge of China's united front strategy around the world is that there is enhanced Chinese Ministry of State Security early targeting of politicians deemed likely to, in future, assume influential positions such as Attorney General of Canada.
We know from a leaked December 2021 CSIS report how China's Ministry of State Security uses three colour-coded political interference tactics to gain influence over Canadian government officials here in Canada and those travelling to China. Blue refers to sophisticated cyber-attacks on targets' computers, smart phones and hotel rooms for possible blackmail. Gold refers to bribes. Yellow is what CSIS described as “honey pots”. That's how China employs sexual seduction to compromise a target.
Bill and existing legislation should go a long way to addressing this kind of concern, but I would put forward that there are more sophisticated operations by the Chinese regime here in Canada and other countries that are more challenging for us to counter.
For example, former Australian prime minister Bob Hawke recalls in his biography that shortly after he retired from politics, he travelled to Beijing and met with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, who told him, “Mr. Hawke, China never forgets its friends. I want you to know that we regard you as one of our best friends.” In the years that followed, Mr. Hawke took on several directorships and consultancy positions relating to China, which enabled him to achieve considerable financial success.
Here in Canada, we observe former cabinet ministers, former ambassadors to China and people retired from senior roles in our foreign ministry who have assumed lucrative opportunities relating to China after leaving government. Government career options in law firms, businesses and other sectors with associations with business networks identified with the Chinese Communist Party would, clearly, not be open to those identified as unfriendly to China while in a position of public trust, because we know that the Chinese regime keeps extensive files on all of us. They know who their friends are.
A concern is whether Canadian officials, because of the very subtle Chinese influence process of implied future benefits after retirement for Canadian policy-makers, which Bill cannot track, would perhaps not act immediately on intelligence assessments they receive that would call for Canadian government action that goes against Chinese interests in Canada, but leave these for others to respond to, for fear of being identified with actions the Chinese embassy would not feel well disposed towards.
If I could just conclude, I would say from this that just as government officials cannot exploit classified information to serve personal interests after retirement and have to keep the secrets that they derive in the course of their service secret for life, perhaps we need to restrict public servants from receiving benefits from foreign entities for life as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Thank you very much, Chair McKinnon and members, for inviting me.
I would just begin by saying that, overall, the very large bill, which touches on the constellation of laws that govern Canadian national security, is very complex and welcome. The amendments, I understand, are quite urgent. There is a desire, perhaps, to have certain measures in place in time for any election that may come in 2025. Some of the easier reforms certainly could possibly be achieved in that time frame. I'll flag some that are perhaps a little bit more complicated, that raise more concerns and that may render it more difficult to implement some recommendations in time for that potential election.
Reform to the CSIS Act, amendments to other areas of national security legislation, and the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry are obviously the three main dimensions of reform. Most of what I have to say relates to the CSIS Act itself, seeing as that's one of my major areas of expertise, as opposed to the others, although I will raise a couple of issues with regard to the other two categories.
With respect to CSIS Act reform, I would regard it as very appropriate that CSIS now be able to pursue foreign intelligence virtually stored beyond Canada's borders. Having wider ability to secure information from third parties, notably telecommunications companies, through streamlined procedures is very welcome. All of this coming through streamlined applications procedures for less invasive warrants is very welcome. As I read it in the bill, it's probably a good balance for ensuring civil liberties on those sliding scales of pursuing warrants in an expedited fashion.
The key new ability for CSIS to share threat intelligence with other levels of government beyond Ottawa—including indigenous governance bodies, private sector institutions and the university community—is, indeed, extremely urgent. Fortunately, it's very easy to legislate, which means that it could possibly be done in time for CSIS to be able to advise other bodies around any election in 2025. However, it's more difficult to implement in practice once on the ground.
I'd merely flag for you that CSIS and its new partners will have to figure out how best to share this new intelligence and what the thresholds for the sharing of intelligence with a wider variety of partners ought to look like, not only because of CSIS's long-standing culture of being reticent with the sharing of information, but also because of many partners simply not yet being skilled in weighing the value of and so putting into action different types of intelligence.
Perhaps these types of issues could be addressed through regulations developed through Public Safety or Foreign Affairs and with CSIS's oversight body to guide CSIS in the development of those protocols. It's very encouraging, in particular, given that this bill is understandably.... Although large, it does not address some of the broader thematic issues around CSIS's mandate and CSIS's relationship with other agencies, such as the RCMP, whose role in national security is itself evolving and certain to be significantly reformed over the course of the next five years or so.
The automatic requirement for review of the CSIS Act every five years is extremely important and welcome. It leads me to read this bill in terms of whether we are putting in place anything that could frustrate some of the broader reforms that may be coming down the pipe in five years' time. Fortunately, there are not many areas that appear to lay barriers to bigger questions that may come up, but there are a couple of areas where we may not want to tie our hands, which I'll briefly touch on before I close my five minutes.
I would encourage you to read your reforms to the CSIS Act as part of a triptych of legislation—as it was in the 1980s when the CSIS Act, the Emergencies Act, and the RCMP Act were all drafted with reference to one another—such that in this piece of legislation, we have not revisited the question of the mandate of CSIS overall or the connection of the CSIS Act's famous section 2 standards for whether or not CSIS gets involved in anything to the standards for invoking the Emergencies Act itself.
It is probably wise to leave the section 2 standards as they are in this legislation, for the reason that the second set of issues will be certain to come up as we have decisions from the Federal Court of Appeal on what exactly the section 2 standards for the Emergencies Act entail. There will be future lessons that will come from the Hogue commission's review, added to the Rouleau commission's insights into the Emergencies Act, as well as the ongoing work of NSICOP and NSIRA into the future of the RCMP and so forth. Therefore, leaving that open is very wise at this time.
However—
As we get to the CSIS Act review, a key question will be whether or not “threats to the security of Canada” can include economic disruption as a form of violence that could pose a threat to the security of Canada.
Very briefly, there are two areas of concern that may tie our hands into the future. One is creating Criminal Code offences related to interference, any type of offence beyond terrorism committed in service of a foreign entity. You may find hurdles there if you have very minor offences, such as summary offences committed for a foreign entity, that could lead to severe penalties similar to those for major indictable offences.
Finally, on the transparency registry, it seems that the country-agnostic approach might prove difficult, in that you would bring a very wide range of countries to the attention of an agency that potentially could not monitor all of that information. I understand the desire not to create a permanent list of blacklisted countries, but a potential solution there would be to allow for regulations whereby the ministers, in co-operation with CSIS and its oversight body, could produce periodic lists of countries of concern that could change with time.
Thank you.
:
I would say one thing about country-agnostic. I was invited down to the U.S. Congress to talk about Canada-China, and I mentioned the possibility of this legislation. The American congresspeople were not entirely happy about the idea that we were going to be requiring transparency of foreign influence, because they're foreign in Canada too. I was a bit taken aback by that.
I think the real difference in terms of the U.S. FARA is the degree of resources and implementation and effectiveness of the legislation. Australia has been slow to bring people to account. I think they just did the first one. They've had the act since 2019. When the act came into effect, Andrew Robb, the former Australian trade and investment minister, had been responsible for shaping the China-Australia free trade agreement, which we did not regard that highly when we were thinking of doing free trade with China, and negotiated a 99-year lease on the port of Darwin. Andrew Robb, we subsequently found out, had been paid almost $800,000 a year by a Chinese billionaire associated with the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which is the number one agency for the United Front Work Department in China. He resigned from that consultancy just before the legislation came into effect. We saw some other Australians who did so.
We might see a similar impact in Canada of people who decided they'd rather not be associated with potential Chinese association. I think Mr. Robb suggested that it was really the political pressure that caused him to resign. There's no suggestion that he ever did anything that was against the law or anything like that.
I do think it's a question of how enthusiastically we decide to implement this legislation, more than the legislation itself: the extent to which we provide the resources necessary, including to the foreign influence commissioner; the nature of the regulations we decide to put into effect; and I guess whom the government decides to appoint, through an order in council, to that role. Legislation is one thing, but making it work is something else.
:
I've made this recommendation. If you've served in government, you shouldn't be allowed to take money from a foreign power in retirement when you return to the private sector. Many of our people are leaving Foreign Affairs in their fifties. They feel they never got rewarded enough and want to make big money. I'm seeing a number of my friends from my years in diplomatic service who, in fact, have left government and are working for China-related associations.
The issue is this: If, while in a position of public trust, you were identified by the Chinese government as not being friendly to China in some way, you would be toxic to a wide range of Canadian law firms, businesses and boards that would not be able to hire you for fear of alienating the Chinese, who we know do this. We know from , for example, that she's not able to go to normal events in her riding because the Chinese evidently don't like her and don't want her present. From that point of view, we have to accept the reality that it's very hard for people not to be tempted to go easy on China while in public life, because they have half a mind on what they're doing afterwards.
I'm not suggesting that they have this all planned out. I think it could be a somewhat unconscious thing, not shaking the Chinese tree. I don't think we have a situation where, say, the Chinese ambassador goes to the Canadian foreign minister and says, “You know, if you take it easy on the Ministry of State Security agents operating in your country, we'll do good things for you when you leave office.” It doesn't work that way. It's a much more sophisticated process of “We just know this is how it goes.” There are so many examples that seem to me to be awfully coincidental. People who seem to give China an easy time or support Chinese purposes—those who, say, supported the immediate release of Meng Wanzhou—find themselves being very successful in China business after they leave public service, even though they previously had no business experience.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to thank both of you for being here today to help guide us through this study of a very important piece of legislation.
Professor Kempa, I'd like to start with you.
Going to clause 34 of the bill, which is giving the new disclosure rules to CSIS, I can read very clearly that all of the following conditions have to be met before it's disclosed, but I, too, have questions on how the service is going to make decisions. More importantly, what will the receiving entity or person do with that because it's intelligence that is being shared? Then I guess the questions arise of what the person is expected to do. I know there are protections for personal information, but if an organization is told by the service that there's someone in its employ whom they have concerns with, what is it then supposed to do with that?
Is there anything that you could elaborate on to help guide this committee? Does this section need some amending or, as you said, would you like to see some clarification in regulatory-making authority?
:
Sure. I think what I was getting at is that, given that we have a five-year requirement to review this legislation, it enables us to come back to some of the lessons that we will pick up over how well the institutions on the ground, some of which are significantly evolving their mandates, are able to enact or carry out what you have here.
In the 1980s, of course, the Emergencies Act, the RCMP Act and the CSIS Act were all written over a period of a couple of years with reference to one another. Obviously, CSIS was created from taking national security and intelligence issues away from the RCMP.
Given that there's an ongoing debate about the capacity of the RCMP to fulfill its federal policing functions, including investigations in national security, it would be great if CSIS now becomes more effective at sharing information or intelligence with the RCMP, but if they're not in a position to carry that out, it will be very difficult. There's an ongoing debate as to what the future of the RCMP will be. Will they carry on, and to what extent, with contract policing across the country? Will they become two organizations, with one principally focused on federal policing issues? We don't have the answers to that today, nor will we have them in a year.
What we have laid out here, and how the RCMP manages its new responsibilities with CSIS sharing information, could inform what's done with the RCMP Act in five years' time, for example, and the review of the CSIS Act in five years' time, taking into consideration what happens with the RCMP and CBSA, for that matter, and other partners down the line. It's a learning basis here for what ends up working well and poorly for review in five years.
:
There are clearly a lot of institutions that are pretending to be civil institutions but that in fact, as we know from some of the leaked CSIS documents, are under the supervision of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party. We know that some of those leaders, 100- some in number, have been vetted by the Chinese embassy. One can assume that those institutions to some extent have a mandate to serve Chinese purposes. They often have addresses that are the same as the so-called police stations that we are concerned about, where the Chinese government is engaging in activities off-site that probably involve some degree of influence or espionage activities.
I think we need more transparency on that. The commissioner can provide that kind of information so people are aware, when they're dealing with institutions that may have a function which serves the interests of a foreign state in addition to their social function, that these are institutions that sign petitions in newspapers that support the Hong Kong national security law, urge that Meng Wanzhou be released early, or other things that the Chinese government feels are positive and that probably most Canadians would feel are not in the Canadian interest.
That being said, I think people have the right to have a political choice, and if their political choices correspond with the interests of China in Canada, that's well within their rights as Canadian citizens.
What it really comes down to is whether they are receiving funding or support from a foreign power. When you look at things coming up on the Internet for elections, it's perfectly legitimate for governments to put together videos of politicians saying things they wish they hadn't said or doing embarrassing things. However, if those videos are funded and supported by a foreign power, it's a different level of participation in our democratic process.
Maybe I'll have a pseudonym one day as Gregor McAllister, and that would confuse everyone.
Professor Kempa, when I was reading through this bill, everything seemed to flow and make sense in terms of the title of the bill and what it is aiming to do. The one section, though, that seems to stick out to me as being in an odd place to fit it in is the amendments to the Criminal Code. I'm talking specifically about clause 60 and clause 61. There's an update to the “Sabotage” section of the Criminal Code. I note that the government, in drafting this bill, did insert two sections where, for greater certainty, it's not an offence if it's “advocacy, protest or dissent”.
I'm just wondering if, in your review of these amendments to the Criminal Cod, you have any opinions on them. Are you satisfied that they are in good order?
:
Well, I certainly think it's important that citizens of Canada should be serving the purposes of Canada and shouldn't have some remnant loyalties to a nation that they or their ancestors may have come from.
I do think it's incumbent on us to have much more transparency in these matters.
With the Winnipeg lab matter, I suppose the issue was that Professor Qiu was receiving benefits from China through these thousand talents programs and other arrangements with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which she was not open about.
In terms of the issue with Kenny Chiu, for example, I think the main problem was that we couldn't find out where the information on WeChat and other Chinese websites was coming from. Was it domestic political preference, or was it something coming out of Beijing? We couldn't get any transparency on the sources. All of the stuff was under pen names and on websites that we couldn't associate with any existing institution, which of course by itself is suspicious. I do think that we just have to know.
Also, of course, we haven't talked about this, but the point of this legislation is not to prevent people from taking benefits from a foreign state, but for them to be transparent about it. That would be a choice of Canadians. I receive funding from different foreign governments that have engaged my consulting services. I am only too happy, if called upon, to make that publicly known.
:
Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank both of you for your excellent contributions so far.
I'm not usually someone who sits on this committee, and I feel very privileged to be here.
One of the hats I wear is that of chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. I'm often with other NATO parliamentarians around the world. We often talk about foreign interference, cybersecurity and disinformation. One of the things we talk about is whether or not our national security and intelligence units have the ability to be transparent about attacks that might be happening and that they stop. For example, around disinformation, often it's a way of communicating to the broader public that something has taken place and has been stopped.
I want to get your take first, Mr. Kempa, and then Mr. Burton's, if he has something to add, as to whether there is the framework in place that allows CSIS to be able to provide that transparency to Canadians.
:
Thank you, Chair and committee members.
I deeply appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today on the important matter of countering foreign interference. I would like to thank everyone involved for taking this matter seriously and for the detailed process to develop countering measures.
I would like to focus my presentation on part 1 of Bill with reference to the review of the bill by Sarah Teich and Hannah Taylor. While the review finds many of the amendments encouraging, it points to a limitation, which is that Bill does not propose the addition of a definition of “transnational repression” to any pieces of legislation that the bill proposes to amend or enact.
Defining transnational repression is essential to recognize and address the specific tactics used by foreign states to silence dissent among diaspora communities. This repression can take various forms, including harassment, surveillance, threats, coercion and physical violence. Authoritarian states, such as the People's Republic of China, routinely use these tactics to control dissent and opposition beyond their borders.
The PRC's transnational repression is a well-documented phenomenon affecting several groups, including the Tibetan diaspora. The Chinese Communist Party employs various methods to exert control and suppress Tibetan activism and identity worldwide.
I'd like to describe some of the key tactics here.
One is surveillance and intimidation. The CCP gathers personal information on exiled Tibetans through cyber-attacks and spyware and by questioning relatives in Tibet. This information is used to intimidate and coerce Tibetans abroad, often through direct threats or by harming their families back home.
Two is coercion by proxy. The Chinese authorities frequently threaten or harm relatives of exiled Tibetans in Tibet to exert control over the diaspora. This method ensures that exiled activists are silenced or forced to conform to the CCP's demands out of fear for their loved ones.
Three is infiltration and disinformation. The CCP infiltrates the Tibetan diaspora communities and organizations, using spies and co-opted individuals to sow distrust, spread disinformation and undermine solidarity networks. These activities severely disrupt the community's ability to organize and advocate for Tibetan rights.
Four is economic and social coercion. Tibetan exiles often face economic and social pressure from the CCP, including blackmail and efforts to sabotage their livelihoods. Such tactics aim to destabilize the diaspora and reduce its capacity to support the Tibetan cause.
There is a need for a clear definition in Bill . Incorporating a clear definition of transnational repression in Bill would enhance Canada's ability to combat such foreign interference effectively. It would provide a legal basis for identifying and prosecuting transnational repression activities, thereby protecting diaspora communities from foreign state harassment and coercion.
With this, I'd like to offer some recommendations for Bill .
Recommendation one is to define “transnational repression”: Include a comprehensive definition of transnational repression that encompasses all forms of extraterritorial control and coercion used by foreign states against diaspora communities.
Recommendation two is to enhance surveillance and prosecution mechanisms: Strengthen provisions within the CSIS Act and the Criminal Code to allow for robust monitoring and prosecution of transnational repression activities, ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable.
Recommendation three is to support victims and communities: Establish mechanisms, including specialized funds, to support and protect diaspora communities, providing resources and assistance to those affected by transnational repression.
Finally, recommendation four is international co-operation: Foster international collaboration to address transnational repression, working with allies to develop coordinated responses and share best practices.
In conclusion, defining transnational repression in Bill is a crucial step towards effectively countering the PRC's tactics against the Tibetan diaspora and other affected communities. By recognizing and addressing these activities, Canada can better protect the rights and freedoms of all its residents, ensuring a safe and supportive environment for those fleeing authoritarian oppression.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Chair and distinguished members.
I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the critical and pressing issue that we have been advocating on for nearly decades: countering foreign interference. As a fervent advocate for the Uyghur people and against the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing genocide, I can say that foreign interference by the Chinese state has had a marked impact on my personal life here in Canada.
Chinese repressive and innovative efforts to silence dissidents have attempted to shackle my activism and intimidate me into retreating from speaking out about the devastation of my family, friends and community. I have received numerous times threatening phone calls from the state police directly and messages about the most wild things being said about my loved ones. I'm a Canadian, and my rights to exercise free speech and freedom of assembly are attempted to be curtailed by the Chinese government all the time.
Bill is a heartening response by the Canadian government to my community's experience of transnational repression. Bill C-70 is a significant step forward in addressing foreign interference and protecting Canadian citizens from transnational repression. We talk about transnational repression because, on a personal level, we do not experience interference. We experience repression by the hijacking of our family members just for our speaking up in Canada. For that reason, both Tibetans and Uyghurs use the term “transnational repression”.
As a human rights defender, I do believe that the broader application and the coverage of certain acts of transnational repression against human rights activists afforded by the proposed amendments in Bill will allow for greater protection of the full and uninhibited exercise of our democratic rights in Canada. The proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will foster a joint strength among us Canadians to effectively counter threats to the security of Canada and safeguard the diaspora communities in Canada and abroad.
The expansion of information disclosure to anyone, not just a public official, if deemed to be essential in the public interest, will allow for enhanced bureaucratic transparency. Enhancing CSIS's ability to carry out its important functions serves to strengthen Canadians' trust in the agency and its capacity to detect, prevent and respond to threats from foreign agents, including those from China.
Necessarily, Bill 's emphasis on international co-operation underpins a crucial and powerful tactic in countering the global reach of authoritarian regimes such as China.
I applaud the proposed creation of a foreign influence transparency registry, which will enhance the effectiveness of protecting vulnerable diaspora communities, and the proposed appointment of a commissioner of foreign influence transparency; however, I am a little bit concerned about the absence in Bill of proposing the addition of specific foreign interference offences to the Criminal Code, nor does it propose that refugee espionage, online harassment or digital violence be criminalized. Further, given the limited amendments to the Criminal Code, there are deficient means for the victims of foreign interference to seek redress for the impacts of transnational oppression.
It is crucial that the government go beyond interference that activists carry out in relation to certain political and government processes in all aspects of Bill . The Chinese government's reach extends far beyond attempts at directly interfering with Canadian institutions. My experience of transnational oppression is unrelated to political or governmental process, yet it is an assault on my democratic rights, warranting protection as much as upholding the integrity of our democratic process.
Crucially, addressing foreign interference must take a victim-centric approach. Chinese transnational oppression and interference in Canada pose a significant threat to the Uyghur communities and the Canadian values of freedom and democracy. With the introduction of Bill , Canada is making a strong statement against those oppressive tactics. It is imperative that we remain vigilant, stand in solidarity with those affected and take concrete steps to counter these challenges.
Thank you.
:
Good afternoon. My name is Balpreet Singh. I serve as legal counsel for the World Sikh Organization of Canada, which is also known as the WSO.
The first week of June is a particularly sombre time for Sikhs, as we remember the 1984 Sikh genocide and the Indian government's brutal attack on the Darbar Sahib complex and approximately 70 other gurdwaras across Punjab. I mention the horrific acts of June 1984 to remind committee members of the price that Sikh community members have paid due to state-sponsored violence, foreign interference and surveillance, simply for practising our faith.
For the past 40 years, India has consistently sought to intimidate Sikhs in Canada and stifle Sikh advocacy for Khalistan, which is a sovereign state governed according to Sikh principles and values. This interference has included disinformation campaigns, visa denials, intimidation of family members and, as we know now, even assassinations. Discussing or promoting Khalistan is protected under freedom of expression and political discourse. Attempts to draw attention to ongoing Indian interference targeting Sikhs have fallen largely on deaf ears, as India constantly maligns Sikh activism as extremism and worse.
The Sikh community is currently at a pivotal moment in its history. In June 2023, Bhai Hardeep Singh Nijjar was assassinated while leaving the Guru Nanak gurdwara in Surrey, where he served as president. The community, including our own organization, the WSO, recognized that this was an assassination at the hands of the Indian state. This was later substantiated as information emerged of Indian plans to kill Sikh activists here in Canada and across the world.
This weekend, I met with two Sikhs who have been given duties to warn. They have been provided with no details on the source of the threat they face or any resources to protect themselves. In short, they feel that they are on their own and pretty much abandoned.
Foreign interference has had deadly consequences for Sikhs in Canada. We believe more needs to be done to counter foreign interference. In that respect, Bill is a step in the right direction.
I would like to highlight the ability of CSIS to now disclose security information to any person or entity, should CSIS deem it relevant. This will be a positive step. However, we are also concerned about whether foreign consular officials in Canada might also be considered an entity. Also, India regularly supplies false and misleading intelligence about Sikh activists in Canada. There would need to be some sort of controls to ensure that this isn't further disseminated.
We know that the framework for co-operation on countering terrorism and violent extremism between Canada and India is still active. We have grave concerns over intelligence sharing between Canada and India. Vigilance needs to be ensured, so that new powers created by this legislation are used to counter foreign interference and not turned around against communities here. India has falsely claimed that Khalistan activism in Canada is directed by foreign state actors. Could accusations like that trigger the provisions in this bill?
The sabotage provision being added to the Criminal Code makes it an offence to interfere “with access to an essential infrastructure...with the intent to”—and this is in (b)—“endanger the safety or security of the naval, army or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada”. Sikhs have often protested in front of Indian consulates and the embassy here in Ottawa. The Indian embassy staff includes a military, naval and air attaché. Last year, the Indian media falsely reported that the Indian embassy in Ottawa was targeted with “two grenades” by a Sikh protester—a story covered today in the Journal de Montréal. India's NIA, the National Investigation Agency, also filed charges against a Montreal-based Sikh based on these accusations. Could this new Criminal Code provision be used to stifle Sikh protests?
With the short amount of time I have left, I'd like to highlight the reference to international relations between countries in Bill .
We're concerned that this language and provision could go against the overall purpose of the legislation. Judges are given discretion to not release records following a trial if they believe that doing so “would be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security”. Additionally, subsection 82.31(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act gives the minister the ability to intervene if they believe that matters could damage international relations.
The reason foreign interference against Sikhs has gone unchecked for the past 40 years is the desire of successive Canadian governments to increase trade relations with India. This has been at the expense of the Sikh community. A report by Sam Cooper in The Bureau revealed that “CSIS planned a major intervention in 2017” to dismantle “Indian intelligence networks in Vancouver that were monitoring and targeting the Sikh community”. According to this report, this operation was obstructed by the government, citing potential repercussions for Canada-India relations.
Canada needs new tools to counter foreign interference, no doubt. However, our organization and the Sikh community fear that the international relations clause may be used as an excuse to ignore ongoing interference by India against Sikhs in Canada and might even create tools that would persecute Canadian Sikh activists.
That's my time.
I look forward to the questions you might have.
:
Thank you very much, Chair.
It's a real pleasure for me to have these three witnesses before the committee. All three individuals represent groups that I've had a chance to work with for almost the entirety of my time as a member of Parliament.
I want to thank all three of you for the way you diligently inform us as legislators and also for your work on many important issues.
As all of you know, Conservatives have been highlighting the urgent need to pass this legislation. The Liberal government has done everything possible over the last nine years to delay action on foreign interference. We are concerned, given the delays we've seen, that they may want to avoid this legislation being in force in time for the next election, which is why we have been pushing them for timelines to get this done.
This is a question for all three of you. I would ask you to answer it quickly, if possible. I want feedback from each of your on the information-sharing provisions in this legislation.
If CSIS is aware of a threat against an individual, there are obviously many advantages to CSIS being able to make the decision to inform that individual of the threats directly. There's maybe the concern about potentially political decision-making if there's a political check requirement and that leading to an avoidance of information being disseminated.
What do you think about the information-sharing provisions? Are they adequate? Should they be strengthened?
I would ask for a quick response from all three of you, please.
:
In your opening testimony, Balpreet, you spoke about the security sharing that's taking place under this bill. From my review of the bill and the legislation, this bill, as far as I am aware, does not open up new avenues for security information sharing with foreign entities. It's largely for Canadian entities, whether it be government bodies or individual persons within Canada. Any sort of information sharing that's taking place is happening within frameworks that are already established.
You mentioned one of them, which is the co-operation agreement. I think that was established with India as well. As far as I'm aware, this bill does not open up new avenues for that kind of information sharing. Again, we are going to have CSIS appear before us, and the . I'd be happy to raise these concerns with him and with CSIS as well.
As for the information sharing, it's among government bodies. We've heard testimony that CSIS is reticent at times to share information. This bill will allow for more information sharing. Different government agencies may have different pieces of that pie, and only when you put those pieces together do you get the full picture and perhaps reach that bar whereby you can move to the next step.
I do want to say that from what I've heard from testimony and from witnesses and from conversations that I've had, we are generally a net recipient of information. I think that's a good thing in the international framework.
One thing about this legislation is that there's a requirement that Parliament review the CSIS Act every five years in order to ensure that CSIS's mandate and powers are consistent to address the threat landscape that they operate in. Does your organization support this review?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all of the witnesses for joining us today as we take a deep dive into Bill .
I want to start with Mr. Therchin and Mr. Tohti.
I was taking notes when you both made your opening statements, particularly with regard to the need for a definition of “transnational oppression”. I'm trying to figure out, when we come to a stage where we're considering amendments, where to best fit this in. This bill amends a number of different existing statutes and also creates a new one. However, I want to draw your attention to the fact that, in this bill, there are important amendments to the Security of Information Act. There are going to be new clauses to go after intimidation, threats or violence committed on behalf of a foreign entity. There are going to be amendments about committing an indictable offence on behalf of a foreign entity, about omitting the fact that you are working for a foreign entity, or about interfering in the political process on behalf of a foreign entity. A lot of these—in fact, all of them—have quite serious punishments associated with them.
If you want to submit a brief to this committee, that's great. We can get it later on. However, is there anything you want that is missing in those I covered? What are we missing? This seems to cover a lot of what you said in your opening statements. I want to make sure we're getting all of our bases covered.
I'll start with you, sir.
I took note of how you had a slight bit of disappointment that we weren't using the term in the Criminal Code. However, I think, given that the Security of Information Act is being amended in these ways and that there are some significant punishments—some of these are up to life imprisonment—perhaps there's an area of the bill where the committee can look at inserting the definition. We've noted that and I appreciate your testimony.
I wanted to save my last question for the World Sikh Organization.
Mr. Singh, with regard to your comments about amendments to the Criminal Code, you referenced the definition of “sabotage”, which specifically says:
endanger the safety or security of the naval, army or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada
If you read further down the bill, there is a section that says:
For greater certainty, no person commits an offence [if they are] participating in advocacy, protest or dissent but they do not intend to cause any of the harms referred to in [that paragraph].
Are you satisfied with that, or do you think this committee needs to establish guardrails that are better than what's already in the bill?
:
I gave you the example of the Ottawa protest from March 2023. This was, by all accounts, a peaceful protest, but when you have accusations of grenades being thrown, how is that going to affect individuals who want to come and protest?
I mean, is this opening it up to foreign governments basically threatening or throwing the sink at these dissenting communities and hoping something sticks? On the other side, even if you know you're going to be exonerated at the end, it puts you in this long process and you just decide that it's not worth the risk.
This is how I see a lot of things in this entire bill: They're double-edged swords if they're used by foreign governments. For example, the Sikhs are a stateless people. We have networks in countries across the world. Now when India accuses us of Khalistan advocacy, of being directed by foreign entities, is this going to cause us trouble here? I hope not, but what are the safeguards? This is what I'm confused about.
This is intended to stop transnational oppression and foreign interference, but will it be a wet blanket for communities like mine, who are advocating for causes that foreign governments do not like and which they're willing to use all of their resources to stop?
:
Can I speak, Chair? Can you bring the member to order?
The Liberals want to praise the 's public statement in the House even though this Liberal government has done nothing substantively to combat foreign interference.
Following the assassination of Mr. Nijjar, I submitted Order Paper Question No. 2488, regarding information-sharing between Canada and India. The government confirmed in response to that question that the information-sharing agreement signed by the Trudeau government is still operating and information continues to be shared.
I further asked in the same question if any information had been shared with the Government of India regarding Mr. Nijjar specifically, before or after his assassination. I said in the question: “was any information shared at any time between law enforcement or security agencies of Canada and India regarding Hardeep Singh Nijjar?”
The government refused to answer the question. They flat out refused to answer my question about whether intelligence was shared with the Government of India on Mr. Nijjar. One would think that if the answer had been no, they would have just given a no.
Mr. Singh, I want to bring you into this conversation. Do you think it is inconsistent for the and for Mr. Gaheer to make statements in the House on the one hand but refuse to answer questions about whether this Liberal government shared intelligence about Mr. Nijjar?
Yes, as I said, since 1998 I have been living in Canada. I'm totally isolated from my family members. I didn't have any chance to visit my mother and all of my siblings. For them, they didn't have any chance to come to Canada and visit me because the Chinese government has blocked their passport applications. For more than 33 years it is total isolation; I'm alone here in Canada with my own family.
As I said, Chinese repression did not stop within its borders. Wherever we do advocacy work in Canada or some other places, the extended arms of Chinese authorities always hunt us. Just a couple of hours before testifying before the committee on China's genocidal policy, I received a very ugly message about my mother. Then just two weeks before the parliamentary vote on M-62 for resettlement of 10,000 Uyghur refugees, I received a direct call from the Chinese state police. They put my uncle on the other end of the phone and threatened me. They said a number of my family members were already dead and if I continued I would face the consequence. It was that kind of death threat.
Last year again, before I headed to one conference, two cars chased me. It was a warning from Canadian officials at Global Affairs that saved our lives, because we then changed our route. This threat is imminent every day, and this bill in that regard just provides one tool to combat those foreign actors.
I'll ask for an answer from all three of the witnesses. In this bill, the main purpose, of course, is to have transparency and to raise public awareness of just how foreign influence by foreign principals work to influence certain processes here in this country.
One thing other witnesses have noted is that it is country-agnostic because it might also be a good thing for the Canadian public to be aware of how our allies are influencing us, which of course happens. We have close friendships with many countries, but it's no secret, particularly with the United States, that they have sometimes tried to influence how Canada adopts certain policies. That's a historical fact. Other bills have addressed this by drawing up a schedule or list, which would be influenced by reports from CSIS or NSICOP, but still subject to the Governor in Council adding certain countries.
From each of you, what is your preference? Are you happy with this being country-agnostic, or would you like to see that certain countries be more of a focus than others? I would like to hear very quickly from all three of you, please.
:
Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.
That brings this panel to a close. Before we suspend for the next panel, members of the committee, the clerk distributed on Friday, May 31 a project budget for Bill in the amount of $53,250. Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt this budget?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: That is done. Thank you.
Gentlemen, to all of our witnesses, thank you all for being here today. Your interventions have been most helpful.
With that, we will suspend and bring in the next panel. Thank you all.
Thank you to the members of the committee for the opportunity to share my thoughts and recommendations on Bill .
I'll begin by sharing the premises that guided my analysis.
A strong and healthy democracy must be protected by three fundamental concepts: transparency, accountability and independence, free from interference, of dependants.
[English]
The debate over the threat of foreign interference has raged for nearly two years. What has emerged is the extent to which there was dysfunction, scheming and control games in the arena of foreign interference. Yes, we have been targeted by foreign powers, but their work was facilitated by actors in key positions in our government, past and present, who have facilitated and even taken advantage of the situation for their personal and partisan gain. To that effect, I bring your attention to a report that was just released by the parliamentary committee on national security, which again blames severely some elected officials for willingly and consciously collaborating with foreign states, hence the need to recall the three basic concepts for protecting our democratic system: transparency, accountability and independence, free from all interference from people in office.
Bill is an opportunity to correct these errors and manipulations in order to aim for a Kantian ideal of our system.
[Translation]
I have only had 48 hours to prepare my formal presentation, so I will quickly mention a few key points. My concerns are mainly related to the implementation of the proposed reforms.
First, I welcome the proposals to expand communication between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and organizations other than the 's Office.
Having said that, if we're going to talk about a real national security agenda, we must include the provinces and persuade the premiers to appoint national security advisers. They are already targeted by foreign agents and are completely unaware of it.
[English]
I welcome the efforts to clearly define criminal actions taken by agents acting for the benefit of foreign powers. However, I fear the execution of that because, to successfully contain the problem, the RCMP and CSIS will have to collaborate. Unfortunately, history tells us that, since its creation, CSIS, out of concern and due to formal instruction received a right at its outset—and I was there when it took place—not to testify ever in court or to prevent its going to court as much as possible, which has led to intentional obstruction of RCMP investigations. This happened in the files of Air India, Ahmed Ressam, Adil Charkaoui and Jeffrey Deslisle, to name only the few that are known publicly. So it is normal to fear that the system will reproduce the same deficient mechanisms.
In support of that apprehension, the director of CSIS, Monsieur Daniel Vigneault, testified before the commission of inquiry into foreign interference that he had, on two occasions, following a meeting with the , modified the reports to accommodate this last. This clearly demonstrates that our national security does not have the necessary and desired independence.
[Translation]
In that vein, I will remind committee members that prime ministers, from Mr. Mulroney to Mr. Trudeau, have all been briefed on the issue of foreign interference and have all chosen to ignore it for personal or political gain. This systemic problem is not new. Again, this is an issue of intelligence monitoring and accountability.
In the time I have left, I will continue with my analysis of the registry. The main purpose of the registry is to maintain the integrity of the system by keeping everyone transparent and accountable.
[English]
First of all, I note a lack of concordance between part 1 and part 4 of the bill. When we look at the new powers being devolved to CSIS—and even to the RCMP, in a certain perspective—they do not seem to work to maintain the efforts that will possibly be deployed by the new commissioner's office.
Second, the new position of commissioner must be independent and report to the House of Commons, not to the minister. As the Auditor General currently does, they should report directly to the House of Commons. Reporting to the minister will only replicate or perpetuate the existing problem.
Independence of the office of the commissioner must be also financial. The protection of our democracy must be protected from—
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and distinguished committee members, for the opportunity to speak today on this important bill. It's a pleasure to be here.
Indeed, maybe I'll start by saying something that you probably don't all hear very often: Thank you very much. It was a real pleasure to see this bill proceed with the pace and with all of the work you're doing.
We're independent and non-partisan, so when I say this, I genuinely mean it. I know how hard you're working. We're sitting here in the evening, and everyone's working away to get this done, so thank you very much.
It's in that spirit that I plan to make three arguments.
Number one is that activities covered by the proposed foreign influence transparency and accountability act should extend to municipalities, and we need definitional clarity around who is a public office holder.
Number two, the registry and the commissioner should be in place before the next federal election.
Number three, the act should nest within a broader national security strategy.
Now, let me tell you what I mean by those things.
First, we need to extend this to municipalities, and we need definitional clarity. Now, in Canada, the preamble of a bill is an important tool for looking at its statutory interpretation. I don't want to put everyone to sleep by talking about the tools of that interpretation, but let me just say that the preamble provides an introductory statement that sets out the guiding principles, the values and the objectives of the legislation.
The preamble for the Foreign Influence and Transparency Accountability Act says:
Whereas efforts by foreign states or powers and their proxies to influence, in a non-transparent manner, political and governmental processes at all levels of government in Canada have systemic effects throughout the country and endanger democracy, sovereignty and core Canadian values;
I pause there to dwell on “all levels of government”, and just the impact of that.
Now we have to look at how it applies. The application of the act applies to:
(a) federal political or governmental processes;
(b) provincial or territorial political or governmental processes;
And, essentially, it applies to the governmental processes of indigenous groups and governments.
Now you have to look at the definitions. You go through them, and there's a definition of “public office holder”, but it's different in the Security of Information Act.
We're not covering municipalities here, and we have two different definitions in the same bill about what a public office holder is, so we're probably going to want to take a hard look at that.
If you contrast that with the Security of Information Act, what the bill says is that:
Every person commits an indictable offence who, at the direction of...or in association with, a foreign entity...engages in surreptitious or deceptive conduct...with the intent [to influence a political or governmental process, educational governance etc., etc., with a democratic right in Canada.]
It goes on to define a public office holder differently, and so now you have two pieces of legislation wrapped up in the same bill, effectively trying to do the same thing with different definitions of what a public office holder is.
I wonder why you wouldn't have concomitant obligations for registration. It's two sides of the same coin.
In my view, the SOIA provides the legal teeth to prosecute and punish covert foreign operations, while the FITAA—I don't know if that's what we're calling it, but I'll call it the FITAA—complements this by creating a preventive transparency regime aimed at exposing and deterring such activities through mandatory disclosure and public oversight.
It's a dual approach—deterrence and, hopefully, long-term preventative transparency.
Secondly, we must have the registry in place before the next federal election. You have to again go back to the purposes of the act, like we did at the beginning—“in Canada have systemic effects throughout the country and endanger democracy, sovereignty and core Canadian values”. It's not “might” have systemic effects; the bill says “have systemic effects”. It is a statement of fact.
If you were to meet that purpose, how can you not have it in place before the next federal election? It would be a little bit like bringing a birthday cake for a Saturday afternoon party on the following Tuesday. You will have missed it.
I watched the officials testifying. If it's too hard to do it all at once, just go with the federal government, the federal election. Roll it to provinces and municipalities separately and after. However, you have to get the birthday cake to the party.
Thirdly, it should nest within a broader national security architecture. The defence policy update said we're going to do a national security strategy every four years. The defence policy is going to be updated every four years. We have Bill that went through this committee, which I was happy to testify about. We have the CSE Act that's due for an update, a review, in 2022. The CSIS Act is now on a five-year review cycle. Bill , on the Investment Canada Act....
This is all coming together. I think the point here is to look at all of the pieces of legislation and all of the various strategies—critical minerals, intellectual property, innovation, research, economic security. Look at them systematically, because adversarial states are looking at them systematically, believe me, and it requires a strategic approach.
As I said at the beginning of this, I've had the privilege of speaking with some of you before. I know how hard this committee works, and I know that you can do it, but I would just encourage you to think strategically and not just do the whack-a-mole thing on one piece of law.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
:
Mr. Chair, thank you very much for the invitation to appear today to speak to Bill .
I'm with the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, a Canadian coalition of 46 civil society organizations that works to defend civil liberties and human rights in the context of national security and anti-terrorism activities.
Bill has been presented as legislation to address the threat of foreign interference. We recognize the importance of addressing this issue, particularly as we've heard in instances where governments are threatening individuals or their close ones in order to repress their ability to exercise their fundamental rights or engage in democratic processes. However, the changes proposed by this legislation go much further.
If adopted, this bill would have wide-ranging impacts on Canada's national security, intelligence and criminal justice systems. As such, it would also have significant impacts on the lives and fundamental rights of people in Canada. For example, providing CSIS with new forms of warrants, granting it extraterritorial reach for foreign intelligence activities and allowing the service to disclose information to any person or entity in order to build resiliency could lead to increased surveillance, diminished privacy and racial, religious and political profiling.
Powerful new offences for actions taken secretly at the behest of foreign entities, including foreign governments and terrorist organizations, while necessary, are punishable up to life in prison. Those could infringe on freedom of expression and association and raise questions of proportionality in sentencing.
The bill would also transform how federal courts handle sensitive information that can be withheld from appellants or those seeking judicial review undermining due process in courts through the use of secret evidence.
A bill of such breadth requires in-depth study. We're very grateful for the work that committee members are doing and recognize the amount of time and effort being put into these hearings which, as was pointed out, are extending long today and throughout the week.
However, we're still deeply concerned with the hastiness with which this legislation is being considered. Introduced barely a month ago, with a foreign interference inquiry ongoing, it will have gone through committee study within a week. This is even faster than the rushed 2001 study of the first Anti-terrorism Act, which was in committee for a month.
We're grateful for today's invitation; however, we only found out about our appearance on Friday afternoon. Colleagues from other organizations who would have asked to appear or submitted written briefs have said they will be unable to do so on such short timelines, let alone develop specific amendments to suggest for Friday's deadline.
Rushing the parliamentary process, supported by a state of suspicion and ardent calls to protect national security, can lead to serious negative and long-lasting consequences. An expedited study also risks missing ways the bill could be improved to better address issues of foreign interference. We are therefore urging the committee to work with your colleagues in the House of Commons to extend your study of this very consequential bill.
Apart from the process of this study, we have some specific areas of concern.
First, modifications to CSIS's dataset regime are only tangentially related to foreign interference. Many of these changes relate to significant problems that the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency identified in a scathing report on the regime. The necessity and potential consequences of these changes remain unclear and should have been addressed during a statutory review of 2019's National Security Act. We would recommend removing these changes until such a review happens. I'd be happy to speak to this further during the discussion.
We're also concerned around the powers of disclosure in section 19 of the CSIS Act. While we understand the goal of ensuring appropriate information can be shared, journalists and NSIRA have raised serious questions about how CSIS has handled the disclosure of sensitive information in the past. Bill also grants CSIS significant new production order and warrant powers. The changes come after years of the courts admonishing CSIS for misleading them in their warrant applications. Warrant requirements exist to protect our rights. They shouldn't be lessened and especially not while CSIS's problems of breaches of duty of candour to the courts have not been resolved.
Bill also changes the Security of Information Act, including new indictable offences for the carrying out of any indictable offence, including relatively minor transgressions, if done for the benefit of a foreign entity. This, along with other new or modified offences, would be punishable by either life in prison or consecutive sentences that could amount to life in prison, provisions that are normally reserved for the worst forms of crimes and raise concerns of proportionality in sentencing.
Finally, we also have concerns about the new sabotage offences and the proposed foreign influence registry.
I will finish by commenting on changes to the Canada Evidence Act. Our coalition is fundamentally opposed to expanding the use of secret evidence in Canada's courts under the guise of protecting national security, national defence and international affairs. Introducing a standardized system for withholding information from those challenging government decisions that have significant impacts on their lives will normalize this process and is likely to facilitate the spread of the use of secret information further into our justice system.
Thank you. I'm looking forward to the discussion and questions.
Mr. Shull, I'd like to start with you.
I'm glad you brought up the consistency between SOIA and the new . When I questioned Department of Justice officials last week, they said, to paraphrase them, that the definitions used in SOIA are within the context of SOIA, and there's a reason for this difference.
It can be confusing because the definition of "public office holder", specifically in part 4, does reference other acts that are more comprehensive.
I guess you're arguing to this committee that, for harmony's sake, SOIA and this act should have the exact same list.
There are two key areas there. One is about personal information that could be shared with ministerial authorization, and there's information that doesn't contain personal information but can be shared more broadly for building resiliency.
In terms of what the minister can share, including personal information, we're concerned that's being opened up to any person or entity. We have grave concerns about international information-sharing and how that can have effects on the rights of Canadians who are travelling or people abroad. So we think there should be greater safeguards around how even ministerial authorizations can be shared.
It's important to note that under that there's a safeguard that requires that those kinds of disclosures be reported to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and that's a very important safeguard. Unfortunately, under the new provisions for sharing information for resiliency, no such safeguard exists, so we think that maybe one of the things that could be considered is that there be reporting and transparency when CSIS is sharing that information for resiliency. The reason for that is, as I mentioned, that there have been reports, through NSIRA and others, about how the information is used as a follow-through. For example, even when CSIS shares information through its threat-reduction measures, NSIRA found that they don't take responsibility for charter breaches that could arise from how that information is being shared.
We think that having more accountability and transparency, even if it's just with NSIRA, could help to ensure that there's follow-up and some kinds of ways to ensure that it's not being used to violate the charter. Also, it could help to ensure that the veracity and accuracy of that information is being shared, because as we've heard today, sometimes that's at issue, too, in what CSIS is sharing. If it's shared with a university, how would they know whether or not it's accurate or right unless there were some kind of follow-up by another body?
:
I do not want to lack respect, but we do not act on information. We act on intelligence, and we produce intelligence. We do not collect intelligence. Intelligence comes from information plus an analytical process that puts together the intelligence. From the intelligence, we take a course of action. We turn that into actionable intelligence.
The independence we've been talking about currently is necessary because, unfortunately—and I stress not only in the current years but for the last 30 years—we've seen agents of influence being capable and to literally hijack the process and deter taking the right actions by the government or other departments. It doesn't need necessarily an army. It needs just the right person at the right place. It's called a minister, it's called a director general and it's called a deputy minister who will say, “No, that's not really good.”
I reported back in 1998 foreign interference. We had evidence at that period of time. I was ordered to destroy my documents and my information because it would embarrass the government at that point. I was doing my job. They would rather kill the messenger than go after what was a threat to our national security.
That's the problem here. That's why we need to be able to have, just like the Auditor General.... That's the example I prefer to use. The Auditor General sometimes talks about issues that are difficult, that are sensitive and that are embarrassing, but it needs to be said. This is the only way that we'll have a healthy and solid democracy: by having this transparency and this element of accountability that I was mentioning earlier.
Mr. McSorley, when I was reading through this act, of course there's a lot of harmony between the various federal statutes that are being amended for a purpose. However, the one section that does stand out a little bit is the amendments to the Criminal Code, specifically on pages 35 and 36 of the bill. Clauses 60 and 61 amend the Criminal Code's definition of sabotage. In a previous round during this meeting, we heard testimony from the World Sikh Organization that there's a reference here to the safety or security of the naval, army, or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada. That could mean military attachés at an embassy.
They have said that in previous examples, the Indian government has tossed around spurious accusations about protests around their diplomatic missions, etc., and they're worried that this could be used to unfairly target certain groups. I did ask them if they were okay with it, because there is a “for greater certainty” clause here about how this would not apply for anyone who's participating in advocacy, protest or dissent and does not intend to cause any harms.
Do you have any thoughts you want to share with the committee on these specific amendments to the Criminal Code and anything that we might need to look at?
:
Through the Chair, thank you very much for the question.
We have concerns about the amendments to sabotage.... It is good to see there is an exception being considered. We're concerned it may not go far enough. We know that when individuals engage in dissent, there are often accusations that they are going too far. We're worried that the way it's currently framed, especially with questions around what is meant by the intent to cause harm, could cause a chilling effect.
An example is a protest crossing a railway or going on a road that is used by emergency services. The intent is to protest. It may lead to the disruption of those services. The individuals may not intend that harm, but they know it could happen. They know, and everyone knows, an ambulance may want to pass and a train could be passing.
We're concerned about where the line will be drawn in terms of what is considered intent. Obviously, that's well defined by jurisprudence, but we're still concerned that it could lead to a chilling effect and result in individuals not participating in the exercise of their democratic right to protest and freedoms of expression and association.