:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 118 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.
Before we begin, I would ask all in-person participants to read the guidelines written on the updated cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. You will also notice a QR code on the card that links to a short awareness video.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to remind participants of the following points. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. All comments should be addressed through the chair. Members, please raise your hand if you wish to speak, whether participating in person or by Zoom. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can.
I inform you that the position of first vice-chair is vacant. MP Doug Shipley announced his resignation to me on Monday, September 16.
Thank you, Doug, for your service.
I now give the floor to the clerk so he can proceed with the election. Go ahead, Mr. Clerk.
:
All in favour? All opposed?
(Motion agreed to)
The Chair: It seems to be unanimous.
Welcome back. It's good to have you back.
We shall resume here the business of today. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on August 13, the committee is meeting to study the review of the foiled terrorist plot in Toronto and of the security screening process for permanent residence and citizenship applications.
I want to remind members that there is currently a section 517 publication ban in place. A section 517 publication ban prohibits the publication of any information, evidence or representations made at or in anticipation of a bail hearing. Any bail conditions, the reasoning of the bail court and any evidence or materials relied upon at the bail hearing are prohibited from disclosure.
I would now like to welcome the witnesses for the first hour. We have the Honourable Marc Miller, PC, MP, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship.
Welcome.
From the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, we have with us Harpreet S. Kochhar, deputy minister; Pemi Gill, assistant deputy minister; Soyoung Park, assistant deputy minister, asylum and refugee resettlement; and Aiesha Zafar, assistant deputy minister, migration integrity.
I now invite Minister Miller to make an opening statement.
Please go ahead, sir.
Hello, members and everyone.
I want to first congratulate MP Dancho on becoming first vice-chair and the unanimous nomination by this committee. It's probably one of the few times the committee has voted unanimously on something.
Welcome back to the House of Commons. It's nice to see you.
It's nice to see all of you, for that matter.
I in turn want to echo the words of the in commending the work of our security and law enforcement partners in apprehending the individuals in question. They've proven yet again that continued collaboration across law enforcement, security and border agencies is essential to keep people safe.
At the same time, I intimately share your serious concerns about the arrest of the two individuals charged in the terrorism attempt in Toronto, Ahmed Eldidi and Mostafa Eldidi. I'm also concerned about the arrest a few weeks ago of Muhammad Khan, a Pakistani national suspected of plotting an attack in New York.
I will provide as much information as possible, and, echoing the instructions of the chair in the ongoing court case, we must remember not to impair the Crown's ability to prosecute the individuals, the accused, and the right of the accused to a fair trial.
[Translation]
On August 28, we provided this committee with a chronology of events. I have also asked my deputy minister to conduct a thorough review of how these two individuals entered Canada, and we are conducting a review of our internal security screening procedures.
The first step is to gather all the facts. Once these elements are in place, and I will move quickly to make the necessary changes to strengthen the system, if necessary. The internal review will be completed in the coming weeks, and the findings and recommendations will be made public.
Before highlighting my department's role in strengthening security screening procedures in Canada, I would like to give you an overview of how my department works with other agencies to protect the country.
[English]
Canadians deserve answers and transparency. It's precisely what all of us aim to provide today. It's why my department provided a chronology of events to this committee regarding Muhammad Khan, in addition to the chronology of events provided in August.
I do want to be clear. Everyone who wants to come to Canada is screened. IRCC works closely with CBSA, with CSIS and with the RCMP to share information and to identify people who may pose a national security risk.
This monitoring occurs in three stages: before the person arrives to Canada, at the port of entry and once in Canada. You heard that from my colleague a few weeks ago.
My department leads on the first stage in collaboration with CBSA and with CSIS. Every applicant for a temporary or a permanent residency is subject to an initial security assessment. We assess their personal information and their history against a set of risk indicators to determine if they could pose a potential threat.
Based on those risk indicators, we identify applicants who warrant further security screening by CBSA or by CSIS. We also confirm their identity and assess admissibility, verifying biometric data such as fingerprints and biographic information against RCMP databases, as well as immigration data held by international partners. That includes our most important partner, the United States.
[Translation]
Immigration officers systematically assess applications based on the criteria set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. They may deem someone inadmissible on the basis of criminal activity, human rights violations, national security concerns or misrepresentation. Members of a terrorist organization are inadmissible.
Officers with CBSA, the Canada Border Services Agency, conduct another level of screening at entry into Canada. People who misrepresent themselves, use fraudulent documents or are flagged in our system can be refused entry. All adults who claim asylum in Canada undergo extensive security screening by the CBSA and CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Once individuals are admitted to Canada, security and law enforcement partners work together to manage threats within our borders.
[English]
If applicants violate the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, they risk losing their status and facing removal and criminal charges. As minister, I have the authority to revoke someone's Canadian citizenship if they've obtained it by being dishonest, committing fraud or hiding important information.
With regard to Ahmed Eldidi, his initial temporary resident visa application was refused. This was not for security reasons, as no risk indicators were identified during the initial assessment. Rather, he was deemed a potential non-genuine visitor over concerns that he wouldn't leave Canada at the end of his authorized stay. When he applied again, his application was approved after the officer was satisfied that he intended to visit Canada.
Risk indicators that were flagged along his immigration journey, from his asylum claim to his applications for permanent residency and citizenship, were referred to security partners. A favourable recommendation, as you heard a few weeks ago, was returned each time. No issues were found by the officers that made him inadmissible.
[Translation]
I'm taking this situation very seriously. I fully support my department's review and the discussion today. We are committed to taking all necessary steps to keep everyone safe.
The safety of Canadians is the top priority of this government and of all members of cabinet. Together, we will continue to prevent, detect, and disrupt any suspected terrorist threat or activity. We are also committed to continually reviewing and improving our security apparatus.
[English]
Thank you, Chair.
I'm happy to take your questions.
Thank you, Minister, for being here, and thank you for your kind opening words. I appreciate that.
As we know, we have a very serious situation on our hands, Minister. It's the reason you're here. Your government has allowed three alleged terrorists into our country through the immigration streams.
That came ultimately from what we've learned from the RCMP through Globe and Mail reporting. It came within hours of the murdering of an untold number of innocent people—Canadians and Americans—and learning of the latest alleged terrorists who have gained entry into Canada under immigration streams under your watch, sir.
Unfortunately, although it's been several weeks since the first two and a few weeks since the second iteration, we've yet to find out how this happened, and, to my knowledge, you've made no commitments on how you're going to fix it and prevent it from happening again.
What we do know and understand is that your government in the past has directed public servants to fast-track immigration procedures: to cut some corners to bring people in as quickly as possible. Now we have a situation in which we have three alleged terrorists on our hands. It is reasonable to believe that there could be more.
What specific steps have you taken in the past few weeks to ensure no more alleged terrorists can gain entry to Canada through our immigration streams?
:
Thank you for the question, MP Dancho.
As you know, there are a number of elements about this case that I cannot discuss publicly. I would also not assume a number of facts that are not in evidence currently, but again, we take these incidents extremely seriously. I announced in the French portion of my speech that we should come up with a result of our internal investigation within the next two weeks.
Again, that will be made public. I think the discussion here is to see if and when there was any deficiency and, if there was one, whether it is one that is systematic, and then how we remedy that.
What we will disclose to you in the next two weeks, obviously, we can't disclose today. The investigation is not complete, but we've prepared to disclose it in the next two weeks.
:
Thank you. I appreciate that.
With my knowledge of immigration, the procedures are already known. In fact, your department has provided a list of how the procedures are undertaken.
To me, it's very clear that if you can follow the trail over the last number of years, you should be able to determine how it is, for example, that we weren't able to determine that there was a 2015 ISIS video in which one of the alleged terrorists was dismembering a prisoner. Back in 2015, that was circulating on the Internet, yet, three years later, he gained entry to Canada and, in fact, went through six different immigration streams since that time and ultimately gained Canadian citizenship. In that time, there were four red flags flagged for that individual. Three of them were risk indicators. Obviously, none of them were taken seriously, or not to the extent that he was not allowed to continue down the immigration stream.
What I did find interesting, though, Minister, is that in 2018 your government removed the requirement for police background checks—officially called “police clearance certificates”—from the country of origin, from countries like Pakistan. Pakistan ultimately is a bit of a high-risk country, to say the least, and it's puzzling that this was done in 2018. This security check was removed, and now we know that a student visa holder from Pakistan gained entry into Canada.
Have you reinstated this security requirement, for example? That is an easy step that you could have taken by now.
Thank you, Minister, for coming on this important issue.
Before I get to my questions, I just want to say that I am very concerned about the rhetoric we saw from some of my Conservative colleagues in the last meeting that we had on this issue.
This is a very serious issue, and all Canadians want us to get answers on the security processes that are in place for people who are seeking to come to Canada, but as leaders we also have a responsibility to choose our words carefully. While we do our work, we must be careful not to cast aspersions on all immigrants or all Canadians from minority communities. Conservative members even sought to tie these cases to the Syrian refugee program, which they know is false. We must not fuel online hatred, which too often becomes real-world violence.
I came to this country as an immigrant to build a better life for my children. In a few days, it will be 25 years for me here. Because Canada is welcoming and a land of opportunity, so have many other people. Canadians from minority groups are too often the target of racism and discrimination.
I ask that we keep that in mind during this study.
Coming to questions, Minister, can you please outline the specific screening measures currently in place to prevent individuals with extremist ties from entering Canada?
Can you please elaborate on the portion of this security screening that the IRCC is responsible for? What happens if IRCC does identify risk indicators on an application?
:
Thank you for the question.
The security screening process is a trilateral program. IRCC is definitely the first line, where we look at individuals before they enter Canada. We screen 100% of all applicants who come into Canada. We have the risk indicator packages we talked about before. I'm happy to go into further detail on those.
Those risk indicator packages are not just for individuals who may be engaged in terrorism. They refer to all serious inadmissibilities in IRPA. Those would include our security inadmissibilities, such as terrorism and being a danger to the security of Canada, or someone who may have engaged in acts of violence that would threaten Canadians. It also includes espionage and subversion of a government, for instance. Other serious inadmissibilities include human or international rights violations, war crimes, or organized or serious crime. The risk indicators cover all of what we call “serious inadmissibilities”, of which terrorism might be one.
Our officers are trained on these risk indicator packages. If they notice a risk indicator on an application—again, that risk indicator is like a clue for the officer that there might be more investigation that needs to be done—they refer it to CBSA and CSIS for comprehensive security screening.
Once CBSA and CSIS complete their screening, they will provide back to IRCC a recommendation from a security screening perspective. That recommendation could be favourable—which means they have not identified a serious inadmissibility—non-favourable—which means they have—or inconclusive. An “inconclusive” requires the officer to gather more information until they can be satisfied and make a final determination.
Thank you.
Mr. Minister, thank you for being here.
I would like to welcome back our colleague Ms. Dancho.
I missed a few committee meetings on the subject, unfortunately, so I don't know if the topics I want to bring up have already been discussed. Whatever the case may be, it will be the first time they will be addressed in your presence, Mr. Minister.
You said that the purpose of today's discussion was to determine whether there had been any failures in your department throughout the process. If we look at the chronology of events, we see that there were risk indicators at certain times with regard to the father. I think this is the kind of red flag that can be raised in an immigration process. In some cases, no further investigation was conducted, even though a risk indicator had been raised. Earlier, Ms. Zafar said that normally, when there is a risk indicator, a more in-depth investigation is conducted, but that doesn't seem to have been the case a few times in this matter.
When you look at the chronology of events, do you feel that there was a failure in those areas? Should there have been more thorough investigations at certain points in the process? There was more than one risk indicator on more than one occasion. That could have raised red flags.
What is your assessment today, when you look at the chronology of events?
:
That's a very good question.
First, you will hear the findings of our internal review in a few weeks. If there were breaches, you'll know then whether they were systemic in nature and what corrections need to be made, if any.
Second, it's very important to point out that a red flag isn't automatically an indicator of terrorism. It may be something that can be remedied or a question that can be answered. It may not be a risk per se.
What I do know is that, at the time of the decision, the officers hadn't received any information indicating that this person could not be admitted to Canada. Far be it from me to question that conclusion. Obviously, we're here today for a reason. Checks need to be done, and that's why the deputy minister, Harpreet S. Kochhar, is conducting an internal review. We take that very seriously.
:
Mathematically speaking, as you can imagine, the standard is that the vast majority of people who come here do so legitimately, in accordance with the grounds they've submitted to the officers and to our government.
Some practices are increasingly common among asylum seekers, whether they make a claim at the airport or later. These days, people who claim asylum at the airport do so mainly at Montréal-Trudeau International Airport or at Pearson.
That said, these aren't exclusively cases where people come here and immediately claim asylum. One example that's been in the media is when students come here to study for a year and then make a refugee claim. They can do so after a few months of reflection. The timeline is sometimes questionable, especially when the person is well established here and suddenly makes a refugee claim. Despite everything, under the current legal system, these people are entitled to a fair process, and that is what we're doing.
The trend we're seeing these days is that people who are here on a visa, regardless of what kind of visa it is, are claiming asylum from Canada. This is happening more and more. It may be because they are in a precarious situation, because their visa is expiring or for other reasons.
Thank you, Minister, for appearing before our committee today to help us answer some questions on this particular and very serious situation.
This is similar to what was just asked of you with respect to the chronology, and I know you are awaiting an internal investigation, but I'm curious. When you have your conversations with in his role as Minister of Public Safety and you look at these timelines, thank God CSIS, the RCMP and the CBSA acted when they did. The fact that these individuals were apprehended, that they are in custody, I guess to some extent shows that the system worked. When you're having your conversations with Minister LeBlanc, there's also the fact that they got into Canada.
When you're taking the totality of that chronology and the fact that it did end in success, are you satisfied that the system worked? Are you satisfied that this is an overall success? Can you opine for the committee on what your initial findings are between you and the ?
:
Thank you for being here, Minister.
Since our last meeting, another ISIS terrorist was arrested, and a plot was foiled. You alluded to that in your opening commentary about Mr. Khan.
You previously told Canadians that there were criminal background checks for temporary residents. There's actually no requirement for a police certificate. I'm going to go back to that, because you were very unclear.
In 2018, the government removed.... That means it doesn't require the police background checks; those are police clearance certificates from some countries of origin. In the case we're talking about, Pakistan is included in that, and it turns out that the student to whom your incompetent predecessor gave a visa is part of that. You removed the security checks. Your government removed the security checks.
You know that this guy was arrested. You know that a terrorist plot was foiled, with the help of U.S. intelligence. You know that he was off to Brooklyn to kill Jews. Have you reinstated that requirement for security checks that you previously told Canadians was in place?
Minister, thank you for appearing before the committee.
Immigration has certainly been in the news a lot for the past year. I think generally we do have a great immigration system, and tweaks are needed from time to time. You're certainly making those tweaks now, and they're very welcome.
I want to ask about this particular case. I want to make the point that, as an office that deals with a very high level of immigration work, for every one individual who gains temporary access to Canada to visit, there are multiple more who are denied on the merits of the file itself.
However, for cases when there is limited or unreliable data from the country of origin, how does your department handle that?
:
You're right that there are certain places where the information that may be available is less reliable, but our officers need to be satisfied that an individual is not inadmissible to Canada so that they don't pose any threat and they don't have any inadmissibilities.
Working closely with our security partners, such as CBSA and CSIS, as well as through our partnerships with our Five Eyes and other international partners, we're able to collect information that can help strengthen the inadmissibility assessment of any applicant.
If the officer is not satisfied, they can continue to ask for more information. For instance, they may require things such as police certificates, employment history or documents that will allow the officer to be satisfied that the individual does not pose a risk to Canada.
In addition to that, we collect biometrics. Biometrics are an important part of the immigration system, because they're not just for a security screening purpose where we're identifying if there's criminality; they're also to anchor identity. It's the first time we might see an individual, and using those biometrics and sharing those with our partners also helps us understand identity and determine if there's any derogatory information that exists on that individual.
:
I'd be happy to do that.
As my colleague said, there are a number of additional pieces of information that we can request. One thing that wasn't said in her answer in English that I would add is that we can also ask for interviews. If there are risk indicators, we can request police certificates. I didn't want to minimize their importance, but I also didn't want to digress as your Conservative colleagues have done. If additional information is needed, there are a number of ways to proceed.
Biometrics is also a very important component. This is a rather new practice, historically speaking, for screening people who come here to Canada. It's very reliable. It's not perfect, but we verify that data by comparing it with the databases of IRCC and our security partners, whether in Canada or abroad.
That may not be the most reliable interpretation of my colleague's answer, but I did my best.
Mr. Minister, I know you said that your findings would soon be made public and that we'd find out whether there had been any breaches and, if so, what improvements need to be made. I tend to agree with what was said earlier, that if there were three examples, there may be others. It shows that there may indeed be a gap in the system, and that there may be a need to improve the processes, the security screening and the trilateral program that you talked about.
I can't help but notice that there are more and more permanent residents in Canada and immigration applications. The system is overloaded. As my NDP colleague said, we experience it every day at our constituency offices. We are working with citizens who have been waiting years for their cases to be resolved. Because it's an extremely long process, it's difficult to imagine that shortcuts are being taken to get the work done more quickly. There's a tendency to think of it as a complex and rigorous process. However, when we see cases like this one, we think that it may not be so rigorous, ultimately, and that the process may have been carried out too hastily in some cases.
So what's your observation today? Do you intend to improve the safety system?
Fortunately, disaster was averted thanks to CSIS and the police. However, I don't think we should wait for another disaster to improve or tighten up the immigration process, if that's where there was a gap.
I'd like to hear your comments on that.
:
I call the meeting back to order.
Thank you, all. We'll resume the meeting at this point.
I would like to welcome the new officials joining the officials from IRCC at the table.
From the Canada Border Services Agency, we have Ted Gallivan, executive vice-president. From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Vanessa Lloyd, interim director. From the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have Michael Duheme, commissioner.
Welcome, everyone. Thank you for being here.
We'll start straight away with questions. This panel has no opening statements.
We'll go first to Ms. Dancho. Please, go ahead.
:
Thank you. I was just making sure everyone was caught up.
The rationale, Mr. Chair, is the fact that throughout this meeting, in the context of the original motion, the was asked questions about this third alleged terror plot. He answered those questions. There were two rounds by Conservatives. All parties had a chance to ask on that. There were no objections raised by us, although it was outside, technically, the scope of the meeting. However, these are important questions that Canadians want answers to. We have all of the agencies listed in the original motion here now. Had the member not interrupted the meeting, they would have had the opportunity to ask those very questions.
We have absolutely no issue with expanding the scope, but all of those questions can be posed to the individuals who have been listed and to the responsible agencies. Therefore, I would hope that there is support around the table for this amendment to just ensure that the scope is expanded. However, the Conservatives, if they want to just take over the committee, to not allow us to actually conduct our business and ensure that all parties have the opportunity to ask appropriate questions, if they just want to filibuster the rest of the meeting, that's going to be on them, but we are certainly supportive of expanding the scope as we already have in the previous panel.
Thanks, Mr. Chair. I'll ask for a recorded vote on my amendment.
There are a few things. We have had discussions. I'll propose it to our Liberal colleagues shortly.
First of all, I would say that this amendment by Ms. O'Connell does change the scope of the motion that we put forward. My understanding is that it's not admissible, then. If you're changing the scope of the motion with an amendment, it doesn't work. It's just not how this works is my understanding. It just changes it.
I just wanted to point that out. I'm not going to stick to it, but the amendment fundamentally changes what we were asking for. My understanding is that's not appropriate for amendments. I will leave it there, but the next time there is an amendment to a motion, we should just make sure that that is being followed.
We do have an alternative proposal, but I don't believe I can make an amendment to an amendment.
Is that correct?
:
That's right. You are correct. Thank you very much to both of you for confirming that. It's been about a year, so I'm a little rusty.
I would like to propose, I suppose, a subamendment, but first I'll just discuss it, and then I'll move the subamendment.
I recognize that we have had officials' time to come, and we very much appreciate that. Also, the has made quite clear—and alluded to this as well, of course, and it's been public—that there are ongoing investigations in Immigration, CSIS and the RCMP, and CBSA are also involved in that. According to what the minister said today, he made it sound like in quite short order, a number of weeks, I believe was the quote, that would be concluded. He several times alluded to how we may have answers by then. I appreciate that there's an investigation, and Canadians expect that.
To give that a little bit of time, I think what we would propose is—since we've already agreed as a committee to have three additional meetings outside this current one, so three extra was already agreed to—rather than ask for more, we would amend the original motion, or this one, whatever works best, to say that both the and the would come respectively for two hours each, plus officials. That's what would be included in those remaining three meetings. The ministers would each come for two hours themselves, plus officials. That way we can ask them questions in response to the investigation.
It is a bit like we're hitting a wall, and I think the Jewish community and others deserve answers on this. We've been hitting that “it's under investigation” wall. I would like to give the an opportunity to respond once he can tell us more about the findings, and I would like the —I believe he would agree to it—to come back and answer once he has more information as well.
Our proposal is that. I could amend this motion or I could amend the original one, whatever you think would be better.
I know we don't have a lot of time left, but I want to speak to this.
Russia is known to use right-wing commentators in various countries, particularly in the West, to disseminate disinformation as a part of its broader influence operations. These commentators, often with large followings and credibility among the right-wing conservative audience, are used as conduits for spreading pro-Russian narratives or divisive content and applying issues like nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment, skepticism of main street media and distrust of democratic institutions.
Russia seeks to destabilize its adversaries from within and create chaos. This strategy involves seeding disinformation or half-truths that influencers repeat through social media and alt-news platforms. This tactic helps Russia achieve its geopolitical objectives by fostering division and polarization and undermining confidence in the democratic process.
I've had concerns about this issue for quite some time and was quite upset when I saw the charges that were laid by the United States on this.
It's something that I think all of us need to be looking at, and I'm hoping that we can vote to adopt this motion today.
I know we don't have a lot of time left, Chair, so I may finish there so that we can adopt the motion.
I have no problems with the motion.
There are some people I'd like to add. Probably I'd seek a very slight amendment for the list. It would be “includes but is not limited to”.
I would like to see people like Rachel Curran, who is head of public policy at Meta; Steve de Eyre, director of public policy and government affairs for TikTok Canada; and Lindsay Doyle, head of government affairs and policy at YouTube.
These are the platforms that a lot of these people have their content on. We know from previous studies at this committee that a lot of these social media giants are not even addressing their own terms of service, so I'd like to see those folks included.
I'm fine with having them listed here, or, to give everyone a chance to present their own witnesses, maybe we just include language that it “includes” this list “but is not limited to” it. I'm fine either way.