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I call this meeting to order. Welcome to meeting 121 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I remind participants of the following points. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. All comments should be addressed through the chair. Members, please raise your hand if you wish to speak, whether participating in person or on Zoom. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best as we can.
We're undertaking today the study on Russian interference and disinformation campaigns in Canada. I apologize to the committee, because the notice went out this morning. While it is valid according to the rules, it's not best practice. It had been my intention to send it out on Friday, but due to an error on my part it didn't happen, so I apologize.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on September 19, 2024, the committee is starting its study of Russian interference and disinformation campaigns in Canada.
I now welcome our witnesses for the first hour. From the Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance we have Yuriy Novodvorskiy, founder and administrator, and Guillaume Sirois, counsel. From the Ukrainian Canadian Congress we have Alexandra Chyczij, president.
I now invite Mr. Novodvorskiy and Mr. Sirois to make an opening statement of up to five minutes. Please go ahead.
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Thank you for your invitation and for addressing the national security threat posed by Russian propaganda and cognitive warfare.
My name is Yuri Novodvorskiy. I am the director of the Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance. I am accompanied by our counsel, Guillaume Sirois.
The RCDA is a volunteer-led, non-profit organization created in the wake of Russia's criminal invasion of Ukraine. Its core mission is to support the development of the Russian-Canadian community around the ideals of democracy, human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law. Opposing the invasion of Ukraine and Putin's regime is a core focus of our organization, along with supporting political prisoners in Russia.
I have three key points that I would like to focus on today.
First, Russia is actively engaged in cognitive warfare against Canada and its allies.
Second, this cognitive warfare is significantly impacting the stability of civil society and institutions in Canada.
Third, this threat has not been taken seriously for too long, and now we are facing the compounded effects of years of Russian propaganda.
I will conclude my presentation with a series of immediate calls to action for your consideration.
Russia has been conducting propaganda campaigns in Canada that are aimed at sowing social division and eroding trust in our institutions, including the media, for years. The goal of these campaigns is to create a divided and distrustful society that is easier for Russia to manipulate and control. Russia seeks to influence how Canadians think and vote, and ultimately to shape Canada's policies to advance its own strategic interests. These include re-establishing a world order aligned with its authoritarian values, dismantling NATO, lifting sanctions and ending Canada's support for Ukraine. These efforts are targeting the Russian-Canadian community and the greater Canadian population, as evidenced by the Tenet Media operation.
Although Canada has shown more resilience to Russian propaganda than our American neighbours, we are already starting to witness its effects. There is declining support for the war in Ukraine, increasing radicalization and social divisions, and eroding trust in our democratic institutions. These have been strategic objectives for Russia since at least the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These narratives, including the Tenet Media operation and during the last two general elections, have directly targeted the , specifically because of his support for Ukraine and his condemnation of Russia's human rights abuses.
Furthermore, these narratives are notably echoed by certain media outlets and at least one political party in Canada, which received close to a million votes in 2021 and is poised to gain even more in the next election. Even if these fringe elements do not succeed, larger parties may be tempted to court their voters by adopting a less robust stance in support of Ukraine, for instance. As we have seen in the neighbouring United States, it is not a question of whether these narratives become part of the mainstream national discourse, but when. By then, it may be too late.
The Canadian videos from Tenet Media have made headlines, but they represent only the tip of the iceberg of Russian propaganda in Canada. Russia has been waging its cognitive warfare in Canada for close to a decade. A foreign nation should not be permitted to shape Canadians' thoughts and policies, especially when this has been an ongoing issue for so long.
The Tenet Media videos about Canada have been viewed over a half million times. If a foreign power chartered a cargo plane to drop 500,000 propaganda leaflets over Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal, criticizing Canadian policies and the and undermining our society and institutions, what would have been the reaction? The Tenet Media operation is much worse than that.
Our institutions are not equipped to respond to or even detect these threats from Russia. We have learned of the Tenet Media operation from a United States indictment, and our government does not want to tell us anything more than what is already public. Without our American allies, this propaganda campaign might never have been detected. Except for public condemnations, our government has seemingly done nothing in retaliation. Vladimir Putin is not deterred by public statements.
As a result, the RCDA has the following calls to action for your consideration.
First, we must address this issue as the national threat it poses. This is not mere disinformation or propaganda. It is cognitive warfare targeting all Canadians, particularly the Russian-Canadian community.
Second, there should be one agency or institution that is clearly responsible and accountable for defending and responding to this threat, coordinating with the other actors involved, such as other democratic nations, CSIS, CSE, Global Affairs Canada, political parties and civil society.
Third, we need to ask the foreign interference commission to examine and assess the events related to Tenet Media. The RCDA already made that request weeks ago, but we are still waiting for a response and no witnesses related to the Tenet Media events are slated to testify before the commission.
Finally, social media platforms provide the infrastructure that has made much of this cognitive warfare possible. As such, they should be held to a higher standard of reporting and managing foreign interference.
In conclusion, we must recognize the severity of this threat and take immediate action to counteract Russia's cognitive warfare strategies. Our national security, societal cohesion and democratic values depend on it.
Thank you.
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Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members, for the opportunity to speak to you this morning.
The Ukrainian-Canadian community has been the target of Soviet and now Russian disinformation for many decades. What many Canadians have difficulty understanding is that this is not a case of homeland against diaspora. Our Ukrainian government is not targeting us. It's a foreign government, the Russian government, that has made us the object of its disinformation.
As my friends have alluded to, CSIS has identified Russia as a foreign actor and player in disinformation. To quote from their report, “Russia also continues to attempt to discredit Canada’s Ukrainian community, falsely claiming that it is composed of neo-fascists who control Canada’s foreign policy.” There's more that they say, but I'm sure you've read the report.
When our intelligence service comes to these conclusions, why is Canada still a safe haven for Russian operatives? One of the reasons is that some Canadian politicians, foreign policy advisers and staff in Global Affairs hold a naive view of Russia and the threat it poses to Canada and our democratic institutions.
For over a decade, our community advocated for the ban on RT, Russian television. That didn't happen until a full year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. RT was finally sanctioned by Canada—along with other Russian institutions, such as Putin's think tank, the Valdai club—but no action has been taken by the government with regard to those in Canada who collaborate with these institutions. Many Canadian contributors to RT are allowed to operate with impunity. Indeed, some of them are invited to appear before Canadian parliamentary committees. Others are given grants from Canadian taxpayer money to produce Russian propaganda films.
We also know that Canada is a preferred destination for Russian sleeper agents. There doesn't appear to be any detection or prevention of foreign espionage in Canada. They come here because we make it easy for them to establish their identities, all the while carrying on their spycraft. They then move to other allied countries, posing as citizens of a reliable allied partner: They're now Canadians.
You know the story of the Vavilov family and of course Mikhail Mikushin, who was recently exchanged in the Evan Gershkovich exchange. He was a colonel in Russian military intelligence, a valued asset of Putin's.
Russia co-opts authoritative, influential and persuasive individuals, such as academics, journalists and social media influencers, whom Stalin called “useful idiots”, to repeat and amplify its narratives. When these narratives are word for word what the Russian embassy and Putin are saying, why does no one ask why?
We know that we're here to discuss the RT-run Tenet or Doppelganger operation, involving a Canadian company owned by two Canadians using Canadian social influencers. They produce Canadian-themed videos on hot-button divisive issues. Once they have the ear of a frightened and disaffected audience, they blame the economy and everything else that is wrong in the world on Canadian support for Ukraine—who are all Nazis, by the way. The government has failed to do anything. This creates a culture of impunity that normalizes this behaviour of referring to Ukrainians as Nazis. This has also posed a threat to our community, unfortunately. We surveyed our community and saw a substantial increase in the number of anti-Ukrainian hate-motivated incidents. We have asked two successive ministers of public safety to speak out and condemn this behaviour, but they remain silent.
We know that for decades the Soviet Union engaged in “active measures”, or operations to discredit our post World War II diaspora, who were very critical of the Soviet regime. We posed a threat to them. One of these operations, unfortunately, was the Deschênes commission. Evidence in Operation Payback shows a campaign to inflame the Canadian public by falsely claiming that the infamous Dr. Mengele was hiding in Canada. This campaign was started by a Canadian representative of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, Sol Littman, who deliberately planted false stories. Once the Canadian public was sufficiently inflamed, the Mulroney government convened a commission of inquiry that cleared all but 29 individuals.
However, today we hear repeated calls for the disclosure of the names of these people, over 800 of them, who have several generations of descendants.
I'm glad to see my Conservative colleagues take this study so seriously, and I sincerely hope that there isn't an attempt to shut it down or limit it, as our first witnesses have already highlighted pretty significant areas of concern. I think it's imperative that this committee do this work. I'd be quite disappointed after that line of questioning to see any sort of limitations of looking into this study coming from Conservatives, or any attempts to not continue with this study when this is our first day. I guess we'll see. I guess we'll see if there's action behind the words we just heard.
Moving to my questions, I found—and this is going to be directed at both organizations—that as a local MP I could honestly feel a shift and a difference in the narrative around the public perception of the invasion of Ukraine. For example, I remember in the early days attending vigils in my community in Uxbridge, which has a large Ukrainian population, and how quickly on social media that support for Ukraine started to erode. Even in our first debates on the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, it was pretty uneventful. There seemed to be all-party support. Then you started to see things shift.
A large part of that was changes in the narrative online, on social media accounts. When this came forward with regard to influencers being potentially and allegedly paid by Russia to look like and mimic Canadian organizations or Canadian social media pages, you started to put two and two together. I could very clearly see that shift, as just a local MP, with Ukrainians in my riding as one example, but overall I was hearing people start to defend Russia, or seeing Russian flags on the Hill and protests against anything really....
My first question is—and I'd like both of your perspectives on this—do you believe that for those with influencer accounts that were being funded, or allegedly being funded, by Russia, they really didn't know who was paying, or is there a world in which people wouldn't know that Russia is sending propaganda?
On the comment about if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, if you're repeating Russian propaganda and then claim you had no idea you were being paid by, or repeating, Russian propaganda.... Have you seen other examples of this claim, where they had no idea who was footing the bill? Maybe I'll start here, if you don't mind.
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Even though, right now, these are still allegations, even a cursory search would show that these perspectives are coming from the Russian government. Many times, if not word for word, they're idea for idea. The idea is coming from the Kremlin and propagated in Russian government propaganda channels.
To address something said earlier, I agree with Ms. Chyczij. RCDA is dissatisfied with the Canadian government's response to the disinformation that we have seen permeating Canadian social media, but also in regard to enforcement of the measures that have been enacted, including sanctions.
We have questions as to how these sanctions are enforced, why violations of sanctions seem to be.... These investigations seem to be coming from the United States, not from within Canada.
Even if a lot of the disinformation seems to be happening in the United States, due to the interconnectedness of the Canadian-American ecosystems, narratives that originate there permeate, eventually ending up in Canada and affecting the national discourse here.
I would like to thank the witnesses for being with us today.
As the testimony shows, the issue of interference, including Russian interference, is an important and troubling one.
I don't know if you are aware of other states that engage in interference in Canada. In your opinion, is there a significant difference between the types of interference and is there a way of distinguishing them?
In fact, in this case, we know that it is coming from Russia. Is there a difference between Russian interference and, for example, Chinese or Indian interference, or interference by other states? In your opinion, is there anything specific that would allow us to recognize the types of interference?
Mr. Novodvorskiy, do you have any comments on that?
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today. It's greatly appreciated.
Look, no one around this table is a stranger to misinformation and disinformation. I wish I could show you what comes into my email inbox on a daily basis. Honestly, I think that if you look at a number of conspiracy theories...there are multiple Venn diagrams that could be constructed out of what we're talking about here today.
From my perspective, this is partially a frustrating thing. This committee and the topic of foreign interference have been pretty top of mind for the last couple of years. In fact, this committee conducted a study in 2022. The report was tabled in the House of Commons in March 2023. It was looking at Canada's security posture vis-à-vis Russia. We were looking at all kinds of areas of Russian involvement in cybersecurity espionage and in misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and we made a series of recommendations in that report. That's about a year and a half ago now.
Maybe I'll turn to the Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance with this question, because in your opening statement you wanted us to address this as a “national security threat”. You wanted to see one institution responsible. We made a recommendation to the government about examining the full extent of Russian disinformation targeting Canada: the actors, the methods, the messages and the platforms involved.
In response, the government said that in budget 2022 they had committed to providing $13.4 million over five years to renew and expand the G7 rapid response mechanism. I'm just wondering if you can comment on that, because if we've made a recommendation and they've provided a response, I'd like to have your feedback on how well that's working, so that maybe we can update our recommendation in this report.
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I agree with my friend.
As to the narrow point of RRM Canada, they are active and they are trying to identify these threats, but Lauren Chen, who helped set up Tenet Media, was actually very active during the 2021 general election in amplifying content related to the People's Party of Canada and discrediting the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party.
She hosted a debate with Maxime Bernier and one PPC candidate, which received 16,000 views, right on September 10 of that election year. That wasn't detected by RRM Canada, and the Tenet Media operation was not detected by RRM Canada, so even though they are trying, for some reason they are not able to detect these threats, from what we've seen.
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Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. This has been very interesting. I appreciated Ms. Alexandra Chyczij's reference to Finland. Recently, with my other hat—being in the Canadian military—I had the pleasure of meeting with a colonel from Finland and talking about the military and cyber-preparedness that that country has as opposed to our country. I was very impressed by that.
However, getting back to this, actually at this committee back in June 2022, we had former minister at committee. He was the minister of emergency preparedness at the time, but during the 2021 election he was the minister for public safety. At that time, I was very concerned, and I remain concerned about foreign interference in our elections. I asked him point blank, as the record shows, “Has your government identified disinformation in the 2021 federal election as being from foreign sources?”
His words were, “I can advise you—I checked in anticipation of your question—that I have not received any information that Russia was involved in any effort at foreign interference in the last federal election.”
Now, I said:
I understand that, but if Russia sees that one country can influence our elections, they might be emboldened to try to do that themselves.
Has your government identified any foreign interference in the 2021federal election?
He replied that his agencies were very alert and that they had not identified any foreign interference.
We now know that not to be the case. There was foreign interference in our election. Was it surprising to you that back as early as 2022, we had ministers in this government who said there was no foreign interference happening in our country? Is that surprising to you at all?
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Well, I don't want to reveal my age, but I remember going to school in the eighties. The academics who taught history, whether it was Russian, eastern European or whatever, were all schooled in the Soviet school of academia. They all spent their summers in Moscow being wined and dined by the KGB, and they would come back and repeat, really, Soviet lines of thinking.
There is concern in the academic world that Slavic and eastern European studies have been colonized by the Russians, so we need to start with our educational institutions, start decolonizing them and focusing not on the Russian imperialist view of the world but on the other countries neighbouring Russia, namely Ukraine.
We have politicians, staff and advisers at Global Affairs who take a very benign view of Russia. When the full-scale invasion started, many of them were sitting there and saying, “Oh my God, the lion ate my face. What happened here?”
It's a question of restaffing with individuals who understand what Russia is today. The Helsinki Commission is recommending to the U.S. government and to other governments that they need a reset, and I'm not talking about the Obama reset. We need a complete rethinking of our approach to Russia and to identify it as a global security threat.
At this committee we have often had the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service before us as witnesses to update the committee on their activities. Of course, a lot of what they do by its very nature goes unreported. They have to operate in a very clandestine world. They have to be very mindful that their sources could be compromised and their lives even put in danger if they reveal too much information.
However, in the spring session, there was a rare moment of unity when the entire House of Commons came together in very short order to pass Bill , which among other things pretty much brought an analog law up to date in a digital world. It has allowed CSIS to be a bit more proactive in how it shares information with other entities. Certainly I've had meetings with CSIS officials since that act received royal assent. The service is still coming to terms with how it's going to implement some measures, but it certainly is being a bit more proactive.
When it comes to the work that our security and intelligence agencies are doing—and this includes the officials at Public Safety Canada—and you compare it to some of the European examples, are there any wishes that you have for how maybe those agencies could be a little more proactive with the Canadian public in a non-political way in underlining the gravity of the threat and the measures that need to be taken to counteract it? Could they maybe be a bit more proactive when we actually have some success in stopping some of these campaigns?
Maybe I'll start with you, and we can ask everyone to comment on it quickly.
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I call this meeting back to order.
For this panel, as an individual, we have Marcus Kolga, senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and from the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Aaron Shull, managing director and general counsel.
Both of our witnesses are appearing by video conference.
Before we start with witness statements, I want to remind people that we had asked that anyone who has recommendations and suggestions for the auto study report get them in, hopefully by today. Sooner is better, because the analysts need to work them into the report. Could we do that?
I would also ask the clerk to remind people to get witnesses for this study in by Friday, if at all possible, so that we can organize that as well.
We will go now to Mr. Kolga for a statement of up to five minutes.
Please go ahead, sir.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for the privilege and opportunity to testify before you today. I want to begin by expressing my gratitude for your recognition of the serious threat that Russian information and influence operations pose to our democracy and society.
For the past 15 years I've dedicated myself to monitoring and exposing Russian information warfare and influence campaigns targeting Canada and our allies. This is not a partisan issue. Safeguarding Canada's cognitive sovereignty and the integrity of our information environment is essential to defending our democracy and maintaining social cohesion.
The September 4, 2024 indictment from the U.S. Department of Justice highlights the extent of this threat, but it is just the tip of a much larger iceberg. For over a decade, Canadians have collaborated with Russian state media outlets like RT and Sputnik news, and with platforms like Montreal's Global Research, which the U.S. state department has identified as a key pillar of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. They also enable and collaborate in Russian transnational repression, targeting Canadian activists like me, communities and even parliamentarians.
Furthermore, Canadians continue to engage with sanctioned Kremlin-aligned think tanks such as the Valdai club and the Russian International Affairs Council, which played pivotal roles in the laundering of disinformation and in efforts to affect policy and opinions in Canada through the influencers connected to them. These Kremlin-controlled entities, including RT, are not merely propaganda tools. They are designed to weaponize information in order to manipulate our understanding of the world around us, undermine our democracy and erode our social fabric. They are not bound by any physical borders, either.
An FBI affidavit released alongside the DOJ indictment of September 4 provides detailed minutes of high-level Russian meetings and strategy documents. One of Vladimir Putin's closest advisers, Sergey Kiriyenko, was involved in these meetings, underscoring the personal importance of these operations to Putin. Among the documents in the affidavit are instructions to Russian propaganda agents to monitor western information environments for domestic conflicts, friction points and crises, and to artificially create and intensify tensions in countries allied with the United States. The documents instruct agents to create false narratives and lies. They are delivered through western influencers and state media platforms like RT to achieve this. Global Affairs Canada has now identified RT as an arm of Russia's intelligence apparatus engaging in psychological operations and disinformation, while its cyber-actors target western nations, including Canadian critical infrastructure.
The U.S. indictment exposes the significant involvement of Canadians in RT's activities. It alleges that a company established by two Canadians received $10 million from RT to create a platform for transmitting these narratives to Canadian and American audiences. While this may seem like a large sum, it is only a fraction of the $3 billion that Russia spends annually on information operations globally. The indictment claims that Canadians were producing content for RT as early as March 2021 and that RT funnelled money to these individuals through U.K. shell companies as recently as this year. RT was added to Canada's sanctions list in July 2022, which raises serious questions about potential violations of Canadian sanctions laws. This committee should inquire as to whether the RCMP is investigating these Canadians and others collaborating with Kremlin-controlled entities.
Both the DOJ indictment and the FBI affidavit are smoking guns. They provide clear evidence of Russian operations targeting Canada, a threat that has persisted for nearly 90 years. Perhaps the most alarming case of Russian intelligence operations in Canada, and one that's been largely ignored, is of GRU Colonel Mikhail Mikushin. For over a decade, Mikushin attended Carleton University and the University of Calgary. He even wrote an article for the Canadian Naval Review journal and volunteered on a Canadian political campaign. Shockingly, it wasn't CSIS, CSE or the RCMP that uncovered Mikushin's identity as a GRU colonel recently. It was Norwegian intelligence. That's Norway, not Canada. The service Mikushin provided to Russia's intelligence operations was so important to Vladimir Putin that he was included in the August prisoner swap, returning to Russia alongside Putin's other GRU assassins and hackers.
It's unlikely that Mikushin was the only Russian intelligence agent working in Canada, nor are the Canadians behind Tenet Media the only Canadians collaborating with RT and other Kremlin media. If we seek to disrupt, stop and deter such operations, we must hold those behind them and their Canadian collaborators to account by investigating and exposing them, enforcing our existing laws, properly implementing new ones like the foreign influence transparency registry and Bill, and simply ending our willful ignorance to this threat.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, members of the committee. It's a pleasure to be with you again.
I think I would start by just noting what we all know, that Russian disinformation campaigns pose a grave threat to our democracy, but they also follow what we refer to as a calculated disinformation kill chain. It begins by pinpointing societal vulnerabilities and then crafting deceptive content to exploit these weak points. Through amplification by bots and fake accounts, these false narratives gain undue prominence and are further spread by unwitting influencers. By manipulating the public's reaction, these actors sow discord and confusion, achieving their goal of undermining our democratic processes.
Now, in response, Canada has implemented a number of measures. One of them is the rapid response mechanism, which monitors and addresses foreign information manipulation. We also have the digital citizenship contribution program through Heritage, which supports these efforts by promoting digital literacy and raising public awareness.
Looking ahead, we must, however, do more to strengthen our defences. First, by expanding our sanctions regime in coordination with our allies, we can impose tangible consequences on those perpetuating disinformation. Second, by utilizing the Communications Security Establishment's offensive cyber-capabilities, we can disrupt disinformation networks at their source, following the successful model that the NSA, in the United States, used in advance of the last election. Finally, we must implement a national digital resilience strategy that engages all levels of society.
This strategy would involve collaboration with provincial and territorial governments to embed digital literacy in school curricula, ensuring that students from an early age are equipped with the critical thinking skills needed to navigate the digital world. Additionally, agile adult education programs, led by educational institutions and supported by community organizations, would provide vulnerable populations and the wider public with the tools to recognize and counter disinformation.
Public awareness campaigns coordinated through community hubs like libraries and local cultural institutions would reinforce these efforts by ensuring that digital literacy becomes a national priority.
Let me pause there for a moment: Digital literacy must become a national priority. By fostering collaboration between government, civil society and educational institutions, we can create a unified and resilient front against foreign information manipulation and interference by helping Canadians critically assess the information they encounter and reducing the societal impact of disinformation.
Recent intelligence assessments, including CSIS's report entitled “Moscow's War in the Ukraine: Implications for Russian FI Activities in Canada”, highlight the ongoing risk we face. While Canada differs from other Western nations in its level of exposure to Russian foreign influence activities, these operations do persist and target specific groups, including the Russian diaspora in Canada, to promote disinformation about the conflict in the Ukraine.
According to CSIS, Russia is using pro-Russian proxies and witting or unwitting influencers to amplify narratives aimed at discrediting Canada's policies on the Ukraine and smearing the Ukrainian diaspora. These attempts are particularly concerning given the size of the Russian-speaking population in Canada and the Kremlin's focus on exploiting divisions within Canadian society. Furthermore, the CSIS report stresses that while Russian foreign influence activities have declined in some areas due to its loss of reputation in Western countries, we cannot afford to underestimate the continuing threat. Russian state-linked actors remain committed to using disinformation to undermine social cohesion and trust in Canadian institutions and to counter Canada's strong stance on Ukraine.
Our understanding of this threat continues to evolve, and there has been important recent research that highlights valuable insights. The report, entitled “Canadian Vulnerability to Russian Narratives About Ukraine”, authored by my co-panellist, Marcus Kolga, who is testifying, reveals that a significant portion of Canadians, indeed, 71%, have been exposed to at least one Kremlin narrative. Many believe these narratives or are unsure of their falsehood. This highlights the urgent need for comprehensive media literacy programs and increased public awareness to counter the spread of Russian disinformation in Canada.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and I will look forward to questions.
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Indeed, Russian transnational repression is a persistent and growing threat to our democracy. Transnational repression itself is when a foreign regime uses coercion, threats, intimidation and violence to discredit and silence regime critics, including activists, minority communities and even parliamentarians. This is happening in Canada. In the worst cases, the Kremlin has tried to poison its critics, like the Skripals in the United Kingdom, or use brutal violence, like in the case of Alexei Navalny's colleague, Leonid Volkov, in Lithuania.
In Canada, we've observed Russian government surveillance of diaspora groups, campaigns to discredit parliamentarians and efforts to incite hate towards the Ukrainian diaspora. I've personally been targeted multiple times by the Kremlin and their proxies and influencers in Canada to intimidate and discredit me. Russian state media regularly publishes articles about me. Former Canadian diplomats, academics and officials connected to Kremlin think tanks like the Valdai club, Russian companies and a trade promotion agency have tried to discredit and defame me through poison pen campaigns. I was among the first Canadians placed on the Kremlin's sanctions list.
In 2019 I received a series of emails threatening to kill me and my family, originating from Internet IP addresses in Canada and in Moscow. When I looked to help from the RCMP, they told me to report it to my local law enforcement agencies. They, in turn, told me to report it back to the RCMP, who then told me to report it to CSIS. CSIS, as we all know, is a black hole that focuses primarily on the collection of information. Luckily for me, an officer in York Region picked up my file a few months later and opened an investigation. They found one culprit, a radicalized Russian nationalist living between Thornhill and Florida. Thankfully, York Regional Police provided me and my family with victim training and a phone number to call in case of a future emergency.
I should also mention that for the Ukrainian community, Russia's incitement of hate has manifested in violence towards Ukrainian community members, including vandalized businesses, homes and even vehicles. Students have been intimidated, and the Ukrainian Canadian Congress has even been forced to create a national crisis hotline to support victims.
We've also witnessed parliamentarians targeted with transnational repression. In 2018, the , and her family were the targets of just such a campaign, where historical facts were distorted and manipulated to defame her and her entire family and, in fact, the entire Ukrainian community. A story was first planted into a Moscow blog that was run by an alleged former KGB agent. It then spread from there into the constellation of Kremlin-aligned online proxy platforms. That story eventually metastasized into our national media, which willingly ran this very well-orchestrated Russian information operation against her. This is not unlike the Chinese state's Global Times campaign against former Conservative Party leader Erin O'Toole in 2021, which, coincidentally, was first exposed by my organization, DisinfoWatch.
The campaign against Ms. Freeland also demonstrates that Russia is playing the long game, operating between elections to impact election outcomes, not just during elections—an important fact that has been clearly missed by the commission looking into foreign interference in our elections. In terms of national security, this is a significant threat, as we currently leave the door wide open for Russia, China and Iran to target and attack our citizens and residents. We need to be doing much more in terms of protecting these vulnerable communities.
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I think the basic answer is no.
The content of that film and the nature of it have been widely discussed in the media over the past couple of weeks. One point that I think hasn't been made clearly enough is that the vetting process for granting money for these sorts of projects, even for film festivals that decide to screen films like this, is clearly not rigorous enough. We are ignoring the threat of Russian information operations, the way they try to manipulate us and how they do it.
With regard to this film, it would have taken some simple vetting to look at the filmmaker. The fact that the filmmaker made 12 films for RT over the past decade or less—it was six years, or something like that—should have been a huge red flag. We know, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, that RT is an extension of Russia's intelligence apparatus. Again, it didn't take much. You just have to put the filmmaker's name into Google and you would find this out.
I would conversely say that there are some very good Russian journalists we should be supporting—people like Dmitry Muratov, the editor of Novaya Gazeta, who's in Toronto today to speak at a gala for Journalists for Human Rights. He bravely speaks out against the Kremlin, despite all the threats against him, and he continues to live in Moscow.
There are hundreds of independent Russian journalists living abroad whom we could be supporting, who will speak truth to the war and who have been doing so. They've been forced into exile.
There's a lot more that we could be doing. Again, we have to be very careful about who we're funding in terms of any sort of content that's proposed about Russia.
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Thank you for the question. It's good to see you as well.
This is a very good question. I don't think we're able to necessarily directly measure the impact of these narratives. You are right that Russian state media and its influencers on both the far left and the far right—it's important to note that they're on both sides of the political spectrum—target some of the most polarizing issues in society today. They target both sides of them, and they use influencers, proxy platforms and state media, like RT, to start tearing in both directions in order to pull apart the cohesion of our society.
These documents that I mentioned in this FBI affidavit—and I strongly recommend that every member of this committee look up the affidavit and look into the documents that are included there—clearly outline these objectives, and they're exactly consistent with what I was saying before. What these operators do is they look for those. They monitor our information space. They monitor social media for those specific subjects, and then they develop narratives in the Kremlin and with the organizations that work with them to attack those narratives. They've been effectively doing this.
I would say that in this affidavit I'm mentioning that is connected to the “Doppelganger” affair, one of the primary tactics there was to create fake news outlets. I think the impact of that was probably quite low, and I think we focused far too much on it. What we haven't focused on is the role that the influencers play in these campaigns.
That affidavit says that there were nearly 2,000 influencers in the western world who were used to amplify those narratives. I know that there are Canadian influencers as well, again on the far left and the far right, and we know from the Tenet Media indictment that there are clearly Canadians who are helping with the amplification of those narratives.
That's where the real threat is. We don't know what the impact is, but it is an important part of Russia's disinformation laundromat to clear out the Russian state fingerprints on them and to have those narratives amplified in our own ecosystem.
The final point I would make is that in a study that we did with Digital Public Square in 2023, we actually found that there were 200,000 accounts on Twitter that were actively promoting these narratives to Canadian audiences, and over 90% of them were far left and far right accounts, so in terms of impact, we do have that number.
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I completely agree that an agency, a unit within government, to support the victims of transnational repression would be extremely helpful.
When these sorts of attacks happen, it is psychologically taxing. It is very difficult to deal with them. Reputations are harmed. There are impacts on family members. At the moment, there is zero support for the victims.
I would also argue that there are hundreds, possibly thousands, of victims of transnational repression in Canada right now. We have seen how the Chinese government has targeted its own diaspora, and how it has targeted Uyghur and Tibetan activists in this country.
The only support they have is when we talk to each other. We have an informal network, and we try to do as much as we can to support each other. The government really does have a role here to support those victims, but also to enforce the laws that we have by implementing Bill , which will provide some degree of protection for the victims of transnational repression.
I would also argue that Canada has a role to play in creating an international network of nations where there are victims who are targets of transnational repression. Canada is not the only country where there are victims. We know that citizens of the U.K. and Sweden, among others, have been targeted. Working together, maybe within the framework of the G7 or NATO, might be helpful in creating that international network and an international front, like a coalition, to push back on transnational repression.
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I have been privileged to be able to work with Russian human rights activists and independent journalists now for the past 20 years or so. Most of those journalists, who were once based in Moscow—whether it was 15 years ago or even two years ago, before the start of the full-scale invasion—have been forced to flee Russia.
These are outlets like Novaya Gazeta, Echo of Moscow, Mediazona, Proekt Media, and TV Rain. There are many of them. They are based in cities like Riga, Vilnius, Warsaw and Berlin. They are operating from those cities, trying as best they can to circumvent Russian state censors and get facts and truth into Russia. Truth and facts are toxic to the Putin regime.
Canada is right now engaging in a fairly significant way in supporting those media outlets by financing some training and supporting the creation of content, but we need to do much more. We need to be working with our allies to ensure that these outlets are sustained. All of their revenue inside Russia has completely dried up. We need to be working with our allies to make sure they're able to sustain their efforts, again, to promote facts and truth inside Russia. It's facts and truth that will eventually lead to a change towards democracy in Russia and a lasting and sustained peace in Europe.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both witnesses for being with our committee today.
Foreign interference has obviously been a hot topic this year. We had the explosive revelations in the NSICOP report, and we also saw the House of Commons come together in a rare show of unanimous support for an important piece of legislation in Bill . We certainly are looking forward to updates on how our intelligence and security agencies are going to make use of that legislation to beef up their capabilities.
I want to go back a bit further, because, of course, Mr. Kolga and Mr. Shull, you were both really good witnesses for our previous study looking into Canada's security posture vis-à-vis Russia. Certainly your testimony back in 2022 aided this committee in making a lot of the recommendations to the government. It's in that context that I would like for both of you to weigh in.
Is there anything else you would like to tell this committee about? If you compare the recommendations we made in that report, which was tabled in the House of Commons in March 2023, and where we are now, is there anything more you would like to see this committee focus on, where some of those recommendations are still a work in progress? Is there anything that we should be highlighting in that context?
Mr. Kolga, I'll start with you and then move to Mr. Shull.
I think that the government has made some progress, even significant progress, in terms of addressing foreign influence operations. I think a shining example of that is the rapid response mechanism at Global Affairs Canada. It started out rather slowly, some six or seven years ago, but has really become quite bold in its efforts to expose foreign information narratives and those tactics to Canadians to build that awareness. That is exactly what is needed. It's that boldness in clearly exposing those narratives and tactics that will help build awareness.
Bill , as you mentioned, is a step in the right direction. We still don't know how that's going to be implemented.
The previous panel mentioned the fact that there have been major changes to the CSIS Act. Allowing CSIS to communicate threats that they are detecting and observing to vulnerable ethnic community groups, for example, is extremely important. It's incredibly important for them to be able to communicate with civil society organizations like DisinfoWatch to let us know what they're seeing, so that we might be able to expose some of those narratives and tactics.
Making sure that the foreign influence transparency registry is properly implemented will be critically important as well, to help protect Canadians against these sorts of operations as well as against transnational repression.
The last thing I will say is that we need to be enforcing our sanctions legislation. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, with the Tenet Media case we know now, thanks to the United States and the Department of Justice, that two Canadians received financing and funds directly from RT—well, through some U.K. shell companies. They received this funding in 2024, according to that indictment.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, RT was placed on our sanctions list in 2022 already. That raises a number of questions in terms of the Special Economic Measures Act, which allows us to place sanctions on these entities. There are questions as to whether that legislation has been violated.
Enforcing our sanctions legislation is the first thing we need to be doing.
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Through you, Mr. Chair, I'd like to thank Mr. MacGregor for his question.
At the risk of sounding like a sycophant, I thought you all did a great job on that report. I particularly liked recommendation five, which was about capital and cost allowances and tax measures for baseline controls on cyber.
I want to throw out a bigger thing that wasn't part of that discussion. This is in terms of what Mr. Kolga talked about when he was targeted. You have a prominent Canadian who's targeted, and no one knows who's on first. We cannot have that. We need to look at how the RCMP functions. While I like the idea of having the commissioner take some responsibility, as currently drafted that is not in their ambit of focus.
This is criminal activity. Let's treat it like that. What would a reimagined RCMP look like were it to follow the FBI, enhancing their national security focus, strengthening their counter-intelligence capabilities and increasing our ability to coordinate and collaborate with allies? To the question “Who's in charge?” when this type of stuff happens, every single person will know what the answer is.
:
That's a great question. We've known since 2012 or so, and even before that, because I think RT was actually established in 2005, that this was going to be a propaganda arm of the Russian government. Anyone appearing, or at least the experts, the academics and the activists who continue to appear on RT today....
In fact, we know that one Canadian activist just last week appeared on an RT talking head show. Whether that individual received compensation for that, we don't know, but the fact is that we have Canadians who know exactly what RT is. They know exactly what its role is in terms of our information space, and they continue to appear on it.
This includes those who were appearing on it before 2022; we know of at least two academics. One Canadian academic was what you might refer to as a “star columnist” for RT up until February 24, 2022, when the full-scale invasion happened. If you go to RT and search up this Canadian academic's name, it will bring up hundreds of columns. This individual was producing content for RT on a weekly basis. They were a Russia expert. They knew exactly what they were doing and who they were speaking to.
I know that the previous panel also mentioned Russian think tanks like the Valdai club. There are several—
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No. We can always be doing more. I think I mentioned in my opening remarks that Russia spends $3 billion annually on these operations.
Now, these operations that they're funding are targeting their own people, but they're also targeting us. The U.S. DOJ indictment clearly indicates that $10 million was spent by the Russian government to try to directly influence our information space. We're not even coming close to matching Russia in terms of the resources we are deploying to push back on these sorts of narratives. As I said earlier, I think there are signs of hope and some bright spots where we are trying to push back, but again, we need to be doing a lot more.
I think the previous panel also mentioned that we should be looking at a whole-of-society approach to this. We should be making sure our media has a firm understanding of these operations and who the influencers are, for example, so that they are not inadvertently calling them to be on talking head shows or political programs.
We need to make sure our—
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It's probably two or three things.
Number one is a lack of political will and leadership. It's hard to do.
The second barrier is section 91 and section 92 of the Constitution Act, which I won't bore people to death with. The point is, once you get into this interjurisdictional ball of yarn, it gets trickier and trickier.
Then add school boards to that, so there are a lot of players that need to be coordinated. That makes it harder, but just because it's hard doesn't necessarily mean we shouldn't do it. It's about equipping our kids with the skills they need: logic, reasoning, comprehension and analytical ability. Those skills will help here, for sure, but they will help in life generally. We should be teaching them that stuff anyway.
Thank you, witnesses, for being here today and for the resilience you've shown, especially Mr. Kolga with all that you've faced.
Obviously, fighting the interference is key to maintaining a nation's sovereignty and democratic values.
Can each of you, relatively quickly, give this committee three points on what and how we could improve the outcome of this study to ensure we're on the right page? We talked about a lot of different things, and there are a lot of different witnesses here today, so some of it is repetitious.
To prioritize three items we could focus on in our study, could each of you give me a very quick synopsis?
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Marcus, why don't I shoot first on this one?
Number one, I talked about a national strategy for digital literacy. This will require political leadership. It is one of the most non-partisan issues I could ever imagine—making sure the next generation is equipped for this. Lean into that, because we have a problem. The digital citizen contribution program I mentioned was good. It's just a dosage problem. It didn't do enough. It didn't go far enough, and it was one government department at one level of government doing interesting things. We need to spread it around and make it a national priority.
Number two—I already tipped my hand on this—is looking at the RCMP and making sure they're equipped for the 21st century and have the tools and capabilities they need—whether or not the institution is fit for purpose, both on counter-intelligence and on combatting state adversaries. What Marcus said shouldn't be allowed to happen. We need to know who's running point in this country. If we can't do that, and if we get to where everyone's pointing at somebody else, we have a serious problem that needs to be remedied.
Number three is this: Do it fast and do it with seriousness and purpose, because this is all going to get way worse. You just need to look at the trend lines on AI. This is set to get supercharged like you wouldn't believe, so my third point is this: See points one and two, and do them with purpose.
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Yes. Listen to what Aaron suggested, and do that. That's the first point.
Second, I'll go back to the influencers. We need to be working with our allies and figuring out a way to expose them. This is the best way to protect us and our democracy against these sorts of operations. Exposing influencers using our existing legislation, and working with journalists and our allies to do that—that's very important.
We need to ban all Russian state media. We took some leadership back in 2022, by banning RT from our satellite and cable systems. We need to follow Europe's example and completely ban RT, Sputnik and all of these Russian state media outlets from the Internet and our airwaves.
I would also say media literacy—following Finland's example, working with the provinces to make sure our school curriculum in all provinces, from kindergarten to grade 12, includes digital media literacy. This doesn't mean just one course or one hour per year. This means baking it into every single course so that our children, our future generations, become resilient against these sorts of information operations and disinformation.
As Aaron said, this is only going to get supercharged. We've seen Russia already use AI to start producing content. They are producing content at a rapid rate in various different languages across Africa and South America. They are winning the disinformation game in those territories, thanks to AI. We need to be prepared for that.
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I'll say quickly that it's a triple bottom line.
Number one, CSIS's data provisions have been cleaned up a little, so they're going to be better as a consequence.
Number two, they're going to be able to share information with people who have been targeted by this type of activity, in a manner that they would have been unable to do.
Number three, should someone fall within the parameters of the agent registry, they can basically get nicked for that. In some ways, it's like Al Capone, right? They didn't get Al Capone on murder. They got him on money laundering. Failing to register, in and of itself, is now a crime.
I'll be brief.
Mr. Kolga, Mr. Shull, you are basically saying the same thing. You conclude that we have to work with our allies, determine who they are and support genuine journalists. We need to ban fake media, if I can put it that way, or influencers, from social networks. There are a lot of suggestions like that.
I think it is important to provide training in schools. However, we have a problem here because training and education are a provincial responsibility, not a federal one. That's a hurdle to be overcome. There would be administrative hoops to jump through, but nothing insurmountable.
Something has been bothering me for a while. I would like to put a question to Mr. Shull, who works as general counsel.
How can we do all of this effectively while protecting freedom of expression, which is an important pillar of our society? In my opinion, there's a problem there, or at least a hurdle.
Maybe we'll start with Mr. Kolga and then go to Mr. Shull.